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-rw-r--r--sys/netinet6/ah_input.c708
1 files changed, 708 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c b/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f42814
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys/netinet6/ah_input.c
@@ -0,0 +1,708 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+/*
+ * RFC1826/2402 authentication header.
+ */
+
+#include "opt_inet.h"
+#include "opt_inet6.h"
+#include "opt_ipsec.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/mbuf.h>
+#include <sys/domain.h>
+#include <sys/protosw.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/errno.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
+#include <sys/syslog.h>
+
+#include <net/if.h>
+#include <net/route.h>
+#include <net/netisr.h>
+#include <machine/cpu.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/in_var.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
+#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <netinet6/ip6.h>
+#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
+#include <netinet6/icmp6.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
+#include <netinet6/ah.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <netinet6/ipsec6.h>
+#include <netinet6/ah6.h>
+#endif
+#include <netkey/key.h>
+#include <netkey/keydb.h>
+#ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG
+#include <netkey/key_debug.h>
+#else
+#define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg)
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/ipprotosw.h>
+
+#include <machine/stdarg.h>
+
+#include <net/net_osdep.h>
+
+#ifdef INET
+extern struct ipprotosw inetsw[];
+
+void
+ah4_input(m, off, proto)
+ struct mbuf *m;
+ int off, proto;
+{
+ struct ip *ip;
+ struct ah *ah;
+ u_int32_t spi;
+ struct ah_algorithm *algo;
+ size_t siz;
+ size_t siz1;
+ u_char *cksum;
+ struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
+ u_int16_t nxt;
+ size_t hlen;
+ int s;
+
+ if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct newah)) {
+ m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct newah));
+ if (!m) {
+ printf("IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
+ "dropping the packet for simplicity\n");
+ ipsecstat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
+ ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
+ nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
+#ifdef _IP_VHL
+ hlen = IP_VHL_HL(ip->ip_vhl) << 2;
+#else
+ hlen = ip->ip_hl << 2;
+#endif
+
+ /* find the sassoc. */
+ spi = ah->ah_spi;
+
+ if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET,
+ (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst,
+ IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
+ printf("IPv4 AH input: no key association found for spi %u;"
+ "dropping the packet for simplicity\n",
+ (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi));
+ ipsecstat.in_nosa++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
+ printf("DP ah4_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
+ if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
+ && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
+ printf("IPv4 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; "
+ "dropping the packet for simplicity\n",
+ (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi));
+ ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (sav->alg_auth == SADB_AALG_NONE) {
+ printf("IPv4 AH input: unspecified authentication algorithm "
+ "for spi %u;"
+ "dropping the packet for simplicity\n",
+ (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi));
+ ipsecstat.in_badspi++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ algo = &ah_algorithms[sav->alg_auth];
+
+ siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
+ siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
+
+ /*
+ * sanity checks for header, 1.
+ */
+ {
+ int sizoff;
+
+ sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
+
+ if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
+ log(LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv4 AH input "
+ "(%d should be %u): %s\n",
+ (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (unsigned int)siz1,
+ ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi));
+ ipsecstat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (m->m_len < off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1) {
+ m = m_pullup(m, off + sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1);
+ if (!m) {
+ printf("IPv4 AH input: can't pullup;"
+ "dropping the packet for simplicity\n");
+ ipsecstat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
+ ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip) + off);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * check for sequence number.
+ */
+ if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
+ if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
+ ; /*okey*/
+ else {
+ ipsecstat.in_ahreplay++;
+ log(LOG_AUTH, "replay packet in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
+ ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi),
+ ipsec_logsastr(sav));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
+ * cryptographic checksum.
+ */
+ cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
+ if (!cksum) {
+ printf("IPv4 AH input: couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n");
+ ipsecstat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ {
+ /*
+ * some of IP header fields are flipped to the host endian.
+ * convert them back to network endian. VERY stupid.
