diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/libexec/uucp/libunix/spawn.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/libexec/uucp/libunix/spawn.c | 32 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/libexec/uucp/libunix/spawn.c b/gnu/libexec/uucp/libunix/spawn.c index a56fd84..d39e2ba 100644 --- a/gnu/libexec/uucp/libunix/spawn.c +++ b/gnu/libexec/uucp/libunix/spawn.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* spawn.c Spawn a program securely. - Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994 Ian Lance Taylor + Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 Ian Lance Taylor This file is part of the Taylor UUCP package. @@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. + Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. The author of the program may be contacted at ian@airs.com or - c/o Cygnus Support, Building 200, 1 Kendall Square, Cambridge, MA 02139. + c/o Cygnus Support, 48 Grove Street, Somerville, MA 02144. */ #include "uucp.h" @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ ixsspawn (pazargs, aidescs, fkeepuid, fkeepenv, zchdir, fnosigs, fshell, zspace = azenv[0] + sizeof "PATH=" - 1; while ((zspace = strchr (zspace, ' ')) != NULL) *zspace = ':'; - + azenv[1] = zbufalc (sizeof "HOME=" + strlen (zSspooldir)); sprintf (azenv[1], "HOME=%s", zSspooldir); @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ixsspawn (pazargs, aidescs, fkeepuid, fkeepenv, zchdir, fnosigs, fshell, sprintf (azenv[2], "TERM=%s", zterm); azenv[3] = zbufcpy ("SHELL=/bin/sh"); - + azenv[4] = zbufalc (sizeof "USER=" + strlen (OWNER)); sprintf (azenv[4], "USER=%s", OWNER); @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ ixsspawn (pazargs, aidescs, fkeepuid, fkeepenv, zchdir, fnosigs, fshell, ierr = errno; ferr = TRUE; break; - } + } } } @@ -360,12 +360,22 @@ ixsspawn (pazargs, aidescs, fkeepuid, fkeepenv, zchdir, fnosigs, fshell, { /* Try to force the UUCP uid to be both real and effective user ID, in order to present a consistent environment regardless - of the invoking user. This won't work on System V based - systems, but it will do no harm. It would be possible to use - a setuid root program to force the UID setting, but I don't - think the efficiency loss is worth it. */ + of the invoking user. This won't work on older System V + based systems, where it can cause trouble if ordinary users + wind up executing uuxqt, perhaps via uucico; any program + which uuxqt executes will have an arbitrary real user ID, so + if the program is itself a setuid program, any security + checks it does based on the real user ID will be incorrect. + Fixing this problem would seem to require a special setuid + root program; I have not used this approach because + modern systems should not suffer from it. */ +#if HAVE_SETREUID + (void) setreuid (geteuid (), -1); + (void) setregid (getegid (), -1); +#else (void) setuid (geteuid ()); (void) setgid (getegid ()); +#endif } if (zchdir != NULL) @@ -406,7 +416,7 @@ ixsspawn (pazargs, aidescs, fkeepuid, fkeepenv, zchdir, fnosigs, fshell, { char *zto; const char *azshargs[4]; - + pazargs[0] = zcmd; zto = zshcmd; for (i = 0; pazargs[i] != NULL; i++) |
