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Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/kern_mac.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/kern_mac.c | 3955 |
1 files changed, 3955 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_mac.c b/sys/kern/kern_mac.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d6bf29 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/kern/kern_mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,3955 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson + * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin + * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the + * TrustedBSD Project. + * + * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network + * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network + * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), + * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Framework for extensible kernel access control. Kernel and userland + * interface to the framework, policy registration and composition. + */ + +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include "opt_mac.h" +#include "opt_devfs.h" + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/condvar.h> +#include <sys/extattr.h> +#include <sys/imgact.h> +#include <sys/kernel.h> +#include <sys/lock.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/mutex.h> +#include <sys/mac.h> +#include <sys/module.h> +#include <sys/proc.h> +#include <sys/sbuf.h> +#include <sys/systm.h> +#include <sys/sysproto.h> +#include <sys/sysent.h> +#include <sys/vnode.h> +#include <sys/mount.h> +#include <sys/file.h> +#include <sys/namei.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/pipe.h> +#include <sys/socketvar.h> +#include <sys/sysctl.h> + +#include <vm/vm.h> +#include <vm/pmap.h> +#include <vm/vm_map.h> +#include <vm/vm_object.h> + +#include <sys/mac_policy.h> + +#include <fs/devfs/devfs.h> + +#include <net/bpfdesc.h> +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/if_var.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <netinet/ip_var.h> + +#ifdef MAC + +/* + * Declare that the kernel provides MAC support, version 1. This permits + * modules to refuse to be loaded if the necessary support isn't present, + * even if it's pre-boot. + */ +MODULE_VERSION(kernel_mac_support, 1); + +SYSCTL_DECL(_security); + +SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, mac, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, + "TrustedBSD MAC policy controls"); + +#if MAC_MAX_SLOTS > 32 +#error "MAC_MAX_SLOTS too large" +#endif + +static unsigned int mac_max_slots = MAC_MAX_SLOTS; +static unsigned int mac_slot_offsets_free = (1 << MAC_MAX_SLOTS) - 1; +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, max_slots, CTLFLAG_RD, + &mac_max_slots, 0, ""); + +/* + * Has the kernel started generating labeled objects yet? All read/write + * access to this variable is serialized during the boot process. Following + * the end of serialization, we don't update this flag; no locking. + */ +static int mac_late = 0; + +/* + * Warn about EA transactions only the first time they happen. + * Weak coherency, no locking. + */ +static int ea_warn_once = 0; + +#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF +/* + * Flag to indicate whether or not we should allocate label storage for + * new mbufs. Since most dynamic policies we currently work with don't + * rely on mbuf labeling, try to avoid paying the cost of mtag allocation + * unless specifically notified of interest. One result of this is + * that if a dynamically loaded policy requests mbuf labels, it must + * be able to deal with a NULL label being returned on any mbufs that + * were already in flight when the policy was loaded. Since the policy + * already has to deal with uninitialized labels, this probably won't + * be a problem. Note: currently no locking. Will this be a problem? + */ +static int mac_labelmbufs = 0; +#endif + +static int mac_enforce_fs = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); + +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + +static int mac_enforce_network = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_network", &mac_enforce_network); + +static int mac_enforce_pipe = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_pipe, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_pipe, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on pipe operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_pipe", &mac_enforce_pipe); + +static int mac_enforce_process = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_process, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_process, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on inter-process operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_process", &mac_enforce_process); + +static int mac_enforce_socket = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_socket, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_socket, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on socket operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_socket", &mac_enforce_socket); + +static int mac_enforce_system = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_system, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_system, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on system operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_system", &mac_enforce_system); + +static int mac_enforce_vm = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_vm, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_vm, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on vm operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_vm", &mac_enforce_vm); + +static int mac_mmap_revocation = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_mmap_revocation, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files on subject " + "relabel"); +static int mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow = 0; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via " + "copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access"); + +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG +SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, debug, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, + "TrustedBSD MAC debug info"); + +static int mac_debug_label_fallback = 0; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_debug, OID_AUTO, label_fallback, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_debug_label_fallback, 0, "Filesystems should fall back to fs label" + "when label is corrupted."); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.debug_label_fallback", + &mac_debug_label_fallback); + +SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac_debug, OID_AUTO, counters, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, + "TrustedBSD MAC object counters"); + +static unsigned int nmacmbufs, nmaccreds, nmacifnets, nmacbpfdescs, + nmacsockets, nmacmounts, nmactemp, nmacvnodes, nmacdevfsdirents, + nmacipqs, nmacpipes, nmacprocs; + +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mbufs, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacmbufs, 0, "number of mbufs in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, creds, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmaccreds, 0, "number of ucreds in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ifnets, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacifnets, 0, "number of ifnets in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipqs, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacipqs, 0, "number of ipqs in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, bpfdescs, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacbpfdescs, 0, "number of bpfdescs in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, sockets, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacsockets, 0, "number of sockets in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, pipes, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacpipes, 0, "number of pipes in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, procs, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacprocs, 0, "number of procs in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mounts, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacmounts, 0, "number of mounts in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, temp, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmactemp, 0, "number of temporary labels in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, vnodes, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacvnodes, 0, "number of vnodes in use"); +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, devfsdirents, CTLFLAG_RD, + &nmacdevfsdirents, 0, "number of devfs dirents inuse"); +#endif + +static int error_select(int error1, int error2); +static int mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc); +static int mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc); + +static void mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(struct ucred *cred, + struct vnode *vp, int *prot); +static void mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td, + struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map); + +static void mac_destroy_socket_label(struct label *label); + +static int mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr(struct ucred *cred, + struct vnode *vp, struct label *intlabel); + +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACPIPELABEL, "macpipelabel", "MAC labels for pipes"); +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACTEMP, "mactemp", "MAC temporary label storage"); + +/* + * mac_static_policy_list holds a list of policy modules that are not + * loaded while the system is "live", and cannot be unloaded. These + * policies can be invoked without holding the busy count. + * + * mac_policy_list stores the list of dynamic policies. A busy count is + * maintained for the list, stored in mac_policy_busy. The busy count + * is protected by mac_policy_mtx; the list may be modified only + * while the busy count is 0, requiring that the lock be held to + * prevent new references to the list from being acquired. For almost + * all operations, incrementing the busy count is sufficient to + * guarantee consistency, as the list cannot be modified while the + * busy count is elevated. For a few special operations involving a + * change to the list of active policies, the mtx itself must be held. + * A condition variable, mac_policy_cv, is used to signal potential + * exclusive consumers that they should try to acquire the lock if a + * first attempt at exclusive access fails. + */ +static struct mtx mac_policy_mtx; +static struct cv mac_policy_cv; +static int mac_policy_count; +static