+ */
+ ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len + hlen);
+ ip->ip_id = htons(ip->ip_id);
+ ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off);
+ if (ah4_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, algo, sav)) {
+ free(cksum, M_TEMP);
+ ipsecstat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ipsecstat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
+ /*
+ * flip them back.
+ */
+ ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
+ ip->ip_id = ntohs(ip->ip_id);
+ ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
+ }
+
+ {
+ caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
+
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1826 */
+ sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
+ } else {
+ /* RFC 2402 */
+ sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
+ }
+
+ if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
+ log(LOG_AUTH, "checksum mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
+ ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi),
+ ipsec_logsastr(sav));
+ free(cksum, M_TEMP);
+ ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ free(cksum, M_TEMP);
+
+ m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
+ m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
+
+ /* M_AUTH related flags might be cleared here in the future */
+
+ if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
+ && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
+ ipsecstat.in_ahauthsucc++;
+ } else {
+ log(LOG_AUTH, "authentication failed in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
+ ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi),
+ ipsec_logsastr(sav));
+ ipsecstat.in_ahauthfail++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * update sequence number.
+ */
+ if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
+ (void)ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav);
+ }
+
+ /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
+ if (ipsec4_tunnel_validate(ip, nxt, sav) && nxt == IPPROTO_IPV4) {
+ /*
+ * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
+ * IP xx AH IP' payload -> IP' payload
+ *
+ * XXX more sanity checks
+ * XXX relationship with gif?
+ */
+ size_t stripsiz = 0;
+ u_int8_t tos;
+
+ tos = ip->ip_tos;
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1826 */
+ stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
+ } else {
+ /* RFC 2402 */
+ stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
+ }
+ m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
+ if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip)) {
+ m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip));
+ if (!m) {
+ ipsecstat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
+ /* ECN consideration. */
+ ip_ecn_egress(ip4_ipsec_ecn, &tos, &ip->ip_tos);
+ if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET,
+ (caddr_t)&ip->ip_src, (caddr_t)&ip->ip_dst)) {
+ log(LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch in IPv4 AH input: %s %s\n",
+ ipsec4_logpacketstr(ip, spi),
+ ipsec_logsastr(sav));
+ ipsecstat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Should the inner packet be considered authentic?
+ * My current answer is: NO.
+ *
+ * host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2
+ * In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the
+ * outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered
+ * between host1 and gw1.
+ *
+ * host1 -- gw1 === host2
+ * This case falls into the same scenario as above.
+ *
+ * host1 === host2
+ * This case is the only case when we may be able to leave
+ * M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set.
+ * However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows
+ * attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and
+ * dst=host2, you are in risk.
+ */
+ m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
+ m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
+
+ key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
+
+ s = splimp();
+ if (IF_QFULL(&ipintrq)) {
+ ipsecstat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ IF_ENQUEUE(&ipintrq, m);
+ m = NULL;
+ schednetisr(NETISR_IP); /*can be skipped but to make sure*/
+ splx(s);
+ nxt = IPPROTO_DONE;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * strip off AH.
+ * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
+ * the packet is placed in a single external mbuf.
