diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c | 106 |
1 files changed, 66 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index dd5bd00..7831046 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } skip_ext: - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { size_t salglen; const unsigned char *salg; salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); @@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; - if (data >= (limit - 2)) + if (limit - data <= 2) return; data += 2; - if (data > (limit - 4)) + if (limit - data < 4) return; n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); @@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; - if (data + size > limit) + if (limit - data < size) return; data += size; @@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) + if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) return; @@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, } else { const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len != limit) + if (limit - data != (int)(len)) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) return; @@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, if (data == limit) goto ri_check; - if (data > (limit - 2)) + if (limit - data < 2) goto err; n2s(data, len); - if (data + len != limit) + if (limit - data != len) goto err; - while (data <= (limit - 4)) { + while (limit - data >= 4) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); - if (data + size > (limit)) + if (limit - data < size) goto err; # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); @@ -2316,6 +2316,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, size -= 2; if (dsize > size) goto err; + + /* + * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake + * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 + */ + sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, + OCSP_RESPID_free); + if (dsize > 0) { + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } else { + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; + } + while (dsize > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; int idsize; @@ -2335,13 +2352,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, OCSP_RESPID_free(id); goto err; } - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids - && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2472,18 +2482,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) return 1; - if (data >= limit - 2) + if (limit - data <= 2) return 1; n2s(data, len); - if (data > limit - len) + if (limit - data < len) return 1; - while (data <= limit - 4) { + while (limit - data >= 4) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); - if (data + size > limit) + if (limit - data < size) return 1; if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) return 0; @@ -2569,20 +2579,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); # endif - if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + if ((d + n) - data <= 2) goto ri_check; n2s(data, length); - if (data + length != d + n) { + if ((d + n) - data != length) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { + while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); - if (data + size > (d + n)) + if ((d + n) - data < size) goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) @@ -2712,6 +2722,11 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + /* + * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in + * a single Serverhello + */ + OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -3307,29 +3322,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { i = *(p++); - p += i; - if (p >= limit) + + if (limit - p <= i) return -1; + + p += i; } /* Skip past cipher list */ n2s(p, i); - p += i; - if (p >= limit) + if (limit - p <= i) return -1; + p += i; + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ i = *(p++); - p += i; - if (p > limit) + if (limit - p < i) return -1; + p += i; + /* Now at start of extensions */ - if ((p + 2) >= limit) + if (limit - p <= 2) return 0; n2s(p, i); - while ((p + 4) <= limit) { + while (limit - p >= 4) { unsigned short type, size; n2s(p, type); n2s(p, size); - if (p + size > limit) + if (limit - p < size) return 0; if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { int r; @@ -3397,9 +3416,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, HMAC_CTX hctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ - if (eticklen < 48) - return 2; + /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); @@ -3433,6 +3450,13 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, if (mlen < 0) { goto err; } + /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ + if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return 2; + } + eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 @@ -3902,7 +3926,7 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } @@ -3980,6 +4004,8 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) * - Padding */ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); + if (buf == NULL) + return -1; p = buf; /* Message Type */ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; @@ -3988,13 +4014,13 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 16; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } |
