diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/kern_jail.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/kern_jail.c | 4640 |
1 files changed, 4640 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ff64d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c @@ -0,0 +1,4640 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1999 Poul-Henning Kamp. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Bjoern A. Zeeb. + * Copyright (c) 2009 James Gritton. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include "opt_compat.h" +#include "opt_ddb.h" +#include "opt_inet.h" +#include "opt_inet6.h" + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/kernel.h> +#include <sys/systm.h> +#include <sys/errno.h> +#include <sys/sysproto.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/osd.h> +#include <sys/priv.h> +#include <sys/proc.h> +#include <sys/taskqueue.h> +#include <sys/fcntl.h> +#include <sys/jail.h> +#include <sys/lock.h> +#include <sys/mutex.h> +#include <sys/racct.h> +#include <sys/refcount.h> +#include <sys/sx.h> +#include <sys/sysent.h> +#include <sys/namei.h> +#include <sys/mount.h> +#include <sys/queue.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/syscallsubr.h> +#include <sys/sysctl.h> +#include <sys/vnode.h> + +#include <net/if.h> +#include <net/vnet.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> + +#ifdef DDB +#include <ddb/ddb.h> +#ifdef INET6 +#include <netinet6/in6_var.h> +#endif /* INET6 */ +#endif /* DDB */ + +#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h> + +#define DEFAULT_HOSTUUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" + +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON, "prison", "Prison structures"); +static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON_RACCT, "prison_racct", "Prison racct structures"); + +/* Keep struct prison prison0 and some code in kern_jail_set() readable. */ +#ifdef INET +#ifdef INET6 +#define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP4_SADDRSEL|PR_IP6_SADDRSEL +#else +#define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP4_SADDRSEL +#endif +#else /* !INET */ +#ifdef INET6 +#define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP6_SADDRSEL +#else +#define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL 0 +#endif +#endif + +/* prison0 describes what is "real" about the system. */ +struct prison prison0 = { + .pr_id = 0, + .pr_name = "0", + .pr_ref = 1, + .pr_uref = 1, + .pr_path = "/", + .pr_securelevel = -1, + .pr_devfs_rsnum = 0, + .pr_childmax = JAIL_MAX, + .pr_hostuuid = DEFAULT_HOSTUUID, + .pr_children = LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(prison0.pr_children), +#ifdef VIMAGE + .pr_flags = PR_HOST|PR_VNET|_PR_IP_SADDRSEL, +#else + .pr_flags = PR_HOST|_PR_IP_SADDRSEL, +#endif + .pr_allow = PR_ALLOW_ALL, +}; +MTX_SYSINIT(prison0, &prison0.pr_mtx, "jail mutex", MTX_DEF); + +/* allprison, allprison_racct and lastprid are protected by allprison_lock. */ +struct sx allprison_lock; +SX_SYSINIT(allprison_lock, &allprison_lock, "allprison"); +struct prisonlist allprison = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(allprison); +LIST_HEAD(, prison_racct) allprison_racct; +int lastprid = 0; + +static int do_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct prison *pr); +static void prison_complete(void *context, int pending); +static void prison_deref(struct prison *pr, int flags); +static char *prison_path(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2); +static void prison_remove_one(struct prison *pr); +#ifdef RACCT +static void prison_racct_attach(struct prison *pr); +static void prison_racct_modify(struct prison *pr); +static void prison_racct_detach(struct prison *pr); +#endif +#ifdef INET +static int _prison_check_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *ia); +static int prison_restrict_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *newip4); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 +static int _prison_check_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *ia6); +static int prison_restrict_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *newip6); +#endif + +/* Flags for prison_deref */ +#define PD_DEREF 0x01 +#define PD_DEUREF 0x02 +#define PD_LOCKED 0x04 +#define PD_LIST_SLOCKED 0x08 +#define PD_LIST_XLOCKED 0x10 + +/* + * Parameter names corresponding to PR_* flag values. Size values are for kvm + * as we cannot figure out the size of a sparse array, or an array without a + * terminating entry. + */ +static char *pr_flag_names[] = { + [0] = "persist", +#ifdef INET + [7] = "ip4.saddrsel", +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + [8] = "ip6.saddrsel", +#endif +}; +const size_t pr_flag_names_size = sizeof(pr_flag_names); + +static char *pr_flag_nonames[] = { + [0] = "nopersist", +#ifdef INET + [7] = "ip4.nosaddrsel", +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + [8] = "ip6.nosaddrsel", +#endif +}; +const size_t pr_flag_nonames_size = sizeof(pr_flag_nonames); + +struct jailsys_flags { + const char *name; + unsigned disable; + unsigned new; +} pr_flag_jailsys[] = { + { "host", 0, PR_HOST }, +#ifdef VIMAGE + { "vnet", 0, PR_VNET }, +#endif +#ifdef INET + { "ip4", PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP4_DISABLE, PR_IP4_USER }, +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + { "ip6", PR_IP6_USER | PR_IP6_DISABLE, PR_IP6_USER }, +#endif +}; +const size_t pr_flag_jailsys_size = sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys); + +static char *pr_allow_names[] = { + "allow.set_hostname", + "allow.sysvipc", + "allow.raw_sockets", + "allow.chflags", + "allow.mount", + "allow.quotas", + "allow.socket_af", + "allow.mount.devfs", + "allow.mount.nullfs", + "allow.mount.zfs", + "allow.mount.procfs", +}; +const size_t pr_allow_names_size = sizeof(pr_allow_names); + +static char *pr_allow_nonames[] = { + "allow.noset_hostname", + "allow.nosysvipc", + "allow.noraw_sockets", + "allow.nochflags", + "allow.nomount", + "allow.noquotas", + "allow.nosocket_af", + "allow.mount.nodevfs", + "allow.mount.nonullfs", + "allow.mount.nozfs", + "allow.mount.noprocfs", +}; +const size_t pr_allow_nonames_size = sizeof(pr_allow_nonames); + +#define JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW PR_ALLOW_SET_HOSTNAME +#define JAIL_DEFAULT_ENFORCE_STATFS 2 +#define JAIL_DEFAULT_DEVFS_RSNUM 0 +static unsigned jail_default_allow = JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW; +static int jail_default_enforce_statfs = JAIL_DEFAULT_ENFORCE_STATFS; +static int jail_default_devfs_rsnum = JAIL_DEFAULT_DEVFS_RSNUM; +#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) +static unsigned jail_max_af_ips = 255; +#endif + +#ifdef INET +static int +qcmp_v4(const void *ip1, const void *ip2) +{ + in_addr_t iaa, iab; + + /* + * We need to compare in HBO here to get the list sorted as expected + * by the result of the code. Sorting NBO addresses gives you + * interesting results. If you do not understand, do not try. + */ + iaa = ntohl(((const struct in_addr *)ip1)->s_addr); + iab = ntohl(((const struct in_addr *)ip2)->s_addr); + + /* + * Do not simply return the difference of the two numbers, the int is + * not wide enough. + */ + if (iaa > iab) + return (1); + else if (iaa < iab) + return (-1); + else + return (0); +} +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +static int +qcmp_v6(const void *ip1, const void *ip2) +{ + const struct in6_addr *ia6a, *ia6b; + int i, rc; + + ia6a = (const struct in6_addr *)ip1; + ia6b = (const struct in6_addr *)ip2; + + rc = 0; + for (i = 0; rc == 0 && i < sizeof(struct in6_addr); i++) { + if (ia6a->s6_addr[i] > ia6b->s6_addr[i]) + rc = 1; + else if (ia6a->s6_addr[i] < ia6b->s6_addr[i]) + rc = -1; + } + return (rc); +} +#endif + +/* + * struct jail_args { + * struct jail *jail; + * }; + */ +int +sys_jail(struct thread *td, struct jail_args *uap) +{ + uint32_t version; + int error; + struct jail j; + + error = copyin(uap->jail, &version, sizeof(uint32_t)); + if (error) + return (error); + + switch (version) { + case 0: + { + struct jail_v0 j0; + + /* FreeBSD single IPv4 jails. */ + bzero(&j, sizeof(struct jail)); + error = copyin(uap->jail, &j0, sizeof(struct jail_v0)); + if (error) + return (error); + j.version = j0.version; + j.path = j0.path; + j.hostname = j0.hostname; + j.ip4s = j0.ip_number; + break; + } + + case 1: + /* + * Version 1 was used by multi-IPv4 jail implementations + * that never made it into the official kernel. + */ + return (EINVAL); + + case 2: /* JAIL_API_VERSION */ + /* FreeBSD multi-IPv4/IPv6,noIP jails. */ + error = copyin(uap->jail, &j, sizeof(struct jail)); + if (error) + return (error); + break; + + default: + /* Sci-Fi jails are not supported, sorry. */ + return (EINVAL); + } + return (kern_jail(td, &j)); +} + +int +kern_jail(struct thread *td, struct jail *j) +{ + struct iovec optiov[2 * (4 + + sizeof(pr_allow_names) / sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]) +#ifdef INET + + 1 +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + + 1 +#endif + )]; + struct uio opt; + char *u_path, *u_hostname, *u_name; +#ifdef INET + uint32_t ip4s; + struct in_addr *u_ip4; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + struct in6_addr *u_ip6; +#endif + size_t tmplen; + int error, enforce_statfs, fi; + + bzero(&optiov, sizeof(optiov)); + opt.uio_iov = optiov; + opt.uio_iovcnt = 0; + opt.uio_offset = -1; + opt.uio_resid = -1; + opt.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE; + opt.uio_rw = UIO_READ; + opt.uio_td = td; + + /* Set permissions for top-level jails from sysctls. */ + if (!jailed(td->td_ucred)) { + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_allow_names) / + sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]); fi++) { + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = + (jail_default_allow & (1 << fi)) + ? pr_allow_names[fi] : pr_allow_nonames[fi]; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = + strlen(optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base) + 1; + opt.uio_iovcnt += 2; + } + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "enforce_statfs"; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("enforce_statfs"); + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + enforce_statfs = jail_default_enforce_statfs; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = &enforce_statfs; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof(enforce_statfs); + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + } + + tmplen = MAXPATHLEN + MAXHOSTNAMELEN + MAXHOSTNAMELEN; +#ifdef INET + ip4s = (j->version == 0) ? 1 : j->ip4s; + if (ip4s > jail_max_af_ips) + return (EINVAL); + tmplen += ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr); +#else + if (j->ip4s > 0) + return (EINVAL); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + if (j->ip6s > jail_max_af_ips) + return (EINVAL); + tmplen += j->ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr); +#else + if (j->ip6s > 0) + return (EINVAL); +#endif + u_path = malloc(tmplen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); + u_hostname = u_path + MAXPATHLEN; + u_name = u_hostname + MAXHOSTNAMELEN; +#ifdef INET + u_ip4 = (struct in_addr *)(u_name + MAXHOSTNAMELEN); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 +#ifdef INET + u_ip6 = (struct in6_addr *)(u_ip4 + ip4s); +#else + u_ip6 = (struct in6_addr *)(u_name + MAXHOSTNAMELEN); +#endif +#endif + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "path"; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("path"); + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_path; + error = copyinstr(j->path, u_path, MAXPATHLEN, + &optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); + if (error) { + free(u_path, M_TEMP); + return (error); + } + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "host.hostname"; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("host.hostname"); + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_hostname; + error = copyinstr(j->hostname, u_hostname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, + &optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); + if (error) { + free(u_path, M_TEMP); + return (error); + } + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + if (j->jailname != NULL) { + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "name"; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("name"); + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_name; + error = copyinstr(j->jailname, u_name, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, + &optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); + if (error) { + free(u_path, M_TEMP); + return (error); + } + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + } +#ifdef INET + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "ip4.addr"; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("ip4.addr"); + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_ip4; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr); + if (j->version == 0) + u_ip4->s_addr = j->ip4s; + else { + error = copyin(j->ip4, u_ip4, optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); + if (error) { + free(u_path, M_TEMP); + return (error); + } + } + opt.uio_iovcnt++; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "ip6.addr"; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("ip6.addr"); + opt.uio_iovcnt++; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_ip6; + optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = j->ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr); + error = copyin(j->ip6, u_ip6, optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); + if (error) { + free(u_path, M_TEMP); + return (error); + } + opt.uio_iovcnt++; +#endif + KASSERT(opt.uio_iovcnt <= sizeof(optiov) / sizeof(optiov[0]), + ("kern_jail: too many iovecs (%d)", opt.uio_iovcnt)); + error = kern_jail_set(td, &opt, JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_ATTACH); + free(u_path, M_TEMP); + return (error); +} + + +/* + * struct jail_set_args { + * struct iovec *iovp; + * unsigned int iovcnt; + * int flags; + * }; + */ +int +sys_jail_set(struct thread *td, struct jail_set_args *uap) +{ + struct uio *auio; + int error; + + /* Check that we have an even number of iovecs. */ + if (uap->iovcnt & 1) + return (EINVAL); + + error = copyinuio(uap->iovp, uap->iovcnt, &auio); + if (error) + return (error); + error = kern_jail_set(td, auio, uap->flags); + free(auio, M_IOV); + return (error); +} + +int +kern_jail_set(struct thread *td, struct uio *optuio, int flags) +{ + struct nameidata nd; +#ifdef INET + struct in_addr *ip4; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + struct in6_addr *ip6; +#endif + struct vfsopt *opt; + struct vfsoptlist *opts; + struct prison *pr, *deadpr, *mypr, *ppr, *tpr; + struct vnode *root; + char *domain, *errmsg, *host, *name, *namelc, *p, *path, *uuid; + char *g_path; +#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) + struct prison *tppr; + void *op; +#endif + unsigned long hid; + size_t namelen, onamelen; + int created, cuflags, descend, enforce, error, errmsg_len, errmsg_pos; + int gotchildmax, gotenforce, gothid, gotrsnum, gotslevel; + int fi, jid, jsys, len, level; + int childmax, rsnum, slevel; + int fullpath_disabled; +#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) + int ii, ij; +#endif +#ifdef INET + int ip4s, redo_ip4; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + int ip6s, redo_ip6; +#endif + uint64_t pr_allow, ch_allow, pr_flags, ch_flags; + unsigned tallow; + char numbuf[12]; + + error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_SET); + if (!error && (flags & JAIL_ATTACH)) + error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH); + if (error) + return (error); + mypr = ppr = td->td_ucred->cr_prison; + if ((flags & JAIL_CREATE) && mypr->pr_childmax == 0) + return (EPERM); + if (flags & ~JAIL_SET_MASK) + return (EINVAL); + + /* + * Check all the parameters before committing to anything. Not all + * errors can be caught early, but we may as well try. Also, this + * takes care of some expensive stuff (path lookup) before getting + * the allprison lock. + * + * XXX Jails are not filesystems, and jail