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Diffstat (limited to 'secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3')
-rw-r--r-- | secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 | 436 |
1 files changed, 436 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 b/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc855f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 @@ -0,0 +1,436 @@ +.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.25 (Pod::Simple 3.28) +.\" +.\" Standard preamble: +.\" ======================================================================== +.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) +.if t .sp .5v +.if n .sp +.. +.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text +.ft CW +.nf +.ne \\$1 +.. +.de Ve \" End verbatim text +.ft R +.fi +.. +.\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will +.\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left +.\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. \*(C+ will +.\" give a nicer C++. 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Always turn off hyphenation; it makes +.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. +.if n .ad l +.nh +.SH "NAME" +SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_clear_options, SSL_clear_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options, SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support \- manipulate SSL options +.SH "SYNOPSIS" +.IX Header "SYNOPSIS" +.Vb 1 +\& #include <openssl/ssl.h> +\& +\& long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); +\& long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options); +\& +\& long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); +\& long SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, long options); +\& +\& long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx); +\& long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl); +\& +\& long SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl); +.Ve +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.IX Header "DESCRIPTION" +Note: all these functions are implemented using macros. +.PP +\&\fISSL_CTX_set_options()\fR adds the options set via bitmask in \fBoptions\fR to \fBctx\fR. +Options already set before are not cleared! +.PP +\&\fISSL_set_options()\fR adds the options set via bitmask in \fBoptions\fR to \fBssl\fR. +Options already set before are not cleared! +.PP +\&\fISSL_CTX_clear_options()\fR clears the options set via bitmask in \fBoptions\fR +to \fBctx\fR. +.PP +\&\fISSL_clear_options()\fR clears the options set via bitmask in \fBoptions\fR to \fBssl\fR. +.PP +\&\fISSL_CTX_get_options()\fR returns the options set for \fBctx\fR. +.PP +\&\fISSL_get_options()\fR returns the options set for \fBssl\fR. +.PP +\&\fISSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support()\fR indicates whether the peer supports +secure renegotiation. +.SH "NOTES" +.IX Header "NOTES" +The behaviour of the \s-1SSL\s0 library can be changed by setting several options. +The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a logical \fBor\fR +operation (|). +.PP +\&\fISSL_CTX_set_options()\fR and \fISSL_set_options()\fR affect the (external) +protocol behaviour of the \s-1SSL\s0 library. The (internal) behaviour of +the \s-1API\s0 can be changed by using the similar +\&\fISSL_CTX_set_mode\fR\|(3) and \fISSL_set_mode()\fR functions. +.PP +During a handshake, the option settings of the \s-1SSL\s0 object are used. When +a new \s-1SSL\s0 object is created from a context using \fISSL_new()\fR, the current +option setting is copied. Changes to \fBctx\fR do not affect already created +\&\s-1SSL\s0 objects. \fISSL_clear()\fR does not affect the settings. +.PP +The following \fBbug workaround\fR options are available: +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG" +www.microsoft.com \- when talking SSLv2, if session-id reuse is +performed, the session-id passed back in the server-finished message +is different from the one decided upon. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG" +Netscape\-Commerce/1.12, when talking SSLv2, accepts a 32 byte +challenge but then appears to only use 16 bytes when generating the +encryption keys. Using 16 bytes is ok but it should be ok to use 32. +According to the SSLv3 spec, one should use 32 bytes for the challenge +when operating in SSLv2/v3 compatibility mode, but as mentioned above, +this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to go. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG" +As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG" +\&... +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER" +\&... +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG" +Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on \s-1OS\s0 X. +\&\s-1OS\s0 X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG" +\&... +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG" +\&... +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG" +\&... +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS" +Disables a countermeasure against a \s-1SSL\s0 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol +vulnerability affecting \s-1CBC\s0 ciphers, which cannot be handled by some +broken \s-1SSL\s0 implementations. This option has no effect for connections +using other ciphers. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING" +Adds a padding extension to ensure the ClientHello size is never between +256 and 511 bytes in length. This is needed as a workaround for some +implementations. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_ALL\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_ALL" +All of the above bug workarounds. +.PP +It is usually safe to use \fB\s-1SSL_OP_ALL\s0\fR to enable the bug workaround +options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is +desired. +.PP +The following \fBmodifying\fR options are available: +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG" +Disable version rollback attack detection. +.Sp +During the client key exchange, the client must send the same information +about acceptable \s-1SSL/TLS\s0 protocol levels as during the first hello. Some +clients violate this rule by adapting to the server's answer. (Example: +the client sends a SSLv2 hello and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server +only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the +same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect +to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.) +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE" +Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral \s-1DH\s0 parameters +(see \fISSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback\fR\|(3)). +This option must be used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when +the \s-1DH\s0 parameters were not generated using \*(L"strong\*(R" primes +(e.g. when using DSA-parameters, see \fIdhparam\fR\|(1)). +If \*(L"strong\*(R" primes were used, it is not strictly necessary to generate +a new \s-1DH\s0 key during each handshake but it is also recommended. +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE\s0\fR should therefore be enabled whenever +temporary/ephemeral \s-1DH\s0 parameters are used. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA" +Always use ephemeral (temporary) \s-1RSA\s0 key when doing \s-1RSA\s0 operations +(see \fISSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback\fR\|(3)). +According to the specifications this is only done, when a \s-1RSA\s0 key +can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers +with restricted \s-1RSA\s0 keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral +\&\s-1RSA\s0 keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the +\&\s-1SSL/TLS\s0 specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with +clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with \s-1EDH\s0 (ephemeral +Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE" +When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client +preferences. When not set, the \s-1SSL\s0 server will always follow the clients +preferences. When set, the SSLv3/TLSv1 server will choose following its +own preferences. Because of the different protocol, for SSLv2 the server +will send its list of preferences to the client and the client chooses. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1" +\&... +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2" +\&... +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG" +If we accept a netscape connection, demand a client cert, have a +non-self-signed \s-1CA\s0 which does not have its \s-1CA\s0 in netscape, and the +browser has a cert, it will crash/hang. Works for 3.x and 4.xbeta +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG" +\&... +.IP "SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2" +Do not use the SSLv2 protocol. +.IP "SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3" +Do not use the SSLv3 protocol. +.IP "SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1" +Do not use the TLSv1 protocol. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION" +When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session +(i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial +handshake). This option is not needed for clients. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_NO_TICKET\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_NO_TICKET" +Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently make use +of RFC4507bis tickets for stateless session resumption. +.Sp +If this option is set this functionality is disabled and tickets will +not be used by clients or servers. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION" +Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or +servers. See the \fB\s-1SECURE\s0 \s-1RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR section for more details. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT" +Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched servers +\&\fBonly\fR: this option is currently set by default. See the +\&\fB\s-1SECURE\s0 \s-1RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR section for more details. +.SH "SECURE RENEGOTIATION" +.IX Header "SECURE RENEGOTIATION" +OpenSSL 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as +described in \s-1RFC5746\s0. This counters the prefix attack described in +\&\s-1CVE\-2009\-3555\s0 and elsewhere. +.PP +The deprecated and highly broken SSLv2 protocol does not support +renegotiation at all: its use is \fBstrongly\fR discouraged. +.PP +This attack has far reaching consequences which application writers should be +aware of. In the description below an implementation supporting secure +renegotiation is referred to as \fIpatched\fR. A server not supporting secure +renegotiation is referred to as \fIunpatched\fR. +.PP +The following sections describe the operations permitted by OpenSSL's secure +renegotiation implementation. +.SS "Patched client and server" +.IX Subsection "Patched client and server" +Connections and renegotiation are always permitted by OpenSSL implementations. +.SS "Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server" +.IX Subsection "Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server" +The initial connection succeeds but client renegotiation is denied by the +server with a \fBno_renegotiation\fR warning alert if \s-1TLS\s0 v1.0 is used or a fatal +\&\fBhandshake_failure\fR alert in \s-1SSL\s0 v3.0. +.PP +If the patched OpenSSL server attempts to renegotiate a fatal +\&\fBhandshake_failure\fR alert is sent. This is because the server code may be +unaware of the unpatched nature of the client. +.PP +If the option \fB\s-1SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR is set then +renegotiation \fBalways\fR succeeds. +.PP +\&\fB\s-1NB:\s0\fR a bug in OpenSSL clients earlier than 0.9.8m (all of which are +unpatched) will result in the connection hanging if it receives a +\&\fBno_renegotiation\fR alert. OpenSSL versions 0.9.8m and later will regard +a \fBno_renegotiation\fR alert as fatal and respond with a fatal +\&\fBhandshake_failure\fR alert. This is because the OpenSSL \s-1API\s0 currently has +no provision to indicate to an application that a renegotiation attempt +was refused. +.SS "Patched OpenSSL client and unpatched server." +.IX Subsection "Patched OpenSSL client and unpatched server." +If the option \fB\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0\fR or +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR is set then initial connections +and renegotiation between patched OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers +succeeds. If neither option is set then initial connections to unpatched +servers will fail. +.PP +The option \fB\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0\fR is currently set by default even +though it has security implications: otherwise it would be impossible to +connect to unpatched servers (i.e. all of them initially) and this is clearly +not acceptable. Renegotiation is permitted because this does not add any +additional security issues: during an attack clients do not see any +renegotiations anyway. +.PP +As more servers become patched the option \fB\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0\fR will +\&\fBnot\fR be set by default in a future version of OpenSSL. +.PP +OpenSSL client applications wishing to ensure they can connect to unpatched +servers should always \fBset\fR \fB\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0\fR +.PP +OpenSSL client applications that want to ensure they can \fBnot\fR connect to +unpatched servers (and thus avoid any security issues) should always \fBclear\fR +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0\fR using \fISSL_CTX_clear_options()\fR or +\&\fISSL_clear_options()\fR. +.PP +The difference between the \fB\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0\fR and +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR options is that +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0\fR enables initial connections and secure +renegotiation between OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers \fBonly\fR, while +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR allows initial connections +and renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers. +.SH "RETURN VALUES" +.IX Header "RETURN VALUES" +\&\fISSL_CTX_set_options()\fR and \fISSL_set_options()\fR return the new options bitmask +after adding \fBoptions\fR. +.PP +\&\fISSL_CTX_clear_options()\fR and \fISSL_clear_options()\fR return the new options bitmask +after clearing \fBoptions\fR. +.PP +\&\fISSL_CTX_get_options()\fR and \fISSL_get_options()\fR return the current bitmask. +.PP +\&\fISSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support()\fR returns 1 is the peer supports +secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.IX Header "SEE ALSO" +\&\fIssl\fR\|(3), \fISSL_new\fR\|(3), \fISSL_clear\fR\|(3), +\&\fISSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback\fR\|(3), +\&\fISSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback\fR\|(3), +\&\fIdhparam\fR\|(1) +.SH "HISTORY" +.IX Header "HISTORY" +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE\s0\fR and +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR have been added in +OpenSSL 0.9.7. +.PP +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG\s0\fR has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6 and was automatically +enabled with \fB\s-1SSL_OP_ALL\s0\fR. As of 0.9.7, it is no longer included in \fB\s-1SSL_OP_ALL\s0\fR +and must be explicitly set. +.PP +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS\s0\fR has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6e. +Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not include the countermeasure that +can be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always +enabled). +.PP +\&\fISSL_CTX_clear_options()\fR and \fISSL_clear_options()\fR were first added in OpenSSL +0.9.8m. +.PP +\&\fB\s-1SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR, \fB\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0\fR +and the function \fISSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support()\fR were first added in +OpenSSL 0.9.8m. |