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-rw-r--r--lib/libradius/radlib.c1232
1 files changed, 1232 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libradius/radlib.c b/lib/libradius/radlib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6060885
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libradius/radlib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1232 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright 1998 Juniper Networks, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#define MD5Init MD5_Init
+#define MD5Update MD5_Update
+#define MD5Final MD5_Final
+#else
+#define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16
+#include <md5.h>
+#endif
+
+/* We need the MPPE_KEY_LEN define */
+#include <netgraph/ng_mppc.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "radlib_private.h"
+
+static void clear_password(struct rad_handle *);
+static void generr(struct rad_handle *, const char *, ...)
+ __printflike(2, 3);
+static void insert_scrambled_password(struct rad_handle *, int);
+static void insert_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *, int);
+static void insert_message_authenticator(struct rad_handle *, int);
+static int is_valid_response(struct rad_handle *, int,
+ const struct sockaddr_in *);
+static int put_password_attr(struct rad_handle *, int,
+ const void *, size_t);
+static int put_raw_attr(struct rad_handle *, int,
+ const void *, size_t);
+static int split(char *, char *[], int, char *, size_t);
+
+static void
+clear_password(struct rad_handle *h)
+{
+ if (h->pass_len != 0) {
+ memset(h->pass, 0, h->pass_len);
+ h->pass_len = 0;
+ }
+ h->pass_pos = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+generr(struct rad_handle *h, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, format);
+ vsnprintf(h->errmsg, ERRSIZE, format, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+}
+
+static void
+insert_scrambled_password(struct rad_handle *h, int srv)
+{
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ const struct rad_server *srvp;
+ int padded_len;
+ int pos;
+
+ srvp = &h->servers[srv];
+ padded_len = h->pass_len == 0 ? 16 : (h->pass_len+15) & ~0xf;
+
+ memcpy(md5, &h->request[POS_AUTH], LEN_AUTH);
+ for (pos = 0; pos < padded_len; pos += 16) {
+ int i;
+
+ /* Calculate the new scrambler */
+ MD5Init(&ctx);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret));
+ MD5Update(&ctx, md5, 16);
+ MD5Final(md5, &ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Mix in the current chunk of the password, and copy
+ * the result into the right place in the request. Also
+ * modify the scrambler in place, since we will use this
+ * in calculating the scrambler for next time.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ h->request[h->pass_pos + pos + i] =
+ md5[i] ^= h->pass[pos + i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+insert_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, int srv)
+{
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+ const struct rad_server *srvp;
+
+ srvp = &h->servers[srv];
+
+ /* Create the request authenticator */
+ MD5Init(&ctx);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_CODE], POS_AUTH - POS_CODE);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, memset(&h->request[POS_AUTH], 0, LEN_AUTH), LEN_AUTH);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_ATTRS], h->req_len - POS_ATTRS);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret));
+ MD5Final(&h->request[POS_AUTH], &ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+insert_message_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, int srv)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+ u_char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ u_int md_len;
+ const struct rad_server *srvp;
+ HMAC_CTX ctx;
+ srvp = &h->servers[srv];
+
+ if (h->authentic_pos != 0) {
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_Init(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret), EVP_md5());
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_CODE], POS_AUTH - POS_CODE);
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_AUTH], LEN_AUTH);
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_ATTRS],
+ h->req_len - POS_ATTRS);
+ HMAC_Final(&ctx, md, &md_len);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_cleanup(&ctx);
+ memcpy(&h->request[h->authentic_pos + 2], md, md_len);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if the current response is valid for a request to the
+ * specified server.
+ */
+static int
+is_valid_response(struct rad_handle *h, int srv,
+ const struct sockaddr_in *from)
+{
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ const struct rad_server *srvp;
+ int len;
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ u_char resp[MSGSIZE], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int pos, md_len;
+#endif
+
+ srvp = &h->servers[srv];
+
+ /* Check the source address */
+ if (from->sin_family != srvp->addr.sin_family ||
+ from->sin_addr.s_addr != srvp->addr.sin_addr.s_addr ||
+ from->sin_port != srvp->addr.sin_port)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check the message length */
+ if (h->resp_len < POS_ATTRS)
+ return 0;
+ len = h->response[POS_LENGTH] << 8 | h->response[POS_LENGTH+1];
+ if (len > h->resp_len)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check the response authenticator */
+ MD5Init(&ctx);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, &h->response[POS_CODE], POS_AUTH - POS_CODE);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, &h->request[POS_AUTH], LEN_AUTH);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, &h->response[POS_ATTRS], len - POS_ATTRS);
+ MD5Update(&ctx, srvp->secret, strlen(srvp->secret));
+ MD5Final(md5, &ctx);
+ if (memcmp(&h->response[POS_AUTH], md5, sizeof md5) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+ /*
+ * For non accounting responses check the message authenticator,
+ * if any.
