| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Handle non-compressed packets for IPComp in tunnel mode.
RFC3173 says that the IP datagram MUST be sent in the original
non-compressed form, when the total size of a compressed payload
and the IPComp header is not smaller than the size of the original
payload. In tunnel mode for small packets IPComp will send
encapsulated IP datagrams without IPComp header.
Add ip_encap handler for IPPROTO_IPV4 and IPPROTO_IPV6 to handle
these datagrams. The handler does lookup for SA related to IPComp
protocol and given from mbuf source and destination addresses as
tunnel endpoints. It decapsulates packets only when corresponding SA
is found.
Reported by: gnn
Reviewed by: gnn
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D6062
r298536:
Use ipsec_address() function to print IP addresses.
r298549:
Fix build for NOINET and NOINET6 kernels.
Use own protosw structures for both address families.
Check proto in encapcheck function and use -1 as proto argument in
encap_attach_func(), both address families can have IPPROTO_IPV4
and IPPROTO_IPV6 protocols.
Reported by: bz
TAG: IPSEC-HEAD
(cherry picked from commit a1d2523e7f503ed719420848cc61de12bdf8ab4f)
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Constify mbuf pointer for IPSEC functions where mbuf isn't modified.
TAG: IPSEC-HEAD
(cherry picked from commit 9570d79d4a30dcd428dd55f2f996c1090c777c52)
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Make IPsec work with AES-GCM and AES-ICM (aka CTR) in OCF... IPsec
defines the keys differently than NIST does, so we have to muck with
key lengths and nonce/IVs to be standard compliant...
Remove the iv from secasvar as it was unused...
Add a counter protected by a mutex to ensure that the counter for GCM
and ICM will never be repeated.. This is a requirement for security..
I would use atomics, but we don't have a 64bit one on all platforms..
Fix a bug where IPsec was depending upon the OCF to ensure that the
blocksize was always at least 4 bytes to maintain alignment... Move
this logic into IPsec so changes to OCF won't break IPsec...
In one place, espx was always non-NULL, so don't test that it's
non-NULL before doing work..
minor style cleanups...
drop setting key and klen as they were not used...
Enforce that OCF won't pass invalid key lengths to AES that would
panic the machine...
This was has been tested by others too... I tested this against
NetBSD 6.1.5 using mini-test suite in
https://github.com/jmgurney/ipseccfgs and the only things that don't
pass are keyed md5 and sha1, and 3des-deriv (setkey syntax error),
all other modes listed in setkey's man page... The nice thing is
that NetBSD uses setkey, so same config files were used on both...
Reviewed by: gnn
TAG: IPSEC-HEAD
Issue: #4841
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Rename ip4_def_policy variable to def_policy. It is used by both IPv4 and
IPv6. Initialize it only once in def_policy_init(). Remove its
initialization from key_init() and make it static.
Remove several fields from struct secpolicy:
* lock - it isn't so useful having mutex in the structure, but the only
thing we do with it is initialization and destroying.
* state - it has only two values - DEAD and ALIVE. Instead of take a lock
and change the state to DEAD, then take lock again in GC function and
delete policy from the chain - keep in the chain only ALIVE policies.
* scangen - it was used in GC function to protect from sending several
SADB_SPDEXPIRE messages for one SPD entry. Now we don't keep DEAD entries
in the chain and there is no need to have scangen variable.
Use TAILQ to implement SPD entries chain. Use rmlock to protect access
to SPD entries chain. Protect all SP lookup with RLOCK, and use WLOCK
when we are inserting (or removing) SP entry in the chain.
Instead of using pattern "LOCK(); refcnt++; UNLOCK();", use refcount(9)
API to implement refcounting in SPD. Merge code from key_delsp() and
_key_delsp() into _key_freesp(). And use KEY_FREESP() macro in all cases
when we want to release reference or just delete SP entry.
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
TAG: IPSEC-HEAD
Issue: #4841
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Remove unused declartations.
MFC r275437:
ANSIfy function declarations.
MFC r275438:
Remove __P() macro.
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
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Remove route chaching support from ipsec code. It isn't used for some time.
* remove sa_route_union declaration and route_cache member from struct secashead;
* remove key_sa_routechange() call from ICMP and ICMPv6 code;
* simplify ip_ipsec_mtu();
* remove #include <net/route.h>;
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
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(DPCPU), as suggested by Peter Wemm, and implement a new per-virtual
network stack memory allocator. Modify vnet to use the allocator
instead of monolithic global container structures (vinet, ...). This
change solves many binary compatibility problems associated with
VIMAGE, and restores ELF symbols for virtualized global variables.
