317 files changed, 105057 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/CREDITS b/crypto/openssh/CREDITS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eaf105a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/CREDITS
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - Creator of SSH
+
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH
+
+Ahsan Rashid <arms@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
+Alain St-Denis <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca> - Irix fix
+Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br> - AIX fixes
+Andre Lucas <andre@ae-35.com> - new login code, many fixes
+Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> - Shadow password expiry support
+Andrew McGill <andrewm@datrix.co.za> - SCO fixes
+Andrew Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com> - PAM bugfixes
+Andrew Stribblehill <a.d.stribblehill@durham.ac.uk> - Bugfixes
+Andy Sloane <andy@guildsoftware.com> - bugfixes
+Aran Cox <acox@cv.telegroup.com> - SCO bugfixes
+Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl> - IPv6 compat fixes
+Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> - NeXT support
+Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net> - Solaris debugging and fixes
+Bratislav ILICH <bilic@zepter.ru> - Configure fix
+Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca> - SunOS 4 & bug fixes
+Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com> - Assorted patches
+Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> - OSF SIA support
+Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com> - SuSE packaging
+Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com> - Password auth fixes
+Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com> - Autoconf fixes
+Chun-Chung Chen <cjj@u.washington.edu> - RPM fixes
+Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - Cygwin support
+Chad Mynhier <mynhier@interstel.net> - Solaris Process Contract support
+Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> - Autoconf support, build fixes
+Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org> - AIX patches
+Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> - AIX BFF package scripts
+David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com> - Build fixes
+David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
+David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
+David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
+Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
+Dhiraj Gulati <dgulati@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
+Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
+Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes
+Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com> - SCO support
+Ged Lodder <lodder@yacc.com.au> - HPUX fixes and enhancements
+Gert Doering <gd@hilb1.medat.de> - bug and portability fixes
+HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org> - Translations & doc fixes
+Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@ecei.tohoku.ac.jp> - IPv6 and bug fixes
+Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
+Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE> - KRB4/AFS config patch
+IWAMURO Motonori <iwa@mmp.fujitsu.co.jp> - bugfixes
+Jani Hakala <jahakala@cc.jyu.fi> - Patches
+Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@hytti.uku.fi> - Bugfixes
+Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> - Many patches
+Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH
+Juergen Keil <jk@tools.de> - scp bugfixing
+KAMAHARA Junzo <kamahara@cc.kshosen.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
+Kees Cook <cook@cpoint.net> - scp fixes
+Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org> - Configure fixes
+Kevin Cawlfield <cawlfiel@us.ibm.com> - AIX fixes.
+Kevin O'Connor <kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com> - RSAless operation
+Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com> - HP support, bugfixes, improvements
+Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp> - Bugfixes
+Larry Jones <larry.jones@sdrc.com> - Bugfixes
+Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> - Bugfixes
+Marc G. Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca> - Solaris patches
+Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> - bug fixes
+Martin Johansson <fatbob@acc.umu.se> - Linux fixes
+Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net> - Features, bug fixes
+Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net> - Bugfixes
+Matt Richards <v2matt@btv.ibm.com> - AIX patches
+Michael Steffens <michael_steffens at hp.com> - HP-UX fixes
+Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu> - Irix enhancements
+Nakaji Hiroyuki <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp> - Sony News-OS patch
+Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin.dahyabhai@pobox.com> - PAM environment patch
+Nate Itkin <nitkin@europa.com> - SunOS 4.1.x fixes
+Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk> - Assorted patches
+Pavel Kankovsky <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz> - Security fixes
+Pavel Troller <patrol@omni.sinus.cz> - Bugfixes
+Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - Bugfixes
+Peter Kocks <peter.kocks@baygate.com> - Makefile fixes
+Peter Stuge <stuge@cdy.org> - mdoc2man.awk script
+Phil Hands <phil@hands.com> - Debian scripts, assorted patches
+Phil Karn <karn@ka9q.ampr.org> - Autoconf fixes
+Philippe WILLEM <Philippe.WILLEM@urssaf.fr> - Bugfixes
+Phill Camp <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk> - login code fix
+Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com> - Solaris package support, fixes
+Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem at siemens.com> - Reliant Unix fixes
+Roumen Petrov <openssh@roumenpetrov.info> - Compile & configure fixes
+SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp> - Multiple bugfixes
+Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk> - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV
+Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> - many patches and technical assistance
+Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com> - Bugfixes
+Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de> - Shadow passwords
+Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> - Portability & SCO fixes
+Tobias Oetiker <oetiker@ee.ethz.ch> - Bugfixes
+Tom Bertelson's <tbert@abac.com> - AIX auth fixes
+Tor-Ake Fransson <torake@hotmail.com> - AIX support
+Tudor Bosman <tudorb@jm.nu> - MD5 password support
+Udo Schweigert <ust@cert.siemens.de> - ReliantUNIX support
+Wendy Palm <wendyp at cray.com> - Cray support.
+Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org> - GNOME askpass enhancement
+
+Apologies to anyone I have missed.
+
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+
+$Id: CREDITS,v 1.81 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2df660
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
@@ -0,0 +1,1648 @@
+20090926
+ - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+         [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update for release
+ - (djm) [README] update relnotes URL
+ - (djm) [packet.c] Restore EWOULDBLOCK handling that got lost somewhere
+ - (djm) Release 5.3p1
+
+20090911
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Change the -lresolv check so it works on Mac OS X
+   10.6 (which doesn't have BIND8_COMPAT and thus uses res_9_query).  Patch
+   from jbasney at ncsa uiuc edu.
+
+20090908
+ - (djm) [serverloop.c] Fix test for server-assigned remote forwarding port
+   (-R 0:...); bz#1578, spotted and fix by gavin AT emf.net; ok dtucker@
+
+20090901
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1639: use AC_PATH_PROG to search the path for
+   krb5-config if it's not in the location specified by --with-kerberos5.
+   Patch from jchadima at redhat.
+
+20090829
+ - (dtucker) [README.platform] Add text about development packages, based on
+   text from Chris Pepper in bug #1631.
+
+20090828
+ - dtucker [auth-sia.c] Roll back the change for bug #1241 as it apparently
+   causes problems in some Tru64 configurations.
+ - (djm) [sshd_config.5] downgrade mention of login.conf to be an example
+   and mention PAM as another provider for ChallengeResponseAuthentication;
+   bz#1408; ok dtucker@
+ - (djm) [sftp-server.c] bz#1535: accept ENOSYS as a fallback error when
+   attempting atomic rename(); ok dtucker@
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in] bz#1505: Solaris make(1) doesn't accept make variables
+   in argv, so pass them in the environment; ok dtucker@
+ - (dtucker) [channels.c configure.ac] Bug #1528: skip the tcgetattr call on
+    the pty master on Solaris, since it never succeeds and can hang if large
+    amounts of data is sent to the slave (eg a copy-paste).  Based on a patch
+    originally from Doke Scott, ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [clientloop.c configure.ac defines.h] Make the client's IO buffer
+   size a compile-time option and set it to 64k on Cygwin, since Corinna
+   reports that it makes a significant difference to performance.  ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Fix the syntax of the Solaris tcgetattr entry.
+
+20090820
+ - (dtucker) [includes.h] Bug #1634: do not include system glob.h if we're not
+   using it since the type conflicts can cause problems on FreeBSD.  Patch
+   from Jonathan Chen.
+ - (dtucker) [session.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.h] Bugs #1249 and #1567: move
+   the setpcred call on AIX to immediately before the permanently_set_uid().
+   Ensures that we still have privileges when we call chroot and
+   pam_open_sesson.  Based on a patch from David Leonard.
+
+20090817
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Check for headers before libraries for openssl an
+   zlib, which should make the errors slightly more meaningful on platforms
+   where there's separate "-devel" packages for those.
+ - (dtucker) [sshlogin.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.{c,h}] Bug #1595: make
+   PrintLastLog work on AIX.  Based in part on a patch from Miguel Sanders.
+
+20090729
+ - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config] Change script to call correct error
+   function. Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+
+20090713
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c] Reduce answer buffer size so it
+   fits into 16 bits to work around a bug in glibc's resolver where it masks
+   off the buffer size at 16 bits.  Patch from Hauke Lampe, ok djm jakob.
+
+20090712
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Include sys/param.h for the sys/mount.h test,
+   prevents configure complaining on older BSDs.
+ - (dtucker [contrib/cygwin/ssh-{host,user}-config] Add license text. Patch
+   from Corinna Vinschen.
+ - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] Bug #1534: move the deletion of PAM credentials on
+   logout to after the session close.  Patch from Anicka Bernathova,
+   originally from Andreas Schwab via Novelll ok djm.
+
+20090707
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] better support for automated
+   scripts and fix usage of eval.  Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+
+20090705
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/27 09:29:06
+     [packet.h packet.c]
+     packet_bacup_state() and packet_restore_state() will be used to
+     temporarily save the current state ren resuming a suspended connection.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/27 09:32:43
+     [roaming_common.c roaming.h]
+     It may be necessary to retransmit some data when resuming, so add it
+     to a buffer when roaming is enabled.
+     Most of this code was written by Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/27 09:35:06
+     [readconf.h readconf.c]
+     Add client option UseRoaming. It doesn't do anything yet but will
+     control whether the client tries to use roaming if enabled on the
+     server. From Martin Forssen.
+     ok markus@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/30 14:54:40
+     [version.h]
+     crank version; ok deraadt
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/07/02 02:11:47
+     [ssh.c]
+     allow for long home dir paths (bz #1615).  ok deraadt
+     (based in part on a patch from jchadima at redhat)
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/07/05 19:28:33
+     [clientloop.c]
+     only send SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT if we're in compat20; from dtucker@
+     ok deraadt@ markus@
+
+20090622
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/22 05:39:28
+     [monitor_wrap.c monitor_mm.c ssh-keygen.c auth2.c gss-genr.c sftp-client.c]
+     alphabetize includes; reduces diff vs portable and style(9).
+     ok stevesk djm
+     (Id sync only; these were already in order in -portable)
+
+20090621
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/17 21:37:00
+     [ssh.c]
+     pass correct argv[0] to openlog(); ok djm@
+  - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/19 15:15:09
+     [ssh.1]
+     for "Ciphers", just point the reader to the keyword in ssh_config(5), just
+     as we do for "MACs": this stops us getting out of sync when the lists
+     change;
+     fixes documentation/6102, submitted by Peter J. Philipp
+     alternative fix proposed by djm
+     ok markus
+   - tobias@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/23 08:31:19
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     Fixed a possible out-of-bounds memory access if the environment variable
+     SHELL is shorter than 3 characters.
+     with input by and ok dtucker
+   - tobias@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/23 19:38:04
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     My previous commit didn't fix the problem at all, so stick at my first
+     version of the fix presented to dtucker.
+     Issue notified by Matthias Barkhoff (matthias dot barkhoff at gmx dot de).
+     ok dtucker
+   - sobrado@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/26 08:38:39
+     [sftp-server.8 sshd.8 ssh-agent.1]
+     fix a few typographical errors found by spell(1).
+     ok dtucker@, jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/13 19:07:44
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     fix possessive; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/14 16:33:42
+     [sftp-server.c]
+     remove unused option character from getopt() optstring; ok markus@
+   - jj@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/14 21:10:54
+     [servconf.c]
+     Fixed a few the-the misspellings in comments. Skipped a bunch in
+     binutils,gcc and so on. ok jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/17 19:23:06
+     [session.c]
+     use INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME for setproctitle() of in-process sftp-server;
+     ok djm@ markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/17 19:40:17
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     clarify that even internal-sftp needs /dev/log for logging to work; ok
+     markus@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/18 18:39:10
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     tweak previous; ok stevesk
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/21 15:13:17
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     clarify we cd to user's home after chroot; ok markus@ on
+     earlier version; tweaks and ok jmc@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/25 06:48:01
+     [channels.c packet.c clientloop.c packet.h serverloop.c monitor_wrap.c
+     monitor.c]
+     Put the globals in packet.c into a struct and don't access it directly
+     from other files. No functional changes.
+     ok markus@ djm@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:31:25
+     [canohost.h canohost.c]
+     Add clear_cached_addr(), needed for upcoming changes allowing the peer
+     address to change.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:33:39
+     [clientloop.c]
+     Send SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT when the client disconnects. From a larger
+     change from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:34:36
+     [kex.c kex.h]
+     Move the KEX_COOKIE_LEN define to kex.h
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:36:07
+     [packet.h packet.c]
+     Add packet_put_int64() and packet_get_int64(), part of a larger change
+     from Martin Forssen.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:38:16
+     [sshconnect.h sshconnect.c]
+     Un-static ssh_exchange_identification(), part of a larger change from
+     Martin Forssen and needed for upcoming changes.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/28 16:50:16
+     [sshd.c packet.c serverloop.c monitor_wrap.c clientloop.c sshconnect.c
+     monitor.c Added roaming.h roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c]
+     Keep track of number of bytes read and written. Needed for upcoming
+     changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
+     ok markus@
+     Also, applied appropriate changes to Makefile.in
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/12 20:43:22
+     [monitor.c packet.c]
+     Fix warnings found by chl@ and djm@ and change roaming_atomicio's
+     return type to match atomicio's
+     Diff from djm@, ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/12 20:58:32
+     [packet.c]
+     Move some more statics into session_state
+     ok markus@ djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/21 07:37:15
+     [kexdhs.c kexgexs.c]
+     abort if key_sign fails, preventing possible null deref.  Based on report
+     from Paolo Ganci, ok markus@ djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/21 09:04:03
+     [roaming.h roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c]
+     Add  tags for the benefit of the sync scripts
+     Also: pull in the changes for 1.1->1.2 missed in the previous sync.
+ - (dtucker) [auth2-jpake.c auth2.c canohost.h session.c] Whitespace and
+   header-order changes to reduce diff vs OpenBSD.
+ - (dtucker) [servconf.c sshd.c] More whitespace sync.
+ - (dtucker) [roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c] Wrap #include <inttypes.h> in
+   ifdef.
+
+20090616
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Bug #1607: handle the case where fsid_t
+   is a struct with a __val member.  Fixes build on, eg, Redhat 6.2.
+
+20090504
+ - (dtucker) [sshlogin.c] Move the NO_SSH_LASTLOG #ifndef line to include
+   variable declarations.  Should prevent unused warnings anywhere it's set
+   (only Crays as far as I can tell) and be a no-op everywhere else.
+
+20090318
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Remove setting IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN for Cygwin. The problem
+   that setsockopt(IP_TOS) doesn't work on Cygwin has been fixed since 2005.
+   Based on patch from vinschen at redhat com.
+
+20090308
+ - (dtucker) [auth-passwd.c auth1.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c
+   auth2-pubkey.c session.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.{c,h}
+   openbsd-compat/daemon.c] Remove support for Windows 95/98/ME and very old
+   version of Cygwin.  Patch from vinschen at redhat com.
+
+20090307
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/aix/buildbff.sh] Only try to rename ssh_prng_cmds if it
+   exists (it's not created if OpenSSL's PRNG is self-seeded, eg if the OS
+   has a /dev/random).
+ - (dtucker) [schnorr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] Add
+   EVP_DigestUpdate to the OLD_EVP compatibility functions and tell schnorr.c
+   to use them.  Allows building with older OpenSSL versions.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Check for in_port_t and typedef if needed.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Missing comma in type list.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}]
+   EVP_DigestUpdate does not exactly match the other OLD_EVP functions (eg
+   in openssl 0.9.6) so add an explicit test for it.
+
+20090306
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/05 07:18:19
+     [auth2-jpake.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h schnorr.c]
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     refactor the (disabled) Schnorr proof code to make it a little more
+     generally useful
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/05 11:30:50
+     [uuencode.c]
+     document what these functions do so I don't ever have to recuse into
+     b64_pton/ntop to remember their return values
+
+20090223
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/22 23:50:57
+     [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+     don't advertise experimental options
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/22 23:59:25
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     missing period
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/23 00:06:15
+     [version.h]
+     openssh-5.2
+ - (djm) [README] update for 5.2
+ - (djm) Release openssh-5.2p1
+
+20090222
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - tobias@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/21 19:32:04
+     [misc.c sftp-server-main.c ssh-keygen.c]
+     Added missing newlines in error messages.
+     ok dtucker
+
+20090221
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/17 01:28:32
+     [ssh_config]
+     sync with revised default ciphers; pointed out by dkrause@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/18 04:31:21
+     [schnorr.c]
+     signature should hash over the entire group, not just the generator
+     (this is still disabled code)
+ - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+   [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Prepare for 5.2p1
+
+20090216
+ - (djm) [regress/conch-ciphers.sh regress/putty-ciphers.sh]
+   [regress/putty-kex.sh regress/putty-transfer.sh] Downgrade disabled
+   interop tests from FATAL error to a warning. Allows some interop
+   tests to proceed if others are missing necessary prerequisites.
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] support GNU/kFreeBSD and GNU/kOpensolaris
+   systems; patch from Aurelien Jarno via rmh AT aybabtu.com
+
+20090214
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/02 11:15:14
+     [sftp.c]
+     Initialize a few variables to prevent spurious "may be used
+     uninitialized" warnings from newer gcc's.  ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/12 03:00:56
+     [canohost.c canohost.h channels.c channels.h clientloop.c readconf.c]
+     [readconf.h serverloop.c ssh.c]
+     support remote port forwarding with a zero listen port (-R0:...) to
+     dyamically allocate a listen port at runtime (this is actually
+     specified in rfc4254); bz#1003 ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/12 03:16:01
+     [serverloop.c]
+     tighten check for -R0:... forwarding: only allow dynamic allocation
+     if want_reply is set in the packet
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/12 03:26:22
+     [monitor.c]
+     some paranoia: check that the serialised key is really KEY_RSA before
+     diddling its internals
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/12 03:42:09
+     [ssh.1]
+     document -R0:... usage
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/12 03:44:25
+     [ssh.1]
+     consistency: Dq => Ql
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/12 03:46:17
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     document RemoteForward usage with 0 listen port
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/12 07:34:20
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     kill trailing whitespace;
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/13 11:50:21
+     [packet.c]
+     check for enc !=NULL in packet_start_discard
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/14 06:35:49
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     mention that eow and no-more-sessions extensions are sent only to
+     OpenSSH peers
+
+20090212
+ - (djm) [sshpty.c] bz#1419: OSX uses cloning ptys that automagically
+   set ownership and modes, so avoid explicitly setting them
+ - (djm) [configure.ac loginrec.c] bz#1421: fix lastlog support for OSX.
+   OSX provides a getlastlogxbyname function that automates the reading of
+   a lastlog file. Also, the pututxline function will update lastlog so
+   there is no need for loginrec.c to do it explicitly. Collapse some
+   overly verbose code while I'm in there.
+
+20090201
+ - (dtucker) [defines.h sshconnect.c] INET6_ADDRSTRLEN is now needed in
+   channels.c too, so move the definition for non-IP6 platforms to defines.h
+   where it can be shared.
+
+20090129
+ - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+   If the CYGWIN environment variable is empty, the installer script
+   should not install the service with an empty CYGWIN variable, but
+   rather without setting CYGWNI entirely.
+ - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Whitespace cleanup. No code changes.
+
+20090128
+ - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+   Changes to work on Cygwin 1.5.x as well as on the new Cygwin 1.7.x.
+   The information given for the setting of the CYGWIN environment variable
+   is wrong for both releases so I just removed it, together with the
+   unnecessary (Cygwin 1.5.x) or wrong (Cygwin 1.7.x) default setting.
+
+20081228
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/09 03:20:42
+     [channels.c servconf.c]
+     channel_print_adm_permitted_opens() should deal with all the printing
+     for that config option.  suggested by markus@; ok markus@ djm@
+     dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/09 04:32:22
+     [auth2-chall.c]
+     replace by-hand string building with xasprinf(); ok deraadt@
+   - sobrado@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/09 15:35:00
+     [sftp.1 sftp.c]
+     update for the synopses displayed by the 'help' command, there are a
+     few missing flags; add 'bye' to the output of 'help'; sorting and spacing.
+     jmc@ suggested replacing .Oo/.Oc with a single .Op macro.
+     ok jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/09 22:37:33
+     [clientloop.c]
+     fix typo in error message
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/10 03:55:20
+     [addrmatch.c]
+     o cannot be NULL here but use xfree() to be consistent; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/29 01:12:36
+     [ssh-keyscan.1]
+     fix example, default key type is rsa for 3+ years; from
+     frederic.perrin@resel.fr
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/29 02:23:26
+     [pathnames.h]
+     no need to escape single quotes in comments
+   - okan@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/30 00:46:56
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     add AllowAgentForwarding to available Match keywords list
+     ok djm
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/01 21:14:35
+     [channels.c]
+     call channel destroy callbacks on receipt of open failure messages.
+     fixes client hangs when connecting to a server that has MaxSessions=0
+     set spotted by imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/01 21:17:36
+     [kexgexs.c]
+     fix hash calculation for KEXGEX: hash over the original client-supplied
+     values and not the sanity checked versions that we acutally use;
+     bz#1540 reported by john.smith AT arrows.demon.co.uk
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/14 01:38:06
+     [channels.c]
+     support SOCKS4A protocol, from dwmw2 AT infradead.org via bz#1482;
+     "looks ok" markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/15 17:38:43
+     [readconf.c]
+     1) use obsolete instead of alias for consistency
+     2) oUserKnownHostsFile not obsolete but oGlobalKnownHostsFile2 is
+        so move the comment.
+     3) reorder so like options are together
+     ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/22 09:46:01
+     [channels.c channels.h session.c]
+     make Channel->path an allocated string, saving a few bytes here and
+     there and fixing bz#1380 in the process; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/22 09:49:57
+     [channels.c]
+     oops! I committed the wrong version of the Channel->path diff,
+     it was missing some tweaks suggested by stevesk@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/22 10:02:34
+     [clientloop.c misc.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h]
+     [serverloop.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshd.c]
+     make a2port() return -1 when it encounters an invalid port number
+     rather than 0, which it will now treat as valid (needed for future work)
+     adjust current consumers of a2port() to check its return value is <= 0,
+     which in turn required some things to be converted from u_short => int
+     make use of int vs. u_short consistent in some other places too
+     feedback & ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/22 10:09:16
+     [auth-options.c]
+     another chunk of a2port() diff that got away. wtfdjm??
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/23 07:58:11
+     [myproposal.h]
+     prefer CTR modes and revised arcfour (i.e w/ discard) modes to CBC
+     modes; ok markus@
+   - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/24 17:10:22
+     [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+     sync list of preferred ciphers; ok djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/01/26 09:58:15
+     [cipher.c cipher.h packet.c]
+     Work around the CPNI-957037 Plaintext Recovery Attack by always
+     reading 256K of data on packet size or HMAC errors (in CBC mode only).
+     Help, feedback and ok djm@
+     Feedback from Martin Albrecht and Paterson Kenny
+
+20090107
+ - (djm) [uidswap.c] bz#1412: Support >16 supplemental groups in OS X.
+   Patch based on one from vgiffin AT apple.com; ok dtucker@
+ - (djm) [channels.c] bz#1419: support "on demand" X11 forwarding via
+   launchd on OS X; patch from vgiffin AT apple.com, slightly tweaked;
+   ok dtucker@
+ - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 contrib/ssh-copy-id] bz#1492: Make
+   ssh-copy-id copy id_rsa.pub by default (instead of the legacy "identity"
+   key). Patch from cjwatson AT debian.org
+
+20090107
+ - (tim) [configure.ac defines.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
+   openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c] Add SECUREWARE support to OpenServer 6 SVR5 ABI.
+   OK djm@ dtucker@
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Move check_for_libcrypt_later=1 in *-*-sysv5*) section.
+   OpenServer 6 doesn't need libcrypt.
+
+20081209
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/09 02:38:18
+     [clientloop.c]
+     The ~C escape handler does not work correctly for multiplexed sessions -
+     it opens a commandline on the master session, instead of on the slave
+     that requested it. Disable it on slave sessions until such time as it
+     is fixed; bz#1543 report from Adrian Bridgett via Colin Watson
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/09 02:39:59
+     [sftp.c]
+     Deal correctly with failures in remote stat() operation in sftp,
+     correcting fail-on-error behaviour in batchmode. bz#1541 report and
+     fix from anedvedicky AT gmail.com; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/09 02:58:16
+     [readconf.c]
+     don't leave junk (free'd) pointers around in Forward *fwd argument on
+     failure; avoids double-free in ~C -L handler when given an invalid
+     forwarding specification; bz#1539 report from adejong AT debian.org
+     via Colin Watson; ok markus@ dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/09 03:02:37
+     [sftp.1 sftp.c]
+     correct sftp(1) and corresponding usage syntax;
+     bz#1518 patch from imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; ok deraadt@ improved diff jmc@
+
+20081208
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] bz#1538: better test for ProPolice/SSP: actually
+   use some stack in main().
+   Report and suggested fix from vapier AT gentoo.org
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/02 19:01:07
+     [clientloop.c]
+     we have to use the recipient's channel number (RFC 4254) for
+     SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS/SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE messages,
+     otherwise we trigger 'Non-public channel' error messages on sshd
+     systems with clientkeepalive enabled; noticed by sturm; ok djm;
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/02 19:08:59
+     [serverloop.c]
+     backout 1.149, since it's not necessary and openssh clients send
+     broken CHANNEL_FAILURE/SUCCESS messages since about 2004; ok djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/12/02 19:09:38
+     [channels.c]
+     s/remote_id/id/ to be more consistent with other code; ok djm@
+
+20081201
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/{Makefile,ssh-host-config}]  Add new doc files
+   and tweak the is-sshd-running check in ssh-host-config.  Patch from
+   vinschen at redhat com.
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/21 15:47:38
+     [packet.c]
+     packet_disconnect() on padding error, too.  should reduce the success
+     probability for the CPNI-957037 Plaintext Recovery Attack to 2^-18
+     ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/30 11:59:26
+     [monitor_fdpass.c]
+     Retry sendmsg/recvmsg on EAGAIN and EINTR; ok djm@
+
+20081123
+ - (dtucker) [monitor_fdpass.c] Reduce diff vs OpenBSD by moving some
+    declarations, removing an unnecessary union member and adding whitespace.
+    cmsgbuf.tmp thing spotted by des at des no, ok djm some time ago.
+
+20081118
+ - (tim) [addrmatch.c configure.ac] Some platforms do not have sin6_scope_id
+   member of sockaddr_in6. Also reported in Bug 1491 by David Leonard. OK and
+   feedback by djm@
+
+20081111
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/05 11:22:54
+     [servconf.c]
+     passord -> password;
+     fixes user/5975 from Rene Maroufi
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/07 00:42:12
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     spelling/typo in comment
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/07 18:50:18
+     [nchan.c]
+     add space to some log/debug messages for readability; ok djm@ markus@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/07 23:34:48
+     [auth2-jpake.c]
+     Move JPAKE define to make life easier for portable.  ok djm@
+   - tobias@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/09 12:34:47
+     [session.c ssh.1]
+     typo fixed (overriden -> overridden)
+     ok espie, jmc
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/11 02:58:09
+     [servconf.c]
+     USE_AFS not referenced so remove #ifdef.  fixes sshd -T not printing
+     kerberosgetafstoken. ok dtucker@
+     (Id sync only, we still want the ifdef in portable)
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/11 03:55:11
+     [channels.c]
+     for sshd -T print 'permitopen any' vs. 'permitopen' for case of no
+     permitopen's; ok and input dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/10 02:06:35
+     [regress/putty-ciphers.sh]
+     PuTTY supports AES CTR modes, so interop test against them too
+
+20081105
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/03 08:59:41
+     [servconf.c]
+     include MaxSessions in sshd -T output; patch from imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/04 07:58:09
+     [auth.c]
+     need unistd.h for close() prototype
+     (ID sync only)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/04 08:22:13
+     [auth.h auth2.c monitor.c monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h]
+     [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h ssh_config.5]
+     [sshconnect2.c sshd_config.5 jpake.c jpake.h schnorr.c auth2-jpake.c]
+     [Makefile.in]
+     Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication
+     method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
+     "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
+     Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.
+     
+     This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
+     the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
+     cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
+     revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.
+     
+     This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
+     compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).
+     
+     "just commit it.  It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/04 19:18:00
+     [readconf.c]
+     because parse_forward() is now used to parse all forward types (DLR),
+     and it malloc's space for host variables, we don't need to malloc
+     here.  fixes small memory leaks.
+     
+     previously dynamic forwards were not parsed in parse_forward() and
+     space was not malloc'd in that case.
+     
+     ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/05 03:23:09
+     [clientloop.c ssh.1]
+     add dynamic forward escape command line; ok djm@
+
+20081103
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/24 23:55:30
+     [ssh-keygen.1]
+     Add "ssh-keygen -F -l" to synopsis (displays fingerprint from
+     known_hosts).  ok djm@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/25 06:56:35
+     [ssh_config]
+     Add VisualHostKey to example file, ok djm@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/25 07:05:16
+     [key.c]
+     In random art visualization, make sure to use the end marker only at the
+     end.  Initial diff by Dirk Loss, tweaks and ok djm@
+  - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/31 14:48:28
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     don't allocate space for empty banners; report t8m at centrum.cz;
+     ok deraadt
+   - krw@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/08/02 04:29:51
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     whitepsace -> whitespace. From Matthew Clarke via bugs@.
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/08/21 04:09:57
+     [session.c]
+     allow ForceCommand internal-sftp with arguments. based on patch from
+     michael.barabanov AT gmail.com; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/09/06 12:24:13
+     [kex.c]
+     OpenSSL 0.9.8h supplies a real EVP_sha256 so we do not need our
+     replacement anymore
+     (ID sync only for portable - we still need this)
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/09/11 14:22:37
+     [compat.c compat.h nchan.c ssh.c]
+     only send eow and no-more-sessions requests to openssh 5 and newer;
+     fixes interop problems with broken ssh v2 implementations; ok djm@
+   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/02 14:39:35
+     [session.c]
+     Convert an unchecked strdup to xstrdup.  OK deraadt@
+  - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/03 13:08:12
+     [sshd.8]
+     do not give an example of how to chmod files: we can presume the user
+     knows that. removes an ambiguity in the permission of authorized_keys;
+     ok deraadt
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/03 23:56:28
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     Repair strnvis() buffersize of 4*n+1, with termination gauranteed by the
+     function.
+     spotted by des@freebsd, who commited an incorrect fix to the freebsd tree
+     and (as is fairly typical) did not report the problem to us.  But this fix
+     is correct.
+     ok djm
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/08 23:34:03
+     [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+     Add -y option to force logging via syslog rather than stderr.
+     Useful for daemonised ssh connection (ssh -f). Patch originally from
+     and ok'd by markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/09 03:50:54
+     [servconf.c sshd_config.5]
+     support setting PermitEmptyPasswords in a Match block
+     requested in PR3891; ok dtucker@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/09 06:54:22
+     [ssh.c]
+     add -y to usage();
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/10 04:55:16
+     [scp.c]
+     spelling in comment; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/10 05:00:12
+     [key.c]
+     typo in error message; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/10 16:43:27
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     use 'Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
+     the remote machine.' for RemoteForward just like ssh.1 -R.
+     ok djm@ jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/14 18:11:33
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     use #define ROQUIET here; no binary change. ok dtucker@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/17 18:36:24
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     correct and clarify VisualHostKey; ok jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/30 19:31:16
+     [clientloop.c sshd.c]
+     don't need to #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/31 15:05:34
+     [dispatch.c]
+     remove unused #define DISPATCH_MIN; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/01 04:50:08
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     sprinkle ARGSUSED on dispatch handlers
+     nuke stale unusued prototype
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/01 06:43:33
+     [channels.c]
+     fix some typos in log messages; ok djm@
+   - sobrado@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/01 11:14:36
+     [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
+     the ellipsis is not an optional argument; while here, improve spacing.
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/01 17:40:33
+     [clientloop.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c]
+     merge dynamic forward parsing into parse_forward();
+     'i think this is OK' djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/02 00:16:16
+     [ttymodes.c]
+     protocol 2 tty modes support is now 7.5 years old so remove these
+     debug3()s; ok deraadt@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/03 01:07:02
+     [readconf.c]
+     remove valueless comment
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/11/03 02:44:41
+     [readconf.c]
+     fix comment
+ - (djm) [contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen contrib/suse/rc.sshd]
+   Make example scripts generate keys with default sizes rather than fixed,
+   non-default 1024 bits; patch from imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov
+ - (djm) [contrib/sshd.pam.generic contrib/caldera/sshd.pam]
+   [contrib/redhat/sshd.pam] Move pam_nologin to account group from
+   incorrect auth group in example files;
+   patch from imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov
+
+20080906
+ - (dtucker) [config.guess config.sub] Update to latest versions from
+   http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/ (2008-04-14 and 2008-06-16
+   respectively).
+
+20080830
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] correctly check for number of FDs
+   larger than FD_SETSIZE (OpenSSH only ever uses poll with one fd).  Patch
+   from Nicholas Marriott.
+
+20080721
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/23 07:36:55
+     [servconf.c]
+     do not try to print options that have been compile-time disabled
+     in config test mode (sshd -T); report from nix-corp AT esperi.org.uk
+     ok dtucker@
+ - (djm) [servconf.c] Print UsePAM option in config test mode (when it
+   has been compiled in); report from nix-corp AT esperi.org.uk
+   ok dtucker@
+
+20080721
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/18 22:51:01
+     [sftp-server.8]
+     no need for .Pp before or after .Sh;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/21 08:19:07
+     [version.h]
+     openssh-5.1
+ - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+   [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version number in README and RPM specs
+ - (djm) Release OpenSSH-5.1
+
+20080717
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/17 08:48:00
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     strnvis preauth banner; pointed out by mpf@ ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/17 08:51:07
+     [auth2-hostbased.c]
+     strip trailing '.' from hostname when HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly=yes
+     report and patch from res AT qoxp.net (bz#1200); ok markus@
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c]  Remove long-unneeded compat
+   code, replace with equivalent cygwin library call.  Patch from vinschen
+   at redhat.com, ok djm@.
+ - (djm) [sshconnect2.c] vis.h isn't available everywhere
+
+20080716
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/15 02:23:14
+     [sftp.1]
+     number of pipelined requests is now 64;
+     prodded by Iain.Morgan AT nasa.gov
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/16 11:51:14
+     [clientloop.c]
+     rename variable first_gc -> last_gc (since it is actually the last
+     in the list).
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/16 11:52:19
+     [channels.c]
+     this loop index should be automatic, not static
+
+20080714
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/13 21:22:52
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     Change "ssh-keygen -F [host] -l" to not display random art unless
+     -v is also specified, making it consistent with the manual and other
+     uses of -l.
+     ok grunk@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/13 22:13:07
+     [channels.c]
+     use struct sockaddr_storage instead of struct sockaddr for accept(2)
+     address argument. from visibilis AT yahoo.com in bz#1485; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/13 22:16:03
+     [sftp.c]
+     increase number of piplelined requests so they properly fill the
+     (recently increased) channel window. prompted by rapier AT psc.edu;
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/14 01:55:56
+     [sftp-server.8]
+     mention requirement for /dev/log inside chroot when using sftp-server
+     with ChrootDirectory
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c] Rename variables s/sin/in/ to
+   avoid clash with sin(3) function; reported by
+   cristian.ionescu-idbohrn AT axis.com
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/rresvport.c] Add unistd.h for missing close()
+   prototype; reported by cristian.ionescu-idbohrn AT axis.com
+ - (djm) [umac.c] Rename variable s/buffer_ptr/bufp/ to avoid clash;
+   reported by cristian.ionescu-idbohrn AT axis.com
+ - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/Makefile contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config]
+   [contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd]
+   Revamped and simplified Cygwin ssh-host-config script that uses
+   unified csih configuration tool. Requires recent Cygwin.
+   Patch from vinschen AT redhat.com
+
+20080712
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/12 04:52:50
+     [channels.c]
+     unbreak; move clearing of cctx struct to before first use
+     reported by dkrause@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/12 05:33:41
+     [scp.1]
+     better description for -i flag:
+     s/RSA authentication/public key authentication/
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h]
+   return EAI_FAMILY when trying to lookup unsupported address family;
+   from vinschen AT redhat.com
+
+20080711
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/07 00:31:41
+     [ttymodes.c]
+     we don't need arg after the debug3() was removed.  from lint.
+     ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/07 23:32:51
+     [key.c]
+     /*NOTREACHED*/ for lint warning:
+       warning: function key_equal falls off bottom without returning value
+     ok djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/10 18:05:58
+     [channels.c]
+     missing bzero; from mickey; ok djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/10 18:08:11
+     [clientloop.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c packet.h sshd.c]
+     sync v1 and v2 traffic accounting; add it to sshd, too;
+     ok djm@, dtucker@
+
+20080709
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in] Print "all tests passed" when all regress tests pass
+ - (djm) [auth1.c] Fix format string vulnerability in protocol 1 PAM
+   account check failure path. The vulnerable format buffer is supplied
+   from PAM and should not contain attacker-supplied data.
+ - (djm) [auth.c] Missing unistd.h for close()
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] Add -Wformat-security to CFLAGS for gcc 3.x and 4.x
+
+20080705
+ - (djm) [auth.c] Fixed test for locked account on HP/UX with shadowed
+   passwords disabled. bz#1083 report & patch from senthilkumar_sen AT
+   hotpop.com, w/ dtucker@
+ - (djm) [atomicio.c configure.ac] Disable poll() fallback in atomiciov for
+   Tru64. readv doesn't seem to be a comparable object there.
+   bz#1386, patch from dtucker@ ok me
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in] Pass though pass to conch for interop tests
+ - (djm) [configure.ac] unbreak: remove extra closing brace
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/04 23:08:25
+     [packet.c]
+     handle EINTR in packet_write_poll()l ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/04 23:30:16
+     [auth1.c auth2.c]
+     Make protocol 1 MaxAuthTries logic match protocol 2's.
+     Do not treat the first protocol 2 authentication attempt as
+     a failure IFF it is for method "none".
+     Makes MaxAuthTries' user-visible behaviour identical for
+     protocol 1 vs 2.
+     ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/05 05:16:01
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     grammar
+
+20080704
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/02 13:30:34
+     [auth2.c]
+     really really remove the freebie "none" auth try for protocol 2
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/02 13:47:39
+     [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+     When forking after authentication ("ssh -f") with ExitOnForwardFailure
+     enabled, delay the fork until after replies for any -R forwards have
+     been seen. Allows for robust detection of -R forward failure when
+     using -f (similar to bz#92); ok dtucker@
+   - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/03 21:46:58
+     [auth2-pubkey.c]
+     avoid nasty double free; ok dtucker@ djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/04 03:44:59
+     [servconf.c groupaccess.h groupaccess.c]
+     support negation of groups in "Match group" block (bz#1315); ok dtucker@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/04 03:47:02
+     [monitor.c]
+     Make debug a little clearer.  ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/30 08:07:34
+     [regress/key-options.sh]
+     shell portability: use "=" instead of "==" in test(1) expressions,
+     double-quote string with backslash escaped /
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/30 10:31:11
+     [regress/{putty-transfer,putty-kex,putty-ciphers}.sh]
+     remove "set -e" left over from debugging
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/30 10:43:03
+     [regress/conch-ciphers.sh]
+     explicitly disable conch options that could interfere with the test
+ - (dtucker) [sftp-server.c] Bug #1447: fall back to racy rename if link
+   returns EXDEV.  Patch from Mike Garrison, ok djm@
+ - (djm) [atomicio.c channels.c clientloop.c defines.h includes.h]
+   [packet.c scp.c serverloop.c sftp-client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keyscan.c]
+   [sshd.c] Explicitly handle EWOULDBLOCK wherever we handle EAGAIN, on
+   some platforms (HP nonstop) it is a distinct errno;
+   bz#1467 reported by sconeu AT yahoo.com; ok dtucker@
+
+20080702
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/30 08:05:59
+      [PROTOCOL.agent]
+      typo: s/constraint_date/constraint_data/
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/30 12:15:39
+     [serverloop.c]
+     only pass channel requests on session channels through to the session
+     channel handler, avoiding spurious log messages; ok! markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/30 12:16:02
+     [nchan.c]
+     only send eow@openssh.com notifications for session channels; ok! markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/30 12:18:34
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     clarify that eow@openssh.com is only sent on session channels
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/01 07:20:52
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     Check ExitOnForwardFailure if forwardings are disabled due to a failed
+     host key check.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/01 07:24:22
+     [sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+     Send CR LF during protocol banner exchanges, but only for Protocol 2 only,
+     in order to comply with RFC 4253.  bz #1443, ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/01 23:12:47
+     [PROTOCOL.agent]
+     fix some typos; ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/02 02:24:18
+     [sshd_config sshd_config.5 sshd.8 servconf.c]
+     increase default size of ssh protocol 1 ephemeral key from 768 to 1024
+     bits; prodded by & ok dtucker@ ok deraadt@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/02 12:03:51
+     [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth2-pubkey.c auth.h]
+     Merge duplicate host key file checks, based in part on a patch from Rob
+     Holland via bz #1348 .  Also checks for non-regular files during protocol
+     1 RSA auth.  ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/02 12:36:39
+     [auth2-none.c auth2.c]
+     Make protocol 2 MaxAuthTries behaviour a little more sensible:
+     Check whether client has exceeded MaxAuthTries before running
+     an authentication method and skip it if they have, previously it
+     would always allow one try (for "none" auth).
+     Preincrement failure count before post-auth test - previously this
+     checked and postincremented, also to allow one "none" try.
+     Together, these two changes always count the "none" auth method
+     which could be skipped by a malicious client (e.g. an SSH worm)
+     to get an extra attempt at a real auth method. They also make
+     MaxAuthTries=0 a useful way to block users entirely (esp. in a
+     sshd_config Match block).
+     Also, move sending of any preauth banner from "none" auth method
+     to the first call to input_userauth_request(), so worms that skip
+     the "none" method get to see it too.
+
+20080630
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 23:13:43
+     [regress/Makefile regress/key-options.sh]
+     Add regress test for key options.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:11:40
+     [regress/Makefile]
+     Don't run cipher-speed test by default; mistakenly enabled by me
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/28 13:57:25
+     [regress/Makefile regress/test-exec.sh regress/conch-ciphers.sh]
+     very basic regress test against Twisted Conch in "make interop"
+     target (conch is available in ports/devel/py-twisted/conch);
+     ok markus@
+ - (djm) [regress/Makefile] search for conch by path, like we do putty
+
+20080629
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - martynas@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/21 07:46:46
+     [sftp.c]
+     use optopt to get invalid flag, instead of return value of getopt,
+     which is always '?';  ok djm@
+   - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/25 11:13:43
+     [key.c]
+     add key length to visual fingerprint; zap magical constants;
+     ok grunk@ djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/26 06:10:09
+     [sftp-client.c sftp-server.c]
+     allow the sftp chmod(2)-equivalent operation to set set[ug]id/sticky
+     bits. Note that this only affects explicit setting of modes (e.g. via
+     sftp(1)'s chmod command) and not file transfers. (bz#1310)
+     ok deraadt@ at c2k8
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/26 09:19:40
+     [dh.c dh.h moduli.c]
+     when loading moduli from /etc/moduli in sshd(8), check that they
+     are of the expected "safe prime" structure and have had
+     appropriate primality tests performed;
+     feedback and ok dtucker@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/26 11:46:31
+     [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]
+     Move SSH Fingerprint Visualization away from sharing the config option
+     CheckHostIP to an own config option named VisualHostKey.
+     While there, fix the behaviour that ssh would draw a random art picture
+     on every newly seen host even when the option was not enabled.
+     prodded by deraadt@, discussions,
+     help and ok markus@ djm@ dtucker@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/26 21:11:46
+     [ssh.1]
+     add VisualHostKey to the list of options listed in -o;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/28 07:25:07
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     spelling fixes
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/28 13:58:23
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     refuse to add a key that has unknown constraints specified;
+     ok markus
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/28 14:05:15
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     reset global compat flag after processing a protocol 2 signature
+     request with the legacy DSA encoding flag set; ok markus
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/28 14:08:30
+     [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent]
+     document the protocol used by ssh-agent; "looks ok" markus@
+
+20080628
+ - (djm) [RFC.nroff contrib/cygwin/Makefile contrib/suse/openssh.spec]
+   RFC.nroff lacks a license, remove it (it is long gone in OpenBSD).
+
+20080626
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in moduli.5] Include moduli(5) manpage from OpenBSD.
+   (bz#1372)
+ - (djm) [ contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+   [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Include moduli.5 in RPM spec files.
+
+20080616
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/16 13:22:53
+     [session.c channels.c]
+     Rename the isatty argument to is_tty so we don't shadow
+     isatty(3).  ok markus@
+ - (dtucker) [channels.c] isatty -> is_tty here too.
+
+20080615
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Enable -fno-builtin-memset when using gcc.
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/14 15:49:48
+     [sshd.c]
+     wrap long line at 80 chars
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/14 17:07:11
+     [sshd.c]
+     ensure default umask disallows at least group and world write; ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/14 18:33:43
+     [session.c]
+     suppress the warning message from chdir(homedir) failures
+     when chrooted (bz#1461); ok dtucker
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/14 19:42:10
+     [scp.1]
+     Mention that scp follows symlinks during -r.  bz #1466,
+     from nectar at apple
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/15 16:55:38
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     MaxSessions is allowed in a Match block too
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/15 16:58:40
+     [servconf.c sshd_config.5]
+     Allow MaxAuthTries within a Match block.  ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/15 20:06:26
+     [channels.c channels.h session.c]
+     don't call isatty() on a pty master, instead pass a flag down to
+     channel_set_fds() indicating that te fds refer to a tty. Fixes a
+     hang on exit on Solaris (bz#1463) in portable but is actually
+     a generic bug; ok dtucker deraadt markus
+
+20080614
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sigact.c] Avoid NULL derefs in ancient sigaction
+   replacement code; patch from ighighi AT gmail.com in bz#1240;
+   ok dtucker
+
+20080613
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 09:44:36
+     [packet.c]
+     compile on older gcc; no decl after code
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 13:56:59
+     [monitor.c]
+     Clear key options in the monitor on failed authentication, prevents
+     applying additional restrictions to non-pubkey authentications in
+     the case where pubkey fails but another method subsequently succeeds.
+     bz #1472, found by Colin Watson, ok markus@ djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 14:18:51
+     [auth2-pubkey.c auth-rhosts.c]
+     Include unistd.h for close(), prevents warnings in -portable
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 17:21:20
+     [mux.c]
+     Friendlier error messages for mux fallback.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 18:55:22
+     [scp.c]
+     Prevent -Wsign-compare warnings on LP64 systems.  bz #1192, ok deraadt@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 20:13:26
+     [ssh.1]
+     Explain the use of SSH fpr visualization using random art, and cite the
+     original scientific paper inspiring that technique.
+     Much help with English and nroff by jmc@, thanks.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1276: avoid linking against libgssapi, which
+   despite its name doesn't seem to implement all of GSSAPI.  Patch from
+   Jan Engelhardt, sanity checked by Simon Wilkinson.
+
+20080612
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 07:30:37
+     [sshd.8]
+     kill trailing whitespace;
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 21:01:35
+     [ssh_config.5 key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c key.c
+      sshconnect.c]
+     Introduce SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualization, a technique inspired by the
+     graphical hash visualization schemes known as "random art", and by
+     Dan Kaminsky's musings on the subject during a BlackOp talk at the
+     23C3 in Berlin.
+     Scientific publication (original paper):
+     "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
+     Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+     Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
+     http://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
+     The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
+     leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
+     Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise.  Bumping into walls
+     makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn,
+     thus switching to the other color of the chessboard.
+     Graphs are not unambiguous for now, because circles in graphs can be
+     walked in either direction.
+     discussions with several people,
+     help, corrections and ok markus@ djm@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 21:38:25
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     ssh-keygen -lv -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+     would not display you the random art as intended, spotted by canacar@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 22:20:46
+     [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keygen.1]
+     ssh-keygen would write fingerprints to STDOUT, and random art to STDERR,
+     that is not how it was envisioned.
+     Also correct manpage saying that -v is needed along with -l for it to work.
+     spotted by naddy@
+   - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:02:22
+     [key.c]
+     simpler way of computing the augmentations; ok grunk@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:03:56
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     CheckHostIP set to ``fingerprint'' will display both hex and random art
+     spotted by naddy@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:51:57
+     [key.c]
+     #define statements that are not atoms need braces around them, else they
+     will cause trouble in some cases.
+     Also do a computation of -1 once, and not in a loop several times.
+     spotted by otto@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 00:03:49
+     [dns.c canohost.c sshconnect.c]
+     Do not pass "0" strings as ports to getaddrinfo because the lookups
+     can slow things down and we never use the service info anyway. bz
+     #859, patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki and John Devitofranceschi.  ok
+     deraadt@ djm@
+     djm belives that the reason for the "0" strings is to ensure that
+     it's not possible to call getaddrinfo with both host and port being
+     NULL.  In the case of canohost.c host is a local array.  In the
+     case of sshconnect.c, it's checked for null immediately before use.
+     In dns.c it ultimately comes from ssh.c:main() and is guaranteed to
+     be non-null but it's not obvious, so I added a warning message in
+     case it is ever passed a null.
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 00:13:55
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     Make ssh print the random art also when ssh'ing to a host using IP only.
+     spotted by naddy@, ok and help djm@ dtucker@
+   - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 00:13:13
+     [key.c]
+     use an odd number of rows and columns and a separate start marker, looks
+     better; ok grunk@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 03:40:52
+     [clientloop.h mux.c channels.c clientloop.c channels.h]
+     Enable ~ escapes for multiplex slave sessions; give each channel
+     its own escape state and hook the escape filters up to muxed
+     channels. bz #1331
+     Mux slaves do not currently support the ~^Z and ~& escapes.
+     NB. this change cranks the mux protocol version, so a new ssh
+     mux client will not be able to connect to a running old ssh
+     mux master.
