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* Introduce accmode_t. This is required for NFSv4 ACLs - it will be neccessarytrasz2008-10-281-2/+3
| | | | | | | to add more V* constants, and the variables changed by this patch were often being assigned to mode_t variables, which is 16 bit. Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
* Rename mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms(), which revokes access to virtualrwatson2008-10-281-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | memory mappings when the MAC label on a process changes, to mac_proc_vm_revoke(), It now also acquires its own credential reference directly from the affected process rather than accepting one passed by the the caller, simplifying the API and consumer code. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Rename three MAC entry points from _proc_ to _cred_ to reflect the factrwatson2008-10-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | that they operate directly on credentials: mac_proc_create_swapper(), mac_proc_create_init(), and mac_proc_associate_nfsd(). Update policies. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Add a MAC label, MAC Framework, and MAC policy entry points for IPv6rwatson2008-10-261-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | fragment reassembly queues. This allows policies to label reassembly queues, perform access control checks when matching fragments to a queue, update a queue label when fragments are matched, and label the resulting reassembled datagram. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Add mac_inpcb_check_visible MAC Framework entry point, which is similarbz2008-10-171-0/+1
| | | | | | | to mac_socket_check_visible but operates on the inpcb. Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 3 months (set timer, decide then)
* Introduce two related changes to the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:rwatson2008-08-231-6/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (1) Abstract interpreter vnode labeling in execve(2) and mac_execve(2) so that the general exec code isn't aware of the details of allocating, copying, and freeing labels, rather, simply passes in a void pointer to start and stop functions that will be used by the framework. This change will be MFC'd. (2) Introduce a new flags field to the MAC_POLICY_SET(9) interface allowing policies to declare which types of objects require label allocation, initialization, and destruction, and define a set of flags covering various supported object types (MPC_OBJECT_PROC, MPC_OBJECT_VNODE, MPC_OBJECT_INPCB, ...). This change reduces the overhead of compiling the MAC Framework into the kernel if policies aren't loaded, or if policies require labels on only a small number or even no object types. Each time a policy is loaded or unloaded, we recalculate a mask of labeled object types across all policies present in the system. Eliminate MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF option as it is no longer required. MFC after: 1 week ((1) only) Reviewed by: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
* Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIXjhb2008-06-271-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach. Some bugs that were fixed as a result include: - References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that. - Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore objects that could never be cleaned up. - On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to 'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(), sem_wait(), etc. - As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug. - If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores, then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when they are unloaded. XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking to drain any threads from the calls. - Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init() isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that case. Other changes: - Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories in their pathname. - The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks. - Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor. - A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present in src/tools/regression/posixsem. Reported by: kris (1) Tested by: kris Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly) MFC after: 1 month
* Remove the posixsem_check_destroy() MAC check. It is semantically identicaljhb2008-06-231-1/+0
| | | | | | | to doing a MAC check for close(), but no other types of close() (including close(2) and ksem_close(2)) have MAC checks. Discussed with: rwatson
* The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is therwatson2008-06-131-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name 'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing tools. MFC after: 1 week Reported by: julian
* Make naming of include guards for MAC Framework include files morerwatson2008-04-131-3/+3
| | | | | | consistent with other kernel include guards (don't start with _SYS). MFC after: 3 days
* Add a new file descriptor type for IPC shared memory objects and use it tojhb2008-01-081-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel: - Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2), ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared memory file descriptors. - shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash of the pathname. - As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea bandied about the lists several times over the years. - The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or the shm_open(2) virtual namespace. Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions) Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version) Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
* Garbage collect mac_mbuf_create_multicast_encap TrustedBSD MAC Frameworkrwatson2007-10-281-2/+0
| | | | | | | | entry point, which is no longer required now that we don't support old-style multicast tunnels. This removes the last mbuf object class entry point that isn't init/copy/destroy. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Continue to move from generic network entry points in the TrustedBSD MACrwatson2007-10-281-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Framework by moving from mac_mbuf_create_netlayer() to more specific entry points for specific network services: - mac_netinet_firewall_reply() to be used when replying to in-bound TCP segments in pf and ipfw (etc). - Rename mac_netinet_icmp_reply() to mac_netinet_icmp_replyinplace() and add mac_netinet_icmp_reply(), reflecting that in some cases we overwrite a label in place, but in others we apply the label to a new mbuf. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Move towards more explicit support for various network protocol stacksrwatson2007-10-281-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework: - Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send() for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send() for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry point. - Remove previous genering link layer entry point, mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used. - Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove old link layer entry point implementation. - Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now needed outside of mac_net.c. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Update comment following MAC Framework entry point renaming andrwatson2007-10-261-1/+6
| | | | | | reorganization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Rename 'mac_mbuf_create_from_firewall' to 'mac_netinet_firewall_send' asrwatson2007-10-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | we move towards netinet as a pseudo-object for the MAC Framework. Rename 'mac_create_mbuf_linklayer' to 'mac_mbuf_create_linklayer' to reflect general object-first ordering preference. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
