diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'eBones/kdb/krb_kdb_utils.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | eBones/kdb/krb_kdb_utils.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/eBones/kdb/krb_kdb_utils.c b/eBones/kdb/krb_kdb_utils.c index c283e0f..275cc39 100644 --- a/eBones/kdb/krb_kdb_utils.c +++ b/eBones/kdb/krb_kdb_utils.c @@ -10,25 +10,27 @@ * Jon Rochlis, MIT Telecom, March 1988 * * from: krb_kdb_utils.c,v 4.1 89/07/26 11:01:12 jtkohl Exp $ - * $Id: krb_kdb_utils.c,v 1.1.1.1 1994/09/30 14:49:55 csgr Exp $ + * $Id: krb_kdb_utils.c,v 1.3 1995/07/18 16:37:15 mark Exp $ */ +#if 0 #ifndef lint static char rcsid[] = -"$Id: krb_kdb_utils.c,v 1.1.1.1 1994/09/30 14:49:55 csgr Exp $"; +"$Id: krb_kdb_utils.c,v 1.3 1995/07/18 16:37:15 mark Exp $"; #endif lint +#endif -#include <des.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/file.h> #include <krb.h> #include <krb_db.h> #include <kdc.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <sys/file.h> -long kdb_get_master_key(prompt, master_key, master_key_sched) - int prompt; - C_Block master_key; - Key_schedule master_key_sched; +long kdb_get_master_key(int prompt, C_Block master_key, + Key_schedule master_key_sched) { int kfile; @@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ long kdb_get_master_key(prompt, master_key, master_key_sched) placebo_read_password(master_key, "\nEnter Kerberos master key: ", 0); #else - des_read_password(master_key, + des_read_password((C_Block *)master_key, "\nEnter Kerberos master key: ", 0); #endif printf ("\n"); @@ -55,20 +57,33 @@ long kdb_get_master_key(prompt, master_key, master_key_sched) } #ifndef NOENCRYPTION - key_sched(master_key,master_key_sched); + key_sched((C_Block *)master_key,master_key_sched); #endif return (0); } +/* The old algorithm used the key schedule as the initial vector which + was byte order depedent ... */ + +void kdb_encrypt_key (C_Block in, C_Block out, C_Block master_key, + Key_schedule master_key_sched, int e_d_flag) +{ + +#ifdef NOENCRYPTION + bcopy(in, out, sizeof(C_Block)); +#else + pcbc_encrypt((C_Block *)in,(C_Block *)out,(long)sizeof(C_Block), + master_key_sched,(C_Block *)master_key, e_d_flag); +#endif +} + /* The caller is reasponsible for cleaning up the master key and sched, even if we can't verify the master key */ /* Returns master key version if successful, otherwise -1 */ -long kdb_verify_master_key (master_key, master_key_sched, out) - C_Block master_key; - Key_schedule master_key_sched; - FILE *out; /* setting this to non-null be do output */ +long kdb_verify_master_key (C_Block master_key, Key_schedule master_key_sched, + FILE *out) { C_Block key_from_db; Principal principal_data[1]; @@ -122,20 +137,3 @@ long kdb_verify_master_key (master_key, master_key_sched, out) return (master_key_version); } - -/* The old algorithm used the key schedule as the initial vector which - was byte order depedent ... */ - -kdb_encrypt_key (in, out, master_key, master_key_sched, e_d_flag) - C_Block in, out, master_key; - Key_schedule master_key_sched; - int e_d_flag; -{ - -#ifdef NOENCRYPTION - bcopy(in, out, sizeof(C_Block)); -#else - pcbc_encrypt(in,out,(long)sizeof(C_Block),master_key_sched,master_key, - e_d_flag); -#endif -} |