+     ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 04:06:00
+     [clientloop.h ssh.c clientloop.c]
+     maintain an ordered queue of outstanding global requests that we
+     expect replies to, similar to the per-channel confirmation queue.
+     Use this queue to verify success or failure for remote forward
+     establishment in a race free way.
+     ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 04:17:47
+     [clientloop.c]
+     thall shalt not code past the eightieth column
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 04:24:06
+     [ssh.c]
+     thal shalt not code past the eightieth column
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 05:15:41
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     document tun@openssh.com forwarding method
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 05:32:30
+     [mux.c]
+     some more TODO for me
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 05:42:46
+     [key.c]
+     supply the key type (rsa1, rsa, dsa) as a caption in the frame of the
+     random art.  while there, stress the fact that the field base should at
+     least be 8 characters for the pictures to make sense.
+     comment and ok djm@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 06:32:59
+     [key.c]
+     We already mark the start of the worm, now also mark the end of the worm
+     in our random art drawings.
+     ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 15:19:17
+     [clientloop.h channels.h clientloop.c channels.c mux.c]
+     The multiplexing escape char handler commit last night introduced a
+     small memory leak per session; plug it.
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 16:35:31
+     [ssh_config.5 ssh.c]
+     keyword expansion for localcommand.  ok djm@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 19:10:09
+     [ssh_config.5 ssh-keygen.1]
+     tweak the ascii art text; ok grunk
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 20:38:28
+     [sshd.c sshconnect.c packet.h misc.c misc.h packet.c]
+     Make keepalive timeouts apply while waiting for a packet, particularly
+     during key renegotiation (bz #1363).  With djm and Matt Day, ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 20:47:04
+     [sftp-client.c]
+     print extension revisions for extensions that we understand
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 21:06:25
+     [clientloop.c]
+     I was coalescing expected global request confirmation replies at
+     the wrong end of the queue - fix; prompted by markus@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 21:14:46
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     make ssh-keygen -lf show the key type just as ssh-add -l would do it
+     ok djm@ markus@
+   - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 22:03:36
+     [key.c]
+     add my copyright, ok djm@
+   - ian@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 23:24:58
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     tweak wording in message, ok deraadt@ jmc@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 00:12:02
+     [sftp.h log.h]
+     replace __dead with __attribute__((noreturn)), makes things
+     a little easier to port.  Also, add it to sigdie().  ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 00:16:49
+     [mux.c]
+     fall back to creating a new TCP connection on most multiplexing errors
+     (socket connect fail, invalid version, refused permittion, corrupted
+     messages, etc.); bz #1329 ok dtucker@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 00:47:53
+     [mux.c]
+     upcast size_t to u_long to match format arg; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 00:51:47
+     [mac.c]
+     upcast another size_t to u_long to match format
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 01:38:23
+     [misc.c]
+     upcast uid to long with matching %ld, prevents warnings in portable
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/13 04:40:22
+     [auth2-pubkey.c auth-rhosts.c]
+     refuse to read ~/.shosts or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys that are not
+     regular files; report from Solar Designer via Colin Watson in bz#1471
+     ok dtucker@ deraadt
+  - (dtucker) [clientloop.c serverloop.c]  channel_register_filter now
+    takes 2 more args.  with djm@
+  - (dtucker) [defines.h] Bug #1112: __dead is, well dead. Based on a patch
+    from Todd Vierling.
+  - (dtucker) [auth-sia.c] Bug #1241: support password expiry on Tru64 SIA
+    systems.  Patch from R. Scott Bailey.
+  - (dtucker) [umac.c] STORE_UINT32_REVERSED and endian_convert are never used
+    on big endian machines, so ifdef them for little-endian only to prevent
+    unused function warnings on big-endians.
+  - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/setenv.c] Make offsets size_t to prevent
+    compiler warnings on some platforms.  Based on a discussion with otto@
+
+20080611
+ - (djm) [channels.c configure.ac]
+   Do not set SO_REUSEADDR on wildcard X11 listeners (X11UseLocalhost=no)
+   bz#1464; ok dtucker 
+
+20080610
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 03:57:27
+     [servconf.c match.h sshd_config.5]
+     support CIDR address matching in sshd_config "Match address" blocks, with
+     full support for negation and fall-back to classic wildcard matching.
+     For example:
+     Match address 192.0.2.0/24,3ffe:ffff::/32,!10.*
+         PasswordAuthentication yes
+     addrmatch.c code mostly lifted from flowd's addr.c
+     feedback and ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 04:17:46
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     better reference for pattern-list
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 04:50:25
+     [sshd.c channels.h channels.c log.c servconf.c log.h servconf.h sshd.8]
+     Add extended test mode (-T) and connection parameters for test mode (-C).
+     -T causes sshd to write its effective configuration to stdout and exit.
+     -C causes any relevant Match rules to be applied before output.  The
+     combination allows tesing of the parser and config files.  ok deraadt djm
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 07:12:00
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     tweak previous;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 08:17:40
+     [sshd.8 sshd.c]
+     - update usage()
+     - fix SYNOPSIS, and sort options
+     - some minor additional fixes
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/09 18:06:32
+     [regress/test-exec.sh]
+     Don't generate putty keys if we're not going to use them.  ok djm
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 05:23:32
+     [regress/addrmatch.sh regress/Makefile]
+     Regress test for Match CIDR rules.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 15:21:41
+     [test-exec.sh]
+     Use a more portable construct for checking if we're running a putty test
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 15:28:49
+     [test-exec.sh]
+     Add quotes
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 18:21:24
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     clarify that Host patterns are space-separated.  ok deraadt
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 22:15:23
+     [PROTOCOL ssh.c serverloop.c]
+     Add a no-more-sessions@openssh.com global request extension that the
+     client sends when it knows that it will never request another session
+     (i.e. when session multiplexing is disabled). This allows a server to
+     disallow further session requests and terminate the session.
+     Why would a non-multiplexing client ever issue additional session
+     requests? It could have been attacked with something like SSH'jack:
+     http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7
+     feedback & ok markus
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 23:06:19
+     [auth-options.c match.c servconf.c addrmatch.c sshd.8]
+     support CIDR address matching in .ssh/authorized_keys from="..." stanzas
+     ok and extensive testing dtucker@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 23:21:34
+     [bufaux.c]
+     Use '\0' for a nul byte rather than unadorned 0.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/10 23:13:43
+     [Makefile regress/key-options.sh]
+     Add regress test for key options.  ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h] Add sin6_scope_id to sockaddr_in6
+   since the new CIDR code in addmatch.c references it.
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac regress/addrmatch.sh] Skip IPv6
+   specific tests on platforms that don't do IPv6.
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Define TEST_SSH_IPV6 in make's arguments as well
+   as environment.
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Move addrmatch.o to libssh.a where it's needed now.
+
+20080609
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/08 17:04:41
+     [sftp-server.c]
+     Add case for ENOSYS in errno_to_portable; ok deraadt
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/08 20:15:29
+     [sftp.c sftp-client.c sftp-client.h]
+     Have the sftp client store the statvfs replies in wire format,
+     which prevents problems when the server's native sizes exceed the
+     client's.
+     Also extends the sizes of the remaining 32bit wire format to 64bit,
+     they're specified as unsigned long in the standard.
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/09 13:02:39
+     [sftp-server.c]
+     Extend 32bit -> 64bit values for statvfs extension missed in previous
+     commit.
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/09 13:38:46
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     Use a $OpenBSD tag so our scripts will sync changes.
+
+20080608
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h sftp-client.c sftp-server.c sftp.c
+   openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+   openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.{c,h}] Add a null implementation of statvfs and
+   fstatvfs and remove #defines around statvfs code.  ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h sftp-client.c M sftp-server.c] Add a
+   macro to convert fsid to unsigned long for platforms where fsid is a
+   2-member array.
+
+20080607
+ - (dtucker) [mux.c] Include paths.h inside ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h sftp-client.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
+   Do not enable statvfs extensions on platforms that do not have statvfs.
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/19 06:14:02
+     [packet.c] unbreak protocol keepalive timeouts bz#1465; ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/19 15:45:07
+     [sshtty.c ttymodes.c sshpty.h]
+     Fix sending tty modes when stdin is not a tty (bz#1199). Previously
+     we would send the modes corresponding to a zeroed struct termios,
+     whereas we should have been sending an empty list of modes.
+     Based on patch from daniel.ritz AT alcatel.ch; ok dtucker@ markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/19 15:46:31
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     support -l (print fingerprint) in combination with -F (find host) to
+     search for a host in ~/.ssh/known_hosts and display its fingerprint;
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/19 20:53:52
+     [clientloop.c]
+     unbreak tree by committing this bit that I missed from:
+     Fix sending tty modes when stdin is not a tty (bz#1199). Previously
+     we would send the modes corresponding to a zeroed struct termios,
+     whereas we should have been sending an empty list of modes.
+     Based on patch from daniel.ritz AT alcatel.ch; ok dtucker@ markus@ 
+
+20080604
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] Fix math bug that caused bias
+   in arc4random_uniform with upper_bound in (2^30,2*31). Note that 
+   OpenSSH did not make requests with upper bounds in this range.
+
+20080519
+ - (djm) [configure.ac mux.c sftp.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in]
+   [openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
+   Fix compilation on Linux, including pulling in fmt_scaled(3)
+   implementation from OpenBSD's libutil.
+
+20080518
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/04 05:14:38
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     ChrootDirectory is supported in Match blocks (in fact, it is most useful
+     there). Spotted by Minstrel AT minstrel.org.uk
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/04 06:44:26
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     oops, some unrelated stuff crept into that commit - backout.
+     spotted by jmc@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/05 02:46:02
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     HostbasedAuthentication is supported under Match too
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.c]
+     [configure.ac] Implement arc4random_buf(), import implementation of
+     arc4random_uniform() from OpenBSD
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] Warning fixes
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/port-tun.c] needs sys/queue.h
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/13 00:22:17
+     [dh.c sshd.c]
+     Use arc4random_buf() when requesting more than a single word of output
+     Use arc4random_uniform() when the desired random number upper bound
+     is not a power of two
+     ok deraadt@ millert@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/18 12:32:11
+     [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp.c sftp.h]
+     introduce sftp extension methods statvfs@openssh.com and
+     fstatvfs@openssh.com that implement statvfs(2)-like operations,
+     based on a patch from miklos AT szeredi.hu (bz#1399)
+     also add a "df" command to the sftp client that uses the
+     statvfs@openssh.com to produce a df(1)-like display of filesystem
+     space and inode utilisation
+     ok markus@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/18 17:15:47
+     [sftp.1]
+     macro fixage;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/18 22:01:33
+     [session.c]
+     remove unneccessary parentheses
+   - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/29 11:20:31
+     [monitor_mm.h]
+     garbage collect two unused fields in struct mm_master; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/30 10:14:03
+     [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
+     default to rsa (protocol 2) keys, instead of rsa1 keys; spotted by
+     larsnooden AT openoffice.org
+   - pyr@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/07 05:49:37
+     [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config.5]
+     Enable the AllowAgentForwarding option in sshd_config (global and match
+     context), to specify if agents should be permitted on the server.
+     As the man page states:
+     ``Note that disabling Agent forwarding does not improve security
+     unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install
+     their own forwarders.''
+     ok djm@, ok and a mild frown markus@
+   - pyr@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/07 06:43:35
+     [sshd_config]
+     push the sshd_config bits in, spotted by ajacoutot@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/07 08:00:14
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     sort;
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/08 06:59:01
+     [bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c packet.c packet.h]
+     avoid extra malloc/copy/free when receiving data over the net;
+     ~10% speedup for localhost-scp; ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/08 12:02:23
+     [auth-options.c auth1.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c gss-serv.c]
+     [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c nchan.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c]
+     [ssh.c sshd.c]
+     Implement a channel success/failure status confirmation callback
+     mechanism. Each channel maintains a queue of callbacks, which will
+     be drained in order (RFC4253 guarantees confirm messages are not
+     reordered within an channel).
+     Also includes a abandonment callback to clean up if a channel is
+     closed without sending confirmation messages. This probably
+     shouldn't happen in compliant implementations, but it could be
+     abused to leak memory.
+     ok markus@ (as part of a larger diff)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/08 12:21:16
+     [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c]
+     [sshd_config sshd_config.5]
+     Make the maximum number of sessions run-time controllable via
+     a sshd_config MaxSessions knob. This is useful for disabling
+     login/shell/subsystem access while leaving port-forwarding working
+     (MaxSessions 0), disabling connection multiplexing (MaxSessions 1) or
+     simply increasing the number of allows multiplexed sessions.
+     Because some bozos are sure to configure MaxSessions in excess of the
+     number of available file descriptors in sshd (which, at peak, might be
+     as many as 9*MaxSessions), audit sshd to ensure that it doesn't leak fds
+     on error paths, and make it fail gracefully on out-of-fd conditions -
+     sending channel errors instead of than exiting with fatal().
+     bz#1090; MaxSessions config bits and manpage from junyer AT gmail.com
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/08 13:06:11
+     [clientloop.c clientloop.h ssh.c]
+     Use new channel status confirmation callback system to properly deal
+     with "important" channel requests that fail, in particular command exec,
+     shell and subsystem requests. Previously we would optimistically assume
+     that the requests would always succeed, which could cause hangs if they
+     did not (e.g. when the server runs out of fds) or were unimplemented by
+     the server (bz #1384)
+     Also, properly report failing multiplex channel requests via the mux
+     client stderr (subject to LogLevel in the mux master) - better than
+     silently failing.
+     most bits ok markus@ (as part of a larger diff)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/09 04:55:56
+     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c]
+     Try additional addresses when connecting to a port forward destination
+     whose DNS name resolves to more than one address. The previous behaviour
+     was to try the first address and give up.
+     Reported by stig AT venaas.com in bz#343
+     great feedback and ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/09 14:18:44
+     [clientloop.c clientloop.h ssh.c mux.c]
+     tidy up session multiplexing code, moving it into its own file and
+     making the function names more consistent - making ssh.c and
+     clientloop.c a fair bit more readable.
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/09 14:26:08
+     [ssh.c]
+     dingo stole my diff hunk
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/09 16:16:06
+     [session.c]
+     re-add the USE_PIPES code and enable it.
+     without pipes shutdown-read from the sshd does not trigger
+     a SIGPIPE when the forked program does a write.
+     ok djm@
+     (Id sync only, USE_PIPES never left portable OpenSSH)
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/09 16:17:51
+     [channels.c]
+     error-fd race: don't enable the error fd in the select bitmask
+     for channels with both in- and output closed, since the channel
+     will go away before we call select();
+     report, lots of debugging help and ok djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/09 16:21:13
+     [channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c]
+     unbreak
+        ssh -2 localhost od /bin/ls | true
+     ignoring SIGPIPE by adding a new channel message (EOW) that signals
+     the peer that we're not interested in any data it might send.
+     fixes bz #85; discussion, debugging and ok djm@
+   - pvalchev@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/12 20:52:20
+     [umac.c]
+     Ensure nh_result lies on a 64-bit boundary (fixes warnings observed
+     on Itanium on Linux); from Dale Talcott (bug #1462); ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/15 23:52:24
+     [nchan2.ms]
+     document eow message in ssh protocol 2 channel state machine;
+     feedback and ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/18 21:29:05
+     [sftp-server.c]
+     comment extension announcement
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/16 08:30:42
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     document our protocol extensions and deviations; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/05/17 01:31:56
+     [PROTOCOL]
+     grammar and correctness fixes from stevesk@
+
+20080403
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Include stdlib.h to avoid compile-
+   time warnings on LynxOS. Patch from ops AT iki.fi
+ - (djm) Force string arguments to replacement setproctitle() though
+   strnvis first. Ok dtucker@
+
+20080403
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS sync:
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/02 15:36:51
+     [channels.c]
+     avoid possible hijacking of x11-forwarded connections (back out 1.183)
+     CVE-2008-1483; ok djm@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/03/27 22:37:57
+     [sshd.8]
+     remove trailing whitespace;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/03 09:50:14
+     [version.h]
+     openssh-5.0
+ - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+   [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers in RPM spec files
+ - (djm) [README] Update link to release notes
+ - (djm) Release 5.0p1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-tricks b/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-tricks
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..480bffc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-tricks
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# $FreeBSD$
+
+# Shell code to remove FreeBSD tags before merging
+grep -rl '\$Fre[e]BSD:' . | grep -v FREEBSD >tags
+cat tags | while read f ; do
+    sed -i.orig -e '/\$Fre[e]BSD:/d' $f
+done
+
+# Shell + Perl code to add FreeBSD tags wherever an OpenBSD or Id tag occurs
+cat tags |
+xargs perl -n -i.orig -e 'print; s/\$(Id|OpenBSD): [^\$]*/\$FreeBSD/ && print'
+
+# Diff against vendor branch
+svn diff --no-diff-deleted --old=$FSVN/vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ --new=.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-upgrade b/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-upgrade
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03b7dbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+
+
+	    FreeBSD maintainer's guide to OpenSSH-portable
+	    ==============================================
+
+[needs rewriting for svn]
+
+0) Make sure your mail spool has plenty of free space.  It'll fill up
+   pretty fast once you're done with this checklist.
+
+1) Grab the latest OpenSSH-portable tarball from the OpenBSD FTP
+   site (ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/)
+
+2) Unpack the tarball in a suitable directory.
+
+	$ tar xf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz \
+		-X /usr/src/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-Xlist
+
+3) Remove trash:
+
+   Make sure -X took care of everything, and if it didn't, make sure
+   to update FREEBSD-Xlist so you won't miss it the next time.  A good
+   way to do this is to run a test import and see if any new files
+   show up:
+
+	$ cvs -n import src/crypto/openssh OPENSSH x | grep \^N
+
+4) Import the sources:
+
+	$ cvs import src/crypto/openssh OPENSSH OpenSSH_X_YpZ
+
+5) Resolve conflicts.  Remember to bump the version number and
+   addendum in version.h, and update the default value in
+   ssh{,d}_config and ssh{,d}_config.5.
+
+6) Generate configure and config.h.in:
+
+	$ autoconf
+	$ autoheader
+
+   Note: this requires a recent version of autoconf, not autoconf213.
+
+7) Run configure with the appropriate arguments:
+
+	$ ./configure --prefix=/usr --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh \
+		--with-pam --with-tcp-wrappers --with-libedit \
+		--with-ssl-engine
+
+   This will regenerate config.h, which must be committed along with
+   the rest.
+
+   Note that we don't want to configure OpenSSH for Kerberos using
+   configure since we have to be able to turn it on or off depending
+   on the value of MK_KERBEROS.  Our Makefiles take care of this.
+
+8) If source files have been added or removed, update the appropriate
+   makefiles to reflect changes in the vendor's Makefile.in.
+
+9) Build libssh.  Follow the instructions in ssh_namespace.h to get a
+   list of new symbols.  Update ssh_namespace.h, build everything,
+   install and test.
+
+A) Build and test the pam_ssh PAM module.  It gropes around libssh's
+   internals and will break if something significant changes or if
+   ssh_namespace.h is out of whack.
+
+B) Re-commit everything on repoman (you *did* use a test repo for
+   this, didn't you?)
+
+
+
+	  An overview of FreeBSD changes to OpenSSH-portable
+	  ==================================================
+
+0) VersionAddendum
+
+   The SSH protocol allows for a human-readable version string of up
+   to 40 characters to be appended to the protocol version string.
+   FreeBSD takes advantage of this to include a date indicating the
+   "patch level", so people can easily determine whether their system
+   is vulnerable when an OpenSSH advisory goes out.  Some people,
+   however, dislike advertising their patch level in the protocol
+   handshake, so we've added a VersionAddendum configuration variable
+   to allow them to change or disable it.
+
+1) Modified server-side defaults
+
+   We've modified some configuration defaults in sshd:
+
+      - PasswordAuthentication defaults to "no".
+
+      - LoginGraceTime defaults to 120 seconds instead of 600.
+
+      - PermitRootLogin defaults to "no".
+
+      - X11Forwarding defaults to "yes" (it's a threat to the client,
+        not to the server.)
+
+2) Modified client-side defaults
+
+   We've modified some configuration defaults in ssh:
+
+      - CheckHostIP defaults to "no".
+
+3) Canonic host names
+
+   We've added code to ssh.c to canonicize the target host name after
+   reading options but before trying to connect.  This eliminates the
+   usual problem with duplicate known_hosts entries.
+
+4) setusercontext() environment
+
+   Our setusercontext(3) can set environment variables, which we must
+   take care to transfer to the child's environment.
+
+
+
+This port was brought to you by (in no particular order) DARPA, NAI
+Labs, ThinkSec, Nescafé, the Aberlour Glenlivet Distillery Co.,
+Suzanne Vega, and a Sanford's #69 Deluxe Marker.
+
+					-- des@FreeBSD.org
+
+$FreeBSD$
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-vendor b/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-vendor
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0fa56d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-vendor
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# $FreeBSD$
+Project:	Portable OpenSSH
+ProjectURL:	http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+Version:	5.2p1
+License:	BSD
+Maintainer:	des
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..001ebb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+1. Prerequisites
+----------------
+
+You will need working installations of Zlib and OpenSSL.
+
+Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (ealier 1.2.x versions have problems):
+http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+
+OpenSSL 0.9.6 or greater:
+http://www.openssl.org/
+
+(OpenSSL 0.9.5a is partially supported, but some ciphers (SSH protocol 1
+Blowfish) do not work correctly.)
+
+The remaining items are optional.
+
+NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
+OpenSSL to use it. OpenSSH relies on OpenSSL's direct support of
+/dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd.  If you don't have
+any of these you will have to rely on ssh-rand-helper, which is inferior
+to a good kernel-based solution or prngd.
+
+PRNGD:
+
+If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
+Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
+
+http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
+
+EGD:
+
+The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is supported if you have a system which
+lacks /dev/random and don't want to use OpenSSH's internal entropy collection.
+
+http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
+
+PAM:
+
+OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
+system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
+HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
+
+Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
+
+Solaris PAM:	http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
+Linux PAM:	http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+OpenPAM:	http://www.openpam.org/
+
+If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
+libraries and headers.
+
+GNOME:
+http://www.gnome.org/
+
+Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
+
+http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
+
+TCP Wrappers:
+
+If you wish to use the TCP wrappers functionality you will need at least
+tcpd.h and libwrap.a, either in the standard include and library paths,
+or in the directory specified by --with-tcp-wrappers.  Version 7.6 is
+known to work.
+
+http://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html
+
+S/Key Libraries:
+
+If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the library below
+installed.  No other S/Key library is currently known to be supported.
+
+http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/
+
+LibEdit:
+
+sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit.  If your platform
+has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
+these multi-platform ports:
+
+http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
+http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
+
+Autoconf:
+
+If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
+the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.61 to rebuild
+the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf".  Earlier
+versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
+
+http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
+
+Basic Security Module (BSM):
+
+Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
+FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X.  Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
+implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
+
+
+2. Building / Installation
+--------------------------
+
+To install OpenSSH with default options:
+
+./configure
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
+in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
+installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt
+make
+make install
+
+Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
+specific paths, for example:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
+configuration files in /etc/ssh.
+
+If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default)
+then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by
+sshd for privilege separation.  See README.privsep for details.
+
+If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
+file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
+them).  Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
+which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
+for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd).  If you have renamed your sshd
+executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
+
+A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
+you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
+using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
+contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful.  Failure to install a
+valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
+authentication.  On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
+configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
+name).
+
+There are a few other options to the configure script:
+
+--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
+Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
+(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
+
+--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
+also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
+
+--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
+support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
+collection support.
+
+--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
+and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
+collection support.
+
+--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
+./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
+it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
+
+--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
+
+--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
+Integration Architecture.  The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
+
+--with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will
+need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work.
+
+--with-tcp-wrappers will enable TCP Wrappers (/etc/hosts.allow|deny)
+support.
+
+--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
+if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
+not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
+resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
+
+--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
+some platforms.
+
+--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
+
+--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
+$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
+
+--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
+started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
+
+--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
+created.
+
+--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
+
+--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your OpenSSL libraries
+are installed.
+
+--with-ssl-engine enables OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
+
+--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
+real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
+
+--with-opensc=DIR
+--with-sectok=DIR allows for OpenSC or sectok smartcard libraries to
+be used with OpenSSH.  See 'README.smartcard' for more details.
+
+If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
+can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
+For example:
+
+CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure
+
+3. Configuration
+----------------
+
+The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
+whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
+
+The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
+review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
+
+To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
+manually using the following commands:
+
+    ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
+    ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
+    ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
+
+Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
+(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
+configuration)
+
+If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
+running and has collected some Entropy.
+
+For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
+for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
+
+4. (Optional) Send survey
+-------------------------
+
+$ make survey
+[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
+that you consider sensitive]
+$ make send-survey
+
+This will send configuration information for the currently configured
+host to a survey address.  This will help determine which configurations
+are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
+exist.  The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
+summary data may be published.
+
+5. Problems?
+------------
+
+If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
+Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
+http://www.openssh.com/
+
+
+$Id: INSTALL,v 1.84 2007/08/17 12:52:05 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3964b1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+This file is part of the OpenSSH software.
+
+The licences which components of this software fall under are as
+follows.  First, we will summarize and say that all components
+are under a BSD licence, or a licence more free than that.
+
+OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
+
+1)
+     * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+     *                    All rights reserved
+     *
+     * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+     * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+     * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+     * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+     * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+
+    [Tatu continues]
+     *  However, I am not implying to give any licenses to any patents or
+     * copyrights held by third parties, and the software includes parts that
+     * are not under my direct control.  As far as I know, all included
+     * source code is used in accordance with the relevant license agreements
+     * and can be used freely for any purpose (the GNU license being the most
+     * restrictive); see below for details.
+
+    [However, none of that term is relevant at this point in time.  All of
+    these restrictively licenced software components which he talks about
+    have been removed from OpenSSH, i.e.,
+
+     - RSA is no longer included, found in the OpenSSL library
+     - IDEA is no longer included, its use is deprecated
+     - DES is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+     - GMP is no longer used, and instead we call BN code from OpenSSL
+     - Zlib is now external, in a library
+     - The make-ssh-known-hosts script is no longer included
+     - TSS has been removed
+     - MD5 is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+     - RC4 support has been replaced with ARC4 support from OpenSSL
+     - Blowfish is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+
+    [The licence continues]
+
+    Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this
+    software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major
+    bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide.  More
+    information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto".
+
+    The legal status of this program is some combination of all these
+    permissions and restrictions.  Use only at your own responsibility.
+    You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not
+    making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in
+    your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf.
+
+
+			    NO WARRANTY
+
+    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
+    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
+    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
+    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
+    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
+    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
+    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
+    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+
+    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
+    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
+    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
+    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
+    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
+    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
+    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+
+2)
+    The 32-bit CRC compensation attack detector in deattack.c was
+    contributed by CORE SDI S.A. under a BSD-style license.
+
+     * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
+     *
+     * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+     *
+     * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+     * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+     * this copyright notice is retained.
+     *
+     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+     * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+     * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+     * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+     * SOFTWARE.
+     *
+     * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
+     * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+
+3)
+    ssh-keyscan was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style
+    license.
+
+     * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+     *
+     * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+     * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+     * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+
+4)
+    The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers
+    and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed
+    with the following license:
+
+     * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+     *
+     * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+     *
+     * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+     * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+     * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+     *
+     * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+     *
+     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+     * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+     * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+     * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+     * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+     * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+     * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+     * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+     * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+     * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+     * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+5)
+    One component of the ssh source code is under a 3-clause BSD license,
+    held by the University of California, since we pulled these parts from
+    original Berkeley code.
+
+     * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
+     *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+     *
+     * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+     * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+     * are met:
+     * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+     * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+     *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+     * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+     *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+     *    without specific prior written permission.
+     *
+     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+     * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+     * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+     * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+     * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+     * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+     * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+     * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+     * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+     * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+     * SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+6)
+    Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard
+    2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders:
+
+	Markus Friedl
+	Theo de Raadt
+	Niels Provos
+	Dug Song
+	Aaron Campbell
+	Damien Miller
+	Kevin Steves
+	Daniel Kouril
+	Wesley Griffin
+	Per Allansson
+	Nils Nordman
+	Simon Wilkinson
+
+    Portable OpenSSH additionally includes code from the following copyright
+    holders, also under the 2-term BSD license:
+
+	Ben Lindstrom
+	Tim Rice
+	Andre Lucas
+	Chris Adams
+	Corinna Vinschen
+	Cray Inc.
+	Denis Parker
+	Gert Doering
+	Jakob Schlyter
+	Jason Downs
+	Juha Yrjölä
+	Michael Stone
+	Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+	Solar Designer
+	Todd C. Miller
+	Wayne Schroeder
+	William Jones
+	Darren Tucker
+	Sun Microsystems
+	The SCO Group
+	Daniel Walsh
+
+     * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+     * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+     * are met:
+     * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+     * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+     *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+     *
+     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+     * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+     * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+     * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+     * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+     * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+     * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+     * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+     * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+     * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+8) Portable OpenSSH contains the following additional licenses:
+
+    a) md5crypt.c, md5crypt.h
+
+	 * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+	 * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this
+	 * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet
+	 * some day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a
+	 * beer in return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
+
+    b) snprintf replacement
+
+	* Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
+	* This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell
+	* (papowell@astart.com) It may be used for any purpose as long as this
+	* notice remains intact on all source code distributions
+
+    c) Compatibility code (openbsd-compat)
+
+       Apart from the previously mentioned licenses, various pieces of code
+       in the openbsd-compat/ subdirectory are licensed as follows:
+
+       Some code is licensed under a 3-term BSD license, to the following
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Todd C. Miller
+	Theo de Raadt
+	Damien Miller
+	Eric P. Allman
+	The Regents of the University of California
+	Constantin S. Svintsoff
+
+	* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+	* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+	* are met:
+	* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+	*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+	* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+	*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+	*    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+	* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+	*    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+	*    without specific prior written permission.
+	*
+	* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+	* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+	* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+	* ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+	* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+	* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+	* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+	* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+	* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+	* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+	* SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+       Some code is licensed under an ISC-style license, to the following
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Internet Software Consortium.
+	Todd C. Miller
+	Reyk Floeter
+	Chad Mynhier
+
+	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+	* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+	*
+	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TODD C. MILLER DISCLAIMS ALL
+	* WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+	* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL TODD C. MILLER BE LIABLE
+	* FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+	* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+	* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+	* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+       Some code is licensed under a MIT-style license to the following
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+	* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+	* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+	* "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+	* without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+	* distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+	* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+	* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+	* in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+	* OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+	* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+	* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+	* DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+	* OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+	* THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+	* holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+	* sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+	* authorization.                                                           *
+	****************************************************************************/
+
+
+------
+$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.19 2004/08/30 09:18:08 markus Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW b/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e1cc0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after
+OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE.  It has been left in
+the distribution because some of its information may still be useful
+to developers.]
+
+This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source
+code.  This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code.
+
+Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+Updated 17 Nov 1995.
+Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2
+Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2
+
+The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and
+the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and
+make-ssh-known-hosts.  The main program for each of these is in a .c
+file with the same name.
+
+There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of
+these programs.
+
+  Buffer manipulation routines
+
+    - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended.
+      Data can be consumed from either end.  The code is used heavily
+      throughout ssh.  The basic buffer manipulation functions are in
+      buffer.c (header buffer.h), and additional code to manipulate specific
+      data types is in bufaux.c.
+
+  Compression Library
+
+    - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB).
+
+  Encryption/Decryption
+
+    - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms.  These are all
+      accessed through the cipher.h interface.  The interface code is
+      in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc.
+
+  Multiple Precision Integer Library
+
+    - Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary.
+
+  Random Numbers
+
+    - Uses arc4random() and such.
+
+  RSA key generation, encryption, decryption
+
+    - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl.
+
+  RSA key files
+
+    - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format.  The code to
+      read/write these files is in authfile.c.  The files are normally
+      encrypted with a passphrase.  The functions to read passphrases
+      are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords).
+
+  Binary packet protocol
+
+    - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c.  The
+      code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their
+      execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and
+      extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt
+      packets.  CRC code comes from crc32.c.
+
+    - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines
+      (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (compress.c, zlib),
+      and the encryption routines.
+
+  X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding
+
+    - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c.
+      The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication
+      channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to
+      implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication
+      agent forwarding.
+      The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c
+
+  Authentication agent
+
+    - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c.
+
+  Authentication methods
+
+    - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c
+      (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c).  This
+      code is linked into the server.  The routines also manipulate
+      known hosts files using code in hostfile.c.  Code in canohost.c
+      is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host.
+      Code in match.c is used to match host names.
+
+    - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c.  It
+      reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c.  It reads
+      RSA key files with authfile.c.  It communicates the
+      authentication agent using authfd.c.
+
+  The ssh client
+
+    - The client main program is in ssh.c.  It first parses arguments
+      and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in
+      sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a
+      proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c).
+      It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests.  It may call
+      code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes.  Finally it
+      calls client_loop in clientloop.c.  This does the real work for
+      the session.
+
+    - The client is suid root.  It tries to temporarily give up this
+      rights while reading the configuration data.  The root
+      privileges are only used to make the connection (from a
+      privileged socket).  Any extra privileges are dropped before
+      calling ssh_login.
+
+  Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes
+
+    - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c.  Code to
+      encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c.
+
+  Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.)
+
+    - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in
+      login.c.  This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp,
+      and lastlog files.  Some of the code is in sshd.c.
+
+  Writing to the system log and terminal
+
+    - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error()
+      in many places to write messages to system log or user's
+      terminal.  The implementation that logs to system log is in
+      log-server.c; it is used in the server program.  The other
+      programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it
+      is in log-client.c.  The definitions are in ssh.h.
+
+  The sshd server (daemon)
+
+    - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the
+      configuration file (servconf.c).  It then reads the host key,
+      starts listening for connections, and generates the server key.
+      The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm.
+
+    - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the
+      regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client.
+      They first perform identification string exchange, then
+      negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory
+      operations, and finally the server enters the normal session
+      mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c.  This does the real
+      work, calling functions in other modules.
+
+    - The code for the server is in sshd.c.  It contains a lot of
+      stuff, including:
+	- server main program
+	- waiting for connections
+	- processing new connection
+	- authentication
+	- preparatory operations
+	- building up the execution environment for the user program
+	- starting the user program.
+
+  Auxiliary files
+
+    - There are several other files in the distribution that contain
+      various auxiliary routines:
+	ssh.h	     the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
+	uidswap.c    uid-swapping
+	xmalloc.c    "safe" malloc routines
+
+$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.11 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5aada63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
+protocol.
+
+Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
+filexfer protocol described in:
+
+http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
+
+Features from newer versions of the draft are not supported, unless
+explicitly implemented as extensions described below.
+
+The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
+PROTOCOL.agent
+
+1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
+
+This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
+(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
+in:
+
+http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
+
+2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
+
+This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
+algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
+start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
+avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
+
+The method is documented in:
+
+http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
+
+3. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+
+The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
+message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
+more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
+an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
+while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
+the peer.
+
+This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
+otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
+processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
+descriptor.
+
+OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
+signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
+an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
+experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
+	uint32		recipient channel
+	string		"eow@openssh.com"
+	boolean		FALSE
+
+On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
+the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
+originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
+
+As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
+remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
+still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
+window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
+
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
+message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
+Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
+upon request.
+
+4. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
+   "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
+
+Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
+attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
+additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
+request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
+
+When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
+(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
+will send the following global request:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
+	char		want-reply
+
+On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
+future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
+connection.
+
+Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
+(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
+
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
+servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
+whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
+
+5. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
+channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
+with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with 
+interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
+requested by the client with the following packet:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+	string		"tun@openssh.com"
+	uint32		sender channel
+	uint32		initial window size
+	uint32		maximum packet size
+	uint32		tunnel mode
+	uint32		remote unit number
+
+The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
+layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
+
+	SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT  1		/* layer 3 packets */
+	SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET     2		/* layer 2 frames */
+
+The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
+be zero to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A server
+that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse the
+request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful open,
+the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
+
+Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
+over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
+and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
+are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
+	uint32		recipient channel
+	string		data
+
+The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
+
+	uint32			packet length
+	uint32			address family
+	byte[packet length - 4]	packet data
+
+The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
+It may be one of:
+
+	SSH_TUN_AF_INET		2		/* IPv4 */
+	SSH_TUN_AF_INET6	24		/* IPv6 */
+
+The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
+without any link layer header.
+
+The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
+
+	uint32			packet length
+	byte[packet length]	frame
+
+The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
+header.
+
+6. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
+
+When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
+to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
+the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
+fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
+current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
+SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		targetpath
+	string		linkpath
+
+7. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
+
+OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
+standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
+hello packet:
+
+	uint32		3		/* protocol version */
+	string		ext1-name
+	string		ext1-version
+	string		ext2-name
+	string		ext2-version
+	...
+	string		extN-name
+	string		extN-version
+
+Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
+string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
+ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
+extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
+check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
+
+8. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
+
+This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
+are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
+draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
+SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"posix-rename@openssh.com"
+	string		oldpath
+	string		newpath
+
+On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
+rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+9. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
+         "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
+
+These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
+interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
+pathname, and is formatted as follows:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"statvfs@openssh.com"
+	string		path
+
+The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"fstatvfs@openssh.com"
+	string		handle
+
+These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
+return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
+
+	uint32		id
+	uint64		f_bsize		/* file system block size */
+	uint64		f_frsize	/* fundamental fs block size */
+	uint64		f_blocks	/* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
+	uint64		f_bfree		/* free blocks in file system */
+	uint64		f_bavail	/* free blocks for non-root */
+	uint64		f_files		/* total file inodes */
+	uint64		f_ffree		/* free file inodes */
+	uint64		f_favail	/* free file inodes for to non-root */
+	uint64		f_fsid		/* file system id */
+	uint64		f_flag		/* bit mask of f_flag values */
+	uint64		f_namemax	/* maximum filename length */
+
+The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
+
+	#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY	0x1	/* read-only */
+	#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID	0x2	/* no setuid */
+
+Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
+advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.12 2009/02/14 06:35:49 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49adbdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent
@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
+This describes the protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent.
+
+OpenSSH's agent supports managing keys for the standard SSH protocol
+2 as well as the legacy SSH protocol 1. Support for these key types
+is almost completely disjoint - in all but a few cases, operations on
+protocol 2 keys cannot see or affect protocol 1 keys and vice-versa.
+
+Protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys are separated because of the differing
+cryptographic usage: protocol 1 private RSA keys are used to decrypt
+challenges that were encrypted with the corresponding public key,
+whereas protocol 2 RSA private keys are used to sign challenges with
+a private key for verification with the corresponding public key. It
+is considered unsound practice to use the same key for signing and
+encryption.
+
+With a couple of exceptions, the protocol message names used in this
+document indicate which type of key the message relates to. SSH_*
+messages refer to protocol 1 keys only. SSH2_* messages refer to
+protocol 2 keys. Furthermore, the names also indicate whether the
+message is a request to the agent (*_AGENTC_*) or a reply from the
+agent (*_AGENT_*). Section 3 below contains the mapping of the
+protocol message names to their integer values.
+
+1. Data types
+
+Because of support for legacy SSH protocol 1 keys, OpenSSH's agent
+protocol makes use of some data types not defined in RFC 4251.
+
+1.1 uint16
+
+The "uint16" data type is a simple MSB-first 16 bit unsigned integer
+encoded in two bytes.
+
+1.2 mpint1
+
+The "mpint1" type represents an arbitrary precision integer (bignum).
+Its format is as follows:
+
+	uint16			bits
+	byte[(bits + 7) / 8]	bignum
+
+"bignum" contains an unsigned arbitrary precision integer encoded as
+eight bits per byte in big-endian (MSB first) format.
+
+Note the difference between the "mpint1" encoding and the "mpint"
+encoding defined in RFC 4251. Also note that the length of the encoded
+integer is specified in bits, not bytes and that the byte length of
+the integer must be calculated by rounding up the number of bits to the
+nearest eight.
+
+2. Protocol Messages
+
+All protocol messages are prefixed with their length in bytes, encoded
+as a 32 bit unsigned integer. Specifically:
+
+	uint32			message_length
+	byte[message_length]	message
+
+The following message descriptions refer only to the content the
+"message" field.
+
+2.1 Generic server responses
+
+The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response to
+requests from the client. On success the agent may reply either with:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
+
+or a request-specific success message.
+
+On failure, the agent may reply with:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENT_FAILURE
+
+SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to unknown request
+types.
+
+2.2 Adding keys to the agent
+
+Keys are added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and
+SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY requests for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys
+respectively.
+
+Two variants of these requests are SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
+and SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - these add keys with optional
+"constraints" on their usage.
+
+OpenSSH may be built with support for keys hosted on a smartcard
+or other hardware security module. These keys may be added
+to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and
+SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests.
+
+2.2.1 Key constraints
+
+The OpenSSH agent supports some basic optional constraints on key usage.
+At present there are two constraints defined.
+
+The first constraint limits the validity duration of a key. It is
+encoded as:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME
+	uint32			seconds
+
+Where "seconds" contains the number of seconds that the key shall remain
+valid measured from the moment that the agent receives it. After the
+validity period has expired, OpenSSH's agent will erase these keys from
+memory.
+
+The second constraint requires the agent to seek explicit user
+confirmation before performing private key operations with the loaded
+key. This constraint is encoded as:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM
+
+Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one
+of the *_CONSTRAINED requests. Multiple constraints are appended
+consecutively to the end of the request:
+
+	byte			constraint1_type
+	....			constraint1_data
+	byte			constraint2_type
+	....			constraint2_data
+	....
+	byte			constraintN_type
+	....			constraintN_data
+
+Such a sequence of zero or more constraints will be referred to below
+as "constraint[]". Agents may determine whether there are constraints
+by checking whether additional data exists in the "add key" request
+after the key data itself. OpenSSH will refuse to add a key if it
+contains unknown constraints.
+
+2.2.2 Add protocol 1 key
+
+A client may add a protocol 1 key to an agent with the following
+request:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY or
+				SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
+	uint32			ignored
+	mpint1			rsa_n
+	mpint1			rsa_e
+	mpint1			rsa_d
+	mpint1			rsa_iqmp
+	mpint1			rsa_q
+	mpint1			rsa_p
+	string			key_comment
+	constraint[]		key_constraints
+
+Note that there is some redundancy in the key parameters; a key could be
+fully specified using just rsa_q, rsa_p and rsa_e at the cost of extra
+computation.
+
+"key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
+SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY.
+
+The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
+successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
+
+2.2.3 Add protocol 2 key
+
+The OpenSSH agent supports DSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA keys may
+be added using the following request
+
+	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+				SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+	string			"ssh-dss"
+	mpint			dsa_p
+	mpint			dsa_q
+	mpint			dsa_g
+	mpint			dsa_public_key
+	mpint			dsa_private_key
+	string			key_comment
+	constraint[]		key_constraints
+
+RSA keys may be added with this request:
+
+	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+				SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+	string			"ssh-rsa"
+	mpint			rsa_n
+	mpint			rsa_e
+	mpint			rsa_d
+	mpint			rsa_iqmp
+	mpint			rsa_p
+	mpint			rsa_q
+	string			key_comment
+	constraint[]		key_constraints
+
+Note that the 'rsa_p' and 'rsa_q' parameters are sent in the reverse
+order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding
+protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid
+redundant processing.
+
+For both DSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be
+present if the request type is SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED.
+
+The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
+successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
+
+2.2.4 Loading keys from a smartcard
+
+The OpenSSH agent may have optional smartcard support built in to it. If
+so, it supports an operation to load keys from a smartcard. Technically,
+only the public components of the keys are loaded into the agent so
+this operation really arranges for future private key operations to be
+delegated to the smartcard.
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or
+				SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED
+	string			reader_id
+	string			pin
+	constraint[]		key_constraints
+
+"reader_id" is an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin"
+is a PIN or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the
+device. "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
+SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED.
+
+This operation may load all SSH keys that are unlocked using the
+"pin" on the specified reader. The type of key loaded (protocol 1
+or protocol 2) will be specified by the smartcard itself, it is not
+client-specified.
+
+The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have
+been successfully loaded or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
+The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support
+smartcards.
+
+2.3 Removing multiple keys
+
+A client may request that an agent delete all protocol 1 keys using the
+following request:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES
+
+This message requests the deletion of all protocol 2 keys:
+
+	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES
+
+On success, the agent will delete all keys of the requested type and
+reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS message. If an error occurred, the agent
+will reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+Note that, to delete all keys (both protocol 1 and 2), a client
+must send both a SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES and a
+SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES request.
+
+2.4 Removing specific keys
+
+2.4.1 Removing a protocol 1 key
+
+Removal of a protocol 1 key may be requested with the following message:
+
+	byte 			SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY
+	uint32			key_bits
+	mpint1			rsa_e
+	mpint1			rsa_n
+
+Note that key_bits is strictly redundant, as it may be inferred by the
+length of rsa_n.
+
+The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
+and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
+return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+2.4.2 Removing a protocol 2 key
+
+Protocol 2 keys may be removed with the following request:
+
+	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY
+	string			key_blob
+
+Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
+Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or
+"ssh-rsa".
+
+The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
+and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
+return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+2.4.3 Removing keys loaded from a smartcard
+
+A client may request that a server remove one or more smartcard-hosted
+keys using this message:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY
+	string			reader_id
+	string			pin
+
+"reader_id" the an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" is a PIN
+or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the device.
+
+When this message is received, and if the agent supports
+smartcard-hosted keys, it will delete all keys that are hosted on the
+specified smartcard that may be accessed with the given "pin".
+
+The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have
+been successfully removed or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
+The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support
+smartcards.
+
+2.5 Requesting a list of known keys
+
+An agent may be requested to list which keys it holds. Different
+requests exist for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
+
+2.5.1 Requesting a list of protocol 1 keys
+
+To request a list of protocol 1 keys that are held in the agent, a
+client may send the following message:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
+
+The agent will reply with the following message:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
+	uint32			num_keys
+
+Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
+
+	uint32			bits
+	mpint1			rsa_e
+	mpint1			rsa_n
+	string			key_comment
+
+2.5.2 Requesting a list of protocol 2 keys
+
+A client may send the following message to request a list of
+protocol 2 keys that are stored in the agent:
+
+	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
+
+The agent will reply with the following message header:
+
+	byte			SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
+	uint32			num_keys
+
+Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
+
+	string			key_blob
+	string			key_comment
+
+Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
+Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or
+"ssh-rsa".
+
+2.6 Private key operations
+
+The purpose of the agent is to perform private key operations, such as
+signing and encryption without requiring a passphrase to unlock the
+key and without allowing the private key itself to be exposed. There
+are separate requests for the protocol 1 and protocol 2 private key
+operations.
+
+2.6.1 Protocol 1 private key challenge
+
+The private key operation used in version 1 of the SSH protocol is
+decrypting a challenge that has been encrypted with a public key.
+It may be requested using this message:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
+	uint32			ignored
+	mpint1			rsa_e
+	mpint1			rsa_n
+	mpint1			encrypted_challenge
+	byte[16]		session_id
+	uint32			response_type /* must be 1 */
+
+"rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use.
+"encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably)
+been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range 
+1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1
+session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral
+key and the session cookie).
+
+"ignored" and "response_type" exist for compatibility with legacy
+implementations. "response_type" must be equal to 1; other response
+types are not supported.
+
+On receiving this request, the server decrypts the "encrypted_challenge"
+using the private key matching the supplied (rsa_e, rsa_n) values. For
+the response derivation, the decrypted challenge is represented as an
+unsigned, big-endian integer encoded in a 32 byte buffer (i.e. values
+smaller than 2^248 will have leading 0 bytes).
+
+The response value is then calculated as:
+
+	response = MD5(decrypted_challenge || session_id)
+
+and returned in the following message
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
+	byte[16]		response
+
+If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied (rsa_e,
+rsa_n) then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+2.6.2 Protocol 2 private key signature request
+
+A client may use the following message to request signing of data using
+a protocol 2 key:
+
+	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
+	string			key_blob
+	string			data
+	uint32			flags
+
+Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
+Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or
+"ssh-rsa". "flags" is a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value
+is defined (see below for its meaning):
+
+	SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE		1
+
+Upon receiving this request, the agent will look up the private key that
+corresponds to the public key contained in key_blob. It will use this
+private key to sign the "data" and produce a signature blob using the
+key type-specific method described in RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
+Algorithms".
+
+An exception to this is for "ssh-dss" keys where the "flags" word
+contains the value SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE. In this case, a legacy
+signature encoding is used in lieu of the standard one. In this case,
+the DSA signature blob is encoded as:
+
+	byte[40]		signature
+
+The signature will be returned in the response message:
+
+	byte			SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
+	string			signature_blob
+
+If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied key_blob then
+it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+2.7 Locking or unlocking an agent
+
+The agent supports temporary locking with a passphrase to suspend
+processing of sensitive operations until it has been unlocked with the
+same passphrase. To lock an agent, a client send the following request:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENTC_LOCK
+	string			passphrase
+
+Upon receipt of this message and if the agent is not already locked,
+it will suspend processing requests and return a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
+reply. If the agent is already locked, it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+While locked, the agent will refuse all requests except
+SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES and
+SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES. The "request identities" requests are
+treated specially by a locked agent: it will always return an empty list
+of keys.
