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Diffstat (limited to 'secure/usr.bin/openssl/man/verify.1')
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diff --git a/secure/usr.bin/openssl/man/verify.1 b/secure/usr.bin/openssl/man/verify.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c987a55 --- /dev/null +++ b/secure/usr.bin/openssl/man/verify.1 @@ -0,0 +1,512 @@ +.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.28 (Pod::Simple 3.28) +.\" +.\" Standard preamble: +.\" ======================================================================== +.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) +.if t .sp .5v +.if n .sp +.. +.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text +.ft CW +.nf +.ne \\$1 +.. +.de Ve \" End verbatim text +.ft R +.fi +.. +.\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will +.\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left +.\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. \*(C+ will +.\" give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used to do unbreakable dashes and +.\" therefore won't be available. \*(C` and \*(C' expand to `' in nroff, +.\" nothing in troff, for use with C<>. +.tr \(*W- +.ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p' +.ie n \{\ +. ds -- \(*W- +. ds PI pi +. if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch +. if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch +. ds L" "" +. ds R" "" +. ds C` "" +. ds C' "" +'br\} +.el\{\ +. ds -- \|\(em\| +. ds PI \(*p +. ds L" `` +. ds R" '' +. ds C` +. ds C' +'br\} +.\" +.\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform. +.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq +.el .ds Aq ' +.\" +.\" If the F register is turned on, we'll generate index entries on stderr for +.\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index +.\" entries marked with X<> in POD. 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Always turn off hyphenation; it makes +.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. +.if n .ad l +.nh +.SH "NAME" +verify \- Utility to verify certificates. +.SH "SYNOPSIS" +.IX Header "SYNOPSIS" +\&\fBopenssl\fR \fBverify\fR +[\fB\-CApath directory\fR] +[\fB\-CAfile file\fR] +[\fB\-purpose purpose\fR] +[\fB\-policy arg\fR] +[\fB\-ignore_critical\fR] +[\fB\-attime timestamp\fR] +[\fB\-check_ss_sig\fR] +[\fB\-crlfile file\fR] +[\fB\-crl_download\fR] +[\fB\-crl_check\fR] +[\fB\-crl_check_all\fR] +[\fB\-policy_check\fR] +[\fB\-explicit_policy\fR] +[\fB\-inhibit_any\fR] +[\fB\-inhibit_map\fR] +[\fB\-x509_strict\fR] +[\fB\-extended_crl\fR] +[\fB\-use_deltas\fR] +[\fB\-policy_print\fR] +[\fB\-no_alt_chains\fR] +[\fB\-untrusted file\fR] +[\fB\-help\fR] +[\fB\-issuer_checks\fR] +[\fB\-trusted file\fR] +[\fB\-verbose\fR] +[\fB\-\fR] +[certificates] +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.IX Header "DESCRIPTION" +The \fBverify\fR command verifies certificate chains. +.SH "COMMAND OPTIONS" +.IX Header "COMMAND OPTIONS" +.IP "\fB\-CApath directory\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-CApath directory" +A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names +of the form: hash.0 or have symbolic links to them of this +form (\*(L"hash\*(R" is the hashed certificate subject name: see the \fB\-hash\fR option +of the \fBx509\fR utility). Under Unix the \fBc_rehash\fR script will automatically +create symbolic links to a directory of certificates. +.IP "\fB\-CAfile file\fR A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates in \s-1PEM\s0 format concatenated together." 4 +.IX Item "-CAfile file A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates in PEM format concatenated together." +.PD 0 +.IP "\fB\-attime timestamp\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-attime timestamp" +.PD +Perform validation checks using time specified by \fBtimestamp\fR and not +current system time. \fBtimestamp\fR is the number of seconds since +01.01.1970 (\s-1UNIX\s0 time). +.IP "\fB\-check_ss_sig\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-check_ss_sig" +Verify the signature on the self-signed root \s-1CA.\s0 This is disabled by default +because it doesn't add any security. +.IP "\fB\-crlfile file\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-crlfile file" +File containing one or more \s-1CRL\s0's (in \s-1PEM\s0 format) to load. +.IP "\fB\-crl_download\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-crl_download" +Attempt to download \s-1CRL\s0 information for this certificate. +.IP "\fB\-crl_check\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-crl_check" +Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid \s-1CRL.\s0 +If a valid \s-1CRL\s0 cannot be found an error occurs. +.IP "\fB\-untrusted file\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-untrusted file" +A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates +in \s-1PEM\s0 format concatenated together. +.IP "\fB\-purpose purpose\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-purpose purpose" +The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified, +\&\fBverify\fR will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification. +Currently accepted uses are \fBsslclient\fR, \fBsslserver\fR, \fBnssslserver\fR, +\&\fBsmimesign\fR, \fBsmimeencrypt\fR. See the \fB\s-1VERIFY OPERATION\s0\fR section for more +information. +.IP "\fB\-help\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-help" +Print out a usage message. +.IP "\fB\-verbose\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-verbose" +Print extra information about the operations being performed. +.IP "\fB\-issuer_checks\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-issuer_checks" +Print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate of the +current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer certificate was +rejected. The presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that +anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several +rejections may take place. +.IP "\fB\-policy arg\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-policy arg" +Enable policy processing and add \fBarg\fR to the user-initial-policy-set (see +\&\s-1RFC5280\s0). The policy \fBarg\fR can be an object name an \s-1OID\s0 in numeric form. +This argument can appear more than once. +.IP "\fB\-policy_check\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-policy_check" +Enables certificate policy processing. +.IP "\fB\-explicit_policy\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-explicit_policy" +Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see \s-1RFC5280\s0). +.IP "\fB\-inhibit_any\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-inhibit_any" +Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see \s-1RFC5280\s0). +.IP "\fB\-inhibit_map\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-inhibit_map" +Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see \s-1RFC5280\s0). +.IP "\fB\-no_alt_chains\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-no_alt_chains" +When building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not +trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an alternative chain can +be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that +only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the +behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions. +.IP "\fB\-trusted file\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-trusted file" +A file of additional trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple +certificates in \s-1PEM\s0 format concatenated together. +.IP "\fB\-policy_print\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-policy_print" +Print out diagnostics related to policy processing. +.IP "\fB\-crl_check\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-crl_check" +Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid \s-1CRL.