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-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c508
1 files changed, 249 insertions, 259 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
index fe3c6c8..f2ae1e5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* p5_crpt2.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 1999.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -59,286 +60,275 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HMAC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA)
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include "evp_locl.h"
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include "evp_locl.h"
/* set this to print out info about the keygen algorithm */
/* #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 */
-#ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
- static void h__dump (const unsigned char *p, int len);
-#endif
+# ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
+static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len);
+# endif
-/* This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
- * derivation function PBKDF2.
- * SHA1 version verified against test vectors posted by Peter Gutmann
- * <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> to the PKCS-TNG <pkcs-tng@rsa.com> mailing list.
+/*
+ * This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
+ * derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
+ * posted by Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> to the PKCS-TNG
+ * <pkcs-tng@rsa.com> mailing list.
*/
int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
- const EVP_MD *digest,
- int keylen, unsigned char *out)
- {
- unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
- int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
- unsigned long i = 1;
- HMAC_CTX hctx_tpl, hctx;
-
- mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
- if (mdlen < 0)
- return 0;
-
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx_tpl);
- p = out;
- tkeylen = keylen;
- if(!pass)
- passlen = 0;
- else if(passlen == -1)
- passlen = strlen(pass);
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
- {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
- return 0;
- }
- while(tkeylen)
- {
- if(tkeylen > mdlen)
- cplen = mdlen;
- else
- cplen = tkeylen;
- /* We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!)
- * but just in case...
- */
- itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
- itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
- itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
- itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
- if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl))
- {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen)
- || !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4)
- || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
- {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- return 0;
- }
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
- for(j = 1; j < iter; j++)
- {
- if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl))
- {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
- || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
- {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- return 0;
- }
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- for(k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
- p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
- }
- tkeylen-= cplen;
- i++;
- p+= cplen;
- }
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
- fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n");
- h__dump (pass, passlen);
- fprintf(stderr, "Salt:\n");
- h__dump (salt, saltlen);
- fprintf(stderr, "Iteration count %d\n", iter);
- fprintf(stderr, "Key:\n");
- h__dump (out, keylen);
-#endif
- return 1;
- }
+ const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+ const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
+ int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
+ unsigned long i = 1;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx_tpl, hctx;
+
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+ if (mdlen < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx_tpl);
+ p = out;
+ tkeylen = keylen;
+ if (!pass)
+ passlen = 0;
+ else if (passlen == -1)
+ passlen = strlen(pass);
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (tkeylen) {
+ if (tkeylen > mdlen)
+ cplen = mdlen;
+ else
+ cplen = tkeylen;
+ /*
+ * We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but
+ * just in case...
+ */
+ itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
+ itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
+ itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
+ itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
+ if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl)) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen)
+ || !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4)
+ || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL)) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
+ for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
+ if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl)) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
+ || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL)) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
+ p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
+ }
+ tkeylen -= cplen;
+ i++;
+ p += cplen;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+# ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
+ fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n");
+ h__dump(pass, passlen);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Salt:\n");
+ h__dump(salt, saltlen);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Iteration count %d\n", iter);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Key:\n");
+ h__dump(out, keylen);
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen,
- const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
- int keylen, unsigned char *out)
- {
- return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, EVP_sha1(),
- keylen, out);
- }
-
-#ifdef DO_TEST
+ const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+ int keylen, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, EVP_sha1(),
+ keylen, out);
+}
+
+# ifdef DO_TEST
main()
{
- unsigned char out[4];
- unsigned char salt[] = {0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78};
- PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1("password", -1, salt, 4, 5, 4, out);
- fprintf(stderr, "Out %02X %02X %02X %02X\n",
- out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3]);
+ unsigned char out[4];
+ unsigned char salt[] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78 };
+ PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1("password", -1, salt, 4, 5, 4, out);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Out %02X %02X %02X %02X\n",
+ out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3]);
}
-#endif
+# endif
-/* Now the key derivation function itself. This is a bit evil because
- * it has to check the ASN1 parameters are valid: and there are quite a
- * few of them...
+/*
+ * Now the key derivation function itself. This is a bit evil because it has
+ * to check the ASN1 parameters are valid: and there are quite a few of
+ * them...
*/
int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
- ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md,
- int en_de)
+ ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+ const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
{
- const unsigned char *pbuf;
- int plen;
- PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-
- int rv = 0;
-
- if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
- param->value.sequence == NULL) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pbuf = param->value.sequence->data;
- plen = param->value.sequence->length;
- if(!(pbe2 = d2i_PBE2PARAM(NULL, &pbuf, plen))) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* See if we recognise the key derivation function */
-
- if(OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->keyfunc->algorithm) != NID_id_pbkdf2) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
- EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* lets see if we recognise the encryption algorithm.
- */
-
- cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm);
-
- if(!cipher) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
- EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier */
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
- goto err;
- if(EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, pbe2->encryption->parameter) < 0) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
- EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- rv = PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(ctx, pass, passlen,
- pbe2->keyfunc->parameter, c, md, en_de);
- err:
- PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
- return rv;
+ const unsigned char *pbuf;
+ int plen;
+ PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
+ param->value.sequence == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pbuf = param->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = param->value.sequence->length;
+ if (!(pbe2 = d2i_PBE2PARAM(NULL, &pbuf, plen))) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* See if we recognise the key derivation function */
+
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->keyfunc->algorithm) != NID_id_pbkdf2) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
+ EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * lets see if we recognise the encryption algorithm.
+ */
+
+ cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm);
+
+ if (!cipher) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier */
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, pbe2->encryption->parameter) < 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rv = PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(ctx, pass, passlen,
+ pbe2->keyfunc->parameter, c, md, en_de);
+ err:
+ PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
+ return rv;
}
-int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
- ASN1_TYPE *param,
- const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
+int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
{
- unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- const unsigned char *pbuf;
- int saltlen, iter, plen;
- int rv = 0;
- unsigned int keylen = 0;
- int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid;
- PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *prfmd;
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL)
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN,EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
- goto err;
- }
- keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
- OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof key);
-
- /* Decode parameter */
-
- if(!param || (param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN,EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pbuf = param->value.sequence->data;
- plen = param->value.sequence->length;
-
- if(!(kdf = d2i_PBKDF2PARAM(NULL, &pbuf, plen)) ) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN,EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
-
- /* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
-
- if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)){
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN,
- EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (kdf->prf)
- prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm);
- else
- prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
-
- if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0))
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
- goto err;
- }
-
- prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid);
- if (prfmd == NULL)
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if(kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN,
- EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* it seems that its all OK */
- salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data;
- saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length;
- iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter);
- if(!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
- keylen, key))
- goto err;
- rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
- err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
- PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
- return rv;
+ unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ const unsigned char *pbuf;
+ int saltlen, iter, plen;
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned int keylen = 0;
+ int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid;
+ PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *prfmd;
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof key);
+
+ /* Decode parameter */
+
+ if (!param || (param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pbuf = param->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = param->value.sequence->length;
+
+ if (!(kdf = d2i_PBKDF2PARAM(NULL, &pbuf, plen))) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+
+ /* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
+
+ if (kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (kdf->prf)
+ prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm);
+ else
+ prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
+
+ if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid);
+ if (prfmd == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* it seems that its all OK */
+ salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data;
+ saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length;
+ iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter);
+ if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
+ keylen, key))
+ goto err;
+ rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
+ PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
+ return rv;
}
-#ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
-static void h__dump (const unsigned char *p, int len)
+# ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
+static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len)
{
- for (; len --; p++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", *p);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ for (; len--; p++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", *p);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
-#endif
+# endif
#endif
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