+ */
+ if (h->response[POS_CODE] != RAD_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE) {
+
+ memcpy(resp, h->response, MSGSIZE);
+ pos = POS_ATTRS;
+
+ /* Search and verify the Message-Authenticator */
+ while (pos < len - 2) {
+
+ if (h->response[pos] == RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC) {
+ /* zero fill the Message-Authenticator */
+ memset(&resp[pos + 2], 0, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ HMAC_Init(&hctx, srvp->secret,
+ strlen(srvp->secret), EVP_md5());
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, &h->response[POS_CODE],
+ POS_AUTH - POS_CODE);
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, &h->request[POS_AUTH],
+ LEN_AUTH);
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, &resp[POS_ATTRS],
+ h->resp_len - POS_ATTRS);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, md, &md_len);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ HMAC_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (memcmp(md, &h->response[pos + 2],
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ pos += h->response[pos + 1];
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+put_password_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const void *value, size_t len)
+{
+ int padded_len;
+ int pad_len;
+
+ if (h->pass_pos != 0) {
+ generr(h, "Multiple User-Password attributes specified");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (len > PASSSIZE)
+ len = PASSSIZE;
+ padded_len = len == 0 ? 16 : (len+15) & ~0xf;
+ pad_len = padded_len - len;
+
+ /*
+ * Put in a place-holder attribute containing all zeros, and
+ * remember where it is so we can fill it in later.
+ */
+ clear_password(h);
+ put_raw_attr(h, type, h->pass, padded_len);
+ h->pass_pos = h->req_len - padded_len;
+
+ /* Save the cleartext password, padded as necessary */
+ memcpy(h->pass, value, len);
+ h->pass_len = len;
+ memset(h->pass + len, 0, pad_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+put_raw_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const void *value, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len > 253) {
+ generr(h, "Attribute too long");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (h->req_len + 2 + len > MSGSIZE) {
+ generr(h, "Maximum message length exceeded");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ h->request[h->req_len++] = type;
+ h->request[h->req_len++] = len + 2;
+ memcpy(&h->request[h->req_len], value, len);
+ h->req_len += len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+rad_add_server(struct rad_handle *h, const char *host, int port,
+ const char *secret, int timeout, int tries)
+{
+ struct rad_server *srvp;
+
+ if (h->num_servers >= MAXSERVERS) {
+ generr(h, "Too many RADIUS servers specified");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ srvp = &h->servers[h->num_servers];
+
+ memset(&srvp->addr, 0, sizeof srvp->addr);
+ srvp->addr.sin_len = sizeof srvp->addr;
+ srvp->addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ if (!inet_aton(host, &srvp->addr.sin_addr)) {
+ struct hostent *hent;
+
+ if ((hent = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL) {
+ generr(h, "%s: host not found", host);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(&srvp->addr.sin_addr, hent->h_addr,
+ sizeof srvp->addr.sin_addr);
+ }
+ if (port != 0)
+ srvp->addr.sin_port = htons((u_short)port);
+ else {
+ struct servent *sent;
+
+ if (h->type == RADIUS_AUTH)
+ srvp->addr.sin_port =
+ (sent = getservbyname("radius", "udp")) != NULL ?
+ sent->s_port : htons(RADIUS_PORT);
+ else
+ srvp->addr.sin_port =
+ (sent = getservbyname("radacct", "udp")) != NULL ?
+ sent->s_port : htons(RADACCT_PORT);
+ }
+ if ((srvp->secret = strdup(secret)) == NULL) {
+ generr(h, "Out of memory");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ srvp->timeout = timeout;
+ srvp->max_tries = tries;
+ srvp->num_tries = 0;
+ h->num_servers++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+rad_close(struct rad_handle *h)
+{
+ int srv;
+
+ if (h->fd != -1)
+ close(h->fd);
+ for (srv = 0; srv < h->num_servers; srv++) {
+ memset(h->servers[srv].secret, 0,
+ strlen(h->servers[srv].secret));
+ free(h->servers[srv].secret);
+ }
+ clear_password(h);
+ free(h);
+}
+
+int
+rad_config(struct rad_handle *h, const char *path)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char buf[MAXCONFLINE];
+ int linenum;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (path == NULL)
+ path = PATH_RADIUS_CONF;
+ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+ generr(h, "Cannot open \"%s\": %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ retval = 0;
+ linenum = 0;
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, fp) != NULL) {
+ int len;
+ char *fields[5];
+ int nfields;
+ char msg[ERRSIZE];
+ char *type;
+ char *host, *res;
+ char *port_str;
+ char *secret;
+ char *timeout_str;
+ char *maxtries_str;
+ char *end;
+ char *wanttype;
+ unsigned long timeout;
+ unsigned long maxtries;
+ int port;
+ int i;
+
+ linenum++;
+ len = strlen(buf);
+ /* We know len > 0, else fgets would have returned NULL. */
+ if (buf[len - 1] != '\n') {
+ if (len == sizeof buf - 1)
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: line too long", path,
+ linenum);
+ else
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: missing newline", path,
+ linenum);
+ retval = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ buf[len - 1] = '\0';
+
+ /* Extract the fields from the line. */
+ nfields = split(buf, fields, 5, msg, sizeof msg);
+ if (nfields == -1) {
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: %s", path, linenum, msg);
+ retval = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (nfields == 0)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * The first field should contain "auth" or "acct" for
+ * authentication or accounting, respectively. But older
+ * versions of the file didn't have that field. Default
+ * it to "auth" for backward compatibility.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(fields[0], "auth") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(fields[0], "acct") != 0) {
+ if (nfields >= 5) {
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: invalid service type", path,
+ linenum);
+ retval = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ nfields++;
+ for (i = nfields; --i > 0; )
+ fields[i] = fields[i - 1];
+ fields[0] = "auth";
+ }
+ if (nfields < 3) {
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: missing shared secret", path,
+ linenum);
+ retval = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ type = fields[0];
+ host = fields[1];
+ secret = fields[2];
+ timeout_str = fields[3];
+ maxtries_str = fields[4];
+
+ /* Ignore the line if it is for the wrong service type. */
+ wanttype = h->type == RADIUS_AUTH ? "auth" : "acct";
+ if (strcmp(type, wanttype) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Parse and validate the fields. */
+ res = host;
+ host = strsep(&res, ":");
+ port_str = strsep(&res, ":");
+ if (port_str != NULL) {
+ port = strtoul(port_str, &end, 10);
+ if (*end != '\0') {
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: invalid port", path,
+ linenum);
+ retval = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ port = 0;
+ if (timeout_str != NULL) {
+ timeout = strtoul(timeout_str, &end, 10);
+ if (*end != '\0') {
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: invalid timeout", path,
+ linenum);
+ retval = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ timeout = TIMEOUT;
+ if (maxtries_str != NULL) {
+ maxtries = strtoul(maxtries_str, &end, 10);
+ if (*end != '\0') {
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: invalid maxtries", path,
+ linenum);
+ retval = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ maxtries = MAXTRIES;
+
+ if (rad_add_server(h, host, port, secret, timeout, maxtries) ==
+ -1) {
+ strcpy(msg, h->errmsg);
+ generr(h, "%s:%d: %s", path, linenum, msg);
+ retval = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Clear out the buffer to wipe a possible copy of a shared secret */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
+ fclose(fp);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rad_init_send_request() must have previously been called.
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 The application should select on *fd with a timeout of tv before
+ * calling rad_continue_send_request again.
+ * < 0 Failure
+ * > 0 Success
+ */
+int
+rad_continue_send_request(struct rad_handle *h, int selected, int *fd,
+ struct timeval *tv)
+{
+ int n;
+
+ if (selected) {
+ struct sockaddr_in from;
+ int fromlen;
+
+ fromlen = sizeof from;
+ h->resp_len = recvfrom(h->fd, h->response,
+ MSGSIZE, MSG_WAITALL, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
+ if (h->resp_len == -1) {
+ generr(h, "recvfrom: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (is_valid_response(h, h->srv, &from)) {
+ h->resp_len = h->response[POS_LENGTH] << 8 |
+ h->response[POS_LENGTH+1];
+ h->resp_pos = POS_ATTRS;
+ return h->response[POS_CODE];
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (h->try == h->total_tries) {
+ generr(h, "No valid RADIUS responses received");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Scan round-robin to the next server that has some
+ * tries left. There is guaranteed to be one, or we
+ * would have exited this loop by now.
