diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c | 105 |
1 files changed, 104 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c index a512589..97caffc 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c @@ -117,12 +117,17 @@ #undef NON_MAIN #undef USE_SOCKETS #include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> #include <openssl/ssl.h> #include "s_apps.h" +#define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH 16 + int verify_depth=0; int verify_error=X509_V_OK; +unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH]; +int cookie_initialized=0; int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { @@ -338,6 +343,12 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void * break; default: str_version = "???"; + case DTLS1_VERSION: + str_version = "DTLS 1.0 "; + break; + case DTLS1_BAD_VER: + str_version = "DTLS 1.0 (bad) "; + break; } if (version == SSL2_VERSION) @@ -401,7 +412,10 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void * } } - if (version == SSL3_VERSION || version == TLS1_VERSION) + if (version == SSL3_VERSION || + version == TLS1_VERSION || + version == DTLS1_VERSION || + version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { switch (content_type) { @@ -540,6 +554,9 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void * case 15: str_details1 = ", CertificateVerify"; break; + case 3: + str_details1 = ", HelloVerifyRequest"; + break; case 16: str_details1 = ", ClientKeyExchange"; break; @@ -621,6 +638,9 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, extname = "server ticket"; break; + case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate: + extname = "renegotiate"; + break; default: extname = "unknown"; @@ -634,3 +654,86 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, BIO_dump(bio, (char *)data, len); (void)BIO_flush(bio); } + +int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len) + { + unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int length, resultlength; + struct sockaddr_in peer; + + /* Initialize a random secret */ + if (!cookie_initialized) + { + if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH)) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting random cookie secret\n"); + return 0; + } + cookie_initialized = 1; + } + + /* Read peer information */ + (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer); + + /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */ + length = sizeof(peer.sin_addr); + length += sizeof(peer.sin_port); + buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length); + + if (buffer == NULL) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n"); + return 0; + } + + memcpy(buffer, &peer.sin_addr, sizeof(peer.sin_addr)); + memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.sin_addr), &peer.sin_port, sizeof(peer.sin_port)); + + /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */ + HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH, + buffer, length, result, &resultlength); + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + + memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength); + *cookie_len = resultlength; + + return 1; + } + +int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len) + { + unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int length, resultlength; + struct sockaddr_in peer; + + /* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */ + if (!cookie_initialized) + return 0; + + /* Read peer information */ + (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer); + + /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */ + length = sizeof(peer.sin_addr); + length += sizeof(peer.sin_port); + buffer = (unsigned char*) OPENSSL_malloc(length); + + if (buffer == NULL) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n"); + return 0; + } + + memcpy(buffer, &peer.sin_addr, sizeof(peer.sin_addr)); + memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.sin_addr), &peer.sin_port, sizeof(peer.sin_port)); + + /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */ + HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH, + buffer, length, result, &resultlength); + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + + if (cookie_len == resultlength && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0) + return 1; + + return 0; + } |