diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rand/md_rand.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 80 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c index 0f8dd3e..fcdd3f2 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c @@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ * */ +#define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP + #ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG # ifndef NDEBUG # define NDEBUG @@ -126,10 +128,6 @@ #include <openssl/crypto.h> #include <openssl/err.h> -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -#include <openssl/fips.h> -#endif - #ifdef BN_DEBUG # define PREDICT @@ -149,7 +147,7 @@ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND * (to prevent double locking) */ /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ -static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ +static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ #ifdef PREDICT @@ -161,13 +159,14 @@ const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo); +static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); static int ssleay_rand_status(void); RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={ ssleay_rand_seed, - ssleay_rand_bytes, + ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes, ssleay_rand_cleanup, ssleay_rand_add, ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, @@ -217,8 +216,10 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) /* check if we already have the lock */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id()); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else @@ -274,8 +275,16 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) } else MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); - + + /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ MD_Update(&m,buf,j); + /* We know that line may cause programs such as + purify and valgrind to complain about use of + uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's + with the caller. Removing that line will make + sure you get really bad randomness and thereby + other problems such as very insecure keys. */ + MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); MD_Final(&m,local_md); md_c[1]++; @@ -322,7 +331,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); } -static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) +static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) { static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx; @@ -336,14 +345,6 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) #endif int do_stir_pool = 0; -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if(FIPS_mode()) - { - FIPSerr(FIPS_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,FIPS_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD); - return 0; - } -#endif - #ifdef PREDICT if (rand_predictable) { @@ -384,7 +385,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id(); + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; @@ -476,9 +477,18 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) #endif MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); -#ifndef PURIFY - MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */ + +#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */ + /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small + * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised + * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to + * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal + * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on + * security. + */ + MD_Update(&m,buf,j); #endif + k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num; if (k > 0) { @@ -510,7 +520,9 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); if (ok) return(1); - else + else if (pseudo) + return 0; + else { RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " @@ -519,35 +531,31 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) } } +static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + { + return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0); + } + /* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable */ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { - int ret; - unsigned long err; - - ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num); - if (ret == 0) - { - err = ERR_peek_error(); - if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND && - ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED) - ERR_clear_error(); - } - return (ret); + return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1); } static int ssleay_rand_status(void) { + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; int ret; int do_not_lock; + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); /* check if we already have the lock * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id()); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else @@ -559,7 +567,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void) /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id(); + CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; } |