+
+To unlock an agent, a client may request:
+
+	byte			SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK
+	string			passphrase
+
+If the passphrase matches and the agent is locked, then it will resume
+processing all requests and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If the agent
+is not locked or the passphrase does not match then it will return
+SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+
+Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
+
+3. Protocol message numbers
+
+3.1 Requests from client to agent for protocol 1 key operations
+
+	SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES		1
+	SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE			3
+	SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY			7
+	SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY			8
+	SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES		9
+	SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED		24
+
+3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations
+
+	SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES			11
+	SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST			13
+	SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY			17
+	SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY			18
+	SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES		19
+	SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED			25
+
+3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent
+
+	SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY			20
+	SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY			21
+	SSH_AGENTC_LOCK					22
+	SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK				23
+	SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED	26
+
+3.4 Generic replies from agent to client
+
+	SSH_AGENT_FAILURE				5
+	SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS				6
+
+3.5 Replies from agent to client for protocol 1 key operations
+
+	SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER			2
+	SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE				4
+
+3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations
+
+	SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER			12
+	SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE			14
+
+3.7 Key constraint identifiers
+
+	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME			1
+	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM			2
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.4 2008/07/01 23:12:47 stevesk Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README b/crypto/openssh/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8538e8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.3 for the release notes.
+
+- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
+- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
+- Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
+
+This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
+Unices.
+
+OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
+implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
+external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
+reintroduced and many other clean-ups.  OpenSSH has been created by
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
+and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/
+
+This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
+support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library
+functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
+has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
+NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare.
+
+This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
+
+The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
+commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
+all logins, not just when using password authentication.
+
+OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5].
+
+There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
+refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
+
+Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
+openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by
+unsubscribed users.Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the 
+OpenBSD style guidelines[6].
+
+Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
+OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this
+port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7]
+for details and general tips.
+
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+
+Miscellania -
+
+This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
+CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
+implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
+
+References -
+
+[0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
+[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
+[2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
+[3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+[4] http://www.openssl.org/
+[5] http://www.openpam.org
+    http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ 
+    (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
+[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
+[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
+
+$Id: README,v 1.70.4.1 2009/09/26 04:11:47 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.dns b/crypto/openssh/README.dns
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9787918
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.dns
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+How to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS
+---------------------------------------------
+
+OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described in
+draft-ietf-secsh-dns-05.txt. The document contains very brief instructions
+on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the scope of this
+document.
+
+
+(1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR
+
+To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the
+public host key, use the following command:
+
+	ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g
+
+where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the
+file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys,
+you should generate one RR for each key.
+
+In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a
+generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server
+implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR
+you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR.
+
+To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR
+to your DNS zone file and sign your zone.
+
+
+(2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS
+
+To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to
+add the following option to the ssh configuration file
+($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config):
+
+    VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
+
+Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR
+using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches
+the remote host key, the user will be notified.
+
+
+	Jakob Schlyter
+	Wesley Griffin
+
+
+$OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.platform b/crypto/openssh/README.platform
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d198232
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.platform
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms.
+
+AIX
+---
+As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry
+settings, where previously it did not.  Because of this, it's possible for
+sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which
+have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between
+password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired
+chuser attribute).
+
+Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
+administrator.  As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
+passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
+
+As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version
+and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
+if found.  This will enable IPv6 support.  If for some reason configure
+gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
+than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
+to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
+
+IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
+IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
+
+If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
+locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
+define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
+
+blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
+  --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
+
+If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
+by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
+loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
+"rlogin" attribute set.  This check is not done for the root account,
+instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
+
+
+Cygwin
+------
+To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
+gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
+openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
+
+
+Darwin and MacOS X
+------------------
+Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
+virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
+has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
+
+Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
+MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
+using a third party driver. More information is available at:
+	http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
+
+
+Linux
+-----
+
+Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
+headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
+binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
+missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
+development packages.  On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
+zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
+libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
+
+
+Solaris
+-------
+If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
+for praudit(1m) to give sensible output.  The following line needs to be
+added to /etc/security/audit_event:
+
+	32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo
+
+The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is
+32768 - 65535.  Event number 32800 has been choosen for AUE_openssh.
+There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this
+number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time
+by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding.
+
+
+Platforms using PAM
+-------------------
+As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when
+PAM is enabled.  To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be
+added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell
+sessions.  Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or
+account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
+return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
+
+
+$Id: README.platform,v 1.10 2009/08/28 23:14:48 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.privsep b/crypto/openssh/README.privsep
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f565e72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.privsep
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+Privilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which
+operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate
+privileged monitor process.  Its purpose is to prevent privilege
+escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process.
+More information is available at:
+	http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html
+
+Privilege separation is now enabled by default; see the
+UsePrivilegeSeparation option in sshd_config(5).
+
+On systems which lack mmap or anonymous (MAP_ANON) memory mapping,
+compression must be disabled in order for privilege separation to
+function.
+
+When privsep is enabled, during the pre-authentication phase sshd will
+chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user
+and its primary group.  sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be
+used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
+"nologin" or invalid shell.
+
+You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep
+preauth environment:
+
+	# mkdir /var/empty
+	# chown root:sys /var/empty
+	# chmod 755 /var/empty
+	# groupadd sshd
+	# useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd
+
+/var/empty should not contain any files.
+
+configure supports the following options to change the default
+privsep user and chroot directory:
+
+  --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot
+  --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
+
+Privsep requires operating system support for file descriptor passing.
+Compression will be disabled on systems without a working mmap MAP_ANON.
+
+PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD, 
+HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris.
+
+On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix, OpenServer, and Unicos only the pre-authentication
+part of privsep is supported.  Post-authentication privsep is disabled
+automatically (so you won't see the additional process mentioned below).
+
+Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep
+will require 1 additional process per login session.
+
+Given the following process listing (from HP-UX):
+
+     UID   PID  PPID  C    STIME TTY       TIME COMMAND
+    root  1005     1  0 10:45:17 ?         0:08 /opt/openssh/sbin/sshd -u0
+    root  6917  1005  0 15:19:16 ?         0:00 sshd: stevesk [priv]
+ stevesk  6919  6917  0 15:19:17 ?         0:03 sshd: stevesk@2
+ stevesk  6921  6919  0 15:19:17 pts/2     0:00 -bash
+
+process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections.
+process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned
+sshd process and 6921 is the shell process.
+
+$Id: README.privsep,v 1.16 2005/06/04 23:21:41 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.smartcard b/crypto/openssh/README.smartcard
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdf83ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.smartcard
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+How to use smartcards with OpenSSH?
+
+OpenSSH contains experimental support for authentication using
+Cyberflex smartcards and TODOS card readers, in addition to the cards
+with PKCS#15 structure supported by OpenSC. To enable this you
+need to:
+
+Using libsectok:
+
+(1) enable sectok support in OpenSSH:
+
+	$ ./configure --with-sectok
+
+(2) If you have used a previous version of ssh with your card, you
+    must remove the old applet and keys.
+
+	$ sectok
+	sectok> login -d
+	sectok> junload Ssh.bin
+	sectok> delete 0012
+	sectok> delete sh
+	sectok> quit
+
+(3) load the Java Cardlet to the Cyberflex card and set card passphrase:
+
+	$ sectok
+	sectok> login -d
+	sectok> jload /usr/libdata/ssh/Ssh.bin
+	sectok> setpass
+	Enter new AUT0 passphrase:
+	Re-enter passphrase:
+	sectok> quit
+
+	Do not forget the passphrase.  There is no way to
+	recover if you do.
+
+	IMPORTANT WARNING: If you attempt to login with the
+	wrong passphrase three times in a row, you will
+	destroy your card.
+
+(4) load a RSA key to the card:
+
+	$ ssh-keygen -f /path/to/rsakey -U 1
+	(where 1 is the reader number, you can also try 0)
+
+	In spite of the name, this does not generate a key.
+	It just loads an already existing key on to the card.
+
+(5) Optional: If you don't want to use a card passphrase, change the
+    acl on the private key file:
+
+	$ sectok
+	sectok> login -d
+	sectok> acl 0012 world: w
+	 world: w
+	 AUT0: w inval
+	sectok> quit
+
+	If you do this, anyone who has access to your card
+	can assume your identity.  This is not recommended.
+
+
+Using OpenSC:
+
+(1) install OpenSC:
+
+	Sources and instructions are available from
+	http://www.opensc.org/
+
+(2) enable OpenSC support in OpenSSH:
+
+	$ ./configure --with-opensc[=/path/to/opensc] [options]
+
+(3) load a RSA key to the card:
+
+	Not supported yet.
+
+
+Common operations:
+
+(1) tell the ssh client to use the card reader:
+
+	$ ssh -I 1 otherhost
+
+(2) or tell the agent (don't forget to restart) to use the smartcard:
+
+	$ ssh-add -s 1
+
+
+-markus,
+Tue Jul 17 23:54:51 CEST 2001
+
+$OpenBSD: README.smartcard,v 1.9 2003/11/21 11:57:02 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.tun b/crypto/openssh/README.tun
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e1cb07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.tun
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+How to use OpenSSH-based virtual private networks
+-------------------------------------------------
+
+OpenSSH contains support for VPN tunneling using the tun(4) network
+tunnel pseudo-device which is available on most platforms, either for
+layer 2 or 3 traffic.
+
+The following brief instructions on how to use this feature use
+a network configuration specific to the OpenBSD operating system.
+
+(1) Server: Enable support for SSH tunneling
+
+To enable the ssh server to accept tunnel requests from the client, you
+have to add the following option to the ssh server configuration file
+(/etc/ssh/sshd_config):
+
+	PermitTunnel yes
+
+Restart the server or send the hangup signal (SIGHUP) to let the server
+reread it's configuration.
+
+(2) Server: Restrict client access and assign the tunnel
+
+The OpenSSH server simply uses the file /root/.ssh/authorized_keys to
+restrict the client to connect to a specified tunnel and to
+automatically start the related interface configuration command. These
+settings are optional but recommended:
+
+	tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... reyk@openbsd.org
+
+(3) Client: Configure the local network tunnel interface
+
+Use the hostname.if(5) interface-specific configuration file to set up
+the network tunnel configuration with OpenBSD. For example, use the
+following configuration in /etc/hostname.tun0 to set up the layer 3
+tunnel on the client:
+
+	inet 192.168.5.1 255.255.255.252 192.168.5.2
+
+OpenBSD also supports layer 2 tunneling over the tun device by adding
+the link0 flag:
+
+	inet 192.168.1.78 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.255 link0
+
+Layer 2 tunnels can be used in combination with an Ethernet bridge(4)
+interface, like the following example for /etc/bridgename.bridge0:
+
+	add tun0
+	add sis0
+	up
+
+(4) Client: Configure the OpenSSH client
+
+To establish tunnel forwarding for connections to a specified
+remote host by default, use the following ssh client configuration for
+the privileged user (in /root/.ssh/config):
+
+	Host sshgateway
+		Tunnel yes
+		TunnelDevice 0:any
+		PermitLocalCommand yes
+	        LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
+
+A more complicated configuration is possible to establish a tunnel to
+a remote host which is not directly accessible by the client.
+The following example describes a client configuration to connect to
+the remote host over two ssh hops in between. It uses the OpenSSH
+ProxyCommand in combination with the nc(1) program to forward the final
+ssh tunnel destination over multiple ssh sessions.
+
+	Host access.somewhere.net
+	        User puffy
+	Host dmzgw
+	        User puffy
+	        ProxyCommand ssh access.somewhere.net nc dmzgw 22
+	Host sshgateway
+	        Tunnel Ethernet
+	        TunnelDevice 0:any
+	        PermitLocalCommand yes
+	        LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
+	        ProxyCommand ssh dmzgw nc sshgateway 22
+
+The following network plan illustrates the previous configuration in
+combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging.
+
++--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
+| Client |------(  Internet  )-----| access.somewhere.net |
++--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
+    : 192.168.1.78                             |
+    :.............................         +-------+
+     Forwarded ssh connection    :         | dmzgw |
+     Layer 2 tunnel              :         +-------+
+                                 :             |
+                                 :             |
+                                 :      +------------+
+                                 :......| sshgateway |
+                                      | +------------+
+--- real connection                 Bridge ->  |          +----------+
+... "virtual connection"                     [ X ]--------| somehost |
+[X] switch                                                +----------+
+                                                          192.168.1.25
+
+(5) Client: Connect to the server and establish the tunnel
+
+Finally connect to the OpenSSH server to establish the tunnel by using
+the following command:
+
+	ssh sshgateway
+
+It is also possible to tell the client to fork into the background after
+the connection has been successfully established:
+
+	ssh -f sshgateway true
+
+Without the ssh configuration done in step (4), it is also possible
+to use the following command lines:
+
+	ssh -fw 0:1 sshgateway true
+	ifconfig tun0 192.168.5.1 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+
+Using OpenSSH tunnel forwarding is a simple way to establish secure
+and ad hoc virtual private networks. Possible fields of application
+could be wireless networks or administrative VPN tunnels.
+
+Nevertheless, ssh tunneling requires some packet header overhead and
+runs on top of TCP. It is still suggested to use the IP Security
+Protocol (IPSec) for robust and permanent VPN connections and to
+interconnect corporate networks.
+
+	Reyk Floeter
+
+$OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.4 2006/03/28 00:12:31 deraadt Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/TODO b/crypto/openssh/TODO
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8aaa4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/TODO
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Documentation:
+
+- Update the docs
+  - Update README
+  - Update INSTALL
+  - Merge INSTALL & README.privsep
+
+- Install FAQ?
+
+- General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it
+  would be best to use them.
+
+- Create a Documentation/ directory?
+
+Programming:
+
+- Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix
+
+- Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result
+  is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp
+  <holger.trapp@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> reports that changing the configure
+  generated link order from:
+	-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl  -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto
+  to:
+	-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl  -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes
+  fixing the problem.
+
+- Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket
+  rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S".
+
+- More platforms for for setproctitle() emulation (testing needed)
+
+- Improve PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ - Informational messages
+ - Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from
+   Solar Designer)
+ - Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used
+   and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication skey, pam"
+
+- Complete Tru64 SIA support
+ - It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down
+   on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too?
+
+- Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS
+  (Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+- 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com):
+  - utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?)
+  - can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet)
+
+Clean up configure/makefiles:
+- Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables
+  left to do.  HAVE_LOGIN is one of them.  Consider NOT looking for
+  information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected
+  from the start
+
+- Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better???
+ - Do it in configure.ac
+
+- Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h  into seperate test
+  to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly.
+
+- Consider splitting configure.ac into seperate files which do logically
+  similar tests. E.g move all the type detection stuff into one file,
+  entropy related stuff into another.
+
+Packaging:
+- HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts.
+  (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+PrivSep Issues:
+- mmap() issues.
+  + /dev/zero solution (Solaris)
+  + No/broken MAP_ANON (Irix)
+  + broken /dev/zero parse (Linux)
+- PAM
+  + See above PAM notes
+- AIX
+  + usrinfo() does not set TTY, but only required for legacy systems.  Works
+    with PrivSep.
+- OSF
+  + SIA is broken
+- Cygwin
+  + Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing)
+
+$Id: TODO,v 1.58 2004/12/06 11:40:11 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/WARNING.RNG b/crypto/openssh/WARNING.RNG
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97da74f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/WARNING.RNG
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+This document contains a description of portable OpenSSH's random
+number collection code. An alternate reading of this text could
+well be titled "Why I should pressure my system vendor to supply
+/dev/random in their OS".
+
+Why is this important? OpenSSH depends on good, unpredictable numbers
+for generating keys, performing digital signatures and forming
+cryptographic challenges. If the random numbers that it uses are
+predictable, then the strength of the whole system is compromised.
+
+A particularly pernicious problem arises with DSA keys (used by the
+ssh2 protocol). Performing a DSA signature (which is required for
+authentication), entails the use of a 160 bit random number.  If an
+attacker can predict this number, then they can deduce your *private*
+key and impersonate you or your hosts.
+
+If you are using the builtin random number support (configure will
+tell you if this is the case), then read this document in its entirety.
+Alternately, you can use Lutz Jaenicke's PRNGd - a small daemon which
+collects random numbers and makes them available by a socket.
+
+Please also request that your OS vendor provides a kernel-based random
+number collector (/dev/random) in future versions of your operating
+systems by default.
+
+On to the description...
+
+The portable OpenSSH contains random number collection support for
+systems which lack a kernel entropy pool (/dev/random).
+
+This collector (as of 3.1 and beyond) comes as an external application
+that allows the local admin to decide on how to implement entropy
+collection.
+
+The default entropy collector operates by executing the programs listed
+in ($etcdir)/ssh_prng_cmds, reading their output and adding it to the
+PRNG supplied by OpenSSL (which is hash-based). It also stirs in the
+output of several system calls and timings from the execution of the
+programs that it runs.
+
+The ssh_prng_cmds file also specifies a 'rate' for each program. This
+represents the number of bits of randomness per byte of output from
+the specified program.
+
+The random number code will also read and save a seed file to
+~/.ssh/prng_seed. This contents of this file are added to the random
+number generator at startup. The goal here is to maintain as much
+randomness between sessions as possible.
+
+The default entropy collection code has two main problems:
+
+1. It is slow.
+
+Executing each program in the list can take a large amount of time,
+especially on slower machines. Additionally some program can take a
+disproportionate time to execute.
+
+Tuning the random helper can be done by running ./ssh-random-helper in
+very verbose mode ("-vvv") and identifying the commands that are taking
+excessive amounts of time or hanging altogher.  Any problem commands can
+be modified or removed from ssh_prng_cmds.
+
+The default entropy collector will timeout programs which take too long
+to execute, the actual timeout used can be adjusted with the
+--with-entropy-timeout configure option. OpenSSH will not try to
+re-execute programs which have not been found, have had a non-zero
+exit status or have timed out more than a couple of times.
+
+2. Estimating the real 'rate' of program outputs is non-trivial
+
+The shear volume of the task is problematic: there are currently
+around 50 commands in the ssh_prng_cmds list, portable OpenSSH
+supports at least 12 different OSs. That is already 600 sets of data
+to be analysed, without taking into account the numerous differences
+between versions of each OS.
+
+On top of this, the different commands can produce varying amounts of
+usable data depending on how busy the machine is, how long it has been
+up and various other factors.
+
+To make matters even more complex, some of the commands are reporting
+largely the same data as other commands (eg. the various "ps" calls).
+
+
+How to avoid the default entropy code?
+
+The best way is to read the OpenSSL documentation and recompile OpenSSL
+to use prngd or egd.  Some platforms (like earily solaris) have 3rd
+party /dev/random devices that can be also used for this task.
+
+If you are forced to use ssh-rand-helper consider still downloading
+prngd/egd and configure OpenSSH using --with-prngd-port=xx or
+--with-prngd-socket=xx (refer to INSTALL for more information).
+
+$Id: WARNING.RNG,v 1.8 2005/05/26 01:47:54 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4 b/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b68a470
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+dnl $Id: aclocal.m4,v 1.6 2005/09/19 16:33:39 tim Exp $
+dnl
+dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros
+dnl
+
+
+dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol)
+dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field'
+dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result.
+dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there
+AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [
+# look for field '$1' in header '$2'
+	dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename
+	ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+	dnl
+	ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2)
+	AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [
+		AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl
+			eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl
+		], [ dnl
+			eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl
+		]) dnl
+	])
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result)
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+			AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2])
+		fi
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+	fi
+])
+
+dnl OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(variablename, command):
+dnl Tidiness function, sets 'undef' if not found, and does the AC_SUBST
+AC_DEFUN(OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG, [
+	AC_PATH_PROG($1, $2)
+	if test -z "[$]$1" ; then
+		$1="undef"
+	fi
+	AC_SUBST($1)
+])
+
+dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in
+dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different
+dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc.  So we
+dnl have to test to find something that will work.
+AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T],
+[
+   AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[
+      AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent])
+      AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv],
+      [
+	 # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
+	 # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
+	 curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
+	 for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
+	    for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
+	       AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+		  #include <sys/types.h>
+		  #include <sys/socket.h>
+
+		  int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
+	       ],[
+		  $t len;
+		  getpeername(0,0,&len);
+	       ],[
+		  curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
+		  break
+	       ])
+	    done
+	 done
+
+	 if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
+	    AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])
+	 fi
+      ])
+      AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv)
+      AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv,
+			[type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])],
+      [#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>])
+])
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/acss.c b/crypto/openssh/acss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86e2c01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/acss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+/*	$Id: acss.c,v 1.4 2006/07/24 04:51:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenBSD project
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906000L)
+
+#include "acss.h"
+
+/* decryption sbox */
+static unsigned char sboxdec[] = {
+	0x33, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x26, 0x63, 0x23, 0x6b, 0x76,
+	0x3e, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x7b,
+	0xd3, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x06, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4b, 0x96,
+	0xde, 0x9e, 0xd6, 0x0b, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x9b,
+	0x57, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x87, 0xcf, 0x12,
+	0x5a, 0x1a, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xc2, 0x1f,
+	0xd9, 0x99, 0xd1, 0x00, 0x49, 0x09, 0x41, 0x90,
+	0xd8, 0x98, 0xd0, 0x01, 0x48, 0x08, 0x40, 0x91,
+	0x3d, 0x7d, 0x35, 0x24, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x74,
+	0x3c, 0x7c, 0x34, 0x25, 0x6c, 0x2c, 0x64, 0x75,
+	0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd5, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x0d, 0x45, 0x94,
+	0xdc, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0x05, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0x44, 0x95,
+	0x59, 0x19, 0x51, 0x80, 0xc9, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x10,
+	0x58, 0x18, 0x50, 0x81, 0xc8, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x11,
+	0xd7, 0x97, 0xdf, 0x02, 0x47, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x92,
+	0xda, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x4a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0x9f,
+	0x53, 0x13, 0x5b, 0x86, 0xc3, 0x83, 0xcb, 0x16,
+	0x5e, 0x1e, 0x56, 0x8b, 0xce, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1b,
+	0xb3, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf6,
+	0xbe, 0xfe, 0xb6, 0xab, 0xee, 0xae, 0xe6, 0xfb,
+	0x37, 0x77, 0x3f, 0x22, 0x67, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x72,
+	0x3a, 0x7a, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x6a, 0x2a, 0x62, 0x7f,
+	0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0xf0,
+	0xb8, 0xf8, 0xb0, 0xa1, 0xe8, 0xa8, 0xe0, 0xf1,
+	0x5d, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x8d, 0xc5, 0x14,
+	0x5c, 0x1c, 0x54, 0x85, 0xcc, 0x8c, 0xc4, 0x15,
+	0xbd, 0xfd, 0xb5, 0xa4, 0xed, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf4,
+	0xbc, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0xec, 0xac, 0xe4, 0xf5,
+	0x39, 0x79, 0x31, 0x20, 0x69, 0x29, 0x61, 0x70,
+	0x38, 0x78, 0x30, 0x21, 0x68, 0x28, 0x60, 0x71,
+	0xb7, 0xf7, 0xbf, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xa7, 0xef, 0xf2,
+	0xba, 0xfa, 0xb2, 0xaf, 0xea, 0xaa, 0xe2, 0xff
+};
+
+/* encryption sbox */
+static unsigned char sboxenc[] = {
+	0x33, 0x3b, 0x73, 0x15, 0x53, 0x5b, 0x13, 0x75,
+	0x3d, 0x35, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0x5d, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x7b,
+	0x67, 0x6f, 0x27, 0x81, 0xc7, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x21,
+	0x69, 0x61, 0x29, 0x8f, 0xc9, 0xc1, 0x89, 0x2f,
+	0xe3, 0xeb, 0xa3, 0x05, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x03, 0xa5,
+	0xed, 0xe5, 0xad, 0x0b, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x0d, 0xab,
+	0xea, 0xe2, 0xaa, 0x00, 0x4a, 0x42, 0x0a, 0xa0,
+	0xe8, 0xe0, 0xa8, 0x02, 0x48, 0x40, 0x08, 0xa2,
+	0x3e, 0x36, 0x7e, 0x14, 0x5e, 0x56, 0x1e, 0x74,
+	0x3c, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x16, 0x5c, 0x54, 0x1c, 0x76,
+	0x6a, 0x62, 0x2a, 0x80, 0xca, 0xc2, 0x8a, 0x20,
+	0x68, 0x60, 0x28, 0x82, 0xc8, 0xc0, 0x88, 0x22,
+	0xee, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x04, 0x4e, 0x46, 0x0e, 0xa4,
+	0xec, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x06, 0x4c, 0x44, 0x0c, 0xa6,
+	0xe7, 0xef, 0xa7, 0x01, 0x47, 0x4f, 0x07, 0xa1,
+	0xe9, 0xe1, 0xa9, 0x0f, 0x49, 0x41, 0x09, 0xaf,
+	0x63, 0x6b, 0x23, 0x85, 0xc3, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x25,
+	0x6d, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x8b, 0xcd, 0xc5, 0x8d, 0x2b,
+	0x37, 0x3f, 0x77, 0x11, 0x57, 0x5f, 0x17, 0x71,
+	0x39, 0x31, 0x79, 0x1f, 0x59, 0x51, 0x19, 0x7f,
+	0xb3, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0x95, 0xd3, 0xdb, 0x93, 0xf5,
+	0xbd, 0xb5, 0xfd, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0xd5, 0x9d, 0xfb,
+	0xba, 0xb2, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xda, 0xd2, 0x9a, 0xf0,
+	0xb8, 0xb0, 0xf8, 0x92, 0xd8, 0xd0, 0x98, 0xf2,
+	0x6e, 0x66, 0x2e, 0x84, 0xce, 0xc6, 0x8e, 0x24,
+	0x6c, 0x64, 0x2c, 0x86, 0xcc, 0xc4, 0x8c, 0x26,
+	0x3a, 0x32, 0x7a, 0x10, 0x5a, 0x52, 0x1a, 0x70,
+	0x38, 0x30, 0x78, 0x12, 0x58, 0x50, 0x18, 0x72,
+	0xbe, 0xb6, 0xfe, 0x94, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x9e, 0xf4,
+	0xbc, 0xb4, 0xfc, 0x96, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x9c, 0xf6,
+	0xb7, 0xbf, 0xf7, 0x91, 0xd7, 0xdf, 0x97, 0xf1,
+	0xb9, 0xb1, 0xf9, 0x9f, 0xd9, 0xd1, 0x99, 0xff
+};
+
+static unsigned char reverse[] = {
+	0x00, 0x80, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xa0, 0x60, 0xe0,
+	0x10, 0x90, 0x50, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x70, 0xf0,
+	0x08, 0x88, 0x48, 0xc8, 0x28, 0xa8, 0x68, 0xe8,
+	0x18, 0x98, 0x58, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x78, 0xf8,
+	0x04, 0x84, 0x44, 0xc4, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xe4,
+	0x14, 0x94, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xf4,
+	0x0c, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x6c, 0xec,
+	0x1c, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0x3c, 0xbc, 0x7c, 0xfc,
+	0x02, 0x82, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x62, 0xe2,
+	0x12, 0x92, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x32, 0xb2, 0x72, 0xf2,
+	0x0a, 0x8a, 0x4a, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0xea,
+	0x1a, 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xda, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xfa,
+	0x06, 0x86, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xa6, 0x66, 0xe6,
+	0x16, 0x96, 0x56, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf6,
+	0x0e, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0xce, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x6e, 0xee,
+	0x1e, 0x9e, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xfe,
+	0x01, 0x81, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x21, 0xa1, 0x61, 0xe1,
+	0x11, 0x91, 0x51, 0xd1, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x71, 0xf1,
+	0x09, 0x89, 0x49, 0xc9, 0x29, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xe9,
+	0x19, 0x99, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x79, 0xf9,
+	0x05, 0x85, 0x45, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xe5,
+	0x15, 0x95, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xf5,
+	0x0d, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xed,
+	0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0xdd, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfd,
+	0x03, 0x83, 0x43, 0xc3, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xe3,
+	0x13, 0x93, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb3, 0x73, 0xf3,
+	0x0b, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x6b, 0xeb,
+	0x1b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0xdb, 0x3b, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0xfb,
+	0x07, 0x87, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x27, 0xa7, 0x67, 0xe7,
+	0x17, 0x97, 0x57, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x77, 0xf7,
+	0x0f, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xef,
+	0x1f, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xff
+};
+
+/*
+ * Two linear feedback shift registers are used:
+ *
+ * lfsr17:  polynomial of degree 17, primitive modulo 2 (listed in Schneier)
+ *          x^15 + x + 1
+ * lfsr25:  polynomial of degree 25, not know if primitive modulo 2
+ *          x^13 + x^5 + x^4 + x^1 + 1
+ *
+ * Output bits are discarded, instead the feedback bits are added to produce
+ * the cipher stream.  Depending on the mode, feedback bytes may be inverted
+ * bit-wise before addition.
+ *
+ * The lfsrs are seeded with bytes from the raw key:
+ *
+ * lfsr17:  byte 0[0:7] at bit 9
+ *          byte 1[0:7] at bit 0
+ *
+ * lfsr25:  byte 2[0:4] at bit 16
+ *          byte 2[5:7] at bit 22
+ *          byte 3[0:7] at bit 8
+ *          byte 4[0:7] at bit 0
+ *
+ * To prevent 0 cycles, 1's are inject at bit 8 in lfrs17 and bit 21 in
+ * lfsr25.
+ *
+ */
+
+int
+acss(ACSS_KEY *key, unsigned long len, const unsigned char *in,
+    unsigned char *out)
+{
+	unsigned long i;
+	unsigned long lfsr17tmp, lfsr25tmp, lfsrsumtmp;
+
+	lfsrsumtmp = lfsr17tmp = lfsr25tmp = 0;
+
+	/* keystream is sum of lfsrs */
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		lfsr17tmp = key->lfsr17 ^ (key->lfsr17 >> 14);
+		key->lfsr17 = (key->lfsr17 >> 8)
+			^ (lfsr17tmp << 9)
+			^ (lfsr17tmp << 12)
+			^ (lfsr17tmp << 15);
+		key->lfsr17 &= 0x1ffff;	/* 17 bit LFSR */
+
+		lfsr25tmp = key->lfsr25
+			^ (key->lfsr25 >> 3)
+			^ (key->lfsr25 >> 4)
+			^ (key->lfsr25 >> 12);
+		key->lfsr25 = (key->lfsr25 >> 8) ^ (lfsr25tmp << 17);
+		key->lfsr25 &= 0x1ffffff;	/* 25 bit LFSR */
+
+		lfsrsumtmp = key->lfsrsum;
+
+		/* addition */
+		switch (key->mode) {
+		case ACSS_AUTHENTICATE:
+		case ACSS_DATA:
+			key->lfsrsum = 0xff & ~(key->lfsr17 >> 9);
+			key->lfsrsum += key->lfsr25 >> 17;
+			break;
+		case ACSS_SESSIONKEY:
+			key->lfsrsum = key->lfsr17 >> 9;
+			key->lfsrsum += key->lfsr25 >> 17;
+			break;
+		case ACSS_TITLEKEY:
+			key->lfsrsum = key->lfsr17 >> 9;
+			key->lfsrsum += 0xff & ~(key->lfsr25 >> 17);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return 1;
+		}
+		key->lfsrsum += (lfsrsumtmp >> 8);
+
+		if (key->encrypt) {
+			out[i] = sboxenc[(in[i] ^ key->lfsrsum) & 0xff];
+		} else {
+			out[i] = (sboxdec[in[i]] ^ key->lfsrsum) & 0xff;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+acss_seed(ACSS_KEY *key)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	/* if available, mangle with subkey */
+	if (key->subkey_avilable) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ACSS_KEYSIZE; i++)
+			key->seed[i] = reverse[key->data[i] ^ key->subkey[i]];
+	} else {
+		for (i = 0; i < ACSS_KEYSIZE; i++)
+			key->seed[i] = reverse[key->data[i]];
+	}
+
+	/* seed lfsrs */
+	key->lfsr17 = key->seed[1]
+		| (key->seed[0] << 9)
+		| (1 << 8);	/* inject 1 at bit 9 */
+	key->lfsr25 = key->seed[4]
+		| (key->seed[3] << 8)
+		| ((key->seed[2] & 0x1f) << 16)
+		| ((key->seed[2] & 0xe0) << 17)
+			| (1 << 21);	/* inject 1 at bit 22 */
+
+	key->lfsrsum = 0;
+}
+
+void
+acss_setkey(ACSS_KEY *key, const unsigned char *data, int enc, int mode)
+{
+	memcpy(key->data, data, sizeof(key->data));
+	memset(key->subkey, 0, sizeof(key->subkey));
+
+	if (enc != -1)
+		key->encrypt = enc;
+	key->mode = mode;
+	key->subkey_avilable = 0;
+
+	acss_seed(key);
+}
+
+void
+acss_setsubkey(ACSS_KEY *key, const unsigned char *subkey)
+{
+	memcpy(key->subkey, subkey, sizeof(key->subkey));
+	key->subkey_avilable = 1;
+	acss_seed(key);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/acss.h b/crypto/openssh/acss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91b4895
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/acss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*	$Id: acss.h,v 1.2 2004/02/06 04:22:43 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenBSD project
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ACSS_H_
+#define _ACSS_H_
+
+/* 40bit key */
+#define ACSS_KEYSIZE		5
+
+/* modes of acss */
+#define ACSS_AUTHENTICATE	0
+#define ACSS_SESSIONKEY		1
+#define ACSS_TITLEKEY		2
+#define ACSS_DATA		3
+
+typedef struct acss_key_st {
+	unsigned int	lfsr17;		/* current state of lfsrs */
+	unsigned int	lfsr25;
+	unsigned int	lfsrsum;
+	unsigned char	seed[ACSS_KEYSIZE];
+	unsigned char	data[ACSS_KEYSIZE];
+	unsigned char	subkey[ACSS_KEYSIZE];
+	int		encrypt;	/* XXX make these bit flags? */
+	int		mode;
+	int		seeded;
+	int		subkey_avilable;
+} ACSS_KEY;
+
+void acss_setkey(ACSS_KEY *, const unsigned char *, int, int);
+void acss_setsubkey(ACSS_KEY *, const unsigned char *);
+int acss(ACSS_KEY *, unsigned long, const unsigned char *, unsigned char *);
+
+#endif /* ifndef _ACSS_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c b/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d39885b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.4 2008/12/10 03:55:20 stevesk Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct xaddr {
+	sa_family_t	af;
+	union {
+		struct in_addr		v4;
+		struct in6_addr		v6;
+		u_int8_t		addr8[16];
+		u_int32_t		addr32[4];
+	} xa;		    /* 128-bit address */
+	u_int32_t	scope_id;	/* iface scope id for v6 */
+#define v4	xa.v4
+#define v6	xa.v6
+#define addr8	xa.addr8
+#define addr32	xa.addr32
+};
+
+static int
+addr_unicast_masklen(int af)
+{
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return 32;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return 128;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int
+masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen)
+{
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+
+	memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa));
+
+	switch (sa->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (slen < sizeof(*in4))
+			return -1;
+		xa->af = AF_INET;
+		memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4));
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (slen < sizeof(*in6))
+			return -1;
+		xa->af = AF_INET6;
+		memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6));
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+		xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id;
+#endif
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
+ * store it in 'n'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n));
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		n->af = AF_INET;
+		n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff);
+		return 0;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		n->af = AF_INET6;
+		for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32)
+			n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU;
+		if (i < 4 && l != 0)
+			n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) &
+			    0xffffffff);
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af)
+		return -1;
+
+	memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst));
+	switch (a->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr;
+		return 0;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		dst->scope_id = a->scope_id;
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+			dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i];
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare addresses 'a' and 'b'
+ * Return 0 if addresses are identical, -1 if (a < b) or 1 if (a > b)
+ */
+static int
+addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (a->af != b->af)
+		return a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1;
+
+	switch (a->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr)
+			return 0;
+		return ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+			if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0)
+				return a->addr8[i] > b->addr8[i] ? 1 : -1;
+		if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id)
+			return 0;
+		return a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse string address 'p' into 'n'
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+	memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (n != NULL &&
+	    addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, n) == -1) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	freeaddrinfo(ai);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform bitwise negation of address
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_invert(struct xaddr *n)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (n == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	switch (n->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr;
+		return (0);
+	case AF_INET6:
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+			n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i];
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		return (-1);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
+ * store it in 'n'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+	if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether address 'a' is all zeros (i.e. 0.0.0.0 or ::)
+ * Returns 0 on if address is all-zeros, -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	switch (a->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1);
+	case AF_INET6:;
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+			if (a->addr32[i] != 0)
+				return (-1);
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		return (-1);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen'
+ * is all zeros.
+ * Returns 0 on if host portion of address is all-zeros,
+ * -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
+ */
+static int
+addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
+{
+	struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result;
+
+	memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr));
+	if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	return (addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z).
+ * Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success.
+ */
+static int
+addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l)
+{
+	struct xaddr tmp;
+	long unsigned int masklen = 999;
+	char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp;
+
+	/* Don't modify argument */
+	if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) > sizeof(addrbuf))
+		return -1;
+
+	if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) {
+		*mp = '\0';
+		mp++;
+		masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10);
+		if (*mp == '\0' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128)
+			return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (mp == NULL)
+		masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af);
+	if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1)
+		return -2;
+	if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0)
+		return -2;
+
+	if (n != NULL)
+		memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n));
+	if (l != NULL)
+		*l = masklen;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen)
+{
+	struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result;
+
+	if (host->af != net->af)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a
+ * mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards.
+ *
+ * If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed
+ * and checked for well-formedness.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
+ * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
+ * Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
+ * Returns -2 on invalid list entry.
+ */
+int
+addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
+{
+	char *list, *cp, *o;
+	struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
+	u_int masklen, neg;
+	int ret = 0, r;
+
+	if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
+		debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
+		neg = *cp == '!';
+		if (neg)
+			cp++;
+		if (*cp == '\0') {
+			ret = -2;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Prefer CIDR address matching */
+		r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
+		if (r == -2) {
+			error("Inconsistent mask length for "
+			    "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
+			ret = -2;
+			break;
+		} else if (r == 0) {
+			if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr,
+                           &match_addr, masklen) == 0) {
+ foundit:
+				if (neg) {
+					ret = -1;
+					break;
+				}
+				ret = 1;
+			}
+			continue;
+		} else {
+			/* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */
+			if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1)
+				goto foundit;
+		}
+	}
+	xfree(o);
+
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6b2d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.25 2007/06/25 12:02:27 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
+ */
+size_t
+atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n)
+{
+	char *s = _s;
+	size_t pos = 0;
+	ssize_t res;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+	pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+	while (n > pos) {
+		res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
+		switch (res) {
+		case -1:
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+				continue;
+			}
+			return 0;
+		case 0:
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return pos;
+		default:
+			pos += (size_t)res;
+		}
+	}
+	return (pos);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
+ */
+size_t
+atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
+    const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt)
+{
+	size_t pos = 0, rem;
+	ssize_t res;
+	struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	if (iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
+	memcpy(iov, _iov, iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
+
+#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+	pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+#endif
+	for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
+		res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
+		switch (res) {
+		case -1:
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+#endif
+				continue;
+			}
+			return 0;
+		case 0:
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return pos;
+		default:
+			rem = (size_t)res;
+			pos += rem;
+			/* skip completed iov entries */
+			while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) {
+				rem -= iov[0].iov_len;
+				iov++;
+				iovcnt--;
+			}
+			/* This shouldn't happen... */
+			if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) {
+				errno = EFAULT;
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (iovcnt == 0)
+				break;
+			/* update pointer in partially complete iov */
+			iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem;
+			iov[0].iov_len -= rem;
+		}
+	}
+	return pos;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fcd25d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ATOMICIO_H
+#define _ATOMICIO_H
+
+/*
+ * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
+ */
+size_t	atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
+
+#define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
+ */
+size_t	atomiciov(ssize_t (*)(int, const struct iovec *, int),
+    int, const struct iovec *, int);
+
+#endif /* _ATOMICIO_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c b/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c417bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+/* $Id: audit-bsm.c,v 1.6 2008/02/25 10:05:04 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO
+ *
+ * - deal with overlap between this and sys_auth_allowed_user
+ *   sys_auth_record_login and record_failed_login.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1988-2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+/* #pragma ident	"@(#)bsmaudit.c	1.1	01/09/17 SMI" */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if defined(USE_BSM_AUDIT)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#ifndef AUE_openssh
+# define AUE_openssh     32800
+#endif
+#include <bsm/audit.h>
+#include <bsm/libbsm.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_uevents.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_record.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+#define	AuditInfoStruct		auditinfo_addr
+#define AuditInfoTermID		au_tid_addr_t
+#define SetAuditFunc(a,b)	setaudit_addr((a),(b))
+#define SetAuditFuncText	"setaudit_addr"
+#define AUToSubjectFunc		au_to_subject_ex
+#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b)	au_to_return32((a), (int32_t)(b))
+#else
+#define	AuditInfoStruct		auditinfo
+#define AuditInfoTermID		au_tid_t
+#define SetAuditFunc(a,b)	setaudit(a)
+#define SetAuditFuncText	"setaudit"
+#define AUToSubjectFunc		au_to_subject
+#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b)	au_to_return((a), (u_int)(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef cannot_audit
+extern int	cannot_audit(int);
+#endif
+extern void	aug_init(void);
+extern void	aug_save_auid(au_id_t);
+extern void	aug_save_uid(uid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_euid(uid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_gid(gid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_egid(gid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_pid(pid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_asid(au_asid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_tid(dev_t, unsigned int);
+extern void	aug_save_tid_ex(dev_t, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t);
+extern int	aug_save_me(void);
+extern int	aug_save_namask(void);
+extern void	aug_save_event(au_event_t);
+extern void	aug_save_sorf(int);
+extern void	aug_save_text(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_text1(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_text2(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_na(int);
+extern void	aug_save_user(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_path(char *);
+extern int	aug_save_policy(void);
+extern void	aug_save_afunc(int (*)(int));
+extern int	aug_audit(void);
+extern int	aug_na_selected(void);
+extern int	aug_selected(void);
+extern int	aug_daemon_session(void);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETTEXT
+# define gettext(a)	(a)
+#endif
+
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+static AuditInfoTermID ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+/* Below is the low-level BSM interface code */
+
+/*
+ * aug_get_machine is only required on IPv6 capable machines, we use a
+ * different mechanism in audit_connection_from() for IPv4-only machines.
+ * getaudit_addr() is only present on IPv6 capable machines.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+extern int 	aug_get_machine(char *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
+#else
+static int
+aug_get_machine(char *host, u_int32_t *addr, u_int32_t *type)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *ai; 
+	struct sockaddr_in *in4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+	int ret = 0, r;
+
+	if ((r = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, NULL, &ai)) != 0) {
+		error("BSM audit: getaddrinfo failed for %.100s: %.100s", host,
+		    r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	
+	switch (ai->ai_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr;
+		*type = AU_IPv4;
+		memcpy(addr, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		break;
+#ifdef AU_IPv6
+	case AF_INET6: 
+		in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr;
+		*type = AU_IPv6;
+		memcpy(addr, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		error("BSM audit: unknown address family for %.100s: %d",
+		    host, ai->ai_family);
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(ai);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check if the specified event is selected (enabled) for auditing.
+ * Returns 1 if the event is selected, 0 if not and -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+selected(char *username, uid_t uid, au_event_t event, int sf)
+{
+	int rc, sorf;
+	char naflags[512];
+	struct au_mask mask;
+
+	mask.am_success = mask.am_failure = 0;
+	if (uid < 0) {
+		/* get flags for non-attributable (to a real user) events */
+		rc = getacna(naflags, sizeof(naflags));
+		if (rc == 0)
+			(void) getauditflagsbin(naflags, &mask);
+	} else
+		rc = au_user_mask(username, &mask);
+
+	sorf = (sf == 0) ? AU_PRS_SUCCESS : AU_PRS_FAILURE;
+	return(au_preselect(event, &mask, sorf, AU_PRS_REREAD));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string, au_event_t event_no)
+{
+	int		ad, rc, sel;
+	uid_t		uid = -1;
+	gid_t		gid = -1;
+	pid_t		pid = getpid();
+	AuditInfoTermID	tid = ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+	if (the_authctxt != NULL && the_authctxt->valid) {
+		uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
+		gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid;
+	}
+
+	rc = (typ == 0) ? 0 : -1;
+	sel = selected(the_authctxt->user, uid, event_no, rc);
+	debug3("BSM audit: typ %d rc %d \"%s\"", typ, rc, string);
+	if (!sel)
+		return;	/* audit event does not match mask, do not write */
+
+	debug3("BSM audit: writing audit new record");
+	ad = au_open();
+
+	(void) au_write(ad, AUToSubjectFunc(uid, uid, gid, uid, gid,
+	    pid, pid, &tid));
+	(void) au_write(ad, au_to_text(string));
+	(void) au_write(ad, AUToReturnFunc(typ, rc));
+
+	rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		error("BSM audit: %s failed to write \"%s\" record: %s",
+		    __func__, string, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_session_setup(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct AuditInfoStruct info;
+	au_mask_t mask;
+
+	if (the_authctxt == NULL) {
+		error("BSM audit: session setup internal error (NULL ctxt)");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (the_authctxt->valid)
+		info.ai_auid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
+	else
+		info.ai_auid = -1;
+	info.ai_asid = getpid();
+	mask.am_success = 0;
+	mask.am_failure = 0;
+
+	(void) au_user_mask(the_authctxt->user, &mask);
+
+	info.ai_mask.am_success  = mask.am_success;
+	info.ai_mask.am_failure  = mask.am_failure;
+
+	info.ai_termid = ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+	rc = SetAuditFunc(&info, sizeof(info));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		error("BSM audit: %s: %s failed: %s", __func__,
+		    SetAuditFuncText, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_bad_login(const char *what)
+{
+	char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
+
+	if (the_authctxt->valid) {
+		(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
+			gettext("invalid %s for user %s"),
+			    what, the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(4, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+	} else {
+		(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
+			gettext("invalid user name \"%s\""),
+			    the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(3, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+	AuditInfoTermID *tid = &ssh_bsm_tid;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	if (cannot_audit(0))
+		return;
+	debug3("BSM audit: connection from %.100s port %d", host, port);
+
+	/* populate our terminal id structure */
+#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+	tid->at_port = (dev_t)port;
+	aug_get_machine((char *)host, &(tid->at_addr[0]), &(tid->at_type));
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x %08x %08x %08x", tid->at_addr[0],
+	    tid->at_addr[1], tid->at_addr[2], tid->at_addr[3]);
+	debug3("BSM audit: iptype %d machine ID %s", (int)tid->at_type, buf);
+#else
+	/* this is used on IPv4-only machines */
+	tid->port = (dev_t)port;
+	tid->machine = inet_addr(host);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine);
+	debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_open(const char *ttyn)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_close(const char *ttyn)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	char    textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
+	static int logged_in = 0;
+	const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)";
+
+	if (cannot_audit(0))
+		return;
+
+	switch(event) {
+	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+		logged_in = 1;
+		bsm_audit_session_setup();
+		snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+		    gettext("successful login %s"), user);
+		bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+		/*
+		 * We can also get a close event if the user attempted auth
+		 * but never succeeded.
+		 */
+		if (logged_in) {
+			snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+			    gettext("sshd logout %s"), the_authctxt->user);
+			bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_logout);
+		} else {
+			debug("%s: connection closed without authentication",
+			    __func__);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+		bsm_audit_record(1,
+		    gettext("logins disabled by /etc/nologin"), AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+		snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+		    gettext("too many tries for user %s"), the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(1, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+		bsm_audit_record(2, gettext("not_console"), AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+		bsm_audit_bad_login("password");
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+		bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry");
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit.c b/crypto/openssh/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbea34c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.5 2006/09/01 05:38:36 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/*
+ * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+ * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
+ * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
+ */
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+
+/* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
+ssh_audit_event_t
+audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
+{
+	if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
+	else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
+	else
+		return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/* helper to return supplied username */
+const char *
+audit_username(void)
+{
+	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
+	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
+
+	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
+		return (unknownuser);
+	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
+		return (invaliduser);
+	return (the_authctxt->user);
+}
+
+const char *
+audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+{
+	int i;
+	static struct event_lookup_struct {
+		ssh_audit_event_t event;
+		const char *name;
+	} event_lookup[] = {
+		{SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,	"LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
+		{SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,		"LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,		"AUTH_SUCCESS"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,		"AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,		"AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,		"AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,		"AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	"AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,		"AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
+		{SSH_INVALID_USER,		"INVALID_USER"},
+		{SSH_NOLOGIN,			"NOLOGIN"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,		"CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	"CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
+		{SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN,		"AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
+		if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
+			break;
+	return(event_lookup[i].name);
+}
+
+# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+/*
+ * Null implementations of audit functions.
+ * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
+ * has been attempted.
+ */
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+	debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port,
+	    (int)geteuid());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when various events occur (see audit.h for a list of possible
+ * events and what they mean).