+ */
+ while (h->servers[h->srv].num_tries >= h->servers[h->srv].max_tries)
+ if (++h->srv >= h->num_servers)
+ h->srv = 0;
+
+ if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST)
+ /* Insert the request authenticator into the request */
+ insert_request_authenticator(h, h->srv);
+ else
+ /* Insert the scrambled password into the request */
+ if (h->pass_pos != 0)
+ insert_scrambled_password(h, h->srv);
+
+ insert_message_authenticator(h, h->srv);
+
+ /* Send the request */
+ n = sendto(h->fd, h->request, h->req_len, 0,
+ (const struct sockaddr *)&h->servers[h->srv].addr,
+ sizeof h->servers[h->srv].addr);
+ if (n != h->req_len) {
+ if (n == -1)
+ generr(h, "sendto: %s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ generr(h, "sendto: short write");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ h->try++;
+ h->servers[h->srv].num_tries++;
+ tv->tv_sec = h->servers[h->srv].timeout;
+ tv->tv_usec = 0;
+ *fd = h->fd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+rad_create_request(struct rad_handle *h, int code)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ h->request[POS_CODE] = code;
+ h->request[POS_IDENT] = ++h->ident;
+ /* Create a random authenticator */
+ for (i = 0; i < LEN_AUTH; i += 2) {
+ long r;
+ r = random();
+ h->request[POS_AUTH+i] = (u_char)r;
+ h->request[POS_AUTH+i+1] = (u_char)(r >> 8);
+ }
+ h->req_len = POS_ATTRS;
+ clear_password(h);
+ h->request_created = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct in_addr
+rad_cvt_addr(const void *data)
+{
+ struct in_addr value;
+
+ memcpy(&value.s_addr, data, sizeof value.s_addr);
+ return value;
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+rad_cvt_int(const void *data)
+{
+ u_int32_t value;
+
+ memcpy(&value, data, sizeof value);
+ return ntohl(value);
+}
+
+char *
+rad_cvt_string(const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ char *s;
+
+ s = malloc(len + 1);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ memcpy(s, data, len);
+ s[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ return s;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the attribute type. If none are left, returns 0. On failure,
+ * returns -1.
+ */
+int
+rad_get_attr(struct rad_handle *h, const void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+ int type;
+
+ if (h->resp_pos >= h->resp_len)
+ return 0;
+ if (h->resp_pos + 2 > h->resp_len) {
+ generr(h, "Malformed attribute in response");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ type = h->response[h->resp_pos++];
+ *len = h->response[h->resp_pos++] - 2;
+ if (h->resp_pos + (int)*len > h->resp_len) {
+ generr(h, "Malformed attribute in response");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *value = &h->response[h->resp_pos];
+ h->resp_pos += *len;
+ return type;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns -1 on error, 0 to indicate no event and >0 for success
+ */
+int
+rad_init_send_request(struct rad_handle *h, int *fd, struct timeval *tv)
+{
+ int srv;
+
+ /* Make sure we have a socket to use */
+ if (h->fd == -1) {
+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
+
+ if ((h->fd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) == -1) {
+ generr(h, "Cannot create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memset(&sin, 0, sizeof sin);
+ sin.sin_len = sizeof sin;
+ sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
+ sin.sin_port = htons(0);
+ if (bind(h->fd, (const struct sockaddr *)&sin,
+ sizeof sin) == -1) {
+ generr(h, "bind: %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(h->fd);
+ h->fd = -1;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) {
+ /* Make sure no password given */
+ if (h->pass_pos || h->chap_pass) {
+ generr(h, "User or Chap Password"
+ " in accounting request");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (h->eap_msg == 0) {
+ /* Make sure the user gave us a password */
+ if (h->pass_pos == 0 && !h->chap_pass) {
+ generr(h, "No User or Chap Password"
+ " attributes given");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (h->pass_pos != 0 && h->chap_pass) {
+ generr(h, "Both User and Chap Password"
+ " attributes given");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in the length field in the message */
+ h->request[POS_LENGTH] = h->req_len >> 8;
+ h->request[POS_LENGTH+1] = h->req_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Count the total number of tries we will make, and zero the
+ * counter for each server.