parameters are not mount + * options. But it makes more sense to re-use the vfsopt code + * than duplicate it under a different name. + */ + error = vfs_buildopts(optuio, &opts); + if (error) + return (error); +#ifdef INET + ip4 = NULL; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + ip6 = NULL; +#endif + g_path = NULL; + + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "jid", &jid, sizeof(jid)); + if (error == ENOENT) + jid = 0; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "securelevel", &slevel, sizeof(slevel)); + if (error == ENOENT) + gotslevel = 0; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else + gotslevel = 1; + + error = + vfs_copyopt(opts, "children.max", &childmax, sizeof(childmax)); + if (error == ENOENT) + gotchildmax = 0; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else + gotchildmax = 1; + + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "enforce_statfs", &enforce, sizeof(enforce)); + if (error == ENOENT) + gotenforce = 0; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else if (enforce < 0 || enforce > 2) { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } else + gotenforce = 1; + + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "devfs_ruleset", &rsnum, sizeof(rsnum)); + if (error == ENOENT) + gotrsnum = 0; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else + gotrsnum = 1; + + pr_flags = ch_flags = 0; + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_names) / sizeof(pr_flag_names[0]); + fi++) { + if (pr_flag_names[fi] == NULL) + continue; + vfs_flagopt(opts, pr_flag_names[fi], &pr_flags, 1 << fi); + vfs_flagopt(opts, pr_flag_nonames[fi], &ch_flags, 1 << fi); + } + ch_flags |= pr_flags; + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys) / sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys[0]); + fi++) { + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, pr_flag_jailsys[fi].name, &jsys, + sizeof(jsys)); + if (error == ENOENT) + continue; + if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + switch (jsys) { + case JAIL_SYS_DISABLE: + if (!pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable) { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + pr_flags |= pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable; + break; + case JAIL_SYS_NEW: + pr_flags |= pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new; + break; + case JAIL_SYS_INHERIT: + break; + default: + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + ch_flags |= + pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new | pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable; + } + if ((flags & (JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_UPDATE | JAIL_ATTACH)) == JAIL_CREATE + && !(pr_flags & PR_PERSIST)) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "new jail must persist or attach"); + goto done_errmsg; + } +#ifdef VIMAGE + if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_VNET)) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "vnet cannot be changed after creation"); + goto done_errmsg; + } +#endif +#ifdef INET + if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "ip4 cannot be changed after creation"); + goto done_errmsg; + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "ip6 cannot be changed after creation"); + goto done_errmsg; + } +#endif + + pr_allow = ch_allow = 0; + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_allow_names) / sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]); + fi++) { + vfs_flagopt(opts, pr_allow_names[fi], &pr_allow, 1 << fi); + vfs_flagopt(opts, pr_allow_nonames[fi], &ch_allow, 1 << fi); + } + ch_allow |= pr_allow; + + error = vfs_getopt(opts, "name", (void **)&name, &len); + if (error == ENOENT) + name = NULL; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else { + if (len == 0 || name[len - 1] != '\0') { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { + error = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto done_free; + } + } + + error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.hostname", (void **)&host, &len); + if (error == ENOENT) + host = NULL; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else { + ch_flags |= PR_HOST; + pr_flags |= PR_HOST; + if (len == 0 || host[len - 1] != '\0') { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { + error = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto done_free; + } + } + + error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.domainname", (void **)&domain, &len); + if (error == ENOENT) + domain = NULL; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else { + ch_flags |= PR_HOST; + pr_flags |= PR_HOST; + if (len == 0 || domain[len - 1] != '\0') { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { + error = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto done_free; + } + } + + error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.hostuuid", (void **)&uuid, &len); + if (error == ENOENT) + uuid = NULL; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else { + ch_flags |= PR_HOST; + pr_flags |= PR_HOST; + if (len == 0 || uuid[len - 1] != '\0') { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + if (len > HOSTUUIDLEN) { + error = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto done_free; + } + } + +#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32 + if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) { + uint32_t hid32; + + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid32, sizeof(hid32)); + hid = hid32; + } else +#endif + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid, sizeof(hid)); + if (error == ENOENT) + gothid = 0; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else { + gothid = 1; + ch_flags |= PR_HOST; + pr_flags |= PR_HOST; + } + +#ifdef INET + error = vfs_getopt(opts, "ip4.addr", &op, &ip4s); + if (error == ENOENT) + ip4s = (pr_flags & PR_IP4_DISABLE) ? 0 : -1; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else if (ip4s & (sizeof(*ip4) - 1)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } else { + ch_flags |= PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP4_DISABLE; + if (ip4s == 0) + pr_flags |= PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP4_DISABLE; + else { + pr_flags = (pr_flags & ~PR_IP4_DISABLE) | PR_IP4_USER; + ip4s /= sizeof(*ip4); + if (ip4s > jail_max_af_ips) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "too many IPv4 addresses"); + goto done_errmsg; + } + ip4 = malloc(ip4s * sizeof(*ip4), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); + bcopy(op, ip4, ip4s * sizeof(*ip4)); + /* + * IP addresses are all sorted but ip[0] to preserve + * the primary IP address as given from userland. + * This special IP is used for unbound outgoing + * connections as well for "loopback" traffic in case + * source address selection cannot find any more fitting + * address to connect from. + */ + if (ip4s > 1) + qsort(ip4 + 1, ip4s - 1, sizeof(*ip4), qcmp_v4); + /* + * Check for duplicate addresses and do some simple + * zero and broadcast checks. If users give other bogus + * addresses it is their problem. + * + * We do not have to care about byte order for these + * checks so we will do them in NBO. + */ + for (ii = 0; ii < ip4s; ii++) { + if (ip4[ii].s_addr == INADDR_ANY || + ip4[ii].s_addr == INADDR_BROADCAST) { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + if ((ii+1) < ip4s && + (ip4[0].s_addr == ip4[ii+1].s_addr || + ip4[ii].s_addr == ip4[ii+1].s_addr)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + } + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 + error = vfs_getopt(opts, "ip6.addr", &op, &ip6s); + if (error == ENOENT) + ip6s = (pr_flags & PR_IP6_DISABLE) ? 0 : -1; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else if (ip6s & (sizeof(*ip6) - 1)) { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } else { + ch_flags |= PR_IP6_USER | PR_IP6_DISABLE; + if (ip6s == 0) + pr_flags |= PR_IP6_USER | PR_IP6_DISABLE; + else { + pr_flags = (pr_flags & ~PR_IP6_DISABLE) | PR_IP6_USER; + ip6s /= sizeof(*ip6); + if (ip6s > jail_max_af_ips) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "too many IPv6 addresses"); + goto done_errmsg; + } + ip6 = malloc(ip6s * sizeof(*ip6), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); + bcopy(op, ip6, ip6s * sizeof(*ip6)); + if (ip6s > 1) + qsort(ip6 + 1, ip6s - 1, sizeof(*ip6), qcmp_v6); + for (ii = 0; ii < ip6s; ii++) { + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6[ii])) { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + if ((ii+1) < ip6s && + (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[0], &ip6[ii+1]) || + IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[ii], &ip6[ii+1]))) + { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + } + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(VIMAGE) && (defined(INET) || defined(INET6)) + if ((ch_flags & PR_VNET) && (ch_flags & (PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP6_USER))) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "vnet jails cannot have IP address restrictions"); + goto done_errmsg; + } +#endif + + fullpath_disabled = 0; + root = NULL; + error = vfs_getopt(opts, "path", (void **)&path, &len); + if (error == ENOENT) + path = NULL; + else if (error != 0) + goto done_free; + else { + if (flags & JAIL_UPDATE) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "path cannot be changed after creation"); + goto done_errmsg; + } + if (len == 0 || path[len - 1] != '\0') { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_free; + } + NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_SYSSPACE, + path, td); + error = namei(&nd); + if (error) + goto done_free; + root = nd.ni_vp; + NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF); + g_path = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); + strlcpy(g_path, path, MAXPATHLEN); + error = vn_path_to_global_path(td, root, g_path, MAXPATHLEN); + if (error == 0) + path = g_path; + else if (error == ENODEV) { + /* proceed if sysctl debug.disablefullpath == 1 */ + fullpath_disabled = 1; + if (len < 2 || (len == 2 && path[0] == '/')) + path = NULL; + } else { + /* exit on other errors */ + goto done_free; + } + if (root->v_type != VDIR) { + error = ENOTDIR; + vput(root); + goto done_free; + } + VOP_UNLOCK(root, 0); + if (fullpath_disabled) { + /* Leave room for a real-root full pathname. */ + if (len + (path[0] == '/' && strcmp(mypr->pr_path, "/") + ? strlen(mypr->pr_path) : 0) > MAXPATHLEN) { + error = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto done_free; + } + } + } + + /* + * Grab the allprison lock before letting modules check their + * parameters. Once we have it, do not let go so we'll have a + * consistent view of the OSD list. + */ + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + error = osd_jail_call(NULL, PR_METHOD_CHECK, opts); + if (error) + goto done_unlock_list; + + /* By now, all parameters should have been noted. */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) { + if (!opt->seen && strcmp(opt->name, "errmsg")) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "unknown parameter: %s", opt->name); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + } + + /* + * See if we are creating a new record or updating an existing one. + * This abuses the file error codes ENOENT and EEXIST. + */ + cuflags = flags & (JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_UPDATE); + if (!cuflags) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "no valid operation (create or update)"); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + pr = NULL; + namelc = NULL; + if (cuflags == JAIL_CREATE && jid == 0 && name != NULL) { + namelc = strrchr(name, '.'); + jid = strtoul(namelc != NULL ? namelc + 1 : name, &p, 10); + if (*p != '\0') + jid = 0; + } + if (jid != 0) { + /* + * See if a requested jid already exists. There is an + * information leak here if the jid exists but is not within + * the caller's jail hierarchy. Jail creators will get EEXIST + * even though they cannot see the jail, and CREATE | UPDATE + * will return ENOENT which is not normally a valid error. + */ + if (jid < 0) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "negative jid"); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + pr = prison_find(jid); + if (pr != NULL) { + ppr = pr->pr_parent; + /* Create: jid must not exist. */ + if (cuflags == JAIL_CREATE) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + error = EEXIST; + vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d already exists", + jid); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + if (!prison_ischild(mypr, pr)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + pr = NULL; + } else if (pr->pr_uref == 0) { + if (!(flags & JAIL_DYING)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d is dying", + jid); + goto done_unlock_list; + } else if ((flags & JAIL_ATTACH) || + (pr_flags & PR_PERSIST)) { + /* + * A dying jail might be resurrected + * (via attach or persist), but first + * it must determine if another jail + * has claimed its name. Accomplish + * this by implicitly re-setting the + * name. + */ + if (name == NULL) + name = prison_name(mypr, pr); + } + } + } + if (pr == NULL) { + /* Update: jid must exist. */ + if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE) { + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d not found", jid); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + } + } + /* + * If the caller provided a name, look for a jail by that name. + * This has different semantics for creates and updates keyed by jid + * (where the name must not already exist in a different jail), + * and updates keyed by the name itself (where the name must exist + * because that is the jail being updated). + */ + if (name != NULL) { + namelc = strrchr(name, '.'); + if (namelc == NULL) + namelc = name; + else { + /* + * This is a hierarchical name. Split it into the + * parent and child names, and make sure the parent + * exists or matches an already found jail. + */ + *namelc = '\0'; + if (pr != NULL) { + if (strncmp(name, ppr->pr_name, namelc - name) + || ppr->pr_name[namelc - name] != '\0') { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "cannot change jail's parent"); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + } else { + ppr = prison_find_name(mypr, name); + if (ppr == NULL) { + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "jail \"%s\" not found", name); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx); + } + name = ++namelc; + } + if (name[0] != '\0') { + namelen = + (ppr == &prison0) ? 