diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 1523 |
1 files changed, 756 insertions, 767 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c index aa81045..b147fff 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in @@ -118,798 +118,787 @@ #ifndef RSA_NULL static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); -static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, + BN_CTX *ctx); static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); -static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ - "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", - RSA_eay_public_encrypt, - RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ - RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ - RSA_eay_private_decrypt, - RSA_eay_mod_exp, - BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */ - RSA_eay_init, - RSA_eay_finish, - 0, /* flags */ - NULL, - 0, /* rsa_sign */ - 0, /* rsa_verify */ - NULL /* rsa_keygen */ - }; +static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = { + "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", + RSA_eay_public_encrypt, + RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ + RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ + RSA_eay_private_decrypt, + RSA_eay_mod_exp, + BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery + * if e == 3 */ + RSA_eay_init, + RSA_eay_finish, + 0, /* flags */ + NULL, + 0, /* rsa_sign */ + 0, /* rsa_verify */ + NULL /* rsa_keygen */ +}; const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) - { - return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); - } +{ + return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); +} static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM *f,*ret; - int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; - unsigned char *buf=NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) - { - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - } - - if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (!f || !ret || !buf) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen); - break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0); - break; -#endif - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - - /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the - * length of the modulus */ - j=BN_num_bytes(ret); - i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j])); - for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) - to[k]=0; - - r=num; -err: - if (ctx != NULL) - { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return(r); - } + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + BIGNUM *f, *ret; + int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + } + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (!f || !ret || !buf) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); + break; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); + break; +# endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) + goto err; + + if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { + /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + + /* + * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the + * modulus + */ + j = BN_num_bytes(ret); + i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); + for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) + to[k] = 0; + + r = num; + err: + if (ctx != NULL) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } + if (buf != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); +} static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) { - BN_BLINDING *ret; - int got_write_lock = 0; - CRYPTO_THREADID cur; - - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - - if (rsa->blinding == NULL) - { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - got_write_lock = 1; - - if (rsa->blinding == NULL) - rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - } - - ret = rsa->blinding; - if (ret == NULL) - goto err; - - CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); - if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) - { - /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ - - *local = 1; - } - else - { - /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ - - *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() - * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses - * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be - * stored outside the BN_BLINDING - */ - - if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) - { - if (!got_write_lock) - { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - got_write_lock = 1; - } - - if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) - rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - } - ret = rsa->mt_blinding; - } + BN_BLINDING *ret; + int got_write_lock = 0; + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + + if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + got_write_lock = 1; + + if (rsa->blinding == NULL) + rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); + } + + ret = rsa->blinding; + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; + + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); + if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { + /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ + + *local = 1; + } else { + /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ + + /* + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the + * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and + * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING + */ + *local = 0; + + if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { + if (!got_write_lock) { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + got_write_lock = 1; + } + + if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) + rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); + } + ret = rsa->mt_blinding; + } err: - if (got_write_lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - else - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - return ret; + if (got_write_lock) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + else + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + return ret; } static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, - BN_CTX *ctx) - { - if (unblind == NULL) - /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor - * in BN_BLINDING. */ - return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); - else - { - /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor - * outside BN_BLINDING. */ - int ret; - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - return ret; - } - } + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + if (unblind == NULL) + /* + * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. + */ + return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); + else { + /* + * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. + */ + int ret; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); + ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); + return ret; + } +} static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, - BN_CTX *ctx) - { - /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex - * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. - * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: - * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, - * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. - * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock. - */ - return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); - } + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + /* + * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex + * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING + * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: + * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and + * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe + * to access the blinding without a lock. + */ + return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); +} /* signing */ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; - int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; - unsigned char *buf=NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; - /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store - * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ - BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; - BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; - - if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if(!f || !ret || !buf) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - case RSA_X931_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) - { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); - if (blinding == NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (blinding != NULL) - { - if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || - ((rsa->p != NULL) && - (rsa->q != NULL) && - (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && - (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && - (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) - { - if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - BIGNUM local_d; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - BN_init(&local_d); - d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - d= rsa->d; - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - } - - if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) - { - BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); - if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) - res = f; - else - res = ret; - } - else - res = ret; - - /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the - * length of the modulus */ - j=BN_num_bytes(res); - i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j])); - for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) - to[k]=0; - - r=num; -err: - if (ctx != NULL) - { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return(r); - } + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; + int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int local_blinding = 0; + /* + * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store + * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. + */ + BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; + BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (!f || !ret || !buf) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_X931_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) + goto err; + + if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { + /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { + blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); + if (blinding == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (blinding != NULL) { + if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || + ((rsa->p != NULL) && + (rsa->q != NULL) && + (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { + if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + BIGNUM local_d; + BIGNUM *d = NULL; + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + BN_init(&local_d); + d = &local_d; + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + d = rsa->d; + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + } + + if (blinding) + if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { + BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); + if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) + res = f; + else + res = ret; + } else + res = ret; + + /* + * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the + * modulus + */ + j = BN_num_bytes(res); + i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); + for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) + to[k] = 0; + + r = num; + err: + if (ctx != NULL) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } + if (buf != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); +} static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int j,num=0,r= -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf=NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; - /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store - * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ - BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; - BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; - - if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if(!f || !ret || !buf) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things - * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ - if (flen > num) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - /* make data into a big number */ - if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) - { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); - if (blinding == NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (blinding != NULL) - { - if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* do the decrypt */ - if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || - ((rsa->p != NULL) && - (rsa->q != NULL) && - (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && - (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && - (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) - { - if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - BIGNUM local_d; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - d = rsa->d; - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; - } - - if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - - p=buf; - j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); - break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); - break; -#endif - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - -err: - if (ctx != NULL) - { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return(r); - } + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + BIGNUM *f, *ret; + int j, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int local_blinding = 0; + /* + * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store + * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. + */ + BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; + BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (!f || !ret || !buf) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the + * top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + /* make data into a big number */ + if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { + blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); + if (blinding == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (blinding != NULL) { + if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + /* do the decrypt */ + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || + ((rsa->p != NULL) && + (rsa->q != NULL) && + (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { + if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + BIGNUM local_d; + BIGNUM *d = NULL; + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + d = &local_d; + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + d = rsa->d; + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + } + + if (blinding) + if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + + p = buf; + j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); + break; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); + break; +# endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); + break; + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + + err: + if (ctx != NULL) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } + if (buf != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); +} /* signature verification */ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM *f,*ret; - int i,num=0,r= -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf=NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) - { - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - } - - if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if(!f || !ret || !buf) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things - * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ - if (flen > num) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - - if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) - if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err; - - p=buf; - i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); - break; - case RSA_X931_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - -err: - if (ctx != NULL) - { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return(r); - } + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + BIGNUM *f, *ret; + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + } + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (!f || !ret || !buf) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the + * top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, + RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + + if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) + if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) + goto err; + + p = buf; + i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); + + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); + break; + case RSA_X931_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); + break; + default: + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + + err: + if (ctx != NULL) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } + if (buf != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); +} static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) - { - BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy; - BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1; - BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1; - int ret=0; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - - { - BIGNUM local_p, local_q; - BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; - - /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the - * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) - */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - BN_init(&local_p); - p = &local_p; - BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - BN_init(&local_q); - q = &local_q; - BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - { - p = rsa->p; - q = rsa->q; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) - { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) - goto err; - } - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - c = &local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - dmq1 = &local_dmq1; - BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; - - /* compute I mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - c = &local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - dmp1 = &local_dmp1; - BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; - - if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err; - /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does - * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; - - if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; - - /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - pr1 = &local_r1; - BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - pr1 = r1; - if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; - - /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of - * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still - * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following - * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. - * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because - * they ensure p > q [steve] - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; - if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err; - - if (rsa->e && rsa->n) - { - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation - * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of - * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check - * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ - if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; - if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) - if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; - if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) - { - /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak - * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) - * mod_exp and return that instead. */ - - BIGNUM local_d; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - d = rsa->d; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - } - } - ret=1; -err: - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - return(ret); - } +{ + BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; + BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; + BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; + int ret = 0; + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + + { + BIGNUM local_p, local_q; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; + + /* + * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) + */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + BN_init(&local_p); + p = &local_p; + BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + BN_init(&local_q); + q = &local_q; + BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else { + p = rsa->p; + q = rsa->q; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) + goto err; + } + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* compute I mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + c = &local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + dmq1 = &local_dmq1; + BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) + goto err; + + /* compute I mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + c = &local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + dmp1 = &local_dmp1; + BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) + goto err; + + if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) + goto err; + /* + * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the + * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size + */ + if (BN_is_negative(r0)) + if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) + goto err; + + if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + pr1 = &local_r1; + BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + pr1 = r1; + if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* + * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' + * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can + * break the private key operations: the following second correction + * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen + * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] + */ + if (BN_is_negative(r0)) + if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) + goto err; + if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) + goto err; + + if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + /* + * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will + * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the + * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for + * absolute equality, just congruency. + */ + if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) + goto err; + if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) + if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) + goto err; + if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { + /* + * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak + * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and + * return that instead. + */ + + BIGNUM local_d; + BIGNUM *d = NULL; + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { + d = &local_d; + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else + d = rsa->d; + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + } + } + ret = 1; + err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + return (ret); +} static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) - { - rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; - return(1); - } +{ + rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; + return (1); +} static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) - { - if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); - if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); - if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); - return(1); - } +{ + if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); + if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); + if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); + return (1); +} #endif |
