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Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netipsec/xform_esp.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/netipsec/xform_esp.c171
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 81 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netipsec/xform_esp.c b/sys/netipsec/xform_esp.c
index 18953f9..f1c1eaf 100644
--- a/sys/netipsec/xform_esp.c
+++ b/sys/netipsec/xform_esp.c
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/mutex.h>
+#include <machine/atomic.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/vnet.h>
@@ -180,12 +183,14 @@ esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
__func__, txform->name));
return EINVAL;
}
- if ((sav->flags&(SADB_X_EXT_OLD|SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) == SADB_X_EXT_IV4B) {
+ if ((sav->flags & (SADB_X_EXT_OLD | SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) ==
+ SADB_X_EXT_IV4B) {
DPRINTF(("%s: 4-byte IV not supported with protocol\n",
__func__));
return EINVAL;
}
- keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc);
+ /* subtract off the salt, RFC4106, 8.1 and RFC3686, 5.1 */
+ keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) * 4;
if (txform->minkey > keylen || keylen > txform->maxkey) {
DPRINTF(("%s: invalid key length %u, must be in the range "
"[%u..%u] for algorithm %s\n", __func__,
@@ -200,9 +205,10 @@ esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
* the ESP header will be processed incorrectly. The
* compromise is to force it to zero here.
*/
- sav->ivlen = (txform == &enc_xform_null ? 0 : txform->ivsize);
- sav->iv = (caddr_t) malloc(sav->ivlen, M_XDATA, M_WAITOK);
- key_randomfill(sav->iv, sav->ivlen); /*XXX*/
+ if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav))
+ sav->ivlen = 8; /* RFC4106 3.1 and RFC3686 3.1 */
+ else
+ sav->ivlen = (txform == &enc_xform_null ? 0 : txform->ivsize);
/*
* Setup AH-related state.
@@ -224,15 +230,15 @@ esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
*/
if (sav->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16) {
switch (keylen) {
- case AES_128_HMAC_KEY_LEN:
+ case AES_128_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES128GMAC;
sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128;
break;
- case AES_192_HMAC_KEY_LEN:
+ case AES_192_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES192GMAC;
sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192;
break;
- case AES_256_HMAC_KEY_LEN:
+ case AES_256_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES256GMAC;
sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256;
break;
@@ -244,19 +250,15 @@ esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
}
bzero(&cria, sizeof(cria));
cria.cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
- cria.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) + 4;
cria.cri_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
+ cria.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) - SAV_ISGCM(sav) * 32;
}
/* Initialize crypto session. */
- bzero(&crie, sizeof (crie));
+ bzero(&crie, sizeof(crie));
crie.cri_alg = sav->tdb_encalgxform->type;
- crie.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
crie.cri_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
- if (sav->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16)
- arc4rand(crie.cri_iv, sav->ivlen, 0);
-
- /* XXX Rounds ? */
+ crie.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) - SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) * 32;
if (sav->tdb_authalgxform && sav->tdb_encalgxform) {
/* init both auth & enc */
@@ -289,10 +291,6 @@ esp_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
if (sav->key_enc)
bzero(sav->key_enc->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc));
- if (sav->iv) {
- free(sav->iv, M_XDATA);
- sav->iv = NULL;
- }
sav->tdb_encalgxform = NULL;
sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
return error;
@@ -308,6 +306,7 @@ esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
struct auth_hash *esph;
struct enc_xform *espx;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
+ uint8_t *ivp;
int plen, alen, hlen;
struct newesp *esp;
struct cryptodesc *crde;
@@ -348,15 +347,13 @@ esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
*/
plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
if ((plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) || (plen <= 0)) {
- if (!espx || sav->alg_enc != SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16) {
- DPRINTF(("%s: payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets,"
- " SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
- plen, espx->blocksize, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst,
- buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
- ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
- m_freem(m);
- return EINVAL;
- }
+ DPRINTF(("%s: payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets,"
+ " SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, plen, espx->blocksize,
+ ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
+ (u_long)ntohl(sav->spi)));
+ ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
+ m_freem(m);
+ return EINVAL;
}
/*
@@ -402,20 +399,13 @@ esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
/* Authentication descriptor */
crda->crd_skip = skip;
- if (espx && espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
- crda->crd_len = hlen - sav->ivlen;
+ if (SAV_ISGCM(sav))
+ crda->crd_len = 8; /* RFC4106 5, SPI + SN */
else
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
- if (espx && (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)) {
- crda->crd_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
- crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
- } else {
- crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
- crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
- }
/* Copy the authenticator */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen,
@@ -450,13 +440,26 @@ esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
- crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
- crde->crd_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
- crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
- if (espx && (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16))
+ if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav)) {
+ ivp = &crde->crd_iv[0];
+
+ /* GCM IV Format: RFC4106 4 */
+ /* CTR IV Format: RFC3686 4 */
+ /* Salt is last four bytes of key, RFC4106 8.1 */
+ /* Nonce is last four bytes of key, RFC3686 5.1 */
+ memcpy(ivp, sav->key_enc->key_data +
+ _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - 4, 4);
+
+ if (SAV_ISCTR(sav)) {
+ /* Initial block counter is 1, RFC3686 4 */
+ be32enc(&ivp[sav->ivlen + 4], 1);
+ }
+
+ m_copydata(m, skip + hlen - sav->ivlen, sav->ivlen, &ivp[4]);
crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT;
+ }
- /* XXX Rounds ? */
+ crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
}
@@ -662,6 +665,8 @@ esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp,
char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
struct enc_xform *espx;
struct auth_hash *esph;
+ uint8_t *ivp;
+ uint64_t cntr;
int hlen, rlen, padding, blks, alen, i, roff;
struct mbuf *mo = (struct mbuf *) NULL;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
@@ -687,10 +692,9 @@ esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp,
rlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - skip; /* Raw payload length. */
/*
- * NB: The null encoding transform has a blocksize of 4
- * so that headers are properly aligned.
