1 files changed, 266 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c b/sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c109a4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris/kern/opensolaris_policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/priv.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/policy.h>
+
+int
+secpolicy_zfs(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_MOUNT, 0));
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_sys_config(struct ucred *cred, int checkonly __unused)
+{
+
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ZFS_POOL_CONFIG, 0));
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_zinject(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ZFS_INJECT, 0));
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_fs_unmount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *vfsp __unused)
+{
+
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT, 0));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This check is done in kern_link(), so we could just return 0 here.
+ */
+extern int hardlink_check_uid;
+int
+secpolicy_basic_link(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	if (!hardlink_check_uid)
+		return (0);
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_stky_modify(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	return (EPERM);
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_remove(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, uint64_t owner,
+    int mode)
+{
+
+	if ((mode & VREAD) &&
+	    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+		return (EACCES);
+	}
+	if ((mode & VWRITE) &&
+	    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+		return (EACCES);
+	}
+	if (mode & VEXEC) {
+		if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
+			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP,
+			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+				return (EACCES);
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC,
+			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+				return (EACCES);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_setdac(struct ucred *cred, uid_t owner)
+{
+
+	if (owner == cred->cr_uid)
+		return (0);
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_setattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap,
+    const struct vattr *ovap, int flags,
+    int unlocked_access(void *, int, struct ucred *), void *node)
+{
+	int mask = vap->va_mask;
+	int error;
+
+	if (mask & AT_SIZE) {
+		if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
+			return (EISDIR);
+		error = unlocked_access(node, VWRITE, cred);
+		if (error)
+			return (error);
+	}
+	if (mask & AT_MODE) {
+		/*
+		 * If not the owner of the file then check privilege
+		 * for two things: the privilege to set the mode at all
+		 * and, if we're setting setuid, we also need permissions
+		 * to add the set-uid bit, if we're not the owner.
+		 * In the specific case of creating a set-uid root
+		 * file, we need even more permissions.
+		 */
+		error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(cred, ovap->va_uid);
+		if (error)
+			return (error);
+		error = secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(vp, vap, ovap, cred);
+		if (error)
+			return (error);
+	} else {
+		vap->va_mode = ovap->va_mode;
+	}
+	if (mask & (AT_UID | AT_GID)) {
+		error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(cred, ovap->va_uid);
+		if (error)
+			return (error);
+
+		/*
+		 * To change the owner of a file, or change the group of a file to a
+		 * group of which we are not a member, the caller must have
+		 * privilege.
+		 */
+		if (((mask & AT_UID) && vap->va_uid != ovap->va_uid) ||
+		    ((mask & AT_GID) && vap->va_gid != ovap->va_gid &&
+		     !groupmember(vap->va_gid, cred))) {
+			error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN,
+			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			if (error)
+				return (error);
+		}
+
+		if (((mask & AT_UID) && vap->va_uid != ovap->va_uid) ||
+		    ((mask & AT_GID) && vap->va_gid != ovap->va_gid)) {
+			secpolicy_setid_clear(vap, cred);
+		}
+	}
+	if (mask & (AT_ATIME | AT_MTIME)) {
+		/*
+		 * From utimes(2):
+		 * If times is NULL, ... The caller must be the owner of
+		 * the file, have permission to write the file, or be the
+		 * super-user.
+		 * If times is non-NULL, ... The caller must be the owner of
+		 * the file or be the super-user.
+		 */
+		error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(cred, ovap->va_uid);
+		if (error && (vap->va_vaflags & VA_UTIMES_NULL))
+			error = unlocked_access(node, VWRITE, cred);
+		if (error)
+			return (error);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_create_gid(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	return (EPERM);
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
+{
+
+	if (!groupmember(gid, cred))
+		return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_SETGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(struct ucred *cred, boolean_t issuidroot __unused)
+{
+
+	return (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL));
+}
+
+void
+secpolicy_setid_clear(struct vattr *vap, struct ucred *cred)
+{
+
+	if ((vap->va_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) != 0) {
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID,
+		    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) {
+			vap->va_mask |= AT_MODE;
+			vap->va_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *vap,
+    const struct vattr *ovap, struct ucred *cred)
+{
+        int error;
+
+	/*
+	 * Privileged processes may set the sticky bit on non-directories,
+	 * as well as set the setgid bit on a file with a group that the process
+	 * is not a member of. Both of these are allowed in jail(8).
+	 */
+	if (vp->v_type != VDIR && (vap->va_mode & S_ISTXT)) {
+		if (priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+			return (EFTYPE);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Check for privilege if attempting to set the
+	 * group-id bit.
+	 */
+	if ((vap->va_mode & S_ISGID) != 0) {
+		error = secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(cred, ovap->va_gid);
+		if (error)
+			return (error);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}