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* o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subjectrwatson2001-02-211-18/+67
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison). o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence. o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code. o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead of struct proc arguments. o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed, rather than directly checking pointers all over the place. o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function. o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h. o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the flag in the process flags field itself. o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect mutex use. Notes: o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required. o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code. o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the structure. Reviewed by: freebsd-arch Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
* Convert more malloc+bzero to malloc+M_ZERO.dwmalone2000-12-081-2/+1
| | | | | Submitted by: josh@zipperup.org Submitted by: Robert Drehmel <robd@gmx.net>
* o Deny access to System V IPC from within jail by default, as in therwatson2000-10-311-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | current implementation, jail neither virtualizes the Sys V IPC namespace, nor provides inter-jail protections on IPC objects. o Support for System V IPC can be enabled by setting jail.sysvipc_allowed=1 using sysctl. o This is not the "real fix" which involves virtualizing the System V IPC namespace, but prevents processes within jail from influencing those outside of jail when not approved by the administrator. Reported by: Paulo Fragoso <paulo@nlink.com.br>
* o Modify jail to limit creation of sockets to UNIX domain sockets,rwatson2000-06-041-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TCP/IP (v4) sockets, and routing sockets. Previously, interaction with IPv6 was not well-defined, and might be inappropriate for some environments. Similarly, sysctl MIB entries providing interface information also give out only addresses from those protocol domains. For the time being, this functionality is enabled by default, and toggleable using the sysctl variable jail.socket_unixiproute_only. In the future, protocol domains will be able to determine whether or not they are ``jail aware''. o Further limitations on process use of getpriority() and setpriority() by jailed processes. Addresses problem described in kern/17878. Reviewed by: phk, jmg
* Yet-another-update: rename ``kern.prison'' to a new sysctl root entry,rwatson2000-02-121-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | ``jail'', and move the set_hostname_allowed sysctl there, as well as fixing a bug in the sysctl that resulted in jails being over-limited (preventing them from reading as well as writing the hostname). Also, correct some formatting issues, courtesy bde :-). Reviewed by: phk Approved by: jkh
* Add a version number field to the jail(2) argument so that future changesphk1999-09-191-0/+2
| | | | can be handled intelligently.
* $Id$ -> $FreeBSD$peter1999-08-281-1/+1
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* Add beer-ware license and $Id$phk1999-04-301-0/+11
| | | | Noticed by: dillon
* Make BOOTP to work again.phk1999-04-301-1/+1
| | | | | Submitted by: dillon Reviewed by: phk
* This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.phk1999-04-281-0/+114
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
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