\s0 +If a valid \s-1CRL\s0 cannot be found an error occurs. +.IP "\fB\-crl_check_all\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-crl_check_all" +Checks the validity of \fBall\fR certificates in the chain by attempting +to look up valid CRLs. +.IP "\fB\-ignore_critical\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-ignore_critical" +Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not +supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by \s-1RFC5280\s0). +If this option is set critical extensions are ignored. +.IP "\fB\-x509_strict\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-x509_strict" +For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken +certificates. +.IP "\fB\-extended_crl\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-extended_crl" +Enable extended \s-1CRL\s0 features such as indirect CRLs and alternate \s-1CRL\s0 +signing keys. +.IP "\fB\-use_deltas\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-use_deltas" +Enable support for delta CRLs. +.IP "\fB\-check_ss_sig\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-check_ss_sig" +Verify the signature on the self-signed root \s-1CA.\s0 This is disabled by default +because it doesn't add any security. +.IP "\fB\-\fR" 4 +.IX Item "-" +Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be +certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins +with a \fB\-\fR. +.IP "\fBcertificates\fR" 4 +.IX Item "certificates" +One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given, \fBverify\fR +will attempt to read a certificate from standard input. Certificates must be +in \s-1PEM\s0 format. +.SH "VERIFY OPERATION" +.IX Header "VERIFY OPERATION" +The \fBverify\fR program uses the same functions as the internal \s-1SSL\s0 and S/MIME +verification, therefore this description applies to these verify operations +too. +.PP +There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed +by the \fBverify\fR program: wherever possible an attempt is made to continue +after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the +first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be +determined. +.PP +The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps. +.PP +Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate +and ending in the root \s-1CA.\s0 It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built +up. The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current +certificate. If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed +to be the root \s-1CA.\s0 +.PP +The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number +of steps. In versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.5a the first certificate whose +subject name matched the issuer of the current certificate was assumed to be +the issuers certificate. In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later all certificates +whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current certificate are +subject to further tests. The relevant authority key identifier components +of the current certificate (if present) must match the subject key identifier +(if present) and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition +the keyUsage extension of the candidate issuer (if present) must permit +certificate signing. +.PP +The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match +is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root \s-1CA\s0 +is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to +verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted +list. +.PP +The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for +consistency with the supplied purpose. If the \fB\-purpose\fR option is not included +then no checks are done. The supplied or \*(L"leaf\*(R" certificate must have extensions +compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid +\&\s-1CA\s0 certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in +the \fB\s-1CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS\s0\fR section of the \fBx509\fR utility. +.PP +The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root \s-1CA.\s0 The root +\&\s-1CA\s0 should be trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility with previous +versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL a certificate with no trust settings is considered +to be valid for all purposes. +.PP +The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity +period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter +dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this +point. +.PP +If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If +any operation fails then the certificate is not valid. +.SH "DIAGNOSTICS" +.IX Header "DIAGNOSTICS" +When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The +general form of the error message is: +.PP +.Vb 2 +\& server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit) +\& error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate +.Ve +.PP +The first line contains the name of the certificate being verified followed by +the subject name of the certificate. The second line contains the error number +and the depth. The depth is number of the certificate being verified when a +problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itself +then 1 for the \s-1CA\s0 that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version +of the error number is presented. +.PP +An exhaustive list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also +includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h +Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described +as \*(L"unused\*(R". +.IP "\fB0 X509_V_OK: ok\fR" 4 +.IX Item "0 X509_V_OK: ok" +the operation was successful. +.IP "\fB2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate\fR" 4 +.IX Item "2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate" +the issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This +normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete. +.IP "\fB3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: unable to get certificate \s-1CRL\s0\fR" 4 +.IX Item "3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: unable to get certificate CRL" +the \s-1CRL\s0 of a certificate could not be found. +.IP "\fB4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature\fR" 4 +.IX Item "4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature" +the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value +could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only +meaningful for \s-1RSA\s0 keys. +.IP "\fB5 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt \s-1CRL\s0's signature\fR" 4 +.IX Item "5 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt CRL's signature" +the \s-1CRL\s0 signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value +could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused. +.IP "\fB6 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key\fR" 4 +.IX Item "6 