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* Some kernel threads try to do significant work, and the default KSTACK_PAGESscottl2002-10-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | doesn't give them enough stack to do much before blowing away the pcb. This adds MI and MD code to allow the allocation of an alternate kstack who's size can be speficied when calling kthread_create. Passing the value 0 prevents the alternate kstack from being created. Note that the ia64 MD code is missing for now, and PowerPC was only partially written due to the pmap.c being incomplete there. Though this patch does not modify anything to make use of the alternate kstack, acpi and usb are good candidates. Reviewed by: jake, peter, jhb
* Plug memory leaks.phk2002-09-301-4/+14
| | | | | Detected by: FlexeLint Approved by: jhb
* - Change utrace ktrace events to malloc the work buffer before getting ajhb2002-09-111-9/+10
| | | | | | | | | | request structure. - Re-optimize the case of utrace being disabled by doing an explicit KTRPOINT check instead of relying on the one in ktr_getrequest() so that we don't waste time on a malloc in the non-tracing case. - Change utrace() to return an error if the copyin() fails. Before it would just ignore the request but still return success. This last is a change in behavior and can be backed out if necessary.
* Remove support for synchronous ktrace requests now that none exist anymore.jhb2002-09-111-33/+11
| | | | They were an ugly, gross hack.
* - Change ktrace genio events to only copy up to ktr_geniosize bytes of ajhb2002-09-111-18/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | transfer to a malloc'd buffer and use that bufer for the ktrace event. This means that genio ktrace events no longer need to be synchronous. - Now that ktr_buffer isn't overloaded to sometimes point to a cached uio pointer for genio requests and always points to a malloc'd buffer if not NULL, free the buffer in ktr_freerequest() instead of in ktr_writerequest(). This closes a memory leak for ktrace events that used a malloc'd buffer that had their vnode ripped out from under them while they were on the todo list. Suggested by: bde (1, in principle)
* - Add a kern.ktrace sysctl node.jhb2002-09-111-2/+9
| | | | | | | | - Rename kern.ktrace_request_pool tunable/sysctl to kern.ktrace.request_pool. - Add a variable to control the max amount of data to log for genio events. This variable is tunable via the tunable/sysctl kern.ktrace.genio_size and defaults to one page.
* Change namei and syscall ktrace events to malloc work buffers beforejhb2002-09-111-7/+14
| | | | | obtaining a ktr_request structure from the free pool so we can avoid starving other threads of ktr_request structures.
* Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitlyrwatson2002-08-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
* Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks:rwatson2002-08-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
* If we fail to write to a vnode during a ktrace write, then we drop alljhb2002-08-011-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | other references to that vnode as a trace vnode in other processes as well as in any pending requests on the todo list. Thus, it is possible for a ktrace request structure to have a NULL ktr_vp when it is destroyed in ktr_freerequest(). We shouldn't call vrele() on the vnode in that case. Reported by: bde
* Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensiblerwatson2002-08-011-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | kernel access control. Instrument the ktrace write operation so that it invokes the MAC framework's vnode write authorization check. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
* More caddr_t removal, make fo_ioctl take a void * instead of a caddr_t.alfred2002-06-291-2/+2
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* Overhaul the ktrace subsystem a bit. For the most part, the actual vnodejhb2002-06-071-227/+446
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | operations to dump a ktrace event out to an output file are now handled asychronously by a ktrace worker thread. This enables most ktrace events to not need Giant once p_tracep and p_traceflag are suitably protected by the new ktrace_lock. There is a single todo list of pending ktrace requests. The various ktrace tracepoints allocate a ktrace request object and tack it onto the end of the queue. The ktrace kernel thread grabs requests off the head of the queue and processes them using the trace vnode and credentials of the thread triggering the event. Since we cannot assume that the user memory referenced when doing a ktrgenio() will be valid and since we can't access it from the ktrace worker thread without a bit of hassle anyways, ktrgenio() requests are still handled synchronously. However, in order to ensure that the requests from a given thread still maintain relative order to one another, when a synchronous ktrace event (such as a genio event) is triggered, we still put the request object on the todo list to synchronize with the worker thread. The original thread blocks atomically with putting the item on the queue. When the worker thread comes across an asynchronous request, it wakes up the original thread and then blocks to ensure it doesn't manage to write a later event before the original thread has a chance to write out the synchronous event. When the original thread wakes up, it writes out the synchronous using its own context and then finally wakes the worker thread back up. Yuck. The sychronous events aren't pretty but they do work. Since ktrace events can be triggered in fairly low-level areas (msleep() and cv_wait() for example) the ktrace code is designed to use very few locks when posting an event (currently just the ktrace_mtx lock and the vnode interlock to bump the refcoun on the trace vnode). This also means that we can't allocate a ktrace request object when an event is triggered. Instead, ktrace request objects are allocated from a pre-allocated pool and returned to the pool after a request is serviced. The size of this pool defaults to 100 objects, which is about 13k on an i386 kernel. The size of the pool can be adjusted at compile time via the KTRACE_REQUEST_POOL kernel option, at boot time via the kern.ktrace_request_pool loader tunable, or at runtime via the kern.ktrace_request_pool sysctl. If the pool of request objects is exhausted, then a warning message is printed to the console. The message is rate-limited in that it is only printed once until the size of the pool is adjusted via the sysctl. I have tested all kernel traces but have not tested user traces submitted by utrace(2), though they should work fine in theory. Since a ktrace request has several properties (content of event, trace vnode, details of originating process, credentials for I/O, etc.), I chose to drop the first argument to the various ktrfoo() functions. Currently the functions just assume the event is posted from curthread. If there is a great desire to do so, I suppose I could instead put back the first argument but this time make it a thread pointer instead of a vnode pointer. Also, KTRPOINT() now takes a thread as its first argument instead of a process. This is because the check for a recursive ktrace event is now per-thread instead of process-wide. Tested on: i386 Compiles on: sparc64, alpha
* Change p_can{debug,see,sched,signal}()'s first argument to be a threadjhb2002-05-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | pointer instead of a proc pointer and require the process pointed to by the second argument to be locked. We now use the thread ucred reference for the credential checks in p_can*() as a result. p_canfoo() should now no longer need Giant.