+ */
+void
+audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+ * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
+ * within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_session_open(const char *ttyn)
+{
+	const char *t = ttyn ? ttyn : "(no tty)";
+
+	debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when a user session is closed.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+ * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
+ * within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_session_close(const char *ttyn)
+{
+	const char *t = ttyn ? ttyn : "(no tty)";
+
+	debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), command);
+}
+# endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit.h b/crypto/openssh/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..695f723
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.3 2006/08/05 14:05:10 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
+# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
+	SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
+	SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	/* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	/* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
+	SSH_INVALID_USER,
+	SSH_NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+};
+typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+
+void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void	audit_session_open(const char *);
+void	audit_session_close(const char *);
+void	audit_run_command(const char *);
+ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+
+#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b3262b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.11 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+static void *
+bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	return authctxt;
+}
+
+int
+bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+	char *challenge = NULL;
+
+	if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
+		challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
+		if (challenge == NULL) {
+			auth_close(authctxt->as);
+			authctxt->as = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (challenge == NULL) {
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
+		debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
+		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
+		authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
+		    authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
+		if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+			challenge = NULL;
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
+	}
+
+	if (challenge == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	*name = xstrdup("");
+	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
+	*numprompts = 1;
+	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
+	(*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+	int authok;
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (authctxt->as == 0)
+		error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
+
+	if (numresponses != 1)
+		return -1;
+
+	authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
+	authctxt->as = NULL;
+	debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
+
+	return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+
+	if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
+		auth_close(authctxt->as);
+		authctxt->as = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
+	"bsdauth",
+	bsdauth_init_ctx,
+	bsdauth_query,
+	bsdauth_respond,
+	bsdauth_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = {
+	"bsdauth",
+	bsdauth_init_ctx,
+	mm_bsdauth_query,
+	mm_bsdauth_respond,
+	bsdauth_free_ctx
+};
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..919b1ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.12 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
+
+extern KbdintDevice *devices[];
+static KbdintDevice *device;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+char *
+get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts;
+	u_int i, numprompts;
+	u_int *echo_on;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		remove_kbdint_device("pam");
+#endif
+
+	device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */
+	if (device == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
+	    &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) {
+		device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+		authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (numprompts < 1)
+		fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1");
+	challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]);
+	for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
+		xfree(prompts[i]);
+	xfree(prompts);
+	xfree(name);
+	xfree(echo_on);
+	xfree(info);
+
+	return (challenge);
+}
+int
+verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response)
+{
+	char *resp[1], *name, *info, **prompts;
+	u_int i, numprompts, *echo_on;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	if (device == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	resp[0] = (char *)response;
+	switch (device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp)) {
+	case 0: /* Success */
+		authenticated = 1;
+		break;
+	case 1: /* Postponed - retry with empty query for PAM */
+		if ((device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
+		    &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) != 0)
+			break;
+		if (numprompts == 0 &&
+		    device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 0, resp) == 0)
+			authenticated = 1;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
+			xfree(prompts[i]);
+		xfree(prompts);
+		xfree(name);
+		xfree(echo_on);
+		xfree(info);
+		break;
+	}
+	device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+	authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+	return authenticated;
+}
+void
+abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
+		device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+		authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8682881
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.19 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ *    Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar Exp $
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <krb5.h>
+
+extern ServerOptions	 options;
+
+static int
+krb5_init(void *context)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+
+	if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) {
+		problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+		if (problem)
+			return (problem);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+#ifndef HEIMDAL
+	krb5_creds creds;
+	krb5_principal server;
+#endif
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+	int len;
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+
+	problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->pw->pw_name,
+		    &authctxt->krb5_user);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+		authctxt->krb5_user);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	restore_uid();
+
+	problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+	    ccache, password, 1, NULL);
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops,
+	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+	ccache = NULL;
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+#else
+	problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds,
+	    authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
+	    KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	restore_uid();
+	problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server,
+	    NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
+	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+			  authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
+		problem = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
+				     authctxt->krb5_user);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
+				 &creds);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+#endif
+
+	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+
+	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+#endif
+
+ out:
+	restore_uid();
+
+	if (problem) {
+		if (ccache)
+			krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+
+		if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1)
+			debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
+			    krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem));
+		else
+			debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d",
+			    problem);
+
+		krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+
+		if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+			return (-1);
+		else
+			return (0);
+	}
+	return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+void
+krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
+	}
+	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
+	}
+	if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
+		krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+		authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifndef HEIMDAL
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+	int tmpfd, ret;
+	char ccname[40];
+	mode_t old_umask;
+
+	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+		return ENOMEM;
+
+	old_umask = umask(0177);
+	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+	umask(old_umask);
+	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return errno;
+	}
+
+	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		close(tmpfd);
+		return errno;
+	}
+	close(tmpfd);
+
+	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+}
+#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+#endif /* KRB5 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab085c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.44 2009/01/22 10:09:16 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* Flags set authorized_keys flags */
+int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_pty_flag = 0;
+int no_user_rc = 0;
+
+/* "command=" option. */
+char *forced_command = NULL;
+
+/* "environment=" options. */
+struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL;
+
+/* "tunnel=" option. */
+int forced_tun_device = -1;
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+auth_clear_options(void)
+{
+	no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+	no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+	no_pty_flag = 0;
+	no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+	no_user_rc = 0;
+	while (custom_environment) {
+		struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
+		custom_environment = ce->next;
+		xfree(ce->s);
+		xfree(ce);
+	}
+	if (forced_command) {
+		xfree(forced_command);
+		forced_command = NULL;
+	}
+	forced_tun_device = -1;
+	channel_clear_permitted_opens();
+	auth_debug_reset();
+}
+
+/*
+ * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not.
+ * side effect: sets key option flags
+ */
+int
+auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+	int i;
+
+	/* reset options */
+	auth_clear_options();
+
+	if (!opts)
+		return 1;
+
+	while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
+		cp = "no-port-forwarding";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			auth_debug_add("Port forwarding disabled.");
+			no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+		cp = "no-agent-forwarding";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			auth_debug_add("Agent forwarding disabled.");
+			no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+		cp = "no-X11-forwarding";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			auth_debug_add("X11 forwarding disabled.");
+			no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+		cp = "no-pty";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			auth_debug_add("Pty allocation disabled.");
+			no_pty_flag = 1;
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+		cp = "no-user-rc";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			auth_debug_add("User rc file execution disabled.");
+			no_user_rc = 1;
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+		cp = "command=\"";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+			i = 0;
+			while (*opts) {
+				if (*opts == '"')
+					break;
+				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+					opts += 2;
+					forced_command[i++] = '"';
+					continue;
+				}
+				forced_command[i++] = *opts++;
+			}
+			if (!*opts) {
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				xfree(forced_command);
+				forced_command = NULL;
+				goto bad_option;
+			}
+			forced_command[i] = '\0';
+			auth_debug_add("Forced command: %.900s", forced_command);
+			opts++;
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+		cp = "environment=\"";
+		if (options.permit_user_env &&
+		    strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			char *s;
+			struct envstring *new_envstring;
+
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+			i = 0;
+			while (*opts) {
+				if (*opts == '"')
+					break;
+				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+					opts += 2;
+					s[i++] = '"';
+					continue;
+				}
+				s[i++] = *opts++;
+			}
+			if (!*opts) {
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				xfree(s);
+				goto bad_option;
+			}
+			s[i] = '\0';
+			auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
+			debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
+			opts++;
+			new_envstring = xmalloc(sizeof(struct envstring));
+			new_envstring->s = s;
+			new_envstring->next = custom_environment;
+			custom_environment = new_envstring;
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+		cp = "from=\"";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+			const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname(
+			    options.use_dns);
+			char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			i = 0;
+			while (*opts) {
+				if (*opts == '"')
+					break;
+				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+					opts += 2;
+					patterns[i++] = '"';
+					continue;
+				}
+				patterns[i++] = *opts++;
+			}
+			if (!*opts) {
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				xfree(patterns);
+				goto bad_option;
+			}
+			patterns[i] = '\0';
+			opts++;
+			switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
+			    patterns)) {
+			case 1:
+				xfree(patterns);
+				/* Host name matches. */
+				goto next_option;
+			case -1:
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid criteria",
+				    file, linenum);
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
+				    "invalid criteria", file, linenum);
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			case 0:
+				xfree(patterns);
+				logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
+				    "correct key but not from a permitted "
+				    "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
+				    pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
+				auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
+				    "permitted to use this key for login.",
+				    remote_host);
+				break;
+			}
+			/* deny access */
+			return 0;
+		}
+		cp = "permitopen=\"";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			char *host, *p;
+			int port;
+			char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			i = 0;
+			while (*opts) {
+				if (*opts == '"')
+					break;
+				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+					opts += 2;
+					patterns[i++] = '"';
+					continue;
+				}
+				patterns[i++] = *opts++;
+			}
+			if (!*opts) {
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing "
+				    "end quote", file, linenum);
+				xfree(patterns);
+				goto bad_option;
+			}
+			patterns[i] = '\0';
+			opts++;
+			p = patterns;
+			host = hpdelim(&p);
+			if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen "
+				    "specification <%.100s>", file, linenum,
+				    patterns);
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
+				    "Bad permitopen specification", file,
+				    linenum);
+				xfree(patterns);
+				goto bad_option;
+			}
+			host = cleanhostname(host);
+			if (p == NULL || (port = a2port(p)) <= 0) {
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port "
+				    "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : "");
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
+				    "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum);
+				xfree(patterns);
+				goto bad_option;
+			}
+			if (options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
+				channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port);
+			xfree(patterns);
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+		cp = "tunnel=\"";
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+			char *tun = NULL;
+			opts += strlen(cp);
+			tun = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+			i = 0;
+			while (*opts) {
+				if (*opts == '"')
+					break;
+				tun[i++] = *opts++;
+			}
+			if (!*opts) {
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+				    file, linenum);
+				xfree(tun);
+				forced_tun_device = -1;
+				goto bad_option;
+			}
+			tun[i] = '\0';
+			forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL);
+			xfree(tun);
+			if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+				debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
+				    file, linenum);
+				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
+				    file, linenum);
+				forced_tun_device = -1;
+				goto bad_option;
+			}
+			auth_debug_add("Forced tun device: %d", forced_tun_device);
+			opts++;
+			goto next_option;
+		}
+next_option:
+		/*
+		 * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
+		 * (or break out if there are no more).
+		 */
+		if (!*opts)
+			fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing.");
+		if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
+			break;		/* End of options. */
+		if (*opts != ',')
+			goto bad_option;
+		opts++;
+		/* Process the next option. */
+	}
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		auth_debug_send();
+
+	/* grant access */
+	return 1;
+
+bad_option:
+	logit("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
+	    file, linenum, opts);
+	auth_debug_add("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
+	    file, linenum, opts);
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		auth_debug_send();
+
+	/* deny access */
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14488f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.17 2008/03/26 21:28:14 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
+#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
+
+/* Linked list of custom environment strings */
+struct envstring {
+	struct envstring *next;
+	char   *s;
+};
+
+/* Flags that may be set in authorized_keys options. */
+extern int no_port_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_agent_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_x11_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_pty_flag;
+extern int no_user_rc;
+extern char *forced_command;
+extern struct envstring *custom_environment;
+extern int forced_tun_device;
+
+int	auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
+void	auth_clear_options(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc79dee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1221 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
+ * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
+ * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
+ * DARPA CHATS research program.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Based on $FreeBSD$ */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+
+/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define sshpam_const		/* Solaris, HP-UX, AIX */
+#else
+# define sshpam_const	const	/* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM */
+#endif
+
+/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
+#else
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern int compat20;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+
+/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
+#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
+ * and generally a bad idea.  Use at own risk and do not expect support if
+ * this breaks.
+ */
+#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+#include <pthread.h>
+/*
+ * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
+ * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h
+ * (e.g. Linux)
+ */
+typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
+#else
+typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
+#endif
+
+struct pam_ctxt {
+	sp_pthread_t	 pam_thread;
+	int		 pam_psock;
+	int		 pam_csock;
+	int		 pam_done;
+};
+
+static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+/*
+ * Simulate threads with processes.
+ */
+
+static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
+static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig;
+
+static void
+sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
+		return;	/* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
+	if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
+	    <= 0) {
+		/* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
+		kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
+		if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0)
+		    <= 0)
+			return; /* could not wait */
+	}
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) &&
+	    WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
+		return;	/* terminated by pthread_cancel */
+	if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
+		sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
+	if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
+		sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+pthread_exit(void *value)
+{
+	_exit(0);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
+    void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
+
+	sshpam_thread_status = -1;
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	case 0:
+		close(ctx->pam_psock);
+		ctx->pam_psock = -1;
+		thread_start(arg);
+		_exit(1);
+	default:
+		*thread = pid;
+		close(ctx->pam_csock);
+		ctx->pam_csock = -1;
+		sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
+{
+	signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+	return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
+		return (sshpam_thread_status);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+	waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
+	return (status);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
+static int sshpam_err = 0;
+static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
+static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
+static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
+static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
+static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
+static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
+
+/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
+#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+static char **
+pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+	/*
+	 * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
+	 * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
+	 * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
+	 */
+	 return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
+ * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
+ * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root.
+ * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do
+ * the right thing.
+ */
+#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
+static int
+sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized");
+	if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags);
+	if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	return result;
+}
+# define pam_chauthtok(a,b)	(sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
+#endif
+
+void
+sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
+{
+	debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd);
+	if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
+	sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd;
+	if (reqd) {
+		no_port_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+		no_agent_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+		no_x11_forwarding_flag |= 2;
+	} else {
+		no_port_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
+		no_agent_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
+		no_x11_forwarding_flag &= ~2;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
+static void
+import_environments(Buffer *b)
+{
+	char *env;
+	u_int i, num_env;
+	int err;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+	/* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
+	sshpam_account_status = buffer_get_int(b);
+	sshpam_password_change_required(buffer_get_int(b));
+
+	/* Import environment from subprocess */
+	num_env = buffer_get_int(b);
+	if (num_env > 1024)
+		fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
+		    __func__, num_env);
+	sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
+	debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
+	for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++)
+		sshpam_env[i] = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
+
+	sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL;
+
+	/* Import PAM environment from subprocess */
+	num_env = buffer_get_int(b);
+	debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env);
+	for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
+		env = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+		/* Errors are not fatal here */
+		if ((err = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
+			    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conversation function for authentication thread.
+ */
+static int
+sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	Buffer buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int i;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (data == NULL) {
+		error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context");
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+	}
+	ctxt = data;
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+			if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+			if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+			break;
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+			if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+			if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+			break;
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		buffer_clear(&buffer);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
+			xfree(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	xfree(reply);
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authentication thread.
+ */
+static void *
+sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+	Buffer buffer;
+	struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
+	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+	extern char **environ;
+	char **env_from_pam;
+	u_int i;
+	const char *pam_user;
+	const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+	char *tz = getenv("TZ");
+
+	pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
+	    (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+
+	environ[0] = NULL;
+	if (tz != NULL)
+		if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
+			error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
+			    strerror(errno));
+
+	if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
+		setproctitle("%s [pam]",
+		    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown");
+	}
+#endif
+
+	sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
+	sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
+
+	if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&sshpam_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		goto auth_fail;
+	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		goto auth_fail;
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		if (!do_pam_account()) {
+			sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+			goto auth_fail;
+		}
+		if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+			sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
+			    PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+			if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+				goto auth_fail;
+			sshpam_password_change_required(0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK");
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+	/* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
+	buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_account_status);
+	buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange);
+
+	/* Export any environment strings set in child */
+	for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++)
+		; /* Count */
+	buffer_put_int(&buffer, i);
+	for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++)
+		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, environ[i]);
+
+	/* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */
+	env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle);
+	for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++)
+		; /* Count */
+	buffer_put_int(&buffer, i);
+	for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++)
+		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, env_from_pam[i]);
+#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
+
+	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, &buffer);
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+ auth_fail:
+	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
+	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, &buffer);
+	else
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+	return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
+}
+
+void
+sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+	if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) {
+		pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
+		pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
+		close(ctxt->pam_psock);
+		close(ctxt->pam_csock);
+		memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
+		cleanup_ctxt = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
+
+static int
+sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int i;
+	size_t len;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len);
+			buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1 );
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
+			xfree(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	xfree(reply);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
+
+void
+sshpam_cleanup(void)
+{
+	if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
+		return;
+	debug("PAM: cleanup");
+	pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
+	if (sshpam_session_open) {
+		debug("PAM: closing session");
+		pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
+		sshpam_session_open = 0;
+	}
+	if (sshpam_cred_established) {
+		debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
+		pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+		sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+	}
+	sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+	pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+	sshpam_handle = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+	const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
+	const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+
+	if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
+		/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
+		sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
+		    PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+		if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
+			return (0);
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+	}
+	debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
+	sshpam_err =
+	    pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
+	sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	pam_rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns);
+	debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost);
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+	/*
+	 * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
+	 * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and
+	 * may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
+	 */
+	debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+#endif
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static void *
+sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+	int socks[2];
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+	/*
+	 * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
+	 * has previously failed.
+	 */
+	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Initialize PAM */
+	if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) {
+		error("PAM: initialization failed");
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
+
+	/* Start the authentication thread */
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
+		error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
+		xfree(ctxt);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
+	ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
+	if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) {
+		error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		close(socks[0]);
+		close(socks[1]);
+		xfree(ctxt);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	cleanup_ctxt = ctxt;
+	return (ctxt);
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+    u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Buffer buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+	size_t plen;
+	u_char type;
+	char *msg;
+	size_t len, mlen;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	*name = xstrdup("");
+	*info = xstrdup("");
+	*prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+	**prompts = NULL;
+	plen = 0;
+	*echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
+	while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, &buffer) == 0) {
+		type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+		msg = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+		mlen = strlen(msg);
+		switch (type) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			*num = 1;
+			len = plen + mlen + 1;
+			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
+			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+			plen += mlen;
+			**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
+			xfree(msg);
+			return (0);
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			/* accumulate messages */
+			len = plen + mlen + 2;
+			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
+			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+			plen += mlen;
+			strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
+			plen++;
+			xfree(msg);
+			break;
+		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+			sshpam_account_status = 0;
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
+			debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
+			if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
+				*info = **prompts;
+				**prompts = NULL;
+				*num = 0;
+				**echo_on = 0;
+				ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+				xfree(msg);
+				return 0;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case PAM_SUCCESS:
+			if (**prompts != NULL) {
+				/* drain any accumulated messages */
+				debug("PAM: %s", **prompts);
+				buffer_append(&loginmsg, **prompts,
+				    strlen(**prompts));
+				xfree(**prompts);
+				**prompts = NULL;
+			}
+			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+				if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
+				    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+				    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+					fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
+					    "succeeded when it should have "
+					    "failed");
+				import_environments(&buffer);
+				*num = 0;
+				**echo_on = 0;
+				ctxt->pam_done = 1;
+				xfree(msg);
+				return (0);
+			}
+			error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
+			    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
+			    sshpam_authctxt->user,
+			    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns));
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		default:
+			*num = 0;
+			**echo_on = 0;
+			xfree(msg);
+			ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
+static int
+sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+{
+	Buffer buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+
+	debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
+	switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
+	case 1:
+		sshpam_authenticated = 1;
+		return (0);
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (num != 1) {
+		error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
+	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
+	    options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
+	else
+		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
+	if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
+		buffer_free(&buffer);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+	sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+	xfree(ctxt);
+	/*
+	 * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
+	 * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session.  It's
+	 * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
+	 * the server process terminates.
+	 */
+}
+
+KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
+	"pam",
+	sshpam_init_ctx,
+	sshpam_query,
+	sshpam_respond,
+	sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
+	"pam",
+	mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
+	mm_sshpam_query,
+	mm_sshpam_respond,
+	mm_sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+/*
+ * This replaces auth-pam.c
+ */
+void
+start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
+
+	if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1)
+		fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
+}
+
+void
+finish_pam(void)
+{
+	sshpam_cleanup();
+}
+
+u_int
+do_pam_account(void)
+{
+	debug("%s: called", __func__);
+	if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
+		return (sshpam_account_status);
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
+	debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
+	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
+		sshpam_account_status = 0;
+		return (sshpam_account_status);
+	}
+
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+		sshpam_password_change_required(1);
+
+	sshpam_account_status = 1;
+	return (sshpam_account_status);
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_set_tty(const char *tty)
+{
+	if (tty != NULL) {
+		debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"%s\"", tty);
+		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
+		if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+			fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_TTY: %s",
+			    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	}
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_setcred(int init)
+{
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&store_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	if (init) {
+		debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
+		sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+	} else {
+		debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
+		sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+	}
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		sshpam_cred_established = 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sshpam_authenticated)
+		fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	else
+		debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int i;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			reply[i].resp =
+			    read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg),
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
+				input[0] = '\0';
+			if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
+			xfree(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	xfree(reply);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
+ * support that
+ */
+void
+do_pam_chauthtok(void)
+{
+	if (use_privsep)
+		fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&tty_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	debug("PAM: changing password");
+	sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_session(void)
+{
+	debug3("PAM: opening session");
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&store_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
+		sshpam_session_open = 1;
+	else {
+		sshpam_session_open = 0;
+		disable_forwarding();
+		error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	}
+
+}
+
+int
+is_pam_session_open(void)
+{
+	return sshpam_session_open;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
+ * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
+ * during the ssh authentication process.
+ */
+int
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+{
+	int ret = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+	char *compound;
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
+	compound = xmalloc(len);
+
+	snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
+	ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
+	xfree(compound);
+#endif
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+char **
+fetch_pam_child_environment(void)
+{
+	return sshpam_env;
+}
+
+char **
+fetch_pam_environment(void)
+{
+	return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
+}
+
+void
+free_pam_environment(char **env)
+{
+	char **envp;
+
+	if (env == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
+		xfree(*envp);
+	xfree(env);
+}
+
+/*
+ * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication.  Assumes that
+ * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later
+ * display.
+ */
+static int
+sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int i;
+	size_t len;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			if (sshpam_password == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			if (len > 0) {
+				buffer_append(&loginmsg,
+				    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len);
+				buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1);
+			}
+			if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
+			xfree(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	xfree(reply);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Attempt password authentication via PAM
+ */
+int
+sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+
+	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
+		fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
+		    "initialise.", __func__);
+
+	sshpam_password = password;
+	sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
+	 * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
+	 * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
+	 */
+	if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+	    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+		sshpam_password = badpw;
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&passwd_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+	sshpam_password = NULL;
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
+		debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
+		    authctxt->user);
+		return 1;
+	} else {
+		debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
+		    authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1a2b52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.27 2004/09/11 12:17:26 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+
+#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		__progname
+#endif
+
+void start_pam(Authctxt *);
+void finish_pam(void);
+u_int do_pam_account(void);
+void do_pam_session(void);
+void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
+void do_pam_setcred(int );
+void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+void free_pam_environment(char **);
+void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void);
+void sshpam_cleanup(void);
+int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int is_pam_session_open(void);
+
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1c6ce0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.43 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Password authentication.  This file contains the functions to check whether
+ * the password is valid for the user.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+
+#define DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+#define TWO_WEEKS	(2L * 7 * DAY)	/* 2 weeks in seconds */
+
+void
+disable_forwarding(void)
+{
+	no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+	no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+	no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using password.  Returns true if
+ * authentication succeeds.
+ */
+int
+auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
+	int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+	static int expire_checked = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
+		ok = 0;
+#endif
+	if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
+		int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
+		if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
+			return ret && ok;
+		/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	{
+		HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
+
+		if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+			return 0;
+		cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
+		return ok;
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok);
+#endif
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+	if (!expire_checked) {
+		expire_checked = 1;
+		if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt))
+			authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+	}
+#endif
+	result = sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password);
+	if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
+		disable_forwarding();
+	return (result && ok);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+static void
+warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+	quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
+
+	pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
+
+	pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
+	actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (authctxt->valid) {
+		pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+		    TWO_WEEKS);
+		acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+		    TWO_WEEKS);
+	}
+#endif
+	if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
+		daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+	if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
+		daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+}
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	auth_session_t *as;
+	static int expire_checked = 0;
+
+	as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
+	    (char *)password);
+	if (as == NULL)
+		return (0);
+	if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
+		auth_close(as);
+		disable_forwarding();
+		authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+		return (1);
+	} else {
+		if (!expire_checked) {
+			expire_checked = 1;
+			warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
+		}
+		return (auth_close(as));
+	}
+}
+#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	char *encrypted_password;
+
+	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+
+	/* Check for users with no password. */
+	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
+	    (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
+
+	/*
+	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+	 * are identical.
+	 */
+	return (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eca7502
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.42 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
+ * authentication.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+int
+auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, char *chost,
+    Key *client_host_key)
+{
+	HostStatus host_status;
+
+	/* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
+	if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser))
+		return 0;
+
+	host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_host_key,
+	    chost, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
+	    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+
+	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
+ * its host key.  Returns true if authentication succeeds.
+ */
+int
+auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
+{
+	char *chost;
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+
+	debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s",
+	    cuser);
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid || client_host_key == NULL ||
+	    client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	chost = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+	debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
+
+	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
+		debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
+		packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* A matching host key was found and is known. */
+
+	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
+	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
+		logit("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
+		    chost);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
+	 * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
+	 */
+
+	verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
+	    pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
+	packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
+	return 1;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c12967
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.43 2008/06/13 14:18:51 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Rhosts authentication.  This file contains code to check whether to admit
+ * the login based on rhosts authentication.  This file also processes
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
+# include <netgroup.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
+
+/*
+ * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv).  This returns true if authentication can be granted
+ * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
+ */
+
+static int
+check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
+		  const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
+		  const char *server_user)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char buf[1024];	/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
+	int fd;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
+	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file",
+		    server_user, filename);
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	unset_nonblock(fd);
+	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+		/* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */
+		char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp;
+		int negated;
+
+		for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1.  We skip it (we
+		 * don't ever support the plus syntax).
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
+		 * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
+		 */
+		switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf,
+		    dummy)) {
+		case 0:
+			auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
+			continue;
+		case 1:
+			/* Host name only. */
+			strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			/* Got both host and user name. */
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
+			continue;
+		default:
+			/* Weird... */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		host = hostbuf;
+		user = userbuf;
+		negated = 0;
+
+		/* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
+		if (host[0] == '-') {
+			negated = 1;
+			host++;
+		} else if (host[0] == '+')
+			host++;
+
+		if (user[0] == '-') {
+			negated = 1;
+			user++;
+		} else if (user[0] == '+')
+			user++;
+
+		/* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
+		if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
+			/* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
+			auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.",
+			    filename);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Verify that host name matches. */
+		if (host[0] == '@') {
+			if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
+			    !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
+				continue;
+		} else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
+			continue;	/* Different hostname. */
+
+		/* Verify that user name matches. */
+		if (user[0] == '@') {
+			if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
+				continue;
+		} else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
+			continue;	/* Different username. */
+
+		/* Found the user and host. */
+		fclose(f);
+
+		/* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
+		if (negated) {
+			auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
+			    filename);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		/* Accept authentication. */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Authentication using this file denied. */
+	fclose(f);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
+ * true if authentication succeeds.  If ignore_rhosts is true, only
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
+{
+	const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
+
+	hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+	ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+	return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+}
+
+static int
+auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ipaddr)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	struct stat st;
+	static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
+	u_int rhosts_file_index;
+
+	debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
+	    client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+
+	/* Switch to the user's uid. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	/*
+	 * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return
+	 * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
+	 * servers.
+	 */
+	for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
+	    rhosts_file_index++) {
+		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
+			 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+		if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	/* Switch back to privileged uid. */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	/* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */
+	if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
+	    stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
+	    stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */
+	if (pw->pw_uid != 0) {
+		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
+		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.",
+			    hostname, ipaddr);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
+		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.",
+			    hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
+	 * not group or world writable.
+	 */
+	if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
+		logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+		    "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
+		auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+		    "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (options.strict_modes &&
+	    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+		logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+		    "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
+		auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+		    "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	/* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
+	for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
+	    rhosts_file_index++) {
+		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
+			 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
+		 * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
+		 * owner.  This is to help avoid novices accidentally
+		 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
+		 */
+		if (options.strict_modes &&
+		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+			logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
+			    pw->pw_name, buf);
+			auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */
+		if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
+			auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.",
+			    rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
+		if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
+			    rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+			/* Restore the privileged uid. */
+			restore_uid();
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user %s server_user %s",
+				hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
+	restore_uid();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ipaddr)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	auth_debug_reset();
+	ret = auth_rhosts2_raw(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		auth_debug_send();
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf54620
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.73 2008/07/02 12:03:51 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * RSA-based authentication.  This code determines whether to admit a login
+ * based on RSA authentication.  This file also contains functions to check
+ * validity of the host key.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
+ * responses to a particular session.
+ */
+extern u_char session_id[16];
+
+/*
+ * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
+ * following format:
+ *   options bits e n comment
+ * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
+ * and comment is any string of characters up to newline.  The maximum
+ * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters.  See sshd(8) for a
+ * description of the options.
+ */
+
+BIGNUM *
+auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
+{
+	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	BN_CTX *ctx;
+
+	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
+	/* Generate a random challenge. */
+	if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
+	if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+	return challenge;
+}
+
+int
+auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
+{
+	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
+	MD5_CTX md;
+	int len;
+
+	/* don't allow short keys */
+	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+		error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+	if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_verify_response: bad challenge length %d", len);
+	memset(buf, 0, 32);
+	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
+	MD5_Init(&md);
+	MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
+	MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
+	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+
+	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
+	if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
+		/* Wrong answer. */
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/* Correct answer. */
+	return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
+ * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
+ * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
+{
+	BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
+	u_char response[16];
+	int i, success;
+
+	if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
+
+	challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
+
+	/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
+	rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa);
+
+	/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
+	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+	packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
+	packet_send();
+	BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/* Wait for a response. */
+	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
+	BN_clear_free(challenge);
+	return (success);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if there's user key matching client_n,
+ * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
+{
+	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *file;
+	int allowed = 0;
+	u_int bits;
+	FILE *f;
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+	Key *key;
+
+	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	/* The authorized keys. */
+	file = authorized_keys_file(pw);
+	debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
+	f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
+	if (!f) {
+		xfree(file);
+		restore_uid();
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Flag indicating whether the key is allowed. */
+	allowed = 0;
+
+	key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key.  If
+	 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
+	 * user really has the corresponding private key.
+	 */
+	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+		char *cp;
+		char *key_options;
+		int keybits;
+
+		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
+		 * save their starting address and skip the option part
+		 * for now.  If there are no options, set the starting
+		 * address to NULL.
+		 */
+		if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
+			int quoted = 0;
+			key_options = cp;
+			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+					cp++;	/* Skip both */
+				else if (*cp == '"')
+					quoted = !quoted;
+			}
+		} else
+			key_options = NULL;
+
+		/* Parse the key from the line. */
+		if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
+			debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
+			    file, linenum);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* cp now points to the comment part. */
+
+		/* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its modulus). */
+		if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* check the real bits  */
+		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+		if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
+			logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
+			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
+			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+
+		/* We have found the desired key. */
+		/*
+		 * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
+		 * do not send challenge.
+		 */
+		if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
+			continue;
+
+		/* break out, this key is allowed */
+		allowed = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	/* Close the file. */
+	xfree(file);
+	fclose(f);
+
+	/* return key if allowed */
+	if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
+		*rkey = key;
+	else
+		key_free(key);
+	return (allowed);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client.  This returns
+ * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
+ * successful.  This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
+ */
+int
+auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	char *fp;
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+
+	/* no user given */
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
+		auth_clear_options();
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
+	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
+		/* Wrong response. */
+		verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
+		packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
+		/*
+		 * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
+		 * another challenge and break the protocol.
+		 */
+		key_free(key);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Correct response.  The client has been successfully
+	 * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
+	 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
+	 * authentication to be rejected.
+	 */
+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
+	    key_type(key), fp);
+	xfree(fp);
+	key_free(key);
+
+	packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
+	return (1);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2190916
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifdef DAY
+# undef DAY
+#endif
+#define DAY	(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/*
+ * For the account and password expiration functions, we assume the expiry
+ * occurs the day after the day specified.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Check if specified account is expired.  Returns 1 if account is expired,
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *spw)
+{
+	time_t today;
+	int daysleft;
+	char buf[256];
+
+	today = time(NULL) / DAY;
+	daysleft = spw->sp_expire - today;
+	debug3("%s: today %d sp_expire %d days left %d", __func__, (int)today,
+	    (int)spw->sp_expire, daysleft);
+
+	if (spw->sp_expire == -1) {
+		debug3("account expiration disabled");
+	} else if (daysleft < 0) {
+		logit("Account %.100s has expired", spw->sp_namp);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
+		debug3("account will expire in %d days", daysleft);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your account will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
+		    daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks password expiry for platforms that use shadow passwd files.
+ * Returns: 1 = password expired, 0 = password not expired
+ */
+int
+auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+	const char *user = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
+	char buf[256];
+	time_t today;
+	int daysleft, disabled = 0;
+
+	if ((spw = getspnam((char *)user)) == NULL) {
+		error("Could not get shadow information for %.100s", user);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	today = time(NULL) / DAY;
+	debug3("%s: today %d sp_lstchg %d sp_max %d", __func__, (int)today,
+	    (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max);
+
+#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	if (iscomsec()) {
+		struct pr_passwd *pr;
+
+		pr = getprpwnam((char *)user);
+
+		/* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */
+		if (pr != NULL && pr->ufld.fd_min == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_lifetime == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_expire == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_pw_expire_warning == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_schange != 0)
+			disabled = 1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* TODO: check sp_inact */
+	daysleft = spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max - today;
+	if (disabled) {
+		debug3("password expiration disabled");
+	} else if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) {
+		logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", user);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (spw->sp_max == -1) {
+		debug3("password expiration disabled");
+	} else if (daysleft < 0) {
+		logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", user);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
+		debug3("password will expire in %d days", daysleft);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your password will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
+		    daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif	/* USE_SHADOW && HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9e1c25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+#include <sia.h>
+#include <siad.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-sia.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int saved_argc;
+extern char **saved_argv;
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *pass)
+{
+	int ret;
+	SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
+	const char *host;
+
+	host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+
+	if (!authctxt->user || pass == NULL || pass[0] == '\0')
+		return (0);
+
+	if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, authctxt->user,
+	    NULL, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
+		return (0);
+
+	if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) {
+		error("Couldn't authenticate %s from %s",
+		    authctxt->user, host);
+		if (ret & SIASTOP)
+			sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+session_setup_sia(struct passwd *pw, char *tty)
+{
+	SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
+	const char *host;
+
+	host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+
+	if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, pw->pw_name,
+	    tty, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("sia_ses_init failed");
+
+	if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) {
+		sia_ses_release(&ent);
+		fatal("sia_make_entity_pwd failed");
+	}
+
+	ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE;
+	if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("Couldn't establish session for %s from %s",
+		    pw->pw_name, host);
+
+	if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("Couldn't launch session for %s from %s",
+		    pw->pw_name, host);
+
+	sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+	setuid(0);
+	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27cbb93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+
+void	session_setup_sia(struct passwd *, char *);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb43dba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.27 2007/01/21 01:41:54 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <skey.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+static void *
+skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	return authctxt;
+}
+
+int
+skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+    u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+	char challenge[1024];
+	struct skey skey;
+
+	if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
+	    sizeof(challenge)) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	*name = xstrdup("");
+	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
+	*numprompts = 1;
+	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
+
+	xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+
+	if (authctxt->valid &&
+	    numresponses == 1 &&
+	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
+	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1)
+	    return 0;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+skey_free_ctx(void *ctx)
+{
+	/* we don't have a special context */
+}
+
+KbdintDevice skey_device = {
+	"skey",
+	skey_init_ctx,
+	skey_query,
+	skey_respond,
+	skey_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_skey_device = {
+	"skey",
+	skey_init_ctx,
+	mm_skey_query,
+	mm_skey_respond,
+	skey_free_ctx
+};
+#endif /* SKEY */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02f9175
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,623 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.80 2008/11/04 07:58:09 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+#include <login.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+#include <shadow.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
+
+/* Debugging messages */
+Buffer auth_debug;
+int auth_debug_init;
+
+/*
+ * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
+ * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
+ * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
+ * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
+ * listed there, false will be returned.
+ * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
+ * Otherwise true is returned.
+ */
+int
+allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
+	char *shell;
+	u_int i;
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+#endif
+
+	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
+	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
+		return 0;
+#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
+
+	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
+	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+	if (spw != NULL)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
+#else
+		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+#endif
+
+	/* check for locked account */
+	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
+		int locked = 0;
+
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
+			 locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
+		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
+			 locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
+		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
+			locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+		free(passwd);
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+		if (locked) {
+			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
+			    pw->pw_name);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is
+	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+	 */
+	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+
+	/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
+	if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
+		    pw->pw_name, shell);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
+	    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
+		logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
+		    pw->pw_name, shell);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
+	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+	}
+
+	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
+	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
+			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+			    options.deny_users[i])) {
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
+				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
+				return 0;
+			}
+	}
+	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
+	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
+			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+			    options.allow_users[i]))
+				break;
+		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
+		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
+			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
+		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
+			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
+		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
+			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
+			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
+				ga_free();
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
+				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
+				return 0;
+			}
+		/*
+		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
+		 * isn't listed there
+		 */
+		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
+			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
+			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
+				ga_free();
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
+				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+				return 0;
+			}
+		ga_free();
+	}
+
+#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
+	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
+		return 0;
+#endif
+
+	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void
+auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
+{
+	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
+	char *authmsg;
+
+	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+		return;
+
+	/* Raise logging level */
+	if (authenticated == 1 ||
+	    !authctxt->valid ||
+	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+		authlog = logit;
+
+	if (authctxt->postponed)
+		authmsg = "Postponed";
+	else
+		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
+
+	authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
+	    authmsg,
+	    method,
+	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+	    authctxt->user,
+	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+	    get_remote_port(),
+	    info);
+
+#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
+	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
+	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
+		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
+		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
+# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+	if (authenticated)
+		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
+		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
+		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
+ */
+int
+auth_root_allowed(char *method)
+{
+	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
+	case PERMIT_YES:
+		return 1;
+	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+		if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
+		if (forced_command) {
+			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
+ * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
+ * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
+ *
+ * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
+ */
+static char *
+expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+	int i;
+
+	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
+	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
+	 */
+	if (*file == '/')
+		return (file);
+
+	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
+	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
+		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
+	xfree(file);
+	return (xstrdup(ret));
+}
+
+char *
+authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
+}
+
+char *
+authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
+}
+
+/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
+    const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
+{
+	Key *found;
+	char *user_hostfile;
+	struct stat st;
+	HostStatus host_status;
+
+	/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
+	found = key_new(key->type);
+	host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
+
+	if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
+		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
+		if (options.strict_modes &&
+		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
+		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
+			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
+			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
+		} else {
+			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+			host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
+			    host, key, found, NULL);
+			restore_uid();
+		}
+		xfree(user_hostfile);
+	}
+	key_free(found);
+
+	debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
+	    "ok" : "not found", host);
+	return host_status;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
+ * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
+ * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
+ *
+ * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
+ *
+ * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
+ * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+static int
+secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+    char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
+	char *cp;
+	int comparehome = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+		comparehome = 1;
+
+	/* check the open file to avoid races */
+	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
+	    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+		    buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
+			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+
+		debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+			snprintf(err, errlen,
+			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+			debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+			    buf);
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
+		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
+		 */
+		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
+			break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+FILE *
+auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+	char line[1024];
+	struct stat st;
+	int fd;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	/*
+	 * Open the file containing the authorized keys
+	 * Fail quietly if file does not exist
+	 */
+	if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		logit("User %s authorized keys %s is not a regular file",
+		    pw->pw_name, file);
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	unset_nonblock(fd);
+	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (options.strict_modes &&
+	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
+		fclose(f);
+		logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return f;
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+getpwnamallow(const char *user)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	auth_session_t *as;
+#endif
+#endif
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
+	    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
+
+	pw = getpwnam(user);
+	if (pw == NULL) {
+		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
+		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
+#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+		record_failed_login(user,
+		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	if (!allowed_user(pw))
+		return (NULL);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) {
+		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
+	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
+		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
+		pw = NULL;
+	}
+	if (as != NULL)
+		auth_close(as);
+#endif
+#endif
+	if (pw != NULL)
+		return (pwcopy(pw));
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	va_list args;
+
+	if (!auth_debug_init)
+		return;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_send(void)
+{
+	char *msg;
+
+	if (!auth_debug_init)
+		return;
+	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
+		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
+		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
+		xfree(msg);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_reset(void)
+{
+	if (auth_debug_init)
+		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
+	else {
+		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
+		auth_debug_init = 1;
+	}
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+fakepw(void)
+{
+	static struct passwd fake;
+
+	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
+	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
+	fake.pw_passwd =
+	    "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
+	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
+	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
+	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+	fake.pw_class = "";
+#endif
+	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
+	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
+
+	return (&fake);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.h b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a70f44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.62 2008/11/04 08:22:12 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTH_H
+#define AUTH_H
+
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#include <login_cap.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+#include <bsd_auth.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
+
+typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
+typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
+
+struct Authctxt {
+	sig_atomic_t	 success;
+	int		 authenticated;	/* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
+	int		 postponed;	/* authentication needs another step */
+	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
+	int		 attempt;
+	int		 failures;
+	int		 force_pwchange;
+	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
+	char		*service;
+	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+	char		*style;
+	void		*kbdintctxt;
+	void		*jpake_ctx;
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	auth_session_t	*as;
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+	krb5_context	 krb5_ctx;
+	krb5_ccache	 krb5_fwd_ccache;
+	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+	char		*krb5_ccname;
+#endif
+	Buffer		*loginmsg;
+	void		*methoddata;
+};
+/*
+ * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
+ * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this
+ * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by
+ * the client.
+ */
+
+struct Authmethod {
+	char	*name;
+	int	(*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+	int	*enabled;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Keyboard interactive device:
+ * init_ctx	returns: non NULL upon success
+ * query	returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
+ * respond	returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
+ *		otherwise - failure
+ */
+struct KbdintDevice
+{
+	const char *name;
+	void*	(*init_ctx)(Authctxt*);
+	int	(*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+		    u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on);
+	int	(*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses);
+	void	(*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
+};
+
+int      auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
+int
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+int	 auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *);
+int      auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int      auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *);
+int      auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *);
+BIGNUM	*auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+int	 auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]);
+int	 auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+
+int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
+int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
+int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
+int	auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
+void	krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt);
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+#include <shadow.h>
+int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *);
+int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
+#endif
+
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
+
+void disable_forwarding(void);
+
+void	do_authentication(Authctxt *);
+void	do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
+
+void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
+void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *);
+void	userauth_send_banner(const char *);
+int	auth_root_allowed(char *);
+
+char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
+
+void	privsep_challenge_enable(void);
+
+int	auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *);
+void	auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *);
+int	bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int	bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+int	skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int	skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+void	auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
+void	auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *);
+
+int	allowed_user(struct passwd *);
+struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
+
+char	*get_challenge(Authctxt *);
+int	verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
+void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
+
+char	*authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);
+char	*authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);
+
+FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
+    const char *, const char *);
+
+/* hostkey handling */
+Key	*get_hostkey_by_index(int);
+Key	*get_hostkey_by_type(int);
+int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);
+int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+
+/* debug messages during authentication */
+void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void	 auth_debug_send(void);
+void	 auth_debug_reset(void);
+
+struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+
+int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+
+#define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
+
+#define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+#include <krb5.h>
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1801661
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.73 2008/07/04 23:30:16 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+
+static char *client_user = NULL;    /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
+
+struct AuthMethod1 {
+	int type;
+	char *name;
+	int *enabled;
+	int (*method)(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+};
+
+const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
+		&options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
+		&options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
+		&options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
+		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
+		auth1_process_tis_challenge
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
+		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
+		auth1_process_tis_response
+	},
+	{ -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+static const struct AuthMethod1
+*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
+		if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
+			return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
+
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+static char *
+get_authname(int type)
+{
+	const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
+	static char buf[64];
+
+	if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
+		return (a->name);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
+	return (buf);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	char *password;
+	u_int dlen;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read user password.  It is in plain text, but was
+	 * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
+	 * not visible to an outside observer.
+	 */
+	password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/* Try authentication with the password. */
+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
+
+	memset(password, 0, dlen);
+	xfree(password);
+
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	BIGNUM *n;
+
+	/* RSA authentication requested. */
+	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(n);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
+	BN_clear_free(n);
+
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	int keybits, authenticated = 0;
+	u_int bits;
+	Key *client_host_key;
+	u_int ulen;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get client user name.  Note that we just have to
+	 * trust the client; root on the client machine can
+	 * claim to be any user.
+	 */
+	client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+
+	/* Get the client host key. */
+	client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	bits = packet_get_int();
+	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
+
+	keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
+	if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
+		verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
+		    "actual %d, announced %d",
+		    BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
+	    client_host_key);
+	key_free(client_host_key);
+
+	snprintf(info, infolen, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
+
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	char *challenge;
+
+	if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
+	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
+	packet_put_cstring(challenge);
+	xfree(challenge);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	char *response;
+	u_int dlen;
+
+	response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
+	memset(response, 'r', dlen);
+	xfree(response);
+
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+/*
+ * read packets, try to authenticate the user and
+ * return only if authentication is successful
+ */
+static void
+do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	char info[1024];
+	int prev = 0, type = 0;
+	const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
+
+	debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
+	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
+
+	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
+	if (options.password_authentication &&
+#ifdef KRB5
+	    (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
+#endif
+	    PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+		if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
+#endif
+		{
+			auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", "");
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
+	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	for (;;) {
+		/* default to fail */
+		authenticated = 0;
+
+		info[0] = '\0';
+
+		/* Get a packet from the client. */
+		prev = type;
+		type = packet_read();
+
+		/*
+		 * If we started challenge-response authentication but the
+		 * next packet is not a response to our challenge, release
+		 * the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would
+		 * normally have been released by verify_response() had we
+		 * received such a response)
+		 */
+		if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS &&
+		    type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
+			abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
+
+		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
+			goto skip;
+		if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
+			logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
+			    "type %d", type);
+			goto skip;
+		}
+
+		if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
+			verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
+			goto skip;
+		}
+
+		authenticated = meth->method(authctxt, info, sizeof(info));
+		if (authenticated == -1)
+			continue; /* "postponed" */
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+		if (authctxt->as) {
+			auth_close(authctxt->as);
+			authctxt->as = NULL;
+		}
+#endif
+		if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+			fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
+			    authctxt->user);
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+		if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
+			authenticated = 0;
+			fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
+		}
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+		/* Special handling for root */
+		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+		    !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
+ 			authenticated = 0;
+# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+# endif
+		}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+		if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
+		    !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
+			char *msg;
+			size_t len;
+
+			error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
+			    "configuration", authctxt->user);
+			len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
+			buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+			msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
+			/* strip trailing newlines */
+			if (len > 0)
+				while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n')
+					msg[len] = '\0';
+			else
+				msg = "Access denied.";
+			packet_disconnect("%s", msg);
+		}
+#endif
+
+ skip:
+		/* Log before sending the reply */
+		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
+
+		if (client_user != NULL) {
+			xfree(client_user);
+			client_user = NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (authenticated)
+			return;
+
+		if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
+			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+		}
+
+		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs authentication of an incoming connection.  Session key has already
+ * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
+ */
+void
+do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	u_int ulen;
+	char *user, *style = NULL;
+
+	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
+	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+
+	/* Get the user name. */
+	user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+		*style++ = '\0';
+
+	authctxt->user = user;
+	authctxt->style = style;
+
+	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
+	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
+		authctxt->valid = 1;
+	else {
+		debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user);
+		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+	}
+
+	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
+	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
+	 * the server.
+	 */
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
+	    authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
+		packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
+	 * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
+	 */
+	do_authloop(authctxt);
+
+	/* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
+	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6dbffe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.34 2008/12/09 04:32:22 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *);
+static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *);
+static void input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+extern KbdintDevice skey_device;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	&bsdauth_device,
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	&sshpam_device,
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+	&skey_device,
+#endif
+#endif
+	NULL
+};
+
+typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
+struct KbdintAuthctxt
+{
+	char *devices;
+	void *ctxt;
+	KbdintDevice *device;
+	u_int nreq;
+};
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void
+remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
+		if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
+			for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
+				devices[j] = devices[j+1];
+			i--;
+		}
+}
+#endif
+
+static KbdintAuthctxt *
+kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
+{
+	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+	Buffer b;
+	int i;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		remove_kbdint_device("pam");
+#endif
+
+	kbdintctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
+	if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
+		buffer_init(&b);
+		for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
+			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+			buffer_append(&b, devices[i]->name,
+			    strlen(devices[i]->name));
+		}
+		buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+		kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+		buffer_free(&b);
+	} else {
+		kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
+	}
+	debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
+	kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
+	kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+	kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
+
+	return kbdintctxt;
+}
+static void
+kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+	if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
+		kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
+		kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
+	}
+	kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+}
+static void
+kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+	if (kbdintctxt->device)
+		kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
+	if (kbdintctxt->devices) {
+		xfree(kbdintctxt->devices);
+		kbdintctxt->devices = NULL;
+	}
+	xfree(kbdintctxt);
+}
+/* get next device */
+static int
+kbdint_next_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	char *t;
+	int i;
+
+	if (kbdintctxt->device)
+		kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
+	do {
+		len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
+		    strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
+
+		if (len == 0)
+			break;
+		for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++)
+			if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0)
+				kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
+		t = kbdintctxt->devices;
+		kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
+		xfree(t);
+		debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
+		    kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+	} while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
+
+	return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
+ * wait for the response.
+ */
+int
+auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs)
+{
+	debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
+	    authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
+	    devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
+
+	if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
+		return 0;
+	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
+		authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
+	return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
+}
+
+/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */
+void
+auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	/* unregister callback */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
+	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
+		kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+		authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
+static int
+auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+
+	debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
+	    kbdintctxt->devices ?  kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+
+	if (kbdint_next_device(kbdintctxt) == 0) {
+		auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
+	    kbdintctxt->device->name);
+
+	if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
+		auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) {
+		auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
+	    &input_userauth_info_response);
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+	char *name, *instr, **prompts;
+	u_int i, *echo_on;
+
+	kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+	if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
+	    &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
+		return 0;
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(name);
+	packet_put_cstring(instr);
+	packet_put_cstring("");		/* language not used */
+	packet_put_int(kbdintctxt->nreq);
+	for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
+		packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]);
+		packet_put_char(echo_on[i]);
+	}
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
+		xfree(prompts[i]);
+	xfree(prompts);
+	xfree(echo_on);
+	xfree(name);
+	xfree(instr);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+	int authenticated = 0, res;
+	u_int i, nresp;
+	char **response = NULL, *method;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
+	kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+	if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt");
+	if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device");
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;	/* reset */
+	nresp = packet_get_int();
+	if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
+		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies");
+	if (nresp > 100)
+		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
+	if (nresp > 0) {
+		response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
+		for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
+			response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
+		memset(response[i], 'r', strlen(response[i]));
+		xfree(response[i]);
+	}
+	if (response)
+		xfree(response);
+
+	switch (res) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Success! */
+		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		/* Authentication needs further interaction */
+		if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 1)
+			authctxt->postponed = 1;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Failure! */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	xasprintf(&method, "keyboard-interactive/%s", kbdintctxt->device->name);
+
+	if (!authctxt->postponed) {
+		if (authenticated) {
+			auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+		} else {
+			/* start next device */
+			/* may set authctxt->postponed */
+			auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
+		}
+	}
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
+	xfree(method);
+}
+
+void
+privsep_challenge_enable(void)
+{
+#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) || defined(SKEY)
+	int n = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+	extern KbdintDevice mm_skey_device;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+	devices[n++] = &mm_skey_device;
+#endif
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e08d88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+/*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+	int mechs;
+	gss_OID_set supported;
+	int present;
+	OM_uint32 ms;
+	u_int len;
+	u_char *doid = NULL;
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	mechs = packet_get_int();
+	if (mechs == 0) {
+		debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
+	do {
+		mechs--;
+
+		if (doid)
+			xfree(doid);
+
+		present = 0;
+		doid = packet_get_string(&len);
+
+		if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
+		    doid[1] == len - 2) {
+			goid.elements = doid + 2;
+			goid.length   = len - 2;
+			gss_test_oid_set_member(&ms, &goid, supported,
+			    &present);
+		} else {
+			logit("Badly formed OID received");
+		}
+	} while (mechs > 0 && !present);
+
+	gss_release_oid_set(&ms, &supported);
+
+	if (!present) {
+		xfree(doid);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+		if (ctxt != NULL)
+			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+		xfree(doid);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE);
+
+	/* Return the OID that we received */
+	packet_put_string(doid, len);
+
+	packet_send();
+	xfree(doid);
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+	authctxt->postponed = 1;
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static void
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
+	u_int len;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+	recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+	recv_tok.length = len; /* u_int vs. size_t */
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+	    &send_tok, &flags));
+
+	xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
+			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+			packet_send();
+		}
+		authctxt->postponed = 0;
+		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+		userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic");
+	} else {
+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+			packet_send();
+		}
+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+			dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
+				dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
+				    &input_gssapi_mic);
+			else
+				dispatch_set(
+				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
+				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
+		}
+	}
+
+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+}
+
+static void
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 maj_status;
+	u_int len;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+	recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+	recv_tok.length = len;
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
+	maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+	    &send_tok, NULL));
+
+	xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+	/* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+
+	/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
+
+	gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
+ * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
+ * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
+ */
+
+static void
+input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	int authenticated;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
+	 * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
+	 */
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+}
+
+static void
+input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	Buffer b;
+	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+	u_int len;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+	mic.length = len;
+
+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+	else
+		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	xfree(mic.value);
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+}
+
+Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+	"gssapi-with-mic",
+	userauth_gssapi,
+	&options.gss_authentication
+};
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..041051c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.12 2008/07/17 08:51:07 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
+static int
+userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
+	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+	u_int alen, blen, slen;
+	int pktype;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid) {
+		debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+	pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+	chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	cuser = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
+
+	debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d",
+	    cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	debug("signature:");
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, sig, slen);
+	buffer_dump(&b);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+#endif
+	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		/* this is perfectly legal */
+		logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported "
+		    "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key->type != pktype) {
+		error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key "
+		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
+	    authctxt->service;
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+	/* reconstruct packet */
+	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
+	buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+	authenticated = 0;
+	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
+	    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+			buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+		authenticated = 1;
+
+	buffer_free(&b);
+done:
+	debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
+	if (key != NULL)
+		key_free(key);
+	xfree(pkalg);
+	xfree(pkblob);
+	xfree(cuser);
+	xfree(chost);
+	xfree(sig);
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
+int
+hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
+    Key *key)
+{
+	const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup;
+	HostStatus host_status;
+	int len;
+
+	resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+	ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+
+	debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
+	    chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
+
+	if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
+		debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
+		chost[len - 1] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
+		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0)
+			return 0;
+		lookup = chost;
+	} else {
+		if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
+			logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
+			    "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
+			    chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
+		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0)
+			return 0;
+		lookup = resolvedname;
+	}
+	debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
+
+	host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
+	    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
+	    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+
+	/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
+	if (host_status == HOST_NEW)
+		host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
+		    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
+		    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
+
+	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
+}
+
+Authmethod method_hostbased = {
+	"hostbased",
+	userauth_hostbased,
+	&options.hostbased_authentication
+};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5de5506
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c
@@ -0,0 +1,558 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.3 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Server side of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
+ * as described in:
+ *
+ * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
+ * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
+ *
+ * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
+ */
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <login_cap.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+#include "schnorr.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
+
+/*
+ * XXX options->permit_empty_passwd (at the moment, they will be refused
+ * anyway because they will mismatch on fake salt.
+ */
+
+/* Dispatch handlers */
+static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static void input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+static int auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *);
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
+/*
+ * Attempt J-PAKE authentication.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("jpake-01@openssh.com requested");
+
+	if (authctxt->user != NULL) {
+		if (authctxt->jpake_ctx == NULL)
+			authctxt->jpake_ctx = jpake_new();
+		if (options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
+			authenticated = auth2_jpake_start(authctxt);
+	}
+
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_jpake = {
+	"jpake-01@openssh.com",
+	userauth_jpake,
+	&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication
+};
+
+/* Clear context and callbacks */
+void
+auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	/* unregister callbacks */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
+	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
+		jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+		authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if 'c' is a valid crypt(3) salt character, 0 otherwise */
+static int
+valid_crypt_salt(int c)
+{
+	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
+		return 1;
+	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
+		return 1;
+	if (c >= '.' && c <= '9')
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive fake salt as H(username || first_private_host_key)
+ * This provides relatively stable fake salts for non-existent
+ * users and avoids the jpake method becoming an account validity
+ * oracle.
+ */
+static void
+derive_rawsalt(const char *username, u_char *rawsalt, u_int len)
+{
+	u_char *digest;
+	u_int digest_len;
+	Buffer b;
+	Key *k;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, username);
+	if ((k = get_hostkey_by_index(0)) == NULL ||
+	    (k->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
+		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if (k->rsa->p == NULL || k->rsa->q == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: RSA key missing p and/or q", __func__);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->q);
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if (k->dsa->priv_key == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: DSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->dsa->priv_key);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, k->type);
+	}
+	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
+	    &digest, &digest_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (len > digest_len)
+		fatal("%s: not enough bytes for rawsalt (want %u have %u)",
+		    __func__, len, digest_len);
+	memcpy(rawsalt, digest, len);
+	bzero(digest, digest_len);
+	xfree(digest);
+}
+
+/* ASCII an integer [0, 64) for inclusion in a password/salt */
+static char
+pw_encode64(u_int i64)
+{
+	const u_char e64[] =
+	    "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+	return e64[i64 % 64];
+}
+
+/* Generate ASCII salt bytes for user */
+static char *
+makesalt(u_int want, const char *user)
+{
+	u_char rawsalt[32];
+	static char ret[33];
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (want > sizeof(ret) - 1)
+		fatal("%s: want %u", __func__, want);
+
+	derive_rawsalt(user, rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
+	bzero(ret, sizeof(ret));
+	for (i = 0; i < want; i++)
+		ret[i] = pw_encode64(rawsalt[i]);
+	bzero(rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Select the system's default password hashing scheme and generate
+ * a stable fake salt under it for use by a non-existent account.
+ * Prevents jpake method being used to infer the validity of accounts.
+ */
+static void
+fake_salt_and_scheme(Authctxt *authctxt, char **salt, char **scheme)
+{
+	char *rounds_s, *style;
+	long long rounds;
+	login_cap_t *lc;
+
+
+	if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL &&
+	    (lc = login_getclass(NULL)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: login_getclass failed", __func__);
+	style = login_getcapstr(lc, "localcipher", NULL, NULL);
+	if (style == NULL)
+		style = xstrdup("blowfish,6");
+	login_close(lc);
+	
+	if ((rounds_s = strchr(style, ',')) != NULL)
+		*rounds_s++ = '\0';
+	rounds = strtonum(rounds_s, 1, 1<<31, NULL);
+	
+	if (strcmp(style, "md5") == 0) {
+		xasprintf(salt, "$1$%s$", makesalt(8, authctxt->user));
+		*scheme = xstrdup("md5");
+	} else if (strcmp(style, "old") == 0) {
+		*salt = xstrdup(makesalt(2, authctxt->user));
+		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
+	} else if (strcmp(style, "newsalt") == 0) {
+		rounds = MAX(rounds, 7250);
+		rounds = MIN(rounds, (1<<24) - 1);
+		xasprintf(salt, "_%c%c%c%c%s",
+		    pw_encode64(rounds), pw_encode64(rounds >> 6),
+		    pw_encode64(rounds >> 12), pw_encode64(rounds >> 18),
+		    makesalt(4, authctxt->user));
+		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
+	} else {
+		/* Default to blowfish */
+		rounds = MAX(rounds, 3);
+		rounds = MIN(rounds, 31);
+		xasprintf(salt, "$2a$%02lld$%s", rounds,
+		    makesalt(22, authctxt->user));
+		*scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
+	}
+	xfree(style);
+	debug3("%s: fake %s salt for user %s: %s",
+	    __func__, *scheme, authctxt->user, *salt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fetch password hashing scheme, password salt and derive shared secret
+ * for user. If user does not exist, a fake but stable and user-unique
+ * salt will be returned.
+ */
+void
+auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
+    char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
+{
+	char *cp;
+	u_char *secret;
+	u_int secret_len, salt_len;
+
+#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
+	debug3("%s: valid %d pw %.5s...", __func__,
+	    authctxt->valid, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd);
+#endif
+
+	*salt = NULL;
+	*hash_scheme = NULL;
+	if (authctxt->valid) {
+		if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2$", 3) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 28) {
+			/*
+			 * old-variant bcrypt:
+			 *     "$2$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
+			 */
+			salt_len = 3 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
+			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
+			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
+		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2a$", 4) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 29) {
+			/*
+			 * current-variant bcrypt:
+			 *     "$2a$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
+			 */
+			salt_len = 4 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
+			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
+			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
+		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$1$", 3) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 5) {
+			/*
+			 * md5crypt:
+			 *     "$1$", salt until "$"
+			 */
+			cp = strchr(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd + 3, '$');
+			if (cp != NULL) {
+				salt_len = (cp - authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) + 1;
+				*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+				strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
+				    salt_len);
+				*hash_scheme = xstrdup("md5crypt");
+			}
+		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "_", 1) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 9) {
+			/*
+			 * BSDI extended crypt:
+			 *     "_", 4 digits count, 4 chars salt
+			 */
+			salt_len = 1 + 4 + 4 + 1;
+			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
+			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
+		} else if (strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) == 13  &&
+		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[0]) &&
+		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[1])) {
+			/*
+			 * traditional crypt:
+			 *     2 chars salt
+			 */
+			salt_len = 2 + 1;
+			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
+			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
+			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
+		}
+		if (*salt == NULL) {
+			debug("%s: unrecognised crypt scheme for user %s",
+			    __func__, authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+		}
+	}
+	if (*salt == NULL)
+		fake_salt_and_scheme(authctxt, salt, hash_scheme);
+
+	if (hash_buffer(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
+	    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd), EVP_sha256(),
+	    &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+	if ((*s = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
+#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
+	debug3("%s: salt = %s (len %u)", __func__,
+	    *salt, (u_int)strlen(*salt));
+	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, *hash_scheme);
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((*s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
+#endif
+	bzero(secret, secret_len);
+	xfree(secret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Begin authentication attempt.
+ * Note, sets authctxt->postponed while in subprotocol
+ */
+static int
+auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
+	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
+	char *salt, *hash_scheme;
+
+	debug("%s: start", __func__);
+
+	PRIVSEP(jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
+	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
+	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
+	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
+	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len));
+
+	PRIVSEP(auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s,
+	    &hash_scheme, &salt));
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1);
+	packet_put_cstring(hash_scheme);
+	packet_put_cstring(salt);
+	packet_put_string(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
+	packet_put_string(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	packet_put_string(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
+	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
+	xfree(hash_scheme);
+	xfree(salt);
+	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+	xfree(x3_proof);
+	xfree(x4_proof);
+
+	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step1);
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
+	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
+
+	/* Fetch step 1 values */
+	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	pctx->client_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->client_id_len);
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
+	x1_proof = packet_get_string(&x1_proof_len);
+	x2_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_proof_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
+
+	PRIVSEP(jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
+	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
+	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->b,
+	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len));
+
+	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+	xfree(x1_proof);
+	xfree(x2_proof);
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Send values for step 2 */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->b);
+	packet_put_string(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x4_s_proof);
+
+	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step2);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x2_s_proof;
+	u_int x2_s_proof_len;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
+
+	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Fetch step 2 values */
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->a);
+	x2_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_s_proof_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
+	PRIVSEP(jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
+	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->k,
+	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len));
+
+	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x2_s_proof);
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Send key confirmation proof */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM);
+	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
+
+	pctx->h_k_cid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
+	if (PRIVSEP(jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len)) == 1)
+		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
+	else
+		debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
+		
+	/* done */
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
+}
+
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fae67da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	char *lang, *devs;
+
+	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	devs = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
+
+	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+		authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs);
+
+	xfree(devs);
+	xfree(lang);
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_kbdint = {
+	"keyboard-interactive",
+	userauth_kbdint,
+	&options.kbd_interactive_authentication
+};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08f2f93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.15 2008/07/02 12:36:39 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/* "none" is allowed only one time */
+static int none_enabled = 1;
+
+static int
+userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	none_enabled = 0;
+	packet_check_eom();
+	if (options.password_authentication)
+		return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, "")));
+	return (0);
+}
+
+Authmethod method_none = {
+	"none",
+	userauth_none,
+	&none_enabled
+};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f1f363
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.9 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	char *password, *newpass;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	int change;
+	u_int len, newlen;
+
+	change = packet_get_char();
+	password = packet_get_string(&len);
+	if (change) {
+		/* discard new password from packet */
+		newpass = packet_get_string(&newlen);
+		memset(newpass, 0, newlen);
+		xfree(newpass);
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (change)
+		logit("password change not supported");
+	else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1)
+		authenticated = 1;
+	memset(password, 0, len);
+	xfree(password);
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_passwd = {
+	"password",
+	userauth_passwd,
+	&options.password_authentication
+};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2886f12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.19 2008/07/03 21:46:58 otto Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
+static int
+userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	char *pkalg;
+	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+	u_int alen, blen, slen;
+	int have_sig, pktype;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid) {
+		debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	have_sig = packet_get_char();
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+		debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
+		/* no explicit pkalg given */
+		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+		buffer_init(&b);
+		buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
+		/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
+		pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
+		buffer_free(&b);
+	} else {
+		pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+	}
+	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		/* this is perfectly legal */
+		logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
+		    pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key->type != pktype) {
+		error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
+		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (have_sig) {
+		sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
+		packet_check_eom();
+		buffer_init(&b);
+		if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+			buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+		} else {
+			buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+		}
+		/* reconstruct packet */
+		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+		    "ssh-userauth" :
+		    authctxt->service);
+		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+		} else {
+			buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+			buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+		}
+		buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+		/* test for correct signature */
+		authenticated = 0;
+		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
+		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+			authenticated = 1;
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		xfree(sig);
+	} else {
+		debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
+		packet_check_eom();
+
+		/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
+		/*
+		 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
+		 * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
+		 * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
+		 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
+		 * issue? -markus
+		 */
+		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
+			packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
+			packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
+			packet_send();
+			packet_write_wait();
+			authctxt->postponed = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (authenticated != 1)
+		auth_clear_options();
+done:
+	debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
+	if (key != NULL)
+		key_free(key);
+	xfree(pkalg);
+	xfree(pkblob);
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+/* return 1 if user allows given key */
+static int
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+{
+	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+	int found_key = 0;
+	FILE *f;
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+	Key *found;
+	char *fp;
+
+	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
+	f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
+
+	if (!f) {
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	found_key = 0;
+	found = key_new(key->type);
+
+	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+		char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
+
+		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+			continue;
+
+		if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+			/* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
+			int quoted = 0;
+			debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+			key_options = cp;
+			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+					cp++;	/* Skip both */
+				else if (*cp == '"')
+					quoted = !quoted;
+			}
+			/* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+			for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+				;
+			if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+				debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+				/* still no key?  advance to next line*/
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+		if (key_equal(found, key) &&
+		    auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) == 1) {
+			found_key = 1;
+			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
+			    file, linenum);
+			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
+			    key_type(found), fp);
+			xfree(fp);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	restore_uid();
+	fclose(f);
+	key_free(found);
+	if (!found_key)
+		debug2("key not found");
+	return found_key;
+}
+
+/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
+int
+user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+{
+	int success;
+	char *file;
+
+	file = authorized_keys_file(pw);
+	success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
+	xfree(file);
+	if (success)
+		return success;
+
+	/* try suffix "2" for backward compat, too */
+	file = authorized_keys_file2(pw);
+	success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
+	xfree(file);
+	return success;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_pubkey = {
+	"publickey",
+	userauth_pubkey,
+	&options.pubkey_authentication
+};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50fb339
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.121 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* methods */
+
+extern Authmethod method_none;
+extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
+extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+#endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+extern Authmethod method_jpake;
+#endif
+
+Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+	&method_none,
+	&method_pubkey,
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	&method_gssapi,
+#endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	&method_jpake,
+#endif
+	&method_passwd,
+	&method_kbdint,
+	&method_hostbased,
+	NULL
+};
+
+/* protocol */
+
+static void input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+/* helper */
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *);
+static char *authmethods_get(void);
+
+char *
+auth2_read_banner(void)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	char *banner = NULL;
+	size_t len, n;
+	int fd;
+
+	if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		return (NULL);
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+		close(fd);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	if (st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
+		close(fd);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	len = (size_t)st.st_size;		/* truncate */
+	banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
+	n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len);
+	close(fd);
+
+	if (n != len) {
+		xfree(banner);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	banner[n] = '\0';
+
+	return (banner);
+}
+
+void
+userauth_send_banner(const char *msg)
+{
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER)
+		return;
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
+	packet_put_cstring(msg);
+	packet_put_cstring("");		/* language, unused */
+	packet_send();
+	debug("%s: sent", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+userauth_banner(void)
+{
+	char *banner = NULL;
+
+	if (options.banner == NULL ||
+	    strcasecmp(options.banner, "none") == 0 ||
+	    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER) != 0)
+		return;
+
+	if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
+		goto done;
+	userauth_send_banner(banner);
+
+done:
+	if (banner)
+		xfree(banner);
+}
+
+/*
+ * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
+ */
+void
+do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
+	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	u_int len;
+	int acceptit = 0;
+	char *service = packet_get_string(&len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
+
+	if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
+		if (!authctxt->success) {
+			acceptit = 1;
+			/* now we can handle user-auth requests */
+			dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request);
+		}
+	}
+	/* XXX all other service requests are denied */
+
+	if (acceptit) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
+		packet_put_cstring(service);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+	} else {
+		debug("bad service request %s", service);
+		packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service);
+	}
+	xfree(service);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	login_cap_t *lc;
+	const char *from_host, *from_ip;
+
+        from_host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+        from_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+#endif
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
+
+	user = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	service = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	method = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+
+	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+		*style++ = 0;
+
+	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
+		/* setup auth context */
+		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
+		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
+		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
+			authctxt->valid = 1;
+			debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
+		} else {
+			logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
+			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
+#endif
+		}
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+		if (options.use_pam)
+			PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+#endif
+		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
+		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+		if (use_privsep)
+			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+		userauth_banner();
+	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
+	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
+		packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
+		    "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
+		    authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+        if (authctxt->pw != NULL) {
+                lc = login_getpwclass(authctxt->pw);
+                if (lc == NULL)
+                        lc = login_getclassbyname(NULL, authctxt->pw);
+                if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) {
+                        logit("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
+                            authctxt->pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
+                        packet_disconnect("Sorry, you are not allowed to connect.");
+                }
+                if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) {
+                        logit("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME) FROM %.200s",
+                            authctxt->pw->pw_name, from_host);
+                        packet_disconnect("Logins not available right now.");
+                }
+                login_close(lc);
+                lc = NULL;
+        }
+#endif  /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+
+	/* reset state */
+	auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	auth2_jpake_stop(authctxt);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+#endif
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+
+	/* try to authenticate user */
+	m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+	if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
+		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
+		authenticated =	m->userauth(authctxt);
+	}
+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
+
+	xfree(service);
+	xfree(user);
+	xfree(method);
+}
+
+void
+userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+{
+	char *methods;
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
+		    authctxt->user);
+
+	/* Special handling for root */
+	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+	    !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
+		authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+#endif
+	}
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+		if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
+			/* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */
+			if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
+				buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+				userauth_send_banner(buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+				packet_write_wait();
+			}
+			fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
+			    "configuration", authctxt->user);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+	if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
+		authenticated = 0;
+		fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
+	}
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+
+	/* Log before sending the reply */
+	auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2");
+
+	if (authctxt->postponed)
+		return;
+
+	/* XXX todo: check if multiple auth methods are needed */
+	if (authenticated == 1) {
+		/* turn off userauth */
+		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+		/* now we can break out */
+		authctxt->success = 1;
+	} else {
+
+		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+		if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
+			authctxt->failures++;
+		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
+			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+		}
+		methods = authmethods_get();
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
+		packet_put_cstring(methods);
+		packet_put_char(0);	/* XXX partial success, unused */
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+		xfree(methods);
+	}
+}
+
+static char *
+authmethods_get(void)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	char *list;
+	int i;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
+		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0) {
+			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+			buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
+			    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
+		}
+	}
+	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+	list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return list;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (name != NULL)
+		for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
+			if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
+			    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
+			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0)
+				return authmethods[i];
+	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
+	    name ? name : "NULL");
+	return NULL;
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61faad1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,671 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.80 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static int agent_present = 0;
+
+/* helper */
+int	decode_reply(int type);
+
+/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
+#define agent_failed(x) \
+    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+    (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+
+int
+ssh_agent_present(void)
+{
+	int authfd;
+
+	if (agent_present)
+		return 1;
+	if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	else {
+		ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+		return 1;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
+
+int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
+{
+	const char *authsocket;
+	int sock;
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+
+	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+	if (!authsocket)
+		return -1;
+
+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* close on exec */
+	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
+		close(sock);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+		close(sock);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	agent_present = 1;
+	return sock;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
+{
+	u_int l, len;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
+	len = buffer_len(request);
+	put_u32(buf, len);
+
+	/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+	    atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
+	    buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
+		error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Wait for response from the agent.  First read the length of the
+	 * response packet.
+	 */
+	if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) {
+	    error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
+	    return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
+	len = get_u32(buf);
+	if (len > 256 * 1024)
+		fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
+
+	/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
+	buffer_clear(reply);
+	while (len > 0) {
+		l = len;
+		if (l > sizeof(buf))
+			l = sizeof(buf);
+		if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
+			error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
+		len -= l;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
+ * obtained).  The argument must have been returned by
+ * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
+ */
+
+void
+ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
+{
+	if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
+		close(sock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Opens and connects a private socket for communication with the
+ * authentication agent.  Returns the file descriptor (which must be
+ * shut down and closed by the caller when no longer needed).
+ * Returns NULL if an error occurred and the connection could not be
+ * opened.
+ */
+
+AuthenticationConnection *
+ssh_get_authentication_connection(void)
+{
+	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
+	int sock;
+
+	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+
+	/*
+	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
+	 * exited due to a timeout.
+	 */
+	if (sock < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
+	auth->fd = sock;
+	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
+	auth->howmany = 0;
+
+	return auth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated
+ * memory.
+ */
+
+void
+ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
+{
+	buffer_free(&auth->identities);
+	close(auth->fd);
+	xfree(auth);
+}
+
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
+{
+	int type;
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
+
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
+{
+	int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
+	Buffer request;
+
+	switch (version) {
+	case 1:
+		code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+		code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+		code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
+	 * identities it can represent.
+	 */
+	buffer_init(&request);
+	buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
+
+	buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&request);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	buffer_free(&request);
+
+	/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
+	type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
+	if (agent_failed(type)) {
+		return 0;
+	} else if (type != code2) {
+		fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
+	}
+
+	/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
+	auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+	if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
+		fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
+		    auth->howmany);
+
+	return auth->howmany;
+}
+
+Key *
+ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
+{
+	/* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */
+	if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0)
+		return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+Key *
+ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
+{
+	int keybits;
+	u_int bits;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+
+	/* Return failure if no more entries. */
+	if (auth->howmany <= 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the next entry from the packet.  These will abort with a fatal
+	 * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
+	 */
+	switch (version) {
+	case 1:
+		key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+		bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
+		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+		if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
+			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+			    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
+		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+		key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+		xfree(blob);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
+	auth->howmany--;
+	return key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates a random challenge, sends it to the agent, and waits for
+ * response from the agent.  Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the
+ * correct answer, zero otherwise.  Response type selects the style of
+ * response desired, with 0 corresponding to protocol version 1.0 (no longer
+ * supported) and 1 corresponding to protocol version 1.1.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+    Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
+    u_char session_id[16],
+    u_int response_type,
+    u_char response[16])
+{
+	Buffer buffer;
+	int success = 0;
+	int i;
+	int type;
+
+	if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
+		return 0;
+	if (response_type == 0) {
+		logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+	buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
+	buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
+	buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
+
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&buffer);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+
+	if (agent_failed(type)) {
+		logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
+	} else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
+		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+	} else {
+		success = 1;
+		/*
+		 * Get the response from the packet.  This will abort with a
+		 * fatal error if the packet is corrupt.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+			response[i] = (u_char)buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	return success;
+}
+
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+    Key *key,
+    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	extern int datafellows;
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+	int type, flags = 0;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
+		flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	if (agent_failed(type)) {
+		logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+	} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+	} else {
+		ret = 0;
+		*sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
+
+static void
+ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+{
+	buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
+	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
+	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
+	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->d);
+	/* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
+	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp);	/* ssh key->u */
+	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q);	/* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
+	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p);	/* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
+	buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+	buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+		break;
+	}
+	buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server.  This call is not meant to
+ * be used by normal applications.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
+    const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+		ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+		ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
+		break;
+	default:
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (constrained) {
+		if (life != 0) {
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+			buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+		}
+		if (confirm != 0)
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+	}
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+	return ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes an identity from the authentication server.  This call is not
+ * meant to be used by normal applications.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	int type;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
+		buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+		buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+	} else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+		key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
+		buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+		xfree(blob);
+	} else {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
+    const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+
+	if (add) {
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+	} else
+		type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
+
+	if (constrained) {
+		if (life != 0) {
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+			buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+		}
+		if (confirm != 0)
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+	}
+
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes all identities from the agent.  This call is not meant to be used
+ * by normal applications.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	int type;
+	int code = (version==1) ?
+		SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+		SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
+
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+int
+decode_reply(int type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
+	case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
+	case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
+		logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
+		return 0;
+	case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
+		return 1;
+	default:
+		fatal("Bad response from authentication agent: %d", type);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.h b/crypto/openssh/authfd.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3da2561
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.36 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTHFD_H
+#define AUTHFD_H
+
+/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES	1
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		2
+#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE		3
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE			4
+#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE			5
+#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS			6
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY		7
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY		8
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES	9
+
+/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES		11
+#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		12
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST		13
+#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE		14
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY		17
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY		18
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES	19
+
+/* smartcard */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY		20
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY		21
+
+/* lock/unlock the agent */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK				22
+#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK			23
+
+/* add key with constraints */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED	24
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED		25
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
+
+#define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME		1
+#define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM		2
+
+/* extended failure messages */
+#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE			30
+
+/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
+#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE			102
+
+#define	SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE			0x01
+
+typedef struct {
+	int	fd;
+	Buffer	identities;
+	int	howmany;
+}	AuthenticationConnection;
+
+int	ssh_agent_present(void);
+int	ssh_get_authentication_socket(void);
+void	ssh_close_authentication_socket(int);
+
+AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection(void);
+void	ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *);
+int	 ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
+Key	*ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
+Key	*ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
+int	 ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, const char *);
+int	 ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *,
+    const char *, u_int, u_int);
+int	 ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *);
+int	 ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
+int	 ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *);
+int	 ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *,
+    const char *, u_int, u_int);
+
+int
+ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[16],
+    u_int, u_char[16]);
+
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *,
+    u_int);
+
+#endif				/* AUTHFD_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..735c647
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,679 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.76 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file contains functions for reading and writing identity files, and
+ * for reading the passphrase from the user.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
+static const char authfile_id_string[] =
+    "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n";
+
+/*
+ * Saves the authentication (private) key in a file, encrypting it with
+ * passphrase.  The identification of the file (lowest 64 bits of n) will
+ * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a
+ * passphrase.
+ */
+
+static int
+key_save_private_rsa1(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+    const char *comment)
+{
+	Buffer buffer, encrypted;
+	u_char buf[100], *cp;
+	int fd, i, cipher_num;
+	CipherContext ciphercontext;
+	Cipher *cipher;
+	u_int32_t rnd;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting
+	 * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER.
+	 */
+	cipher_num = (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) ?
+	    SSH_CIPHER_NONE : SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER;
+	if ((cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_num)) == NULL)
+		fatal("save_private_key_rsa: bad cipher");
+
+	/* This buffer is used to built the secret part of the private key. */
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+
+	/* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */
+	rnd = arc4random();
+	buf[0] = rnd & 0xff;
+	buf[1] = (rnd >> 8) & 0xff;
+	buf[2] = buf[0];
+	buf[3] = buf[1];
+	buffer_append(&buffer, buf, 4);
+
+	/*
+	 * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they
+	 * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted
+	 * format would just give known plaintext).
+	 */
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->d);
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->iqmp);
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->q);	/* reverse from SSL p */
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->p);	/* reverse from SSL q */
+
+	/* Pad the part to be encrypted until its size is a multiple of 8. */
+	while (buffer_len(&buffer) % 8 != 0)
+		buffer_put_char(&buffer, 0);
+
+	/* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */
+	buffer_init(&encrypted);
+
+	/* First store keyfile id string. */
+	for (i = 0; authfile_id_string[i]; i++)
+		buffer_put_char(&encrypted, authfile_id_string[i]);
+	buffer_put_char(&encrypted, 0);
+
+	/* Store cipher type. */
+	buffer_put_char(&encrypted, cipher_num);
+	buffer_put_int(&encrypted, 0);	/* For future extension */
+
+	/* Store public key.  This will be in plain text. */
+	buffer_put_int(&encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+	buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->n);
+	buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->e);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&encrypted, comment);
+
+	/* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer));
+
+	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
+	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
+	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer));
+	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+	memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+
+	/* Destroy temporary data. */
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+
+	fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		error("open %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno));
+		buffer_free(&encrypted);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(&encrypted),
+	    buffer_len(&encrypted)) != buffer_len(&encrypted)) {
+		error("write to key file %s failed: %s", filename,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		buffer_free(&encrypted);
+		close(fd);
+		unlink(filename);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	buffer_free(&encrypted);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* save SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
+static int
+key_save_private_pem(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *_passphrase,
+    const char *comment)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	int fd;
+	int success = 0;
+	int len = strlen(_passphrase);
+	u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL;
+	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL;
+
+	if (len > 0 && len <= 4) {
+		error("passphrase too short: have %d bytes, need > 4", len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		error("open %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	fp = fdopen(fd, "w");
+	if (fp == NULL) {
+		error("fdopen %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		success = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(fp, key->dsa,
+		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		success = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(fp, key->rsa,
+		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+		break;
+	}
+	fclose(fp);
+	return success;
+}
+
+int
+key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+    const char *comment)
+{
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		return key_save_private_rsa1(key, filename, passphrase,
+		    comment);
+	case KEY_DSA:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		return key_save_private_pem(key, filename, passphrase,
+		    comment);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	error("key_save_private: cannot save key type %d", key->type);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file.  Returns NULL if an error was
+ * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+
+static Key *
+key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+	Buffer buffer;
+	Key *pub;
+	struct stat st;
+	char *cp;
+	u_int i;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+		error("fstat for key file %.200s failed: %.100s",
+		    filename, strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
+		error("key file %.200s too large", filename);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	len = (size_t)st.st_size;		/* truncated */
+
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&buffer, len);
+
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, cp, len) != len) {
+		debug("Read from key file %.200s failed: %.100s", filename,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		buffer_free(&buffer);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */
+	if (len < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) {
+		debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename);
+		buffer_free(&buffer);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Make sure it begins with the id string.  Consume the id string
+	 * from the buffer.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(authfile_id_string); i++)
+		if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != authfile_id_string[i]) {
+			debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename);
+			buffer_free(&buffer);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	/* Skip cipher type and reserved data. */
+	(void) buffer_get_char(&buffer);	/* cipher type */
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&buffer);		/* reserved */
+
+	/* Read the public key from the buffer. */
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&buffer);
+	pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, pub->rsa->n);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, pub->rsa->e);
+	if (commentp)
+		*commentp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+	/* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */
+
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	return pub;
+}
+
+/* load public key from private-key file, works only for SSH v1 */
+Key *
+key_load_public_type(int type, const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+	Key *pub;
+	int fd;
+
+	if (type == KEY_RSA1) {
+		fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+		if (fd < 0)
+			return NULL;
+		pub = key_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, commentp);
+		close(fd);
+		return pub;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Loads the private key from the file.  Returns 0 if an error is encountered
+ * (file does not exist or is not readable, or passphrase is bad). This
+ * initializes the private key.
+ * Assumes we are called under uid of the owner of the file.
+ */
+
+static Key *
+key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+    char **commentp)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int check1, check2, cipher_type;
+	size_t len;
+	Buffer buffer, decrypted;
+	u_char *cp;
+	CipherContext ciphercontext;
+	Cipher *cipher;
+	Key *prv = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+		error("fstat for key file %.200s failed: %.100s",
+		    filename, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
+		error("key file %.200s too large", filename);
+		close(fd);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	len = (size_t)st.st_size;		/* truncated */
+
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&buffer, len);
+
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, cp, len) != len) {
+		debug("Read from key file %.200s failed: %.100s", filename,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		buffer_free(&buffer);
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */
+	if (len < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) {
+		debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename);
+		buffer_free(&buffer);
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Make sure it begins with the id string.  Consume the id string
+	 * from the buffer.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(authfile_id_string); i++)
+		if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != authfile_id_string[i]) {
+			debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename);
+			buffer_free(&buffer);
+			close(fd);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* Read cipher type. */
+	cipher_type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&buffer);	/* Reserved data. */
+
+	/* Read the public key from the buffer. */
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&buffer);
+	prv = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
+
+	buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, prv->rsa->n);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, prv->rsa->e);
+	if (commentp)
+		*commentp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+	else
+		xfree(buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL));
+
+	/* Check that it is a supported cipher. */
+	cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type);
+	if (cipher == NULL) {
+		debug("Unsupported cipher %d used in key file %.200s.",
+		    cipher_type, filename);
+		buffer_free(&buffer);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* Initialize space for decrypted data. */
+	buffer_init(&decrypted);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(&buffer));
+
+	/* Rest of the buffer is encrypted.  Decrypt it using the passphrase. */
+	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
+	    CIPHER_DECRYPT);
+	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer));
+	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+	memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+
+	check1 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted);
+	check2 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted);
+	if (check1 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted) ||
+	    check2 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted)) {
+		if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0)
+			debug("Bad passphrase supplied for key file %.200s.",
+			    filename);
+		/* Bad passphrase. */
+		buffer_free(&decrypted);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* Read the rest of the private key. */
+	buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->d);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp);		/* u */
+	/* in SSL and SSH v1 p and q are exchanged */
+	buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->q);		/* p */
+	buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->p);		/* q */
+
+	/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
+	rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa);
+
+	buffer_free(&decrypted);
+
+	/* enable blinding */
+	if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+		error("key_load_private_rsa1: RSA_blinding_on failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	return prv;
+
+fail:
+	if (commentp)
+		xfree(*commentp);
+	close(fd);
+	key_free(prv);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
+    char **commentp)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+	Key *prv = NULL;
+	char *name = "<no key>";
+
+	fp = fdopen(fd, "r");
+	if (fp == NULL) {
+		error("fdopen failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	pk = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, (char *)passphrase);
+	if (pk == NULL) {
+		debug("PEM_read_PrivateKey failed");
+		(void)ERR_get_error();
+	} else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
+	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_RSA)) {
+		prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+		prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
+		prv->type = KEY_RSA;
+		name = "rsa w/o comment";
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+		if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+			error("key_load_private_pem: RSA_blinding_on failed");
+			key_free(prv);
+			prv = NULL;
+		}
+	} else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_DSA)) {
+		prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+		prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
+		prv->type = KEY_DSA;
+		name = "dsa w/o comment";
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+	} else {
+		error("PEM_read_PrivateKey: mismatch or "
+		    "unknown EVP_PKEY save_type %d", pk->save_type);
+	}
+	fclose(fp);
+	if (pk != NULL)
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+	if (prv != NULL && commentp)
+		*commentp = xstrdup(name);
+	debug("read PEM private key done: type %s",
+	    prv ? key_type(prv) : "<unknown>");
+	return prv;
+}
+
+int
+key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
+	 * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
+	 * then we don't care.
+	 */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (check_ntsec(filename))
+#endif
+	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
+		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
+		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+		error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
+		    (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
+		error("It is recommended that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
+		error("This private key will be ignored.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+    char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) {
+		if (perm_ok != NULL)
+			*perm_ok = 0;
+		error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename);
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (perm_ok != NULL)
+		*perm_ok = 1;
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		return key_load_private_rsa1(fd, filename, passphrase,
+		    commentp);
+		/* closes fd */
+	case KEY_DSA:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+		return key_load_private_pem(fd, type, passphrase, commentp);
+		/* closes fd */
+	default:
+		close(fd);
+		break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+    char **commentp)
+{
+	Key *pub, *prv;
+	int fd;
+
+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) {
+		error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename);
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	pub = key_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, commentp);
+	lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_SET);		/* rewind */
+	if (pub == NULL) {
+		/* closes fd */
+		prv = key_load_private_pem(fd, KEY_UNSPEC, passphrase, NULL);
+		/* use the filename as a comment for PEM */
+		if (commentp && prv)
+			*commentp = xstrdup(filename);
+	} else {
+		/* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */
+		key_free(pub);
+		/* closes fd */
+		prv = key_load_private_rsa1(fd, filename, passphrase, NULL);
+	}
+	return prv;
+}
+
+static int
+key_try_load_public(Key *k, const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+	char *cp;
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+
+	f = fopen(filename, "r");
+	if (f != NULL) {
+		while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
+			    &linenum) != -1) {
+			cp = line;
+			switch (*cp) {
+			case '#':
+			case '\n':
+			case '\0':
+				continue;
+			}
+			/* Skip leading whitespace. */
+			for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
+				;
+			if (*cp) {
+				if (key_read(k, &cp) == 1) {
+					if (commentp)
+						*commentp=xstrdup(filename);
+					fclose(f);
+					return 1;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		fclose(f);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */
+Key *
+key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+	Key *pub;
+	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	/* try rsa1 private key */
+	pub = key_load_public_type(KEY_RSA1, filename, commentp);
+	if (pub != NULL)
+		return pub;
+
+	/* try rsa1 public key */
+	pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1)
+		return pub;
+	key_free(pub);
+
+	/* try ssh2 public key */
+	pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+	if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1)
+		return pub;
+	if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
+	    (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
+	    (key_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp) == 1))
+		return pub;
+	key_free(pub);
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.h b/crypto/openssh/authfile.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6c7493
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.13 2006/04/25 08:02:27 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
+#define AUTHFILE_H
+
+int	 key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+Key	*key_load_public(const char *, char **);
+Key	*key_load_public_type(int, const char *, char **);
+Key	*key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
+Key	*key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *);
+Key	*key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **);
+int	 key_perm_ok(int, const char *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd9a35d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.46 2008/06/10 23:21:34 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
+ * Buffers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Returns integers from the buffer (msb first).
+ */
+
+int
+buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *ret, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_char buf[2];
+
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	*ret = get_u16(buf);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+u_short
+buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_short ret;
+
+	if (buffer_get_short_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_short: buffer error");
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *ret, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_char buf[4];
+
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 4) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	*ret = get_u32(buf);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+u_int
+buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_int ret;
+
+	if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error");
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *ret, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_char buf[8];
+
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 8) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	*ret = get_u64(buf);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_int64_t ret;
+
+	if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error");
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores integers in the buffer, msb first.
+ */
+void
+buffer_put_short(Buffer *buffer, u_short value)
+{
+	char buf[2];
+
+	put_u16(buf, value);
+	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 2);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
+{
+	char buf[4];
+
+	put_u32(buf, value);
+	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
+{
+	char buf[8];
+
+	put_u64(buf, value);
+	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns an arbitrary binary string from the buffer.  The string cannot
+ * be longer than 256k.  The returned value points to memory allocated
+ * with xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling function to free
+ * the data.  If length_ptr is non-NULL, the length of the returned data
+ * will be stored there.  A null character will be automatically appended
+ * to the returned string, and is not counted in length.
+ */
+void *
+buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+	u_char *value;
+	u_int len;
+
+	/* Get the length. */
+	len = buffer_get_int(buffer);
+	if (len > 256 * 1024) {
+		error("buffer_get_string_ret: bad string length %u", len);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	/* Allocate space for the string.  Add one byte for a null character. */
+	value = xmalloc(len + 1);
+	/* Get the string. */
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, value, len) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_string_ret: buffer_get failed");
+		xfree(value);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	/* Append a null character to make processing easier. */
+	value[len] = '\0';
+	/* Optionally return the length of the string. */
+	if (length_ptr)
+		*length_ptr = len;
+	return (value);
+}
+
+void *
+buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+	void *ret;
+
+	if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL)
+		fatal("buffer_get_string: buffer error");
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+void *
+buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+	u_int len;
+
+	len = buffer_get_int(buffer);
+	if (len > 256 * 1024)
+		fatal("buffer_get_string_ptr: bad string length %u", len);
+	ptr = buffer_ptr(buffer);
+	buffer_consume(buffer, len);
+	if (length_ptr)
+		*length_ptr = len;
+	return (ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores and arbitrary binary string in the buffer.
+ */
+void
+buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+	buffer_put_int(buffer, len);
+	buffer_append(buffer, buf, len);
+}
+void
+buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s)
+{
+	if (s == NULL)
+		fatal("buffer_put_cstring: s == NULL");
+	buffer_put_string(buffer, s, strlen(s));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a character from the buffer (0 - 255).
+ */
+int
+buffer_get_char_ret(char *ret, Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, ret, 1) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_char_ret: buffer_get_ret failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	char ch;
+
+	if (buffer_get_char_ret(&ch, buffer) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_char: buffer error");
+	return (u_char) ch;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores a character in the buffer.
+ */
+void
+buffer_put_char(Buffer *buffer, int value)
+{
+	char ch = value;
+
+	buffer_append(buffer, &ch, 1);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c b/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..251cd09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.6 2007/06/02 09:04:58 djm Exp $*/
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
+ * Buffers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed
+ * by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first.
+ */
+int
+buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	int bits = BN_num_bits(value);
+	int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8;
+	u_char *buf = xmalloc(bin_size);
+	int oi;
+	char msg[2];
+
+	/* Get the value of in binary */
+	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf);
+	if (oi != bin_size) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
+		    oi, bin_size);
+		xfree(buf);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */
+	put_u16(msg, bits);
+	buffer_append(buffer, msg, 2);
+	/* Store the binary data. */
+	buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi);
+
+	memset(buf, 0, bin_size);
+	xfree(buf);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_put_bignum: buffer error");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieves a BIGNUM from the buffer.
+ */
+int
+buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int bits, bytes;
+	u_char buf[2], *bin;
+
+	/* Get the number of bits. */
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: invalid length");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	bits = get_u16(buf);
+	/* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
+	bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+	if (bytes > 8 * 1024) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: input buffer too small");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	bin = buffer_ptr(buffer);
+	if (BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value) == NULL) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: buffer_consume failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum: buffer error");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores a BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format.
+ */
+int
+buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int bytes;
+	u_char *buf;
+	int oi;
+	u_int hasnohigh = 0;
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(value)) {
+		buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (value->neg) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1; /* extra padding byte */
+	if (bytes < 2) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN too small");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+	buf[0] = 0x00;
+	/* Get the value of in binary */
+	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
+	if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
+		    "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
+		xfree(buf);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
+	buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
+	memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+	xfree(buf);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_put_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: buffer error");
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int len;
+	u_char *bin;
+
+	if ((bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: invalid bignum");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
+		xfree(bin);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (len > 8 * 1024) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
+		    len);
+		xfree(bin);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value) == NULL) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
+		xfree(bin);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	xfree(bin);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: buffer error");
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/buffer.c b/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e02e1e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.31 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for manipulating fifo buffers (that can grow if needed).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define	BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK	0x100000
+#define	BUFFER_MAX_LEN		0xa00000
+#define	BUFFER_ALLOCSZ		0x008000
+
+/* Initializes the buffer structure. */
+
+void
+buffer_init(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	const u_int len = 4096;
+
+	buffer->alloc = 0;
+	buffer->buf = xmalloc(len);
+	buffer->alloc = len;
+	buffer->offset = 0;
+	buffer->end = 0;
+}
+
+/* Frees any memory used for the buffer. */
+
+void
+buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	if (buffer->alloc > 0) {
+		memset(buffer->buf, 0, buffer->alloc);
+		buffer->alloc = 0;
+		xfree(buffer->buf);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clears any data from the buffer, making it empty.  This does not actually
+ * zero the memory.
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_clear(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	buffer->offset = 0;
+	buffer->end = 0;
+}
+
+/* Appends data to the buffer, expanding it if necessary. */
+
+void
+buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, u_int len)
+{
+	void *p;
+	p = buffer_append_space(buffer, len);
+	memcpy(p, data, len);
+}
+
+static int
+buffer_compact(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the
+	 * data to the beginning.
+	 */
+	if (buffer->offset > MIN(buffer->alloc, BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)) {
+		memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset,
+			buffer->end - buffer->offset);
+		buffer->end -= buffer->offset;
+		buffer->offset = 0;
+		return (1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Appends space to the buffer, expanding the buffer if necessary. This does
+ * not actually copy the data into the buffer, but instead returns a pointer
+ * to the allocated region.
+ */
+
+void *
+buffer_append_space(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
+{
+	u_int newlen;
+	void *p;
+
+	if (len > BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)
+		fatal("buffer_append_space: len %u not supported", len);
+
+	/* If the buffer is empty, start using it from the beginning. */
+	if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
+		buffer->offset = 0;
+		buffer->end = 0;
+	}
+restart:
+	/* If there is enough space to store all data, store it now. */
+	if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc) {
+		p = buffer->buf + buffer->end;
+		buffer->end += len;
+		return p;
+	}
+
+	/* Compact data back to the start of the buffer if necessary */
+	if (buffer_compact(buffer))
+		goto restart;
+
+	/* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
+	newlen = roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ);
+	if (newlen > BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
+		fatal("buffer_append_space: alloc %u not supported",
+		    newlen);
+	buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, 1, newlen);
+	buffer->alloc = newlen;
+	goto restart;
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether an allocation of 'len' will fit in the buffer
+ * This must follow the same math as buffer_append_space
+ */
+int
+buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
+{
+	if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
+		buffer->offset = 0;
+		buffer->end = 0;
+	}
+ restart:
+	if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc)
+		return (1);
+	if (buffer_compact(buffer))
+		goto restart;
+	if (roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ) <= BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
+		return (1);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* Returns the number of bytes of data in the buffer. */
+
+u_int
+buffer_len(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	return buffer->end - buffer->offset;
+}
+
+/* Gets data from the beginning of the buffer. */
+
+int
+buffer_get_ret(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+	if (len > buffer->end - buffer->offset) {
+		error("buffer_get_ret: trying to get more bytes %d than in buffer %d",
+		    len, buffer->end - buffer->offset);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	memcpy(buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset, len);
+	buffer->offset += len;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, buf, len) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get: buffer error");
+}
+
+/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the beginning of the buffer. */
+
+int
+buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+	if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset) {
+		error("buffer_consume_ret: trying to get more bytes than in buffer");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	buffer->offset += bytes;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_consume(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+	if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_consume: buffer error");
+}
+
+/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the end of the buffer. */
+
+int
+buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+	if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset)
+		return (-1);
+	buffer->end -= bytes;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_consume_end(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+	if (buffer_consume_end_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_consume_end: trying to get more bytes than in buffer");
+}
+
+/* Returns a pointer to the first used byte in the buffer. */
+
+void *
+buffer_ptr(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	return buffer->buf + buffer->offset;
+}
+
+/* Dumps the contents of the buffer to stderr. */
+
+void
+buffer_dump(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	u_char *ucp = buffer->buf;
+
+	for (i = buffer->offset; i < buffer->end; i++) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%02x", ucp[i]);
+		if ((i-buffer->offset)%16==15)
+			fprintf(stderr, "\r\n");
+		else if ((i-buffer->offset)%2==1)
+			fprintf(stderr, " ");
+	}
+	fprintf(stderr, "\r\n");
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/buffer.h b/crypto/openssh/buffer.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0f354e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/buffer.h
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.17 2008/05/08 06:59:01 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Code for manipulating FIFO buffers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef BUFFER_H
+#define BUFFER_H
+
+typedef struct {
+	u_char	*buf;		/* Buffer for data. */
+	u_int	 alloc;		/* Number of bytes allocated for data. */
+	u_int	 offset;	/* Offset of first byte containing data. */
+	u_int	 end;		/* Offset of last byte containing data. */
+}       Buffer;
+
+void	 buffer_init(Buffer *);
+void	 buffer_clear(Buffer *);
+void	 buffer_free(Buffer *);
+
+u_int	 buffer_len(Buffer *);
+void	*buffer_ptr(Buffer *);
+
+void	 buffer_append(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
+void	*buffer_append_space(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+int	 buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+void	 buffer_get(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
+
+void	 buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int);
+void	 buffer_consume_end(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+void     buffer_dump(Buffer *);
+
+int	 buffer_get_ret(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
+int	 buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
+int	 buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+void    buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+void    buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+void	buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+void	buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+
+u_short	buffer_get_short(Buffer *);
+void	buffer_put_short(Buffer *, u_short);
+
+u_int	buffer_get_int(Buffer *);
+void    buffer_put_int(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *);
+void	buffer_put_int64(Buffer *, u_int64_t);
+
+int     buffer_get_char(Buffer *);
+void    buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int);
+
+void   *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
+void   *buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *, u_int *);
+void    buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
+void	buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *);
+
+#define buffer_skip_string(b) \
+    do { u_int l = buffer_get_int(b); buffer_consume(b, l); } while (0)
+
+int	buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+int	buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int	buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+int	buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int	buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *, Buffer *);
+int	buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *, Buffer *);
+int	buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *, Buffer *);
+void	*buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
+int	buffer_get_char_ret(char *, Buffer *);
+
+#endif				/* BUFFER_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22b19bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.65 2009/05/27 06:31:25 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
+static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
+static int cached_port = -1;
+
+/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The
+ * caller should free the returned string with xfree.
