diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c | 389 |
1 files changed, 389 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c b/sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f666c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org> + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/systm.h> +#include <sys/kernel.h> +#include <sys/module.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/libkern.h> +#include <sys/endian.h> +#if defined(__i386__) && !defined(PC98) +#include <machine/cpufunc.h> +#include <machine/cputypes.h> +#include <machine/md_var.h> +#include <machine/specialreg.h> +#endif + +#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> +#include <opencrypto/cryptosoft.h> /* for hmac_ipad_buffer and hmac_opad_buffer */ +#include <opencrypto/xform.h> + +#include <crypto/via/padlock.h> + +/* + * Implementation notes. + * + * Some VIA CPUs provides SHA1 and SHA256 acceleration. + * We implement all HMAC algorithms provided by crypto(9) framework, but we do + * the crypto work in software unless this is HMAC/SHA1 or HMAC/SHA256 and + * our CPU can accelerate it. + * + * Additional CPU instructions, which preform SHA1 and SHA256 are one-shot + * functions - we have only one chance to give the data, CPU itself will add + * the padding and calculate hash automatically. + * This means, it is not possible to implement common init(), update(), final() + * methods. + * The way I've choosen is to keep adding data to the buffer on update() + * (reallocating the buffer if necessary) and call XSHA{1,256} instruction on + * final(). + */ + +struct padlock_sha_ctx { + uint8_t *psc_buf; + int psc_offset; + int psc_size; +}; +CTASSERT(sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx) <= sizeof(union authctx)); + +static void padlock_sha_init(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx); +static int padlock_sha_update(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *buf, + uint16_t bufsize); +static void padlock_sha1_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx); +static void padlock_sha256_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx); + +static struct auth_hash padlock_hmac_sha1 = { + CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, "HMAC-SHA1", + 20, SHA1_HASH_LEN, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx), + (void (*)(void *))padlock_sha_init, + (int (*)(void *, uint8_t *, uint16_t))padlock_sha_update, + (void (*)(uint8_t *, void *))padlock_sha1_final +}; + +static struct auth_hash padlock_hmac_sha256 = { + CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC, "HMAC-SHA2-256", + 32, SHA2_256_HASH_LEN, SHA2_256_HMAC_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx), + (void (*)(void *))padlock_sha_init, + (int (*)(void *, uint8_t *, uint16_t))padlock_sha_update, + (void (*)(uint8_t *, void *))padlock_sha256_final +}; + +MALLOC_DECLARE(M_PADLOCK); + +static __inline void +padlock_output_block(uint32_t *src, uint32_t *dst, size_t count) +{ + + while (count-- > 0) + *dst++ = bswap32(*src++); +} + +static void +padlock_do_sha1(const u_char *in, u_char *out, int count) +{ + u_char buf[128+16]; /* PadLock needs at least 128 bytes buffer. */ + u_char *result = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf); + + ((uint32_t *)result)[0] = 0x67452301; + ((uint32_t *)result)[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ((uint32_t *)result)[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ((uint32_t *)result)[3] = 0x10325476; + ((uint32_t *)result)[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + +#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM + __asm __volatile( + ".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xc8" /* rep xsha1 */ + : "+S"(in), "+D"(result) + : "c"(count), "a"(0) + ); +#endif + + padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out, + SHA1_HASH_LEN / sizeof(uint32_t)); +} + +static void +padlock_do_sha256(const char *in, char *out, int count) +{ + char buf[128+16]; /* PadLock needs at least 128 bytes buffer. */ + char *result = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf); + + ((uint32_t *)result)[0] = 0x6A09E667; + ((uint32_t *)result)[1] = 0xBB67AE85; + ((uint32_t *)result)[2] = 0x3C6EF372; + ((uint32_t *)result)[3] = 0xA54FF53A; + ((uint32_t *)result)[4] = 0x510E527F; + ((uint32_t *)result)[5] = 0x9B05688C; + ((uint32_t *)result)[6] = 0x1F83D9AB; + ((uint32_t *)result)[7] = 0x5BE0CD19; + +#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM + __asm __volatile( + ".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xd0" /* rep xsha256 */ + : "+S"(in), "+D"(result) + : "c"(count), "a"(0) + ); +#endif + + padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out, + SHA2_256_HASH_LEN / sizeof(uint32_t)); +} + +static void +padlock_sha_init(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx) +{ + + ctx->psc_buf = NULL; + ctx->psc_offset = 0; + ctx->psc_size = 0; +} + +static int +padlock_sha_update(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *buf, uint16_t bufsize) +{ + + if (ctx->psc_size - ctx->psc_offset < bufsize) { + ctx->psc_size = MAX(ctx->psc_size * 2, ctx->psc_size + bufsize); + ctx->psc_buf = realloc(ctx->psc_buf, ctx->psc_size, M_PADLOCK, + M_WAITOK); + } + bcopy(buf, ctx->psc_buf + ctx->psc_offset, bufsize); + ctx->psc_offset += bufsize; + return (0); +} + +static void +padlock_sha_free(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx) +{ + + if (ctx->psc_buf != NULL) { + //bzero(ctx->psc_buf, ctx->psc_size); + free(ctx->psc_buf, M_PADLOCK); + ctx->psc_buf = NULL; + ctx->psc_offset = 0; + ctx->psc_size = 0; + } +} + +static void +padlock_sha1_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx) +{ + + padlock_do_sha1(ctx->psc_buf, hash, ctx->psc_offset); + padlock_sha_free(ctx); +} + +static void +padlock_sha256_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx) +{ + + padlock_do_sha256(ctx->psc_buf, hash, ctx->psc_offset); + padlock_sha_free(ctx); +} + +static void +padlock_copy_ctx(struct auth_hash *axf, void *sctx, void *dctx) +{ + + if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0 && + (axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC || + axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC)) { + struct padlock_sha_ctx *spctx = sctx, *dpctx = dctx; + + dpctx->psc_offset = spctx->psc_offset; + dpctx->psc_size = spctx->psc_size; + dpctx->psc_buf = malloc(dpctx->psc_size, M_PADLOCK, M_WAITOK); + bcopy(spctx->psc_buf, dpctx->psc_buf, dpctx->psc_size); + } else { + bcopy(sctx, dctx, axf->ctxsize); + } +} + +static void +padlock_free_ctx(struct auth_hash *axf, void *ctx) +{ + + if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0 && + (axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC || + axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC)) { + padlock_sha_free(ctx); + } +} + +static void +padlock_hash_key_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen) +{ + struct auth_hash *axf; + int i; + + klen /= 8; + axf = ses->ses_axf; + + /* + * Try to free contexts before using them, because + * padlock_hash_key_setup() can be called twice - once from + * padlock_newsession() and again from padlock_process(). + */ + padlock_free_ctx(axf, ses->ses_ictx); + padlock_free_ctx(axf, ses->ses_octx); + + for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) + key[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VAL; + + axf->Init(ses->ses_ictx); + axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, key, klen); + axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, hmac_ipad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen); + + for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) + key[i] ^= (HMAC_IPAD_VAL ^ HMAC_OPAD_VAL); + + axf->Init(ses->ses_octx); + axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, key, klen); + axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, hmac_opad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen); + + for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) + key[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VAL; +} + +/* + * Compute keyed-hash authenticator. + */ +static int +padlock_authcompute(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *crd, + caddr_t buf, int flags) +{ + u_char hash[HASH_MAX_LEN]; + struct auth_hash *axf; + union authctx ctx; + int error; + + axf = ses->ses_axf; + + padlock_copy_ctx(axf, ses->ses_ictx, &ctx); + error = crypto_apply(flags, buf, crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len, + (int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, (caddr_t)&ctx); + if (error != 0) { + padlock_free_ctx(axf, &ctx); + return (error); + } + axf->Final(hash, &ctx); + + padlock_copy_ctx(axf, ses->ses_octx, &ctx); + axf->Update(&ctx, hash, axf->hashsize); + axf->Final(hash, &ctx); + + /* Inject the authentication data */ + crypto_copyback(flags, buf, crd->crd_inject, + ses->ses_mlen == 0 ? axf->hashsize : ses->ses_mlen, hash); + return (0); +} + +int +padlock_hash_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptoini *macini) +{ + + ses->ses_mlen = macini->cri_mlen; + + /* Find software structure which describes HMAC algorithm. */ + switch (macini->cri_alg) { + case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_null; + break; + case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_md5; + break; + case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: + if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0) + ses->ses_axf = &padlock_hmac_sha1; + else + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1; + break; + case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160; + break; + case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: + if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0) + ses->ses_axf = &padlock_hmac_sha256; + else + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; + break; + case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; + break; + case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; + break; + } + + /* Allocate memory for HMAC inner and outer contexts. */ + ses->ses_ictx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_PADLOCK, + M_ZERO | M_NOWAIT); + ses->ses_octx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_PADLOCK, + M_ZERO | M_NOWAIT); + if (ses->ses_ictx == NULL || ses->ses_octx == NULL) + return (ENOMEM); + + /* Setup key if given. */ + if (macini->cri_key != NULL) { + padlock_hash_key_setup(ses, macini->cri_key, + macini->cri_klen); + } + return (0); +} + +int +padlock_hash_process(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *maccrd, + struct cryptop *crp) +{ + int error; + + if ((maccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0) + padlock_hash_key_setup(ses, maccrd->crd_key, maccrd->crd_klen); + + error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf, crp->crp_flags); + return (error); +} + +void +padlock_hash_free(struct padlock_session *ses) +{ + + if (ses->ses_ictx != NULL) { + padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_ictx); + bzero(ses->ses_ictx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize); + free(ses->ses_ictx, M_PADLOCK); + ses->ses_ictx = NULL; + } + if (ses->ses_octx != NULL) { + padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_octx); + bzero(ses->ses_octx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize); + free(ses->ses_octx, M_PADLOCK); + ses->ses_octx = NULL; + } +} |