0 : strlen(ppr->pr_name) + 1; + name_again: + deadpr = NULL; + FOREACH_PRISON_CHILD(ppr, tpr) { + if (tpr != pr && tpr->pr_ref > 0 && + !strcmp(tpr->pr_name + namelen, name)) { + if (pr == NULL && + cuflags != JAIL_CREATE) { + mtx_lock(&tpr->pr_mtx); + if (tpr->pr_ref > 0) { + /* + * Use this jail + * for updates. + */ + if (tpr->pr_uref > 0) { + pr = tpr; + break; + } + deadpr = tpr; + } + mtx_unlock(&tpr->pr_mtx); + } else if (tpr->pr_uref > 0) { + /* + * Create, or update(jid): + * name must not exist in an + * active sibling jail. + */ + error = EEXIST; + if (pr != NULL) + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + vfs_opterror(opts, + "jail \"%s\" already exists", + name); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + } + } + /* If no active jail is found, use a dying one. */ + if (deadpr != NULL && pr == NULL) { + if (flags & JAIL_DYING) { + mtx_lock(&deadpr->pr_mtx); + if (deadpr->pr_ref == 0) { + mtx_unlock(&deadpr->pr_mtx); + goto name_again; + } + pr = deadpr; + } else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE) { + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "jail \"%s\" is dying", name); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + } + /* Update: name must exist if no jid. */ + else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE && pr == NULL) { + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" not found", + name); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + } + } + /* Update: must provide a jid or name. */ + else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE && pr == NULL) { + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "update specified no jail"); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + + /* If there's no prison to update, create a new one and link it in. */ + if (pr == NULL) { + for (tpr = mypr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent) + if (tpr->pr_childcount >= tpr->pr_childmax) { + error = EPERM; + vfs_opterror(opts, "prison limit exceeded"); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + created = 1; + mtx_lock(&ppr->pr_mtx); + if (ppr->pr_ref == 0 || (ppr->pr_flags & PR_REMOVE)) { + mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx); + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "parent jail went away!"); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + ppr->pr_ref++; + ppr->pr_uref++; + mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx); + pr = malloc(sizeof(*pr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); + if (jid == 0) { + /* Find the next free jid. */ + jid = lastprid + 1; + findnext: + if (jid == JAIL_MAX) + jid = 1; + TAILQ_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list) { + if (tpr->pr_id < jid) + continue; + if (tpr->pr_id > jid || tpr->pr_ref == 0) { + TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(tpr, pr, pr_list); + break; + } + if (jid == lastprid) { + error = EAGAIN; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "no available jail IDs"); + free(pr, M_PRISON); + prison_deref(ppr, PD_DEREF | + PD_DEUREF | PD_LIST_XLOCKED); + goto done_releroot; + } + jid++; + goto findnext; + } + lastprid = jid; + } else { + /* + * The jail already has a jid (that did not yet exist), + * so just find where to insert it. + */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list) + if (tpr->pr_id >= jid) { + TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(tpr, pr, pr_list); + break; + } + } + if (tpr == NULL) + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&allprison, pr, pr_list); + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ppr->pr_children, pr, pr_sibling); + for (tpr = ppr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent) + tpr->pr_childcount++; + + pr->pr_parent = ppr; + pr->pr_id = jid; + + /* Set some default values, and inherit some from the parent. */ + if (name == NULL) + name = ""; + if (path == NULL) { + path = "/"; + root = mypr->pr_root; + vref(root); + } + strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, DEFAULT_HOSTUUID, HOSTUUIDLEN); + pr->pr_flags |= PR_HOST; +#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) +#ifdef VIMAGE + if (!(pr_flags & PR_VNET)) +#endif + { +#ifdef INET + if (!(ch_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) + pr->pr_flags |= + PR_IP4 | PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP4_DISABLE; + else if (!(pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) { + pr->pr_flags |= ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP4; + if (ppr->pr_ip4 != NULL) { + pr->pr_ip4s = ppr->pr_ip4s; + pr->pr_ip4 = malloc(pr->pr_ip4s * + sizeof(struct in_addr), M_PRISON, + M_WAITOK); + bcopy(ppr->pr_ip4, pr->pr_ip4, + pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4)); + } + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + if (!(ch_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) + pr->pr_flags |= + PR_IP6 | PR_IP6_USER | PR_IP6_DISABLE; + else if (!(pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) { + pr->pr_flags |= ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP6; + if (ppr->pr_ip6 != NULL) { + pr->pr_ip6s = ppr->pr_ip6s; + pr->pr_ip6 = malloc(pr->pr_ip6s * + sizeof(struct in6_addr), M_PRISON, + M_WAITOK); + bcopy(ppr->pr_ip6, pr->pr_ip6, + pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6)); + } + } +#endif + } +#endif + /* Source address selection is always on by default. */ + pr->pr_flags |= _PR_IP_SADDRSEL; + + pr->pr_securelevel = ppr->pr_securelevel; + pr->pr_allow = JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW & ppr->pr_allow; + pr->pr_enforce_statfs = JAIL_DEFAULT_ENFORCE_STATFS; + pr->pr_devfs_rsnum = ppr->pr_devfs_rsnum; + + LIST_INIT(&pr->pr_children); + mtx_init(&pr->pr_mtx, "jail mutex", NULL, MTX_DEF | MTX_DUPOK); + +#ifdef VIMAGE + /* Allocate a new vnet if specified. */ + pr->pr_vnet = (pr_flags & PR_VNET) + ? vnet_alloc() : ppr->pr_vnet; +#endif + /* + * Allocate a dedicated cpuset for each jail. + * Unlike other initial settings, this may return an erorr. + */ + error = cpuset_create_root(ppr, &pr->pr_cpuset); + if (error) { + prison_deref(pr, PD_LIST_XLOCKED); + goto done_releroot; + } + + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + /* + * New prisons do not yet have a reference, because we do not + * want other to see the incomplete prison once the + * allprison_lock is downgraded. + */ + } else { + created = 0; + /* + * Grab a reference for existing prisons, to ensure they + * continue to exist for the duration of the call. + */ + pr->pr_ref++; +#if defined(VIMAGE) && (defined(INET) || defined(INET6)) + if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) && + (ch_flags & (PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP6_USER))) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "vnet jails cannot have IP address restrictions"); + goto done_deref_locked; + } +#endif +#ifdef INET + if (PR_IP4_USER & ch_flags & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags)) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "ip4 cannot be changed after creation"); + goto done_deref_locked; + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + if (PR_IP6_USER & ch_flags & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags)) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "ip6 cannot be changed after creation"); + goto done_deref_locked; + } +#endif + } + + /* Do final error checking before setting anything. */ + if (gotslevel) { + if (slevel < ppr->pr_securelevel) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + } + if (gotchildmax) { + if (childmax >= ppr->pr_childmax) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + } + if (gotenforce) { + if (enforce < ppr->pr_enforce_statfs) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + } + if (gotrsnum) { + /* + * devfs_rsnum is a uint16_t + */ + if (rsnum < 0 || rsnum > 65535) { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + /* + * Nested jails always inherit parent's devfs ruleset + */ + if (jailed(td->td_ucred)) { + if (rsnum > 0 && rsnum != ppr->pr_devfs_rsnum) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } else + rsnum = ppr->pr_devfs_rsnum; + } + } +#ifdef INET + if (ip4s > 0) { + if (ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP4) { + /* + * Make sure the new set of IP addresses is a + * subset of the parent's list. Don't worry + * about the parent being unlocked, as any + * setting is done with allprison_lock held. + */ + for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip4s; ij++) + if (ip4[0].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[ij].s_addr) + break; + if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + if (ip4s > 1) { + for (ii = ij = 1; ii < ip4s; ii++) { + if (ip4[ii].s_addr == + ppr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr) + continue; + for (; ij < ppr->pr_ip4s; ij++) + if (ip4[ii].s_addr == + ppr->pr_ip4[ij].s_addr) + break; + if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s) + break; + } + if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + } + } + /* + * Check for conflicting IP addresses. We permit them + * if there is no more than one IP on each jail. If + * there is a duplicate on a jail with more than one + * IP stop checking and return error. + */ + tppr = ppr; +#ifdef VIMAGE + for (; tppr != &prison0; tppr = tppr->pr_parent) + if (tppr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) + break; +#endif + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(tppr, tpr, descend) { + if (tpr == pr || +#ifdef VIMAGE + (tpr != tppr && (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET)) || +#endif + tpr->pr_uref == 0) { + descend = 0; + continue; + } + if (!(tpr->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) + continue; + descend = 0; + if (tpr->pr_ip4 == NULL || + (ip4s == 1 && tpr->pr_ip4s == 1)) + continue; + for (ii = 0; ii < ip4s; ii++) { + if (_prison_check_ip4(tpr, &ip4[ii]) == 0) { + error = EADDRINUSE; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "IPv4 addresses clash"); + goto done_deref_locked; + } + } + } + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + if (ip6s > 0) { + if (ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP6) { + /* + * Make sure the new set of IP addresses is a + * subset of the parent's list. + */ + for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip6s; ij++) + if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[0], + &ppr->pr_ip6[ij])) + break; + if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + if (ip6s > 1) { + for (ii = ij = 1; ii < ip6s; ii++) { + if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[ii], + &ppr->pr_ip6[0])) + continue; + for (; ij < ppr->pr_ip6s; ij++) + if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL( + &ip6[ii], &ppr->pr_ip6[ij])) + break; + if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s) + break; + } + if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + } + } + /* Check for conflicting IP addresses. */ + tppr = ppr; +#ifdef VIMAGE + for (; tppr != &prison0; tppr = tppr->pr_parent) + if (tppr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) + break; +#endif + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(tppr, tpr, descend) { + if (tpr == pr || +#ifdef VIMAGE + (tpr != tppr && (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET)) || +#endif + tpr->pr_uref == 0) { + descend = 0; + continue; + } + if (!(tpr->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) + continue; + descend = 0; + if (tpr->pr_ip6 == NULL || + (ip6s == 1 && tpr->pr_ip6s == 1)) + continue; + for (ii = 0; ii < ip6s; ii++) { + if (_prison_check_ip6(tpr, &ip6[ii]) == 0) { + error = EADDRINUSE; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "IPv6 addresses clash"); + goto done_deref_locked; + } + } + } + } +#endif + onamelen = namelen = 0; + if (name != NULL) { + /* Give a default name of the jid. */ + if (name[0] == '\0') + snprintf(name = numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), "%d", jid); + else if (*namelc == '0' || (strtoul(namelc, &p, 10) != jid && + *p == '\0')) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, + "name cannot be numeric (unless it is the jid)"); + goto done_deref_locked; + } + /* + * Make sure the name isn't too long for the prison or its + * children. + */ + onamelen = strlen(pr->pr_name); + namelen = strlen(name); + if (strlen(ppr->pr_name) + namelen + 2 > sizeof(pr->pr_name)) { + error = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, tpr, descend) { + if (strlen(tpr->pr_name) + (namelen - onamelen) >= + sizeof(pr->pr_name)) { + error = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + } + } + if (pr_allow & ~ppr->pr_allow) { + error = EPERM; + goto done_deref_locked; + } + + /* Set the parameters of the prison. */ +#ifdef INET + redo_ip4 = 0; + if (pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER) { + pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP4; + free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON); + pr->pr_ip4s = ip4s; + pr->pr_ip4 = ip4; + ip4 = NULL; + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { +#ifdef VIMAGE + if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) { + descend = 0; + continue; + } +#endif + if (prison_restrict_ip4(tpr, NULL)) { + redo_ip4 = 1; + descend = 0; + } + } + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + redo_ip6 = 0; + if (pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER) { + pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP6; + free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON); + pr->pr_ip6s = ip6s; + pr->pr_ip6 = ip6; + ip6 = NULL; + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { +#ifdef VIMAGE + if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) { + descend = 0; + continue; + } +#endif + if (prison_restrict_ip6(tpr, NULL)) { + redo_ip6 = 1; + descend = 0; + } + } + } +#endif + if (gotslevel) { + pr->pr_securelevel = slevel; + /* Set all child jails to be at least this level. */ + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) + if (tpr->pr_securelevel < slevel) + tpr->pr_securelevel = slevel; + } + if (gotchildmax) { + pr->pr_childmax = childmax; + /* Set all child jails to under this limit. */ + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED_LEVEL(pr, tpr, descend, level) + if (tpr->pr_childmax > childmax - level) + tpr->pr_childmax = childmax > level + ? childmax - level : 0; + } + if (gotenforce) { + pr->pr_enforce_statfs = enforce; + /* Pass this restriction on to the children. */ + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) + if (tpr->pr_enforce_statfs < enforce) + tpr->pr_enforce_statfs = enforce; + } + if (gotrsnum) { + pr->pr_devfs_rsnum = rsnum; + /* Pass this restriction on to the children. */ + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) + tpr->pr_devfs_rsnum = rsnum; + } + if (name != NULL) { + if (ppr == &prison0) + strlcpy(pr->pr_name, name, sizeof(pr->pr_name)); + else + snprintf(pr->pr_name, sizeof(pr->pr_name), "%s.%s", + ppr->pr_name, name); + /* Change this component of child names. */ + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { + bcopy(tpr->pr_name + onamelen, tpr->pr_name + namelen, + strlen(tpr->pr_name + onamelen) + 1); + bcopy(pr->pr_name, tpr->pr_name, namelen); + } + } + if (path != NULL) { + /* Try to keep a real-rooted full pathname. */ + if (fullpath_disabled && path[0] == '/' && + strcmp(mypr->pr_path, "/")) + snprintf(pr->pr_path, sizeof(pr->pr_path), "%s%s", + mypr->pr_path, path); + else + strlcpy(pr->pr_path, path, sizeof(pr->pr_path)); + pr->pr_root = root; + } + if (PR_HOST & ch_flags & ~pr_flags) { + if (pr->pr_flags & PR_HOST) { + /* + * Copy the parent's host info. As with pr_ip4 above, + * the lack of a lock on the parent is not a problem; + * it is always set with allprison_lock at least + * shared, and is held exclusively here. + */ + strlcpy(pr->pr_hostname, pr->pr_parent->pr_hostname, + sizeof(pr->pr_hostname)); + strlcpy(pr->pr_domainname, pr->pr_parent->pr_domainname, + sizeof(pr->pr_domainname)); + strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, pr->pr_parent->pr_hostuuid, + sizeof(pr->pr_hostuuid)); + pr->pr_hostid = pr->pr_parent->pr_hostid; + } + } else if (host != NULL || domain != NULL || uuid != NULL || gothid) { + /* Set this prison, and any descendants without PR_HOST. */ + if (host != NULL) + strlcpy(pr->pr_hostname, host, sizeof(pr->pr_hostname)); + if (domain != NULL) + strlcpy(pr->pr_domainname, domain, + sizeof(pr->pr_domainname)); + if (uuid != NULL) + strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, uuid, sizeof(pr->pr_hostuuid)); + if (gothid) + pr->pr_hostid = hid; + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { + if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_HOST) + descend = 0; + else { + if (host != NULL) + strlcpy(tpr->pr_hostname, + pr->pr_hostname, + sizeof(tpr->pr_hostname)); + if (domain != NULL) + strlcpy(tpr->pr_domainname, + pr->pr_domainname, + sizeof(tpr->pr_domainname)); + if (uuid != NULL) + strlcpy(tpr->pr_hostuuid, + pr->pr_hostuuid, + sizeof(tpr->pr_hostuuid)); + if (gothid) + tpr->pr_hostid = hid; + } + } + } + if ((tallow = ch_allow & ~pr_allow)) { + /* Clear allow bits in all children. */ + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) + tpr->pr_allow &= ~tallow; + } + pr->pr_allow = (pr->pr_allow & ~ch_allow) | pr_allow; + /* + * Persistent prisons get an extra reference, and prisons losing their + * persist flag lose that reference. Only do this for existing prisons + * for now, so new ones will remain unseen until after the module + * handlers have completed. + */ + if (!created && (ch_flags & PR_PERSIST & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags))) { + if (pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) { + pr->pr_ref++; + pr->pr_uref++; + } else { + pr->pr_ref--; + pr->pr_uref--; + } + } + pr->pr_flags = (pr->pr_flags & ~ch_flags) | pr_flags; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + +#ifdef RACCT + if (created) + prison_racct_attach(pr); +#endif + + /* Locks may have prevented a complete restriction of child IP + * addresses. If so, allocate some more memory and try again. + */ +#ifdef INET + while (redo_ip4) { + ip4s = pr->pr_ip4s; + ip4 = malloc(ip4s * sizeof(*ip4), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + redo_ip4 = 0; + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { +#ifdef VIMAGE + if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) { + descend = 0; + continue; + } +#endif + if (prison_restrict_ip4(tpr, ip4)) { + if (ip4 != NULL) + ip4 = NULL; + else + redo_ip4 = 1; + } + } + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + while (redo_ip6) { + ip6s = pr->pr_ip6s; + ip6 = malloc(ip6s * sizeof(*ip6), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + redo_ip6 = 0; + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { +#ifdef VIMAGE + if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) { + descend = 0; + continue; + } +#endif + if (prison_restrict_ip6(tpr, ip6)) { + if (ip6 != NULL) + ip6 = NULL; + else + redo_ip6 = 1; + } + } + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } +#endif + + /* Let the modules do their work. */ + sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock); + if (created) { + error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_CREATE, opts); + if (error) { + prison_deref(pr, PD_LIST_SLOCKED); + goto done_errmsg; + } + } + error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_SET, opts); + if (error) { + prison_deref(pr, created + ? PD_LIST_SLOCKED + : PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); + goto done_errmsg; + } + + /* Attach this process to the prison if requested. */ + if (flags & JAIL_ATTACH) { + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + error = do_jail_attach(td, pr); + if (error) { + vfs_opterror(opts, "attach failed"); + if (!created) + prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF); + goto done_errmsg; + } + } + +#ifdef RACCT + if (!created) { + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + prison_racct_modify(pr); + sx_slock(&allprison_lock); + } +#endif + + td->td_retval[0] = pr->pr_id; + + /* + * Now that it is all there, drop the temporary reference from existing + * prisons. Or add a reference to newly created persistent prisons + * (which was not done earlier so that the prison would not be publicly + * visible). + */ + if (!created) { + prison_deref(pr, (flags & JAIL_ATTACH) + ? PD_DEREF + : PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); + } else { + if (pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) { + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + pr->pr_ref++; + pr->pr_uref++; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } + if (!(flags & JAIL_ATTACH)) + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + } + + goto done_errmsg; + + done_deref_locked: + prison_deref(pr, created + ? PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED + : PD_DEREF | PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED); + goto done_releroot; + done_unlock_list: + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); + done_releroot: + if (root != NULL) + vrele(root); + done_errmsg: + if (error) { + vfs_getopt(opts, "errmsg", (void **)&errmsg, &errmsg_len); + if (errmsg_len > 0) { + errmsg_pos = 2 * vfs_getopt_pos(opts, "errmsg") + 1; + if (errmsg_pos > 0) { + if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) + bcopy(errmsg, + optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base, + errmsg_len); + else + copyout(errmsg, + optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base, + errmsg_len); + } + } + } + done_free: +#ifdef INET + free(ip4, M_PRISON); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + free(ip6, M_PRISON); +#endif + if (g_path != NULL) + free(g_path, M_TEMP); + vfs_freeopts(opts); + return (error); +} + + +/* + * struct jail_get_args { + * struct iovec *iovp; + * unsigned int iovcnt; + * int flags; + * }; + */ +int +sys_jail_get(struct thread *td, struct jail_get_args *uap) +{ + struct uio *auio; + int error; + + /* Check that we have an even number of iovecs. */ + if (uap->iovcnt & 1) + return (EINVAL); + + error = copyinuio(uap->iovp, uap->iovcnt, &auio); + if (error) + return (error); + error = kern_jail_get(td, auio, uap->flags); + if (error == 0) + error = copyout(auio->uio_iov, uap->iovp, + uap->iovcnt * sizeof (struct iovec)); + free(auio, M_IOV); + return (error); +} + +int +kern_jail_get(struct thread *td, struct uio *optuio, int flags) +{ + struct prison *pr, *mypr; + struct vfsopt *opt; + struct vfsoptlist *opts; + char *errmsg, *name; + int error, errmsg_len, errmsg_pos, fi, i, jid, len, locked, pos; + + if (flags & ~JAIL_GET_MASK) + return (EINVAL); + + /* Get the parameter list. */ + error = vfs_buildopts(optuio, &opts); + if (error) + return (error); + errmsg_pos = vfs_getopt_pos(opts, "errmsg"); + mypr = td->td_ucred->cr_prison; + + /* + * Find the prison specified by one of: lastjid, jid, name. + */ + sx_slock(&allprison_lock); + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "lastjid", &jid, sizeof(jid)); + if (error == 0) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) { + if (pr->pr_id > jid && prison_ischild(mypr, pr)) { + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (pr->pr_ref > 0 && + (pr->pr_uref > 0 || (flags & JAIL_DYING))) + break; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } + } + if (pr != NULL) + goto found_prison; + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "no jail after %d", jid); + goto done_unlock_list; + } else if (error != ENOENT) + goto done_unlock_list; + + error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "jid", &jid, sizeof(jid)); + if (error == 0) { + if (jid != 0) { + pr = prison_find_child(mypr, jid); + if (pr != NULL) { + if (pr->pr_uref == 0 && !(flags & JAIL_DYING)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d is dying", + jid); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + goto found_prison; + } + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d not found", jid); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + } else if (error != ENOENT) + goto done_unlock_list; + + error = vfs_getopt(opts, "name", (void **)&name, &len); + if (error == 0) { + if (len == 0 || name[len - 1] != '\0') { + error = EINVAL; + goto done_unlock_list; + } + pr = prison_find_name(mypr, name); + if (pr != NULL) { + if (pr->pr_uref == 0 && !(flags & JAIL_DYING)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" is dying", + name); + goto done_unlock_list; + } + goto found_prison; + } + error = ENOENT; + vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" not found", name); + goto done_unlock_list; + } else if (error != ENOENT) + goto done_unlock_list; + + vfs_opterror(opts, "no jail specified"); + error = ENOENT; + goto done_unlock_list; + + found_prison: + /* Get the parameters of the prison. */ + pr->pr_ref++; + locked = PD_LOCKED; + td->td_retval[0] = pr->pr_id; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "jid", &pr->pr_id, sizeof(pr->pr_id)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + i = (pr->pr_parent == mypr) ? 0 : pr->pr_parent->pr_id; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "parent", &i, sizeof(i)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopts(opts, "name", prison_name(mypr, pr)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "cpuset.id", &pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id, + sizeof(pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopts(opts, "path", prison_path(mypr, pr)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; +#ifdef INET + error = vfs_setopt_part(opts, "ip4.addr", pr->pr_ip4, + pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + error = vfs_setopt_part(opts, "ip6.addr", pr->pr_ip6, + pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; +#endif + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "securelevel", &pr->pr_securelevel, + sizeof(pr->pr_securelevel)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "children.cur", &pr->pr_childcount, + sizeof(pr->pr_childcount)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "children.max", &pr->pr_childmax, + sizeof(pr->pr_childmax)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.hostname", pr->pr_hostname); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.domainname", pr->pr_domainname); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.hostuuid", pr->pr_hostuuid); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; +#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32 + if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) { + uint32_t hid32 = pr->pr_hostid; + + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid32, sizeof(hid32)); + } else +#endif + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "host.hostid", &pr->pr_hostid, + sizeof(pr->pr_hostid)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "enforce_statfs", &pr->pr_enforce_statfs, + sizeof(pr->pr_enforce_statfs)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "devfs_ruleset", &pr->pr_devfs_rsnum, + sizeof(pr->pr_devfs_rsnum)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_names) / sizeof(pr_flag_names[0]); + fi++) { + if (pr_flag_names[fi] == NULL) + continue; + i = (pr->pr_flags & (1 << fi)) ? 1 : 0; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, pr_flag_names[fi], &i, sizeof(i)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + i = !i; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, pr_flag_nonames[fi], &i, sizeof(i)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + } + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys) / sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys[0]); + fi++) { + i = pr->pr_flags & + (pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable | pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new); + i = pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable && + (i == pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable) ? JAIL_SYS_DISABLE + : (i == pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new) ? JAIL_SYS_NEW + : JAIL_SYS_INHERIT; + error = + vfs_setopt(opts, pr_flag_jailsys[fi].name, &i, sizeof(i)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + } + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_allow_names) / sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]); + fi++) { + if (pr_allow_names[fi] == NULL) + continue; + i = (pr->pr_allow & (1 << fi)) ? 1 : 0; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, pr_allow_names[fi], &i, sizeof(i)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + i = !i; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, pr_allow_nonames[fi], &i, sizeof(i)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + } + i = (pr->pr_uref == 0); + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "dying", &i, sizeof(i)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + i = !i; + error = vfs_setopt(opts, "nodying", &i, sizeof(i)); + if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) + goto done_deref; + + /* Get the module parameters. */ + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + locked = 0; + error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_GET, opts); + if (error) + goto done_deref; + prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); + + /* By now, all parameters should have been noted. */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) { + if (!opt->seen && strcmp(opt->name, "errmsg")) { + error = EINVAL; + vfs_opterror(opts, "unknown parameter: %s", opt->name); + goto done_errmsg; + } + } + + /* Write the fetched parameters back to userspace. */ + error = 0; + TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) { + if (opt->pos >= 0 && opt->pos != errmsg_pos) { + pos = 2 * opt->pos + 1; + optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_len = opt->len; + if (opt->value != NULL) { + if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) { + bcopy(opt->value, + optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_base, + opt->len); + } else { + error = copyout(opt->value, + optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_base, + opt->len); + if (error) + break; + } + } + } + } + goto done_errmsg; + + done_deref: + prison_deref(pr, locked | PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); + goto done_errmsg; + + done_unlock_list: + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + done_errmsg: + if (error && errmsg_pos >= 0) { + vfs_getopt(opts, "errmsg", (void **)&errmsg, &errmsg_len); + errmsg_pos = 2 * errmsg_pos + 1; + if (errmsg_len > 0) { + if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) + bcopy(errmsg, + optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base, + errmsg_len); + else + copyout(errmsg, + optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base, + errmsg_len); + } + } + vfs_freeopts(opts); + return (error); +} + + +/* + * struct jail_remove_args { + * int jid; + * }; + */ +int +sys_jail_remove(struct thread *td, struct jail_remove_args *uap) +{ + struct prison *pr, *cpr, *lpr, *tpr; + int descend, error; + + error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_REMOVE); + if (error) + return (error); + + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + pr = prison_find_child(td->td_ucred->cr_prison, uap->jid); + if (pr == NULL) { + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); + return (EINVAL); + } + + /* Remove all descendants of this prison, then remove this prison. */ + pr->pr_ref++; + pr->pr_flags |= PR_REMOVE; + if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pr->pr_children)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + lpr = NULL; + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, cpr, descend) { + mtx_lock(&cpr->pr_mtx); + if (cpr->pr_ref > 0) { + tpr = cpr; + cpr->pr_ref++; + cpr->pr_flags |= PR_REMOVE; + } else { + /* Already removed - do not do it again. */ + tpr = NULL; + } + mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); + if (lpr != NULL) { + mtx_lock(&lpr->pr_mtx); + prison_remove_one(lpr); + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + } + lpr = tpr; + } + if (lpr != NULL) { + mtx_lock(&lpr->pr_mtx); + prison_remove_one(lpr); + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + } + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } + prison_remove_one(pr); + return (0); +} + +static void +prison_remove_one(struct prison *pr) +{ + struct proc *p; + int deuref; + + /* If the prison was persistent, it is not anymore. */ + deuref = 0; + if (pr->pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) { + pr->pr_ref--; + deuref = PD_DEUREF; + pr->pr_flags &= ~PR_PERSIST; + } + + /* + * jail_remove added a reference. If that's the only one, remove + * the prison now. + */ + KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0, + ("prison_remove_one removing a dead prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id)); + if (pr->pr_ref == 1) { + prison_deref(pr, + deuref | PD_DEREF | PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED); + return; + } + + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); + /* + * Kill all processes unfortunate enough to be attached to this prison. + */ + sx_slock(&allproc_lock); + LIST_FOREACH(p, &allproc, p_list) { + PROC_LOCK(p); + if (p->p_state != PRS_NEW && p->p_ucred && + p->p_ucred->cr_prison == pr) + kern_psignal(p, SIGKILL); + PROC_UNLOCK(p); + } + sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock); + /* Remove the temporary reference added by jail_remove. */ + prison_deref(pr, deuref | PD_DEREF); +} + + +/* + * struct jail_attach_args { + * int jid; + * }; + */ +int +sys_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct jail_attach_args *uap) +{ + struct prison *pr; + int error; + + error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH); + if (error) + return (error); + + sx_slock(&allprison_lock); + pr = prison_find_child(td->td_ucred->cr_prison, uap->jid); + if (pr == NULL) { + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + return (EINVAL); + } + + /* + * Do not allow a process to attach to a prison that is not + * considered to be "alive". + */ + if (pr->pr_uref == 0) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + return (EINVAL); + } + + return (do_jail_attach(td, pr)); +} + +static int +do_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct prison *pr) +{ + struct prison *ppr; + struct proc *p; + struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; + int error; + + /* + * XXX: Note that there is a slight race here if two threads + * in the same privileged process attempt to attach to two + * different jails at the same time. It is important for + * user processes not to do this, or they might end up with + * a process root from one prison, but attached to the jail + * of another. + */ + pr->pr_ref++; + pr->pr_uref++; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + + /* Let modules do whatever they need to prepare for attaching. */ + error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_ATTACH, td); + if (error) { + prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); + return (error); + } + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + + /* + * Reparent the newly attached process to this jail. + */ + ppr = td->td_ucred->cr_prison; + p = td->td_proc; + error = cpuset_setproc_update_set(p, pr->pr_cpuset); + if (error) + goto e_revert_osd; + + vn_lock(pr->pr_root, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); + if ((error = change_dir(pr->pr_root, td)) != 0) + goto e_unlock; +#ifdef MAC + if ((error = mac_vnode_check_chroot(td->td_ucred, pr->pr_root))) + goto e_unlock; +#endif + VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0); + if ((error = change_root(pr->pr_root, td))) + goto e_revert_osd; + + newcred = crget(); + PROC_LOCK(p); + oldcred = p->p_ucred; + setsugid(p); + crcopy(newcred, oldcred); + newcred->cr_prison = pr; + p->p_ucred = newcred; + PROC_UNLOCK(p); +#ifdef RACCT + racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred); +#endif + crfree(oldcred); + prison_deref(ppr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF); + return (0); + e_unlock: + VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0); + e_revert_osd: + /* Tell modules this thread is still in its old jail after all. */ + (void)osd_jail_call(ppr, PR_METHOD_ATTACH, td); + prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF); + return (error); +} + + +/* + * Returns a locked prison instance, or NULL on failure. + */ +struct prison * +prison_find(int prid) +{ + struct prison *pr; + + sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED); + TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) { + if (pr->pr_id == prid) { + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (pr->pr_ref > 0) + return (pr); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } + } + return (NULL); +} + +/* + * Find a prison that is a descendant of mypr. Returns a locked prison or NULL. + */ +struct prison * +prison_find_child(struct prison *mypr, int prid) +{ + struct prison *pr; + int descend; + + sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED); + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(mypr, pr, descend) { + if (pr->pr_id == prid) { + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (pr->pr_ref > 0) + return (pr); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } + } + return (NULL); +} + +/* + * Look for the name relative to mypr. Returns a locked prison or NULL. + */ +struct prison * +prison_find_name(struct prison *mypr, const char *name) +{ + struct prison *pr, *deadpr; + size_t mylen; + int descend; + + sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED); + mylen = (mypr == &prison0) ? 0 : strlen(mypr->pr_name) + 1; + again: + deadpr = NULL; + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(mypr, pr, descend) { + if (!strcmp(pr->pr_name + mylen, name)) { + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (pr->pr_ref > 0) { + if (pr->pr_uref > 0) + return (pr); + deadpr = pr; + } + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } + } + /* There was no valid prison - perhaps there was a dying one. */ + if (deadpr != NULL) { + mtx_lock(&deadpr->pr_mtx); + if (deadpr->pr_ref == 0) { + mtx_unlock(&deadpr->pr_mtx); + goto again; + } + } + return (deadpr); +} + +/* + * See if a prison has the specific flag set. + */ +int +prison_flag(struct ucred *cred, unsigned flag) +{ + + /* This is an atomic read, so no locking is necessary. */ + return (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & flag); +} + +int +prison_allow(struct ucred *cred, unsigned flag) +{ + + /* This is an atomic read, so no locking is necessary. */ + return (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & flag); +} + +/* + * Remove a prison reference. If that was the last reference, remove the + * prison itself - but not in this context in case there are locks held. + */ +void +prison_free_locked(struct prison *pr) +{ + + mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED); + pr->pr_ref--; + if (pr->pr_ref == 0) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + TASK_INIT(&pr->pr_task, 0, prison_complete, pr); + taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &pr->pr_task); + return; + } + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); +} + +void +prison_free(struct prison *pr) +{ + + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + prison_free_locked(pr); +} + +static void +prison_complete(void *context, int pending) +{ + + prison_deref((struct prison *)context, 0); +} + +/* + * Remove a prison reference (usually). This internal version assumes no + * mutexes are held, except perhaps the prison itself. If there are no more + * references, release and delist the prison. On completion, the prison lock + * and the allprison lock are both unlocked. + */ +static void +prison_deref(struct prison *pr, int flags) +{ + struct prison *ppr, *tpr; + + if (!(flags & PD_LOCKED)) + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + for (;;) { + if (flags & PD_DEUREF) { + pr->pr_uref--; + KASSERT(prison0.pr_uref != 0, ("prison0 pr_uref=0")); + } + if (flags & PD_DEREF) + pr->pr_ref--; + /* If the prison still has references, nothing else to do. */ + if (pr->pr_ref > 0) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (flags & PD_LIST_SLOCKED) + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + else if (flags & PD_LIST_XLOCKED) + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); + return; + } + + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (flags & PD_LIST_SLOCKED) { + if (!sx_try_upgrade(&allprison_lock)) { + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + } + } else if (!(flags & PD_LIST_XLOCKED)) + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + + TAILQ_REMOVE(&allprison, pr, pr_list); + LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_sibling); + ppr = pr->pr_parent; + for (tpr = ppr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent) + tpr->pr_childcount--; + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); + +#ifdef VIMAGE + if (pr->pr_vnet != ppr->pr_vnet) + vnet_destroy(pr->pr_vnet); +#endif + if (pr->pr_root != NULL) + vrele(pr->pr_root); + mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx); +#ifdef INET + free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON); +#endif + if (pr->pr_cpuset != NULL) + cpuset_rel(pr->pr_cpuset); + osd_jail_exit(pr); +#ifdef RACCT + prison_racct_detach(pr); +#endif + free(pr, M_PRISON); + + /* Removing a prison frees a reference on its parent. */ + pr = ppr; + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + flags = PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF; + } +} + +void +prison_hold_locked(struct prison *pr) +{ + + mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED); + KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0, + ("Trying to hold dead prison (jid=%d).", pr->pr_id)); + pr->pr_ref++; +} + +void +prison_hold(struct prison *pr) +{ + + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + prison_hold_locked(pr); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); +} + +void +prison_proc_hold(struct prison *pr) +{ + + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + KASSERT(pr->pr_uref > 0, + ("Cannot add a process to a non-alive prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id)); + pr->pr_uref++; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); +} + +void +prison_proc_free(struct prison *pr) +{ + + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + KASSERT(pr->pr_uref > 0, + ("Trying to kill a process in a dead prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id)); + prison_deref(pr, PD_DEUREF | PD_LOCKED); +} + + +#ifdef INET +/* + * Restrict a prison's IP address list with its parent's, possibly replacing + * it. Return true if the replacement buffer was used (or would have been). + */ +static int +prison_restrict_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *newip4) +{ + int ii, ij, used; + struct prison *ppr; + + ppr = pr->pr_parent; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) { + /* This has no user settings, so just copy the parent's list. */ + if (pr->pr_ip4s < ppr->pr_ip4s) { + /* + * There's no room for the parent's list. Use the + * new list buffer, which is assumed to be big enough + * (if it was passed). If there's no buffer, try to + * allocate one. + */ + used = 1; + if (newip4 == NULL) { + newip4 = malloc(ppr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*newip4), + M_PRISON, M_NOWAIT); + if (newip4 != NULL) + used = 0; + } + if (newip4 != NULL) { + bcopy(ppr->pr_ip4, newip4, + ppr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*newip4)); + free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON); + pr->pr_ip4 = newip4; + pr->pr_ip4s = ppr->pr_ip4s; + } + return (used); + } + pr->pr_ip4s = ppr->pr_ip4s; + if (pr->pr_ip4s > 0) + bcopy(ppr->pr_ip4, pr->pr_ip4, + pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*newip4)); + else if (pr->pr_ip4 != NULL) { + free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON); + pr->pr_ip4 = NULL; + } + } else if (pr->pr_ip4s > 0) { + /* Remove addresses that aren't in the parent. */ + for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip4s; ij++) + if (pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[ij].s_addr) + break; + if (ij < ppr->pr_ip4s) + ii = 1; + else { + bcopy(pr->pr_ip4 + 1, pr->pr_ip4, + --pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4)); + ii = 0; + } + for (ij = 1; ii < pr->pr_ip4s; ) { + if (pr->pr_ip4[ii].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr) { + ii++; + continue; + } + switch (ij >= ppr->pr_ip4s ? -1 : + qcmp_v4(&pr->pr_ip4[ii], &ppr->pr_ip4[ij])) { + case -1: + bcopy(pr->pr_ip4 + ii + 1, pr->pr_ip4 + ii, + (--pr->pr_ip4s - ii) * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4)); + break; + case 0: + ii++; + ij++; + break; + case 1: + ij++; + break; + } + } + if (pr->pr_ip4s == 0) { + pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP4_DISABLE; + free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON); + pr->pr_ip4 = NULL; + } + } + return (0); +} + +/* + * Pass back primary IPv4 address of this jail. + * + * If not restricted return success but do not alter the address. Caller has + * to make sure to initialize it correctly (e.g. INADDR_ANY). + * + * Returns 0 on success, EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail doesn't allow IPv4. + * Address returned in NBO. + */ +int +prison_get_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia) +{ + struct prison *pr; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) + return (0); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (EAFNOSUPPORT); + } + + ia->s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); +} + +/* + * Return 1 if we should do proper source address selection or are not jailed. + * We will return 0 if we should bypass source address selection in favour + * of the primary jail IPv4 address. Only in this case *ia will be updated and + * returned in NBO. + * Return EAFNOSUPPORT, in case this jail does not allow IPv4. + */ +int +prison_saddrsel_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia) +{ + struct prison *pr; + struct in_addr lia; + int error; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__)); + + if (!jailed(cred)) + return (1); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4_SADDRSEL) + return (1); + + lia.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + error = prison_get_ip4(cred, &lia); + if (error) + return (error); + if (lia.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) + return (1); + + ia->s_addr = lia.s_addr; + return (0); +} + +/* + * Return true if pr1 and pr2 have the same IPv4 address restrictions. + */ +int +prison_equal_ip4(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2) +{ + + if (pr1 == pr2) + return (1); + + /* + * No need to lock since the PR_IP4_USER flag can't be altered for + * existing prisons. + */ + while (pr1 != &prison0 && +#ifdef VIMAGE + !(pr1->pr_flags & PR_VNET) && +#endif + !(pr1->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) + pr1 = pr1->pr_parent; + while (pr2 != &prison0 && +#ifdef VIMAGE + !(pr2->pr_flags & PR_VNET) && +#endif + !(pr2->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) + pr2 = pr2->pr_parent; + return (pr1 == pr2); +} + +/* + * Make sure our (source) address is set to something meaningful to this + * jail. + * + * Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict IPv4 or if address belongs to jail, + * EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail + * doesn't allow IPv4. Address passed in in NBO and returned in NBO. + */ +int +prison_local_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia) +{ + struct prison *pr; + struct in_addr ia0; + int error; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) + return (0); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (EAFNOSUPPORT); + } + + ia0.s_addr = ntohl(ia->s_addr); + if (ia0.s_addr == INADDR_LOOPBACK) { + ia->s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + + if (ia0.