summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c830
1 files changed, 830 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c b/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70be0ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c
@@ -0,0 +1,830 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Robert N. M. Watson
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+/*
+ * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
+ * Support for POSIX.1e access control lists.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/sysproto.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
+#include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/mutex.h>
+#include <sys/namei.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/sysent.h>
+#include <sys/errno.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/acl.h>
+
+MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ACL, "acl", "access control list");
+
+static int vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
+ acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
+static int vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
+ acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
+static int vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
+ acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
+
+/*
+ * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics.
+ * Return 0 on success, else an errno value. Should be merged into
+ * vaccess() eventually.
+ */
+int
+vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
+ struct acl *acl, mode_t acc_mode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
+{
+ struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
+ mode_t dac_granted;
+ mode_t cap_granted;
+ mode_t acl_mask_granted;
+ int group_matched, i;
+
+ /*
+ * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
+ * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt
+ * to use privileges granted via cap_granted. In some cases,
+ * which privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match",
+ * in which case fall back on first match for the time being.
+ */
+ if (privused != NULL)
+ *privused = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found
+ * a DAC entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
+ */
+#ifndef CAPABILITIES
+ if (suser_cred(cred, PRISON_ROOT) == 0)
+ cap_granted = (VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VADMIN);
+ else
+ cap_granted = 0;
+#else
+ cap_granted = 0;
+
+ if (type == VDIR) {
+ if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
+ CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, PRISON_ROOT))
+ cap_granted |= VEXEC;
+ } else {
+ if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
+ CAP_DAC_EXECUTE, PRISON_ROOT))
+ cap_granted |= VEXEC;
+ }
+
+ if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
+ PRISON_ROOT))
+ cap_granted |= VREAD;
+
+ if ((acc_mode & VWRITE) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_WRITE,
+ PRISON_ROOT))
+ cap_granted |= VWRITE;
+
+ if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_FOWNER,
+ PRISON_ROOT))
+ cap_granted |= VADMIN;
+#endif /* CAPABILITIES */
+
+ /*
+ * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
+ * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're
+ * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK
+ * and ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
+ */
+ acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
+ switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
+ case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+ if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
+ break;
+ dac_granted = 0;
+ dac_granted |= VADMIN;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ dac_granted |= VEXEC;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ dac_granted |= VREAD;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ dac_granted |= VWRITE;
+ if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
+ return (0);
+ if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) ==
+ acc_mode) {
+ if (privused != NULL)
+ *privused = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ goto error;
+
+ case ACL_MASK:
+ acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
+ break;
+
+ case ACL_OTHER:
+ acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access
+ * ACL. If it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now,
+ * this means a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future
+ * should probably be a panic.
+ */
+ if (acl_other == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * XXX This should never happen
+ */
+ printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields
+ * are masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify
+ * the ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential
+ * user matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK,
+ * assume that the mask allows all requests to succeed.
+ */
+ if (acl_mask != NULL) {
+ acl_mask_granted = 0;
+ if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
+ if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
+ if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ acl_mask_granted |= VWRITE;
+ } else
+ acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE;
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate through user ACL entries. Do checks twice, first
+ * without privilege, and then if a match is found but failed,
+ * a second time with privilege.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Check ACL_USER ACL entries.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
+ switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
+ case ACL_USER:
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
+ break;
+ dac_granted = 0;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ dac_granted |= VEXEC;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ dac_granted |= VREAD;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ dac_granted |= VWRITE;
+ dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
+ if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
+ return (0);
+ if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
+ acc_mode)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (privused != NULL)
+ *privused = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a
+ * "best" match. Iterate across, testing each potential group
+ * match. Make sure we keep track of whether we found a match
+ * or not, so that we know if we should try again with any
+ * available privilege, or if we should move on to ACL_OTHER.
+ */
+ group_matched = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
+ switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
+ case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+ if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
+ break;
+ dac_granted = 0;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ dac_granted |= VEXEC;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ dac_granted |= VREAD;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ dac_granted |= VWRITE;
+ dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
+
+ if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
+ return (0);
+
+ group_matched = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case ACL_GROUP:
+ if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
+ break;
+ dac_granted = 0;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ dac_granted |= VEXEC;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ dac_granted |= VREAD;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ dac_granted |= VWRITE;
+ dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
+
+ if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
+ return (0);
+
+ group_matched = 1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (group_matched == 1) {
+ /*
+ * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via
+ * pure DAC. Try again, this time with privilege.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
+ switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
+ case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+ if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
+ break;
+ dac_granted = 0;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ dac_granted |= VEXEC;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ dac_granted |= VREAD;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ dac_granted |= VWRITE;
+ dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
+
+ if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
+ acc_mode)
+ break;
+
+ if (privused != NULL)
+ *privused = 1;
+ return (0);
+
+ case ACL_GROUP:
+ if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
+ cred))
+ break;
+ dac_granted = 0;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ dac_granted |= VEXEC;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ dac_granted |= VREAD;
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ dac_granted |= VWRITE;
+ dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
+
+ if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
+ acc_mode)
+ break;
+
+ if (privused != NULL)
+ *privused = 1;
+ return (0);
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
+ * Return failure.
+ */
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
+ */
+ dac_granted = 0;
+ if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ dac_granted |= VEXEC;
+ if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ dac_granted |= VREAD;
+ if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ dac_granted |= VWRITE;
+
+ if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
+ return (0);
+ if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) == acc_mode) {
+ if (privused != NULL)
+ *privused = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+error:
+ return ((acc_mode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
+}
+
+/*
+ * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an
+ * inode with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry
+ * to an acl_perm_t.
+ */
+acl_perm_t
+acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
+{
+ acl_perm_t perm = 0;
+
+ switch(tag) {
+ case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+ if (mode & S_IXUSR)
+ perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
+ if (mode & S_IRUSR)
+ perm |= ACL_READ;
+ if (mode & S_IWUSR)
+ perm |= ACL_WRITE;
+ return (perm);
+
+ case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+ if (mode & S_IXGRP)
+ perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
+ if (mode & S_IRGRP)
+ perm |= ACL_READ;
+ if (mode & S_IWGRP)
+ perm |= ACL_WRITE;
+ return (perm);
+
+ case ACL_OTHER:
+ if (mode & S_IXOTH)
+ perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
+ if (mode & S_IROTH)
+ perm |= ACL_READ;
+ if (mode & S_IWOTH)
+ perm |= ACL_WRITE;
+ return (perm);
+
+ default:
+ printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
+ * appropriate type.
+ */
+struct acl_entry
+acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+{
+ struct acl_entry acl_entry;
+
+ acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
+ acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
+ switch(tag) {
+ case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+ acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
+ break;
+
+ case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+ acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
+ break;
+
+ case ACL_OTHER:
+ acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
+ printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
+ }
+
+ return (acl_entry);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
+ */
+mode_t
+acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
+ struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
+{
+ mode_t mode;
+
+ mode = 0;
+ if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ mode |= S_IXUSR;
+ if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ mode |= S_IRUSR;
+ if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ mode |= S_IXGRP;
+ if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ mode |= S_IRGRP;
+ if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ mode |= S_IWGRP;
+ if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
+ mode |= S_IXOTH;
+ if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
+ mode |= S_IROTH;
+ if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
+ mode |= S_IWOTH;
+
+ return (mode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an
+ * implementing filesystem to determine if it should accept this and
+ * rely on the POSIX.1e ACL properties.
+ */
+int
+acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
+{
+ int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
+ int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
+ * defined for acl_t.
+ * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
+ * present:
+ * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
+ * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
+ * Exactly one ACL_OTHER
+ * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
+ * ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
+ * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
+ * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
+ * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
+ */
+ num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
+ num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
+ if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES || acl->acl_cnt < 0)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
+ /*
+ * Check for a valid tag.
+ */
+ switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
+ case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+ acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ num_acl_user_obj++;
+ break;
+ case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+ acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ num_acl_group_obj++;
+ break;
+ case ACL_USER:
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ num_acl_user++;
+ break;
+ case ACL_GROUP:
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ num_acl_group++;
+ break;
+ case ACL_OTHER:
+ acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ num_acl_other++;
+ break;
+ case ACL_MASK:
+ acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
+ if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ num_acl_mask++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return (EINVAL);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check for valid perm entries.
+ */
+ if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
+ ACL_PERM_BITS)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ }
+ if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
+ (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
+ return (EINVAL);
+ if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
+ (num_acl_mask != 1))
+ return (EINVAL);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * These calls wrap the real vnode operations, and are called by the
+ * syscall code once the syscall has converted the path or file
+ * descriptor to a vnode (unlocked). The aclp pointer is assumed
+ * still to point to userland, so this should not be consumed within
+ * the kernel except by syscall code. Other code should directly
+ * invoke VOP_{SET,GET}ACL.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Given a vnode, set its ACL.
