1 files changed, 402 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/sys/kern/sys_capability.c b/sys/kern/sys_capability.c
index 89dc923..04f98d8 100644
--- a/sys/kern/sys_capability.c
+++ b/sys/kern/sys_capability.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  *
  */
 
-#include "opt_capabilities.h"
+#include "opt_capsicum.h"
 
 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
@@ -59,18 +59,11 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <vm/uma.h>
 #include <vm/vm.h>
 
-#ifdef CAPABILITIES
+#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
 
 FEATURE(security_capabilities, "Capsicum Capability Mode");
 
 /*
- * We don't currently have any MIB entries for sysctls, but we do expose
- * security.capabilities so that it's easy to tell if options CAPABILITIES is
- * compiled into the kernel.
- */
-SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, capabilities, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Capsicum");
-
-/*
  * System call to enter capability mode for the process.
  */
 int
@@ -106,7 +99,7 @@ cap_getmode(struct thread *td, struct cap_getmode_args *uap)
 	return (copyout(&i, uap->modep, sizeof(i)));
 }
 
-#else /* !CAPABILITIES */
+#else /* !CAPABILITY_MODE */
 
 int
 cap_enter(struct thread *td, struct cap_enter_args *uap)
@@ -122,4 +115,403 @@ cap_getmode(struct thread *td, struct cap_getmode_args *uap)
 	return (ENOSYS);
 }
 
+#endif /* CAPABILITY_MODE */
+
+#ifdef CAPABILITIES
+
+/*
+ * struct capability describes a capability, and is hung off of its struct
+ * file f_data field.  cap_file and cap_rightss are static once hooked up, as
+ * neither the object it references nor the rights it encapsulates are
+ * permitted to change.
+ */
+struct capability {
+	struct file	*cap_object;	/* Underlying object's file. */
+	struct file	*cap_file;	/* Back-pointer to cap's file. */
+	cap_rights_t	 cap_rights;	/* Mask of rights on object. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Capabilities have a fileops vector, but in practice none should ever be
+ * called except for fo_close, as the capability will normally not be
+ * returned during a file descriptor lookup in the system call code.
+ */
+static fo_rdwr_t capability_read;
+static fo_rdwr_t capability_write;
+static fo_truncate_t capability_truncate;
+static fo_ioctl_t capability_ioctl;
+static fo_poll_t capability_poll;
+static fo_kqfilter_t capability_kqfilter;
+static fo_stat_t capability_stat;
+static fo_close_t capability_close;
+
+static struct fileops capability_ops = {
+	.fo_read = capability_read,
+	.fo_write = capability_write,
+	.fo_truncate = capability_truncate,
+	.fo_ioctl = capability_ioctl,
+	.fo_poll = capability_poll,
+	.fo_kqfilter = capability_kqfilter,
+	.fo_stat = capability_stat,
+	.fo_close = capability_close,
+	.fo_flags = DFLAG_PASSABLE,
+};
+
+static struct fileops capability_ops_unpassable = {
+	.fo_read = capability_read,
+	.fo_write = capability_write,
+	.fo_truncate = capability_truncate,
+	.fo_ioctl = capability_ioctl,
+	.fo_poll = capability_poll,
+	.fo_kqfilter = capability_kqfilter,
+	.fo_stat = capability_stat,
+	.fo_close = capability_close,
+	.fo_flags = 0,
+};
+
+static uma_zone_t capability_zone;
+
+static void
+capability_init(void *dummy __unused)
+{
+
+	capability_zone = uma_zcreate("capability", sizeof(struct capability),
+	    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, UMA_ALIGN_PTR, 0);
+	if (capability_zone == NULL)
+		panic("capability_init: capability_zone not initialized");
+}
+SYSINIT(vfs, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_ANY, capability_init, NULL);
+
+/*
+ * Test whether a capability grants the requested rights.
+ */
+static int
+cap_check(struct capability *c, cap_rights_t rights)
+{
+
+	if ((c->cap_rights | rights) != c->cap_rights)
+		return (ENOTCAPABLE);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract rights from a capability for monitoring purposes -- not for use in
+ * any other way, as we want to keep all capability permission evaluation in
+ * this one file.
+ */
+cap_rights_t
+cap_rights(struct file *fp_cap)
+{
+	struct capability *c;
+
+	KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY,
+	    ("cap_rights: !capability"));
+
+	c = fp_cap->f_data;
+	return (c->cap_rights);
+}
+
+/*
+ * System call to create a new capability reference to either an existing
+ * file object or an an existing capability.
+ */
+int
+cap_new(struct thread *td, struct cap_new_args *uap)
+{
+	int error, capfd;
+	int fd = uap->fd;
+	struct file *fp, *fcapp;
+	cap_rights_t rights = uap->rights;
+
+	AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
+#ifdef notyet	/* capability auditing will follow in a few commits */
+	AUDIT_ARG_RIGHTS(rights);
+#endif
+	error = fget(td, fd, &fp);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+	AUDIT_ARG_FILE(td->td_proc, fp);
+	error = kern_capwrap(td, fp, rights, &fcapp, &capfd);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+
+	/*
+	 * Release our reference to the file (kern_capwrap has held a reference
+	 * for the filedesc array).
+	 */
+	fdrop(fp, td);
+	td->td_retval[0] = capfd;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * System call to query the rights mask associated with a capability.
+ */
+int
+cap_getrights(struct thread *td, struct cap_getrights_args *uap)
+{
+	struct capability *cp;
+	struct file *fp;
+	int error;
+
+	AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd);
+	error = fgetcap(td, uap->fd, &fp);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+	cp = fp->f_data;
+	error = copyout(&cp->cap_rights, uap->rightsp, sizeof(*uap->rightsp));
+	fdrop(fp, td);
+	return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a capability to wrap around an existing file.
+ */
+int
+kern_capwrap(struct thread *td, struct file *fp, cap_rights_t rights,
+    struct file **fcappp, int *capfdp)
+{
+	struct capability *cp, *cp_old;
+	struct file *fp_object;
+	int error;
+
+	if ((rights | CAP_MASK_VALID) != CAP_MASK_VALID)
+		return (EINVAL);
+
+	/*
+	 * If a new capability is being derived from an existing capability,
+	 * then the new capability rights must be a subset of the existing
+	 * rights.
+	 */
+	if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY) {
+		cp_old = fp->f_data;
+		if ((cp_old->cap_rights | rights) != cp_old->cap_rights)
+			return (ENOTCAPABLE);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate a new file descriptor to hang the capability off of.
+	 */
+	error = falloc(td, fcappp, capfdp, fp->f_flag);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+
+	/*
+	 * Rather than nesting capabilities, directly reference the object an
+	 * existing capability references.  There's nothing else interesting
+	 * to preserve for future use, as we've incorporated the previous
