diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c | 44 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 93 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c | 58 |
7 files changed, 172 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c index 5e1bc76..7591f4a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c @@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b) case V_ASN1_OBJECT: result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object); break; + case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: + result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean; + break; case V_ASN1_NULL: result = 0; /* They do not have content. */ break; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c index 2cbfa81..33249ab 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c @@ -127,16 +127,22 @@ unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag) ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it) - { +{ ASN1_TLC c; ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL; - if (!pval) - pval = &ptmpval; asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c); - if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) - return *pval; - return NULL; + if (pval && *pval && it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) + ptmpval = *pval; + if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&ptmpval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) { + if (pval && it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) { + if (*pval) + ASN1_item_free(*pval, it); + *pval = ptmpval; + } + return ptmpval; } + return NULL; +} int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt) @@ -311,13 +317,20 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; - /* Allocate structure */ - if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) - { + if (*pval) { + /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */ + i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); + if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { + tt = it->templates + i; + pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); + ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt); + asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it); + } + } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; - } + } /* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */ p = *in; for (i = 0, tt=it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) @@ -407,6 +420,17 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; + /* Free up and zero any ADB found */ + for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { + if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) { + const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; + ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; + seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); + pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); + ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); + } + } + /* Get each field entry */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c index d91aa11..5eb2a5b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c @@ -272,6 +272,25 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL; + if (p7 == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); + return NULL; + } + /* + * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really + * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures). + * + * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an + * error. + * + * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before + * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error. + */ + if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + return NULL; + } + i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; @@ -433,6 +452,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL; int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0; + if (p7 == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); + return NULL; + } + + if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + return NULL; + } + i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; @@ -752,6 +781,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL; + if (p7 == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); + return 0; + } + + if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + return 0; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; @@ -796,6 +835,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) /* If detached data then the content is excluded */ if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) { M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); + os = NULL; p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL; } break; @@ -806,6 +846,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) { M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); + os = NULL; p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL; } break; @@ -866,8 +907,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) } } } - else if (i == NID_pkcs7_digest) - { + else if (i == NID_pkcs7_digest) { unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int md_len; if (!PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, bio, @@ -878,24 +918,31 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len); } - if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) - { - char *cont; - long contlen; - btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM); - if (btmp == NULL) - { - PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); - goto err; + if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) { + /* + * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached + * digested data support is broken. + */ + if (os == NULL) + goto err; + if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) { + char *cont; + long contlen; + btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM); + if (btmp == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); + goto err; } - contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont); - /* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data - * instead of making an extra copy. - */ - BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); - BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0); - ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen); + contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont); + /* + * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data + * instead of making an extra copy. + */ + BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); + BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0); + ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen); } + } ret=1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); @@ -971,6 +1018,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio, STACK_OF(X509) *cert; X509 *x509; + if (p7 == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); + return 0; + } + + if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + return 0; + } + if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { cert=p7->d.sign->cert; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c index d411269..e2fc802 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg) switch (cmd) { + /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */ case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE: if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) { @@ -459,6 +460,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md) STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7) { + if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL) + return NULL; if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { return(p7->d.sign->signer_info); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod index 298ec54..6fed4b1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod @@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ B<*px> is valid is broken and some parts of the reused structure may persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged. +Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify B<*px> if an error occurs. +If parsing succeeds then B<*px> is freed (if it is not NULL) and then +set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result B<*px> +B<must not> be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to +free an invalid pointer. + i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL, if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the @@ -210,7 +216,9 @@ always succeed. d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by -L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used +with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not +modified in the event of error. i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c index c63be30..3c0d6a5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s) OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0 && s->session->master_key_length - < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); + <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length); EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1); c++; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c index 59ced3f..18e2813 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -454,9 +454,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY); return(-1); } - i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc, - &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), - (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher); @@ -475,23 +472,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) else ek=5; + /* + * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is + * 1 byte message type + * 3 bytes cipher + * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear) + * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc) + * 2-byte key args length (IV etc) + * clear key + * encrypted key + * key args + * + * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes + * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of + * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher, + * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length + * must be zero). + */ + if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) || + (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { + ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + /* + * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key. + * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted + * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now. + */ + if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) || + (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + return -1; + } + + i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, + &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), + &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), + (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + /* bad decrypt */ #if 1 /* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */ - if ((i < 0) || - ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) - || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i != - (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) - { + if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)) + || (is_export && i != ek))) { ERR_clear_error(); if (is_export) i=ek; else i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0) + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0) return 0; - } + } #else if (i < 0) { @@ -513,7 +548,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) } #endif - if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear; + if (is_export) + i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { |