summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'secure/lib/libcrypto/man/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3')
-rw-r--r--secure/lib/libcrypto/man/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3374
1 files changed, 374 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3 b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..323e662
--- /dev/null
+++ b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.28 (Pod::Simple 3.28)
+.\"
+.\" Standard preamble:
+.\" ========================================================================
+.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
+.if t .sp .5v
+.if n .sp
+..
+.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text
+.ft CW
+.nf
+.ne \\$1
+..
+.de Ve \" End verbatim text
+.ft R
+.fi
+..
+.\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will
+.\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left
+.\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. \*(C+ will
+.\" give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used to do unbreakable dashes and
+.\" therefore won't be available. \*(C` and \*(C' expand to `' in nroff,
+.\" nothing in troff, for use with C<>.
+.tr \(*W-
+.ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p'
+.ie n \{\
+. ds -- \(*W-
+. ds PI pi
+. if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch
+. if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch
+. ds L" ""
+. ds R" ""
+. ds C` ""
+. ds C' ""
+'br\}
+.el\{\
+. ds -- \|\(em\|
+. ds PI \(*p
+. ds L" ``
+. ds R" ''
+. ds C`
+. ds C'
+'br\}
+.\"
+.\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform.
+.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq
+.el .ds Aq '
+.\"
+.\" If the F register is turned on, we'll generate index entries on stderr for
+.\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index
+.\" entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process the
+.\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion.
+.\"
+.\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'.
+.de IX
+..
+.nr rF 0
+.if \n(.g .if rF .nr rF 1
+.if (\n(rF:(\n(.g==0)) \{
+. if \nF \{
+. de IX
+. tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2"
+..
+. if !\nF==2 \{
+. nr % 0
+. nr F 2
+. \}
+. \}
+.\}
+.rr rF
+.\"
+.\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2).
+.\" Fear. Run. Save yourself. No user-serviceable parts.
+. \" fudge factors for nroff and troff
+.if n \{\
+. ds #H 0
+. ds #V .8m
+. ds #F .3m
+. ds #[ \f1
+. ds #] \fP
+.\}
+.if t \{\
+. ds #H ((1u-(\\\\n(.fu%2u))*.13m)
+. ds #V .6m
+. ds #F 0
+. ds #[ \&
+. ds #] \&
+.\}
+. \" simple accents for nroff and troff
+.if n \{\
+. ds ' \&
+. ds ` \&
+. ds ^ \&
+. ds , \&
+. ds ~ ~
+. ds /
+.\}
+.if t \{\
+. ds ' \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\'\h"|\\n:u"
+. ds ` \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\`\h'|\\n:u'
+. ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'^\h'|\\n:u'
+. ds , \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10)',\h'|\\n:u'
+. ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu-\*(#H-.1m)'~\h'|\\n:u'
+. ds / \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\z\(sl\h'|\\n:u'
+.\}
+. \" troff and (daisy-wheel) nroff accents
+.ds : \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H+.1m+\*(#F)'\v'-\*(#V'\z.\h'.2m+\*(#F'.\h'|\\n:u'\v'\*(#V'
+.ds 8 \h'\*(#H'\(*b\h'-\*(#H'
+.ds o \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu+\w'\(de'u-\*(#H)/2u'\v'-.3n'\*(#[\z\(de\v'.3n'\h'|\\n:u'\*(#]
+.ds d- \h'\*(#H'\(pd\h'-\w'~'u'\v'-.25m'\f2\(hy\fP\v'.25m'\h'-\*(#H'
+.ds D- D\\k:\h'-\w'D'u'\v'-.11m'\z\(hy\v'.11m'\h'|\\n:u'
+.ds th \*(#[\v'.3m'\s+1I\s-1\v'-.3m'\h'-(\w'I'u*2/3)'\s-1o\s+1\*(#]
+.ds Th \*(#[\s+2I\s-2\h'-\w'I'u*3/5'\v'-.3m'o\v'.3m'\*(#]
+.ds ae a\h'-(\w'a'u*4/10)'e
+.ds Ae A\h'-(\w'A'u*4/10)'E
+. \" corrections for vroff
+.if v .ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*9/10-\*(#H)'\s-2\u~\d\s+2\h'|\\n:u'
+.if v .ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'\v'-.4m'^\v'.4m'\h'|\\n:u'
+. \" for low resolution devices (crt and lpr)
+.if \n(.H>23 .if \n(.V>19 \
+\{\
+. ds : e
+. ds 8 ss
+. ds o a
+. ds d- d\h'-1'\(ga
+. ds D- D\h'-1'\(hy
+. ds th \o'bp'
+. ds Th \o'LP'
+. ds ae ae
+. ds Ae AE
+.\}
+.rm #[ #] #H #V #F C
+.\" ========================================================================
+.\"
+.IX Title "X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags 3"
+.TH X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags 3 "2015-12-03" "1.0.2e" "OpenSSL"
+.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
+.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
+.if n .ad l
+.nh
+.SH "NAME"
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc \- X509 verification parameters
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
+.Vb 1
+\& #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+\&
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags);
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+\& unsigned long flags);
+\& unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+\&
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust);
+\&
+\& void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
+\&
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+\& ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+\& STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies);
+\&
+\& void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+\&
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+\& const char *name, size_t namelen);
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+\& const char *name, size_t namelen);
+\& void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+\& unsigned int flags);
+\& char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+\& const char *email, size_t emaillen);
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+\& const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen);
+\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc);
+.Ve
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
+These functions manipulate the \fBX509_VERIFY_PARAM\fR structure associated with
+a certificate verification operation.
+.PP
+The \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags()\fR function sets the flags in \fBparam\fR by oring
+it with \fBflags\fR. See the \fB\s-1VERIFICATION FLAGS\s0\fR section for a complete
+description of values the \fBflags\fR parameter can take.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags()\fR returns the flags in \fBparam\fR.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags()\fR clears the flags \fBflags\fR in \fBparam\fR.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose()\fR sets the verification purpose in \fBparam\fR
+to \fBpurpose\fR. This determines the acceptable purpose of the certificate
+chain, for example \s-1SSL\s0 client or \s-1SSL\s0 server.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust()\fR sets the trust setting in \fBparam\fR to
+\&\fBtrust\fR.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()\fR sets the verification time in \fBparam\fR to
+\&\fBt\fR. Normally the current time is used.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()\fR enables policy checking (it is disabled
+by default) and adds \fBpolicy\fR to the acceptable policy set.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()\fR enables policy checking (it is disabled
+by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to \fBpolicies\fR. Any existing
+policy set is cleared. The \fBpolicies\fR parameter can be \fB\s-1NULL\s0\fR to clear
+an existing policy set.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth()\fR sets the maximum verification depth to \fBdepth\fR.
+That is the maximum number of untrusted \s-1CA\s0 certificates that can appear in a
+chain.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host()\fR sets the expected \s-1DNS\s0 hostname to
+\&\fBname\fR clearing any previously specified host name or names. If
+\&\fBname\fR is \s-1NULL,\s0 or empty the list of hostnames is cleared, and
+name checks are not performed on the peer certificate. If \fBname\fR
+is NUL-terminated, \fBnamelen\fR may be zero, otherwise \fBnamelen\fR
+must be set to the length of \fBname\fR. When a hostname is specified,
+certificate verification automatically invokes \fIX509_check_host\fR\|(3)
+with flags equal to the \fBflags\fR argument given to
+\&\fB\f(BIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags()\fB\fR (default zero). Applications
+are strongly advised to use this interface in preference to explicitly
+calling \fIX509_check_host\fR\|(3), hostname checks are out of scope
+with the \s-1\fIDANE\-EE\s0\fR\|(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will
+be suppressed as appropriate when \s-1DANE\s0 support is added to OpenSSL.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host()\fR adds \fBname\fR as an additional reference
+identifer that can match the peer's certificate. Any previous names
+set via \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host()\fR or \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host()\fR
+are retained, no change is made if \fBname\fR is \s-1NULL\s0 or empty. When
+multiple names are configured, the peer is considered verified when
+any name matches.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername()\fR returns the \s-1DNS\s0 hostname or subject
+CommonName from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference
+identifiers. When wildcard matching is not disabled, or when a
+reference identifier specifies a parent domain (starts with \*(L".\*(R")
+rather than a hostname, the peer name may be a wildcard name or a
+sub-domain of the reference identifier respectively. The return
+string is allocated by the library and is no longer valid once the
+associated \fBparam\fR argument is freed. Applications must not free
+the return value.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email()\fR sets the expected \s-1RFC822\s0 email address to
+\&\fBemail\fR. If \fBemail\fR is NUL-terminated, \fBemaillen\fR may be zero, otherwise
+\&\fBemaillen\fR must be set to the length of \fBemail\fR. When an email address
+is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
+\&\fIX509_check_email\fR\|(3).
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip()\fR sets the expected \s-1IP\s0 address to \fBip\fR.
+The \fBip\fR argument is in binary format, in network byte-order and
+\&\fBiplen\fR must be set to 4 for IPv4 and 16 for IPv6. When an \s-1IP\s0
+address is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
+\&\fIX509_check_ip\fR\|(3).