+ */
+ h->total_tries = 0;
+ for (srv = 0; srv < h->num_servers; srv++) {
+ h->total_tries += h->servers[srv].max_tries;
+ h->servers[srv].num_tries = 0;
+ }
+ if (h->total_tries == 0) {
+ generr(h, "No RADIUS servers specified");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ h->try = h->srv = 0;
+
+ return rad_continue_send_request(h, 0, fd, tv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create and initialize a rad_handle structure, and return it to the
+ * caller. Can fail only if the necessary memory cannot be allocated.
+ * In that case, it returns NULL.
+ */
+struct rad_handle *
+rad_auth_open(void)
+{
+ struct rad_handle *h;
+
+ h = (struct rad_handle *)malloc(sizeof(struct rad_handle));
+ if (h != NULL) {
+ srandomdev();
+ h->fd = -1;
+ h->num_servers = 0;
+ h->ident = random();
+ h->errmsg[0] = '\0';
+ memset(h->pass, 0, sizeof h->pass);
+ h->pass_len = 0;
+ h->pass_pos = 0;
+ h->chap_pass = 0;
+ h->authentic_pos = 0;
+ h->type = RADIUS_AUTH;
+ h->request_created = 0;
+ h->eap_msg = 0;
+ }
+ return h;
+}
+
+struct rad_handle *
+rad_acct_open(void)
+{
+ struct rad_handle *h;
+
+ h = rad_open();
+ if (h != NULL)
+ h->type = RADIUS_ACCT;
+ return h;
+}
+
+struct rad_handle *
+rad_open(void)
+{
+ return rad_auth_open();
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_addr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, struct in_addr addr)
+{
+ return rad_put_attr(h, type, &addr.s_addr, sizeof addr.s_addr);
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const void *value, size_t len)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ if (!h->request_created) {
+ generr(h, "Please call rad_create_request()"
+ " before putting attributes");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) {
+ if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE) {
+ generr(h, "EAP-Message attribute is not valid"
+ " in accounting requests");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * When proxying EAP Messages, the Message Authenticator
+ * MUST be present; see RFC 3579.
+ */
+ if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE) {
+ if (rad_put_message_authentic(h) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (type == RAD_USER_PASSWORD) {
+ result = put_password_attr(h, type, value, len);
+ } else if (type == RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC) {
+ result = rad_put_message_authentic(h);
+ } else {
+ result = put_raw_attr(h, type, value, len);
+ if (result == 0) {
+ if (type == RAD_CHAP_PASSWORD)
+ h->chap_pass = 1;
+ else if (type == RAD_EAP_MESSAGE)
+ h->eap_msg = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_int(struct rad_handle *h, int type, u_int32_t value)
+{
+ u_int32_t nvalue;
+
+ nvalue = htonl(value);
+ return rad_put_attr(h, type, &nvalue, sizeof nvalue);
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_string(struct rad_handle *h, int type, const char *str)
+{
+ return rad_put_attr(h, type, str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_message_authentic(struct rad_handle *h)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+ u_char md_zero[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ if (h->request[POS_CODE] == RAD_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST) {
+ generr(h, "Message-Authenticator is not valid"
+ " in accounting requests");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (h->authentic_pos == 0) {
+ h->authentic_pos = h->req_len;
+ memset(md_zero, 0, sizeof(md_zero));
+ return (put_raw_attr(h, RAD_MESSAGE_AUTHENTIC, md_zero,
+ sizeof(md_zero)));
+ }
+ return 0;
+#else
+ generr(h, "Message Authenticator not supported,"
+ " please recompile libradius with SSL support");
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the response type code on success, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+rad_send_request(struct rad_handle *h)
+{
+ struct timeval timelimit;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ int fd;
+ int n;
+
+ n = rad_init_send_request(h, &fd, &tv);
+
+ if (n != 0)
+ return n;
+
+ gettimeofday(&timelimit, NULL);
+ timeradd(&tv, &timelimit, &timelimit);
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ fd_set readfds;
+
+ FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+ FD_SET(fd, &readfds);
+
+ n = select(fd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+
+ if (n == -1) {
+ generr(h, "select: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!FD_ISSET(fd, &readfds)) {
+ /* Compute a new timeout */
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+ timersub(&timelimit, &tv, &tv);
+ if (tv.tv_sec > 0 || (tv.tv_sec == 0 && tv.tv_usec > 0))
+ /* Continue the select */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ n = rad_continue_send_request(h, n, &fd, &tv);
+
+ if (n != 0)
+ return n;
+
+ gettimeofday(&timelimit, NULL);
+ timeradd(&tv, &timelimit, &timelimit);
+ }
+}
+
+const char *
+rad_strerror(struct rad_handle *h)
+{
+ return h->errmsg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destructively split a string into fields separated by white space.
+ * `#' at the beginning of a field begins a comment that extends to the
+ * end of the string. Fields may be quoted with `"'. Inside quoted
+ * strings, the backslash escapes `\"' and `\\' are honored.
+ *
+ * Pointers to up to the first maxfields fields are stored in the fields
+ * array. Missing fields get NULL pointers.
+ *
+ * The return value is the actual number of fields parsed, and is always
+ * <= maxfields.
+ *
+ * On a syntax error, places a message in the msg string, and returns -1.
+ */
+static int
+split(char *str, char *fields[], int maxfields, char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int i;
+ static const char ws[] = " \t";
+
+ for (i = 0; i < maxfields; i++)
+ fields[i] = NULL;
+ p = str;
+ i = 0;
+ while (*p != '\0') {
+ p += strspn(p, ws);
+ if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
+ break;
+ if (i >= maxfields) {
+ snprintf(msg, msglen, "line has too many fields");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (*p == '"') {
+ char *dst;
+
+ dst = ++p;
+ fields[i] = dst;
+ while (*p != '"') {
+ if (*p == '\\') {
+ p++;
+ if (*p != '"' && *p != '\\' &&
+ *p != '\0') {
+ snprintf(msg, msglen,
+ "invalid `\\' escape");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (*p == '\0') {
+ snprintf(msg, msglen,
+ "unterminated quoted string");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *dst++ = *p++;
+ }
+ *dst = '\0';
+ p++;
+ if (*fields[i] == '\0') {
+ snprintf(msg, msglen,
+ "empty quoted string not permitted");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (*p != '\0' && strspn(p, ws) == 0) {
+ snprintf(msg, msglen, "quoted string not"
+ " followed by white space");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ fields[i] = p;
+ p += strcspn(p, ws);
+ if (*p != '\0')
+ *p++ = '\0';
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ return i;
+}
+
+int
+rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *vendor, const void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct vendor_attribute *attr;
+
+ attr = (struct vendor_attribute *)*data;
+ *vendor = ntohl(attr->vendor_value);
+ *data = attr->attrib_data;
+ *len = attr->attrib_len - 2;
+
+ return (attr->attrib_type);
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_vendor_addr(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type,
+ struct in_addr addr)
+{
+ return (rad_put_vendor_attr(h, vendor, type, &addr.s_addr,
+ sizeof addr.s_addr));
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_vendor_attr(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type,
+ const void *value, size_t len)
+{
+ struct vendor_attribute *attr;
+ int res;
+
+ if (!h->request_created) {
+ generr(h, "Please call rad_create_request()"
+ " before putting attributes");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((attr = malloc(len + 6)) == NULL) {
+ generr(h, "malloc failure (%zu bytes)", len + 6);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ attr->vendor_value = htonl(vendor);
+ attr->attrib_type = type;
+ attr->attrib_len = len + 2;
+ memcpy(attr->attrib_data, value, len);
+
+ res = put_raw_attr(h, RAD_VENDOR_SPECIFIC, attr, len + 6);
+ free(attr);
+ if (res == 0 && vendor == RAD_VENDOR_MICROSOFT
+ && (type == RAD_MICROSOFT_MS_CHAP_RESPONSE
+ || type == RAD_MICROSOFT_MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE)) {
+ h->chap_pass = 1;
+ }
+ return (res);
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_vendor_int(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type, u_int32_t i)
+{
+ u_int32_t value;
+
+ value = htonl(i);
+ return (rad_put_vendor_attr(h, vendor, type, &value, sizeof value));
+}
+
+int
+rad_put_vendor_string(struct rad_handle *h, int vendor, int type,