+ */
+
+static char *
+get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	int i;
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+	/* Get IP address of client. */
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
+		check_ip_options(sock, ntop);
+
+	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+
+	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+	    NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+		fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
+
+	if (!use_dns)
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+
+	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+	 */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+		    name, ntop);
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Convert it to all lowercase (which is expected by the rest
+	 * of this software).
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; name[i]; i++)
+		if (isupper(name[i]))
+			name[i] = (char)tolower(name[i]);
+	/*
+	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+	 * the domain).
+	 */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+		    "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop);
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+				break;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+	if (!ai) {
+		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+		    "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!",
+		    ntop, name);
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+	return xstrdup(name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
+ * disconnect them if any are found).  Basically we are worried about
+ * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
+ * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
+ * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless
+ * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
+ * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
+ * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security.  So we
+ * exit here if we detect any IP options.
+ */
+/* IPv4 only */
+static void
+check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
+{
+#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
+	u_char options[200];
+	char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1];
+	socklen_t option_size;
+	u_int i;
+	int ipproto;
+	struct protoent *ip;
+
+	if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
+		ipproto = ip->p_proto;
+	else
+		ipproto = IPPROTO_IP;
+	option_size = sizeof(options);
+	if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
+	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+		text[0] = '\0';
+		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+			    " %2.2x", options[i]);
+		fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
+		    ipaddr, text);
+	}
+#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+}
+
+void
+ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
+	struct in_addr inaddr;
+	u_int16_t port;
+
+	if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
+	    !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr))
+		return;
+
+	debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address");
+
+	memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr));
+	port = a6->sin6_port;
+
+	memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*a4));
+
+	a4->sin_family = AF_INET;
+	*len = sizeof(*a4);
+	memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr));
+	a4->sin_port = port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+ * several times.
+ */
+
+const char *
+get_canonical_hostname(int use_dns)
+{
+	char *host;
+	static char *canonical_host_name = NULL;
+	static char *remote_ip = NULL;
+
+	/* Check if we have previously retrieved name with same option. */
+	if (use_dns && canonical_host_name != NULL)
+		return canonical_host_name;
+	if (!use_dns && remote_ip != NULL)
+		return remote_ip;
+
+	/* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+		host = get_remote_hostname(packet_get_connection_in(), use_dns);
+	else
+		host = "UNKNOWN";
+
+	if (use_dns)
+		canonical_host_name = host;
+	else
+		remote_ip = host;
+	return host;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string.
+ * The returned string must be freed.
+ */
+static char *
+get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+	int r;
+
+	/* Get IP address of client. */
+	addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+
+	if (remote) {
+		if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
+		    < 0)
+			return NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
+		    < 0)
+			return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
+	if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
+
+	/* Get the address in ascii. */
+	if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
+	    sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
+		error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", flags,
+		    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return xstrdup(ntop);
+}
+
+char *
+get_peer_ipaddr(int sock)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
+		return p;
+	return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+}
+
+char *
+get_local_ipaddr(int sock)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
+		return p;
+	return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+}
+
+char *
+get_local_name(int sock)
+{
+	return get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
+}
+
+void
+clear_cached_addr(void)
+{
+	if (canonical_host_ip != NULL) {
+		xfree(canonical_host_ip);
+		canonical_host_ip = NULL;
+	}
+	cached_port = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string.  The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+ */
+
+const char *
+get_remote_ipaddr(void)
+{
+	/* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
+	if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) {
+		if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+			canonical_host_ip =
+			    get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
+			if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
+				cleanup_exit(255);
+		} else {
+			/* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */
+			canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+		}
+	}
+	return canonical_host_ip;
+}
+
+const char *
+get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int use_dns)
+{
+	static const char *remote = "";
+	if (utmp_len > 0)
+		remote = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns);
+	if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len)
+		remote = get_remote_ipaddr();
+	return remote;
+}
+
+/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */
+
+int
+get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int r;
+
+	/* Get IP address of client. */
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	if (local) {
+		if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+			error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			return 0;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+			debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
+	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+	/* Return port number. */
+	if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
+	    strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
+		fatal("get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s",
+		    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+	return atoi(strport);
+}
+
+/* Returns remote/local port number for the current connection. */
+
+static int
+get_port(int local)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the connection is not a socket, return 65535.  This is
+	 * intentionally chosen to be an unprivileged port number.
+	 */
+	if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+		return 65535;
+
+	/* Get socket and return the port number. */
+	return get_sock_port(packet_get_connection_in(), local);
+}
+
+int
+get_peer_port(int sock)
+{
+	return get_sock_port(sock, 0);
+}
+
+int
+get_remote_port(void)
+{
+	/* Cache to avoid getpeername() on a dead connection */
+	if (cached_port == -1)
+		cached_port = get_port(0);
+
+	return cached_port;
+}
+
+int
+get_local_port(void)
+{
+	return get_port(1);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.h b/crypto/openssh/canohost.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c8636f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.11 2009/05/27 06:31:25 andreas Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+const char	*get_canonical_hostname(int);
+const char	*get_remote_ipaddr(void);
+const char	*get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int, int);
+
+char		*get_peer_ipaddr(int);
+int		 get_peer_port(int);
+char		*get_local_ipaddr(int);
+char		*get_local_name(int);
+
+int		 get_remote_port(void);
+int		 get_local_port(void);
+int		 get_sock_port(int, int);
+void		 clear_cached_addr(void);
+
+void		 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8b8aa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3461 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.296 2009/05/25 06:48:00 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding.
+ * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections,
+ * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+
+/* -- channel core */
+
+/*
+ * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels.  The array is
+ * dynamically extended as needed.
+ */
+static Channel **channels = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Size of the channel array.  All slots of the array must always be
+ * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL
+ */
+static u_int channels_alloc = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels.  This is
+ * updated in channel_new.
+ */
+static int channel_max_fd = 0;
+
+
+/* -- tcp forwarding */
+
+/*
+ * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests.
+ * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent
+ * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local
+ * network (which might be behind a firewall).
+ */
+typedef struct {
+	char *host_to_connect;		/* Connect to 'host'. */
+	u_short port_to_connect;	/* Connect to 'port'. */
+	u_short listen_port;		/* Remote side should listen port number. */
+} ForwardPermission;
+
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */
+static ForwardPermission permitted_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */
+static ForwardPermission permitted_adm_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */
+static int num_permitted_opens = 0;
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */
+static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
+
+/*
+ * If this is true, all opens are permitted.  This is the case on the server
+ * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do
+ * anything after logging in anyway.
+ */
+static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+
+
+/* -- X11 forwarding */
+
+/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
+
+/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
+static char *x11_saved_display = NULL;
+
+/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
+static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL;
+
+/* Saved X11 authentication data.  This is the real data. */
+static char *x11_saved_data = NULL;
+static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Fake X11 authentication data.  This is what the server will be sending us;
+ * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
+ */
+static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL;
+static u_int x11_fake_data_len;
+
+
+/* -- agent forwarding */
+
+#define	NUM_SOCKS	10
+
+/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
+static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+/* helper */
+static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype);
+
+/* non-blocking connect helpers */
+static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
+static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
+
+/* -- channel core */
+
+Channel *
+channel_by_id(int id)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= channels_alloc) {
+		logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id", id);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	c = channels[id];
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id: channel free", id);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages.
+ * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages.
+ */
+Channel *
+channel_lookup(int id)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	switch (c->type) {
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+		return (c);
+	}
+	logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
+ * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
+ */
+static void
+channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+    int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty)
+{
+	/* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */
+	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, rfd);
+	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
+	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
+
+	/* XXX set close-on-exec -markus */
+
+	c->rfd = rfd;
+	c->wfd = wfd;
+	c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
+	c->ctl_fd = -1; /* XXX: set elsewhere */
+	c->efd = efd;
+	c->extended_usage = extusage;
+
+	if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0)
+		debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd);
+	c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd);
+
+	/* enable nonblocking mode */
+	if (nonblock) {
+		if (rfd != -1)
+			set_nonblock(rfd);
+		if (wfd != -1)
+			set_nonblock(wfd);
+		if (efd != -1)
+			set_nonblock(efd);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
+ * remote_name to be freed.
+ */
+Channel *
+channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+    u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
+{
+	int found;
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	/* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */
+	if (channels_alloc == 0) {
+		channels_alloc = 10;
+		channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *));
+		for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+			channels[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
+	for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+		if (channels[i] == NULL) {
+			/* Found a free slot. */
+			found = (int)i;
+			break;
+		}
+	if (found < 0) {
+		/* There are no free slots.  Take last+1 slot and expand the array.  */
+		found = channels_alloc;
+		if (channels_alloc > 10000)
+			fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d "
+			    "too big.", channels_alloc);
+		channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc + 10,
+		    sizeof(Channel *));
+		channels_alloc += 10;
+		debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc);
+		for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+			channels[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	/* Initialize and return new channel. */
+	c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
+	buffer_init(&c->input);
+	buffer_init(&c->output);
+	buffer_init(&c->extended);
+	c->path = NULL;
+	c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
+	c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
+	c->flags = 0;
+	channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
+	c->self = found;
+	c->type = type;
+	c->ctype = ctype;
+	c->local_window = window;
+	c->local_window_max = window;
+	c->local_consumed = 0;
+	c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
+	c->remote_id = -1;
+	c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
+	c->remote_window = 0;
+	c->remote_maxpacket = 0;
+	c->force_drain = 0;
+	c->single_connection = 0;
+	c->detach_user = NULL;
+	c->detach_close = 0;
+	c->open_confirm = NULL;
+	c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
+	c->input_filter = NULL;
+	c->output_filter = NULL;
+	c->filter_ctx = NULL;
+	c->filter_cleanup = NULL;
+	TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms);
+	debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
+	return c;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_find_maxfd(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int max = 0;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = channels[i];
+		if (c != NULL) {
+			max = MAX(max, c->rfd);
+			max = MAX(max, c->wfd);
+			max = MAX(max, c->efd);
+		}
+	}
+	return max;
+}
+
+int
+channel_close_fd(int *fdp)
+{
+	int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
+
+	if (fd != -1) {
+		ret = close(fd);
+		*fdp = -1;
+		if (fd == channel_max_fd)
+			channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd();
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
+static void
+channel_close_fds(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug3("channel %d: close_fds r %d w %d e %d c %d",
+	    c->self, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->ctl_fd);
+
+	channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+	channel_close_fd(&c->ctl_fd);
+	channel_close_fd(&c->rfd);
+	channel_close_fd(&c->wfd);
+	channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+}
+
+/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
+void
+channel_free(Channel *c)
+{
+	char *s;
+	u_int i, n;
+	struct channel_confirm *cc;
+
+	for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+		if (channels[i])
+			n++;
+	debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
+	    c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
+
+	s = channel_open_message();
+	debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
+	xfree(s);
+
+	if (c->sock != -1)
+		shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+	if (c->ctl_fd != -1)
+		shutdown(c->ctl_fd, SHUT_RDWR);
+	channel_close_fds(c);
+	buffer_free(&c->input);
+	buffer_free(&c->output);
+	buffer_free(&c->extended);
+	if (c->remote_name) {
+		xfree(c->remote_name);
+		c->remote_name = NULL;
+	}
+	if (c->path) {
+		xfree(c->path);
+		c->path = NULL;
+	}
+	while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
+		if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
+			cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx);
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+		bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+		xfree(cc);
+	}
+	if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
+		c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx);
+	channels[c->self] = NULL;
+	xfree(c);
+}
+
+void
+channel_free_all(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+		if (channels[i] != NULL)
+			channel_free(channels[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels.  This is used to close extra file
+ * descriptors after a fork.
+ */
+void
+channel_close_all(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+		if (channels[i] != NULL)
+			channel_close_fds(channels[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stop listening to channels.
+ */
+void
+channel_stop_listening(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = channels[i];
+		if (c != NULL) {
+			switch (c->type) {
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+				channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+				channel_free(c);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
+ * more channel is overfull.
+ */
+int
+channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = channels[i];
+		if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+#if 0
+			if (!compat20 &&
+			    buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) {
+				debug2("channel %d: big input buffer %d",
+				    c->self, buffer_len(&c->input));
+				return 0;
+			}
+#endif
+			if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) {
+				debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %u > %u",
+				    c->self, buffer_len(&c->output),
+				    packet_get_maxsize());
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
+int
+channel_still_open(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+		switch (c->type) {
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+			continue;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+			if (!compat20)
+				fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL");
+			continue;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+			return 1;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+			if (!compat13)
+				fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN");
+			return 1;
+		default:
+			fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
+int
+channel_find_open(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL || c->remote_id < 0)
+			continue;
+		switch (c->type) {
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+			continue;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+			return i;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+			if (!compat13)
+				fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN");
+			return i;
+		default:
+			fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections,
+ * suitable for sending to the client.  The message contains crlf pairs for
+ * newlines.
+ */
+char *
+channel_open_message(void)
+{
+	Buffer buffer;
+	Channel *c;
+	char buf[1024], *cp;
+	u_int i;
+
+	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n");
+	buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+		switch (c->type) {
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+			continue;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+			    "  #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%d/%d o%d/%d fd %d/%d cfd %d)\r\n",
+			    c->self, c->remote_name,
+			    c->type, c->remote_id,
+			    c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input),
+			    c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output),
+			    c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_fd);
+			buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+			continue;
+		default:
+			fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
+	cp = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&buffer));
+	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	return cp;
+}
+
+void
+channel_send_open(int id)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	debug2("channel %d: send open", id);
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+	packet_put_cstring(c->ctype);
+	packet_put_int(c->self);
+	packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+	packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+	packet_send();
+}
+
+void
+channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_request_start: %d: unknown channel id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm);
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+	packet_put_cstring(service);
+	packet_put_char(wantconfirm);
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb,
+    channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx)
+{
+	struct channel_confirm *cc;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
+		fatal("channel_register_expect: %d: bad id", id);
+
+	cc = xmalloc(sizeof(*cc));
+	cc->cb = cb;
+	cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb;
+	cc->ctx = ctx;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *ctx)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_register_open_confirm: %d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->open_confirm = fn;
+	c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx;
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_by_id(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->detach_user = fn;
+	c->detach_close = do_close;
+}
+
+void
+channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_by_id(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->detach_user = NULL;
+	c->detach_close = 0;
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
+    channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->input_filter = ifn;
+	c->output_filter = ofn;
+	c->filter_ctx = ctx;
+	c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
+}
+
+void
+channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+    int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+		fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
+	channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty);
+	c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+	c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max;
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+	packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+	packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+	packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to
+ * channels in the select bitmasks.
+ */
+/*
+ * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which
+ * have events pending.
+ */
+typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset);
+chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
+chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
+	FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize())
+		FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+	if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0)
+		FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize();
+
+	if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
+	    limit > 0 &&
+	    buffer_len(&c->input) < limit &&
+	    buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF))
+		FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
+	    c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+		if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+			FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
+		} else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+			if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+				debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
+				    c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+			else
+				chan_obuf_empty(c);
+		}
+	}
+	/** XXX check close conditions, too */
+	if (compat20 && c->efd != -1 && 
+	    !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) {
+		if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+		    buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)
+			FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
+		else if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
+		    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
+		    buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window)
+			FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
+	}
+	/* XXX: What about efd? races? */
+	if (compat20 && c->ctl_fd != -1 &&
+	    c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
+		FD_SET(c->ctl_fd, readset);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) {
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED;
+		debug2("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self);
+	}
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0)
+		chan_mark_dead(c);
+	else
+		FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing.  An opened X11
+ * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this
+ * state until the first packet has been completely read.  The authentication
+ * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the
+ * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode.
+ * XXX All this happens at the client side.
+ * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok
+ */
+static int
+x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
+{
+	u_char *ucp;
+	u_int proto_len, data_len;
+
+	/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+	if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */
+	ucp = buffer_ptr(b);
+	if (ucp[0] == 0x42) {	/* Byte order MSB first. */
+		proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7];
+		data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9];
+	} else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) {	/* Byte order LSB first. */
+		proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7];
+		data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9];
+	} else {
+		debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
+		    ucp[0]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */
+	if (buffer_len(b) <
+	    12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check if authentication protocol matches. */
+	if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) ||
+	    memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) {
+		debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
+	if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len ||
+	    memcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+		x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
+		debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Check fake data length */
+	if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) {
+		error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d",
+		    x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Received authentication protocol and data match
+	 * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real
+	 * data.
+	 */
+	memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+	    x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
+
+	if (ret == 1) {
+		/* Start normal processing for the channel. */
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+		channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset);
+	} else if (ret == -1) {
+		/*
+		 * We have received an X11 connection that has bad
+		 * authentication information.
+		 */
+		logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
+		buffer_clear(&c->input);
+		buffer_clear(&c->output);
+		channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+		c->sock = -1;
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED;
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
+
+	/* c->force_drain = 1; */
+
+	if (ret == 1) {
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+		channel_pre_open(c, readset, writeset);
+	} else if (ret == -1) {
+		logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
+		debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+		chan_read_failed(c);
+		buffer_clear(&c->input);
+		chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+		buffer_clear(&c->output);
+		/* for proto v1, the peer will send an IEOF */
+		if (compat20)
+			chan_write_failed(c);
+		else
+			c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+		debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+	}
+}
+
+/* try to decode a socks4 header */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	char *p, *host;
+	u_int len, have, i, found, need;
+	char username[256];
+	struct {
+		u_int8_t version;
+		u_int8_t command;
+		u_int16_t dest_port;
+		struct in_addr dest_addr;
+	} s4_req, s4_rsp;
+
+	debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self);
+
+	have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+	len = sizeof(s4_req);
+	if (have < len)
+		return 0;
+	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+
+	need = 1;
+	/* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
+	if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self);
+		/* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */
+		need = 2;
+	}
+	/* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */
+	for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
+		if (p[i] == '\0') {
+			found++;
+			if (found == need)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (i > 1024) {
+			/* the peer is probably sending garbage */
+			debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long",
+			    c->self);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (found < need)
+		return 0;
+	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1);
+	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1);
+	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2);
+	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4);
+	have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+	len = strlen(p);
+	debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
+	len++;					/* trailing '\0' */
+	if (len > have)
+		fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d",
+		    c->self, len, have);
+	strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
+	buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+
+	if (c->path != NULL) {
+		xfree(c->path);
+		c->path = NULL;
+	}
+	if (need == 1) {			/* SOCKS4: one string */
+		host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
+		c->path = xstrdup(host);
+	} else {				/* SOCKS4A: two strings */
+		have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+		p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+		len = strlen(p);
+		debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
+		    c->self, p, len);
+		len++;				/* trailing '\0' */
+		if (len > have)
+			fatal("channel %d: decode socks4a: len %d > have %d",
+			    c->self, len, have);
+		if (len > NI_MAXHOST) {
+			error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long",
+			    c->self, p);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		c->path = xstrdup(p);
+		buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+	}
+	c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
+
+	debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
+	    c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
+
+	if (s4_req.command != 1) {
+		debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d",
+		    c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	s4_rsp.version = 0;			/* vn: 0 for reply */
+	s4_rsp.command = 90;			/* cd: req granted */
+	s4_rsp.dest_port = 0;			/* ignored */
+	s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;	/* ignored */
+	buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp));
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* try to decode a socks5 header */
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE	0x1000
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH	0x00
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4		0x01
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN	0x03
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6		0x04
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT	0x01
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS	0x00
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	struct {
+		u_int8_t version;
+		u_int8_t command;
+		u_int8_t reserved;
+		u_int8_t atyp;
+	} s5_req, s5_rsp;
+	u_int16_t dest_port;
+	u_char *p, dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+	u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
+
+	debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
+	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+	if (p[0] != 0x05)
+		return -1;
+	have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+	if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) {
+		/* format: ver | nmethods | methods */
+		if (have < 2)
+			return 0;
+		nmethods = p[1];
+		if (have < nmethods + 2)
+			return 0;
+		/* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
+		for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
+			if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
+				found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (!found) {
+			debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found",
+			    c->self);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		buffer_consume(&c->input, nmethods + 2);
+		buffer_put_char(&c->output, 0x05);		/* version */
+		buffer_put_char(&c->output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH);	/* method */
+		FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+		c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE;
+		debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self);
+		return 0;				/* need more */
+	}
+	debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
+	if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
+		return 0;			/* need more */
+	memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
+	if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
+	    s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
+	    s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
+		debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	switch (s5_req.atyp){
+	case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4:
+		addrlen = 4;
+		af = AF_INET;
+		break;
+	case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN:
+		addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)];
+		af = -1;
+		break;
+	case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6:
+		addrlen = 16;
+		af = AF_INET6;
+		break;
+	default:
+		debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
+	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
+		need++;
+	if (have < need)
+		return 0;
+	buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req));
+	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
+		buffer_consume(&c->input, 1);    /* host string length */
+	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_addr, addrlen);
+	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_port, 2);
+	dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0';
+	if (c->path != NULL) {
+		xfree(c->path);
+		c->path = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
+		if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+			error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname "
+			    "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr);
+	} else {
+		if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		c->path = xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+	c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port);
+
+	debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u",
+	    c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command);
+
+	s5_rsp.version = 0x05;
+	s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS;
+	s5_rsp.reserved = 0;			/* ignored */
+	s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4;
+	((struct in_addr *)&dest_addr)->s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
+	dest_port = 0;				/* ignored */
+
+	buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp));
+	buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+	buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port));
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* dynamic port forwarding */
+static void
+channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	u_char *p;
+	u_int have;
+	int ret;
+
+	have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+	c->delayed = 0;
+	debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
+	/* buffer_dump(&c->input); */
+	/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+	if (have < 3) {
+		/* need more */
+		FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* try to guess the protocol */
+	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+	switch (p[0]) {
+	case 0x04:
+		ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset);
+		break;
+	case 0x05:
+		ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, readset, writeset);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -1;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		chan_mark_dead(c);
+	} else if (ret == 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self);
+		/* need more */
+		FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+	} else {
+		/* switch to the next state */
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+		port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip");
+	}
+}
+
+/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	int newsock;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+	char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr;
+	int remote_port;
+
+	if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+		debug("X11 connection requested.");
+		addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+		newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+		if (c->single_connection) {
+			debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
+			channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+			chan_mark_dead(c);
+		}
+		if (newsock < 0) {
+			error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			return;
+		}
+		set_nodelay(newsock);
+		remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock);
+		remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d",
+		    remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
+
+		nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket",
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
+		    c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1);
+		if (compat20) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+			packet_put_cstring("x11");
+			packet_put_int(nc->self);
+			packet_put_int(nc->local_window_max);
+			packet_put_int(nc->local_maxpacket);
+			/* originator ipaddr and port */
+			packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
+			if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
+				debug2("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode");
+			} else {
+				packet_put_int(remote_port);
+			}
+			packet_send();
+		} else {
+			packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
+			packet_put_int(nc->self);
+			if (packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+			    SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN)
+				packet_put_cstring(buf);
+			packet_send();
+		}
+		xfree(remote_ipaddr);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype)
+{
+	int direct;
+	char buf[1024];
+	char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
+	int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
+
+	direct = (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0);
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+	    "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, "
+	    "connect from %.200s port %d",
+	    rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port,
+	    remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
+
+	xfree(c->remote_name);
+	c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf);
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+		packet_put_cstring(rtype);
+		packet_put_int(c->self);
+		packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+		packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+		if (direct) {
+			/* target host, port */
+			packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+			packet_put_int(c->host_port);
+		} else {
+			/* listen address, port */
+			packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+			packet_put_int(c->listening_port);
+		}
+		/* originator host and port */
+		packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port);
+		packet_send();
+	} else {
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
+		packet_put_int(c->self);
+		packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+		packet_put_int(c->host_port);
+		if (packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+		    SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN)
+			packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+	xfree(remote_ipaddr);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd)
+{
+	int on = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set socket options.
+	 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
+	 */
+	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+		error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	int newsock, nextstate;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+	char *rtype;
+
+	if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+		debug("Connection to port %d forwarding "
+		    "to %.100s port %d requested.",
+		    c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port);
+
+		if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) {
+			nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+			rtype = "forwarded-tcpip";
+		} else {
+			if (c->host_port == 0) {
+				nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC;
+				rtype = "dynamic-tcpip";
+			} else {
+				nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+				rtype = "direct-tcpip";
+			}
+		}
+
+		addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+		newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+		if (newsock < 0) {
+			error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			return;
+		}
+		set_nodelay(newsock);
+		nc = channel_new(rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1,
+		    c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1);
+		nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
+		nc->host_port = c->host_port;
+		if (c->path != NULL)
+			nc->path = xstrdup(c->path);
+
+		if (nextstate == SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) {
+			/*
+			 * do not call the channel_post handler until
+			 * this flag has been reset by a pre-handler.
+			 * otherwise the FD_ISSET calls might overflow
+			 */
+			nc->delayed = 1;
+		} else {
+			port_open_helper(nc, rtype);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
+ * clients.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	int newsock;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+
+	if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+		addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+		newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+		if (newsock < 0) {
+			error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			return;
+		}
+		nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket",
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
+		    c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
+		    0, "accepted auth socket", 1);
+		if (compat20) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+			packet_put_cstring("auth-agent@openssh.com");
+			packet_put_int(nc->self);
+			packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+			packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+		} else {
+			packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
+			packet_put_int(nc->self);
+		}
+		packet_send();
+	}
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	int err = 0, sock;
+	socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
+
+	if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) {
+		if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) {
+			err = errno;
+			error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed");
+		}
+		if (err == 0) {
+			debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d",
+			    c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
+			channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
+			c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+			if (compat20) {
+				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+				packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+				packet_put_int(c->self);
+				packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+				packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+			} else {
+				packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+				packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+				packet_put_int(c->self);
+			}
+		} else {
+			debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
+			    c->self, strerror(err));
+			/* Try next address, if any */
+			if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
+				close(c->sock);
+				c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
+				channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd();
+				return;
+			}
+			/* Exhausted all addresses */
+			error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.",
+			    c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
+			channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
+			if (compat20) {
+				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+				packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+				packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
+				if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+					packet_put_cstring(strerror(err));
+					packet_put_cstring("");
+				}
+			} else {
+				packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+				packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+			}
+			chan_mark_dead(c);
+		}
+		packet_send();
+	}
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
+	int len, force;
+
+	force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+	if (c->rfd != -1 && (force || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) {
+		errno = 0;
+		len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR ||
+		    ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
+			return 1;
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
+		if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+		if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) ||
+		    (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
+			debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d",
+			    c->self, c->rfd, len);
+			if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+				debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+				chan_mark_dead(c);
+				return -1;
+			} else if (compat13) {
+				buffer_clear(&c->output);
+				c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING;
+				debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self);
+			} else {
+				chan_read_failed(c);
+			}
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (c->input_filter != NULL) {
+			if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) {
+				debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
+				chan_read_failed(c);
+			}
+		} else if (c->datagram) {
+			buffer_put_string(&c->input, buf, len);
+		} else {
+			buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len);
+		}
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+	u_char *data = NULL, *buf;
+	u_int dlen;
+	int len;
+
+	/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+	if (c->wfd != -1 &&
+	    FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
+	    buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+		if (c->output_filter != NULL) {
+			if ((buf = c->output_filter(c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) {
+				debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
+				if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+					chan_mark_dead(c);
+				else
+					chan_write_failed(c);
+				return -1;
+			}
+		} else if (c->datagram) {
+			buf = data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, &dlen);
+		} else {
+			buf = data = buffer_ptr(&c->output);
+			dlen = buffer_len(&c->output);
+		}
+
+		if (c->datagram) {
+			/* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */
+			c->local_consumed += dlen + 4;
+			len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
+			xfree(data);
+			if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+				return 1;
+			if (len <= 0) {
+				if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+					chan_mark_dead(c);
+				else
+					chan_write_failed(c);
+				return -1;
+			}
+			return 1;
+		}
+#ifdef _AIX
+		/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
+		if (compat20 && c->wfd_isatty)
+			dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024);
+#endif
+
+		len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
+		if (len < 0 &&
+		    (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+			return 1;
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+				debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+				chan_mark_dead(c);
+				return -1;
+			} else if (compat13) {
+				buffer_clear(&c->output);
+				debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self);
+				c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING;
+			} else {
+				chan_write_failed(c);
+			}
+			return -1;
+		}
+#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
+		if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
+			if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
+			    !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
+				/*
+				 * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
+				 * traffic analysis. We need to match the
+				 * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
+				 * (4 byte channel id + buf)
+				 */
+				packet_send_ignore(4 + len);
+				packet_send();
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+		buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
+		if (compat20 && len > 0) {
+			c->local_consumed += len;
+		}
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
+	int len;
+
+/** XXX handle drain efd, too */
+	if (c->efd != -1) {
+		if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+		    FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) &&
+		    buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) {
+			len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended),
+			    buffer_len(&c->extended));
+			debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d",
+			    c->self, len, c->efd);
+			if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+				return 1;
+			if (len <= 0) {
+				debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d",
+				    c->self, c->efd);
+				channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+			} else {
+				buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
+				c->local_consumed += len;
+			}
+		} else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
+		    (c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) {
+			len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+			debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d",
+			    c->self, len, c->efd);
+			if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close)))
+				return 1;
+			if (len <= 0) {
+				debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
+				    c->self, c->efd);
+				channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+			} else {
+				buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+channel_handle_ctl(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	char buf[16];
+	int len;
+
+	/* Monitor control fd to detect if the slave client exits */
+	if (c->ctl_fd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->ctl_fd, readset)) {
+		len = read(c->ctl_fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (len < 0 &&
+		    (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+			return 1;
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0", c->self);
+			if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+				debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+				chan_mark_dead(c);
+				return -1;
+			} else {
+				chan_read_failed(c);
+				chan_write_failed(c);
+			}
+			return -1;
+		} else
+			fatal("%s: unexpected data on ctl fd", __func__);
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_check_window(Channel *c)
+{
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+	    !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
+	    ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
+	    c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
+	    c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
+	    c->local_consumed > 0) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_put_int(c->local_consumed);
+		packet_send();
+		debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d",
+		    c->self, c->local_window,
+		    c->local_consumed);
+		c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
+		c->local_consumed = 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	if (c->delayed)
+		return;
+	channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset);
+	channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset);
+	if (!compat20)
+		return;
+	channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset);
+	channel_handle_ctl(c, readset, writeset);
+	channel_check_window(c);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	int len;
+
+	/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+	if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+		len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output),
+			    buffer_len(&c->output));
+		if (len <= 0)
+			buffer_clear(&c->output);
+		else
+			buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_20(void)
+{
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] =			&channel_pre_open;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] =		&channel_pre_x11_open;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] =		&channel_pre_connecting;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] =		&channel_pre_dynamic;
+
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] =		&channel_post_open;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_port_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_port_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_x11_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] =		&channel_post_auth_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] =		&channel_post_connecting;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] =		&channel_post_open;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_13(void)
+{
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] =			&channel_pre_open_13;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] =		&channel_pre_x11_open_13;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] =	&channel_pre_input_draining;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] =	&channel_pre_output_draining;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] =		&channel_pre_connecting;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] =		&channel_pre_dynamic;
+
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] =		&channel_post_open;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_x11_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_port_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] =		&channel_post_auth_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] =	&channel_post_output_drain_13;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] =		&channel_post_connecting;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] =		&channel_post_open;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_15(void)
+{
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] =			&channel_pre_open;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] =		&channel_pre_x11_open;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] =		&channel_pre_connecting;
+	channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] =		&channel_pre_dynamic;
+
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_x11_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_port_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] =		&channel_post_auth_listener;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] =		&channel_post_open;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] =		&channel_post_connecting;
+	channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] =		&channel_post_open;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) {
+		channel_pre[i] = NULL;
+		channel_post[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	if (compat20)
+		channel_handler_init_20();
+	else if (compat13)
+		channel_handler_init_13();
+	else
+		channel_handler_init_15();
+}
+
+/* gc dead channels */
+static void
+channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c)
+{
+	if (c == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (c->detach_user != NULL) {
+		if (!chan_is_dead(c, c->detach_close))
+			return;
+		debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self);
+		c->detach_user(c->self, NULL);
+		/* if we still have a callback */
+		if (c->detach_user != NULL)
+			return;
+		debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self);
+	}
+	if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1))
+		return;
+	debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self);
+	channel_free(c);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	static int did_init = 0;
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if (!did_init) {
+		channel_handler_init();
+		did_init = 1;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (ftab[c->type] != NULL)
+			(*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset);
+		channel_garbage_collect(c);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in
+ * select bitmasks.
+ */
+void
+channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+    u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
+{
+	u_int n, sz, nfdset;
+
+	n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd);
+
+	nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
+	/* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
+	if (nfdset && SIZE_T_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
+		fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
+	sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
+
+	/* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
+	if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
+		*readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+		*writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+		*nallocp = sz;
+	}
+	*maxfdp = n;
+	memset(*readsetp, 0, sz);
+	memset(*writesetp, 0, sz);
+
+	if (!rekeying)
+		channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have
+ * events pending.
+ */
+void
+channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset);
+}
+
+
+/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
+void
+channel_output_poll(void)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	u_int i, len;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered
+		 * incoming data.
+		 */
+		if (compat13) {
+			if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+			    c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING)
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+				continue;
+		}
+		if (compat20 &&
+		    (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) {
+			/* XXX is this true? */
+			debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */
+		if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
+		    c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) &&
+		    (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) {
+			if (c->datagram) {
+				if (len > 0) {
+					u_char *data;
+					u_int dlen;
+
+					data = buffer_get_string(&c->input,
+					    &dlen);
+					packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+					packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+					packet_put_string(data, dlen);
+					packet_send();
+					c->remote_window -= dlen + 4;
+					xfree(data);
+				}
+				continue;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Send some data for the other side over the secure
+			 * connection.
+			 */
+			if (compat20) {
+				if (len > c->remote_window)
+					len = c->remote_window;
+				if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
+					len = c->remote_maxpacket;
+			} else {
+				if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+					if (len > 1024)
+						len = 512;
+				} else {
+					/* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+					if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2)
+						len = packet_get_maxsize()/2;
+				}
+			}
+			if (len > 0) {
+				packet_start(compat20 ?
+				    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+				packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+				packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len);
+				packet_send();
+				buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+				c->remote_window -= len;
+			}
+		} else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+			if (compat13)
+				fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3");
+			/*
+			 * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
+			 * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF.
+			 * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use.
+			 */
+			if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+				debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
+				    c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+			else
+				chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+		}
+		/* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
+		if (compat20 &&
+		    !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
+		    c->remote_window > 0 &&
+		    (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 &&
+		    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) {
+			debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %u euse %d",
+			    c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended),
+			    c->extended_usage);
+			if (len > c->remote_window)
+				len = c->remote_window;
+			if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
+				len = c->remote_maxpacket;
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
+			packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+			packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR);
+			packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len);
+			packet_send();
+			buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
+			c->remote_window -= len;
+			debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/* -- protocol input */
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int id;
+	char *data;
+	u_int data_len;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	/* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	c = channel_lookup(id);
+	if (c == NULL)
+		packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+
+	/* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
+	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+	    c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
+		return;
+
+	/* Get the data. */
+	data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore data for protocol > 1.3 if output end is no longer open.
+	 * For protocol 2 the sending side is reducing its window as it sends
+	 * data, so we must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure
+	 * that window updates are sent back.  Otherwise the connection might
+	 * deadlock.
+	 */
+	if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
+		if (compat20) {
+			c->local_window -= data_len;
+			c->local_consumed += data_len;
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		if (data_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
+			logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d",
+			    c->self, data_len, c->local_maxpacket);
+		}
+		if (data_len > c->local_window) {
+			logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d",
+			    c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
+			return;
+		}
+		c->local_window -= data_len;
+	}
+	if (c->datagram)
+		buffer_put_string(&c->output, data, data_len);
+	else
+		buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int id;
+	char *data;
+	u_int data_len, tcode;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	/* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL)
+		packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id);
+	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+		logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
+		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
+			debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", id);
+		else
+			packet_disconnect("Received extended_data after EOF "
+			    "on channel %d.", id);
+	}
+	tcode = packet_get_int();
+	if (c->efd == -1 ||
+	    c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
+	    tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
+		logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
+		return;
+	}
+	data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	if (data_len > c->local_window) {
+		logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d",
+		    c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
+		xfree(data);
+		return;
+	}
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len);
+	c->local_window -= data_len;
+	buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len);
+	xfree(data);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int id;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+	c = channel_lookup(id);
+	if (c == NULL)
+		packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+	chan_rcvd_ieof(c);
+
+	/* XXX force input close */
+	if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) {
+		debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self);
+		c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
+		if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0)
+			chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+	}
+
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int id;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+	c = channel_lookup(id);
+	if (c == NULL)
+		packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+
+	/*
+	 * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more
+	 * data is coming for it.
+	 */
+	packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
+	packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+	packet_send();
+
+	/*
+	 * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request,
+	 * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation.
+	 * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be
+	 * no-one to receive the confirmation.  The channel gets freed when
+	 * the confirmation arrives.
+	 */
+	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) {
+		/*
+		 * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will
+		 * cause it to be freed later.
+		 */
+		buffer_clear(&c->input);
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING;
+	}
+}
+
+/* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int id = packet_get_int();
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+	if (c == NULL)
+		packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+	chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int id = packet_get_int();
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+	if (c == NULL)
+		packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
+		    "out-of-range channel %d.", id);
+	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED)
+		packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
+		    "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type);
+	channel_free(c);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int id, remote_id;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
+		packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for "
+		    "non-opening channel %d.", id);
+	remote_id = packet_get_int();
+	/* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */
+	c->remote_id = remote_id;
+	c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		c->remote_window = packet_get_int();
+		c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int();
+		if (c->open_confirm) {
+			debug2("callback start");
+			c->open_confirm(c->self, c->open_confirm_ctx);
+			debug2("callback done");
+		}
+		debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
+		    c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+}
+
+static char *
+reason2txt(int reason)
+{
+	switch (reason) {
+	case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED:
+		return "administratively prohibited";
+	case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED:
+		return "connect failed";
+	case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE:
+		return "unknown channel type";
+	case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
+		return "resource shortage";
+	}
+	return "unknown reason";
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int id, reason;
+	char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
+		packet_disconnect("Received open failure for "
+		    "non-opening channel %d.", id);
+	if (compat20) {
+		reason = packet_get_int();
+		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+			msg  = packet_get_string(NULL);
+			lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+		}
+		logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id,
+		    reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : "");
+		if (msg != NULL)
+			xfree(msg);
+		if (lang != NULL)
+			xfree(lang);
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+	/* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
+	chan_mark_dead(c);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int id;
+	u_int adjust;
+
+	if (!compat20)
+		return;
+
+	/* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	adjust = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust);
+	c->remote_window += adjust;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	u_short host_port;
+	char *host, *originator_string;
+	int remote_id;
+
+	remote_id = packet_get_int();
+	host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	host_port = packet_get_int();
+
+	if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) {
+		originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	} else {
+		originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)");
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+	c = channel_connect_to(host, host_port,
+	    "connected socket", originator_string);
+	xfree(originator_string);
+	xfree(host);
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+		packet_put_int(remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+	} else
+		c->remote_id = remote_id;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	struct channel_confirm *cc;
+	int id;
+
+	/* Reset keepalive timeout */
+	packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug2("channel_input_status_confirm: type %d id %d", type, id);
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id);
+		return;
+	}	
+	;
+	if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL)
+		return;
+	cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx);
+	TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+	bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+	xfree(cc);
+}
+
+/* -- tcp forwarding */
+
+void
+channel_set_af(int af)
+{
+	IPv4or6 = af;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr,
+    u_short listen_port, int *allocated_listen_port,
+    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	const char *host, *addr;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	in_port_t *lport_p;
+
+	host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
+	    listen_addr : host_to_connect;
+	is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
+
+	if (host == NULL) {
+		error("No forward host name.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+		error("Forward host name too long.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback,
+	 * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind
+	 * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a
+	 * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's
+	 * specification and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2
+	 * (``clientspecified'') will bind to whatever address the client
+	 * asked for.
+	 *
+	 * Special-case listen_addrs are:
+	 *
+	 * "0.0.0.0"               -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR
+	 * "" (empty string), "*"  -> wildcard v4/v6
+	 * "localhost"             -> loopback v4/v6
+	 */
+	addr = NULL;
+	if (listen_addr == NULL) {
+		/* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */
+		if (gateway_ports)
+			wildcard = 1;
+	} else if (gateway_ports || is_client) {
+		if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
+		    strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) ||
+		    *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 ||
+		    (!is_client && gateway_ports == 1))
+			wildcard = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0)
+			addr = listen_addr;
+	}
+
+	debug3("channel_setup_fwd_listener: type %d wildcard %d addr %s",
+	    type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
+	 * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
+	 */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", listen_port);
+	if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+		if (addr == NULL) {
+			/* This really shouldn't happen */
+			packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+		} else {
+			error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: "
+			    "getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr,
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (allocated_listen_port != NULL)
+		*allocated_listen_port = 0;
+	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		switch (ai->ai_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->
+			    sin_port;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->
+			    sin6_port;
+			break;
+		default:
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the
+		 * same port for all address families.
+		 */
+		if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && listen_port == 0 &&
+		    allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0)
+			*lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port);
+
+		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+		    strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+			error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: getnameinfo failed");
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Create a port to listen for the host. */
+		sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (sock < 0) {
+			/* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */
+			verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
+
+		debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.",
+		    ntop, strport);
+
+		/* Bind the socket to the address. */
+		if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+			/* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */
+			if (!ai->ai_next)
+				error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			else
+				verbose("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+			close(sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
+		if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
+			error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			close(sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port -
+		 * record what we got.
+		 */
+		if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && listen_port == 0 &&
+		    allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
+		    *allocated_listen_port == 0) {
+			*allocated_listen_port = get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+			debug("Allocated listen port %d",
+			    *allocated_listen_port);
+		}
+
+		/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
+		c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+		    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+		    0, "port listener", 1);
+		c->path = xstrdup(host);
+		c->host_port = port_to_connect;
+		c->listening_port = listen_port;
+		success = 1;
+	}
+	if (success == 0)
+		error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: cannot listen to port: %d",
+		    listen_port);
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+	return success;
+}
+
+int
+channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		Channel *c = channels[i];
+
+		if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
+		    strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) {
+			debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+			channel_free(c);
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (found);
+}
+
+/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh (and sshd in v1) */
+int
+channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
+    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
+{
+	return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER,
+	    listen_host, listen_port, NULL, host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
+	    gateway_ports);
+}
+
+/* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
+int
+channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *listen_address,
+    u_short listen_port, int *allocated_listen_port, int gateway_ports)
+{
+	return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER,
+	    listen_address, listen_port, allocated_listen_port,
+	    NULL, 0, gateway_ports);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through
+ * the secure channel to host:port from local side.
+ */
+
+int
+channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
+    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect)
+{
+	int type, success = 0;
+
+	/* Record locally that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
+	if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+		fatal("channel_request_remote_forwarding: too many forwards");
+
+	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
+	if (compat20) {
+		const char *address_to_bind;
+		if (listen_host == NULL) {
+			if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR)
+				address_to_bind = "127.0.0.1";
+			else
+				address_to_bind = "localhost";
+		} else if (*listen_host == '\0' ||
+			   strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) {
+			if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR)
+				address_to_bind = "0.0.0.0";
+			else
+				address_to_bind = "";
+		} else
+			address_to_bind = listen_host;
+
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+		packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward");
+		packet_put_char(1);			/* boolean: want reply */
+		packet_put_cstring(address_to_bind);
+		packet_put_int(listen_port);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+		/* Assume that server accepts the request */
+		success = 1;
+	} else {
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
+		packet_put_int(listen_port);
+		packet_put_cstring(host_to_connect);
+		packet_put_int(port_to_connect);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		/* Wait for response from the remote side. */
+		type = packet_read();
+		switch (type) {
+		case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS:
+			success = 1;
+			break;
+		case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Unknown packet */
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:"
+			    "received packet type %d.", type);
+		}
+	}
+	if (success) {
+		permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
+		permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port_to_connect;
+		permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = listen_port;
+		num_permitted_opens++;
+	}
+	return (success ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from
+ * local side.
+ */
+void
+channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!compat20)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
+		if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
+		    permitted_opens[i].listen_port == port)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (i >= num_permitted_opens) {
+		debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
+		return;
+	}
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward");
+	packet_put_char(0);
+	packet_put_cstring(host == NULL ? "" : host);
+	packet_put_int(port);
+	packet_send();
+
+	permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0;
+	permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0;
+	xfree(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+	permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST.  This initates
+ * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect
+ * message if there was an error).
+ */
+int
+channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports)
+{
+	u_short port, host_port;
+	int success = 0;
+	char *hostname;
+
+	/* Get arguments from the packet. */
+	port = packet_get_int();
+	hostname = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	host_port = packet_get_int();
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/*
+	 * Check that an unprivileged user is not trying to forward a
+	 * privileged port.
+	 */
+	if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root)
+		packet_disconnect(
+		    "Requested forwarding of port %d but user is not root.",
+		    port);
+	if (host_port == 0)
+		packet_disconnect("Dynamic forwarding denied.");
+#endif
+
+	/* Initiate forwarding */
+	success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(NULL, port, hostname,
+	    host_port, gateway_ports);
+
+	/* Free the argument string. */
+	xfree(hostname);
+
+	return (success ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_opens[] is empty.  This is
+ * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port
+ * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway.
+ */
+void
+channel_permit_all_opens(void)
+{
+	if (num_permitted_opens == 0)
+		all_opens_permitted = 1;
+}
+
+void
+channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
+{
+	if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+		fatal("channel_add_permitted_opens: too many forwards");
+	debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
+
+	permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host);
+	permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
+	num_permitted_opens++;
+
+	all_opens_permitted = 0;
+}
+
+int
+channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
+{
+	if (num_adm_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+		fatal("channel_add_adm_permitted_opens: too many forwards");
+	debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
+
+	permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect
+	     = xstrdup(host);
+	permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
+	return ++num_adm_permitted_opens;
+}
+
+void
+channel_clear_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
+		if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
+			xfree(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+	num_permitted_opens = 0;
+}
+
+void
+channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+		if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
+			xfree(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+	num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
+}
+
+void
+channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	printf("permitopen");
+	if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) {
+		printf(" any\n");
+		return;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+		if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
+			printf(" %s:%d", permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect,
+			    permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect);
+	printf("\n");
+}
+
+/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
+static int
+connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
+{
+	int sock, saved_errno;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+	for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) {
+		if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
+		    cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+		if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen,
+		    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+			error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed");
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype,
+		    cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
+			if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL)
+				error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			else
+				verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1)
+			fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock);
+		if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr,
+		    cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
+			debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): "
+			    "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			saved_errno = errno;
+			close(sock);
+			errno = saved_errno;
+			continue;	/* fail -- try next */
+		}
+		debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) "
+		    "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock);
+		cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next;
+		set_nodelay(sock);
+		return sock;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
+{
+	xfree(cctx->host);
+	if (cctx->aitop)
+		freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop);
+	bzero(cctx, sizeof(*cctx));
+	cctx->host = NULL;
+	cctx->ai = cctx->aitop = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host, port */
+static Channel *
+connect_to(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints;
+	int gaierr;
+	int sock = -1;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	struct channel_connect cctx;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) {
+		error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", host,
+		    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	cctx.host = xstrdup(host);
+	cctx.port = port;
+	cctx.ai = cctx.aitop;
+
+	if ((sock = connect_next(&cctx)) == -1) {
+		error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s",
+		    host, port, strerror(errno));
+		channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
+	c->connect_ctx = cctx;
+	return c;
+}
+
+Channel *
+channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) {
+		if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
+		    permitted_opens[i].listen_port == listen_port) {
+			return connect_to(
+			    permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect,
+			    permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname);
+		}
+	}
+	error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d",
+	    listen_port);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
+Channel *
+channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
+
+	permit = all_opens_permitted;
+	if (!permit) {
+		for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
+			if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
+			    permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect == port &&
+			    strcmp(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) == 0)
+				permit = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) {
+		permit_adm = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+			if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
+			    permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect == port &&
+			    strcmp(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, host)
+			    == 0)
+				permit_adm = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
+		logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
+		    "but the request was denied.", host, port);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname);
+}
+
+void
+channel_send_window_changes(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	struct winsize ws;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+		if (channels[i] == NULL || !channels[i]->client_tty ||
+		    channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+			continue;
+		if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+			continue;
+		channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+}
+
+/* -- X11 forwarding */
+
+/*
+ * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
+ * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable
+ * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs.
