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* Rename mac*devfsdirent*() to mac*devfs*() to synchronize with SEDarwin,rwatson2007-04-231-4/+4
| | | | | | | | where similar data structures exist to support devfs and the MAC Framework, but are named differently. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
* Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventionsrwatson2007-04-231-141/+138
| | | | | | for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* In the MAC Framework implementation, file systems have two per-mountpointrwatson2007-04-221-7/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | labels: the mount label (label of the mountpoint) and the fs label (label of the file system). In practice, policies appear to only ever use one, and the distinction is not helpful. Combine mnt_mntlabel and mnt_fslabel into a single mnt_label, and eliminate extra machinery required to maintain the additional label. Update policies to reflect removal of extra entry points and label. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
* Remove MAC Framework access control check entry points made redundant withrwatson2007-04-221-32/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege checking/granting. These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and provided no additional security context: - mac_check_sysarch_ioperm() - mac_check_kld_unload() - mac_check_settime() - mac_check_system_nfsd() Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which, for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes considered unprivileged by those two policies. These mostly, but not entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration systemrwatson2007-04-211-4/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
* Continue 7-CURRENT MAC Framework rearrangement and cleanup:rwatson2007-02-061-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now describes only the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel representation of MAC labels. Remove mac.h includes from policies and MAC framework components that do not use userspace MAC API definitions. Add _KERNEL inclusion checks to mac_internal.h and mac_policy.h, as these are kernel-only include files Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Teach the stub policy about some of the more recent entry points that havecsjp2007-01-011-0/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | been introduced to the MAC framework: mpo_associate_nfsd_label mpo_create_mbuf_from_firewall mpo_check_system_nfsd mpo_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade mpo_check_vnode_mprotect mpo_init_syncache_label mpo_destroy_syncache_label mpo_init_syncache_from_inpcb mpo_create_mbuf_from_syncache MFC after: 2 weeks [1] [1] The syncache related entry points will NOT be MFCed as the changes in the syncache subsystem are not present in RELENG_6 yet.
* Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MACrwatson2006-12-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h, completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include files from src/sys/sys. Update the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules. Delete the old mac_policy.h. Third party policy modules will need similar updating. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Merge posix4/* into normal kernel hierarchy.trhodes2006-11-111-2/+1
| | | | | Reviewed by: glanced at by jhb Approved by: silence on -arch@ and -standards@
* Add stub entry point implementations of mpo_priv_check and mpo_priv_grant torwatson2006-11-061-0/+16
| | | | | | the mac_stub policy. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Add #include <sys/sx.h>, devfs is going to require this shortly.phk2005-09-191-0/+1
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* Remove mac_create_root_mount() and mpo_create_root_mount(), whichrwatson2005-09-191-8/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | provided access to the root file system before the start of the init process. This was used briefly by SEBSD before it knew about preloading data in the loader, and using that method to gain access to data earlier results in fewer inconsistencies in the approach. Policy modules still have access to the root file system creation event through the mac_create_mount() entry point. Removed now, and will be removed from RELENG_6, in order to gain third party policy dependencies on the entry point for the lifetime of the 6.x branch. MFC after: 3 days Submitted by: Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com> Sponsored by: SPARTA
* Remove duplicate initialization of mpo_create_stub pointer.rwatson2005-07-211-1/+0
| | | | | | PR: 83779 Submitted by: Wojciech A. Koszek <dunstan at freebsd dot czest dot pl> MFC after: 3 days
* When devfs cloning takes place, provide access to the credential of therwatson2005-07-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid, gid, and MAC label. - Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to MAC. - Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv(). - Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired. - Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential when initializing the skeleton device protections. - Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(), so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework. While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next lookup. Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA MFC after: 1 week MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
* Eliminate MAC entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(), which isrwatson2005-07-051-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the bottom end. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR Approved by: re (scottl)
* Add MAC Framework and MAC policy entry point mac_check_socket_create(),rwatson2005-07-051-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, type, and protocol. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR Approved by: re (scottl) Requested by: SCC
* Gratuitous renaming of four System V Semaphore MAC Framework entryrwatson2005-06-071-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with respect to the other semaphore-related entry points: mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem() mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem() mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem() mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem() Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
* Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and controlrwatson2005-05-041-0/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Introduce p_canwait() and MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry pointsrwatson2005-04-181-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for this reason. The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new entry points. Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points torwatson2005-04-161-0/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
* Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the userwatson2005-04-161-0/+75
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Move MAC check_vnode_mmap entry point out from being exclusive tocsjp2005-04-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally. This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access control checks around run-time linking. -add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of mapped object. -update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file. -Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies. Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 1 month
* Remove policy references to mpo_check_vnode_mprotect(), which isrwatson2005-01-261-9/+0
| | | | | | | | currently unimplemented. Update copyrights. Pointed out by: csjp
* Update mac_stub for MAC Framework policy entry points System V IPCrwatson2005-01-221-5/+213
| | | | | | | | objects (message queues, semaphores, shared memory). Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
* Introduce a temporary mutex, mac_ifnet_mtx, to lock MAC labels onrwatson2004-06-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | network interfaces. This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels. Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces, such as security checks, propagating interface labels to mbufs generated from the interface, retrieving and setting the interface label. Introduce mpo_copy_ifnet_label MAC policy entry point to copy the value of an interface label from one label to another. Use this to avoid performing a label externalize while holding mac_ifnet_mtx; copy the label to a temporary ifnet label and then externalize that. Implement mpo_copy_ifnet_label for various MAC policies that implement interface labeling using generic label copying routines. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
* Do the dreaded s/dev_t/struct cdev */phk2004-06-161-1/+1
| | | | Bump __FreeBSD_version accordingly.
