summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/verify.1
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'secure/lib/libcrypto/man/verify.1')
-rw-r--r--secure/lib/libcrypto/man/verify.1408
1 files changed, 408 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/verify.1 b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/verify.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc52986
--- /dev/null
+++ b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/verify.1
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man version 1.15
+.\" Thu May 9 13:15:13 2002
+.\"
+.\" Standard preamble:
+.\" ======================================================================
+.de Sh \" Subsection heading
+.br
+.if t .Sp
+.ne 5
+.PP
+\fB\\$1\fR
+.PP
+..
+.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
+.if t .sp .5v
+.if n .sp
+..
+.de Ip \" List item
+.br
+.ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3
+.el .ne 3
+.IP "\\$1" \\$2
+..
+.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text
+.ft CW
+.nf
+.ne \\$1
+..
+.de Ve \" End verbatim text
+.ft R
+
+.fi
+..
+.\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will
+.\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left
+.\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. | will give a
+.\" real vertical bar. \*(C+ will give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used
+.\" to do unbreakable dashes and therefore won't be available. \*(C` and
+.\" \*(C' expand to `' in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<>
+.tr \(*W-|\(bv\*(Tr
+.ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p'
+.ie n \{\
+. ds -- \(*W-
+. ds PI pi
+. if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch
+. if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch
+. ds L" ""
+. ds R" ""
+. ds C` ""
+. ds C' ""
+'br\}
+.el\{\
+. ds -- \|\(em\|
+. ds PI \(*p
+. ds L" ``
+. ds R" ''
+'br\}
+.\"
+.\" If the F register is turned on, we'll generate index entries on stderr
+.\" for titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.Sh), items (.Ip), and
+.\" index entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process
+.\" the output yourself in some meaningful fashion.
+.if \nF \{\
+. de IX
+. tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2"
+..
+. nr % 0
+. rr F
+.\}
+.\"
+.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it
+.\" makes way too many mistakes in technical documents.
+.hy 0
+.if n .na
+.\"
+.\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2).
+.\" Fear. Run. Save yourself. No user-serviceable parts.
+.bd B 3
+. \" fudge factors for nroff and troff
+.if n \{\
+. ds #H 0
+. ds #V .8m
+. ds #F .3m
+. ds #[ \f1
+. ds #] \fP
+.\}
+.if t \{\
+. ds #H ((1u-(\\\\n(.fu%2u))*.13m)
+. ds #V .6m
+. ds #F 0
+. ds #[ \&
+. ds #] \&
+.\}
+. \" simple accents for nroff and troff
+.if n \{\
+. ds ' \&
+. ds ` \&
+. ds ^ \&
+. ds , \&
+. ds ~ ~
+. ds /
+.\}
+.if t \{\
+. ds ' \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\'\h"|\\n:u"
+. ds ` \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\`\h'|\\n:u'
+. ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'^\h'|\\n:u'
+. ds , \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10)',\h'|\\n:u'
+. ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu-\*(#H-.1m)'~\h'|\\n:u'
+. ds / \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\z\(sl\h'|\\n:u'
+.\}
+. \" troff and (daisy-wheel) nroff accents
+.ds : \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H+.1m+\*(#F)'\v'-\*(#V'\z.\h'.2m+\*(#F'.\h'|\\n:u'\v'\*(#V'
+.ds 8 \h'\*(#H'\(*b\h'-\*(#H'
+.ds o \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu+\w'\(de'u-\*(#H)/2u'\v'-.3n'\*(#[\z\(de\v'.3n'\h'|\\n:u'\*(#]
+.ds d- \h'\*(#H'\(pd\h'-\w'~'u'\v'-.25m'\f2\(hy\fP\v'.25m'\h'-\*(#H'
+.ds D- D\\k:\h'-\w'D'u'\v'-.11m'\z\(hy\v'.11m'\h'|\\n:u'
+.ds th \*(#[\v'.3m'\s+1I\s-1\v'-.3m'\h'-(\w'I'u*2/3)'\s-1o\s+1\*(#]
+.ds Th \*(#[\s+2I\s-2\h'-\w'I'u*3/5'\v'-.3m'o\v'.3m'\*(#]
+.ds ae a\h'-(\w'a'u*4/10)'e
+.ds Ae A\h'-(\w'A'u*4/10)'E
+. \" corrections for vroff
+.if v .ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*9/10-\*(#H)'\s-2\u~\d\s+2\h'|\\n:u'
+.if v .ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'\v'-.4m'^\v'.4m'\h'|\\n:u'
+. \" for low resolution devices (crt and lpr)
+.if \n(.H>23 .if \n(.V>19 \
+\{\
+. ds : e
+. ds 8 ss
+. ds o a
+. ds d- d\h'-1'\(ga
+. ds D- D\h'-1'\(hy
+. ds th \o'bp'
+. ds Th \o'LP'
+. ds ae ae
+. ds Ae AE
+.\}
+.rm #[ #] #H #V #F C
+.\" ======================================================================
+.\"
+.IX Title "VERIFY 1"
+.TH VERIFY 1 "perl v5.6.1" "2002-01-27" "User Contributed Perl Documentation"
+.UC
+.SH "NAME"
+verify \- Utility to verify certificates.
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
+\&\fBopenssl\fR \fBverify\fR
+[\fB\-CApath directory\fR]
+[\fB\-CAfile file\fR]
+[\fB\-purpose purpose\fR]
+[\fB\-untrusted file\fR]
+[\fB\-help\fR]
+[\fB\-issuer_checks\fR]
+[\fB\-verbose\fR]
+[\fB-\fR]
+[certificates]
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
+The \fBverify\fR command verifies certificate chains.
+.SH "COMMAND OPTIONS"
+.IX Header "COMMAND OPTIONS"
+.Ip "\fB\-CApath directory\fR" 4
+.IX Item "-CApath directory"
+A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names
+of the form: hash.0 or have symbolic links to them of this
+form (\*(L"hash\*(R" is the hashed certificate subject name: see the \fB\-hash\fR option
+of the \fBx509\fR utility). Under Unix the \fBc_rehash\fR script will automatically
+create symbolic links to a directory of certificates.
+.Ip "\fB\-CAfile file\fR" 4
+.IX Item "-CAfile file"
+A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
+in \s-1PEM\s0 format concatenated together.
+.Ip "\fB\-untrusted file\fR" 4
+.IX Item "-untrusted file"
+A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
+.Ip "\fB\-purpose purpose\fR" 4
+.IX Item "-purpose purpose"
+the intended use for the certificate. Without this option no chain verification
+will be done. Currently accepted uses are \fBsslclient\fR, \fBsslserver\fR,
+\&\fBnssslserver\fR, \fBsmimesign\fR, \fBsmimeencrypt\fR. See the \fB\s-1VERIFY\s0 \s-1OPERATION\s0\fR
+section for more information.
+.Ip "\fB\-help\fR" 4
+.IX Item "-help"
+prints out a usage message.
+.Ip "\fB\-verbose\fR" 4
+.IX Item "-verbose"
+print extra information about the operations being performed.
+.Ip "\fB\-issuer_checks\fR" 4
+.IX Item "-issuer_checks"
+print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate
+of the current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer
+certificate was rejected. However the presence of rejection messages
+does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal
+verify process several rejections may take place.
+.Ip "\fB-\fR" 4
+.IX Item "-"
+marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
+certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
+with a \fB-\fR.
+.Ip "\fBcertificates\fR" 4
+.IX Item "certificates"
+one or more certificates to verify. If no certificate filenames are included
+then an attempt is made to read a certificate from standard input. They should
+all be in \s-1PEM\s0 format.
+.SH "VERIFY OPERATION"
+.IX Header "VERIFY OPERATION"
+The \fBverify\fR program uses the same functions as the internal \s-1SSL\s0 and S/MIME
+verification, therefore this description applies to these verify operations
+too.
+.PP
+There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed
+by the \fBverify\fR program: wherever possible an attempt is made to continue
+after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the
+first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be
+determined.
+.PP
+The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps.
+.PP
+Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate
+and ending in the root \s-1CA\s0. It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built
+up. The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current
+certificate. If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed
+to be the root \s-1CA\s0.
+.PP
+The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number
+of steps. In versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.5a the first certificate whose
+subject name matched the issuer of the current certificate was assumed to be
+the issuers certificate. In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later all certificates
+whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current certificate are
+subject to further tests. The relevant authority key identifier components
+of the current certificate (if present) must match the subject key identifier
+(if present) and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition
+the keyUsage extension of the candidate issuer (if present) must permit
+certificate signing.
+.PP
+The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match
+is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root \s-1CA\s0
+is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to
+verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted
+list.
+.PP
+The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for
+consistency with the supplied purpose. If the \fB\-purpose\fR option is not included
+then no checks are done. The supplied or \*(L"leaf\*(R" certificate must have extensions
+compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid
+\&\s-1CA\s0 certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in
+the \fB\s-1CERTIFICATE\s0 \s-1EXTENSIONS\s0\fR section of the \fBx509\fR utility.
+.PP
+The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root \s-1CA\s0. The root
+\&\s-1CA\s0 should be trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility with previous
+versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL a certificate with no trust settings is considered
+to be valid for all purposes.
+.PP
+The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity
+period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter
+dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this
+point.
+.PP
+If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If
+any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
+.SH "DIAGNOSTICS"
+.IX Header "DIAGNOSTICS"
+When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The
+general form of the error message is:
+.PP
+.Vb 2
+\& server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
+\& error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate
+.Ve
+The first line contains the name of the certificate being verified followed by
+the subject name of the certificate. The second line contains the error number
+and the depth. The depth is number of the certificate being verified when a
+problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itself
+then 1 for the \s-1CA\s0 that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version
+of the error number is presented.