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) { + /* + * In case there is only 1 IPv4 address, bind directly. + */ + if (pr->pr_ip4s == 1) + ia->s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + + error = _prison_check_ip4(pr, ia); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (error); +} + +/* + * Rewrite destination address in case we will connect to loopback address. + * + * Returns 0 on success, EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail doesn't allow IPv4. + * Address passed in in NBO and returned in NBO. + */ +int +prison_remote_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia) +{ + struct prison *pr; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) + return (0); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (EAFNOSUPPORT); + } + + if (ntohl(ia->s_addr) == INADDR_LOOPBACK) { + ia->s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + + /* + * Return success because nothing had to be changed. + */ + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); +} + +/* + * Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred/prison. + * + * Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict IPv4 or if address belongs to jail, + * EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail + * doesn't allow IPv4. Address passed in in NBO. + */ +static int +_prison_check_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *ia) +{ + int i, a, z, d; + + /* + * Check the primary IP. + */ + if (pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr == ia->s_addr) + return (0); + + /* + * All the other IPs are sorted so we can do a binary search. + */ + a = 0; + z = pr->pr_ip4s - 2; + while (a <= z) { + i = (a + z) / 2; + d = qcmp_v4(&pr->pr_ip4[i+1], ia); + if (d > 0) + z = i - 1; + else if (d < 0) + a = i + 1; + else + return (0); + } + + return (EADDRNOTAVAIL); +} + +int +prison_check_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia) +{ + struct prison *pr; + int error; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) + return (0); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (EAFNOSUPPORT); + } + + error = _prison_check_ip4(pr, ia); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (error); +} +#endif + +#ifdef INET6 +static int +prison_restrict_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *newip6) +{ + int ii, ij, used; + struct prison *ppr; + + ppr = pr->pr_parent; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) { + /* This has no user settings, so just copy the parent's list. */ + if (pr->pr_ip6s < ppr->pr_ip6s) { + /* + * There's no room for the parent's list. Use the + * new list buffer, which is assumed to be big enough + * (if it was passed). If there's no buffer, try to + * allocate one. + */ + used = 1; + if (newip6 == NULL) { + newip6 = malloc(ppr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*newip6), + M_PRISON, M_NOWAIT); + if (newip6 != NULL) + used = 0; + } + if (newip6 != NULL) { + bcopy(ppr->pr_ip6, newip6, + ppr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*newip6)); + free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON); + pr->pr_ip6 = newip6; + pr->pr_ip6s = ppr->pr_ip6s; + } + return (used); + } + pr->pr_ip6s = ppr->pr_ip6s; + if (pr->pr_ip6s > 0) + bcopy(ppr->pr_ip6, pr->pr_ip6, + pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*newip6)); + else if (pr->pr_ip6 != NULL) { + free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON); + pr->pr_ip6 = NULL; + } + } else if (pr->pr_ip6s > 0) { + /* Remove addresses that aren't in the parent. */ + for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip6s; ij++) + if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&pr->pr_ip6[0], + &ppr->pr_ip6[ij])) + break; + if (ij < ppr->pr_ip6s) + ii = 1; + else { + bcopy(pr->pr_ip6 + 1, pr->pr_ip6, + --pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6)); + ii = 0; + } + for (ij = 1; ii < pr->pr_ip6s; ) { + if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&pr->pr_ip6[ii], + &ppr->pr_ip6[0])) { + ii++; + continue; + } + switch (ij >= ppr->pr_ip4s ? -1 : + qcmp_v6(&pr->pr_ip6[ii], &ppr->pr_ip6[ij])) { + case -1: + bcopy(pr->pr_ip6 + ii + 1, pr->pr_ip6 + ii, + (--pr->pr_ip6s - ii) * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6)); + break; + case 0: + ii++; + ij++; + break; + case 1: + ij++; + break; + } + } + if (pr->pr_ip6s == 0) { + pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP6_DISABLE; + free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON); + pr->pr_ip6 = NULL; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Pass back primary IPv6 address for this jail. + * + * If not restricted return success but do not alter the address. Caller has + * to make sure to initialize it correctly (e.g. IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT). + * + * Returns 0 on success, EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail doesn't allow IPv6. + */ +int +prison_get_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6) +{ + struct prison *pr; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) + return (0); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (EAFNOSUPPORT); + } + + bcopy(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); +} + +/* + * Return 1 if we should do proper source address selection or are not jailed. + * We will return 0 if we should bypass source address selection in favour + * of the primary jail IPv6 address. Only in this case *ia will be updated and + * returned in NBO. + * Return EAFNOSUPPORT, in case this jail does not allow IPv6. + */ +int +prison_saddrsel_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6) +{ + struct prison *pr; + struct in6_addr lia6; + int error; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__)); + + if (!jailed(cred)) + return (1); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6_SADDRSEL) + return (1); + + lia6 = in6addr_any; + error = prison_get_ip6(cred, &lia6); + if (error) + return (error); + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&lia6)) + return (1); + + bcopy(&lia6, ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + return (0); +} + +/* + * Return true if pr1 and pr2 have the same IPv6 address restrictions. + */ +int +prison_equal_ip6(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2) +{ + + if (pr1 == pr2) + return (1); + + while (pr1 != &prison0 && +#ifdef VIMAGE + !(pr1->pr_flags & PR_VNET) && +#endif + !(pr1->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) + pr1 = pr1->pr_parent; + while (pr2 != &prison0 && +#ifdef VIMAGE + !(pr2->pr_flags & PR_VNET) && +#endif + !(pr2->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) + pr2 = pr2->pr_parent; + return (pr1 == pr2); +} + +/* + * Make sure our (source) address is set to something meaningful to this jail. + * + * v6only should be set based on (inp->inp_flags & IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY != 0) + * when needed while binding. + * + * Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict IPv6 or if address belongs to jail, + * EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail + * doesn't allow IPv6. + */ +int +prison_local_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6, int v6only) +{ + struct prison *pr; + int error; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) + return (0); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (EAFNOSUPPORT); + } + + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(ia6)) { + bcopy(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(ia6)) { + /* + * In case there is only 1 IPv6 address, and v6only is true, + * then bind directly. + */ + if (v6only != 0 && pr->pr_ip6s == 1) + bcopy(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + + error = _prison_check_ip6(pr, ia6); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (error); +} + +/* + * Rewrite destination address in case we will connect to loopback address. + * + * Returns 0 on success, EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail doesn't allow IPv6. + */ +int +prison_remote_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6) +{ + struct prison *pr; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) + return (0); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (EAFNOSUPPORT); + } + + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(ia6)) { + bcopy(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + + /* + * Return success because nothing had to be changed. + */ + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); +} + +/* + * Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred/prison. + * + * Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict IPv6 or if address belongs to jail, + * EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if the jail + * doesn't allow IPv6. + */ +static int +_prison_check_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *ia6) +{ + int i, a, z, d; + + /* + * Check the primary IP. + */ + if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6)) + return (0); + + /* + * All the other IPs are sorted so we can do a binary search. + */ + a = 0; + z = pr->pr_ip6s - 2; + while (a <= z) { + i = (a + z) / 2; + d = qcmp_v6(&pr->pr_ip6[i+1], ia6); + if (d > 0) + z = i - 1; + else if (d < 0) + a = i + 1; + else + return (0); + } + + return (EADDRNOTAVAIL); +} + +int +prison_check_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6) +{ + struct prison *pr; + int error; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) + return (0); + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if (!(pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6)) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (0); + } + if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) { + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (EAFNOSUPPORT); + } + + error = _prison_check_ip6(pr, ia6); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + return (error); +} +#endif + +/* + * Check if a jail supports the given address family. + * + * Returns 0 if not jailed or the address family is supported, EAFNOSUPPORT + * if not. + */ +int +prison_check_af(struct ucred *cred, int af) +{ + struct prison *pr; + int error; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + + pr = cred->cr_prison; +#ifdef VIMAGE + /* Prisons with their own network stack are not limited. */ + if (prison_owns_vnet(cred)) + return (0); +#endif + + error = 0; + switch (af) + { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4) + { + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4) && pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) + error = EAFNOSUPPORT; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6) + { + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6) && pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) + error = EAFNOSUPPORT; + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); + } + break; +#endif + case AF_LOCAL: + case AF_ROUTE: + break; + default: + if (!(pr->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF)) + error = EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + return (error); +} + +/* + * Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred (wrapper to + * prison_check_ip[46]). + * + * Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict the address family or if address belongs + * to jail, EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if + * the jail doesn't allow the address family. IPv4 Address passed in in NBO. + */ +int +prison_if(struct ucred *cred, struct sockaddr *sa) +{ +#ifdef INET + struct sockaddr_in *sai; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + struct sockaddr_in6 *sai6; +#endif + int error; + + KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); + KASSERT(sa != NULL, ("%s: sa is NULL", __func__)); + +#ifdef VIMAGE + if (prison_owns_vnet(cred)) + return (0); +#endif + + error = 0; + switch (sa->sa_family) + { +#ifdef INET + case AF_INET: + sai = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + error = prison_check_ip4(cred, &sai->sin_addr); + break; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + case AF_INET6: + sai6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + error = prison_check_ip6(cred, &sai6->sin6_addr); + break; +#endif + default: + if (!(cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF)) + error = EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + return (error); +} + +/* + * Return 0 if jails permit p1 to frob p2, otherwise ESRCH. + */ +int +prison_check(struct ucred *cred1, struct ucred *cred2) +{ + + return ((cred1->cr_prison == cred2->cr_prison || + prison_ischild(cred1->cr_prison, cred2->cr_prison)) ? 0 : ESRCH); +} + +/* + * Return 1 if p2 is a child of p1, otherwise 0. + */ +int +prison_ischild(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2) +{ + + for (pr2 = pr2->pr_parent; pr2 != NULL; pr2 = pr2->pr_parent) + if (pr1 == pr2) + return (1); + return (0); +} + +/* + * Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail, otherwise 0. + */ +int +jailed(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + return (cred->cr_prison != &prison0); +} + +/* + * Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail and that jail does not + * have its own virtual network stack, otherwise 0. + */ +int +jailed_without_vnet(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + if (!jailed(cred)) + return (0); +#ifdef VIMAGE + if (prison_owns_vnet(cred)) + return (0); +#endif + + return (1); +} + +/* + * Return the correct hostname (domainname, et al) for the passed credential. + */ +void +getcredhostname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + struct prison *pr; + + /* + * A NULL credential can be used to shortcut to the physical + * system's hostname. + */ + pr = (cred != NULL) ? cred->cr_prison : &prison0; + mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); + strlcpy(buf, pr->pr_hostname, size); + mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); +} + +void +getcreddomainname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + + mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); + strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_domainname, size); + mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); +} + +void +getcredhostuuid(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + + mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); + strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_hostuuid, size); + mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); +} + +void +getcredhostid(struct ucred *cred, unsigned long *hostid) +{ + + mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); + *hostid = cred->cr_prison->pr_hostid; + mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); +} + +#ifdef VIMAGE +/* + * Determine whether the prison represented by cred owns + * its vnet rather than having it inherited. + * + * Returns 1 in case the prison owns the vnet, 0 otherwise. + */ +int +prison_owns_vnet(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + /* + * vnets cannot be added/removed after jail creation, + * so no need to lock here. + */ + return (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & PR_VNET ? 1 : 0); +} +#endif + +/* + * Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see" + * status of a mount point. + * Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise. + * XXX: This function should be called cr_canseemount() and should be + * placed in kern_prot.c. + */ +int +prison_canseemount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp) +{ + struct prison *pr; + struct statfs *sp; + size_t len; + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 0) + return (0); + if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp) + return (0); + if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 2) + return (ENOENT); + /* + * If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see + * all mount-points from inside a jail. + * This is ugly check, but this is the only situation when jail's + * directory ends with '/'. + */ + if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0) + return (0); + len = strlen(pr->pr_path); + sp = &mp->mnt_stat; + if (strncmp(pr->pr_path, sp->f_mntonname, len) != 0) + return (ENOENT); + /* + * Be sure that we don't have situation where jail's root directory + * is "/some/path" and mount point is "/some/pathpath". + */ + if (sp->f_mntonname[len] != '\0' && sp->f_mntonname[len] != '/') + return (ENOENT); + return (0); +} + +void +prison_enforce_statfs(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, struct statfs *sp) +{ + char jpath[MAXPATHLEN]; + struct prison *pr; + size_t len; + + pr = cred->cr_prison; + if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 0) + return; + if (prison_canseemount(cred, mp) != 0) { + bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); + strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, "[restricted]", + sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); + return; + } + if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp) { + /* + * Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from + * the valid path left there. + */ + bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); + *sp->f_mntonname = '/'; + return; + } + /* + * If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see + * all mount-points from inside a jail. + */ + if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0) + return; + len = strlen(pr->pr_path); + strlcpy(jpath, sp->f_mntonname + len, sizeof(jpath)); + /* + * Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from + * the valid path left there. + */ + bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); + if (*jpath == '\0') { + /* Should never happen. */ + *sp->f_mntonname = '/'; + } else { + strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, jpath, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); + } +} + +/* + * Check with permission for a specific privilege is granted within jail. We + * have a specific list of accepted privileges; the rest are denied. + */ +int +prison_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv) +{ + + if (!jailed(cred)) + return (0); + +#ifdef VIMAGE + /* + * Privileges specific to prisons with a virtual network stack. + * There might be a duplicate entry here in case the privilege + * is only granted conditionally in the legacy jail case. + */ + switch (priv) { +#ifdef