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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt')
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diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt b/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d36b02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +<DRAFT!> + HOWTO proxy certificates + +0. WARNING + +NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAVE BEEN CHECKED! They are just an +example to show you how things can be done. There may be typos or +type conflicts, and you will have to resolve them. + +1. Introduction + +Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820. They are really usual +certificates with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo. + +Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), +either directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by +extension through an already issued proxy certificate.. They are used +to extend rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, +or sometimes to the user itself), so it can perform operations in the +name of the owner of the EE certificate. + +See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information. + + +2. A warning about proxy certificates + +Noone seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind. +Basically, to this date, it seems that proxy certificates have only +been used in a world that's highly aware of them. What would happen +if an unsuspecting application is to validate a chain of certificates +that contains proxy certificates? It would usually consider the leaf +to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, and since proxy +certificates are controlled by the EE certificate owner alone, it's +would be normal to consider what the EE certificate owner could do +with them. + +subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, +and this is enforced in OpenSSL. The subject must be the same as the +issuer, with one commonName added on. + +Possible threats are, as far as has been imagined so far: + + - impersonation through commonName (think server certificates). + - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in + certain environments, that would grant extra or different + authorisation rights. + +For this reason, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates +be explicitely allowed. Currently, this can be done using the +following methods: + + - if the application calls X509_verify_cert() itself, it can do the + following prior to that call (ctx is the pointer passed in the call + to X509_verify_cert()): + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); + + - in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled + before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable + OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY with some non-empty value. + +There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the +default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future. + + +3. How to create proxy cerificates + +It's quite easy to create proxy certificates, by taking advantage of +the lack of checks of the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*). But +first, you need to create a configuration section that contains a +definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this: + + [ v3_proxy ] + # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate. + basicConstraints=CA:FALSE + + # Usual authority key ID + authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always + + # Now, for the extension that marks this certificate as a proxy one + proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB + +It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section: + + proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext + + [ proxy_ext ] + language=id-ppl-anyLanguage + pathlen=0 + policy=text:BC + +The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the +syntag determines what will be done with the string. The recognised +syntags are as follows: + + text indicates that the string is simply the bytes, not + encoded in any kind of way: + + policy=text:räksmörgås + + Previous versions of this design had a specific tag + for UTF-8 text. However, since the bytes are copied + as-is anyway, there's no need for it. Instead, use + the text: tag, like this: + + policy=text:räksmörgÃ¥s + + hex indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons + between each byte (every second hex digit): + + policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73 + + Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a + complete DER blob. However, the only legal use for + this would be to surround the bytes that would go with + the hex: tag with what's needed to construct a correct + OCTET STRING. Since hex: does that, the DER tag felt + superfluous, and was therefore removed. + + file indicates that the text of the policy should really be + taken from a file. The string is then really a file + name. This is useful for policies that are large + (more than a few of lines) XML documents, for example. + +The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this: + + 0.policy=This is + 1.polisy= a multi- + 2.policy=line policy. + +NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part that determines the rights +granted to the process using the proxy certificate. The value is +completely dependent on the application reading and interpretting it! + +Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy +certificate, you can now easily create a proxy certificate like this: + + openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \ + -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key + openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 \ + -out proxy.crt -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key \ + -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy + +It's just as easy to create a proxy certificate using another proxy +certificate as issuer (note that I'm using a different configuration +section for it): + + openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \ + -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key + openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 \ + -out proxy2.crt -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key \ + -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2 + + +4. How to have your application interpret the policy? + +The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to prepare some default +rights, then do a check of the proxy certificate against the a chain +of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates, and see +what rights came out by the end. Sounds easy, huh? It almost is. + +The slightly complicated part is how to pass data between your +application and the certificate validation procedure. + +You need the following ingredients: + + - a callback routing that will be called for every certificate that's + validated. It will be called several times for each certificates, + so you must be attentive to when it's a good time to do the proxy + policy interpretation and check, as well as to fill in the defaults + when the EE certificate is checked. + + - a structure of data that's shared between your application code and + the callback. + + - a wrapper function that sets it all up. + + - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic + ex_data store that's attached to an X509 validation context. + +This is some cookbook code for you to fill in: + + /* In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit + array, one bit for each possible right. */ + typedef struct your_rights { + unsigned char rights[total_rights / 8]; + } YOUR_RIGHTS; + + /* The following procedure will create an index for the ex_data + store in the X509 validation context the first time it's called. + Subsequent calls will return the same index. */ + static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(void) + { + static volatile int idx = -1; + if (idx < 0) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + if (idx < 0) + { + idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, + "for verify callback", + NULL,NULL,NULL); + } + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + } + return idx; + } + + /* Callback to be given to the X509 validation procedure. */ + static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { + if (ok == 1) /* It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy + check within this secion. It's important to know + that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked + from top to bottom. You get the CA root first, + followed by the possible chain of intermediate + CAs, followed by the EE certificate, followed by + the possible proxy certificates. */ + { + X509 *xs = ctx->current_cert; + + if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) + { + YOUR_RIGHTS *rights = + (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, + get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx()); + PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = + X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL); + + switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage)) + { + case NID_Independent: + /* Do whatever you need to grant explicit rights to + this particular proxy certificate, usually by + pulling them from some database. If there are none + to be found, clear all rights (making this and any + subsequent proxy certificate void of any rights). + */ + memset(rights->rights, 0, sizeof(rights->rights)); + break; + case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll: + /* This is basically a NOP, we simply let the current + rights stand as they are. */ + break; + default: + /* This is usually the most complex section of code. + You really do whatever you want as long as you + follow RFC 3820. In the example we use here, the + simplest thing to do is to build another, temporary + bit array and fill it with the rights granted by + the current proxy certificate, then use it as a + mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and + voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit + array. */ + { + int i; + YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights; + memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights)); + + /* process_rights() is supposed to be a procedure + that takes a string and it's length, interprets + it and sets the bits in the YOUR_RIGHTS pointed + at by the third argument. */ + process_rights((char *) pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data, + pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length, + &tmp_rights); + + for(i = 0; i < total_rights / 8; i++) + rights->rights[i] &= tmp_rights.rights[i]; + } + break; + } + PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); + } + else if (!(xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) + { + /* We have a EE certificate, let's use it to set default! + */ + YOUR_RIGHTS *rights = + (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, + get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx()); + + /* The following procedure finds out what rights the owner + of the current certificate has, and sets them in the + YOUR_RIGHTS structure pointed at by the second + argument. */ + set_default_rights(xs, rights); + } + } + return ok; + } + + static int my_X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, + YOUR_RIGHTS *needed_rights) + { + int i; + int (*save_verify_cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) = ctx->verify_cb; + YOUR_RIGHTS rights; + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_callback); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(), &rights); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); + ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx); + + if (ok == 1) + { + ok = check_needed_rights(rights, needed_rights); + } + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, save_verify_cb); + + return ok; + } + +If you use SSL or TLS, you can easily set up a callback to have the +certificates checked properly, using the code above: + + SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, my_X509_verify_cert, &needed_rights); + + +-- +Richard Levitte |