* Sort entry points in mac_framework.h and mac_policy.h alphabetically byrwatson2007-10-251-190/+175
| | | | | | | | | primary object type, and then by secondarily by method name. This sorts entry points relating to particular objects, such as pipes, sockets, and vnodes together. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
* Normalize TCP syncache-related MAC Framework entry points to match mostrwatson2007-10-251-4/+4
| | | | | | | other entry points in the form mac_<object>_method(). Discussed with: csjp Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Rename mac_associate_nfsd_label() to mac_proc_associate_nfsd(), and moverwatson2007-10-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | from mac_vfs.c to mac_process.c to join other functions that setup up process labels for specific purposes. Unlike the two proc create calls, this call is intended to run after creation when a process registers as the NFS daemon, so remains an _associate_ call.. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Further MAC Framework cleanup: normalize some local variable names andrwatson2007-10-251-2/+2
| | | | | | clean up some comments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changesrwatson2007-10-241-193/+192
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to the following general forms: mac_<object>_<method/action> mac_<object>_check_<method/action> The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly, some entry point names. All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to conform to the new KPI. Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
* Canonicalize naming of local variables for struct ksem and associatedrwatson2007-10-211-7/+7
| | | | | | | labels to 'ks' and 'kslabel' to reflect the convention in posix_sem.c. MFC after: 3 days Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Rename mac_check_vnode_delete() MAC Framework and MAC Policy entryrwatson2007-09-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | point to mac_check_vnode_unlink(), reflecting UNIX naming conventions. This is the first of several commits to synchronize the MAC Framework in FreeBSD 7.0 with the MAC Framework as it will appear in Mac OS X Leopard. Reveiwed by: csjp, Samy Bahra <sbahra at gwu dot edu> Submitted by: Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple dot com> Obtained from: Apple Computer, Inc. Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR Approved by: re (bmah)
* Add a new MAC framework and policy entry point,rwatson2007-06-261-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | mpo_check_proc_setaudit_addr to be used when controlling use of setaudit_addr(), rather than mpo_check_proc_setaudit(), which takes a different argument type. Reviewed by: csjp Approved by: re (kensmith)
* Rename mac*devfsdirent*() to mac*devfs*() to synchronize with SEDarwin,rwatson2007-04-231-3/+3
| | | | | | | | where similar data structures exist to support devfs and the MAC Framework, but are named differently. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
* Normalize variable naming in the MAC Framework by adopting the normalrwatson2007-04-221-60/+59
| | | | | | | | | variable name conventions for arguments passed into the framework -- for example, name network interfaces 'ifp', sockets 'so', mounts 'mp', mbufs 'm', processes 'p', etc, wherever possible. Previously there was significant variation in this regard. Normalize copyright lists to ranges where sensible.
* Remove MAC Framework access control check entry points made redundant withrwatson2007-04-221-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege checking/granting. These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and provided no additional security context: - mac_check_sysarch_ioperm() - mac_check_kld_unload() - mac_check_settime() - mac_check_system_nfsd() Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which, for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes considered unprivileged by those two policies. These mostly, but not entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration systemrwatson2007-04-211-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid(). MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9) entry points. Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in some cases, other missing system-related checks. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
* Introduce accessor functions mac_label_get() and mac_label_set() to replacerwatson2007-02-061-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | LABEL_TO_SLOT() macro used by policy modules to query and set label data in struct label. Instead of using a union, store an intptr_t, simplifying the API. Update policies: in most cases this required only small tweaks to current wrapper macros. In two cases, a single wrapper macros had to be split into separate get and set macros. Move struct label definition from _label.h to mac_internal.h and remove _label.h. With this change, policies may now treat struct label * as opaque, allowing us to change the layout of struct label without breaking the policy module ABI. For example, we could make the maximum number of policies with labels modifiable at boot-time rather than just at compile-time. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Comment and white space cleanup.rwatson2006-12-201-15/+17
| | | | | | | Exapnd comments on System V IPC labeling methods, which could use improved consistency with respect to other object types. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Fix LOR between the syncache and inpcb locks when MAC is present in thecsjp2006-12-131-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kernel. This LOR snuck in with some of the recent syncache changes. To fix this, the inpcb handling was changed: - Hang a MAC label off the syncache object - When the syncache entry is initially created, we pickup the PCB lock is held because we extract information from it while initializing the syncache entry. While we do this, copy the MAC label associated with the PCB and use it for the syncache entry. - When the packet is transmitted, copy the label from the syncache entry to the mbuf so it can be processed by security policies which analyze mbuf labels. This change required that the MAC framework be extended to support the label copy operations from the PCB to the syncache entry, and then from the syncache entry to the mbuf. These functions really should be referencing the syncache structure instead of the label. However, due to some of the complexities associated with exposing this syncache structure we operate directly on it's label pointer. This should be OK since we aren't making any access control decisions within this code directly, we are merely allocating and copying label storage so we can properly initialize mbuf labels for any packets the syncache code might create. This also has a nice side effect of caching. Prior to this change, the PCB would be looked up/locked for each packet transmitted. Now the label is cached at the time the syncache entry is initialized. Submitted by: andre [1] Discussed with: rwatson [1] andre submitted the tcp_syncache.c changes
* Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability ofrwatson2006-11-061-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9) interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the existing suser(9) interface: suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv) suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags) A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read before doing so. The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine, rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail is now present in kern_jail.c. The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with root privilege. The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier. This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security policy become more feasible. Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Discussed on: arch@ Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri, Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>, Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>, Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
* Remove extra _MAC_ from #ifdef guard.rwatson2006-10-251-1/+1
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* Complete break-out of sys/sys/mac.h into sys/security/mac/mac_framework.hrwatson2006-10-221-73/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included across most of the kernel instead. This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA
* Introduce a new entry point, mac_create_mbuf_from_firewall. This entry pointcsjp2006-09-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets. This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels when the firewall generates packets. [1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations, an example being icmp_error() This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC Submitted by: mlaier [1] MFC after: 1 week This is a RELENG_6 candidate
* Introduce a new MAC entry point for label initialization of the NFS daemon'scsjp2006-04-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | credential: mac_associate_nfsd_label() This entry point can be utilized by various Mandatory Access Control policies so they can properly initialize the label of files which get created as a result of an NFS operation. This work will be useful for fixing kernel panics associated with accessing un-initialized or invalid vnode labels. The implementation of these entry points will come shortly. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Requested by: mdodd MFC after: 3 weeks
* Complete removal of mac_create_root_mount/mpo_create_root_mount MACrwatson2005-10-021-1/+0
| | | | | | | | interfaces. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Submitted by: Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com> MFC after: 3 days
* When devfs cloning takes place, provide access to the credential of therwatson2005-07-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid, gid, and MAC label. - Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to MAC. - Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv(). - Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired. - Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential when initializing the skeleton device protections. - Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(), so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework. While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next lookup. Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA MFC after: 1 week MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
* Eliminate MAC entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(), which isrwatson2005-07-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the bottom end. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR Approved by: re (scottl)
* Add MAC Framework and MAC policy entry point mac_check_socket_create(),rwatson2005-07-051-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, type, and protocol. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR Approved by: re (scottl) Requested by: SCC
* Gratuitous renaming of four System V Semaphore MAC Framework entryrwatson2005-06-071-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with respect to the other semaphore-related entry points: mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem() mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem() mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem() mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem() Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
* Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and controlrwatson2005-05-041-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | access to POSIX Semaphores: mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points. For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively read/write. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Introduce p_canwait() and MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry pointsrwatson2005-04-181-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for this reason. The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new entry points. Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points torwatson2005-04-161-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations, required for some policies: poll() mac_check_socket_poll() fstat() mac_check_socket_stat() accept() mac_check_socket_accept() Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points. While here, add missing entry point implementations for: mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive() mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send() mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible() Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
* Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the userwatson2005-04-161-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential, including: setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid() seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid() setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid() setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid() setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups() setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid() setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid() setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid() setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid() MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated. Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Move MAC check_vnode_mmap entry point out from being exclusive tocsjp2005-04-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally. This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access control checks around run-time linking. -add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of mapped object. -update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file. -Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies. Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 1 month
* Define new MAC framework and policy entry points for System V IPCrwatson2004-11-171-0/+64
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | objects and operations: - System V IPC message, message queue, semaphore, and shared memory segment init, destroy, cleanup, create operations. - System V IPC message, message queue, seamphore, and shared memory segment access control entry points, including rights to attach, destroy, and manipulate these IPC objects. Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
* Do the dreaded s/dev_t/struct cdev */phk2004-06-161-1/+2
| | | | Bump __FreeBSD_version accordingly.
* Improve consistency of include file guards in src/sys/sys by terminatingrwatson2004-05-101-3/+3
| | | | | | them with '_', as well as beginning with '_'. Observed by: bde
* Reimplement sysctls handling by MAC framework.pjd2004-02-221-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | Now I believe it is done in the right way. Removed some XXMAC cases, we now assume 'high' integrity level for all sysctls, except those with CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag set. No more magic. Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: rwatson, scottl (mentor) Tested with: LINT (compilation), mac_biba(4) (functionality)
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