| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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is based on an old implementation from the University of Michigan with lots of
changes and fixes by me and the addition of a Solaris-compatible API.
Sponsored by: Isilon Systems
Reviewed by: alfred
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fragment header.
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Bug submitted by: Andrea Campi <andrea+freebsd_current@webcom.it>
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Remove the special treatment of non-blocking mode in
the "look ahead function" xdrrec_eof(). It currently
assumes that the last read() in a row of several reads
does not have zero lenght. If this is the case, svc_vc_stat()
does return XPRT_MOREREQS, and the RPC-request aborts because
there is no data to read anymore.
To fix this, go back to the original version of the code
for non-blocking mode until NetBSD comes up with another
possible fix like this one in xdrrec_eof()
if (rstrm->last_frag && rstrm->in_finger == rstrm->in_boundry) {
return TRUE;
}
Return always FALSE in set_input_fragment() for non-blocking
mode. Since this was not used in FreeBSD, I omitted it at the
first time. Now we use this function and we should always
return FALSE for it.
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re
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`implicit declaration of function' variety.
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is finished. This fixes clients doing two RPCs over the
same connection at the same time. Without this fix, we
could end with a reply to old data.
Submitted by: Frank van der Linden <fvdl@netbsd.org>
Reviewed by: rwatson
Obtained from: NetBSD
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Reviewed by: rwatson
Obtained from: NetBSD
MFC after: 1 day
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fact that caddr_t is often misspelled as char *.
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
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I believe have made all of libc .c's as consistent as possible.
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associated changes that had to happen to make this possible as well as
bugs fixed along the way.
Bring in required TLI library routines to support this.
Since we don't support TLI we've essentially copied what NetBSD
has done, adding a thin layer to emulate direct the TLI calls
into BSD socket calls.
This is mostly from Sun's tirpc release that was made in 1994,
however some fixes were backported from the 1999 release (supposedly
only made available after this porting effort was underway).
The submitter has agreed to continue on and bring us up to the
1999 release.
Several key features are introduced with this update:
Client calls are thread safe. (1999 code has server side thread
safe)
Updated, a more modern interface.
Many userland updates were done to bring the code up to par with
the recent RPC API.
There is an update to the pthreads library, a function
pthread_main_np() was added to emulate a function of Sun's threads
library.
While we're at it, bring in NetBSD's lockd, it's been far too
long of a wait.
New rpcbind(8) replaces portmap(8) (supporting communication over
an authenticated Unix-domain socket, and by default only allowing
set and unset requests over that channel). It's much more secure
than the old portmapper.
Umount(8), mountd(8), mount_nfs(8), nfsd(8) have also been upgraded
to support TI-RPC and to support IPV6.
Umount(8) is also fixed to unmount pathnames longer than 80 chars,
which are currently truncated by the Kernel statfs structure.
Submitted by: Martin Blapp <mb@imp.ch>
Manpage review: ru
Secure RPC implemented by: wpaul
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check for on the server may arise legitimately on the client. The
correct way to check for a zero record length is to check for it
without the LAST_FRAG marker in it, since it's legal to send a LAST_FRAG
marker with 0 bytes of data.
PR: misc/16028
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size we receive here should fit into the receive buffer. Unfortunately,
there's no 100% foolproof way to distinguish a ridiculously large record
size that a client actually meant to send us from a ridiculously large
record size that was sent as a spoof attempt.
The one value that we can positively identify as bogus is zero. A
zero-sized record makes absolutely no sense, and sending an endless
supply of zeroes will cause the server to loop forever trying to
fill its receive buffer.
Note that the changes made to readtcp() make it okay to revert this
sanity test since the deadlock case where a client can keep the server
occupied forever in the readtcp() select() loop can't happen anymore.
This solution is not ideal, but is relatively easy to implement. The
ideal solution would be to re-arrange the way dispatching is handled
so that the select() loop in readtcp() can be eliminated, but this is
difficult to implement. I do plan to implement the complete solution
eventually but in the meantime I don't want to leave the RPC library
totally vulnerable.
That you very much Sun, may I have another.
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recently in BUGTRAQ. The set_input_fragment() routine in the XDR record
marking code blindly trusts that the first two bytes it sees will in fact
be an actual record header and that the specified size will be sane. In
fact, if you just telnet to a listening port of an RPC service and send a
few carriage returns, set_input_fragment() will obtain a ridiculously large
record size and sit there for a long time trying to read from the network.
A sanity test is required: if the record size is larger than the receive
buffer, punt.
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This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
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- 64 bit long type safe (wire protocols specified in explicit sized types)
- Support systems that don't do unaligned accesses
- Support for explicit int16 and int32 sizes in xdr
Obtained from: a diff of FreeBSD vs. OpenBSD/NetBSD rpc code.
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