diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl')
26 files changed, 641 insertions, 223 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile index 29d9e45..ad14abb 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ KRB5_INCLUDES= CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com -TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c +TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c index a0c583e..d2d4d2e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c @@ -419,6 +419,10 @@ static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY); b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason; break; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: + BIO_set_retry_special(b); + b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + break; default: break; } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/clienthellotest.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/clienthellotest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a00a7ea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/clienthellotest.c @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> + + +#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN 2 +#define SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN 1 +#define CIPHERS_LEN_LEN 2 +#define COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN 1 +#define EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN 2 +#define EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN 2 +#define EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN 2 + + +#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS 2 + +/* + * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the + * ClientHello for TLS1.2 + */ +#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 0 + +/* + * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the + * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version + */ +#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG 1 + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *con; + BIO *rbio; + BIO *wbio; + BIO *err; + long len; + unsigned char *data; + unsigned char *dataend; + char *dummytick = "Hello World!"; + unsigned int tmplen; + unsigned int type; + unsigned int size; + int testresult = 0; + int currtest = 0; + + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + + err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); + + CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init(); + CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL); + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); + + /* + * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets + * produced when we try to connect + */ + for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) { + testresult = 0; + if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2) { + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_2_method()); + } else { + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); + } + con = SSL_new(ctx); + + rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio); + SSL_set_connect_state(con); + + if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 + || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) { + if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick))) + goto end; + } + + if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) { + /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */ + goto end; + } + + len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data); + dataend = data + len; + + /* Skip the record header */ + data += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + /* Skip the handshake message header */ + data += SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + /* Skip client version and random */ + data += CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + if (data + SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN > dataend) + goto end; + /* Skip session id */ + tmplen = *data; + data += SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN + tmplen; + if (data + CIPHERS_LEN_LEN > dataend) + goto end; + /* Skip ciphers */ + tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1); + data += CIPHERS_LEN_LEN + tmplen; + if (data + COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN > dataend) + goto end; + /* Skip compression */ + tmplen = *data; + data += COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN + tmplen; + if (data + EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN > dataend) + goto end; + /* Extensions len */ + tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1); + data += EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN; + if (data + tmplen > dataend) + goto end; + + /* Loop through all extensions */ + while (tmplen > EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN) { + type = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1); + data += EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN; + size = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1); + data += EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN; + if (data + size > dataend) + goto end; + + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 + || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) { + if (size == strlen(dummytick) + && memcmp(data, dummytick, size) == 0) { + /* Ticket data is as we expected */ + testresult = 1; + } else { + printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n"); + } + break; + } + } + + tmplen -= EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN + size; + data += size; + } + + end: + SSL_free(con); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + if (!testresult) { + printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest); + break; + } + } + + ERR_free_strings(); + ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); + EVP_cleanup(); + CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); + CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err); + + return testresult?0:1; +} diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index 8dd8ea3..d453c07 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -1490,9 +1490,12 @@ int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) { int ret; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && + BIO *wbio; + + wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); + if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { - ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); + ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio); if (ret < 0) return -1; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c index 377c1e6..eb371a2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c @@ -299,13 +299,12 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) #endif case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: - s->shutdown = 0; /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = dtls1_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) @@ -350,11 +349,15 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, - 0); + 0) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, @@ -362,6 +365,10 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + /* receive renewed session ticket */ + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + } } else s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; } @@ -484,9 +491,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c index 41c7dc5..f01b8a6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c @@ -267,6 +267,19 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; + } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { + /* + * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't + * support secure renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; } else { /* * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a @@ -405,9 +418,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); @@ -628,9 +645,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); - SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c index 3766567..2b2855d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c @@ -373,12 +373,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { -#if 0 - /* don't reuse session-id's */ + /* + * Since we're sending s23 client hello, we're not reusing a session, as + * we'd be using the method from the saved session instead + */ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { - return (-1); + return -1; } -#endif p = s->s3->client_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) @@ -439,9 +440,6 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) /* * put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse) */ -#if 0 - s->session->session_id_length = 0; -#endif s2n(0, d); if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG) @@ -729,6 +727,8 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s) goto err; } + s->session->ssl_version = s->version; + /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION); @@ -784,13 +784,6 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s) } s->init_num = 0; - /* - * Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not reusing a - * session-id - */ - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) - goto err; - return (SSL_connect(s)); err: return (-1); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c index 2fb71f2..b3bff74 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -411,8 +411,9 @@ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the * padding too. ) + * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error */ -void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, +int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13], @@ -455,7 +456,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) { case NID_md5: - MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform; @@ -464,7 +466,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, length_is_big_endian = 0; break; case NID_sha1: - SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform; @@ -472,14 +475,16 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 case NID_sha224: - SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform; md_size = 224 / 8; break; case NID_sha256: - SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform; @@ -488,7 +493,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 case NID_sha384: - SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform; @@ -497,7 +503,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, md_length_size = 16; break; case NID_sha512: - SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c); + if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) + return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform; @@ -514,7 +521,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, OPENSSL_assert(0); if (md_out_size) *md_out_size = -1; - return; + return 0; } OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES); @@ -652,7 +659,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, */ if (header_length <= md_block_size) { /* Should never happen */ - return; + return 0; } overhang = header_length - md_block_size; md_transform(md_state.c, header); @@ -733,26 +740,34 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, } EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ ); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0) + goto err; if (is_sslv3) { /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */ memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) + goto err; } else { /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a; - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size); + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) + goto err; } EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u); if (md_out_size) *md_out_size = md_out_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + + return 1; +err: + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return 0; } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 35ad121..0578a9c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -1624,6 +1624,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p += i; + if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; @@ -1644,6 +1650,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p += i; + if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; @@ -1665,6 +1676,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) p += i; n -= param_len; + if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) pkey = @@ -1867,14 +1883,20 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) q = md_buf; for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) - ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, + (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, + NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } q += size; j += size; } @@ -1893,12 +1915,16 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else #endif { - EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len); + if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; @@ -2118,6 +2144,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) long n; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *d; + unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, @@ -2136,6 +2163,19 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint); + n2s(p, ticklen); + /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ + if (ticklen + 6 != n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */ + if (ticklen == 0) + return 1; + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; SSL_SESSION *new_sess; @@ -2167,14 +2207,6 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) s->session = new_sess; } - n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); - n2s(p, ticklen); - /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ - if (ticklen + 6 != n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } if (s->session->tlsext_tick) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; @@ -2185,6 +2217,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) goto err; } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); + s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set @@ -2354,6 +2387,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); goto err; } rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; @@ -2801,6 +2835,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); + if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } /* * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key * @@ -2810,10 +2849,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ - EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); - /* Generate session key */ - if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) { + if (pkey_ctx == NULL + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 + /* Generate session key */ + || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* @@ -2834,13 +2876,18 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) * data */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, - EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); + if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, @@ -2856,7 +2903,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32) - < 0) { + <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; @@ -3057,7 +3104,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); - EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx); + if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) { if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, @@ -3194,7 +3244,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; * return(-1); We then get retied later */ - i = 0; i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c index 152f40d..85ebac8 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -253,7 +253,10 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); dd = s->enc_read_ctx; - ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m); + if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* COMPRESS */ if (s->expand != NULL) { @@ -288,7 +291,10 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx); dd = s->enc_write_ctx; - ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m); + if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* COMPRESS */ if (s->compress != NULL) { @@ -674,19 +680,21 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, return 0; npad = (48 / n) * n; - if (sender != NULL) - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, - s->session->master_key_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i); - - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, - s->session->master_key_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret); + if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len) <= 0) + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i) <= 0 + + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ret = 0; + } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); @@ -758,33 +766,36 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ - ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, - md, &md_size, - header, rec->input, - rec->length + md_size, orig_len, - mac_sec, md_size, 1); + if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, orig_len, + mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) + return -1; } else { unsigned int md_size_u; /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8); rec_char = rec->type; - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1); p = md; s2n(rec->length, p); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u); + if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return -1; + } md_size = md_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); @@ -826,17 +837,24 @@ int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i], strlen((const char *)salt[i])); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n); - - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i], + strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n) <= 0 + + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ret = 0; + break; + } out += n; ret += n; } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c index de917d3..f716d77 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -2955,7 +2955,7 @@ int ssl3_new(SSL *s) void ssl3_free(SSL *s) { - if (s == NULL) + if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL) return; #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 3a5f71d..fcfc2fb 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -383,7 +383,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) */ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; @@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { - int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1; + int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; unsigned int cookie_len; long n; unsigned long id; @@ -1155,8 +1154,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - - ret = 2; + cookie_valid = 1; } p += cookie_len; @@ -1264,7 +1262,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n, &al)) { /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto f_err; @@ -1492,8 +1490,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) } } - if (ret < 0) - ret = 1; + ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -1503,7 +1500,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - return (ret); + return ret; } int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) @@ -1987,14 +1984,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) - ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, + (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 + : s->ctx->sha1, + NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, + (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_LIB_EVP); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } q += i; j += i; } @@ -2024,16 +2029,17 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); - if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { + if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0 + || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); - goto err; + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; } s2n(i, p); n += i + 2; @@ -2879,7 +2885,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); - EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); + if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto gerr; + } /* * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from @@ -3123,7 +3137,17 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) unsigned char signature[64]; int idx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); - EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); + if (pctx == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } if (i != 64) { fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h index d2ab0c0..b8456c6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h @@ -2313,6 +2313,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 +# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET 388 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136 @@ -2465,8 +2466,11 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106 # define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE 375 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE 393 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110 +# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE 395 # define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111 # define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304 diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h index 2dd5462..e9b1170 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h @@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ extern "C" { # define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5 +# define SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 4 + # ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD /* * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c index 39d48ea..35cc27c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c @@ -121,13 +121,16 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st { int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) { #define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2) - int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0, v7 = 0, v8 = 0; + int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0; unsigned char buf[4], ibuf1[LSIZE2], ibuf2[LSIZE2]; unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2], ibuf4[LSIZE2], ibuf5[LSIZE2]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int v6 = 0, v9 = 0, v10 = 0; unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2]; #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + int v7 = 0, v8 = 0; +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP unsigned char cbuf; int v11 = 0; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c index 5df2413..9a4e104 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); + ret->references = 1; ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]]; /* * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that @@ -282,7 +283,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */ - ret->references = 1; /* * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they * will be set during handshake. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index cac525e..cb559d9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -356,10 +356,11 @@ static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; int pkey_id = 0; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); - if (ameth) { - EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth); + if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) > 0) { + return pkey_id; } - return pkey_id; + return 0; } #else @@ -371,7 +372,9 @@ static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) int pkey_id = 0; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); if (ameth) { - EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth); + if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) <= 0) + pkey_id = 0; } if (tmpeng) ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c index 88621b7..caa671a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "SSL3_ENC"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED), "SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET), + "ssl3_generate_master_secret"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS), "SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"}, @@ -369,8 +371,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = { "bad data returned by callback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH), "bad dh g length"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE), "bad dh g value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH), "bad dh pub key length"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE), "bad dh pub key value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH), "bad dh p length"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE), "bad dh p value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE), "bad dsa signature"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"}, diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c index e11746a..93d1cbe 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) s->options = ctx->options; s->mode = ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; + s->references = 1; if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* @@ -375,7 +376,6 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; - s->references = 1; s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; SSL_clear(s); @@ -3283,8 +3283,11 @@ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) { ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - if (md) - EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL); + if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) { + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); + *hash = NULL; + return NULL; + } return *hash; } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h index a7f3f8d..f5d9df6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, - unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); + unsigned char *limit, int *al); int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); @@ -1218,15 +1218,15 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, - unsigned char *md_out, - size_t *md_out_size, - const unsigned char header[13], - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_plus_mac_size, - size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, - const unsigned char *mac_secret, - unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); +int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *md_out, + size_t *md_out_size, + const unsigned char header[13], + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_plus_mac_size, + size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, + const unsigned char *mac_secret, + unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c index daf15dd..c91a998 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c @@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) } RSA_up_ref(rsa); - EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return 0; + } ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); @@ -181,6 +184,15 @@ static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey) if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509); + if (pktmp == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); + return 0; + } + /* + * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately + * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this. + */ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); ERR_clear_error(); @@ -382,6 +394,10 @@ static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) } if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) { + /* + * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately + * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this. + */ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey); ERR_clear_error(); @@ -502,7 +518,10 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa) } RSA_up_ref(rsa); - EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return 0; + } ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 1ad9dc7..de4c59e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; # endif -#endif dest->tlsext_tick = NULL; +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP dest->srp_username = NULL; #endif @@ -324,7 +324,6 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) goto err; } # endif -#endif if (ticket != 0) { dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen); @@ -334,6 +333,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0; dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0; } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (src->srp_username) { diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c index 6a0c293..349ee1e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ /* Or gethostname won't be declared properly on Linux and GNU platforms. */ #define _BSD_SOURCE 1 +#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE 1 #include <assert.h> #include <errno.h> diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c index 8f45294..985356d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -385,6 +385,8 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); dd = s->enc_read_ctx; mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); + if (mac_ctx == NULL) + goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->expand != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); @@ -423,11 +425,14 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) dd = s->enc_write_ctx; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - if (!mac_ctx) + if (mac_ctx == NULL) goto err; s->write_hash = mac_ctx; - } else + } else { mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); + if (mac_ctx == NULL) + goto err; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->compress != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); @@ -500,7 +505,12 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, *mac_secret_size); - EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key); + if (mac_key == NULL + || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) { + EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG @@ -913,8 +923,9 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) } EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret); + if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d) <=0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret) <= 0) + ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return ((int)ret); } @@ -1041,17 +1052,24 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ - ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, - md, &md_size, - header, rec->input, - rec->length + md_size, orig_len, - ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, - ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0); + if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, orig_len, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { + if (!stream_mac) + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); + return -1; + } } else { - EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); - EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); - t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); - OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { + if (!stream_mac) + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); + return -1; + } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (!send && FIPS_mode()) tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index d70b93f..27f1216 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). */ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - const unsigned char *d, int n) + const unsigned char *limit) { unsigned short type, size; static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { @@ -942,11 +942,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; - if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + if (data >= (limit - 2)) return; data += 2; - if (data > (d + n - 4)) + if (data > (limit - 4)) return; n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); @@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; - if (data + size > d + n) + if (data + size > limit) return; data += size; @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n) + if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) return; @@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, } else { const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len != d + n) + if (data + len != limit) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) return; @@ -981,8 +981,8 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, } # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, - int n, int *al) +int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *limit, int *al) { unsigned short type; unsigned short size; @@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) - ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); + ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP @@ -1016,22 +1016,22 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, s->srtp_profile = NULL; - if (data == d + n) + if (data == limit) goto ri_check; - if (data > (d + n - 2)) + if (data > (limit - 2)) goto err; n2s(data, len); - if (data > (d + n - len)) + if (data + len != limit) goto err; - while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { + while (data <= (limit - 4)) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); - if (data + size > (d + n)) + if (data + size > (limit)) goto err; # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); @@ -1396,7 +1396,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, } /* Spurious data on the end */ - if (data != d + n) + if (data != limit) goto err; *p = data; @@ -2291,10 +2291,13 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, /* Check key name matches */ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) return 2; - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); + if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, + etick + 16) <= 0) { + goto err; + } } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity @@ -2302,13 +2305,14 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, */ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); if (mlen < 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; + goto err; } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); + if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 + || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { + goto err; + } HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); @@ -2319,11 +2323,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (!sdec) { + if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return -1; } - EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); @@ -2356,6 +2359,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; +err: + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + return -1; } /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls1.h index 69d8186..91504b1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls1.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls1.h @@ -235,8 +235,7 @@ extern "C" { /* * ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension. - * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml - * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21 @@ -261,20 +260,19 @@ extern "C" { # define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 # endif -/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ +/* NameType value from RFC3546 */ # define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 -/* status request value from RFC 3546 */ +/* status request value from RFC3546 */ # define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1 -/* ECPointFormat values from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ +/* ECPointFormat values from RFC4492 */ # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first 0 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed 0 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime 1 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 2 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last 2 -/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */ - +/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC5246 */ # define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous 0 # define TLSEXT_signature_rsa 1 # define TLSEXT_signature_dsa 2 @@ -404,7 +402,6 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000066 /* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */ - # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000031 @@ -570,7 +567,7 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA" -/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */ +/* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" |