+.PP
+An exhaustive list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also
+includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h
+Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described
+as \*(L"unused\*(R".
+.Ip "\fB0 X509_V_OK: ok\fR" 4
+.IX Item "0 X509_V_OK: ok"
+the operation was successful.
+.Ip "\fB2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate\fR" 4
+.IX Item "2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate"
+the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate
+of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
+.Ip "\fB3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL unable to get certificate \s-1CRL\s0\fR" 4
+.IX Item "3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL unable to get certificate CRL"
+the \s-1CRL\s0 of a certificate could not be found. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature\fR" 4
+.IX Item "4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature"
+the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value
+could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only
+meaningful for \s-1RSA\s0 keys.
+.Ip "\fB5 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt \s-1CRL\s0's signature\fR" 4
+.IX Item "5 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt CRL's signature"
+the \s-1CRL\s0 signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value
+could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB6 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key\fR" 4
+.IX Item "6 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key"
+the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.
+.Ip "\fB7 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure\fR" 4
+.IX Item "7 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure"
+the signature of the certificate is invalid.
+.Ip "\fB8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: \s-1CRL\s0 signature failure\fR" 4
+.IX Item "8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: CRL signature failure"
+the signature of the certificate is invalid. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid\fR" 4
+.IX Item "9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid"
+the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time.
+.Ip "\fB10 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired\fR" 4
+.IX Item "10 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired"
+the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time.
+.Ip "\fB11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: \s-1CRL\s0 is not yet valid\fR" 4
+.IX Item "11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: CRL is not yet valid"
+the \s-1CRL\s0 is not yet valid. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: \s-1CRL\s0 has expired\fR" 4
+.IX Item "12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: CRL has expired"
+the \s-1CRL\s0 has expired. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field\fR" 4
+.IX Item "13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field"
+the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
+.Ip "\fB14 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field\fR" 4
+.IX Item "14 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field"
+the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
+.Ip "\fB15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in \s-1CRL\s0's lastUpdate field\fR" 4
+.IX Item "15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field"
+the \s-1CRL\s0 lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in \s-1CRL\s0's nextUpdate field\fR" 4
+.IX Item "16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field"
+the \s-1CRL\s0 nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory\fR" 4
+.IX Item "17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory"
+an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
+.Ip "\fB18 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate\fR" 4
+.IX Item "18 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate"
+the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of
+trusted certificates.
+.Ip "\fB19 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain\fR" 4
+.IX Item "19 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain"
+the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not
+be found locally.
+.Ip "\fB20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate\fR" 4
+.IX Item "20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate"
+the issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found. This normally means
+the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
+.Ip "\fB21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate\fR" 4
+.IX Item "21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate"
+no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not
+self signed.
+.Ip "\fB22 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long\fR" 4
+.IX Item "22 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long"
+the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked\fR" 4
+.IX Item "23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked"
+the certificate has been revoked. Unused.
+.Ip "\fB24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid \s-1CA\s0 certificate\fR" 4
+.IX Item "24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid CA certificate"
+a \s-1CA\s0 certificate is invalid. Either it is not a \s-1CA\s0 or its extensions are not consistent
+with the supplied purpose.
+.Ip "\fB25 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded\fR" 4
+.IX Item "25 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded"
+the basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded.
+.Ip "\fB26 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose\fR" 4
+.IX Item "26 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose"
+the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
+.Ip "\fB27 X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted\fR" 4
+.IX Item "27 X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted"
+the root \s-1CA\s0 is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
+.Ip "\fB28 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected\fR" 4
+.IX Item "28 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected"
+the root \s-1CA\s0 is marked to reject the specified purpose.
+.Ip "\fB29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch\fR" 4
+.IX Item "29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch"
+the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name
+did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. Only displayed when
+the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set.
+.Ip "\fB30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch\fR" 4
+.IX Item "30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch"
+the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key
+identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current
+certificate. Only displayed when the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set.
+.Ip "\fB31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch\fR" 4
+.IX Item "31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch"
+the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name
+and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier
+of the current certificate. Only displayed when the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set.
+.Ip "\fB32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing\fR" 4
+.IX Item "32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing"
+the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage extension
+does not permit certificate signing.
+.Ip "\fB50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure\fR" 4
+.IX Item "50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure"
+an application specific error. Unused.
+.SH "BUGS"
+.IX Header "BUGS"
+Although the issuer checks are a considerably improvement over the old technique they still
+suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP \s-1API\s0. One consequence of this is that
+trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the
+\&\fB\-CAfile\fR option) or a directory (as specified by \fB\-CApath\fR. If they occur in both then only
+the certificates in the file will be recognised.
+.PP
+Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and
+mishandled them.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
+x509(1)
OpenPOWER on IntegriCloud