notyet + /* + * NFS-specific privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NFS_DAEMON: + case PRIV_NFS_LOCKD: +#endif + /* + * Network stack privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NET_BRIDGE: + case PRIV_NET_GRE: + case PRIV_NET_BPF: + case PRIV_NET_RAW: /* Dup, cond. in legacy jail case. */ + case PRIV_NET_ROUTE: + case PRIV_NET_TAP: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFMTU: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFFLAGS: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFCAP: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFDESCR: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFNAME : + case PRIV_NET_SETIFMETRIC: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFPHYS: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFMAC: + case PRIV_NET_ADDMULTI: + case PRIV_NET_DELMULTI: + case PRIV_NET_HWIOCTL: + case PRIV_NET_SETLLADDR: + case PRIV_NET_ADDIFGROUP: + case PRIV_NET_DELIFGROUP: + case PRIV_NET_IFCREATE: + case PRIV_NET_IFDESTROY: + case PRIV_NET_ADDIFADDR: + case PRIV_NET_DELIFADDR: + case PRIV_NET_LAGG: + case PRIV_NET_GIF: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFVNET: + case PRIV_NET_SETIFFIB: + + /* + * 802.11-related privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NET80211_GETKEY: +#ifdef notyet + case PRIV_NET80211_MANAGE: /* XXX-BZ discuss with sam@ */ +#endif + +#ifdef notyet + /* + * AppleTalk privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NETATALK_RESERVEDPORT: + + /* + * ATM privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NETATM_CFG: + case PRIV_NETATM_ADD: + case PRIV_NETATM_DEL: + case PRIV_NETATM_SET: + + /* + * Bluetooth privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NETBLUETOOTH_RAW: +#endif + + /* + * Netgraph and netgraph module privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NETGRAPH_CONTROL: +#ifdef notyet + case PRIV_NETGRAPH_TTY: +#endif + + /* + * IPv4 and IPv6 privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NETINET_IPFW: + case PRIV_NETINET_DIVERT: + case PRIV_NETINET_PF: + case PRIV_NETINET_DUMMYNET: + case PRIV_NETINET_CARP: + case PRIV_NETINET_MROUTE: + case PRIV_NETINET_RAW: + case PRIV_NETINET_ADDRCTRL6: + case PRIV_NETINET_ND6: + case PRIV_NETINET_SCOPE6: + case PRIV_NETINET_ALIFETIME6: + case PRIV_NETINET_IPSEC: + case PRIV_NETINET_BINDANY: + +#ifdef notyet + /* + * IPX/SPX privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NETIPX_RESERVEDPORT: + case PRIV_NETIPX_RAW: + + /* + * NCP privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NETNCP: + + /* + * SMB privileges. + */ + case PRIV_NETSMB: +#endif + + /* + * No default: or deny here. + * In case of no permit fall through to next switch(). + */ + if (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & PR_VNET) + return (0); + } +#endif /* VIMAGE */ + + switch (priv) { + + /* + * Allow ktrace privileges for root in jail. + */ + case PRIV_KTRACE: + +#if 0 + /* + * Allow jailed processes to configure audit identity and + * submit audit records (login, etc). In the future we may + * want to further refine the relationship between audit and + * jail. + */ + case PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT: + case PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT: + case PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT: +#endif + + /* + * Allow jailed processes to manipulate process UNIX + * credentials in any way they see fit. + */ + case PRIV_CRED_SETUID: + case PRIV_CRED_SETEUID: + case PRIV_CRED_SETGID: + case PRIV_CRED_SETEGID: + case PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS: + case PRIV_CRED_SETREUID: + case PRIV_CRED_SETREGID: + case PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID: + case PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID: + + /* + * Jail implements visibility constraints already, so allow + * jailed root to override uid/gid-based constraints. + */ + case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS: + case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS: + + /* + * Jail implements inter-process debugging limits already, so + * allow jailed root various debugging privileges. + */ + case PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED: + case PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID: + case PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV: + + /* + * Allow jail to set various resource limits and login + * properties, and for now, exceed process resource limits. + */ + case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT: + case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN: + case PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT: + + /* + * System V and POSIX IPC privileges are granted in jail. + */ + case PRIV_IPC_READ: + case PRIV_IPC_WRITE: + case PRIV_IPC_ADMIN: + case PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE: + case PRIV_MQ_ADMIN: + + /* + * Jail operations within a jail work on child jails. + */ + case PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH: + case PRIV_JAIL_SET: + case PRIV_JAIL_REMOVE: + + /* + * Jail implements its own inter-process limits, so allow + * root processes in jail to change scheduling on other + * processes in the same jail. Likewise for signalling. + */ + case PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED: + case PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET: + case PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED: + case PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID: + + /* + * Allow jailed processes to write to sysctls marked as jail + * writable. + */ + case PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL: + + /* + * Allow root in jail to manage a variety of quota + * properties. These should likely be conditional on a + * configuration option. + */ + case PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA: + case PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA: + + /* + * Since Jail relies on chroot() to implement file system + * protections, grant many VFS privileges to root in jail. + * Be careful to exclude mount-related and NFS-related + * privileges. + */ + case PRIV_VFS_READ: + case PRIV_VFS_WRITE: + case PRIV_VFS_ADMIN: + case PRIV_VFS_EXEC: + case PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP: + case PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE: /* XXXRW: Slightly surprising. */ + case PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV: + case PRIV_VFS_CHOWN: + case PRIV_VFS_CHROOT: + case PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID: + case PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT: + case PRIV_VFS_LINK: + case PRIV_VFS_SETGID: + case PRIV_VFS_STAT: + case PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE: + return (0); + + /* + * Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of + * setting system flags. + */ + case PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS: + if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_CHFLAGS) + return (0); + else + return (EPERM); + + /* + * Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of + * mounting/unmounting file systems. + */ + case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT: + case PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT: + case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER: + case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER: + if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_MOUNT && + cred->cr_prison->pr_enforce_statfs < 2) + return (0); + else + return (EPERM); + + /* + * Allow jailed root to bind reserved ports and reuse in-use + * ports. + */ + case PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT: + case PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT: + return (0); + + /* + * Allow jailed root to set certian IPv4/6 (option) headers. + */ + case PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS: + return (0); + + /* + * Conditionally allow creating raw sockets in jail. + */ + case PRIV_NETINET_RAW: + if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_RAW_SOCKETS) + return (0); + else + return (EPERM); + + /* + * Since jail implements its own visibility limits on netstat + * sysctls, allow getcred. This allows identd to work in + * jail. + */ + case PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED: + return (0); + + /* + * Allow jailed root to set loginclass. + */ + case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGINCLASS: + return (0); + + default: + /* + * In all remaining cases, deny the privilege request. This + * includes almost all network privileges, many system + * configuration privileges. + */ + return (EPERM); + } +} + +/* + * Return the part of pr2's name that is relative to pr1, or the whole name + * if it does not directly follow. + */ + +char * +prison_name(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2) +{ + char *name; + + /* Jails see themselves as "0" (if they see themselves at all). */ + if (pr1 == pr2) + return "0"; + name = pr2->pr_name; + if (prison_ischild(pr1, pr2)) { + /* + * pr1 isn't locked (and allprison_lock may not be either) + * so its length can't be counted on. But the number of dots + * can be counted on - and counted. + */ + for (; pr1 != &prison0; pr1 = pr1->pr_parent) + name = strchr(name, '.') + 1; + } + return (name); +} + +/* + * Return the part of pr2's path that is relative to pr1, or the whole path + * if it does not directly follow. + */ +static char * +prison_path(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2) +{ + char *path1, *path2; + int len1; + + path1 = pr1->pr_path; + path2 = pr2->pr_path; + if (!strcmp(path1, "/")) + return (path2); + len1 = strlen(path1); + if (strncmp(path1, path2, len1)) + return (path2); + if (path2[len1] == '\0') + return "/"; + if (path2[len1] == '/') + return (path2 + len1); + return (path2); +} + + +/* + * Jail-related sysctls. + */ +static SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, jail, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, + "Jails"); + +static int +sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) +{ + struct xprison *xp; + struct prison *pr, *cpr; +#ifdef INET + struct in_addr *ip4 = NULL; + int ip4s = 0; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + struct in6_addr *ip6 = NULL; + int ip6s = 0; +#endif + int descend, error; + + xp = malloc(sizeof(*xp), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); + pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison; + error = 0; + sx_slock(&allprison_lock); + FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, cpr, descend) { +#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) + again: +#endif + mtx_lock(&cpr->pr_mtx); +#ifdef INET + if (cpr->pr_ip4s > 0) { + if (ip4s < cpr->pr_ip4s) { + ip4s = cpr->pr_ip4s; + mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); + ip4 = realloc(ip4, ip4s * + sizeof(struct in_addr), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); + goto again; + } + bcopy(cpr->pr_ip4, ip4, + cpr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr)); + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + if (cpr->pr_ip6s > 0) { + if (ip6s < cpr->pr_ip6s) { + ip6s = cpr->pr_ip6s; + mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); + ip6 = realloc(ip6, ip6s * + sizeof(struct in6_addr), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); + goto again; + } + bcopy(cpr->pr_ip6, ip6, + cpr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + } +#endif + if (cpr->pr_ref == 0) { + mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); + continue; + } + bzero(xp, sizeof(*xp)); + xp->pr_version = XPRISON_VERSION; + xp->pr_id = cpr->pr_id; + xp->pr_state = cpr->pr_uref > 0 + ? PRISON_STATE_ALIVE : PRISON_STATE_DYING; + strlcpy(xp->pr_path, prison_path(pr, cpr), sizeof(xp->pr_path)); + strlcpy(xp->pr_host, cpr->pr_hostname, sizeof(xp->pr_host)); + strlcpy(xp->pr_name, prison_name(pr, cpr), sizeof(xp->pr_name)); +#ifdef INET + xp->pr_ip4s = cpr->pr_ip4s; +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + xp->pr_ip6s = cpr->pr_ip6s; +#endif + mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); + error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, xp, sizeof(*xp)); + if (error) + break; +#ifdef INET + if (xp->pr_ip4s > 0) { + error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, ip4, + xp->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr)); + if (error) + break; + } +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + if (xp->pr_ip6s > 0) { + error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, ip6, + xp->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + if (error) + break; + } +#endif + } + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); + free(xp, M_TEMP); +#ifdef INET + free(ip4, M_TEMP); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + free(ip6, M_TEMP); +#endif + return (error); +} + +SYSCTL_OID(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, list, + CTLTYPE_STRUCT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, + sysctl_jail_list, "S", "List of active jails"); + +static int +sysctl_jail_jailed(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) +{ + int error, injail; + + injail = jailed(req->td->td_ucred); + error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &injail, sizeof(injail)); + + return (error); +} + +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jailed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, + sysctl_jail_jailed, "I", "Process in jail?"); + +#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) +SYSCTL_UINT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jail_max_af_ips, CTLFLAG_RW, + &jail_max_af_ips, 0, + "Number of IP addresses a jail may have at most per address family"); +#endif + +/* + * Default parameters for jail(2) compatability. For historical reasons, + * the sysctl names have varying similarity to the parameter names. Prisons + * just see their own parameters, and can't change them. + */ +static int +sysctl_jail_default_allow(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) +{ + struct prison *pr; + int allow, error, i; + + pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison; + allow = (pr == &prison0) ? jail_default_allow : pr->pr_allow; + + /* Get the current flag value, and convert it to a boolean. */ + i = (allow & arg2) ? 