+	 * rights mask into the new one.  This prevents us from having to
+	 * deal with capability chains.
+	 */
+	if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY)
+		fp_object = ((struct capability *)fp->f_data)->cap_object;
+	else
+		fp_object = fp;
+	fhold(fp_object);
+	cp = uma_zalloc(capability_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
+	cp->cap_rights = rights;
+	cp->cap_object = fp_object;
+	cp->cap_file = *fcappp;
+	if (fp->f_flag & DFLAG_PASSABLE)
+		finit(*fcappp, fp->f_flag, DTYPE_CAPABILITY, cp,
+		    &capability_ops);
+	else
+		finit(*fcappp, fp->f_flag, DTYPE_CAPABILITY, cp,
+		    &capability_ops_unpassable);
+
+	/*
+	 * Release our private reference (the proc filedesc still has one).
+	 */
+	fdrop(*fcappp, td);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a file descriptor, test it against a capability rights mask and then
+ * return the file descriptor on which to actually perform the requested
+ * operation.  As long as the reference to fp_cap remains valid, the returned
+ * pointer in *fp will remain valid, so no extra reference management is
+ * required, and the caller should fdrop() fp_cap as normal when done with
+ * both.
+ */
+int
+cap_funwrap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, struct file **fpp)
+{
+	struct capability *c;
+	int error;
+
+	if (fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY) {
+		*fpp = fp_cap;
+		return (0);
+	}
+	c = fp_cap->f_data;
+	error = cap_check(c, rights);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+	*fpp = c->cap_object;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Slightly different routine for memory mapping file descriptors: unwrap the
+ * capability and check CAP_MMAP, but also return a bitmask representing the
+ * maximum mapping rights the capability allows on the object.
+ */
+int
+cap_funwrap_mmap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, u_char *maxprotp,
+    struct file **fpp)
+{
+	struct capability *c;
+	u_char maxprot;
+	int error;
+
+	if (fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY) {
+		*fpp = fp_cap;
+		*maxprotp = VM_PROT_ALL;
+		return (0);
+	}
+	c = fp_cap->f_data;
+	error = cap_check(c, rights | CAP_MMAP);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+	*fpp = c->cap_object;
+	maxprot = 0;
+	if (c->cap_rights & CAP_READ)
+		maxprot |= VM_PROT_READ;
+	if (c->cap_rights & CAP_WRITE)
+		maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
+	if (c->cap_rights & CAP_MAPEXEC)
+		maxprot |= VM_PROT_EXECUTE;
+	*maxprotp = maxprot;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * When a capability is closed, simply drop the reference on the underlying
+ * object and free the capability.  fdrop() will handle the case where the
+ * underlying object also needs to close, and the caller will have already
+ * performed any object-specific lock or mqueue handling.
+ */
+static int
+capability_close(struct file *fp, struct thread *td)
+{
+	struct capability *c;
+	struct file *fp_object;
+
+	KASSERT(fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY,
+	    ("capability_close: !capability"));
+
+	c = fp->f_data;
+	fp->f_ops = &badfileops;
+	fp->f_data = NULL;
+	fp_object = c->cap_object;
+	uma_zfree(capability_zone, c);
+	return (fdrop(fp_object, td));
+}
+
+/*
+ * In general, file descriptor operations should never make it to the
+ * capability, only the underlying file descriptor operation vector, so panic
+ * if we do turn up here.
+ */
+static int
+capability_read(struct file *fp, struct uio *uio, struct ucred *active_cred,
+    int flags, struct thread *td)
+{
+
+	panic("capability_read");
+}
+
+static int
+capability_write(struct file *fp, struct uio *uio, struct ucred *active_cred,
+    int flags, struct thread *td)
+{
+
+	panic("capability_write");
+}
+
+static int
+capability_truncate(struct file *fp, off_t length, struct ucred *active_cred,
+    struct thread *td)
+{
+
+	panic("capability_truncate");
+}
+
+static int
+capability_ioctl(struct file *fp, u_long com, void *data,
+    struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td)
+{
+
+	panic("capability_ioctl");
+}
+
+static int
+capability_poll(struct file *fp, int events, struct ucred *active_cred,
+    struct thread *td)
+{
+
+	panic("capability_poll");
+}
+
+static int
+capability_kqfilter(struct file *fp, struct knote *kn)
+{
+
+	panic("capability_kqfilter");
+}
+
+static int
+capability_stat(struct file *fp, struct stat *sb, struct ucred *active_cred,
+    struct thread *td)
+{
+
+	panic("capability_stat");
+}
+
+#else /* !CAPABILITIES */
+
+/*
+ * Stub Capability functions for when options CAPABILITIES isn't compiled
+ * into the kernel.
+ */
+int
+cap_new(struct thread *td, struct cap_new_args *uap)
+{
+
+	return (ENOSYS);
+}
+
+int
+cap_getrights(struct thread *td, struct cap_getrights_args *uap)
+{
+
+	return (ENOSYS);
+}
+
+int
+cap_funwrap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, struct file **fpp)
+{
+
+	KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY,
+	    ("cap_funwrap: saw capability"));
+
+	*fpp = fp_cap;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+cap_funwrap_mmap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, u_char *maxprotp,
+    struct file **fpp)
+{
+
+	KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY,
+	    ("cap_funwrap_mmap: saw capability"));
+
+	*fpp = fp_cap;
+	*maxprotp = VM_PROT_ALL;
+	return (0);
+}
+
 #endif /* CAPABILITIES */
+