+ */
+static int
+vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
+ struct acl *aclp)
+{
+ struct acl inkernacl;
+ struct mount *mp;
+ int error;
+
+ error = copyin(aclp, &inkernacl, sizeof(struct acl));
+ if (error)
+ return(error);
+ error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
+ if (error != 0)
+ return (error);
+ VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
+ vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
+ error = VOP_SETACL(vp, type, &inkernacl, td->td_ucred, td);
+ VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
+ vn_finished_write(mp);
+ return(error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a vnode, get its ACL.
+ */
+static int
+vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
+ struct acl *aclp)
+{
+ struct acl inkernelacl;
+ int error;
+
+ VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
+ vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
+ error = VOP_GETACL(vp, type, &inkernelacl, td->td_ucred, td);
+ VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
+ if (error == 0)
+ error = copyout(&inkernelacl, aclp, sizeof(struct acl));
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a vnode, delete its ACL.
+ */
+static int
+vacl_delete(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type)
+{
+ struct mount *mp;
+ int error;
+
+ error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+ VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
+ vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
+ error = VOP_SETACL(vp, type, NULL, td->td_ucred, td);
+ VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
+ vn_finished_write(mp);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a vnode, check whether an ACL is appropriate for it
+ */
+static int
+vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
+ struct acl *aclp)
+{
+ struct acl inkernelacl;
+ int error;
+
+ error = copyin(aclp, &inkernelacl, sizeof(struct acl));
+ if (error)
+ return(error);
+ error = VOP_ACLCHECK(vp, type, &inkernelacl, td->td_ucred, td);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * syscalls -- convert the path/fd to a vnode, and call vacl_whatever.
+ * Don't need to lock, as the vacl_ code will get/release any locks
+ * required.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Given a file path, get an ACL for it
+ *
+ * MPSAFE
+ */
+int
+__acl_get_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_file_args *uap)
+{
+ struct nameidata nd;
+ int error;
+
+ mtx_lock(&Giant);
+ NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
+ error = namei(&nd);
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = vacl_get_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, type),
+ SCARG(uap, aclp));
+ NDFREE(&nd, 0);
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a file path, set an ACL for it
+ *
+ * MPSAFE
+ */
+int
+__acl_set_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_file_args *uap)
+{
+ struct nameidata nd;
+ int error;
+
+ mtx_lock(&Giant);
+ NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
+ error = namei(&nd);
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = vacl_set_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, type),
+ SCARG(uap, aclp));
+ NDFREE(&nd, 0);
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a file descriptor, get an ACL for it
+ *
+ * MPSAFE
+ */
+int
+__acl_get_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_fd_args *uap)
+{
+ struct file *fp;
+ int error;
+
+ mtx_lock(&Giant);
+ error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, filedes), &fp);
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = vacl_get_acl(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
+ SCARG(uap, type), SCARG(uap, aclp));
+ fdrop(fp, td);
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a file descriptor, set an ACL for it
+ *
+ * MPSAFE
+ */
+int
+__acl_set_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_fd_args *uap)
+{
+ struct file *fp;
+ int error;
+
+ mtx_lock(&Giant);
+ error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, filedes), &fp);
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = vacl_set_acl(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
+ SCARG(uap, type), SCARG(uap, aclp));
+ fdrop(fp, td);
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a file path, delete an ACL from it.
+ *
+ * MPSAFE
+ */
+int
+__acl_delete_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_file_args *uap)
+{
+ struct nameidata nd;
+ int error;
+
+ mtx_lock(&Giant);
+ NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
+ error = namei(&nd);
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = vacl_delete(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, type));
+ NDFREE(&nd, 0);
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a file path, delete an ACL from it.
+ *
+ * MPSAFE
+ */
+int
+__acl_delete_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_fd_args *uap)
+{
+ struct file *fp;
+ int error;
+
+ mtx_lock(&Giant);
+ error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, filedes), &fp);
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = vacl_delete(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
+ SCARG(uap, type));
+ fdrop(fp, td);
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a file path, check an ACL for it
+ *
+ * MPSAFE
+ */
+int
+__acl_aclcheck_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_file_args *uap)
+{
+ struct nameidata nd;
+ int error;
+
+ mtx_lock(&Giant);
+ NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
+ error = namei(&nd);
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = vacl_aclcheck(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, type),
+ SCARG(uap, aclp));
+ NDFREE(&nd, 0);
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a file descriptor, check an ACL for it
+ *
+ * MPSAFE
+ */
+int
+__acl_aclcheck_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_fd_args *uap)
+{
+ struct file *fp;
+ int error;
+
+ mtx_lock(&Giant);
+ error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, filedes), &fp);
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = vacl_aclcheck(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
+ SCARG(uap, type), SCARG(uap, aclp));
+ fdrop(fp, td);
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+ return (error);
+}
OpenPOWER on IntegriCloud