diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c | 266 |
1 files changed, 266 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c b/sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c109a4c --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2007 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org> + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/priv.h> +#include <sys/vnode.h> +#include <sys/mount.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/policy.h> + +int +secpolicy_zfs(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_MOUNT, 0)); +} + +int +secpolicy_sys_config(struct ucred *cred, int checkonly __unused) +{ + + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ZFS_POOL_CONFIG, 0)); +} + +int +secpolicy_zinject(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ZFS_INJECT, 0)); +} + +int +secpolicy_fs_unmount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *vfsp __unused) +{ + + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT, 0)); +} + +/* + * This check is done in kern_link(), so we could just return 0 here. + */ +extern int hardlink_check_uid; +int +secpolicy_basic_link(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + if (!hardlink_check_uid) + return (0); + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)); +} + +int +secpolicy_vnode_stky_modify(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + return (EPERM); +} + +int +secpolicy_vnode_remove(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)); +} + +int +secpolicy_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, uint64_t owner, + int mode) +{ + + if ((mode & VREAD) && + priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) { + return (EACCES); + } + if ((mode & VWRITE) && + priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) { + return (EACCES); + } + if (mode & VEXEC) { + if (vp->v_type == VDIR) { + if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, + SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) { + return (EACCES); + } + } else { + if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, + SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) { + return (EACCES); + } + } + } + return (0); +} + +int +secpolicy_vnode_setdac(struct ucred *cred, uid_t owner) +{ + + if (owner == cred->cr_uid) + return (0); + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)); +} + +int +secpolicy_vnode_setattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap, + const struct vattr *ovap, int flags, + int unlocked_access(void *, int, struct ucred *), void *node) +{ + int mask = vap->va_mask; + int error; + + if (mask & AT_SIZE) { + if (vp->v_type == VDIR) + return (EISDIR); + error = unlocked_access(node, VWRITE, cred); + if (error) + return (error); + } + if (mask & AT_MODE) { + /* + * If not the owner of the file then check privilege + * for two things: the privilege to set the mode at all + * and, if we're setting setuid, we also need permissions + * to add the set-uid bit, if we're not the owner. + * In the specific case of creating a set-uid root + * file, we need even more permissions. + */ + error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(cred, ovap->va_uid); + if (error) + return (error); + error = secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(vp, vap, ovap, cred); + if (error) + return (error); + } else { + vap->va_mode = ovap->va_mode; + } + if (mask & (AT_UID | AT_GID)) { + error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(cred, ovap->va_uid); + if (error) + return (error); + + /* + * To change the owner of a file, or change the group of a file to a + * group of which we are not a member, the caller must have + * privilege. + */ + if (((mask & AT_UID) && vap->va_uid != ovap->va_uid) || + ((mask & AT_GID) && vap->va_gid != ovap->va_gid && + !groupmember(vap->va_gid, cred))) { + error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, + SUSER_ALLOWJAIL); + if (error) + return (error); + } + + if (((mask & AT_UID) && vap->va_uid != ovap->va_uid) || + ((mask & AT_GID) && vap->va_gid != ovap->va_gid)) { + secpolicy_setid_clear(vap, cred); + } + } + if (mask & (AT_ATIME | AT_MTIME)) { + /* + * From utimes(2): + * If times is NULL, ... The caller must be the owner of + * the file, have permission to write the file, or be the + * super-user. + * If times is non-NULL, ... The caller must be the owner of + * the file or be the super-user. + */ + error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(cred, ovap->va_uid); + if (error && (vap->va_vaflags & VA_UTIMES_NULL)) + error = unlocked_access(node, VWRITE, cred); + if (error) + return (error); + } + return (0); +} + +int +secpolicy_vnode_create_gid(struct ucred *cred) +{ + + return (EPERM); +} + +int +secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid) +{ + + if (!groupmember(gid, cred)) + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)); + return (0); +} + +int +secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(struct ucred *cred, boolean_t issuidroot __unused) +{ + + return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)); +} + +void +secpolicy_setid_clear(struct vattr *vap, struct ucred *cred) +{ + + if ((vap->va_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) != 0) { + if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, + SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) { + vap->va_mask |= AT_MODE; + vap->va_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID); + } + } +} + +int +secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap, + const struct vattr *ovap, struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + /* + * Privileged processes may set the sticky bit on non-directories, + * as well as set the setgid bit on a file with a group that the process + * is not a member of. Both of these are allowed in jail(8). + */ + if (vp->v_type != VDIR && (vap->va_mode & S_ISTXT)) { + if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) + return (EFTYPE); + } + /* + * Check for privilege if attempting to set the + * group-id bit. + */ + if ((vap->va_mode & S_ISGID) != 0) { + error = secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(cred, ovap->va_gid); + if (error) + return (error); + } + return (0); +} |