LIST_HEAD(, mac_policy_conf) mac_policy_list; +static LIST_HEAD(, mac_policy_conf) mac_static_policy_list; + +/* + * We manually invoke WITNESS_WARN() to allow Witness to generate + * warnings even if we don't end up ever triggering the wait at + * run-time. The consumer of the exclusive interface must not hold + * any locks (other than potentially Giant) since we may sleep for + * long (potentially indefinite) periods of time waiting for the + * framework to become quiescent so that a policy list change may + * be made. + */ +static __inline void +mac_policy_grab_exclusive(void) +{ + WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL, + "mac_policy_grab_exclusive() at %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); + mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx); + while (mac_policy_count != 0) + cv_wait(&mac_policy_cv, &mac_policy_mtx); +} + +static __inline void +mac_policy_assert_exclusive(void) +{ + mtx_assert(&mac_policy_mtx, MA_OWNED); + KASSERT(mac_policy_count == 0, + ("mac_policy_assert_exclusive(): not exclusive")); +} + +static __inline void +mac_policy_release_exclusive(void) +{ + + KASSERT(mac_policy_count == 0, + ("mac_policy_release_exclusive(): not exclusive")); + mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx); + cv_signal(&mac_policy_cv); +} + +static __inline void +mac_policy_list_busy(void) +{ + mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx); + mac_policy_count++; + mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx); +} + +static __inline int +mac_policy_list_conditional_busy(void) +{ + int ret; + + mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx); + if (!LIST_EMPTY(&mac_policy_list)) { + mac_policy_count++; + ret = 1; + } else + ret = 0; + mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx); + return (ret); +} + +static __inline void +mac_policy_list_unbusy(void) +{ + mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx); + mac_policy_count--; + KASSERT(mac_policy_count >= 0, ("MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCK")); + if (mac_policy_count == 0) + cv_signal(&mac_policy_cv); + mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx); +} + +/* + * MAC_CHECK performs the designated check by walking the policy + * module list and checking with each as to how it feels about the + * request. Note that it returns its value via 'error' in the scope + * of the caller. + */ +#define MAC_CHECK(check, args...) do { \ + struct mac_policy_conf *mpc; \ + int entrycount; \ + \ + error = 0; \ + LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) { \ + if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## check != NULL) \ + error = error_select( \ + mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## check (args), \ + error); \ + } \ + if ((entrycount = mac_policy_list_conditional_busy()) != 0) { \ + LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { \ + if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## check != NULL) \ + error = error_select( \ + mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## check (args), \ + error); \ + } \ + mac_policy_list_unbusy(); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* + * MAC_BOOLEAN performs the designated boolean composition by walking + * the module list, invoking each instance of the operation, and + * combining the results using the passed C operator. Note that it + * returns its value via 'result' in the scope of the caller, which + * should be initialized by the caller in a meaningful way to get + * a meaningful result. + */ +#define MAC_BOOLEAN(operation, composition, args...) do { \ + struct mac_policy_conf *mpc; \ + int entrycount; \ + \ + LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) { \ + if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation != NULL) \ + result = result composition \ + mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation (args); \ + } \ + if ((entrycount = mac_policy_list_conditional_busy()) != 0) { \ + LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { \ + if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation != NULL) \ + result = result composition \ + mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation \ + (args); \ + } \ + mac_policy_list_unbusy(); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define MAC_EXTERNALIZE(type, label, elementlist, outbuf, \ + outbuflen) do { \ + int claimed, first, ignorenotfound, savedlen; \ + char *element_name, *element_temp; \ + struct sbuf sb; \ + \ + error = 0; \ + first = 1; \ + sbuf_new(&sb, outbuf, outbuflen, SBUF_FIXEDLEN); \ + element_temp = elementlist; \ + while ((element_name = strsep(&element_temp, ",")) != NULL) { \ + if (element_name[0] == '?') { \ + element_name++; \ + ignorenotfound = 1; \ + } else \ + ignorenotfound = 0; \ + savedlen = sbuf_len(&sb); \ + if (first) { \ + error = sbuf_printf(&sb, "%s/", element_name); \ + first = 0; \ + } else \ + error = sbuf_printf(&sb, ",%s/", element_name); \ + if (error == -1) { \ + error = EINVAL; /* XXX: E2BIG? */ \ + break; \ + } \ + claimed = 0; \ + MAC_CHECK(externalize_ ## type, label, element_name, \ + &sb, &claimed); \ + if (error) \ + break; \ + if (claimed == 0 && ignorenotfound) { \ + /* Revert last label name. */ \ + sbuf_setpos(&sb, savedlen); \ + } else if (claimed != 1) { \ + error = EINVAL; /* XXX: ENOLABEL? */ \ + break; \ + } \ + } \ + sbuf_finish(&sb); \ +} while (0) + +#define MAC_INTERNALIZE(type, label, instring) do { \ + char *element, *element_name, *element_data; \ + int claimed; \ + \ + error = 0; \ + element = instring; \ + while ((element_name = strsep(&element, ",")) != NULL) { \ + element_data = element_name; \ + element_name = strsep(&element_data, "/"); \ + if (element_data == NULL) { \ + error = EINVAL; \ + break; \ + } \ + claimed = 0; \ + MAC_CHECK(internalize_ ## type, label, element_name, \ + element_data, &claimed); \ + if (error) \ + break; \ + if (claimed != 1) { \ + /* XXXMAC: Another error here? */ \ + error = EINVAL; \ + break; \ + } \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* + * MAC_PERFORM performs the designated operation by walking the policy + * module list and invoking that operation for each policy. + */ +#define MAC_PERFORM(operation, args...) do { \ + struct mac_policy_conf *mpc; \ + int entrycount; \ + \ + LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) { \ + if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation != NULL) \ + mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation (args); \ + } \ + if ((entrycount = mac_policy_list_conditional_busy()) != 0) { \ + LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { \ + if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation != NULL) \ + mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation (args); \ + } \ + mac_policy_list_unbusy(); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Initialize the MAC subsystem, including appropriate SMP locks. + */ +static void +mac_init(void) +{ + + LIST_INIT(&mac_static_policy_list); + LIST_INIT(&mac_policy_list); + + mtx_init(&mac_policy_mtx, "mac_policy_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF); + cv_init(&mac_policy_cv, "mac_policy_cv"); +} + +/* + * For the purposes of modules that want to know if they were loaded + * "early", set the mac_late flag once we've processed modules either + * linked into the kernel, or loaded before the kernel startup. + */ +static void +mac_late_init(void) +{ + + mac_late = 1; +} + +/* + * After the policy list has changed, walk the list to update any global + * flags. + */ +static void +mac_policy_updateflags(void) +{ + struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc; +#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF + int labelmbufs; +#endif + + mac_policy_assert_exclusive(); + +#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF + labelmbufs = 0; +#endif + + LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) { +#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF + if (tmpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS) + labelmbufs++; +#endif + } + LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { +#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF + if (tmpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS) + labelmbufs++; +#endif + } + +#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF + mac_labelmbufs = (labelmbufs != 0); +#endif +} + +/* + * Allow MAC policy modules to register during boot, etc. + */ +int +mac_policy_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data) +{ + struct mac_policy_conf *mpc; + int error; + + error = 0; + mpc = (struct mac_policy_conf *) data; + + switch (type) { + case MOD_LOAD: + if (mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE && + mac_late) { + printf("mac_policy_modevent: can't load %s policy " + "after booting\n", mpc->mpc_name); + error = EBUSY; + break; + } + error = mac_policy_register(mpc); + break; + case MOD_UNLOAD: + /* Don't unregister the module if it was never registered. */ + if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED) + != 0) + error = mac_policy_unregister(mpc); + else + error = 0; + break; + default: + break; + } + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc) +{ + struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc; + int error, slot, static_entry; + + error = 0; + + /* + * We don't technically need exclusive access while !mac_late, + * but hold it for assertion consistency. + */ + mac_policy_grab_exclusive(); + + /* + * If the module can potentially be unloaded, or we're loading + * late, we have to stick it in the non-static list and pay + * an extra performance overhead. Otherwise, we can pay a + * light locking cost and stick it in the static list. + */ + static_entry = (!mac_late && + !(mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK)); + + if (static_entry) { + LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) { + if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) { + error = EEXIST; + goto out; + } + } + } else { + LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { + if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) { + error = EEXIST; + goto out; + } + } + } + if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) { + slot = ffs(mac_slot_offsets_free); + if (slot == 0) { + error = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + slot--; + mac_slot_offsets_free &= ~(1 << slot); + *mpc->mpc_field_off = slot; + } + mpc->mpc_runtime_flags |= MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED; + + /* + * If we're loading a MAC module after the framework has + * initialized, it has to go into the dynamic list. If + * we're loading it before we've finished initializing, + * it can go into the static list with weaker locker + * requirements. + */ + if (static_entry) + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_static_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list); + else + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list); + + /* Per-policy initialization. */ + if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init != NULL) + (*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init))(mpc); + mac_policy_updateflags(); + + printf("Security policy loaded: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname, + mpc->mpc_name); + +out: + mac_policy_release_exclusive(); + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc) +{ + + /* + * If we fail the load, we may get a request to unload. Check + * to see if we did the run-time registration, and if not, + * silently succeed. + */ + mac_policy_grab_exclusive(); + if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED) == 0) { + mac_policy_release_exclusive(); + return (0); + } +#if 0 + /* + * Don't allow unloading modules with private data. + */ + if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) { + MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK(); + return (EBUSY); + } +#endif + /* + * Only allow the unload to proceed if the module is unloadable + * by its own definition. + */ + if ((mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK) == 0) { + mac_policy_release_exclusive(); + return (EBUSY); + } + if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy != NULL) + (*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy))(mpc); + + LIST_REMOVE(mpc, mpc_list); + mpc->mpc_runtime_flags &= ~MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED; + mac_policy_updateflags(); + + mac_policy_release_exclusive(); + + printf("Security policy unload: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname, + mpc->mpc_name); + + return (0); +} + +/* + * Define an error value precedence, and given two arguments, selects the + * value with the higher precedence. + */ +static int +error_select(int error1, int error2) +{ + + /* Certain decision-making errors take top priority. */ + if (error1 == EDEADLK || error2 == EDEADLK) + return (EDEADLK); + + /* Invalid arguments should be reported where possible. */ + if (error1 == EINVAL || error2 == EINVAL) + return (EINVAL); + + /* Precedence goes to "visibility", with both process and file. */ + if (error1 == ESRCH || error2 == ESRCH) + return (ESRCH); + + if (error1 == ENOENT || error2 == ENOENT) + return (ENOENT); + + /* Precedence goes to DAC/MAC protections. */ + if (error1 == EACCES || error2 == EACCES) + return (EACCES); + + /* Precedence goes to privilege. */ + if (error1 == EPERM || error2 == EPERM) + return (EPERM); + + /* Precedence goes to error over success; otherwise, arbitrary. */ + if (error1 != 0) + return (error1); + return (error2); +} + +static struct label * +mbuf_to_label(struct mbuf *mbuf) +{ + struct m_tag *tag; + struct label *label; + + tag = m_tag_find(mbuf, PACKET_TAG_MACLABEL, NULL); + label = (struct label *)(tag+1); + + return (label); +} + +static void +mac_init_label(struct label *label) +{ + + bzero(label, sizeof(*label)); + label->l_flags = MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED; +} + +static void +mac_destroy_label(struct label *label) +{ + + KASSERT(label->l_flags & MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED, + ("destroying uninitialized label")); + + bzero(label, sizeof(*label)); + /* implicit: label->l_flags &= ~MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED; */ +} + +void +mac_init_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d) +{ + + mac_init_label(&bpf_d->bd_label); + MAC_PERFORM(init_bpfdesc_label, &bpf_d->bd_label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_add_int(&nmacbpfdescs, 1); +#endif +} + +static void +mac_init_cred_label(struct label *label) +{ + + mac_init_label(label); + MAC_PERFORM(init_cred_label, label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_add_int(&nmaccreds, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_init_cred(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + mac_init_cred_label(&cred->cr_label); +} + +void +mac_init_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de) +{ + + mac_init_label(&de->de_label); + MAC_PERFORM(init_devfsdirent_label, &de->de_label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_add_int(&nmacdevfsdirents, 1); +#endif +} + +static void +mac_init_ifnet_label(struct label *label) +{ + + mac_init_label(label); + MAC_PERFORM(init_ifnet_label, label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_add_int(&nmacifnets, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_init_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifp) +{ + + mac_init_ifnet_label(&ifp->if_label); +} + +int +mac_init_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, int flag) +{ + int error; + + mac_init_label(&ipq->ipq_label); + + MAC_CHECK(init_ipq_label, &ipq->ipq_label, flag); + if (error) { + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipq_label, &ipq->ipq_label); + mac_destroy_label(&ipq->ipq_label); + } +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + if (error == 0) + atomic_add_int(&nmacipqs, 1); +#endif + return (error); +} + +int +mac_init_mbuf_tag(struct m_tag *tag, int flag) +{ + struct label *label; + int error; + + label = (struct label *) (tag + 1); + mac_init_label(label); + + MAC_CHECK(init_mbuf_label, label, flag); + if (error) { + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mbuf_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); + } +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + if (error == 0) + atomic_add_int(&nmacmbufs, 1); +#endif + return (error); +} + +int +mac_init_mbuf(struct mbuf *m, int flag) +{ + struct m_tag *tag; + int error; + + M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m); + +#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF + /* + * Don't reserve space for labels on mbufs unless we have a policy + * that uses the labels. + */ + if (mac_labelmbufs) { +#endif + tag = m_tag_get(PACKET_TAG_MACLABEL, sizeof(struct label), + flag); + if (tag == NULL) + return (ENOMEM); + error = mac_init_mbuf_tag(tag, flag); + if (error) { + m_tag_free(tag); + return (error); + } + m_tag_prepend(m, tag); +#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF + } +#endif + return (0); +} + +void +mac_init_mount(struct mount *mp) +{ + + mac_init_label(&mp->mnt_mntlabel); + mac_init_label(&mp->mnt_fslabel); + MAC_PERFORM(init_mount_label, &mp->mnt_mntlabel); + MAC_PERFORM(init_mount_fs_label, &mp->mnt_fslabel); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_add_int(&nmacmounts, 1); +#endif +} + +static void +mac_init_pipe_label(struct label *label) +{ + + mac_init_label(label); + MAC_PERFORM(init_pipe_label, label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_add_int(&nmacpipes, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_init_pipe(struct pipe *pipe) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = malloc(sizeof(struct label), M_MACPIPELABEL, M_ZERO|M_WAITOK); + pipe->pipe_label = label; + pipe->pipe_peer->pipe_label = label; + mac_init_pipe_label(label); +} + +void +mac_init_proc(struct proc *p) +{ + + mac_init_label(&p->p_label); + MAC_PERFORM(init_proc_label, &p->p_label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_add_int(&nmacprocs, 1); +#endif +} + +static int +mac_init_socket_label(struct label *label, int flag) +{ + int error; + + mac_init_label(label); + + MAC_CHECK(init_socket_label, label, flag); + if (error) { + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); + } + +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + if (error == 0) + atomic_add_int(&nmacsockets, 1); +#endif + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_init_socket_peer_label(struct label *label, int flag) +{ + int error; + + mac_init_label(label); + + MAC_CHECK(init_socket_peer_label, label, flag); + if (error) { + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); + } + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_init_socket(struct socket *socket, int flag) +{ + int error; + + error = mac_init_socket_label(&socket->so_label, flag); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_init_socket_peer_label(&socket->so_peerlabel, flag); + if (error) + mac_destroy_socket_label(&socket->so_label); + + return (error); +} + +void +mac_init_vnode_label(struct label *label) +{ + + mac_init_label(label); + MAC_PERFORM(init_vnode_label, label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_add_int(&nmacvnodes, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_init_vnode(struct vnode *vp) +{ + + mac_init_vnode_label(&vp->v_label); +} + +void +mac_destroy_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_bpfdesc_label, &bpf_d->bd_label); + mac_destroy_label(&bpf_d->bd_label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacbpfdescs, 1); +#endif +} + +static void +mac_destroy_cred_label(struct label *label) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_cred_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmaccreds, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_destroy_cred(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + mac_destroy_cred_label(&cred->cr_label); +} + +void +mac_destroy_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_devfsdirent_label, &de->de_label); + mac_destroy_label(&de->de_label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacdevfsdirents, 1); +#endif +} + +static void +mac_destroy_ifnet_label(struct label *label) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ifnet_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacifnets, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_destroy_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifp) +{ + + mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&ifp->if_label); +} + +void +mac_destroy_ipq(struct ipq *ipq) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipq_label, &ipq->ipq_label); + mac_destroy_label(&ipq->ipq_label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacipqs, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(struct m_tag *tag) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = (struct label *)(tag+1); + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mbuf_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacmbufs, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_destroy_mount(struct mount *mp) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mount_label, &mp->mnt_mntlabel); + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mount_fs_label, &mp->mnt_fslabel); + mac_destroy_label(&mp->mnt_fslabel); + mac_destroy_label(&mp->mnt_mntlabel); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacmounts, 1); +#endif +} + +static void +mac_destroy_pipe_label(struct label *label) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_pipe_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacpipes, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_destroy_pipe(struct pipe *pipe) +{ + + mac_destroy_pipe_label(pipe->pipe_label); + free(pipe->pipe_label, M_MACPIPELABEL); +} + +void +mac_destroy_proc(struct proc *p) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_proc_label, &p->p_label); + mac_destroy_label(&p->p_label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacprocs, 1); +#endif +} + +static void +mac_destroy_socket_label(struct label *label) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacsockets, 1); +#endif +} + +static void +mac_destroy_socket_peer_label(struct label *label) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_peer_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); +} + +void +mac_destroy_socket(struct socket *socket) +{ + + mac_destroy_socket_label(&socket->so_label); + mac_destroy_socket_peer_label(&socket->so_peerlabel); +} + +void +mac_destroy_vnode_label(struct label *label) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(destroy_vnode_label, label); + mac_destroy_label(label); +#ifdef MAC_DEBUG + atomic_subtract_int(&nmacvnodes, 1); +#endif +} + +void +mac_destroy_vnode(struct vnode *vp) +{ + + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&vp->v_label); +} + +void +mac_copy_mbuf_tag(struct m_tag *src, struct m_tag *dest) +{ + struct label *src_label, *dest_label; + + src_label = (struct label *)(src+1); + dest_label = (struct label *)(dest+1); + + /* + * mac_init_mbuf_tag() is called on the target tag in + * m_tag_copy(), so we don't need to call it here. + */ + MAC_PERFORM(copy_mbuf_label, src_label, dest_label); +} + +static void +mac_copy_pipe_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(copy_pipe_label, src, dest); +} + +void +mac_copy_vnode_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(copy_vnode_label, src, dest); +} + +static int +mac_check_structmac_consistent(struct mac *mac) +{ + + if (mac->m_buflen > MAC_MAX_LABEL_BUF_LEN) + return (EINVAL); + + return (0); +} + +static int +mac_externalize_cred_label(struct label *label, char *elements, + char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags) +{ + int error; + + MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_externalize_ifnet_label(struct label *label, char *elements, + char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags) +{ + int error; + + MAC_EXTERNALIZE(ifnet_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_externalize_pipe_label(struct label *label, char *elements, + char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags) +{ + int error; + + MAC_EXTERNALIZE(pipe_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_externalize_socket_label(struct label *label, char *elements, + char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags) +{ + int error; + + MAC_EXTERNALIZE(socket_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_externalize_socket_peer_label(struct label *label, char *elements, + char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags) +{ + int error; + + MAC_EXTERNALIZE(socket_peer_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_externalize_vnode_label(struct label *label, char *elements, + char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags) +{ + int error; + + MAC_EXTERNALIZE(vnode_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_internalize_cred_label(struct label *label, char *string) +{ + int error; + + MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred_label, label, string); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_internalize_ifnet_label(struct label *label, char *string) +{ + int error; + + MAC_INTERNALIZE(ifnet_label, label, string); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_internalize_pipe_label(struct label *label, char *string) +{ + int error; + + MAC_INTERNALIZE(pipe_label, label, string); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_internalize_socket_label(struct label *label, char *string) +{ + int error; + + MAC_INTERNALIZE(socket_label, label, string); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_internalize_vnode_label(struct label *label, char *string) +{ + int error; + + MAC_INTERNALIZE(vnode_label, label, string); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other + * kernel processes and threads are spawned. + */ +void +mac_create_proc0(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_proc0, cred); +} + +/* + * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other + * userland processes and threads are spawned. + */ +void +mac_create_proc1(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_proc1, cred); +} + +void +mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td); +} + +/* + * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally, + * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible + * deltas. This function allows that processing to take place. + */ +void +mac_create_cred(struct ucred *parent_cred, struct ucred *child_cred) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_cred, parent_cred, child_cred); +} + +void +mac_update_devfsdirent(struct mount *mp, struct devfs_dirent *de, + struct vnode *vp) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(update_devfsdirent, mp, de, &de->de_label, vp, + &vp->v_label); +} + +void +mac_associate_vnode_devfs(struct mount *mp, struct devfs_dirent *de, + struct vnode *vp) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(associate_vnode_devfs, mp, &mp->mnt_fslabel, de, + &de->de_label, vp, &vp->v_label); +} + +int +mac_associate_vnode_extattr(struct mount *mp, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_associate_vnode_extattr"); + + MAC_CHECK(associate_vnode_extattr, mp, &mp->mnt_fslabel, vp, + &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +void +mac_associate_vnode_singlelabel(struct mount *mp, struct vnode *vp) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(associate_vnode_singlelabel, mp, &mp->mnt_fslabel, vp, + &vp->v_label); +} + +int +mac_create_vnode_extattr(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, + struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_create_vnode_extattr"); + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_create_vnode_extattr"); + + error = VOP_OPENEXTATTR(vp, cred, curthread); + if (error == EOPNOTSUPP) { + /* XXX: Optionally abort if transactions not supported. */ + if (ea_warn_once == 0) { + printf("Warning: transactions not supported " + "in EA write.\n"); + ea_warn_once = 1; + } + } else if (error) + return (error); + + MAC_CHECK(create_vnode_extattr, cred, mp, &mp->mnt_fslabel, + dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp, &vp->v_label, cnp); + + if (error) { + VOP_CLOSEEXTATTR(vp, 0, NOCRED, curthread); + return (error); + } + + error = VOP_CLOSEEXTATTR(vp, 1, NOCRED, curthread); + + if (error == EOPNOTSUPP) + error = 0; /* XXX */ + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *intlabel) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr"); + + error = VOP_OPENEXTATTR(vp, cred, curthread); + if (error == EOPNOTSUPP) { + /* XXX: Optionally abort if transactions not supported. */ + if (ea_warn_once == 0) { + printf("Warning: transactions not supported " + "in EA write.\n"); + ea_warn_once = 1; + } + } else if (error) + return (error); + + MAC_CHECK(setlabel_vnode_extattr, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, intlabel); + + if (error) { + VOP_CLOSEEXTATTR(vp, 0, NOCRED, curthread); + return (error); + } + + error = VOP_CLOSEEXTATTR(vp, 1, NOCRED, curthread); + + if (error == EOPNOTSUPP) + error = 0; /* XXX */ + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p, + struct label *execlabelstorage) +{ + struct mac mac; + char *buffer; + int error; + + if (mac_p == NULL) + return (0); + + error = copyin(mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + mac_init_cred_label(execlabelstorage); + error = mac_internalize_cred_label(execlabelstorage, buffer); + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_cred_label(execlabelstorage); + return (error); + } + imgp->execlabel = execlabelstorage; + return (0); +} + +void +mac_execve_exit(struct image_params *imgp) +{ + if (imgp->execlabel != NULL) + mac_destroy_cred_label(imgp->execlabel); +} + +void +mac_execve_transition(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *interpvnodelabel, struct image_params *imgp) +{ + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_execve_transition"); + + if (!mac_enforce_process && !mac_enforce_fs) + return; + + MAC_PERFORM(execve_transition, old, new, vp, &vp->v_label, + interpvnodelabel, imgp, imgp->execlabel); +} + +int +mac_execve_will_transition(struct ucred *old, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *interpvnodelabel, struct image_params *imgp) +{ + int result; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_execve_will_transition"); + + if (!mac_enforce_process && !mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + result = 0; + MAC_BOOLEAN(execve_will_transition, ||, old, vp, &vp->v_label, + interpvnodelabel, imgp, imgp->execlabel); + + return (result); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int acc_mode) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_access"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_access, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, acc_mode); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_chdir"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_chdir, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_chroot"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_chroot, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_create(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_create"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_create, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, cnp, vap); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_delete(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *vp, + struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_delete"); + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_delete"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_delete, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp, + &vp->v_label, cnp); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + acl_type_t type) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_deleteacl"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_deleteacl, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, type); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct image_params *imgp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_exec"); + + if (!mac_enforce_process && !mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_exec, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, imgp, + imgp->execlabel); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_getacl"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_getacl, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, type); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_getextattr"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_getextattr, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, + attrnamespace, name, uio); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_link(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_link"); + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_link"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_link, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp, + &vp->v_label, cnp); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_lookup"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_lookup, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, cnp); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_mmap(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int prot) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_mmap"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs || !mac_enforce_vm) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_mmap, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, prot); + return (error); +} + +void +mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int *prot) +{ + int result = *prot; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs || !mac_enforce_vm) + return; + + MAC_PERFORM(check_vnode_mmap_downgrade, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, + &result); + + *prot = result; +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_mprotect(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int prot) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_mprotect"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs || !mac_enforce_vm) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_mprotect, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, prot); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int acc_mode) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_open"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_open, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, acc_mode); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_poll(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred, + struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_poll"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_poll, active_cred, file_cred, vp, + &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_read(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred, + struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_read"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_read, active_cred, file_cred, vp, + &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_readdir"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_readdir, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_readlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_readlink"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_readlink, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_check_vnode_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *newlabel) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_relabel"); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_relabel, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, newlabel); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_rename_from"); + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_rename_from"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_rename_from, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp, + &vp->v_label, cnp); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, + struct vnode *vp, int samedir, struct componentname *cnp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_rename_to"); + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_rename_to"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_rename_to, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp, + vp != NULL ? &vp->v_label : NULL, samedir, cnp); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_revoke"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_revoke, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_setacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type, + struct acl *acl) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setacl"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setacl, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, type, acl); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setextattr"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setextattr, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, + attrnamespace, name, uio); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, u_long flags) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setflags"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setflags, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, flags); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, mode_t mode) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setmode"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setmode, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, mode); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, uid_t uid, + gid_t gid) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setowner"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setowner, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, uid, gid); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setutimes"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setutimes, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, atime, + mtime); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_stat(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred, + struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_stat"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_stat, active_cred, file_cred, vp, + &vp->v_label); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_vnode_write(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred, + struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_write"); + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_write, active_cred, file_cred, vp, + &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * When relabeling a process, call out to the policies for the maximum + * permission allowed for each object type we know about in its + * memory space, and revoke access (in the least surprising ways we + * know) when necessary. The process lock is not held here. + */ +void +mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred) +{ + + /* XXX freeze all other threads */ + mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(td, cred, + &td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map); + /* XXX allow other threads to continue */ +} + +static __inline const char * +prot2str(vm_prot_t prot) +{ + + switch (prot & VM_PROT_ALL) { + case VM_PROT_READ: + return ("r--"); + case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE: + return ("rw-"); + case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: + return ("r-x"); + case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: + return ("rwx"); + case VM_PROT_WRITE: + return ("-w-"); + case VM_PROT_EXECUTE: + return ("--x"); + case VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: + return ("-wx"); + default: + return ("---"); + } +} + +static void +mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred, + struct vm_map *map) +{ + struct vm_map_entry *vme; + int result; + vm_prot_t revokeperms; + vm_object_t object; + vm_ooffset_t offset; + struct vnode *vp; + + if (!mac_mmap_revocation) + return; + + vm_map_lock_read(map); + for (vme = map->header.next; vme != &map->header; vme = vme->next) { + if (vme->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP) { + mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(td, cred, + vme->object.sub_map); + continue; + } + /* + * Skip over entries that obviously are not shared. + */ + if (vme->eflags & (MAP_ENTRY_COW | MAP_ENTRY_NOSYNC) || + !vme->max_protection) + continue; + /* + * Drill down to the deepest backing object. + */ + offset = vme->offset; + object = vme->object.vm_object; + if (object == NULL) + continue; + while (object->backing_object != NULL) { + object = object->backing_object; + offset += object->backing_object_offset; + } + /* + * At the moment, vm_maps and objects aren't considered + * by the MAC system, so only things with backing by a + * normal object (read: vnodes) are checked. + */ + if (object->type != OBJT_VNODE) + continue; + vp = (struct vnode *)object->handle; + vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td); + result = vme->max_protection; + mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(cred, vp, &result); + VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); + /* + * Find out what maximum protection we may be allowing + * now but a policy needs to get removed. + */ + revokeperms = vme->max_protection & ~result; + if (!revokeperms) + continue; + printf("pid %ld: revoking %s perms from %#lx:%ld " + "(max %s/cur %s)\n", (long)td->td_proc->p_pid, + prot2str(revokeperms), (u_long)vme->start, + (long)(vme->end - vme->start), + prot2str(vme->max_protection), prot2str(vme->protection)); + vm_map_lock_upgrade(map); + /* + * This is the really simple case: if a map has more + * max_protection than is allowed, but it's not being + * actually used (that is, the current protection is + * still allowed), we can just wipe it out and do + * nothing more. + */ + if ((vme->protection & revokeperms) == 0) { + vme->max_protection -= revokeperms; + } else { + if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_WRITE) { + /* + * In the more complicated case, flush out all + * pending changes to the object then turn it + * copy-on-write. + */ + vm_object_reference(object); + vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td); + VM_OBJECT_LOCK(object); + vm_object_page_clean(object, + OFF_TO_IDX(offset), + OFF_TO_IDX(offset + vme->end - vme->start + + PAGE_MASK), + OBJPC_SYNC); + VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object); + VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); + vm_object_deallocate(object); + /* + * Why bother if there's no read permissions + * anymore? For the rest, we need to leave + * the write permissions on for COW, or + * remove them entirely if configured to. + */ + if (!mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow) { + vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE; + vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE; + } if ((revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) == 0) + vme->eflags |= MAP_ENTRY_COW | + MAP_ENTRY_NEEDS_COPY; + } + if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) { + vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE; + vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE; + } + if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) { + vme->max_protection = 0; + vme->protection = 0; + } + pmap_protect(map->pmap, vme->start, vme->end, + vme->protection & ~revokeperms); + vm_map_simplify_entry(map, vme); + } + vm_map_lock_downgrade(map); + } + vm_map_unlock_read(map); +} + +/* + * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege + * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified + * buffer cache. + */ +static void +mac_relabel_cred(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(relabel_cred, cred, newlabel); +} + +void +mac_relabel_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct label *newlabel) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(relabel_vnode, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, newlabel); +} + +void +mac_create_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_ifnet, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label); +} + +void +mac_create_bpfdesc(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *bpf_d) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_bpfdesc, cred, bpf_d, &bpf_d->bd_label); +} + +void +mac_create_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_socket, cred, socket, &socket->so_label); +} + +void +mac_create_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_pipe, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label); +} + +void +mac_create_socket_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket, + struct socket *newsocket) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_socket_from_socket, oldsocket, &oldsocket->so_label, + newsocket, &newsocket->so_label); +} + +static void +mac_relabel_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket, + struct label *newlabel) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(relabel_socket, cred, socket, &socket->so_label, newlabel); +} + +static void +mac_relabel_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, struct label *newlabel) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(relabel_pipe, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label, newlabel); +} + +void +mac_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *mbuf, struct socket *socket) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mbuf_to_label(mbuf); + + MAC_PERFORM(set_socket_peer_from_mbuf, mbuf, label, socket, + &socket->so_peerlabel); +} + +void +mac_set_socket_peer_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket, + struct socket *newsocket) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(set_socket_peer_from_socket, oldsocket, + &oldsocket->so_label, newsocket, &newsocket->so_peerlabel); +} + +void +mac_create_datagram_from_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, struct mbuf *datagram) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mbuf_to_label(datagram); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_datagram_from_ipq, ipq, &ipq->ipq_label, + datagram, label); +} + +void +mac_create_fragment(struct mbuf *datagram, struct mbuf *fragment) +{ + struct label *datagramlabel, *fragmentlabel; + + datagramlabel = mbuf_to_label(datagram); + fragmentlabel = mbuf_to_label(fragment); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_fragment, datagram, datagramlabel, fragment, + fragmentlabel); +} + +void +mac_create_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mbuf_to_label(fragment); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_ipq, fragment, label, ipq, &ipq->ipq_label); +} + +void +mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct mbuf *newmbuf) +{ + struct label *oldmbuflabel, *newmbuflabel; + + oldmbuflabel = mbuf_to_label(oldmbuf); + newmbuflabel = mbuf_to_label(newmbuf); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_from_mbuf, oldmbuf, oldmbuflabel, newmbuf, + newmbuflabel); +} + +void +mac_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct mbuf *mbuf) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mbuf_to_label(mbuf); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc, bpf_d, &bpf_d->bd_label, mbuf, + label); +} + +void +mac_create_mbuf_linklayer(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *mbuf) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mbuf_to_label(mbuf); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_linklayer, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, mbuf, + label); +} + +void +mac_create_mbuf_from_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *mbuf) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mbuf_to_label(mbuf); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_from_ifnet, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, mbuf, + label); +} + +void +mac_create_mbuf_multicast_encap(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct ifnet *ifnet, + struct mbuf *newmbuf) +{ + struct label *oldmbuflabel, *newmbuflabel; + + oldmbuflabel = mbuf_to_label(oldmbuf); + newmbuflabel = mbuf_to_label(newmbuf); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_multicast_encap, oldmbuf, oldmbuflabel, + ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, newmbuf, newmbuflabel); +} + +void +mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct mbuf *newmbuf) +{ + struct label *oldmbuflabel, *newmbuflabel; + + oldmbuflabel = mbuf_to_label(oldmbuf); + newmbuflabel = mbuf_to_label(newmbuf); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_netlayer, oldmbuf, oldmbuflabel, newmbuf, + newmbuflabel); +} + +int +mac_fragment_match(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq) +{ + struct label *label; + int result; + + label = mbuf_to_label(fragment); + + result = 1; + MAC_BOOLEAN(fragment_match, &&, fragment, label, ipq, + &ipq->ipq_label); + + return (result); +} + +void +mac_update_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mbuf_to_label(fragment); + + MAC_PERFORM(update_ipq, fragment, label, ipq, &ipq->ipq_label); +} + +void +mac_create_mbuf_from_socket(struct socket *socket, struct mbuf *mbuf) +{ + struct label *label; + + label = mbuf_to_label(mbuf); + + MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_from_socket, socket, &socket->so_label, mbuf, + label); +} + +void +mac_create_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_mount, cred, mp, &mp->mnt_mntlabel, + &mp->mnt_fslabel); +} + +void +mac_create_root_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_root_mount, cred, mp, &mp->mnt_mntlabel, + &mp->mnt_fslabel); +} + +int +mac_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct ifnet *ifnet) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_network) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_bpfdesc_receive, bpf_d, &bpf_d->bd_label, ifnet, + &ifnet->if_label); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_check_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) +{ + int error; + + MAC_CHECK(check_cred_relabel, cred, newlabel); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_process) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_cred_visible, u1, u2); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *mbuf) +{ + struct label *label; + int error; + + M_ASSERTPKTHDR(mbuf); + + if (!mac_enforce_network) + return (0); + + label = mbuf_to_label(mbuf); + + MAC_CHECK(check_ifnet_transmit, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, mbuf, + label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kenv_dump(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_dump, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kenv_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_get, cred, name); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kenv_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_set, cred, name, value); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_unset, cred, name); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_fs) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_mount_stat, cred, mount, &mount->mnt_mntlabel); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, unsigned long cmd, + void *data) +{ + int error; + + PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_pipe) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_ioctl, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label, cmd, data); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_pipe_poll(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe) +{ + int error; + + PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_pipe) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_poll, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_pipe_read(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe) +{ + int error; + + PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_pipe) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_read, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_check_pipe_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, + struct label *newlabel) +{ + int error; + + PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_pipe) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_relabel, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label, newlabel); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_pipe_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe) +{ + int error; + + PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_pipe) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_stat, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_pipe_write(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe) +{ + int error; + + PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_pipe) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_write, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc) +{ + int error; + + PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_process) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_proc_debug, cred, proc); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc) +{ + int error; + + PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_process) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_proc_sched, cred, proc); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum) +{ + int error; + + PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); + + if (!mac_enforce_process) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_proc_signal, cred, proc, signum); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *ucred, struct socket *socket, + struct sockaddr *sockaddr) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_socket) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_socket_bind, ucred, socket, &socket->so_label, + sockaddr); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_socket_connect(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket, + struct sockaddr *sockaddr) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_socket) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_socket_connect, cred, socket, &socket->so_label, + sockaddr); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_socket_deliver(struct socket *socket, struct mbuf *mbuf) +{ + struct label *label; + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_socket) + return (0); + + label = mbuf_to_label(mbuf); + + MAC_CHECK(check_socket_deliver, socket, &socket->so_label, mbuf, + label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_socket_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_socket) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_socket_listen, cred, socket, &socket->so_label); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_socket_receive(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_socket) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_socket_receive, cred, so, &so->so_label); + + return (error); +} + +static int +mac_check_socket_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket, + struct label *newlabel) +{ + int error; + + MAC_CHECK(check_socket_relabel, cred, socket, &socket->so_label, + newlabel); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_socket_send(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_socket) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_socket_send, cred, so, &so->so_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_socket) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_socket_visible, cred, socket, &socket->so_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_sysarch_ioperm(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_sysarch_ioperm, cred); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_system_acct(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + if (vp != NULL) { + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_system_acct"); + } + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_system_acct, cred, vp, + vp != NULL ? &vp->v_label : NULL); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_system_nfsd(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_system_nfsd, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_system_reboot(struct ucred *cred, int howto) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_system_reboot, cred, howto); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_system_settime(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_system_settime, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_system_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_system_swapon"); + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_system_swapon, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_system_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_system_swapoff"); + + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_system_swapoff, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen, + void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel, void *new, size_t newlen) +{ + int error; + + /* + * XXXMAC: We're very much like to assert the SYSCTL_LOCK here, + * but since it's not exported from kern_sysctl.c, we can't. + */ + if (!mac_enforce_system) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_system_sysctl, cred, name, namelen, old, oldlenp, + inkernel, new, newlen); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_ioctl_ifnet_get(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr, + struct ifnet *ifnet) +{ + char *elements, *buffer; + struct mac mac; + int error; + + error = copyin(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + error = mac_externalize_ifnet_label(&ifnet->if_label, elements, + buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1); + + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_ioctl_ifnet_set(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr, + struct ifnet *ifnet) +{ + struct label intlabel; + struct mac mac; + char *buffer; + int error; + + error = copyin(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + mac_init_ifnet_label(&intlabel); + error = mac_internalize_ifnet_label(&intlabel, buffer); + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&intlabel); + return (error); + } + + /* + * XXX: Note that this is a redundant privilege check, since + * policies impose this check themselves if required by the + * policy. Eventually, this should go away. + */ + error = suser_cred(cred, 0); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&intlabel); + return (error); + } + + MAC_CHECK(check_ifnet_relabel, cred, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, + &intlabel); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&intlabel); + return (error); + } + + MAC_PERFORM(relabel_ifnet, cred, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, &intlabel); + + mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&intlabel); + return (0); +} + +void +mac_create_devfs_device(struct mount *mp, dev_t dev, struct devfs_dirent *de) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_devfs_device, mp, dev, de, &de->de_label); +} + +void +mac_create_devfs_symlink(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, + struct devfs_dirent *dd, struct devfs_dirent *de) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_devfs_symlink, cred, mp, dd, &dd->de_label, de, + &de->de_label); +} + +void +mac_create_devfs_directory(struct mount *mp, char *dirname, int dirnamelen, + struct devfs_dirent *de) +{ + + MAC_PERFORM(create_devfs_directory, mp, dirname, dirnamelen, de, + &de->de_label); +} + +int +mac_setsockopt_label_set(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so, + struct mac *mac) +{ + struct label intlabel; + char *buffer; + int error; + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + buffer = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac->m_string, buffer, mac->m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + mac_init_socket_label(&intlabel, M_WAITOK); + error = mac_internalize_socket_label(&intlabel, buffer); + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_socket_label(&intlabel); + return (error); + } + + mac_check_socket_relabel(cred, so, &intlabel); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_socket_label(&intlabel); + return (error); + } + + mac_relabel_socket(cred, so, &intlabel); + + mac_destroy_socket_label(&intlabel); + return (0); +} + +int +mac_pipe_label_set(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, struct label *label) +{ + int error; + + PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED); + + error = mac_check_pipe_relabel(cred, pipe, label); + if (error) + return (error); + + mac_relabel_pipe(cred, pipe, label); + + return (0); +} + +int +mac_getsockopt_label_get(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so, + struct mac *mac) +{ + char *buffer, *elements; + int error; + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + elements = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac->m_string, elements, mac->m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + buffer = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + error = mac_externalize_socket_label(&so->so_label, elements, + buffer, mac->m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(buffer, mac->m_string, strlen(buffer)+1); + + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_getsockopt_peerlabel_get(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so, + struct mac *mac) +{ + char *elements, *buffer; + int error; + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + elements = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac->m_string, elements, mac->m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + buffer = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + error = mac_externalize_socket_peer_label(&so->so_peerlabel, + elements, buffer, mac->m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(buffer, mac->m_string, strlen(buffer)+1); + + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * Implementation of VOP_SETLABEL() that relies on extended attributes + * to store label data. Can be referenced by filesystems supporting + * extended attributes. + */ +int +vop_stdsetlabel_ea(struct vop_setlabel_args *ap) +{ + struct vnode *vp = ap->a_vp; + struct label *intlabel = ap->a_label; + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "vop_stdsetlabel_ea"); + + if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_MULTILABEL) == 0) + return (EOPNOTSUPP); + + error = mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr(ap->a_cred, vp, intlabel); + if (error) + return (error); + + mac_relabel_vnode(ap->a_cred, vp, intlabel); + + return (0); +} + +static int +vn_setlabel(struct vnode *vp, struct label *intlabel, struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (vp->v_mount == NULL) { + /* printf("vn_setlabel: null v_mount\n"); */ + if (vp->v_type != VNON) + printf("vn_setlabel: null v_mount with non-VNON\n"); + return (EBADF); + } + + if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_MULTILABEL) == 0) + return (EOPNOTSUPP); + + /* + * Multi-phase commit. First check the policies to confirm the + * change is OK. Then commit via the filesystem. Finally, + * update the actual vnode label. Question: maybe the filesystem + * should update the vnode at the end as part of VOP_SETLABEL()? + */ + error = mac_check_vnode_relabel(cred, vp, intlabel); + if (error) + return (error); + + /* + * VADMIN provides the opportunity for the filesystem to make + * decisions about who is and is not able to modify labels + * and protections on files. This might not be right. We can't + * assume VOP_SETLABEL() will do it, because we might implement + * that as part of vop_stdsetlabel_ea(). + */ + error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VADMIN, cred, curthread); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = VOP_SETLABEL(vp, intlabel, cred, curthread); + if (error) + return (error); + + return (0); +} + +int +__mac_get_pid(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_pid_args *uap) +{ + char *elements, *buffer; + struct mac mac; + struct proc *tproc; + struct ucred *tcred; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + tproc = pfind(uap->pid); + if (tproc == NULL) + return (ESRCH); + + tcred = NULL; /* Satisfy gcc. */ + error = p_cansee(td, tproc); + if (error == 0) + tcred = crhold(tproc->p_ucred); + PROC_UNLOCK(tproc); + if (error) + return (error); + + elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + crfree(tcred); + return (error); + } + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + error = mac_externalize_cred_label(&tcred->cr_label, elements, + buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1); + + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + crfree(tcred); + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +__mac_get_proc(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_proc_args *uap) +{ + char *elements, *buffer; + struct mac mac; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + error = mac_externalize_cred_label(&td->td_ucred->cr_label, + elements, buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1); + + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +__mac_set_proc(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_proc_args *uap) +{ + struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; + struct label intlabel; + struct proc *p; + struct mac mac; + char *buffer; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + mac_init_cred_label(&intlabel); + error = mac_internalize_cred_label(&intlabel, buffer); + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_cred_label(&intlabel); + return (error); + } + + newcred = crget(); + + p = td->td_proc; + PROC_LOCK(p); + oldcred = p->p_ucred; + + error = mac_check_cred_relabel(oldcred, &intlabel); + if (error) { + PROC_UNLOCK(p); + crfree(newcred); + goto out; + } + + setsugid(p); + crcopy(newcred, oldcred); + mac_relabel_cred(newcred, &intlabel); + p->p_ucred = newcred; + + /* + * Grab additional reference for use while revoking mmaps, prior + * to releasing the proc lock and sharing the cred. + */ + crhold(newcred); + PROC_UNLOCK(p); + + if (mac_enforce_vm) { + mtx_lock(&Giant); + mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms(td, newcred); + mtx_unlock(&Giant); + } + + crfree(newcred); /* Free revocation reference. */ + crfree(oldcred); + +out: + mac_destroy_cred_label(&intlabel); + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +__mac_get_fd(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_fd_args *uap) +{ + char *elements, *buffer; + struct label intlabel; + struct file *fp; + struct mac mac; + struct vnode *vp; + struct pipe *pipe; + short label_type; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + error = fget(td, uap->fd, &fp); + if (error) + goto out; + + label_type = fp->f_type; + switch (fp->f_type) { + case DTYPE_FIFO: + case DTYPE_VNODE: + vp = fp->f_vnode; + + mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel); + + vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td); + mac_copy_vnode_label(&vp->v_label, &intlabel); + VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); + + break; + case DTYPE_PIPE: + pipe = fp->f_data; + + mac_init_pipe_label(&intlabel); + + PIPE_LOCK(pipe); + mac_copy_pipe_label(pipe->pipe_label, &intlabel); + PIPE_UNLOCK(pipe); + break; + default: + error = EINVAL; + fdrop(fp, td); + goto out; + } + fdrop(fp, td); + + switch (label_type) { + case DTYPE_FIFO: + case DTYPE_VNODE: + if (error == 0) + error = mac_externalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, + elements, buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + break; + case DTYPE_PIPE: + error = mac_externalize_pipe_label(&intlabel, elements, + buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + mac_destroy_pipe_label(&intlabel); + break; + default: + panic("__mac_get_fd: corrupted label_type"); + } + + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1); + +out: + mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +__mac_get_file(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_file_args *uap) +{ + char *elements, *buffer; + struct nameidata nd; + struct label intlabel; + struct mac mac; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path_p, + td); + error = namei(&nd); + if (error) + goto out; + + mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel); + mac_copy_vnode_label(&nd.ni_vp->v_label, &intlabel); + error = mac_externalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, elements, buffer, + mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + + NDFREE(&nd, 0); + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1); + +out: + mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +__mac_get_link(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_link_args *uap) +{ + char *elements, *buffer; + struct nameidata nd; + struct label intlabel; + struct mac mac; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path_p, + td); + error = namei(&nd); + if (error) + goto out; + + mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel); + mac_copy_vnode_label(&nd.ni_vp->v_label, &intlabel); + error = mac_externalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, elements, buffer, + mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK); + NDFREE(&nd, 0); + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1); + +out: + mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + free(elements, M_MACTEMP); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +__mac_set_fd(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_fd_args *uap) +{ + struct label intlabel; + struct pipe *pipe; + struct file *fp; + struct mount *mp; + struct vnode *vp; + struct mac mac; + char *buffer; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + + error = fget(td, uap->fd, &fp); + if (error) + goto out; + + switch (fp->f_type) { + case DTYPE_FIFO: + case DTYPE_VNODE: + mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel); + error = mac_internalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, buffer); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + break; + } + + vp = fp->f_vnode; + error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH); + if (error != 0) { + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + break; + } + + vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td); + error = vn_setlabel(vp, &intlabel, td->td_ucred); + VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); + vn_finished_write(mp); + + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + break; + + case DTYPE_PIPE: + mac_init_pipe_label(&intlabel); + error = mac_internalize_pipe_label(&intlabel, buffer); + if (error == 0) { + pipe = fp->f_data; + PIPE_LOCK(pipe); + error = mac_pipe_label_set(td->td_ucred, pipe, + &intlabel); + PIPE_UNLOCK(pipe); + } + + mac_destroy_pipe_label(&intlabel); + break; + + default: + error = EINVAL; + } + + fdrop(fp, td); +out: + mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +__mac_set_file(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_file_args *uap) +{ + struct label intlabel; + struct nameidata nd; + struct mount *mp; + struct mac mac; + char *buffer; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel); + error = mac_internalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, buffer); + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + return (error); + } + + mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + + NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path_p, + td); + error = namei(&nd); + if (error == 0) { + error = vn_start_write(nd.ni_vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH); + if (error == 0) + error = vn_setlabel(nd.ni_vp, &intlabel, + td->td_ucred); + vn_finished_write(mp); + } + + NDFREE(&nd, 0); + mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +__mac_set_link(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_link_args *uap) +{ + struct label intlabel; + struct nameidata nd; + struct mount *mp; + struct mac mac; + char *buffer; + int error; + + error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); + if (error) + return (error); + + buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); + error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); + if (error) { + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + return (error); + } + + mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel); + error = mac_internalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, buffer); + free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); + if (error) { + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + return (error); + } + + mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + + NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path_p, + td); + error = namei(&nd); + if (error == 0) { + error = vn_start_write(nd.ni_vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH); + if (error == 0) + error = vn_setlabel(nd.ni_vp, &intlabel, + td->td_ucred); + vn_finished_write(mp); + } + + NDFREE(&nd, 0); + mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */ + mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel); + + return (error); +} + +/* + * MPSAFE + */ +int +mac_syscall(struct thread *td, struct mac_syscall_args *uap) +{ + struct mac_policy_conf *mpc; + char target[MAC_MAX_POLICY_NAME]; + int entrycount, error; + + error = copyinstr(uap->policy, target, sizeof(target), NULL); + if (error) + return (error); + + error = ENOSYS; + LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { + if (strcmp(mpc->mpc_name, target) == 0 && + mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_syscall != NULL) { + error = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_syscall(td, + uap->call, uap->arg); + goto out; + } + } + + if ((entrycount = mac_policy_list_conditional_busy()) != 0) { + LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { + if (strcmp(mpc->mpc_name, target) == 0 && + mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_syscall != NULL) { + error = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_syscall(td, + uap->call, uap->arg); + break; + } + } + mac_policy_list_unbusy(); + } +out: + return (error); +} + +SYSINIT(mac, SI_SUB_MAC, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mac_init, NULL); +SYSINIT(mac_late, SI_SUB_MAC_LATE, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mac_late_init, NULL); + +#else /* !MAC */ + +int +__mac_get_pid(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_pid_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +__mac_get_proc(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_proc_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +__mac_set_proc(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_proc_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +__mac_get_fd(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_fd_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +__mac_get_file(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_file_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +__mac_get_link(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_link_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +__mac_set_fd(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_fd_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +__mac_set_file(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_file_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +__mac_set_link(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_link_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +int +mac_syscall(struct thread *td, struct mac_syscall_args *uap) +{ + + return (ENOSYS); +} + +#endif |