* Reimplement sysctls handling by MAC framework.pjd2004-02-221-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | Now I believe it is done in the right way. Removed some XXMAC cases, we now assume 'high' integrity level for all sysctls, except those with CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag set. No more magic. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: rwatson, scottl (mentor) Tested with: LINT (compilation), mac_biba(4) (functionality)
* Update my personal copyrights and NETA copyrights in the kernelrwatson2004-02-221-2/+2
| | | | | | | | to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3". This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the lines from getting excessively long as the years start to add up. Suggested by: imp
* Commit file missed in last pass: MAC api uses 'struct pipepair', notrwatson2004-02-011-8/+8
| | | | 'struct pipe' now.
* Switch TCP over to using the inpcb label when responding in timedrwatson2003-12-171-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond() instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we require consistency for the inpcb label reference. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Rename mac_create_cred() MAC Framework entry point to mac_copy_cred(),rwatson2003-12-061-7/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency. Approved by: re (scottl) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which cachesrwatson2003-11-181-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Implement sockets support for __mac_get_fd() and __mac_set_fd()rwatson2003-11-161-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | system calls, and prefer these calls over getsockopt()/setsockopt() for ABI reasons. When addressing UNIX domain sockets, these calls retrieve and modify the socket label, not the label of the rendezvous vnode. - Create mac_copy_socket_label() entry point based on mac_copy_pipe_label() entry point, intended to copy the socket label into temporary storage that doesn't require a socket lock to be held (currently Giant). - Implement mac_copy_socket_label() for various policies. - Expose socket label allocation, free, internalize, externalize entry points as non-static from mac_net.c. - Use mac_socket_label_set() in __mac_set_fd(). MAC-aware applications may now use mac_get_fd(), mac_set_fd(), and mac_get_peer() to retrieve and set various socket labels without directly invoking the getsockopt() interface. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Implement mpo_copy_{mbuf,pipe,vnode}_label() entry points forrwatson2003-11-161-0/+9
| | | | | | | mac_stub and mac_test. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Add stub entries for new MAC framework entry points:rwatson2003-08-211-0/+32
| | | | | | | | | | mpo_reflect_mbuf_icmp() mpo_reflect_mbuf_tcp() mpo_check_vnode_deletextattr() mpo_check_vnode_listextattr() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Generally rename things to represent the fact that this is now therwatson2003-08-211-269/+271
| | | | | | | | mac_stub policy and no longer mac_none (as found in the repocopy). Add comment to this effect. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Redesign the externalization APIs from the MAC Framework torwatson2003-06-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all string construction of labels for export to userspace (or elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level, and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful when policies export more complex label data, such as with compartments in Biba and MLS. Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to the removal of the M_NOWAIT case. This has been running in the MAC development tree for about three weeks without problems. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Trim "trustedbsd_" from the front of the policy module "short names";rwatson2003-03-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | the vendor is only included in the long name currently, reducing verbosity when modules are registered and unregistered. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Modify the mac_init_ipq() MAC Framework entry point to accept anrwatson2003-03-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | additional flags argument to indicate blocking disposition, and pass in M_NOWAIT from the IP reassembly code to indicate that blocking is not OK when labeling a new IP fragment reassembly queue. This should eliminate some of the WITNESS warnings that have started popping up since fine-grained IP stack locking started going in; if memory allocation fails, the creation of the fragment queue will be aborted. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Update MAC "none" stub policy to include stubs for the followingrwatson2003-03-251-0/+98
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | entry points: mac_none_thread_userret() mac_none_check_kenv_dump() mac_none_check_kenv_get() mac_none_check_kenv_set() mac_none_check_kenv_unset() mac_none_check_kld_load() mac_none_check_kld_stat() mac_none_check_kld_unload() mac_none_check_sysarch_ioperm() mac_none_check_system_acct() mac_none_check_system_settime() mac_none_check_system_swapoff() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Default policies to on: if you load them or compile them into yourrwatson2002-12-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | kernel, you should expect them to do something, so now they do. This doesn't affect users who don't load or explicitly compile in the policies. Approved by: re (jhb) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and isrwatson2002-12-091-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support. Approved by: re (murray) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Garbage collect mac_create_devfs_vnode() -- it hasn't been used sincerwatson2002-11-121-8/+0
| | | | | | | | we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Update MAC modules for changes in arguments for exec MAC policyrwatson2002-11-081-3/+5
| | | | | | | | entry points to include an explicit execlabel. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Update policy modules for changes in arguments associated with supportrwatson2002-11-051-3/+5
| | | | | for label access on the interpreter, not just the shell script. No policies currently present in the system rely on the new labels.
* License and wording updates: NAI has authorized the removal of clauserwatson2002-11-041-7/+4
| | | | | three from their BSD-style license. Also, s/NAI Labs/Network Associates Laboratories/.
* Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_opsrwatson2002-10-301-272/+137
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Various minor type, prototype tweaks -- clean up cruft due to lack ofrwatson2002-10-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | type checking on entry points (to be introduced shortly). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument forrwatson2002-10-301-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
* Hook up no-op stubs for reboot, swapon, sysctl entry points.rwatson2002-10-291-0/+29
| | | | | Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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