+ */
+int
+x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
+    int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
+{
+	Channel *nc = NULL;
+	int display_number, sock;
+	u_short port;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS];
+
+	if (chanids == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
+	    display_number++) {
+		port = 6000 + display_number;
+		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+			error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+			return -1;
+		}
+		for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+				continue;
+			sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+			    ai->ai_protocol);
+			if (sock < 0) {
+				if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)) {
+					error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+					freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+					return -1;
+				} else {
+					debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported",
+						 ai->ai_family);
+					continue;
+				}
+			}
+#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
+			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
+				int on = 1;
+				if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+					error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			}
+#endif
+			if (x11_use_localhost)
+				channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
+			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+				debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
+				close(sock);
+
+				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+					close(socks[n]);
+				}
+				num_socks = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+				break;
+		}
+		freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+		if (num_socks > 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
+		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
+	for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+		sock = socks[n];
+		if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
+			error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			close(sock);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
+	*chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
+	for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+		sock = socks[n];
+		nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
+		    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+		    0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
+		nc->single_connection = single_connection;
+		(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
+	}
+	(*chanids)[n] = -1;
+
+	/* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
+	*display_numberp = display_number;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+{
+	int sock;
+	struct sockaddr_un addr;
+
+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
+		return sock;
+	close(sock);
+	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
+	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
+}
+
+int
+x11_connect_display(void)
+{
+	u_int display_number;
+	const char *display;
+	char buf[1024], *cp;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int gaierr, sock = 0;
+
+	/* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (!display) {
+		error("DISPLAY not set.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a
+	 * connection to the real X server.
+	 */
+
+	/* Check if the display is from launchd. */
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+	if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
+		sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
+		if (sock < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+		return sock;
+	}
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * Check if it is a unix domain socket.  Unix domain displays are in
+	 * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
+	    display[0] == ':') {
+		/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
+		if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+			error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+			    display);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		/* Create a socket. */
+		sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
+		if (sock < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+		return sock;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Connect to an inet socket.  The DISPLAY value is supposedly
+	 * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
+	 */
+	strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
+	cp = strchr(buf, ':');
+	if (!cp) {
+		error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*cp = 0;
+	/* buf now contains the host name.  But first we parse the display number. */
+	if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+		error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+		    display);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Look up the host address */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		/* Create a socket. */
+		sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (sock < 0) {
+			debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Connect it to the display. */
+		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
+			close(sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Success */
+		break;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+	if (!ai) {
+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	set_nodelay(sock);
+	return sock;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received.  The packet contains
+ * the remote channel number.  We should do whatever we want, and respond
+ * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE.
+ */
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	int remote_id, sock = 0;
+	char *remote_host;
+
+	debug("Received X11 open request.");
+
+	remote_id = packet_get_int();
+
+	if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) {
+		remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	} else {
+		remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)");
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */
+	sock = x11_connect_display();
+	if (sock != -1) {
+		/* Allocate a channel for this connection. */
+		c = channel_new("connected x11 socket",
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0,
+		    remote_host, 1);
+		c->remote_id = remote_id;
+		c->force_drain = 1;
+	}
+	xfree(remote_host);
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		/* Send refusal to the remote host. */
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+		packet_put_int(remote_id);
+	} else {
+		/* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+		packet_put_int(remote_id);
+		packet_put_int(c->self);
+	}
+	packet_send();
+}
+
+/* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int rchan = packet_get_int();
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN:
+		error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
+		break;
+	case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN:
+		error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("deny_input_open: type %d", type);
+		break;
+	}
+	error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a malicious server.");
+	packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+	packet_put_int(rchan);
+	packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication
+ * data, and enables authentication spoofing.
+ * This should be called in the client only.
+ */
+void
+x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp,
+    const char *proto, const char *data)
+{
+	u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
+	u_int i, value;
+	char *new_data;
+	int screen_number;
+	const char *cp;
+	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+
+	if (x11_saved_display == NULL)
+		x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
+	else if (strcmp(disp, x11_saved_display) != 0) {
+		error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different "
+		    "$DISPLAY already forwarded");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	cp = strchr(disp, ':');
+	if (cp)
+		cp = strchr(cp, '.');
+	if (cp)
+		screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
+	else
+		screen_number = 0;
+
+	if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
+		/* Save protocol name. */
+		x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
+		/*
+		 * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data
+		 * of the same length.
+		 */
+		x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+		x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+		for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
+			if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
+				fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
+				    "authentication data: %.100s", data);
+			if (i % 4 == 0)
+				rnd = arc4random();
+			x11_saved_data[i] = value;
+			x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+			rnd >>= 8;
+		}
+		x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
+		x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
+	}
+
+	/* Convert the fake data into hex. */
+	new_data = tohex(x11_fake_data, data_len);
+
+	/* Send the request packet. */
+	if (compat20) {
+		channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", 0);
+		packet_put_char(0);	/* XXX bool single connection */
+	} else {
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+	}
+	packet_put_cstring(proto);
+	packet_put_cstring(new_data);
+	packet_put_int(screen_number);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+	xfree(new_data);
+}
+
+
+/* -- agent forwarding */
+
+/* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */
+
+void
+auth_request_forwarding(void)
+{
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.h b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1488ed7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.98 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CHANNEL_H
+#define CHANNEL_H
+
+/* Definitions for channel types. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER	1	/* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER	2	/* Listening on a port. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING		3	/* waiting for confirmation */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN		4	/* normal open two-way channel */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED		5	/* waiting for close confirmation */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET		6	/* authentication socket */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN		7	/* reading first X11 packet */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING	8	/* sending remaining data to conn */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING	9	/* sending remaining data to app */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL		10	/* larval session */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER	11	/* Listening to a R-style port  */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING		12
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC		13
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE		14	/* Almost dead. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE		15
+
+struct Channel;
+typedef struct Channel Channel;
+
+typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *);
+typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int);
+typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(int, void *);
+typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+/* Channel success/failure callbacks */
+typedef void channel_confirm_cb(int, struct Channel *, void *);
+typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct Channel *, void *);
+struct channel_confirm {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry;
+	channel_confirm_cb *cb;
+	channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb;
+	void *ctx;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm);
+
+/* Context for non-blocking connects */
+struct channel_connect {
+	char *host;
+	int port;
+	struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop;
+};
+
+struct Channel {
+	int     type;		/* channel type/state */
+	int     self;		/* my own channel identifier */
+	int     remote_id;	/* channel identifier for remote peer */
+	u_int   istate;		/* input from channel (state of receive half) */
+	u_int   ostate;		/* output to channel  (state of transmit half) */
+	int     flags;		/* close sent/rcvd */
+	int     rfd;		/* read fd */
+	int     wfd;		/* write fd */
+	int     efd;		/* extended fd */
+	int     sock;		/* sock fd */
+	int     ctl_fd;		/* control fd (client sharing) */
+	int     isatty;		/* rfd is a tty */
+	int     wfd_isatty;	/* wfd is a tty */
+	int	client_tty;	/* (client) TTY has been requested */
+	int     force_drain;	/* force close on iEOF */
+	int     delayed;		/* fdset hack */
+	Buffer  input;		/* data read from socket, to be sent over
+				 * encrypted connection */
+	Buffer  output;		/* data received over encrypted connection for
+				 * send on socket */
+	Buffer  extended;
+	char    *path;
+		/* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
+	int     listening_port;	/* port being listened for forwards */
+	int     host_port;	/* remote port to connect for forwards */
+	char   *remote_name;	/* remote hostname */
+
+	u_int	remote_window;
+	u_int	remote_maxpacket;
+	u_int	local_window;
+	u_int	local_window_max;
+	u_int	local_consumed;
+	u_int	local_maxpacket;
+	int     extended_usage;
+	int	single_connection;
+
+	char   *ctype;		/* type */
+
+	/* callback */
+	channel_callback_fn	*open_confirm;
+	void			*open_confirm_ctx;
+	channel_callback_fn	*detach_user;
+	int			detach_close;
+	struct channel_confirms	status_confirms;
+
+	/* filter */
+	channel_infilter_fn	*input_filter;
+	channel_outfilter_fn	*output_filter;
+	void			*filter_ctx;
+	channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup;
+
+	/* keep boundaries */
+	int     		datagram;
+
+	/* non-blocking connect */
+	struct channel_connect	connect_ctx;
+};
+
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE		0
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ		1
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE		2
+
+/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
+#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT	(32*1024)
+#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT	(64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT	(32*1024)
+#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT	(64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT	(16*1024)
+#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT	(4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+
+/* possible input states */
+#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN			0
+#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN		1
+#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE		2
+#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED		3
+
+/* possible output states */
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN		0
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN		1
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF		2
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED		3
+
+#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT			0x01
+#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD			0x02
+#define CHAN_EOF_SENT			0x04
+#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD			0x08
+
+#define CHAN_RBUF	16*1024
+
+/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */
+#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
+	(compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \
+	(c->efd != -1 || \
+	buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
+#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
+	(compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
+	c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \
+	buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
+
+/* channel management */
+
+Channel	*channel_by_id(int);
+Channel	*channel_lookup(int);
+Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, char *, int);
+void	 channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int);
+void	 channel_free(Channel *);
+void	 channel_free_all(void);
+void	 channel_stop_listening(void);
+
+void	 channel_send_open(int);
+void	 channel_request_start(int, char *, int);
+void	 channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *, int);
+void	 channel_register_open_confirm(int, channel_callback_fn *, void *);
+void	 channel_register_filter(int, channel_infilter_fn *,
+    channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *);
+void	 channel_register_status_confirm(int, channel_confirm_cb *,
+    channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
+void	 channel_cancel_cleanup(int);
+int	 channel_close_fd(int *);
+void	 channel_send_window_changes(void);
+
+/* protocol handler */
+
+void	 channel_input_close(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_close_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
+
+void	 channel_prepare_select(fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, u_int*, int);
+void     channel_after_select(fd_set *, fd_set *);
+void     channel_output_poll(void);
+
+int      channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void);
+void     channel_close_all(void);
+int      channel_still_open(void);
+char	*channel_open_message(void);
+int	 channel_find_open(void);
+
+/* tcp forwarding */
+void	 channel_set_af(int af);
+void     channel_permit_all_opens(void);
+void	 channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int);
+int	 channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *, int);
+void	 channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
+void	 channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
+void 	 channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void);
+int      channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int);
+Channel	*channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
+Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short, char *, char *);
+int	 channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
+	     const char *, u_short);
+int	 channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short,
+	     const char *, u_short, int);
+void	 channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port);
+int	 channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int *, int);
+int	 channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *, u_short);
+
+/* x11 forwarding */
+
+int	 x11_connect_display(void);
+int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+void     x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *,
+	     const char *);
+void	 deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+/* agent forwarding */
+
+void	 auth_request_forwarding(void);
+
+/* channel close */
+
+int	 chan_is_dead(Channel *, int);
+void	 chan_mark_dead(Channel *);
+
+/* channel events */
+
+void	 chan_rcvd_oclose(Channel *);
+void	 chan_rcvd_eow(Channel *);	/* SSH2-only */
+void	 chan_read_failed(Channel *);
+void	 chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *);
+
+void	 chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *);
+void	 chan_write_failed(Channel *);
+void	 chan_obuf_empty(Channel *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17a13a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.6 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is used by SSH1:
+ *
+ * What kind of triple DES are these 2 routines?
+ *
+ * Why is there a redundant initialization vector?
+ *
+ * If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been
+ * outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which
+ * perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the
+ * private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a
+ * result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when
+ * choosing the X block.
+ */
+struct ssh1_3des_ctx
+{
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	k1, k2, k3;
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
+
+static int
+ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+    int enc)
+{
+	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
+	u_char *k1, *k2, *k3;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+	}
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return (1);
+	if (enc == -1)
+		enc = ctx->encrypt;
+	k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key;
+	k2 += 8;
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) {
+		if (enc)
+			k3 += 16;
+		else
+			k1 += 16;
+	}
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1);
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2);
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3);
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc);
+	EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc);
+	EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc);
+#else
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		xfree(c);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+		return (0);
+	}
+#endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		error("ssh1_3des_cbc: no context");
+		return (0);
+	}
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len);
+	EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len);
+	EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len);
+#else
+	if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
+		return (0);
+#endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3);
+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		xfree(c);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len)
+{
+	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
+
+	if (len != 24)
+		fatal("%s: bad 3des iv length: %d", __func__, len);
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__);
+	if (doset) {
+		debug3("%s: Installed 3DES IV", __func__);
+		memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8);
+		memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
+		memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
+	} else {
+		debug3("%s: Copying 3DES IV", __func__);
+		memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8);
+		memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8);
+		memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8);
+	}
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_ssh1_3des(void)
+{
+	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
+
+	memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+	ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef;
+	ssh1_3des.block_size = 8;
+	ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0;
+	ssh1_3des.key_len = 16;
+	ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init;
+	ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup;
+	ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc;
+#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH;
+#endif
+	return (&ssh1_3des);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-acss.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-acss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb0bf73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-acss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenBSD project
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+
+#include "acss.h"
+
+#define data(ctx) ((EVP_ACSS_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
+
+typedef struct {
+	ACSS_KEY ks;
+} EVP_ACSS_KEY;
+
+#define EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE          0xff06
+#define EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_SUBKEY        0xff07
+
+static int
+acss_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+	acss_setkey(&data(ctx)->ks,key,enc,ACSS_DATA);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+acss_ciph(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+    unsigned int inl)
+{
+	acss(&data(ctx)->ks,inl,in,out);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+acss_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+	switch(type) {
+	case EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE:
+		data(ctx)->ks.mode = arg;
+		return 1;
+	case EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_SUBKEY:
+		acss_setsubkey(&data(ctx)->ks,(unsigned char *)ptr);
+		return 1;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_acss(void)
+{
+	static EVP_CIPHER acss_cipher;
+
+	memset(&acss_cipher, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+
+	acss_cipher.nid = NID_undef;
+	acss_cipher.block_size = 1;
+	acss_cipher.key_len = 5;
+	acss_cipher.init = acss_init_key;
+	acss_cipher.do_cipher = acss_ciph;
+	acss_cipher.ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_ACSS_KEY);
+	acss_cipher.ctrl = acss_ctrl;
+
+	return (&acss_cipher);
+}
+#endif
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-aes.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-aes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ea5949
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-aes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16
+struct ssh_rijndael_ctx
+{
+	rijndael_ctx	r_ctx;
+	u_char		r_iv[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER * evp_rijndael(void);
+void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+    int enc)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+	}
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		if (enc == -1)
+			enc = ctx->encrypt;
+		rijndael_set_key(&c->r_ctx, (u_char *)key,
+		    8*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), enc);
+	}
+	if (iv != NULL)
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+    u_int len)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+	u_char buf[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
+	u_char *cprev, *cnow, *plain, *ivp;
+	int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return (1);
+	if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE)
+		fatal("ssh_rijndael_cbc: bad len %d", len);
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_rijndael_cbc: no context");
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (ctx->encrypt) {
+		cnow  = dest;
+		plain = (u_char *)src;
+		cprev = c->r_iv;
+		for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++, plain+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
+		    cnow+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
+			for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
+				buf[j] = plain[j] ^ cprev[j];
+			rijndael_encrypt(&c->r_ctx, buf, cnow);
+			cprev = cnow;
+		}
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, cprev, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	} else {
+		cnow  = (u_char *) (src+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+		plain = dest+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+
+		memcpy(buf, cnow, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+		for (i = blocks; i > 0; i--, cnow-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
+		    plain-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
+			rijndael_decrypt(&c->r_ctx, cnow, plain);
+			ivp = (i == 1) ? c->r_iv : cnow-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+			for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
+				plain[j] ^= ivp[j];
+		}
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, buf, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		xfree(c);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, u_int len)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_rijndael_iv: no context");
+	if (doset)
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, len);
+	else
+		memcpy(iv, c->r_iv, len);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_rijndael(void)
+{
+	static EVP_CIPHER rijndal_cbc;
+
+	memset(&rijndal_cbc, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+	rijndal_cbc.nid = NID_undef;
+	rijndal_cbc.block_size = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+	rijndal_cbc.iv_len = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+	rijndal_cbc.key_len = 16;
+	rijndal_cbc.init = ssh_rijndael_init;
+	rijndal_cbc.cleanup = ssh_rijndael_cleanup;
+	rijndal_cbc.do_cipher = ssh_rijndael_cbc;
+#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	rijndal_cbc.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
+#endif
+	return (&rijndal_cbc);
+}
+#endif /* USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-bf1.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-bf1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0e33b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-bf1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before
+ * and after encryption/decryption. Thus the swap_bytes stuff (yuk).
+ */
+
+const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+
+static void
+swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n)
+{
+	u_char c[4];
+
+	/* Process 4 bytes every lap. */
+	for (n = n / 4; n > 0; n--) {
+		c[3] = *src++;
+		c[2] = *src++;
+		c[1] = *src++;
+		c[0] = *src++;
+
+		*dst++ = c[0];
+		*dst++ = c[1];
+		*dst++ = c[2];
+		*dst++ = c[3];
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+static void bf_ssh1_init (EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+			  const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+	if (iv != NULL)
+		memcpy (&(ctx->oiv[0]), iv, 8);
+	memcpy (&(ctx->iv[0]), &(ctx->oiv[0]), 8);
+	if (key != NULL)
+		BF_set_key (&(ctx->c.bf_ks), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length (ctx),
+			    key);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int (*orig_bf)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int) = NULL;
+
+static int
+bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in, u_int len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	swap_bytes(in, out, len);
+	ret = (*orig_bf)(ctx, out, out, len);
+	swap_bytes(out, out, len);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_ssh1_bf(void)
+{
+	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf;
+
+	memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+	orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher;
+	ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef;
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init;
+#endif
+	ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher;
+	ssh1_bf.key_len = 32;
+	return (&ssh1_bf);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-ctr.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b86cc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#endif
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+
+struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
+{
+	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
+	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+/*
+ * increment counter 'ctr',
+ * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
+ * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
+ */
+static void
+ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, u_int len)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		if (++ctr[i])	/* continue on overflow */
+			return;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+    u_int len)
+{
+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+	u_int n = 0;
+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return (1);
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	while ((len--) > 0) {
+		if (n == 0) {
+			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
+			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
+		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+    int enc)
+{
+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+	}
+	if (key != NULL)
+		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+		    &c->aes_ctx);
+	if (iv != NULL)
+		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		xfree(c);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, u_int len)
+{
+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_iv: no context");
+	if (doset)
+		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, len);
+	else
+		memcpy(iv, c->aes_counter, len);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+{
+	static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr;
+
+	memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+	aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef;
+	aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	aes_ctr.key_len = 16;
+	aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init;
+	aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup;
+	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
+#endif
+	return (&aes_ctr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb5c0ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.82 2009/01/26 09:58:15 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+
+struct Cipher {
+	char	*name;
+	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
+	u_int	block_size;
+	u_int	key_len;
+	u_int	discard_len;
+	u_int	cbc_mode;
+	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
+} ciphers[] = {
+	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+	{ "des",		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
+	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
+	{ "blowfish",		SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
+
+	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+	{ "blowfish-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc },
+	{ "cast128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc },
+	{ "arcfour",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "arcfour128",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "arcfour256",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
+				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+#ifdef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
+	{ "acss@openssh.org",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, 0, EVP_acss },
+#endif
+	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/*--*/
+
+u_int
+cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->block_size);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_keylen(const Cipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->key_len);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_get_number(const Cipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->number);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->cbc_mode);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_mask_ssh1(int client)
+{
+	u_int mask = 0;
+	mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES;		/* Mandatory */
+	mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
+	if (client) {
+		mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_DES;
+	}
+	return mask;
+}
+
+Cipher *
+cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	Cipher *c;
+	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+			return c;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+Cipher *
+cipher_by_number(int id)
+{
+	Cipher *c;
+	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+		if (c->number == id)
+			return c;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#define	CIPHER_SEP	","
+int
+ciphers_valid(const char *names)
+{
+	Cipher *c;
+	char *cipher_list, *cp;
+	char *p;
+
+	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+		return 0;
+	cipher_list = cp = xstrdup(names);
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
+		c = cipher_by_name(p);
+		if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
+			debug("bad cipher %s [%s]", p, names);
+			xfree(cipher_list);
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			debug3("cipher ok: %s [%s]", p, names);
+		}
+	}
+	debug3("ciphers ok: [%s]", names);
+	xfree(cipher_list);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses the name of the cipher.  Returns the number of the corresponding
+ * cipher, or -1 on error.
+ */
+
+int
+cipher_number(const char *name)
+{
+	Cipher *c;
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+			return c->number;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+char *
+cipher_name(int id)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cipher_by_number(id);
+	return (c==NULL) ? "<unknown>" : c->name;
+}
+
+void
+cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
+    const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
+    int do_encrypt)
+{
+	static int dowarn = 1;
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	EVP_CIPHER *type;
+#else
+	const EVP_CIPHER *type;
+	int klen;
+#endif
+	u_char *junk, *discard;
+
+	if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) {
+		if (dowarn) {
+			error("Warning: use of DES is strongly discouraged "
+			    "due to cryptographic weaknesses");
+			dowarn = 0;
+		}
+		if (keylen > 8)
+			keylen = 8;
+	}
+	cc->plaintext = (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_NONE);
+
+	if (keylen < cipher->key_len)
+		fatal("cipher_init: key length %d is insufficient for %s.",
+		    keylen, cipher->name);
+	if (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher->block_size)
+		fatal("cipher_init: iv length %d is insufficient for %s.",
+		    ivlen, cipher->name);
+	cc->cipher = cipher;
+
+	type = (*cipher->evptype)();
+
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cc->evp);
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	if (type->key_len > 0 && type->key_len != keylen) {
+		debug("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)",
+		    type->key_len, keylen);
+		type->key_len = keylen;
+	}
+	EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, (u_char *)key, (u_char *)iv,
+	    (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT));
+#else
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
+	    (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0)
+		fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit failed for %s",
+		    cipher->name);
+	klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
+	if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
+		debug2("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen);
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0)
+			fatal("cipher_init: set keylen failed (%d -> %d)",
+			    klen, keylen);
+	}
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0)
+		fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit: set key failed for %s",
+		    cipher->name);
+#endif
+
+	if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
+		junk = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
+		discard = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
+		if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk,
+		    cipher->discard_len) == 0)
+			fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed during discard");
+		memset(discard, 0, cipher->discard_len);
+		xfree(junk);
+		xfree(discard);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+	if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
+		fatal("cipher_encrypt: bad plaintext length %d", len);
+	if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0)
+		fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed");
+}
+
+void
+cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
+{
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0)
+		error("cipher_cleanup: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup failed");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the
+ * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
+ */
+
+void
+cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
+    const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
+{
+	MD5_CTX md;
+	u_char digest[16];
+
+	MD5_Init(&md);
+	MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+	MD5_Final(digest, &md);
+
+	cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt);
+
+	memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
+	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
+ * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
+ * process.
+ */
+
+int
+cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *cc)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int ivlen;
+
+	if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
+		ivlen = 24;
+	else
+		ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+	return (ivlen);
+}
+
+void
+cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int evplen;
+
+	switch (c->number) {
+	case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+	case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+	case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+		evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+		if (evplen <= 0)
+			return;
+		if ((u_int)evplen != len)
+			fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__,
+			    evplen, len);
+#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+		if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
+			ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
+		else
+#endif
+		if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
+			ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
+		else
+			memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len);
+		break;
+	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
+		ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int evplen = 0;
+
+	switch (c->number) {
+	case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+	case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+	case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+		evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+		if (evplen == 0)
+			return;
+#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+		if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael)
+			ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
+		else
+#endif
+		if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
+			ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen);
+		else
+			memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen);
+		break;
+	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
+		ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, 24);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
+	}
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	&(evp).c
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	sizeof((evp).c)
+#else
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	(evp).cipher_data
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	(evp).cipher->ctx_size
+#endif
+
+int
+cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int plen = 0;
+
+	if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4 || c->evptype == EVP_acss) {
+		plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
+		if (dat == NULL)
+			return (plen);
+		memcpy(dat, EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), plen);
+	}
+	return (plen);
+}
+
+void
+cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int plen;
+
+	if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4 || c->evptype == EVP_acss) {
+		plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
+		memcpy(EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), dat, plen);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.h b/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dd2270
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.37 2009/01/26 09:58:15 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CIPHER_H
+#define CIPHER_H
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+/*
+ * Cipher types for SSH-1.  New types can be added, but old types should not
+ * be removed for compatibility.  The maximum allowed value is 31.
+ */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_SSH2		-3
+#define SSH_CIPHER_INVALID	-2	/* No valid cipher selected. */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET	-1	/* None selected (invalid number). */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_NONE		0	/* no encryption */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA		1	/* IDEA CFB */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_DES		2	/* DES CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_3DES		3	/* 3DES CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_TSS	4	/* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4	5	/* Alleged RC4 */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH	6
+#define SSH_CIPHER_RESERVED	7
+#define SSH_CIPHER_MAX		31
+
+#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
+#define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
+
+typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
+typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
+
+struct Cipher;
+struct CipherContext {
+	int	plaintext;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
+	Cipher *cipher;
+};
+
+u_int	 cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
+Cipher	*cipher_by_name(const char *);
+Cipher	*cipher_by_number(int);
+int	 cipher_number(const char *);
+char	*cipher_name(int);
+int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
+void	 cipher_init(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, int);
+void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int);
+void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
+void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
+u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *);
+
+u_int	 cipher_get_number(const Cipher *);
+void	 cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *, u_int);
+void	 cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *);
+int	 cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *);
+int	 cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *, u_char *);
+void	 cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *, u_char *);
+#endif				/* CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cleanup.c b/crypto/openssh/cleanup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..238f965
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cleanup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cleanup.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* default implementation */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	_exit(i);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a7dc0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2058 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.213 2009/07/05 19:28:33 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+/* import options */
+extern Options options;
+
+/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */
+extern int stdin_null_flag;
+
+/* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */
+extern int no_shell_flag;
+
+/* Control socket */
+extern int muxserver_sock;
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to.  This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+extern char *host;
+
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
+ * not yet been processed.  This will cause a message indicating the new
+ * window size to be sent to the server a little later.  This is volatile
+ * because this is updated in a signal handler.
+ */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */
+static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
+
+/* Common data for the client loop code. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
+static int escape_char1;	/* Escape character. (proto1 only) */
+static int escape_pending1;	/* Last character was an escape (proto1 only) */
+static int last_was_cr;		/* Last character was a newline. */
+static int exit_status;		/* Used to store the command exit status. */
+static int stdin_eof;		/* EOF has been encountered on stderr. */
+static Buffer stdin_buffer;	/* Buffer for stdin data. */
+static Buffer stdout_buffer;	/* Buffer for stdout data. */
+static Buffer stderr_buffer;	/* Buffer for stderr data. */
+static u_int buffer_high;/* Soft max buffer size. */
+static int connection_in;	/* Connection to server (input). */
+static int connection_out;	/* Connection to server (output). */
+static int need_rekeying;	/* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
+static int session_closed = 0;	/* In SSH2: login session closed. */
+
+static void client_init_dispatch(void);
+int	session_ident = -1;
+
+/* Track escape per proto2 channel */
+struct escape_filter_ctx {
+	int escape_pending;
+	int escape_char;
+};
+
+/* Context for channel confirmation replies */
+struct channel_reply_ctx {
+	const char *request_type;
+	int id, do_close;
+};
+
+/* Global request success/failure callbacks */
+struct global_confirm {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry;
+	global_confirm_cb *cb;
+	void *ctx;
+	int ref_count;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
+static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
+    TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
+
+/*XXX*/
+extern Kex *xxx_kex;
+
+void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, Buffer *);
+
+/* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */
+
+static void
+leave_non_blocking(void)
+{
+	if (in_non_blocking_mode) {
+		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+		in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */
+
+static void
+enter_non_blocking(void)
+{
+	in_non_blocking_mode = 1;
+	set_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH).  This just sets a
+ * flag indicating that the window has changed.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED */
+static void
+window_change_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_window_change_signal = 1;
+	signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate.  These
+ * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED */
+static void
+signal_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_signal = sig;
+	quit_pending = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns current time in seconds from Jan 1, 1970 with the maximum
+ * available resolution.
+ */
+
+static double
+get_current_time(void)
+{
+	struct timeval tv;
+	gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+	return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
+}
+
+#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+void
+client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+    u_int trusted, char **_proto, char **_data)
+{
+	char cmd[1024];
+	char line[512];
+	char xdisplay[512];
+	static char proto[512], data[512];
+	FILE *f;
+	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+	char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
+	*_proto = proto;
+	*_data = data;
+	proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
+
+	if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) {
+		debug("No xauth program.");
+	} else {
+		if (display == NULL) {
+			debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
+			return;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
+		 * not match an authorization entry.  For this we
+		 * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
+		 * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
+		 *      is not perfect.
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
+			snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
+			    display + 10);
+			display = xdisplay;
+		}
+		if (trusted == 0) {
+			xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+			xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+			strlcpy(xauthdir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
+			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
+				do_unlink = 1;
+				snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
+				    xauthdir);
+				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
+				    " untrusted timeout 1200 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display);
+				debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+				if (system(cmd) == 0)
+					generated = 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
+		 * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
+		 * above.
+		 */
+		if (trusted || generated) {
+			snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+			    "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+			    xauth_path,
+			    generated ? "-f " : "" ,
+			    generated ? xauthfile : "",
+			    display);
+			debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+			f = popen(cmd, "r");
+			if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
+			    sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
+				got_data = 1;
+			if (f)
+				pclose(f);
+		} else
+			error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
+			    "xauth key data not generated");
+	}
+
+	if (do_unlink) {
+		unlink(xauthfile);
+		rmdir(xauthdir);
+	}
+	if (xauthdir)
+		xfree(xauthdir);
+	if (xauthfile)
+		xfree(xauthfile);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+	 * data.  The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+	 * response anyway, and substitute this data.  The X11
+	 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
+	 * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
+	 * for the local connection.
+	 */
+	if (!got_data) {
+		u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+
+		logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
+		    "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
+		strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+			if (i % 4 == 0)
+				rnd = arc4random();
+			snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
+			    rnd & 0xff);
+			rnd >>= 8;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when the interactive is entered.  This checks if there is
+ * an EOF coming on stdin.  We must check this explicitly, as select() does
+ * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void)
+{
+	int len;
+	char buf[1];
+
+	/*
+	 * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply
+	 * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the
+	 * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears
+	 * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for
+	 * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF.  This
+	 * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar.
+	 */
+	if (stdin_null_flag) {
+		/* Fake EOF on stdin. */
+		debug("Sending eof.");
+		stdin_eof = 1;
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+		packet_send();
+	} else {
+		enter_non_blocking();
+
+		/* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */
+		len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1);
+		if (len == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * EOF.  Record that we have seen it and send
+			 * EOF to server.
+			 */
+			debug("Sending eof.");
+			stdin_eof = 1;
+			packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+			packet_send();
+		} else if (len > 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Got data.  We must store the data in the buffer,
+			 * and also process it as an escape character if
+			 * appropriate.
+			 */
+			if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char1)
+				escape_pending1 = 1;
+			else
+				buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1);
+		}
+		leave_non_blocking();
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the
+ * connection.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void)
+{
+	u_int len;
+
+	/* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */
+	while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 &&
+	    packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+		len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
+		/* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+		if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+			len = packet_get_maxsize();
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
+		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len);
+		packet_send();
+		buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
+		/* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */
+		if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+			packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+			packet_send();
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
+ * the server if so.  The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
+ * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_check_window_change(void)
+{
+	struct winsize ws;
+
+	if (! received_window_change_signal)
+		return;
+	/** XXX race */
+	received_window_change_signal = 0;
+
+	debug2("client_check_window_change: changed");
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		channel_send_window_changes();
+	} else {
+		if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+			return;
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct global_confirm *gc;
+
+	if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (gc->cb != NULL)
+		gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx);
+	if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
+		bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
+		xfree(gc);
+	}
+
+	packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+}
+
+static void
+server_alive_check(void)
+{
+	if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
+		logit("Timeout, server not responding.");
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
+	packet_put_char(1);     /* boolean: want reply */
+	packet_send();
+	/* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
+	client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
+ * one of the file descriptors).
+ */
+static void
+client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
+    int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
+{
+	struct timeval tv, *tvp;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
+	channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, rekeying);
+
+	if (!compat20) {
+		/* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */
+		if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+		    buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+		    channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+			FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+		/*
+		 * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much
+		 * buffered data to send to the server.
+		 */
+		if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+			FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp);
+
+		/* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */
+		if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0)
+			FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp);
+		if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0)
+			FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp);
+	} else {
+		/* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */
+		if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() &&
+		    !packet_have_data_to_write()) {
+			/* clear mask since we did not call select() */
+			memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+			memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+			return;
+		} else {
+			FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */
+	if (packet_have_data_to_write())
+		FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
+
+	if (muxserver_sock != -1)
+		FD_SET(muxserver_sock, *readsetp);
+
+	/*
+	 * Wait for something to happen.  This will suspend the process until
+	 * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
+	 * event pending.
+	 */
+
+	if (options.server_alive_interval == 0 || !compat20)
+		tvp = NULL;
+	else {
+		tv.tv_sec = options.server_alive_interval;
+		tv.tv_usec = 0;
+		tvp = &tv;
+	}
+	ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		char buf[100];
+
+		/*
+		 * We have to clear the select masks, because we return.
+		 * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
+		 * set by the signal handlers.
+		 */
+		memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+		memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+
+		if (errno == EINTR)
+			return;
+		/* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno));
+		buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+		quit_pending = 1;
+	} else if (ret == 0)
+		server_alive_check();
+}
+
+static void
+client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr)
+{
+	/* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
+	if (buffer_len(bout) > 0)
+		atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout),
+		    buffer_len(bout));
+	if (buffer_len(berr) > 0)
+		atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr),
+		    buffer_len(berr));
+
+	leave_raw_mode();
+
+	/*
+	 * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets
+	 * written to swap.
+	 */
+	buffer_free(bin);
+	buffer_free(bout);
+	buffer_free(berr);
+
+	/* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
+	kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
+
+	/* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */
+	received_window_change_signal = 1;
+
+	/* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */
+	buffer_init(bin);
+	buffer_init(bout);
+	buffer_init(berr);
+
+	enter_raw_mode();
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
+{
+	int len, cont = 0;
+	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
+
+	/*
+	 * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
+	 * the packet subsystem.
+	 */
+	if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+		/* Read as much as possible. */
+		len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont);
+		if (len == 0 && cont == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Received EOF.  The remote host has closed the
+			 * connection.
+			 */
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+			    "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n",
+			    host);
+			buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+			quit_pending = 1;
+			return;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to
+		 * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available.
+		 */
+		if (len < 0 &&
+		    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+			len = 0;
+
+		if (len < 0) {
+			/*
+			 * An error has encountered.  Perhaps there is a
+			 * network problem.
+			 */
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+			    "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n",
+			    host, strerror(errno));
+			buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+			quit_pending = 1;
+			return;
+		}
+		packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
+{
+	struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx;
+	char errmsg[256];
+	int tochan;
+
+	/* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */
+	tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
+	    c->ctl_fd != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
+
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+		debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d",
+		    cr->request_type, c->self);
+	} else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+		if (tochan) {
+			snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
+			    "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type);
+		} else {
+			snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
+			    "%s request failed on channel %d",
+			    cr->request_type, c->self);
+		}
+		/* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */
+		if (cr->do_close && c->self == session_ident)
+			fatal("%s", errmsg);
+		/* If error occurred on mux client, append to their stderr */
+		if (tochan)
+			buffer_append(&c->extended, errmsg, strlen(errmsg));
+		else
+			error("%s", errmsg);
+		if (cr->do_close) {
+			chan_read_failed(c);
+			chan_write_failed(c);
+		}
+	}
+	xfree(cr);
+}
+
+static void
+client_abandon_status_confirm(Channel *c, void *ctx)
+{
+	xfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+client_expect_confirm(int id, const char *request, int do_close)
+{
+	struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xmalloc(sizeof(*cr));
+
+	cr->request_type = request;
+	cr->do_close = do_close;
+
+	channel_register_status_confirm(id, client_status_confirm,
+	    client_abandon_status_confirm, cr);
+}
+
+void
+client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
+{
+	struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc;
+
+	/* Coalesce identical callbacks */
+	last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms);
+	if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) {
+		if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX)
+			fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d",
+			    __func__, last_gc->ref_count);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	gc = xmalloc(sizeof(*gc));
+	gc->cb = cb;
+	gc->ctx = ctx;
+	gc->ref_count = 1;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
+}
+
+static void
+process_cmdline(void)
+{
+	void (*handler)(int);
+	char *s, *cmd, *cancel_host;
+	int delete = 0;
+	int local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
+	int cancel_port;
+	Forward fwd;
+
+	bzero(&fwd, sizeof(fwd));
+	fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL;
+
+	leave_raw_mode();
+	handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+	cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
+	if (s == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	while (isspace(*s))
+		s++;
+	if (*s == '-')
+		s++;	/* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
+	if (*s == '\0')
+		goto out;
+
+	if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
+		logit("Commands:");
+		logit("      -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
+		    "Request local forward");
+		logit("      -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
+		    "Request remote forward");
+		logit("      -D[bind_address:]port                  "
+		    "Request dynamic forward");
+		logit("      -KR[bind_address:]port                 "
+		    "Cancel remote forward");
+		if (!options.permit_local_command)
+			goto out;
+		logit("      !args                                  "
+		    "Execute local command");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) {
+		s++;
+		ssh_local_cmd(s);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (*s == 'K') {
+		delete = 1;
+		s++;
+	}
+	if (*s == 'L')
+		local = 1;
+	else if (*s == 'R')
+		remote = 1;
+	else if (*s == 'D')
+		dynamic = 1;
+	else {
+		logit("Invalid command.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((local || dynamic) && delete) {
+		logit("Not supported.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (remote && delete && !compat20) {
+		logit("Not supported for SSH protocol version 1.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while (isspace(*++s))
+		;
+
+	if (delete) {
+		cancel_port = 0;
+		cancel_host = hpdelim(&s);	/* may be NULL */
+		if (s != NULL) {
+			cancel_port = a2port(s);
+			cancel_host = cleanhostname(cancel_host);
+		} else {
+			cancel_port = a2port(cancel_host);
+			cancel_host = NULL;
+		}
+		if (cancel_port <= 0) {
+			logit("Bad forwarding close port");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		channel_request_rforward_cancel(cancel_host, cancel_port);
+	} else {
+		if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
+			logit("Bad forwarding specification.");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (local || dynamic) {
+			if (channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
+			    fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
+			    fwd.connect_port, options.gateway_ports) < 0) {
+				logit("Port forwarding failed.");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
+			    fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
+			    fwd.connect_port) < 0) {
+				logit("Port forwarding failed.");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		logit("Forwarding port.");
+	}
+
+out:
+	signal(SIGINT, handler);
+	enter_raw_mode();
+	if (cmd)
+		xfree(cmd);
+	if (fwd.listen_host != NULL)
+		xfree(fwd.listen_host);
+	if (fwd.connect_host != NULL)
+		xfree(fwd.connect_host);
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Process the characters one by one, call with c==NULL for proto1 case.
+ */
+static int
+process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr,
+    char *buf, int len)
+{
+	char string[1024];
+	pid_t pid;
+	int bytes = 0;
+	u_int i;
+	u_char ch;
+	char *s;
+	int *escape_pendingp, escape_char;
+	struct escape_filter_ctx *efc;
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		escape_pendingp = &escape_pending1;
+		escape_char = escape_char1;
+	} else {
+		if (c->filter_ctx == NULL)
+			return 0;
+		efc = (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx;
+		escape_pendingp = &efc->escape_pending;
+		escape_char = efc->escape_char;
+	}
+	
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
+		/* Get one character at a time. */
+		ch = buf[i];
+
+		if (*escape_pendingp) {
+			/* We have previously seen an escape character. */
+			/* Clear the flag now. */
+			*escape_pendingp = 0;
+
+			/* Process the escaped character. */
+			switch (ch) {
+			case '.':
+				/* Terminate the connection. */
+				snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n",
+				    escape_char);
+				buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+				if (c && c->ctl_fd != -1) {
+					chan_read_failed(c);
+					chan_write_failed(c);
+					return 0;
+				} else
+					quit_pending = 1;
+				return -1;
+
+			case 'Z' - 64:
+				/* XXX support this for mux clients */
+				if (c && c->ctl_fd != -1) {
+ noescape:
+					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+					    "%c%c escape not available to "
+					    "multiplexed sessions\r\n",
+					    escape_char, ch);
+					buffer_append(berr, string,
+					    strlen(string));
+					continue;
+				}
+				/* Suspend the program. Inform the user */
+				snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+				    "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char);
+				buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+				/* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
+				client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
+
+				/* We have been continued. */
+				continue;
+
+			case 'B':
+				if (compat20) {
+					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+					    "%cB\r\n", escape_char);
+					buffer_append(berr, string,
+					    strlen(string));
+					channel_request_start(session_ident,
+					    "break", 0);
+					packet_put_int(1000);
+					packet_send();
+				}
+				continue;
+
+			case 'R':
+				if (compat20) {
+					if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+						logit("Server does not "
+						    "support re-keying");
+					else
+						need_rekeying = 1;
+				}
+				continue;
+
+			case '&':
+				if (c && c->ctl_fd != -1)
+					goto noescape;
+				/*
+				 * Detach the program (continue to serve
+				 * connections, but put in background and no
+				 * more new connections).
+				 */
+				/* Restore tty modes. */
+				leave_raw_mode();
+
+				/* Stop listening for new connections. */
+				channel_stop_listening();
+
+				snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+				    "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char);
+				buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+				/* Fork into background. */
+				pid = fork();
+				if (pid < 0) {
+					error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (pid != 0) {	/* This is the parent. */
+					/* The parent just exits. */
+					exit(0);
+				}
+				/* The child continues serving connections. */
+				if (compat20) {
+					buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1);
+					/* fake EOF on stdin */
+					return -1;
+				} else if (!stdin_eof) {
+					/*
+					 * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not
+					 * always appear to be enough.  So we
+					 * try to send an EOF character first.
+					 */
+					packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
+					packet_put_string("\004", 1);
+					packet_send();
+					/* Close stdin. */
+					stdin_eof = 1;
+					if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) {
+						packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+						packet_send();
+					}
+				}
+				continue;
+
+			case '?':
+				if (c && c->ctl_fd != -1) {
+					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+"%c?\r\n\
+Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
+  %c.  - terminate session\r\n\
+  %cB  - send a BREAK to the remote system\r\n\
+  %cR  - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\
+  %c#  - list forwarded connections\r\n\
+  %c?  - this message\r\n\
+  %c%c  - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\
+(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n",
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char, escape_char);
+				} else {
+					snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+"%c?\r\n\
+Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
+  %c.  - terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)\r\n\
+  %cB  - send a BREAK to the remote system\r\n\
+  %cC  - open a command line\r\n\
+  %cR  - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\
+  %c^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\
+  %c#  - list forwarded connections\r\n\
+  %c&  - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\
+  %c?  - this message\r\n\
+  %c%c  - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\
+(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n",
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char, escape_char,
+					    escape_char);
+				}
+				buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+				continue;
+
+			case '#':
+				snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n",
+				    escape_char);
+				buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+				s = channel_open_message();
+				buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s));
+				xfree(s);
+				continue;
+
+			case 'C':
+				if (c && c->ctl_fd != -1)
+					goto noescape;
+				process_cmdline();
+				continue;
+
+			default:
+				if (ch != escape_char) {
+					buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char);
+					bytes++;
+				}
+				/* Escaped characters fall through here */
+				break;
+			}
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * The previous character was not an escape char.
+			 * Check if this is an escape.
+			 */
+			if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) {
+				/*
+				 * It is. Set the flag and continue to
+				 * next character.
+				 */
+				*escape_pendingp = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Normal character.  Record whether it was a newline,
+		 * and append it to the buffer.
+		 */
+		last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
+		buffer_put_char(bin, ch);
+		bytes++;
+	}
+	return bytes;
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_input(fd_set *readset)
+{
+	int len;
+	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
+
+	/* Read input from stdin. */
+	if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) {
+		/* Read as much as possible. */
+		len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (len < 0 &&
+		    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+			return;		/* we'll try again later */
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Received EOF or error.  They are treated
+			 * similarly, except that an error message is printed
+			 * if it was an error condition.
+			 */
+			if (len < 0) {
+				snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n",
+				    strerror(errno));
+				buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+			}
+			/* Mark that we have seen EOF. */
+			stdin_eof = 1;
+			/*
+			 * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is
+			 * data in the buffer.  If there is data in the
+			 * buffer, no message will be sent now.  Code
+			 * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer
+			 * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set.
+			 */
+			if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+				packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+				packet_send();
+			}
+		} else if (escape_char1 == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
+			/*
+			 * Normal successful read, and no escape character.
+			 * Just append the data to buffer.
+			 */
+			buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Normal, successful read.  But we have an escape
+			 * character and have to process the characters one
+			 * by one.
+			 */
+			if (process_escapes(NULL, &stdin_buffer,
+			    &stdout_buffer, &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1)
+				return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_output(fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	int len;
+	char buf[100];
+
+	/* Write buffered output to stdout. */
+	if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) {
+		/* Write as much data as possible. */
+		len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+				len = 0;
+			else {
+				/*
+				 * An error or EOF was encountered.  Put an
+				 * error message to stderr buffer.
+				 */
+				snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+				    "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno));
+				buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+				quit_pending = 1;
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Consume printed data from the buffer. */
+		buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+	}
+	/* Write buffered output to stderr. */
+	if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) {
+		/* Write as much data as possible. */
+		len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+				len = 0;
+			else {
+				/*
+				 * EOF or error, but can't even print
+				 * error message.
+				 */
+				quit_pending = 1;
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */
+		buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
+ * there are packets available.
+ *
+ * Any unknown packets received during the actual
+ * session cause the session to terminate.  This is
+ * intended to make debugging easier since no
+ * confirmations are sent.  Any compatible protocol
+ * extensions must be negotiated during the
+ * preparatory phase.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_process_buffered_input_packets(void)
+{
+	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending,
+	    compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL);
+}
+
+/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
+
+/* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */
+void *
+client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char)
+{
+	struct escape_filter_ctx *ret;
+
+	ret = xmalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+	ret->escape_pending = 0;
+	ret->escape_char = escape_char;
+	return (void *)ret;
+}
+
+/* Free the escape filter context on channel free */
+void
+client_filter_cleanup(int cid, void *ctx)
+{
+	xfree(ctx);
+}
+
+int
+client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+	if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
+		return 0;
+
+	return process_escapes(c, &c->input, &c->output, &c->extended,
+	    buf, len);
+}
+
+static void
+client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg)
+{
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+	session_closed = 1;
+	leave_raw_mode();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the interactive session with the server.  This is called after
+ * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
+ * remote host.  If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
+ * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
+ */
+
+int
+client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
+{
+	fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+	double start_time, total_time;
+	int max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0;
+	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
+	u_int nalloc = 0;
+	char buf[100];
+
+	debug("Entering interactive session.");
+
+	start_time = get_current_time();
+
+	/* Initialize variables. */
+	escape_pending1 = 0;
+	last_was_cr = 1;
+	exit_status = -1;
+	stdin_eof = 0;
+	buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
+	connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+	connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+	if (muxserver_sock != -1)
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, muxserver_sock);
+
+	if (!compat20) {
+		/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+		if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+			set_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+		if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
+			set_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
+		if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
+			set_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdin));
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdout));
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stderr));
+	}
+	quit_pending = 0;
+	escape_char1 = escape_char_arg;
+
+	/* Initialize buffers. */
+	buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
+	buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
+	buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
+
+	client_init_dispatch();
+
+	/*
+	 * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode)
+	 * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1)
+	 */
+	if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+		signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
+	if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+		signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
+	if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+		signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
+	if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+		signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
+	signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+
+	if (have_pty)
+		enter_raw_mode();
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
+		if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
+			channel_register_filter(session_ident,
+			    client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
+			    client_filter_cleanup,
+			    client_new_escape_filter_ctx(escape_char_arg));
+		if (session_ident != -1)
+			channel_register_cleanup(session_ident,
+			    client_channel_closed, 0);
+	} else {
+		/* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */
+		client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin();
+	}
+
+	/* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
+	while (!quit_pending) {
+
+		/* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
+		client_process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+		if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open())
+			break;
+
+		rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done);
+
+		if (rekeying) {
+			debug("rekeying in progress");
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer
+			 * them for sending to the server.