+ */
+ size_t stripsiz = 0;
+
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1826 */
+ stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
+ } else {
+ /* RFC 2402 */
+ stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
+ }
+
+ ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
+ ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip) + stripsiz), off);
+ m->m_data += stripsiz;
+ m->m_len -= stripsiz;
+ m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
+
+ ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
+ /*ip_len is in host endian*/
+ ip->ip_len = ip->ip_len - stripsiz;
+ ip->ip_p = nxt;
+ /* forget about IP hdr checksum, the check has already been passed */
+
+ if (nxt != IPPROTO_DONE)
+ (*inetsw[ip_protox[nxt]].pr_input)(m, off, nxt);
+ else
+ m_freem(m);
+ m = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (sav) {
+ KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
+ printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
+ key_freesav(sav);
+ }
+ ipsecstat.in_success++;
+ return;
+
+fail:
+ if (sav) {
+ KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
+ printf("DP ah4_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
+ key_freesav(sav);
+ }
+ if (m)
+ m_freem(m);
+ return;
+}
+#endif /* INET */
+
+#ifdef INET6
+int
+ah6_input(mp, offp, proto)
+ struct mbuf **mp;
+ int *offp, proto;
+{
+ struct mbuf *m = *mp;
+ int off = *offp;
+ struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
+ struct ah *ah;
+ u_int32_t spi;
+ struct ah_algorithm *algo;
+ size_t siz;
+ size_t siz1;
+ u_char *cksum;
+ struct secasvar *sav = NULL;
+ u_int16_t nxt;
+ int s;
+
+ IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah), IPPROTO_DONE);
+
+ ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
+ ah = (struct ah *)(((caddr_t)ip6) + off);
+
+ nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
+
+ /* find the sassoc. */
+ spi = ah->ah_spi;
+
+ if (ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) == 0) {
+ printf("IPv6 AH input: AH with IPv6 jumbogram is not supported.\n");
+ ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if ((sav = key_allocsa(AF_INET6,
+ (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst,
+ IPPROTO_AH, spi)) == 0) {
+ printf("IPv6 AH input: no key association found for spi %u;"
+ "dropping the packet for simplicity\n",
+ (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi));
+ ipsec6stat.in_nosa++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
+ printf("DP ah6_input called to allocate SA:%p\n", sav));
+ if (sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
+ && sav->state != SADB_SASTATE_DYING) {
+ printf("IPv6 AH input: non-mature/dying SA found for spi %u; "
+ "dropping the packet for simplicity\n",
+ (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi));
+ ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (sav->alg_auth == SADB_AALG_NONE) {
+ printf("IPv6 AH input: unspecified authentication algorithm "
+ "for spi %u;"
+ "dropping the packet for simplicity\n",
+ (u_int32_t)ntohl(spi));
+ ipsec6stat.in_badspi++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ algo = &ah_algorithms[sav->alg_auth];
+
+ siz = (*algo->sumsiz)(sav);
+ siz1 = ((siz + 3) & ~(4 - 1));
+
+ /*
+ * sanity checks for header, 1.
+ */
+ {
+ int sizoff;
+
+ sizoff = (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 0 : 4;
+
+ if ((ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff != siz1) {
+ log(LOG_NOTICE, "sum length mismatch in IPv6 AH input "
+ "(%d should be %u): %s\n",
+ (ah->ah_len << 2) - sizoff, (unsigned int)siz1,
+ ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi));
+ ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK(m, off, sizeof(struct ah) + sizoff + siz1, IPPROTO_DONE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * check for sequence number.
+ */
+ if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
+ if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav))
+ ; /*okey*/
+ else {
+ ipsec6stat.in_ahreplay++;
+ log(LOG_AUTH, "replay packet in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
+ ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
+ ipsec_logsastr(sav));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * alright, it seems sane. now we are going to check the
+ * cryptographic checksum.
+ */
+ cksum = malloc(siz1, M_TEMP, M_NOWAIT);
+ if (!cksum) {
+ printf("IPv6 AH input: couldn't alloc temporary region for cksum\n");
+ ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (ah6_calccksum(m, (caddr_t)cksum, algo, sav)) {
+ free(cksum, M_TEMP);
+ ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ipsec6stat.in_ahhist[sav->alg_auth]++;
+
+ {
+ caddr_t sumpos = NULL;
+
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1826 */
+ sumpos = (caddr_t)(ah + 1);
+ } else {
+ /* RFC 2402 */
+ sumpos = (caddr_t)(((struct newah *)ah) + 1);
+ }
+
+ if (bcmp(sumpos, cksum, siz) != 0) {
+ log(LOG_AUTH, "checksum mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
+ ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
+ ipsec_logsastr(sav));
+ free(cksum, M_TEMP);
+ ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ free(cksum, M_TEMP);
+
+ m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR;
+ m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
+
+ /* M_AUTH related flags might be cleared here in the future */
+
+ if (m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPHDR
+ && m->m_flags & M_AUTHIPDGM) {
+ ipsec6stat.in_ahauthsucc++;
+ } else {
+ log(LOG_AUTH, "authentication failed in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
+ ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
+ ipsec_logsastr(sav));
+ ipsec6stat.in_ahauthfail++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * update sequence number.