+ * RFC4303 2.4 Requires 4 byte alignment.
*/
- blks = espx->ivsize; /* IV blocksize */
+ blks = MAX(4, espx->blocksize); /* Cipher blocksize */
/* XXX clamp padding length a la KAME??? */
padding = ((blks - ((rlen + 2) % blks)) % blks) + 2;
@@ -814,7 +818,7 @@ esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp,
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (u_char *) &prot);
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
- crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1);
+ crp = crypto_getreq(esph != NULL ? 2 : 1);
if (crp == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
__func__));
@@ -823,29 +827,9 @@ esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp,
goto bad;
}
- if (espx) {
- crde = crp->crp_desc;
- crda = crde->crd_next;
-
- /* Encryption descriptor. */
- crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
- crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
- crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
- crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
-
- /* Encryption operation. */
- crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
- crde->crd_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
- crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
- if (espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
- crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT;
- /* XXX Rounds ? */
- } else
- crda = crp->crp_desc;
-
/* IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto),
- M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
+ M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
if (tc == NULL) {
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
@@ -854,6 +838,40 @@ esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp,
goto bad;
}
+ crde = crp->crp_desc;
+ crda = crde->crd_next;
+
+ /* Encryption descriptor. */
+ crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
+ crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
+ crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
+ crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
+
+ /* Encryption operation. */
+ crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
+ if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav)) {
+ ivp = &crde->crd_iv[0];
+
+ /* GCM IV Format: RFC4106 4 */
+ /* CTR IV Format: RFC3686 4 */
+ /* Salt is last four bytes of key, RFC4106 8.1 */
+ /* Nonce is last four bytes of key, RFC3686 5.1 */
+ memcpy(ivp, sav->key_enc->key_data +
+ _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - 4, 4);
+ SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
+ cntr = sav->cntr++;
+ SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
+ be64enc(&ivp[4], cntr);
+
+ if (SAV_ISCTR(sav)) {
+ /* Initial block counter is 1, RFC3686 4 */
+ be32enc(&ivp[sav->ivlen + 4], 1);
+ }
+
+ m_copyback(m, skip + hlen - sav->ivlen, sav->ivlen, &ivp[4]);
+ crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT|CRD_F_IV_PRESENT;
+ }
+
/* Callback parameters */
tc->tc_isr = isr;
KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
@@ -872,23 +890,13 @@ esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp,
if (esph) {
/* Authentication descriptor. */
+ crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
crda->crd_skip = skip;
- if (espx && espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
- crda->crd_len = hlen - sav->ivlen;
+ if (SAV_ISGCM(sav))
+ crda->crd_len = 8; /* RFC4106 5, SPI + SN */
else
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
-
- /* Authentication operation. */
- crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
- if (espx && espx->type == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16) {
- crda->crd_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
- crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc);
- } else {
- crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
- crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
- }
-
}
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
@@ -919,7 +927,8 @@ esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sp != NULL, ("NULL isr->sp"));
IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr);
sav = tc->tc_sav;
- /* With the isr lock released SA pointer can be updated. */
+
+ /* With the isr lock released, SA pointer may have changed. */
if (sav != isr->sav) {
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_notdb);
DPRINTF(("%s: SA gone during crypto (SA %s/%08lx proto %u)\n",
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