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referring to /dev/[k]mem and noting it's about opening the files rather
than actually reading and writing.
Reviewed by: jmallett
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/dev/kmem and /dev/mem (in addition to traditional file permission checks).
PRIV_KMEM_READ is different from other PRIV_* checks in that it's allowed
by default.
Reviewed by: kib, mckusick
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calls and turn it on.
- Do not allow to call them inside jail. [1]
Pointed out by: trasz [1]
Reviewed by: avg
Approved by: kib (mentor)
MFC after: 1 week
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use '-' in probe names, matching the probe names in Solaris.[1]
Add userland SDT probes definitions to sys/sdt.h.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Discussed with: rwaston [1]
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and used in a large number of files, but also because an increasing number
of incorrect uses of MAC calls were sneaking in due to copy-and-paste of
MAC-aware code without the associated opt_mac.h include.
Discussed with: pjd
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wrapper macros that allow trace points and arguments to be declared
using a single macro rather than several. This means a lot less
repetition and vertical space for each trace point.
Use these macros when defining privilege and MAC Framework trace points.
Reviewed by: jb
MFC after: 1 week
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priv:kernel:priv_check:priv_ok fires for granted privileges
priv:kernel:priv_check:priv_errr fires for denied privileges
The first argument is the requested privilege number. The naming
convention is a little different from the OpenSolaris equivilent
because we can't have '-' in probefunc names, and our privilege
namespace is different.
MFC after: 1 week
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years by the priv_check(9) interface and just very few places are left.
Note that compatibility stub with older FreeBSD version
(all above the 8 limit though) are left in order to reduce diffs against
old versions. It is responsibility of the maintainers for any module, if
they think it is the case, to axe out such cases.
This patch breaks KPI so __FreeBSD_version will be bumped into a later
commit.
This patch needs to be credited 50-50 with rwatson@ as he found time to
explain me how the priv_check() works in detail and to review patches.
Tested by: Giovanni Trematerra <giovanni dot trematerra at gmail dot com>
Reviewed by: rwatson
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MFC after: 3 days
Pointed out by: antoine
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stop declaring it in systm.h -- it's used only in kern_priv.c and is not
required elsewhere.
Approved by: re (kensmith)
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a privilege is checked against the real uid rather than the effective
uid, instead decide which uid to use in priv_check_cred() based on the
privilege passed in. We use the real uid for PRIV_MAXFILES,
PRIV_MAXPROC, and PRIV_PROC_LIMIT. Remove the definition of
SUSER_RUID; there are now no flags defined for priv_check_cred().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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some cases, move to priv_check() if it was an operation on a thread and
no other flags were present.
Eliminate caller-side jail exception checking (also now-unused); jail
privilege exception code now goes solely in kern_jail.c.
We can't yet eliminate suser() due to some cases in the KAME code where
a privilege check is performed and then used in many different deferred
paths. Do, however, move those prototypes to priv.h.
Reviewed by: csjp
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:
suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)
A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.
The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.
The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.
The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.
This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
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