+ */
+ if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0 && sav->replay) {
+ (void)ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(((struct newah *)ah)->ah_seq), sav);
+ }
+
+ /* was it transmitted over the IPsec tunnel SA? */
+ if (ipsec6_tunnel_validate(ip6, nxt, sav) && nxt == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
+ /*
+ * strip off all the headers that precedes AH.
+ * IP6 xx AH IP6' payload -> IP6' payload
+ *
+ * XXX more sanity checks
+ * XXX relationship with gif?
+ */
+ size_t stripsiz = 0;
+ u_int32_t flowinfo; /*net endian*/
+
+ flowinfo = ip6->ip6_flow;
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1826 */
+ stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
+ } else {
+ /* RFC 2402 */
+ stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
+ }
+ m_adj(m, off + stripsiz);
+ if (m->m_len < sizeof(*ip6)) {
+ /*
+ * m_pullup is prohibited in KAME IPv6 input processing
+ * but there's no other way!
+ */
+ m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(*ip6));
+ if (!m) {
+ ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
+ /* ECN consideration. */
+ ip6_ecn_egress(ip6_ipsec_ecn, &flowinfo, &ip6->ip6_flow);
+ if (!key_checktunnelsanity(sav, AF_INET6,
+ (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_src, (caddr_t)&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
+ log(LOG_NOTICE, "ipsec tunnel address mismatch in IPv6 AH input: %s %s\n",
+ ipsec6_logpacketstr(ip6, spi),
+ ipsec_logsastr(sav));
+ ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * should the inner packet be considered authentic?
+ * see comment in ah4_input().
+ */
+ m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
+ m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
+
+ key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
+
+ s = splimp();
+ if (IF_QFULL(&ip6intrq)) {
+ ipsec6stat.in_inval++;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ IF_ENQUEUE(&ip6intrq, m);
+ m = NULL;
+ schednetisr(NETISR_IPV6); /*can be skipped but to make sure*/
+ splx(s);
+ nxt = IPPROTO_DONE;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * strip off AH.
+ * We do deep-copy since KAME requires that
+ * the packet is placed in a single mbuf.
+ */
+ size_t stripsiz = 0;
+ char *prvnxtp;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the value of the next header field of AH to the
+ * next header field of the previous header.
+ * This is necessary because AH will be stripped off below.
+ */
+ prvnxtp = ip6_get_prevhdr(m, off); /* XXX */
+ *prvnxtp = nxt;
+
+ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) {
+ /* RFC 1826 */
+ stripsiz = sizeof(struct ah) + siz1;
+ } else {
+ /* RFC 2402 */
+ stripsiz = sizeof(struct newah) + siz1;
+ }
+
+ ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
+ ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip6, (caddr_t)(((u_char *)ip6) + stripsiz),
+ off);
+ m->m_data += stripsiz;
+ m->m_len -= stripsiz;
+ m->m_pkthdr.len -= stripsiz;
+
+ ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
+ ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) - stripsiz);
+
+ key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
+ }
+
+ *offp = off;
+ *mp = m;
+
+ if (sav) {
+ KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
+ printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
+ key_freesav(sav);
+ }
+ ipsec6stat.in_success++;
+ return nxt;
+
+fail:
+ if (sav) {
+ KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_IPSEC_STAMP,
+ printf("DP ah6_input call free SA:%p\n", sav));
+ key_freesav(sav);
+ }
+ if (m)
+ m_freem(m);
+ return IPPROTO_DONE;
+}
+#endif /* INET6 */
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