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(instead of just mitigating through connection limits) the Bleichenbacher
attack which can lead to guessing of the server key (not host key) by
regenerating it when an RSA failure is detected.
Reviewed by: rwatson
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new features description elided in favor of checking out their
website.
Important new FreeBSD-version stuff: PAM support has been worked
in, partially from the "Unix" OpenSSH version, and a lot due to the
work of Eivind Eklend, too.
This requires at least the following in pam.conf:
sshd auth sufficient pam_skey.so
sshd auth required pam_unix.so try_first_pass
sshd session required pam_permit.so
Parts by: Eivind Eklend <eivind@FreeBSD.org>
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Reviewed by: gshapiro, peter, green
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It's the only way to be sure.
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the librsa* library and reports which version of the library (OpenSSL/RSAREF)
is being used.
This is then used in openssh to detect the failure case of RSAREF and a RSA key
>1024 bits, to print a more helpful error message than 'rsa_public_encrypt() fai
led.'
This is a 4.0-RELEASE candidate.
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