1 : 0; + if (arg1 != NULL) + i = !i; + error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &i, 0, req); + if (error || !req->newptr) + return (error); + i = i ? arg2 : 0; + if (arg1 != NULL) + i ^= arg2; + /* + * The sysctls don't have CTLFLAGS_PRISON, so assume prison0 + * for writing. + */ + mtx_lock(&prison0.pr_mtx); + jail_default_allow = (jail_default_allow & ~arg2) | i; + mtx_unlock(&prison0.pr_mtx); + return (0); +} + +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, set_hostname_allowed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_SET_HOSTNAME, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail can set their hostnames"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, socket_unixiproute_only, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + (void *)1, PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail are limited to creating UNIX/IP/route sockets only"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, sysvipc_allowed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_SYSVIPC, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail can use System V IPC primitives"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, allow_raw_sockets, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_RAW_SOCKETS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Prison root can create raw sockets"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, chflags_allowed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_CHFLAGS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail can alter system file flags"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_allowed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_MOUNT, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail can mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_devfs_allowed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_MOUNT_DEVFS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail can mount the devfs file system"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_nullfs_allowed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_MOUNT_NULLFS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail can mount the nullfs file system"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_procfs_allowed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_MOUNT_PROCFS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail can mount the procfs file system"); +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_zfs_allowed, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + NULL, PR_ALLOW_MOUNT_ZFS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", + "Processes in jail can mount the zfs file system"); + +static int +sysctl_jail_default_level(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) +{ + struct prison *pr; + int level, error; + + pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison; + level = (pr == &prison0) ? *(int *)arg1 : *(int *)((char *)pr + arg2); + error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &level, 0, req); + if (error || !req->newptr) + return (error); + *(int *)arg1 = level; + return (0); +} + +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, enforce_statfs, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + &jail_default_enforce_statfs, offsetof(struct prison, pr_enforce_statfs), + sysctl_jail_default_level, "I", + "Processes in jail cannot see all mounted file systems"); + +SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, devfs_ruleset, + CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, + &jail_default_devfs_rsnum, offsetof(struct prison, pr_devfs_rsnum), + sysctl_jail_default_level, "I", + "Ruleset for the devfs filesystem in jail"); + +/* + * Nodes to describe jail parameters. Maximum length of string parameters + * is returned in the string itself, and the other parameters exist merely + * to make themselves and their types known. + */ +SYSCTL_NODE(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, param, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, + "Jail parameters"); + +int +sysctl_jail_param(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) +{ + int i; + long l; + size_t s; + char numbuf[12]; + + switch (oidp->oid_kind & CTLTYPE) + { + case CTLTYPE_LONG: + case CTLTYPE_ULONG: + l = 0; +#ifdef SCTL_MASK32 + if (!(req->flags & SCTL_MASK32)) +#endif + return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &l, sizeof(l))); + case CTLTYPE_INT: + case CTLTYPE_UINT: + i = 0; + return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &i, sizeof(i))); + case CTLTYPE_STRING: + snprintf(numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), "%jd", (intmax_t)arg2); + return + (sysctl_handle_string(oidp, numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), req)); + case CTLTYPE_STRUCT: + s = (size_t)arg2; + return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &s, sizeof(s))); + } + return (0); +} + +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, jid, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RDTUN, "I", "Jail ID"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, parent, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, "I", "Jail parent ID"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(, name, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, "Jail name"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(, path, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, MAXPATHLEN, "Jail root path"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, securelevel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "I", "Jail secure level"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, enforce_statfs, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "I", "Jail cannot see all mounted file systems"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, devfs_ruleset, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "I", "Ruleset for in-jail devfs mounts"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, persist, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail persistence"); +#ifdef VIMAGE +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, vnet, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RDTUN, + "E,jailsys", "Virtual network stack"); +#endif +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, dying, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, + "B", "Jail is in the process of shutting down"); + +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(children, "Number of child jails"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_children, cur, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, + "I", "Current number of child jails"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_children, max, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "I", "Maximum number of child jails"); + +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(host, CTLFLAG_RW, "Jail host info"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, hostname, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, + "Jail hostname"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, domainname, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, + "Jail NIS domainname"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, hostuuid, CTLFLAG_RW, HOSTUUIDLEN, + "Jail host UUID"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_host, hostid, CTLTYPE_ULONG | CTLFLAG_RW, + "LU", "Jail host ID"); + +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(cpuset, "Jail cpuset"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_cpuset, id, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, "I", "Jail cpuset ID"); + +#ifdef INET +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(ip4, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, + "Jail IPv4 address virtualization"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRUCT(_ip4, addr, CTLFLAG_RW, sizeof(struct in_addr), + "S,in_addr,a", "Jail IPv4 addresses"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_ip4, saddrsel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Do (not) use IPv4 source address selection rather than the " + "primary jail IPv4 address."); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(ip6, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, + "Jail IPv6 address virtualization"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRUCT(_ip6, addr, CTLFLAG_RW, sizeof(struct in6_addr), + "S,in6_addr,a", "Jail IPv6 addresses"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_ip6, saddrsel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Do (not) use IPv6 source address selection rather than the " + "primary jail IPv6 address."); +#endif + +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(allow, "Jail permission flags"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, set_hostname, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may set hostname"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, sysvipc, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may use SYSV IPC"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, raw_sockets, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may create raw sockets"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, chflags, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may alter system file flags"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, quotas, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may set file quotas"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, socket_af, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may create sockets other than just UNIX/IPv4/IPv6/route"); + +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SUBNODE(allow, mount, "Jail mount/unmount permission flags"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow_mount, , CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems in general"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow_mount, devfs, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may mount the devfs file system"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow_mount, nullfs, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may mount the nullfs file system"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow_mount, procfs, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may mount the procfs file system"); +SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow_mount, zfs, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, + "B", "Jail may mount the zfs file system"); + +void +prison_racct_foreach(void (*callback)(struct racct *racct, + void *arg2, void *arg3), void *arg2, void *arg3) +{ + struct prison_racct *prr; + + sx_slock(&allprison_lock); + LIST_FOREACH(prr, &allprison_racct, prr_next) + (callback)(prr->prr_racct, arg2, arg3); + sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); +} + +static struct prison_racct * +prison_racct_find_locked(const char *name) +{ + struct prison_racct *prr; + + sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_XLOCKED); + + if (name[0] == '\0' || strlen(name) >= MAXHOSTNAMELEN) + return (NULL); + + LIST_FOREACH(prr, &allprison_racct, prr_next) { + if (strcmp(name, prr->prr_name) != 0) + continue; + + /* Found prison_racct with a matching name? */ + prison_racct_hold(prr); + return (prr); + } + + /* Add new prison_racct. */ + prr = malloc(sizeof(*prr), M_PRISON_RACCT, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK); + racct_create(&prr->prr_racct); + + strcpy(prr->prr_name, name); + refcount_init(&prr->prr_refcount, 1); + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&allprison_racct, prr, prr_next); + + return (prr); +} + +struct prison_racct * +prison_racct_find(const char *name) +{ + struct prison_racct *prr; + + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + prr = prison_racct_find_locked(name); + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); + return (prr); +} + +void +prison_racct_hold(struct prison_racct *prr) +{ + + refcount_acquire(&prr->prr_refcount); +} + +static void +prison_racct_free_locked(struct prison_racct *prr) +{ + + sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_XLOCKED); + + if (refcount_release(&prr->prr_refcount)) { + racct_destroy(&prr->prr_racct); + LIST_REMOVE(prr, prr_next); + free(prr, M_PRISON_RACCT); + } +} + +void +prison_racct_free(struct prison_racct *prr) +{ + int old; + + sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_UNLOCKED); + + old = prr->prr_refcount; + if (old > 1 && atomic_cmpset_int(&prr->prr_refcount, old, old - 1)) + return; + + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + prison_racct_free_locked(prr); + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); +} + +#ifdef RACCT +static void +prison_racct_attach(struct prison *pr) +{ + struct prison_racct *prr; + + sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_XLOCKED); + + prr = prison_racct_find_locked(pr->pr_name); + KASSERT(prr != NULL, ("cannot find prison_racct")); + + pr->pr_prison_racct = prr; +} + +/* + * Handle jail renaming. From the racct point of view, renaming means + * moving from one prison_racct to another. + */ +static void +prison_racct_modify(struct prison *pr) +{ + struct proc *p; + struct ucred *cred; + struct prison_racct *oldprr; + + sx_slock(&allproc_lock); + sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); + + if (strcmp(pr->pr_name, pr->pr_prison_racct->prr_name) == 0) { + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); + sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock); + return; + } + + oldprr = pr->pr_prison_racct; + pr->pr_prison_racct = NULL; + + prison_racct_attach(pr); + + /* + * Move resource utilisation records. + */ + racct_move(pr->pr_prison_racct->prr_racct, oldprr->prr_racct); + + /* + * Force rctl to reattach rules to processes. + */ + FOREACH_PROC_IN_SYSTEM(p) { + PROC_LOCK(p); + cred = crhold(p->p_ucred); + PROC_UNLOCK(p); + racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, cred, cred); + crfree(cred); + } + + sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock); + prison_racct_free_locked(oldprr); + sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); +} + +static void +prison_racct_detach(struct prison *pr) +{ + + sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_UNLOCKED); + + prison_racct_free(pr->pr_prison_racct); + pr->pr_prison_racct = NULL; +} +#endif /* RACCT */ + +#ifdef DDB + +static void +db_show_prison(struct prison *pr) +{ + int fi; +#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) + int ii; +#endif + unsigned jsf; +#ifdef INET6 + char ip6buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; +#endif + + db_printf("prison %p:\n", pr); + db_printf(" jid = %d\n", pr->pr_id); + db_printf(" name = %s\n", pr->pr_name); + db_printf(" parent = %p\n", pr->pr_parent); + db_printf(" ref = %d\n", pr->pr_ref); + db_printf(" uref = %d\n", pr->pr_uref); + db_printf(" path = %s\n", pr->pr_path); + db_printf(" cpuset = %d\n", pr->pr_cpuset + ? pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id : -1); +#ifdef VIMAGE + db_printf(" vnet = %p\n", pr->pr_vnet); +#endif + db_printf(" root = %p\n", pr->pr_root); + db_printf(" securelevel = %d\n", pr->pr_securelevel); + db_printf(" devfs_rsnum = %d\n", pr->pr_devfs_rsnum); + db_printf(" children.max = %d\n", pr->pr_childmax); + db_printf(" children.cur = %d\n", pr->pr_childcount); + db_printf(" child = %p\n", LIST_FIRST(&pr->pr_children)); + db_printf(" sibling = %p\n", LIST_NEXT(pr, pr_sibling)); + db_printf(" flags = 0x%x", pr->pr_flags); + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_names) / sizeof(pr_flag_names[0]); + fi++) + if (pr_flag_names[fi] != NULL && (pr->pr_flags & (1 << fi))) + db_printf(" %s", pr_flag_names[fi]); + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys) / sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys[0]); + fi++) { + jsf = pr->pr_flags & + (pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable | pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new); + db_printf(" %-16s= %s\n", pr_flag_jailsys[fi].name, + pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable && + (jsf == pr_flag_jailsys[fi].disable) ? "disable" + : (jsf == pr_flag_jailsys[fi].new) ? "new" + : "inherit"); + } + db_printf(" allow = 0x%x", pr->pr_allow); + for (fi = 0; fi < sizeof(pr_allow_names) / sizeof(pr_allow_names[0]); + fi++) + if (pr_allow_names[fi] != NULL && (pr->pr_allow & (1 << fi))) + db_printf(" %s", pr_allow_names[fi]); + db_printf("\n"); + db_printf(" enforce_statfs = %d\n", pr->pr_enforce_statfs); + db_printf(" host.hostname = %s\n", pr->pr_hostname); + db_printf(" host.domainname = %s\n", pr->pr_domainname); + db_printf(" host.hostuuid = %s\n", pr->pr_hostuuid); + db_printf(" host.hostid = %lu\n", pr->pr_hostid); +#ifdef INET + db_printf(" ip4s = %d\n", pr->pr_ip4s); + for (ii = 0; ii < pr->pr_ip4s; ii++) + db_printf(" %s %s\n", + ii == 0 ? "ip4.addr =" : " ", + inet_ntoa(pr->pr_ip4[ii])); +#endif +#ifdef INET6 + db_printf(" ip6s = %d\n", pr->pr_ip6s); + for (ii = 0; ii < pr->pr_ip6s; ii++) + db_printf(" %s %s\n", + ii == 0 ? "ip6.addr =" : " ", + ip6_sprintf(ip6buf, &pr->pr_ip6[ii])); +#endif +} + +DB_SHOW_COMMAND(prison, db_show_prison_command) +{ + struct prison *pr; + + if (!have_addr) { + /* + * Show all prisons in the list, and prison0 which is not + * listed. + */ + db_show_prison(&prison0); + if (!db_pager_quit) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) { + db_show_prison(pr); + if (db_pager_quit) + break; + } + } + return; + } + + if (addr == 0) + pr = &prison0; + else { + /* Look for a prison with the ID and with references. */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) + if (pr->pr_id == addr && pr->pr_ref > 0) + break; + if (pr == NULL) + /* Look again, without requiring a reference. */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) + if (pr->pr_id == addr) + break; + if (pr == NULL) + /* Assume address points to a valid prison. */ + pr = (struct prison *)addr; + } + db_show_prison(pr); +} + +#endif /* DDB */ |
