| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Submitted by: sheldonh@uunet.co.za
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(presuming that the user in question is not in /etc/ftpusers and
does not have a null password).
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This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
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it is both uneeded and breaks certain lock-step timing in the rexec
protocol.
Yes, an attacker can "relay" connections using this trick, but a properly
configured firewall that would make this sort of subterfuge necessary in the
first place (instead of direct packet spoofing) would also thwart useful
attacks based on this.
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succeeded.
Never allow the reverse channel to be to a privileged port.
Cannidate for: 2.1 and 2.2 branches
Reviewed by: pst (with local cleanups)
Submitted by: Cy Shubert <cy@cwsys.cwent.com>
Obtained from: Jaeger <jaeger@dhp.com> via BUGTRAQ
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Rexecd is a crock, it never should have been written, however make it so
that people who have a need to run it don't hurt themselves so badly.
Obtained from: Ideas obtained from logdaemon 4.3 from Wietse Venema
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