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc()\fR sets the expected \s-1IP\s0 address to
+\&\fBipasc\fR. The \fBipasc\fR argument is a NUL-terminal \s-1ASCII\s0 string:
+dotted decimal quad for IPv4 and colon-separated hexadecimal for
+IPv6. The condensed \*(L"::\*(R" notation is supported for IPv6 addresses.
+.SH "RETURN VALUES"
+.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags()\fR, \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags()\fR,
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose()\fR, \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust()\fR,
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()\fR \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()\fR,
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host()\fR, \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags()\fR,
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email()\fR, \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip()\fR and
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc()\fR return 1 for success and 0 for
+failure.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags()\fR returns the current verification flags.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()\fR and \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth()\fR do not return
+values.
+.PP
+\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth()\fR returns the current verification depth.
+.SH "VERIFICATION FLAGS"
+.IX Header "VERIFICATION FLAGS"
+The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags
+ored together.
+.PP
+\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK\fR enables \s-1CRL\s0 checking for the certificate chain leaf
+certificate. An error occurs if a suitable \s-1CRL\s0 cannot be found.
+.PP
+\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL\fR enables \s-1CRL\s0 checking for the entire certificate
+chain.
+.PP
+\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL\fR disabled critical extension checking. By default
+any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs results
+in a fatal error. If this flag is set unhandled critical extensions are
+ignored. \fB\s-1WARNING\s0\fR setting this option for anything other than debugging
+purposes can be a security risk. Finer control over which extensions are
+supported can be performed in the verification callback.
+.PP
+THe \fBX509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT\fR flag disables workarounds for some broken
+certificates and makes the verification strictly apply \fBX509\fR rules.
+.PP
+\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS\fR enables proxy certificate verification.
+.PP
+\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK\fR enables certificate policy checking, by default
+no policy checking is peformed. Additional information is sent to the
+verification callback relating to policy checking.
+.PP
+\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY\fR, \fBX509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY\fR and
+\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP\fR set the \fBrequire explicit policy\fR, \fBinhibit any
+policy\fR and \fBinhibit policy mapping\fR flags respectively as defined in
+\&\fB\s-1RFC3280\s0\fR. Policy checking is automatically enabled if any of these flags
+are set.
+.PP
+If \fBX509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY\fR is set and the policy checking is successful
+a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it
+to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply
+log it for debugging purposes.
+.PP
+By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
+different keys are disabled. If \fBX509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT\fR is set
+they are enabled.
+.PP
+If \fBX509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS\fR ise set delta CRLs (if present) are used to
+determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored.
+.PP
+\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE\fR enables checking of the root \s-1CA\s0 self signed
+cerificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't
+add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to
+check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root \s-1CA\s0
+signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root \s-1CA\s0
+are not treated as fatal errors.
+.PP
+The \fBX509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK\fR flag enables debugging of certificate
+issuer checks. It is \fBnot\fR needed unless you are logging certificate
+verification. If this flag is set then additional status codes will be sent
+to the verification callback and it \fBmust\fR be prepared to handle such cases
+without assuming they are hard errors.
+.PP
+The \fBX509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS\fR flag suppresses checking for alternative
+chains. By default, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate
+chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an
+alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour
+will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.2b.
+.SH "NOTES"
+.IX Header "NOTES"
+The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
+instead of legacy functions which work in specific structures such as
+\&\fIX509_STORE_CTX_set_flags()\fR.
+.SH "BUGS"
+.IX Header "BUGS"
+Delta \s-1CRL\s0 checking is currently primitive. Only a single delta can be used and
+(partly due to limitations of \fBX509_STORE\fR) constructed CRLs are not
+maintained.
+.PP
+If CRLs checking is enable CRLs are expected to be available in the
+corresponding \fBX509_STORE\fR structure. No attempt is made to download
+CRLs from the \s-1CRL\s0 distribution points extension.
+.SH "EXAMPLE"
+.IX Header "EXAMPLE"
+Enable \s-1CRL\s0 checking when performing certificate verification during \s-1SSL \s0
+connections associated with an \fB\s-1SSL_CTX\s0\fR structure \fBctx\fR:
+.PP
+.Vb 5
+\& X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+\& param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+\& X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+\& SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, param);
+\& X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param);
+.Ve
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
+\&\fIX509_verify_cert\fR\|(3),
+\&\fIX509_check_host\fR\|(3),
+\&\fIX509_check_email\fR\|(3),
+\&\fIX509_check_ip\fR\|(3)
+.SH "HISTORY"
+.IX Header "HISTORY"
+The \fBX509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS\fR flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2b
OpenPOWER on IntegriCloud