| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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cap_funwrap() and cap_funwrap_mmap() unwrap capabilities, exposing the
underlying object. Attempting to unwrap a capability with an inadequate
rights mask (e.g. calling cap_funwrap(fp, CAP_WRITE | CAP_MMAP, &result)
on a capability whose rights mask is CAP_READ | CAP_MMAP) will result in
ENOTCAPABLE.
Unwrapping a non-capability is effectively a no-op.
These functions will be used by Capsicum-aware versions of _fget(), etc.
Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc
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to do with global namespaces) and CAPABILITIES (which has to do with
constraining file descriptors). Just in case, and because it's a better
name anyway, let's move CAPABILITIES out of the way.
Also, change opt_capabilities.h to opt_capsicum.h; for now, this will
only hold CAPABILITY_MODE, but it will probably also hold the new
CAPABILITIES (implying constrained file descriptors) in the future.
Approved by: rwatson
Sponsored by: Google UK Ltd
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Since we're now declaring FEATURE(security_capabilities), there's no need for an explicit SYSCTL_NODE.
Approved by: rwatson
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- Rename mac FEATURE to security_mac.
Discussed with: rwatson
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compiled conditionally on options CAPABILITIES:
Add a new credential flag, CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE, which indicates that a
subject (typically a process) is in capability mode.
Add two new system calls, cap_enter(2) and cap_getmode(2), which allow
setting and querying (but never clearing) the flag.
Export the capability mode flag via process information sysctls.
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
Reviewed by: anderson
Discussed with: benl, kris, pjd
Obtained from: Capsicum Project
MFC after: 3 months
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