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the patch from ISC for lib/bind9/check.c and deletion of unused
files in lib/bind.
This version will by default randomize the UDP query source port
(and sequence number of course) for every query.
In order to take advantage of this randomization users MUST have an
appropriate firewall configuration to allow UDP queries to be sent and
answers to be received on random ports; and users MUST NOT specify a
port number using the query-source[-v6] options.
The avoid-v[46]-udp-ports options exist for users who wish to eliminate
certain port numbers from being chosen by named for this purpose. See
the ARM Chatper 6 for more information.
Also please note, this issue applies only to UDP query ports. A random
ephemeral port is always chosen for TCP queries.
This issue applies primarily to name servers whose main purpose is to
resolve random queries (sometimes referred to as "caching" servers, or
more properly as "resolving" servers), although even an "authoritative"
name server will make some queries, primarily at startup time.
All users of BIND are strongly encouraged to upgrade to the latest
version, and to utilize the source port randomization feature.
This update addresses issues raised in:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1447
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-forgery-resilience
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This is useful for things like *.pdf files that svn needs
to know about, and will probably be useful down the road
for other things.
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which included commits to RCS files with non-trunk default branches.
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The problem was, isc_atomic_cmpxchg() is almost like our
atomic_cmpset_32(), except it expects the old value to be
returned, whereas our atomic_cmpset_32 returns 1 on success,
or 0 on failure. So I re-implemented something suitable.
Submitted by: cognet
Reviewed by: bsdimp
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Brought to you by: PEBCAK
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which included commits to RCS files with non-trunk default branches.
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1. The default access control lists (acls) are not being
correctly set. If not set anyone can make recursive queries
and/or query the cache contents.
See also:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-2925
2. The DNS query id generation is vulnerable to cryptographic
analysis which provides a 1 in 8 chance of guessing the next
query id for 50% of the query ids. This can be used to perform
cache poisoning by an attacker.
This bug only affects outgoing queries, generated by BIND 9 to
answer questions as a resolver, or when it is looking up data
for internal uses, such as when sending NOTIFYs to slave name
servers.
All users are encouraged to upgrade.
See also:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-2926
Approved by: re (kensmith, implicit)
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code we already have assembly versions of.
Written by: imp
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present in BIND 9.4.1.
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9.3.3 sources.
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announced by ISC dated 31 October (delivered via e-mail to the
bind-announce@isc.org list on 2 November):
Description:
Because of OpenSSL's recently announced vulnerabilities
(CAN-2006-4339, CVE-2006-2937 and CVE-2006-2940) which affect named,
we are announcing this workaround and releasing patches. A proof of
concept attack on OpenSSL has been demonstrated for CAN-2006-4339.
OpenSSL is required to use DNSSEC with BIND.
Fix for version 9.3.2-P1 and lower:
Upgrade to BIND 9.3.2-P2, then generate new RSASHA1 and
RSAMD5 keys for all old keys using the old default exponent
and perform a key rollover to these new keys.
These versions also change the default RSA exponent to be
65537 which is not vulnerable to the attacks described in
CAN-2006-4339.
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vulnerabilities:
http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/re-20060905-00590.pdf?lang=en
2066. [security] Handle SIG queries gracefully. [RT #16300]
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/697164
1941. [bug] ncache_adderesult() should set eresult even if no
rdataset is passed to it. [RT #15642]
All users of BIND 9 are encouraged to upgrade to this version.
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in BIND 9.3.2 that were mistakenly removed from HEAD.
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part of the structure was a hack to maintain binary compatibility with
Sun binaries, and my understanding is that it's not needed generally
on sparc systems running other operating systems. Therefore, hide this
code behind the same set of tests as in lib/bind/include/netdb.h.
This file is being imported on the vendor branch because a similar change
(or change with similar effect) will be in the next version of BIND 9.
This change will not affect other platforms in any way.
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researched by glebius, and incorporated by ISC into the next
version of BIND. Unfortunately, it looks like their release
will come after the release of FreeBSD 6, so we will bring
this in now.
The patch addresses a problem with high-load resolvers which
hit memory barriers. Without this patch, running the resolving
name server out of memory would lead to "unpredictable results."
Of course, the canonical answer to this problem is to put more
memory into the system, however that is not always possible, and
the code should be able to handle this situation gracefully in
any case.
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These three files were missed in the original import because their names
contained the magic letters w, i and n in that sequence.
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