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license, per letter dated July 22, 1999 and email from Peter Wemm,
Alan Cox and Robert Watson.
Approved by: core, peter, alc, rwatson
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validating the offset within a given memory buffer before handing the
real work off to uiomove(9).
Use uiomove_frombuf in procfs to correct several issues with
integer arithmetic that could result in underflows/overflows. As a
side-effect, the code is significantly simplified.
Add additional sanity checks when computing a memory allocation size
in pfs_read.
Submitted by: rwatson (original uiomove_frombuf -- bugs are mine :-)
Reported by: Joost Pol <joost@pine.nl> (integer underflows/overflows)
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entering sys_process.c debugging primitives, or we violate assertions.
Also, be more careful about releasing the process lock around calls
to uiomove() which may sleep waiting for paging machinations or
related notions. We may want to defer the uiomove() in at least
one case, but jhb will look into that at a later date.
Reported by: Philippe Charnier <charnier@xp11.frmug.org>
Reviewed by: jhb
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The ability to schedule multiple threads per process
(one one cpu) by making ALL system calls optionally asynchronous.
to come: ia64 and power-pc patches, patches for gdb, test program (in tools)
Reviewed by: Almost everyone who counts
(at various times, peter, jhb, matt, alfred, mini, bernd,
and a cast of thousands)
NOTE: this is still Beta code, and contains lots of debugging stuff.
expect slight instability in signals..
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pointer instead of a proc pointer and require the process pointed to
by the second argument to be locked. We now use the thread ucred reference
for the credential checks in p_can*() as a result. p_canfoo() should now
no longer need Giant.
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reading/writing the registers.
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- clobbering of jsp's $Id$ by FreeBSD's old $Id$.
- lost Berkeley id in procfs_dbregs.c
- long lines in recent KSE changes.
- various gratuitous differences between procfs_*regs.c.
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this is a low-functionality change that changes the kernel to access the main
thread of a process via the linked list of threads rather than
assuming that it is embedded in the process. It IS still embeded there
but remove all teh code that assumes that in preparation for the next commit
which will actually move it out.
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, gallatin@cs.duke.edu, benno rice,
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proc_* in the process; procfs_machdep.c is no longer needed.
Run-tested on i386, build-tested on Alpha, untested on other platforms.
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Until now, the ptrace syscall was implemented as a wrapper that called
various functions in procfs depending on which ptrace operation was
requested. Most of these functions were themselves wrappers around
procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs(), with only some extra error checks,
which weren't necessary in the ptrace case anyway.
This commit moves procfs_rwmem() from procfs_mem.c into sys_process.c
(renaming it to proc_rwmem() in the process), and implements ptrace()
directly in terms of procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs() instead of
having it fake up a struct uio and then call procfs_do{,db,fp}regs().
It also moves the prototypes for procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs()
and proc_rwmem() from proc.h to ptrace.h, and marks all procfs files
except procfs_machdep.c as "optional procfs" instead of "standard".
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Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.
Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org
X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
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The p_can(...) construct was a premature (and, it turns out,
awkward) abstraction. The individual calls to p_canxxx() better
reflect differences between the inter-process authorization checks,
such as differing checks based on the type of signal. This has
a side effect of improving code readability.
o Replace direct credential authorization checks in ktrace() with
invocation of p_candebug(), while maintaining the special case
check of KTR_ROOT. This allows ktrace() to "play more nicely"
with new mandatory access control schemes, as well as making its
authorization checks consistent with other "debugging class"
checks.
o Eliminate "privused" construct for p_can*() calls which allowed the
caller to determine if privilege was required for successful
evaluation of the access control check. This primitive is currently
unused, and as such, serves only to complicate the API.
Approved by: ({procfs,linprocfs} changes) des
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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systems were repo-copied from sys/miscfs to sys/fs.
- Renamed the following file systems and their modules:
fdesc -> fdescfs, portal -> portalfs, union -> unionfs.
- Renamed corresponding kernel options:
FDESC -> FDESCFS, PORTAL -> PORTALFS, UNION -> UNIONFS.
- Install header files for the above file systems.
- Removed bogus -I${.CURDIR}/../../sys CFLAGS from userland
Makefiles.
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other "system" header files.
Also help the deprecation of lockmgr.h by making it a sub-include of
sys/lock.h and removing sys/lockmgr.h form kernel .c files.
Sort sys/*.h includes where possible in affected files.
OK'ed by: bde (with reservations)
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find before releasing the allproc lock and returning.
Reviewed by: -smp, dfr, jake
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- <sys/mutex.h> now requires <sys/systm.h>
- <sys/mutex.h> and <sys/sx.h> now require <sys/lock.h>
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int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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Obtained from: http://bogon.freebsd.dk/include
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p_trespass(struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2)
which returns zero or an errno depending on the legality of p1 trespassing
on p2.
Replace kern_sig.c:CANSIGNAL() with call to p_trespass() and one
extra signal related check.
Replace procfs.h:CHECKIO() macros with calls to p_trespass().
Only show command lines to process which can trespass on the target
process.
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ready for it yet.
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changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well)
without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes.
The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems.
Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS
Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files.
Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent
library routine is changed.
Reviewed by: various people
Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
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This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
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Implement a "variable" directory structure. Files that do not make
sense for the given process do not "appear" and cannot be opened.
For example, "system" processes do not have "file", "regs" or "fpregs",
because they do not have a user area.
"attempt" to fill in the user area of a given process when it is being
accessed via /proc/pid/mem (the user struct is just after
VM_MAXUSER_ADDRESS in the process address space.)
Dont do IO to the U area while it's swapped, hold it in place if possible.
Lock off access to the "ctl" file if it's done a setuid like the other
pseudo-files in there.
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