+ const char *str)
+{
+ return (rad_put_vendor_attr(h, vendor, type, str, strlen(str)));
+}
+
+ssize_t
+rad_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len < LEN_AUTH)
+ return (-1);
+ memcpy(buf, h->request + POS_AUTH, LEN_AUTH);
+ if (len > LEN_AUTH)
+ buf[LEN_AUTH] = '\0';
+ return (LEN_AUTH);
+}
+
+u_char *
+rad_demangle(struct rad_handle *h, const void *mangled, size_t mlen)
+{
+ char R[LEN_AUTH];
+ const char *S;
+ int i, Ppos;
+ MD5_CTX Context;
+ u_char b[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], *C, *demangled;
+
+ if ((mlen % 16 != 0) || mlen > 128) {
+ generr(h, "Cannot interpret mangled data of length %lu",
+ (u_long)mlen);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ C = (u_char *)mangled;
+
+ /* We need the shared secret as Salt */
+ S = rad_server_secret(h);
+
+ /* We need the request authenticator */
+ if (rad_request_authenticator(h, R, sizeof R) != LEN_AUTH) {
+ generr(h, "Cannot obtain the RADIUS request authenticator");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ demangled = malloc(mlen);
+ if (!demangled)
+ return NULL;
+
+ MD5Init(&Context);
+ MD5Update(&Context, S, strlen(S));
+ MD5Update(&Context, R, LEN_AUTH);
+ MD5Final(b, &Context);
+ Ppos = 0;
+ while (mlen) {
+
+ mlen -= 16;
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ demangled[Ppos++] = C[i] ^ b[i];
+
+ if (mlen) {
+ MD5Init(&Context);
+ MD5Update(&Context, S, strlen(S));
+ MD5Update(&Context, C, 16);
+ MD5Final(b, &Context);
+ }
+
+ C += 16;
+ }
+
+ return demangled;
+}
+
+u_char *
+rad_demangle_mppe_key(struct rad_handle *h, const void *mangled,
+ size_t mlen, size_t *len)
+{
+ char R[LEN_AUTH]; /* variable names as per rfc2548 */
+ const char *S;
+ u_char b[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], *demangled;
+ const u_char *A, *C;
+ MD5_CTX Context;
+ int Slen, i, Clen, Ppos;
+ u_char *P;
+
+ if (mlen % 16 != SALT_LEN) {
+ generr(h, "Cannot interpret mangled data of length %lu",
+ (u_long)mlen);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* We need the RADIUS Request-Authenticator */
+ if (rad_request_authenticator(h, R, sizeof R) != LEN_AUTH) {
+ generr(h, "Cannot obtain the RADIUS request authenticator");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ A = (const u_char *)mangled; /* Salt comes first */
+ C = (const u_char *)mangled + SALT_LEN; /* Then the ciphertext */
+ Clen = mlen - SALT_LEN;
+ S = rad_server_secret(h); /* We need the RADIUS secret */
+ Slen = strlen(S);
+ P = alloca(Clen); /* We derive our plaintext */
+
+ MD5Init(&Context);
+ MD5Update(&Context, S, Slen);
+ MD5Update(&Context, R, LEN_AUTH);
+ MD5Update(&Context, A, SALT_LEN);
+ MD5Final(b, &Context);
+ Ppos = 0;
+
+ while (Clen) {
+ Clen -= 16;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ P[Ppos++] = C[i] ^ b[i];
+
+ if (Clen) {
+ MD5Init(&Context);
+ MD5Update(&Context, S, Slen);
+ MD5Update(&Context, C, 16);
+ MD5Final(b, &Context);
+ }
+
+ C += 16;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The resulting plain text consists of a one-byte length, the text and
+ * maybe some padding.
+ */
+ *len = *P;
+ if (*len > mlen - 1) {
+ generr(h, "Mangled data seems to be garbage %zu %zu",
+ *len, mlen-1);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (*len > MPPE_KEY_LEN * 2) {
+ generr(h, "Key to long (%zu) for me max. %d",
+ *len, MPPE_KEY_LEN * 2);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ demangled = malloc(*len);
+ if (!demangled)
+ return NULL;
+
+ memcpy(demangled, P + 1, *len);
+ return demangled;
+}
+
+const char *
+rad_server_secret(struct rad_handle *h)
+{
+ return (h->servers[h->srv].secret);
+}
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