* Lock proctree_lock instead of pgrpsess_lock.jhb2002-04-161-4/+4
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* - Change the first argument of ktrcanset(), ktrsetchildren(), and ktrops()jhb2002-04-131-32/+57
| | | | | to a thread pointer so that ktrcanset() can use td_ucred. - Add some proc locking to partially protect p_tracep and p_traceflag.
* Change the suser() API to take advantage of td_ucred as well as do ajhb2002-04-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | general cleanup of the API. The entire API now consists of two functions similar to the pre-KSE API. The suser() function takes a thread pointer as its only argument. The td_ucred member of this thread must be valid so the only valid thread pointers are curthread and a few kernel threads such as thread0. The suser_cred() function takes a pointer to a struct ucred as its first argument and an integer flag as its second argument. The flag is currently only used for the PRISON_ROOT flag. Discussed on: smp@
* Remove __P.alfred2002-03-191-5/+5
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* Giant pushdown for read/write/pread/pwrite syscalls.alfred2002-03-151-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kern/kern_descrip.c: Aquire Giant in fdrop_locked when file refcount hits zero, this removes the requirement for the caller to own Giant for the most part. kern/kern_ktrace.c: Aquire Giant in ktrgenio, simplifies locking in upper read/write syscalls. kern/vfs_bio.c: Aquire Giant in bwillwrite if needed. kern/sys_generic.c Giant pushdown, remove Giant for: read, pread, write and pwrite. readv and writev aren't done yet because of the possible malloc calls for iov to uio processing. kern/sys_socket.c Grab giant in the socket fo_read/write functions. kern/vfs_vnops.c Grab giant in the vnode fo_read/write functions.
* Add a comment about an unlocked access to p_ucred that will go away injhb2002-02-271-0/+1
| | | | the near future.
* Simple p_ucred -> td_ucred changes to start using the per-thread ucredjhb2002-02-271-7/+7
| | | | reference.
* Lock struct pgrp, session and sigio.tanimura2002-02-231-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | New locks are: - pgrpsess_lock which locks the whole pgrps and sessions, - pg_mtx which protects the pgrp members, and - s_mtx which protects the session members. Please refer to sys/proc.h for the coverage of these locks. Changes on the pgrp/session interface: - pgfind() needs the pgrpsess_lock held. - The caller of enterpgrp() is responsible to allocate a new pgrp and session. - Call enterthispgrp() in order to enter an existing pgrp. - pgsignal() requires a pgrp lock held. Reviewed by: jhb, alfred Tested on: cvsup.jp.FreeBSD.org (which is a quad-CPU machine running -current)
* Fix ktrace enablement/disablement races that can result in a vnodedillon2001-10-241-9/+50
| | | | | | | | ref count panic. Bug noticed by: ps Reviewed by: ps MFC after: 1 day
* KSE Milestone 2julian2001-09-121-15/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time). This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except that there is a thread associated with each process. Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!) Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
* Remove the MPSAFE keyword from the parser for syscalls.master.dillon2001-08-301-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead introduce the [M] prefix to existing keywords. e.g. MSTD is the MP SAFE version of STD. This is prepatory for a massive Giant lock pushdown. The old MPSAFE keyword made syscalls.master too messy. Begin comments MP-Safe procedures with the comment: /* * MPSAFE */ This comments means that the procedure may be called without Giant held (The procedure itself may still need to obtain Giant temporarily to do its thing). sv_prepsyscall() is now MP SAFE and assumed to be MP SAFE sv_transtrap() is now MP SAFE and assumed to be MP SAFE ktrsyscall() and ktrsysret() are now MP SAFE (Giant Pushdown) trapsignal() is now MP SAFE (Giant Pushdown) Places which used to do the if (mtx_owned(&Giant)) mtx_unlock(&Giant) test in syscall[2]() in */*/trap.c now do not. Instead they explicitly unlock Giant if they previously obtained it, and then assert that it is no longer held to catch broken system calls. Rebuild syscall tables.