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key" +the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read. +.IP "\fB7 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure\fR" 4 +.IX Item "7 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure" +the signature of the certificate is invalid. +.IP "\fB8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: \s-1CRL\s0 signature failure\fR" 4 +.IX Item "8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: CRL signature failure" +the signature of the certificate is invalid. +.IP "\fB9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid\fR" 4 +.IX Item "9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid" +the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time. +.IP "\fB10 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired\fR" 4 +.IX Item "10 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired" +the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time. +.IP "\fB11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: \s-1CRL\s0 is not yet valid\fR" 4 +.IX Item "11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: CRL is not yet valid" +the \s-1CRL\s0 is not yet valid. +.IP "\fB12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: \s-1CRL\s0 has expired\fR" 4 +.IX Item "12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: CRL has expired" +the \s-1CRL\s0 has expired. +.IP "\fB13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field\fR" 4 +.IX Item "13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field" +the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time. +.IP "\fB14 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field\fR" 4 +.IX Item "14 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field" +the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time. +.IP "\fB15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in \s-1CRL\s0's lastUpdate field\fR" 4 +.IX Item "15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field" +the \s-1CRL\s0 lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. +.IP "\fB16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in \s-1CRL\s0's nextUpdate field\fR" 4 +.IX Item "16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field" +the \s-1CRL\s0 nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. +.IP "\fB17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory\fR" 4 +.IX Item "17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory" +an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen. +.IP "\fB18 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate\fR" 4 +.IX Item "18 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate" +the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of +trusted certificates. +.IP "\fB19 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain\fR" 4 +.IX Item "19 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain" +the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not +be found locally. +.IP "\fB20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate\fR" 4 +.IX Item "20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate" +the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer +certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found. +.IP "\fB21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate\fR" 4 +.IX Item "21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate" +no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not +self signed. +.IP "\fB22 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long\fR" 4 +.IX Item "22 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long" +the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused. +.IP "\fB23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked\fR" 4 +.IX Item "23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked" +the certificate has been revoked. +.IP "\fB24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid \s-1CA\s0 certificate\fR" 4 +.IX Item "24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid CA certificate" +a \s-1CA\s0 certificate is invalid. Either it is not a \s-1CA\s0 or its extensions are not consistent +with the supplied purpose. +.IP "\fB25 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded\fR" 4 +.IX Item "25 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded" +the basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded. +.IP "\fB26 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose\fR" 4 +.IX Item "26 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose" +the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose. +.IP "\fB27 X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted\fR" 4 +.IX Item "27 X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted" +the root \s-1CA\s0 is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose. +.IP "\fB28 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected\fR" 4 +.IX Item "28 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected" +the root \s-1CA\s0 is marked to reject the specified purpose. +.IP "\fB29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch\fR" 4 +.IX Item "29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch" +the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name +did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. Only displayed when +the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set. +.IP "\fB30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch\fR" 4 +.IX Item "30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch" +the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key +identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current +certificate. Only displayed when the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set. +.IP "\fB31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch\fR" 4 +.IX Item "31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch" +the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name +and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier +of the current certificate. Only displayed when the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set. +.IP "\fB32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing\fR" 4 +.IX Item "32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing" +the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage extension +does not permit certificate signing. +.IP "\fB50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure\fR" 4 +.IX Item "50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure" +an application specific error. Unused. +.SH "BUGS" +.IX Header "BUGS" +Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still +suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP \s-1API.\s0 One consequence of this is that +trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the +\&\fB\-CAfile\fR option) or a directory (as specified by \fB\-CApath\fR. If they occur in both then only +the certificates in the file will be recognised. +.PP +Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and +mishandled them. +.PP +Previous versions of this documentation swapped the meaning of the +\&\fBX509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT\fR and +\&\fB20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY\fR error codes. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.IX Header "SEE ALSO" +\&\fIx509\fR\|(1) +.SH "HISTORY" +.IX Header "HISTORY" +The \-no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b. |