Each virtualized global variable exists as a "reference copy", and also
once per virtual network stack. Virtualized global variables are
tagged at compile-time, placing the in a special linker set, which is
loaded into a contiguous region of kernel memory. Virtualized global
variables in the base kernel are linked as normal, but those in modules
are copied and relocated to a reserved portion of the kernel's vnet
region with the help of a the kernel linker.
Virtualized global variables exist in per-vnet memory set up when the
network stack instance is created, and are initialized statically from
the reference copy. Run-time access occurs via an accessor macro, which
converts from the current vnet and requested symbol to a per-vnet
address. When "options VIMAGE" is not compiled into the kernel, normal
global ELF symbols will be used instead and indirection is avoided.
This change restores static initialization for network stack global
variables, restores support for non-global symbols and types, eliminates
the need for many subsystem constructors, eliminates large per-subsystem
structures that caused many binary compatibility issues both for
monitoring applications (netstat) and kernel modules, removes the
per-function INIT_VNET_*() macros throughout the stack, eliminates the
need for vnet_symmap ksym(2) munging, and eliminates duplicate
definitions of virtualized globals under VIMAGE_GLOBALS.
Bump __FreeBSD_version and update UPDATING.
Portions submitted by: bz
Reviewed by: bz, zec
Discussed with: gnn, jamie, jeff, jhb, julian, sam
Suggested by: peter
Approved by: re (kensmith)
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soft lifetime [1] introduced in rev. 1.21 of key.c.
Along with that, fix a related problem in key_debug
printing the correct data.
While there replace a printf by panic in a sanity check.
PR: 120751
Submitted by: Kazuaki ODA (kazuaki aliceblue.jp) [1]
MFC after: 5 days
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This commit includes only the kernel files, the rest of the files
will follow in a second commit.
Reviewed by: bz
Approved by: re
Supported by: Secure Computing
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custom kernels.
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change 38496
o add ipsec_osdep.h that holds os-specific definitions for portability
o s/KASSERT/IPSEC_ASSERT/ for portability
o s/SPLASSERT/IPSEC_SPLASSERT/ for portability
o remove function names from ASSERT strings since line#+file pinpints
the location
o use __func__ uniformly to reduce string storage
o convert some random #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC code to assertions
o remove some debuggging assertions no longer needed
change 38498
o replace numerous bogus panic's with equally bogus assertions
that at least go away on a production system
change 38502 + 38530
o change explicit mtx operations to #defines to simplify
future changes to a different lock type
change 38531
o hookup ipv4 ctlinput paths to a noop routine; we should be
handling path mtu changes at least
o correct potential null pointer deref in ipsec4_common_input_cb
chnage 38685
o fix locking for bundled SA's and for when key exchange is required
change 38770
o eliminate recursion on the SAHTREE lock
change 38804
o cleanup some types: long -> time_t
o remove refrence to dead #define
change 38805
o correct some types: long -> time_t
o add scan generation # to secpolicy to deal with locking issues
change 38806
o use LIST_FOREACH_SAFE instead of handrolled code
o change key_flush_spd to drop the sptree lock before purging
an entry to avoid lock recursion and to avoid holding the lock
over a long-running operation
o misc cleanups of tangled and twisty code
There is still much to do here but for now things look to be
working again.
Supported by: FreeBSD Foundation
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from the KAME IPsec implementation, but with heavy borrowing and influence
of openbsd. A key feature of this implementation is that it uses the kernel
crypto framework to do all crypto work so when h/w crypto support is present
IPsec operation is automatically accelerated. Otherwise the protocol
implementations are rather differet while the SADB and policy management
code is very similar to KAME (for the moment).
Note that this implementation is enabled with a FAST_IPSEC option. With this
you get all protocols; i.e. there is no FAST_IPSEC_ESP option.
FAST_IPSEC and IPSEC are mutually exclusive; you cannot build both into a
single system.
This software is well tested with IPv4 but should be considered very
experimental (i.e. do not deploy in production environments). This software
does NOT currently support IPv6. In fact do not configure FAST_IPSEC and
INET6 in the same system.
Obtained from: KAME + openbsd
Supported by: Vernier Networks
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