* o Replace calls to p_can(..., P_CAN_xxx) with calls to p_canxxx().rwatson2001-07-051-16/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The p_can(...) construct was a premature (and, it turns out, awkward) abstraction. The individual calls to p_canxxx() better reflect differences between the inter-process authorization checks, such as differing checks based on the type of signal. This has a side effect of improving code readability. o Replace direct credential authorization checks in ktrace() with invocation of p_candebug(), while maintaining the special case check of KTR_ROOT. This allows ktrace() to "play more nicely" with new mandatory access control schemes, as well as making its authorization checks consistent with other "debugging class" checks. o Eliminate "privused" construct for p_can*() calls which allowed the caller to determine if privilege was required for successful evaluation of the access control check. This primitive is currently unused, and as such, serves only to complicate the API. Approved by: ({procfs,linprocfs} changes) des Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add therwatson2001-05-251-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which corresponds to the effective uid. o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing original macro that pointed. p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred. o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred, p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo, cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc. o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize cr_ruidinfo there. o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this means moving to a structure like this: newcred = crdup(oldcred); ... p->p_ucred = newcred; crfree(oldcred); It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and exit. o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid; remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem. o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and use improved uid management primitives. o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to pcred removal. o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and allocation. o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision. o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places, current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still remains to be done. o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into account new ruidinfo reference. o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines: change_euid() change_egid() change_ruid() change_rgid() change_svuid() change_svgid() In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its reference requirements. o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks. o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's questionable, and needs to be considered carefully. o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other similar authorization instances. o Update libkvm to take these changes into account. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
* Undo part of the tangle of having sys/lock.h and sys/mutex.h included inmarkm2001-05-011-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | other "system" header files. Also help the deprecation of lockmgr.h by making it a sub-include of sys/lock.h and removing sys/lockmgr.h form kernel .c files. Sort sys/*.h includes where possible in affected files. OK'ed by: bde (with reservations)
* Change the pfind() and zpfind() functions to lock the process that theyjhb2001-04-241-0/+1
| | | | | | find before releasing the allproc lock and returning. Reviewed by: -smp, dfr, jake
* Convert the allproc and proctree locks from lockmgr locks to sx locks.jhb2001-03-281-6/+7
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* o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subjectrwatson2001-02-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Don't use SCARG.alfred2001-01-081-2/+1
| | | | Pointed out by: bde
* Limit size of passed in data for utrace function.alfred2001-01-061-0/+3
| | | | | Requested by: rwatson Obtained from: NetBSD
* Protect proc.p_pptr and proc.p_children/p_sibling with thejake2000-12-231-2/+4
| | | | | | | | proctree_lock. linprocfs not locked pending response from informal maintainer. Reviewed by: jhb, -smp@
* - Change the allproc_lock to use a macro, ALLPROC_LOCK(how), insteadjake2000-12-131-4/+4
| | | | | | | | of explicit calls to lockmgr. Also provides macros for the flags pased to specify shared, exclusive or release which map to the lockmgr flags. This is so that the use of lockmgr can be easily replaced with optimized reader-writer locks. - Add some locking that I missed the first time.
* Protect the following with a lockmgr lock:jake2000-11-221-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | allproc zombproc pidhashtbl proc.p_list proc.p_hash nextpid Reviewed by: jhb Obtained from: BSD/OS and netbsd
* Convert all users of fldoff() to offsetof(). fldoff() is badphk2000-10-271-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | because it only takes a struct tag which makes it impossible to use unions, typedefs etc. Define __offsetof() in <machine/ansi.h> Define offsetof() in terms of __offsetof() in <stddef.h> and <sys/types.h> Remove myriad of local offsetof() definitions. Remove includes of <stddef.h> in kernel code. NB: Kernelcode should *never* include from /usr/include ! Make <sys/queue.h> include <machine/ansi.h> to avoid polluting the API. Deprecate <struct.h> with a warning. The warning turns into an error on 01-12-2000 and the file gets removed entirely on 01-01-2001. Paritials reviews by: various. Significant brucifications by: bde
* Add KTR, a facility that logs kernel events in order to to facilitatejasone2000-09-071-8/+8
| | | | | | | debugging. Acquired from: BSDi (BSD/OS) Submitted by: dfr, grog, jake, jhb
* o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:rwatson2000-08-301-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused) which allows specification of subject process, object process, inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL, and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not be invoked directly. o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks. o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and kern.ps_showallprocs. o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies process flags due to the disabling of ASU. o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(), procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by bde). o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic. Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others Approved by: bde Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Add snapshots to the fast filesystem. Most of the changes supportmckusick2000-07-111-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the gating of system calls that cause modifications to the underlying filesystem. The gating can be enabled by any filesystem that needs to consistently suspend operations by adding the vop_stdgetwritemount to their set of vnops. Once gating is enabled, the function vfs_write_suspend stops all new write operations to a filesystem, allows any filesystem modifying system calls already in progress to complete, then sync's the filesystem to disk and returns. The function vfs_write_resume allows the suspended write operations to begin again. Gating is not added by default for all filesystems as for SMP systems it adds two extra locks to such critical kernel paths as the write system call. Thus, gating should only be added as needed. Details on the use and current status of snapshots in FFS can be found in /sys/ufs/ffs/README.snapshot so for brevity and timelyness is not included here. Unless and until you create a snapshot file, these changes should have no effect on your system (famous last words).
* Change that &@!$# UIO_READ to be UIO_WRITE. I tested the ktrace stuff,green2000-07-071-1/+1
| | | | but somehow... pass the pointy hat, again!
* Move the truncation code out of vn_open and into the open system callmckusick2000-07-041-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | after the acquisition of any advisory locks. This fix corrects a case in which a process tries to open a file with a non-blocking exclusive lock. Even if it fails to get the lock it would still truncate the file even though its open failed. With this change, the truncation is done only after the lock is successfully acquired. Obtained from: BSD/OS
* Modify ktrace's general I/O tracing, ktrgenio(), to use a struct uio *green2000-07-021-35/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | instead of a struct iovec * array and int len. Get rid of stupidly trying to allocate all of the memory and copyin()ing the entire iovec[], and instead just do the proper VOP_WRITE() in ktrwrite() using a copy of the struct uio that the syscall originally used. This solves the DoS which could easily be performed; to work around the DoS, one could also remove "options KTRACE" from the kernel. This is a very strong MFC candidate for 4.1. Found by: art@OpenBSD.org
* Remove unneeded #include <vm/vm_zone.h>phk2000-04-301-1/+0
| | | | Generated by: src/tools/tools/kerninclude
* Introduce NDFREE (and remove VOP_ABORTOP)eivind1999-12-151-0/+3
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* This is a partial commit of the patch from PR 14914:phk1999-11-161-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Alot of the code in sys/kern directly accesses the *Q_HEAD and *Q_ENTRY structures for list operations. This patch makes all list operations in sys/kern use the queue(3) macros, rather than directly accessing the *Q_{HEAD,ENTRY} structures. This batch of changes compile to the same object files. Reviewed by: phk Submitted by: Jake Burkholder <jake@checker.org> PR: 14914
* Fix style bug.marcel1999-10-041-1/+2
| | | | Submitted by: bde
* sigset_t change (part 2 of 5)marcel1999-09-291-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ----------------------------- The core of the signalling code has been rewritten to operate on the new sigset_t. No methodological changes have been made. Most references to a sigset_t object are through macros (see signalvar.h) to create a level of abstraction and to provide a basis for further improvements. The NSIG constant has not been changed to reflect the maximum number of signals possible. The reason is that it breaks programs (especially shells) which assume that all signals have a non-null name in sys_signame. See src/bin/sh/trap.c for an example. Instead _SIG_MAXSIG has been introduced to hold the maximum signal possible with the new sigset_t. struct sigprop has been moved from signalvar.h to kern_sig.c because a) it is only used there, and b) access must be done though function sigprop(). The latter because the table doesn't holds properties for all signals, but only for the first NSIG signals. signal.h has been reorganized to make reading easier and to add the new and/or modified structures. The "old" structures are moved to signalvar.h to prevent namespace polution. Especially the coda filesystem suffers from the change, because it contained lines like (p->p_sigmask == SIGIO), which is easy to do for integral types, but not for compound types. NOTE: kdump (and port linux_kdump) must be recompiled. Thanks to Garrett Wollman and Daniel Eischen for pressing the importance of changing sigreturn as well.
* Kill some spammage that seems to have gotten in through diffs from marcel'sgreen1999-09-211-3/+3
| | | | local tree (which happens to have some things we don't :)
* When bcopying the program name into the ktrace header, make sure we includemarcel1999-09-201-4/+4
| | | | | | the terminating zero by copying MAXCOMLEN + 1 bytes. This fixes the garbage that occasionally appeared behind the programname when it is at least MAXCOMLEN bytes long (such as communicator-4.61-bin).
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