+			 */
+			if (!compat20)
+				client_make_packets_from_stdin_data();
+
+			/*
+			 * Make packets from buffered channel data, and
+			 * enqueue them for sending to the server.
+			 */
+			if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+				channel_output_poll();
+
+			/*
+			 * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
+			 * message about it to the server if so.
+			 */
+			client_check_window_change();
+
+			if (quit_pending)
+				break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
+		 * available on one of the descriptors).
+		 */
+		max_fd2 = max_fd;
+		client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset,
+		    &max_fd2, &nalloc, rekeying);
+
+		if (quit_pending)
+			break;
+
+		/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+		if (!rekeying) {
+			channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+			if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
+				debug("need rekeying");
+				xxx_kex->done = 0;
+				kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex);
+				need_rekeying = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Buffer input from the connection.  */
+		client_process_net_input(readset);
+
+		/* Accept control connections.  */
+		if (muxserver_sock != -1 &&FD_ISSET(muxserver_sock, readset)) {
+			if (muxserver_accept_control())
+				quit_pending = 1;
+		}
+
+		if (quit_pending)
+			break;
+
+		if (!compat20) {
+			/* Buffer data from stdin */
+			client_process_input(readset);
+			/*
+			 * Process output to stdout and stderr.  Output to
+			 * the connection is processed elsewhere (above).
+			 */
+			client_process_output(writeset);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the
+		 * sender.
+		 */
+		if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
+			packet_write_poll();
+	}
+	if (readset)
+		xfree(readset);
+	if (writeset)
+		xfree(writeset);
+
+	/* Terminate the session. */
+
+	/* Stop watching for window change. */
+	signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+		packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION);
+		packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user");
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+	}
+
+	channel_free_all();
+
+	if (have_pty)
+		leave_raw_mode();
+
+	/* restore blocking io */
+	if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+	if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
+		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
+	if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
+		unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
+
+	/*
+	 * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
+	 * exit status to be returned.  In that case, clear error code if the
+	 * connection was deliberately terminated at this end.
+	 */
+	if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) {
+		received_signal = 0;
+		exit_status = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (received_signal)
+		fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
+
+	/*
+	 * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
+	 * that the connection has been closed.
+	 */
+	if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+		    "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host);
+		buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+
+	/* Output any buffered data for stdout. */
+	while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
+		len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer.");
+			break;
+		}
+		buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+	}
+
+	/* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
+	while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
+		len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
+			break;
+		}
+		buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+	}
+
+	/* Clear and free any buffers. */
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
+	buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
+	buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
+
+	/* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
+	total_time = get_current_time() - start_time;
+	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
+	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
+	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
+	    obytes, ibytes, total_time);
+	if (total_time > 0)
+		verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f",
+		    obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time);
+	/* Return the exit status of the program. */
+	debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
+	return exit_status;
+}
+
+/*********/
+
+static void
+client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	u_int data_len;
+	char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len);
+	memset(data, 0, data_len);
+	xfree(data);
+}
+static void
+client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	u_int data_len;
+	char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len);
+	memset(data, 0, data_len);
+	xfree(data);
+}
+static void
+client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	exit_status = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+	/* Acknowledge the exit. */
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
+	packet_send();
+	/*
+	 * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are
+	 * exiting the loop.
+	 */
+	packet_write_wait();
+	/* Flag that we want to exit. */
+	quit_pending = 1;
+}
+static void
+client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	int remote_id, sock;
+
+	/* Read the remote channel number from the message. */
+	remote_id = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/*
+	 * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again
+	 * get forwarded).
+	 */
+	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+
+	/*
+	 * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to
+	 * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies,
+	 * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an
+	 * agent.
+	 */
+	if (sock >= 0) {
+		c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock,
+		    -1, 0, 0, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1);
+		c->remote_id = remote_id;
+		c->force_drain = 1;
+	}
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+		packet_put_int(remote_id);
+	} else {
+		/* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */
+		debug("Forwarding authentication connection.");
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+		packet_put_int(remote_id);
+		packet_put_int(c->self);
+	}
+	packet_send();
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *listen_address, *originator_address;
+	u_short listen_port, originator_port;
+
+	/* Get rest of the packet */
+	listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	listen_port = packet_get_int();
+	originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	originator_port = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("client_request_forwarded_tcpip: listen %s port %d, "
+	    "originator %s port %d", listen_address, listen_port,
+	    originator_address, originator_port);
+
+	c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_port,
+	    "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address);
+
+	xfree(originator_address);
+	xfree(listen_address);
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *originator;
+	u_short originator_port;
+	int sock;
+
+	if (!options.forward_x11) {
+		error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
+		error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
+		    "malicious server.");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
+		debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port");
+		originator_port = 0;
+	} else {
+		originator_port = packet_get_int();
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+	/* XXX check permission */
+	debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator,
+	    originator_port);
+	xfree(originator);
+	sock = x11_connect_display();
+	if (sock < 0)
+		return NULL;
+	c = channel_new("x11",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
+	c->force_drain = 1;
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	int sock;
+
+	if (!options.forward_agent) {
+		error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
+		error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
+		    "malicious server.");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+	if (sock < 0)
+		return NULL;
+	c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
+	    "authentication agent connection", 1);
+	c->force_drain = 1;
+	return c;
+}
+
+int
+client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int fd;
+
+	if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!compat20) {
+		error("Tunnel forwarding is not supported for protocol 1");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
+
+	/* Open local tunnel device */
+	if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode)) == -1) {
+		error("Tunnel device open failed.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+	c->datagram = 1;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+	if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
+		channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
+		    sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+	packet_put_cstring("tun@openssh.com");
+	packet_put_int(c->self);
+	packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+	packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+	packet_put_int(tun_mode);
+	packet_put_int(remote_tun);
+	packet_send();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
+static void
+client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *ctype;
+	int rchan;
+	u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
+
+	ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
+	rchan = packet_get_int();
+	rwindow = packet_get_int();
+	rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
+
+	debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
+	    ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
+
+	if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
+		c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan);
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
+		c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan);
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan);
+	}
+/* XXX duplicate : */
+	if (c != NULL) {
+		debug("confirm %s", ctype);
+		c->remote_id = rchan;
+		c->remote_window = rwindow;
+		c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
+		if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+			packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+			packet_put_int(c->self);
+			packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+			packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+			packet_send();
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("failure %s", ctype);
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+		packet_put_int(rchan);
+		packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
+		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+			packet_put_cstring("open failed");
+			packet_put_cstring("");
+		}
+		packet_send();
+	}
+	xfree(ctype);
+}
+static void
+client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	int exitval, id, reply, success = 0;
+	char *rtype;
+
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	reply = packet_get_char();
+
+	debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d",
+	    id, rtype, reply);
+
+	if (id == -1) {
+		error("client_input_channel_req: request for channel -1");
+	} else if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
+		error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: "
+		    "unknown channel", id);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		packet_check_eom();
+		chan_rcvd_eow(c);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
+		exitval = packet_get_int();
+		if (id == session_ident) {
+			success = 1;
+			exit_status = exitval;
+		} else if (c->ctl_fd == -1) {
+			error("client_input_channel_req: unexpected channel %d",
+			    session_ident);
+		} else {
+			atomicio(vwrite, c->ctl_fd, &exitval, sizeof(exitval));
+			success = 1;
+		}
+		packet_check_eom();
+	}
+	if (reply) {
+		packet_start(success ?
+		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+	xfree(rtype);
+}
+static void
+client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	char *rtype;
+	int want_reply;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	want_reply = packet_get_char();
+	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
+	    rtype, want_reply);
+	if (want_reply) {
+		packet_start(success ?
+		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+	}
+	xfree(rtype);
+}
+
+void
+client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
+    const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, Buffer *cmd, char **env)
+{
+	int len;
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+
+	debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
+		fatal("client_session2_setup: channel %d: unknown channel", id);
+
+	if (want_tty) {
+		struct winsize ws;
+
+		/* Store window size in the packet. */
+		if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+			memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+
+		channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 1);
+		client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", 0);
+		packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : "");
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+		if (tiop == NULL)
+			tiop = get_saved_tio();
+		tty_make_modes(-1, tiop);
+		packet_send();
+		/* XXX wait for reply */
+		c->client_tty = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */
+	if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) {
+		int i, j, matched;
+		char *name, *val;
+
+		debug("Sending environment.");
+		for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			/* Split */
+			name = xstrdup(env[i]);
+			if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
+				xfree(name);
+				continue;
+			}
+			*val++ = '\0';
+
+			matched = 0;
+			for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) {
+				if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) {
+					matched = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (!matched) {
+				debug3("Ignored env %s", name);
+				xfree(name);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val);
+			channel_request_start(id, "env", 0);
+			packet_put_cstring(name);
+			packet_put_cstring(val);
+			packet_send();
+			xfree(name);
+		}
+	}
+
+	len = buffer_len(cmd);
+	if (len > 0) {
+		if (len > 900)
+			len = 900;
+		if (want_subsystem) {
+			debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s",
+			    len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd));
+			channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", 1);
+			client_expect_confirm(id, "subsystem", 1);
+		} else {
+			debug("Sending command: %.*s",
+			    len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd));
+			channel_request_start(id, "exec", 1);
+			client_expect_confirm(id, "exec", 1);
+		}
+		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(cmd), buffer_len(cmd));
+		packet_send();
+	} else {
+		channel_request_start(id, "shell", 1);
+		client_expect_confirm(id, "shell", 1);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_20(void)
+{
+	dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
+
+	/* rekeying */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+
+	/* global request reply messages */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_13(void)
+{
+	dispatch_init(NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data);
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ?
+	    &client_input_agent_open : &deny_input_open);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ?
+	    &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open);
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_15(void)
+{
+	client_init_dispatch_13();
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose);
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch(void)
+{
+	if (compat20)
+		client_init_dispatch_20();
+	else if (compat13)
+		client_init_dispatch_13();
+	else
+		client_init_dispatch_15();
+}
+
+/* client specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	leave_raw_mode();
+	leave_non_blocking();
+	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+		unlink(options.control_path);
+	_exit(i);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bb874b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.22 2008/06/12 15:19:17 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
+int	 client_loop(int, int, int);
+void	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int,
+	    char **, char **);
+void	 client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
+	    int, Buffer *, char **);
+int	 client_request_tun_fwd(int, int, int);
+
+/* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */
+void	*client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int);
+void	 client_filter_cleanup(int, void *);
+int	 client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *, char *, int);
+
+/* Global request confirmation callbacks */
+typedef void global_confirm_cb(int, u_int32_t seq, void *);
+void	 client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *);
+
+/* Multiplexing protocol version */
+#define SSHMUX_VER			2
+
+/* Multiplexing control protocol flags */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN		1	/* Open new connection */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK	2	/* Check master is alive */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE	3	/* Ask master to exit */
+
+#define SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY			(1)	/* Request tty on open */
+#define SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS		(1<<1)	/* Subsystem request on open */
+#define SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD		(1<<2)	/* Request X11 forwarding */
+#define SSHMUX_FLAG_AGENT_FWD		(1<<3)	/* Request agent forwarding */
+
+void	muxserver_listen(void);
+int	muxserver_accept_control(void);
+void	muxclient(const char *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df3541d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.78 2008/09/11 14:22:37 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+int compat13 = 0;
+int compat20 = 0;
+int datafellows = 0;
+
+void
+enable_compat20(void)
+{
+	debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0");
+	compat20 = 1;
+}
+void
+enable_compat13(void)
+{
+	debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3");
+	compat13 = 1;
+}
+/* datafellows bug compatibility */
+void
+compat_datafellows(const char *version)
+{
+	int i;
+	static struct {
+		char	*pat;
+		int	bugs;
+	} check[] = {
+		{ "OpenSSH-2.0*,"
+		  "OpenSSH-2.1*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_2.1*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_2.2*",	SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER|
+					SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.3.0*",	SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|
+					SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.3.*",	SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
+					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+					SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.0p1*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_2.5.1p1*",
+					SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
+					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+					SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.0*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_2.5.1*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_2.5.2*",	SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.3*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+					SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.0*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
+		{ "OpenSSH_3.*",	SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR },
+		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+		{ "OpenSSH_4*",		0 },
+		{ "OpenSSH*",		SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
+		{ "*MindTerm*",		0 },
+		{ "2.1.0*",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+					SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+					SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
+					SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+		{ "2.1 *",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+					SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+					SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
+					SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+		{ "2.0.13*,"
+		  "2.0.14*,"
+		  "2.0.15*,"
+		  "2.0.16*,"
+		  "2.0.17*,"
+		  "2.0.18*,"
+		  "2.0.19*",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+					SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+					SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+					SSH_BUG_PKOK|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
+					SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+					SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+		{ "2.0.11*,"
+		  "2.0.12*",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+					SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+					SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+					SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
+					SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+					SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+		{ "2.0.*",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+					SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+					SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+					SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
+					SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+					SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|
+					SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+		{ "2.2.0*,"
+		  "2.3.0*",		SSH_BUG_HMAC|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+					SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+		{ "2.3.*",		SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
+					SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+		{ "2.4",		SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },	/* Van Dyke */
+		{ "2.*",		SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX|
+					SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR },
+		{ "3.0.*",		SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
+		{ "3.0 SecureCRT*",	SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
+		{ "1.7 SecureFX*",	SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
+		{ "1.2.18*,"
+		  "1.2.19*,"
+		  "1.2.20*,"
+		  "1.2.21*,"
+		  "1.2.22*",		SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+		{ "1.3.2*",		/* F-Secure */
+					SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+		{ "*SSH Compatible Server*",			/* Netscreen */
+					SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+		{ "*OSU_0*,"
+		  "OSU_1.0*,"
+		  "OSU_1.1*,"
+		  "OSU_1.2*,"
+		  "OSU_1.3*,"
+		  "OSU_1.4*,"
+		  "OSU_1.5alpha1*,"
+		  "OSU_1.5alpha2*,"
+		  "OSU_1.5alpha3*",	SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+		{ "*SSH_Version_Mapper*",
+					SSH_BUG_SCANNER },
+		{ "Probe-*",
+					SSH_BUG_PROBE },
+		{ NULL,			0 }
+	};
+
+	/* process table, return first match */
+	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat,
+		    strlen(check[i].pat), 0) == 1) {
+			debug("match: %s pat %s", version, check[i].pat);
+			datafellows = check[i].bugs;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	debug("no match: %s", version);
+}
+
+#define	SEP	","
+int
+proto_spec(const char *spec)
+{
+	char *s, *p, *q;
+	int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+
+	if (spec == NULL)
+		return ret;
+	q = s = xstrdup(spec);
+	for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) {
+		switch (atoi(p)) {
+		case 1:
+			if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+				ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED;
+			ret |= SSH_PROTO_1;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			ret |= SSH_PROTO_2;
+			break;
+		default:
+			logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	xfree(s);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+char *
+compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	char *orig_prop, *fix_ciphers;
+	char *cp, *tmp;
+
+	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
+		return(cipher_prop);
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(cipher_prop);
+	while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
+		if (strncmp(cp, "aes", 3) != 0) {
+			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+			buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp));
+		}
+	}
+	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+	fix_ciphers = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	xfree(orig_prop);
+	debug2("Original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
+	debug2("Compat cipher proposal: %s", fix_ciphers);
+	if (!*fix_ciphers)
+		fatal("No available ciphers found.");
+
+	return(fix_ciphers);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.h b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16cf282
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.42 2008/09/11 14:22:37 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef COMPAT_H
+#define COMPAT_H
+
+#define	SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN	0x00
+#define	SSH_PROTO_1		0x01
+#define	SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED	0x02
+#define	SSH_PROTO_2		0x04
+
+#define SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB		0x00000001
+#define SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE	0x00000002
+#define SSH_BUG_HMAC		0x00000004
+#define SSH_BUG_X11FWD		0x00000008
+#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+#define SSH_BUG_PKAUTH		0x00000020
+#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+#define SSH_BUG_BANNER		0x00000080
+#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG	0x00000100
+#define SSH_BUG_PKOK		0x00000200
+#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD	0x00000400
+#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER		0x00000800
+#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES	0x00001000
+#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5	0x00002000
+#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX		0x00004000
+#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY		0x00008000
+#define SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE	0x00010000
+#define SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE	0x00020000
+#define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY	0x00040000
+#define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN	0x00100000
+#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF		0x00200000
+#define SSH_BUG_PROBE		0x00400000
+#define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX	0x00800000
+#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR	0x01000000
+#define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR	0x02000000
+#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH		0x04000000
+
+void     enable_compat13(void);
+void     enable_compat20(void);
+void     compat_datafellows(const char *);
+int	 proto_spec(const char *);
+char	*compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
+
+extern int compat13;
+extern int compat20;
+extern int datafellows;
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compress.c b/crypto/openssh/compress.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c058d22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compress.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compress.c,v 1.25 2006/08/06 01:13:32 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Interface to packet compression for ssh.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "compress.h"
+
+z_stream incoming_stream;
+z_stream outgoing_stream;
+static int compress_init_send_called = 0;
+static int compress_init_recv_called = 0;
+static int inflate_failed = 0;
+static int deflate_failed = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Initializes compression; level is compression level from 1 to 9
+ * (as in gzip).
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_compress_init_send(int level)
+{
+	if (compress_init_send_called == 1)
+		deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream);
+	compress_init_send_called = 1;
+	debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
+	if (level < 1 || level > 9)
+		fatal("Bad compression level %d.", level);
+	deflateInit(&outgoing_stream, level);
+}
+void
+buffer_compress_init_recv(void)
+{
+	if (compress_init_recv_called == 1)
+		inflateEnd(&incoming_stream);
+	compress_init_recv_called = 1;
+	inflateInit(&incoming_stream);
+}
+
+/* Frees any data structures allocated for compression. */
+
+void
+buffer_compress_uninit(void)
+{
+	debug("compress outgoing: raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
+	    (unsigned long long)outgoing_stream.total_in,
+	    (unsigned long long)outgoing_stream.total_out,
+	    outgoing_stream.total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
+	    (double) outgoing_stream.total_out / outgoing_stream.total_in);
+	debug("compress incoming: raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
+	    (unsigned long long)incoming_stream.total_out,
+	    (unsigned long long)incoming_stream.total_in,
+	    incoming_stream.total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
+	    (double) incoming_stream.total_in / incoming_stream.total_out);
+	if (compress_init_recv_called == 1 && inflate_failed == 0)
+		inflateEnd(&incoming_stream);
+	if (compress_init_send_called == 1 && deflate_failed == 0)
+		deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer.  All packets
+ * compressed using this function will form a single compressed data stream;
+ * however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that each
+ * output_buffer can be decompressed independently (but in the appropriate
+ * order since they together form a single compression stream) by the
+ * receiver.  This appends the compressed data to the output buffer.
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_compress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer)
+{
+	u_char buf[4096];
+	int status;
+
+	/* This case is not handled below. */
+	if (buffer_len(input_buffer) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	/* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
+	outgoing_stream.next_in = buffer_ptr(input_buffer);
+	outgoing_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer);
+
+	/* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
+	do {
+		/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
+		outgoing_stream.next_out = buf;
+		outgoing_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
+
+		/* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
+		status = deflate(&outgoing_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
+		switch (status) {
+		case Z_OK:
+			/* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
+			buffer_append(output_buffer, buf,
+			    sizeof(buf) - outgoing_stream.avail_out);
+			break;
+		default:
+			deflate_failed = 1;
+			fatal("buffer_compress: deflate returned %d", status);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	} while (outgoing_stream.avail_out == 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Uncompresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer.  All packets
+ * uncompressed using this function will form a single compressed data
+ * stream; however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that
+ * each output_buffer.  This must be called for the same size units that the
+ * buffer_compress was called, and in the same order that buffers compressed
+ * with that.  This appends the uncompressed data to the output buffer.
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_uncompress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer)
+{
+	u_char buf[4096];
+	int status;
+
+	incoming_stream.next_in = buffer_ptr(input_buffer);
+	incoming_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
+		incoming_stream.next_out = buf;
+		incoming_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
+
+		status = inflate(&incoming_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
+		switch (status) {
+		case Z_OK:
+			buffer_append(output_buffer, buf,
+			    sizeof(buf) - incoming_stream.avail_out);
+			break;
+		case Z_BUF_ERROR:
+			/*
+			 * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
+			 * inflate() until we get an error.  This appears to
+			 * be the error that we get.
+			 */
+			return;
+		default:
+			inflate_failed = 1;
+			fatal("buffer_uncompress: inflate returned %d", status);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compress.h b/crypto/openssh/compress.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..418d6fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compress.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compress.h,v 1.12 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Interface to packet compression for ssh.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef COMPRESS_H
+#define COMPRESS_H
+
+void	 buffer_compress_init_send(int);
+void	 buffer_compress_init_recv(void);
+void     buffer_compress_uninit(void);
+void     buffer_compress(Buffer *, Buffer *);
+void     buffer_uncompress(Buffer *, Buffer *);
+
+#endif				/* COMPRESS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.guess b/crypto/openssh/config.guess
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c7607c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.guess
@@ -0,0 +1,1526 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Attempt to guess a canonical system name.
+#   Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
+#   2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008
+#   Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+timestamp='2008-04-14'
+
+# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+# General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street - Fifth Floor, Boston, MA
+# 02110-1301, USA.
+#
+# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
+# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
+# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
+# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program.
+
+
+# Originally written by Per Bothner <per@bothner.com>.
+# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>.  Submit a context
+# diff and a properly formatted ChangeLog entry.
+#
+# This script attempts to guess a canonical system name similar to
+# config.sub.  If it succeeds, it prints the system name on stdout, and
+# exits with 0.  Otherwise, it exits with 1.
+#
+# The plan is that this can be called by configure scripts if you
+# don't specify an explicit build system type.
+
+me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
+
+usage="\
+Usage: $0 [OPTION]
+
+Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on.
+
+Operation modes:
+  -h, --help         print this help, then exit
+  -t, --time-stamp   print date of last modification, then exit
+  -v, --version      print version number, then exit
+
+Report bugs and patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>."
+
+version="\
+GNU config.guess ($timestamp)
+
+Originally written by Per Bothner.
+Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
+2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
+
+help="
+Try \`$me --help' for more information."
+
+# Parse command line
+while test $# -gt 0 ; do
+  case $1 in
+    --time-stamp | --time* | -t )
+       echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;;
+    --version | -v )
+       echo "$version" ; exit ;;
+    --help | --h* | -h )
+       echo "$usage"; exit ;;
+    -- )     # Stop option processing
+       shift; break ;;
+    - )	# Use stdin as input.
+       break ;;
+    -* )
+       echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2
+       exit 1 ;;
+    * )
+       break ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+if test $# != 0; then
+  echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+trap 'exit 1' 1 2 15
+
+# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a
+# compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires
+# temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a
+# headache to deal with in a portable fashion.
+
+# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still
+# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated.
+
+# Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team.
+
+set_cc_for_build='
+trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ;
+trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ;
+: ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ;
+ { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } ||
+ { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } ||
+ { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } ||
+ { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ;
+dummy=$tmp/dummy ;
+tmpfiles="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ;
+case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in
+ ,,)    echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ;
+	for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do
+	  if ($c -c -o $dummy.o $dummy.c) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	     CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ;
+	  fi ;
+	done ;
+	if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then
+	  CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ;
+	fi
+	;;
+ ,,*)   CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;;
+ ,*,*)  CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;;
+esac ; set_cc_for_build= ;'
+
+# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe.
+# (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24)
+if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH
+fi
+
+UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown
+UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown
+UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null`  || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown
+UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown
+
+# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive.
+
+case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in
+    *:NetBSD:*:*)
+	# NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or
+	# more of the tupples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*,
+	# *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*.  For targets that recently
+	# switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old
+	# object file format.  This provides both forward
+	# compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the
+	# object file format.
+	#
+	# Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor
+	# portion of the name.  We always set it to "unknown".
+	sysctl="sysctl -n hw.machine_arch"
+	UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \
+	    /usr/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)`
+	case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
+	    armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;;
+	    arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;;
+	    sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;;
+	    sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;;
+	    sh5el) machine=sh5le-unknown ;;
+	    *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown ;;
+	esac
+	# The Operating System including object format, if it has switched
+	# to ELF recently, or will in the future.
+	case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
+	    arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax)
+		eval $set_cc_for_build
+		if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+			| grep __ELF__ >/dev/null
+		then
+		    # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout).
+		    # Return netbsd for either.  FIX?
+		    os=netbsd
+		else
+		    os=netbsdelf
+		fi
+		;;
+	    *)
+	        os=netbsd
+		;;
+	esac
+	# The OS release
+	# Debian GNU/NetBSD machines have a different userland, and
+	# thus, need a distinct triplet. However, they do not need
+	# kernel version information, so it can be replaced with a
+	# suitable tag, in the style of linux-gnu.
+	case "${UNAME_VERSION}" in
+	    Debian*)
+		release='-gnu'
+		;;
+	    *)
+		release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'`
+		;;
+	esac
+	# Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM:
+	# contains redundant information, the shorter form:
+	# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used.
+	echo "${machine}-${os}${release}"
+	exit ;;
+    *:OpenBSD:*:*)
+	UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/OpenBSD.//'`
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:ekkoBSD:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-ekkobsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:SolidBSD:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-solidbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    macppc:MirBSD:*:*)
+	echo powerpc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:MirBSD:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    alpha:OSF1:*:*)
+	case $UNAME_RELEASE in
+	*4.0)
+		UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'`
+		;;
+	*5.*)
+	        UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $4}'`
+		;;
+	esac
+	# According to Compaq, /usr/sbin/psrinfo has been available on
+	# OSF/1 and Tru64 systems produced since 1995.  I hope that
+	# covers most systems running today.  This code pipes the CPU
+	# types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0.
+	ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^  The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1`
+	case "$ALPHA_CPU_TYPE" in
+	    "EV4 (21064)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
+	    "EV4.5 (21064)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
+	    "LCA4 (21066/21068)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
+	    "EV5 (21164)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" ;;
+	    "EV5.6 (21164A)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" ;;
+	    "EV5.6 (21164PC)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" ;;
+	    "EV5.7 (21164PC)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca57" ;;
+	    "EV6 (21264)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" ;;
+	    "EV6.7 (21264A)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67" ;;
+	    "EV6.8CB (21264C)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
+	    "EV6.8AL (21264B)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
+	    "EV6.8CX (21264D)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;;
+	    "EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev69" ;;
+	    "EV7 (21364)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev7" ;;
+	    "EV7.9 (21364A)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev79" ;;
+	esac
+	# A Pn.n version is a patched version.
+	# A Vn.n version is a released version.
+	# A Tn.n version is a released field test version.
+	# A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel.
+	# 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r.
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'`
+	exit ;;
+    Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*)
+	# How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
+	# Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead
+	# of the specific Alpha model?
+	echo alpha-pc-interix
+	exit ;;
+    21064:Windows_NT:50:3)
+	echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5
+	exit ;;
+    Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*)
+	echo m68k-unknown-sysv4
+	exit ;;
+    *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos
+	exit ;;
+    *:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-morphos
+	exit ;;
+    *:OS/390:*:*)
+	echo i370-ibm-openedition
+	exit ;;
+    *:z/VM:*:*)
+	echo s390-ibm-zvmoe
+	exit ;;
+    *:OS400:*:*)
+        echo powerpc-ibm-os400
+	exit ;;
+    arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*)
+	echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    arm:riscos:*:*|arm:RISCOS:*:*)
+	echo arm-unknown-riscos
+	exit ;;
+    SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*)
+	echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp
+	exit ;;
+    Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*)
+	# akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE.
+	if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then
+		echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3
+	else
+		echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    NILE*:*:*:dcosx)
+	echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4
+	exit ;;
+    DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*)
+	echo sparc-icl-nx6
+	exit ;;
+    DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7* | DRS?6000:isis:4.2*:7*)
+	case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in
+	    sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7; exit ;;
+	esac ;;
+    sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*)
+	echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	exit ;;
+    sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*)
+	echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	exit ;;
+    i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*)
+	echo i386-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	exit ;;
+    sun4*:SunOS:6*:*)
+	# According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize
+	# SunOS6.  Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but
+	# it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4.
+	echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	exit ;;
+    sun4*:SunOS:*:*)
+	case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in
+	    Series*|S4*)
+		UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v`
+		;;
+	esac
+	# Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'.
+	echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'`
+	exit ;;
+    sun3*:SunOS:*:*)
+	echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    sun*:*:4.2BSD:*)
+	UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null`
+	test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3
+	case "`/bin/arch`" in
+	    sun3)
+		echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+		;;
+	    sun4)
+		echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+		;;
+	esac
+	exit ;;
+    aushp:SunOS:*:*)
+	echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing.  The machine name
+    # can be virtually everything (everything which is not
+    # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor
+    # > m68000).  The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT"
+    # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint").  Finally
+    # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not
+    # MiNT.  But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should
+    # be no problem.
+    atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
+        echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
+	echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+        exit ;;
+    *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*)
+        echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*)
+        echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+        exit ;;
+    hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*)
+        echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+        exit ;;
+    *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*)
+        echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+        exit ;;
+    m68k:machten:*:*)
+	echo m68k-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    powerpc:machten:*:*)
+	echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    RISC*:Mach:*:*)
+	echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3
+	exit ;;
+    RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*)
+	echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*)
+	echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*)
+	echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos)
+	eval $set_cc_for_build
+	sed 's/^	//' << EOF >$dummy.c
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+#include <stdio.h>  /* for printf() prototype */
+	int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
+#else
+	int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; {
+#endif
+	#if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB)
+	#if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV)
+	  printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+	#endif
+	#if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4)
+	  printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+	#endif
+	#if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD)
+	  printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+	#endif
+	#endif
+	  exit (-1);
+	}
+EOF
+	$CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c &&
+	  dummyarg=`echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` &&
+	  SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy $dummyarg` &&
+	    { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+	echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
+	echo powerpc-motorola-powermax
+	exit ;;
+    Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*)
+	echo powerpc-harris-powermax
+	exit ;;
+    Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
+	echo powerpc-harris-powermax
+	exit ;;
+    Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*)
+	echo powerpc-harris-powerunix
+	exit ;;
+    m88k:CX/UX:7*:*)
+	echo m88k-harris-cxux7
+	exit ;;
+    m88k:*:4*:R4*)
+	echo m88k-motorola-sysv4
+	exit ;;
+    m88k:*:3*:R3*)
+	echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
+	exit ;;
+    AViiON:dgux:*:*)
+        # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures
+        UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
+	if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ]
+	then
+	    if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \
+	       [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ]
+	    then
+		echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	    else
+		echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	    fi
+	else
+	    echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	fi
+ 	exit ;;
+    M88*:DolphinOS:*:*)	# DolphinOS (SVR3)
+	echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3
+	exit ;;
+    M88*:*:R3*:*)
+	# Delta 88k system running SVR3
+	echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
+	exit ;;
+    XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3)
+	echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3
+	exit ;;
+    Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD)
+	echo m68k-tektronix-bsd
+	exit ;;
+    *:IRIX*:*:*)
+	echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'`
+	exit ;;
+    ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2)   # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX.
+	echo romp-ibm-aix     # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id
+	exit ;;               # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX '
+    i*86:AIX:*:*)
+	echo i386-ibm-aix
+	exit ;;
+    ia64:AIX:*:*)
+	if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
+		IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
+	else
+		IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	fi
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
+	exit ;;
+    *:AIX:2:3)
+	if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		eval $set_cc_for_build
+		sed 's/^		//' << EOF >$dummy.c
+		#include <sys/systemcfg.h>
+
+		main()
+			{
+			if (!__power_pc())
+				exit(1);
+			puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5");
+			exit(0);
+			}
+EOF
+		if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy`
+		then
+			echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"
+		else
+			echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5
+		fi
+	elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4
+	else
+		echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    *:AIX:*:[456])
+	IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'`
+	if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		IBM_ARCH=rs6000
+	else
+		IBM_ARCH=powerpc
+	fi
+	if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
+		IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
+	else
+		IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	fi
+	echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
+	exit ;;
+    *:AIX:*:*)
+	echo rs6000-ibm-aix
+	exit ;;
+    ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*)
+	echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4
+	exit ;;
+    ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*)            # covers RT/PC BSD and
+	echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE}   # 4.3 with uname added to
+	exit ;;                             # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3
+    *:BOSX:*:*)
+	echo rs6000-bull-bosx
+	exit ;;
+    DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*)
+	echo m68k-bull-sysv3
+	exit ;;
+    9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*)
+	echo m68k-hp-bsd
+	exit ;;
+    hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*)
+	echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4
+	exit ;;
+    9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*)
+	HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+	case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+	    9000/31? )            HP_ARCH=m68000 ;;
+	    9000/[34]?? )         HP_ARCH=m68k ;;
+	    9000/[678][0-9][0-9])
+		if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then
+		    sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null`
+                    sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null`
+                    case "${sc_cpu_version}" in
+                      523) HP_ARCH="hppa1.0" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0
+                      528) HP_ARCH="hppa1.1" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1
+                      532)                      # CPU_PA_RISC2_0
+                        case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in
+                          32) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0n" ;;
+                          64) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" ;;
+			  '') HP_ARCH="hppa2.0" ;;   # HP-UX 10.20
+                        esac ;;
+                    esac
+		fi
+		if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then
+		    eval $set_cc_for_build
+		    sed 's/^              //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+
+              #define _HPUX_SOURCE
+              #include <stdlib.h>
+              #include <unistd.h>
+
+              int main ()
+              {
+              #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
+                  long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS);
+              #endif
+                  long cpu  = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
+
+                  switch (cpu)
+              	{
+              	case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
+              	case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break;
+              	case CPU_PA_RISC2_0:
+              #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
+              	    switch (bits)
+              		{
+              		case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break;
+              		case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break;
+              		default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
+              		} break;
+              #else  /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */
+              	    puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
+              #endif
+              	default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
+              	}
+                  exit (0);
+              }
+EOF
+		    (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy`
+		    test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa
+		fi ;;
+	esac
+	if [ ${HP_ARCH} = "hppa2.0w" ]
+	then
+	    eval $set_cc_for_build
+
+	    # hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating
+	    # 32-bit code.  hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler
+	    # generating 64-bit code.  GNU and HP use different nomenclature:
+	    #
+	    # $ CC_FOR_BUILD=cc ./config.guess
+	    # => hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.23
+	    # $ CC_FOR_BUILD="cc +DA2.0w" ./config.guess
+	    # => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23
+
+	    if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) |
+		grep __LP64__ >/dev/null
+	    then
+		HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w"
+	    else
+		HP_ARCH="hppa64"
+	    fi
+	fi
+	echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
+	exit ;;
+    ia64:HP-UX:*:*)
+	HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+	echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
+	exit ;;
+    3050*:HI-UX:*:*)
+	eval $set_cc_for_build
+	sed 's/^	//' << EOF >$dummy.c
+	#include <unistd.h>
+	int
+	main ()
+	{
+	  long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
+	  /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns
+	     true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0.  CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct
+	     results, however.  */
+	  if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu))
+	    {
+	      switch (cpu)
+		{
+		  case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+		  case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+		  case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+		  default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+		}
+	    }
+	  else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu))
+	    puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
+	  else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
+	  exit (0);
+	}
+EOF
+	$CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` &&
+		{ echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+	echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2
+	exit ;;
+    9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* )
+	echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd
+	exit ;;
+    9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*)
+	echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd
+	exit ;;
+    *9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*)
+	echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix
+	exit ;;
+    hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* )
+	echo hppa1.1-hp-osf
+	exit ;;
+    hp8??:OSF1:*:*)
+	echo hppa1.0-hp-osf
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:OSF1:*:*)
+	if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then
+	    echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk
+	else
+	    echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    parisc*:Lites*:*:*)
+	echo hppa1.1-hp-lites
+	exit ;;
+    C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*)
+	echo c1-convex-bsd
+        exit ;;
+    C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*)
+	if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
+	then echo c32-convex-bsd
+	else echo c2-convex-bsd
+	fi
+        exit ;;
+    C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*)
+	echo c34-convex-bsd
+        exit ;;
+    C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*)
+	echo c38-convex-bsd
+        exit ;;
+    C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*)
+	echo c4-convex-bsd
+        exit ;;
+    CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*)
+	echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+	exit ;;
+    CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \
+	| sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \
+	      -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \
+	      -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+	exit ;;
+    CRAY*TS:*:*:*)
+	echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+	exit ;;
+    CRAY*T3E:*:*:*)
+	echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+	exit ;;
+    CRAY*SV1:*:*:*)
+	echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+	exit ;;
+    *:UNICOS/mp:*:*)
+	echo craynv-cray-unicosmp${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+	exit ;;
+    F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
+	FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'`
+        FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'`
+        FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+        echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
+        exit ;;
+    5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
+        FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'`
+        FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+        echo "sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*)
+	echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:BSD/OS:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:FreeBSD:*:*)
+	case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in
+	    pc98)
+		echo i386-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+	    amd64)
+		echo x86_64-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+	    *)
+		echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+	esac
+	exit ;;
+    i*:CYGWIN*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin
+	exit ;;
+    *:MINGW*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32
+	exit ;;
+    i*:windows32*:*)
+    	# uname -m includes "-pc" on this system.
+    	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-mingw32
+	exit ;;
+    i*:PW*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32
+	exit ;;
+    *:Interix*:[3456]*)
+    	case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in
+	    x86)
+		echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+		exit ;;
+	    EM64T | authenticamd)
+		echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+		exit ;;
+	    IA64)
+		echo ia64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+		exit ;;
+	esac ;;
+    [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*)
+	echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks
+	exit ;;
+    i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*)
+	# How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
+	# It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we
+	# UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386?
+	echo i586-pc-interix
+	exit ;;
+    i*:UWIN*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin
+	exit ;;
+    amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*)
+	echo x86_64-unknown-cygwin
+	exit ;;
+    p*:CYGWIN*:*)
+	echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin
+	exit ;;
+    prep*:SunOS:5.*:*)
+	echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	exit ;;
+    *:GNU:*:*)
+	# the GNU system
+	echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-gnu`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'`
+	exit ;;
+    *:GNU/*:*:*)
+	# other systems with GNU libc and userland
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-`echo ${UNAME_SYSTEM} | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]'``echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:Minix:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix
+	exit ;;
+    arm*:Linux:*:*)
+	eval $set_cc_for_build
+	if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+	    | grep -q __ARM_EABI__
+	then
+	    echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	else
+	    echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnueabi
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    avr32*:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    cris:Linux:*:*)
+	echo cris-axis-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    crisv32:Linux:*:*)
+	echo crisv32-axis-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    frv:Linux:*:*)
+    	echo frv-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    ia64:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    m32r*:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    m68*:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    mips:Linux:*:*)
+	eval $set_cc_for_build
+	sed 's/^	//' << EOF >$dummy.c
+	#undef CPU
+	#undef mips
+	#undef mipsel
+	#if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL)
+	CPU=mipsel
+	#else
+	#if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB)
+	CPU=mips
+	#else
+	CPU=
+	#endif
+	#endif
+EOF
+	eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | sed -n '
+	    /^CPU/{
+		s: ::g
+		p
+	    }'`"
+	test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu"; exit; }
+	;;
+    mips64:Linux:*:*)
+	eval $set_cc_for_build
+	sed 's/^	//' << EOF >$dummy.c
+	#undef CPU
+	#undef mips64
+	#undef mips64el
+	#if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL)
+	CPU=mips64el
+	#else
+	#if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB)
+	CPU=mips64
+	#else
+	CPU=
+	#endif
+	#endif
+EOF
+	eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | sed -n '
+	    /^CPU/{
+		s: ::g
+		p
+	    }'`"
+	test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu"; exit; }
+	;;
+    or32:Linux:*:*)
+	echo or32-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    ppc:Linux:*:*)
+	echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    ppc64:Linux:*:*)
+	echo powerpc64-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    alpha:Linux:*:*)
+	case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' < /proc/cpuinfo` in
+	  EV5)   UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;;
+	  EV56)  UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;;
+	  PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
+	  PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
+	  EV6)   UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;;
+	  EV67)  UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;;
+	  EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
+        esac
+	objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep ld.so.1 >/dev/null
+	if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC="libc1" ; else LIBC="" ; fi
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC}
+	exit ;;
+    parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*)
+	# Look for CPU level
+	case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in
+	  PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+	  PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+	  *)    echo hppa-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+	esac
+	exit ;;
+    parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*)
+	echo hppa64-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux
+	exit ;;
+    sh64*:Linux:*:*)
+    	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    sh*:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    vax:Linux:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    x86_64:Linux:*:*)
+	echo x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    xtensa*:Linux:*:*)
+    	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:Linux:*:*)
+	# The BFD linker knows what the default object file format is, so
+	# first see if it will tell us. cd to the root directory to prevent
+	# problems with other programs or directories called `ld' in the path.
+	# Set LC_ALL=C to ensure ld outputs messages in English.
+	ld_supported_targets=`cd /; LC_ALL=C ld --help 2>&1 \
+			 | sed -ne '/supported targets:/!d
+				    s/[ 	][ 	]*/ /g
+				    s/.*supported targets: *//
+				    s/ .*//
+				    p'`
+        case "$ld_supported_targets" in
+	  elf32-i386)
+		TENTATIVE="${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnu"
+		;;
+	  a.out-i386-linux)
+		echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuaout"
+		exit ;;
+	  "")
+		# Either a pre-BFD a.out linker (linux-gnuoldld) or
+		# one that does not give us useful --help.
+		echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuoldld"
+		exit ;;
+	esac
+	# Determine whether the default compiler is a.out or elf
+	eval $set_cc_for_build
+	sed 's/^	//' << EOF >$dummy.c
+	#include <features.h>
+	#ifdef __ELF__
+	# ifdef __GLIBC__
+	#  if __GLIBC__ >= 2
+	LIBC=gnu
+	#  else
+	LIBC=gnulibc1
+	#  endif
+	# else
+	LIBC=gnulibc1
+	# endif
+	#else
+	#if defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) || defined(__PGI) || defined(__SUNPRO_C) || defined(__SUNPRO_CC)
+	LIBC=gnu
+	#else
+	LIBC=gnuaout
+	#endif
+	#endif
+	#ifdef __dietlibc__
+	LIBC=dietlibc
+	#endif
+EOF
+	eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | sed -n '
+	    /^LIBC/{
+		s: ::g
+		p
+	    }'`"
+	test x"${LIBC}" != x && {
+		echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}"
+		exit
+	}
+	test x"${TENTATIVE}" != x && { echo "${TENTATIVE}"; exit; }
+	;;
+    i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*)
+	# ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there.
+	# earlier versions are messed up and put the nodename in both
+	# sysname and nodename.
+	echo i386-sequent-sysv4
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*)
+        # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version
+        # number series starting with 2...
+        # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this,
+	# I just have to hope.  -- rms.
+        # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it.
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION}
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:OS/2:*:*)
+	# If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility
+	# is probably installed.
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:XTS-300:*:STOP)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-stop
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:atheos:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-atheos
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:syllable:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-syllable
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.0*:*)
+	echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:*DOS:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*)
+	UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'`
+	if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
+		echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL}
+	else
+		echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL}
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:*:5:[678]*)
+    	# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX and OpenServer 6.
+	case `/bin/uname -X | grep "^Machine"` in
+	    *486*)	     UNAME_MACHINE=i486 ;;
+	    *Pentium)	     UNAME_MACHINE=i586 ;;
+	    *Pent*|*Celeron) UNAME_MACHINE=i686 ;;
+	esac
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION}
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:*:3.2:*)
+	if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then
+		UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' </usr/options/cb.name`
+		echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-isc$UNAME_REL
+	elif /bin/uname -X 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
+		UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')`
+		(/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486
+		(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \
+			&& UNAME_MACHINE=i586
+		(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \
+			&& UNAME_MACHINE=i686
+		(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \
+			&& UNAME_MACHINE=i686
+		echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL
+	else
+		echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    pc:*:*:*)
+	# Left here for compatibility:
+        # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about
+        # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i386.
+	echo i386-pc-msdosdjgpp
+        exit ;;
+    Intel:Mach:3*:*)
+	echo i386-pc-mach3
+	exit ;;
+    paragon:*:*:*)
+	echo i860-intel-osf1
+	exit ;;
+    i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4
+	if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	  echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4
+	else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered.
+	  echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}  # Unknown i860-SVR4
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*)
+	# "miniframe"
+	echo m68010-convergent-sysv
+	exit ;;
+    mc68k:UNIX:SYSTEM5:3.51m)
+	echo m68k-convergent-sysv
+	exit ;;
+    M680?0:D-NIX:5.3:*)
+	echo m68k-diab-dnix
+	exit ;;
+    M68*:*:R3V[5678]*:*)
+	test -r /sysV68 && { echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv'; exit; } ;;
+    3[345]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0 | SDS2:*:4.0:3.0 | SHG2:*:4.0:3.0 | S7501*:*:4.0:3.0)
+	OS_REL=''
+	test -r /etc/.relid \
+	&& OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
+	/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+	  && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+	/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
+	  && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;;
+    3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*)
+        /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+          && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4; exit; } ;;
+    m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*)
+	echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
+	echo m68k-atari-sysv4
+	exit ;;
+    TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+	echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+	echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.0*:*)
+	echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+	echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*)
+	echo mips-sni-sysv4
+	exit ;;
+    RM*:SINIX-*:*:*)
+	echo mips-sni-sysv4
+	exit ;;
+    *:SINIX-*:*:*)
+	if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
+		UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+		echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4
+	else
+		echo ns32k-sni-sysv
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort
+                      # says <Richard.M.Bartel@ccMail.Census.GOV>
+        echo i586-unisys-sysv4
+        exit ;;
+    *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*)
+	# From Gerald Hewes <hewes@openmarket.com>.
+	# How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm
+	echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4
+	exit ;;
+    *:*:*:FTX*)
+	# From seanf@swdc.stratus.com.
+	echo i860-stratus-sysv4
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:VOS:*:*)
+	# From Paul.Green@stratus.com.
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-stratus-vos
+	exit ;;
+    *:VOS:*:*)
+	# From Paul.Green@stratus.com.
+	echo hppa1.1-stratus-vos
+	exit ;;
+    mc68*:A/UX:*:*)
+	echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*)
+	echo mips-sony-newsos6
+	exit ;;
+    R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+	if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then
+	        echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	else
+	        echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	fi
+        exit ;;
+    BeBox:BeOS:*:*)	# BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only.
+	echo powerpc-be-beos
+	exit ;;
+    BeMac:BeOS:*:*)	# BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only.
+	echo powerpc-apple-beos
+	exit ;;
+    BePC:BeOS:*:*)	# BeOS running on Intel PC compatible.
+	echo i586-pc-beos
+	exit ;;
+    BePC:Haiku:*:*)	# Haiku running on Intel PC compatible.
+	echo i586-pc-haiku
+	exit ;;
+    SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx7-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx8-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	echo sx8r-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    Power*:Rhapsody:*:*)
+	echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:Rhapsody:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:Darwin:*:*)
+	UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` || UNAME_PROCESSOR=unknown
+	case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
+	    unknown) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc ;;
+	esac
+	echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*)
+	UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
+	if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = "x86"; then
+		UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386
+		UNAME_MACHINE=pc
+	fi
+	echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:QNX:*:4*)
+	echo i386-pc-qnx
+	exit ;;
+    NSE-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+	echo nse-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    NSR-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+	echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:NonStop-UX:*:*)
+	echo mips-compaq-nonstopux
+	exit ;;
+    BS2000:POSIX*:*:*)
+	echo bs2000-siemens-sysv
+	exit ;;
+    DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:Plan9:*:*)
+	# "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386
+	# is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86
+	# operating systems.
+	if test "$cputype" = "386"; then
+	    UNAME_MACHINE=i386
+	else
+	    UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype"
+	fi
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9
+	exit ;;
+    *:TOPS-10:*:*)
+	echo pdp10-unknown-tops10
+	exit ;;
+    *:TENEX:*:*)
+	echo pdp10-unknown-tenex
+	exit ;;
+    KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*)
+	echo pdp10-dec-tops20
+	exit ;;
+    XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*)
+	echo pdp10-xkl-tops20
+	exit ;;
+    *:TOPS-20:*:*)
+	echo pdp10-unknown-tops20
+	exit ;;
+    *:ITS:*:*)
+	echo pdp10-unknown-its
+	exit ;;
+    SEI:*:*:SEIUX)
+        echo mips-sei-seiux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+	exit ;;
+    *:DragonFly:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-dragonfly`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+	exit ;;
+    *:*VMS:*:*)
+    	UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+	case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+	    A*) echo alpha-dec-vms ; exit ;;
+	    I*) echo ia64-dec-vms ; exit ;;
+	    V*) echo vax-dec-vms ; exit ;;
+	esac ;;
+    *:XENIX:*:SysV)
+	echo i386-pc-xenix
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:skyos:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-skyos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}` | sed -e 's/ .*$//'
+	exit ;;
+    i*86:rdos:*:*)
+	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-rdos
+	exit ;;
+esac
+
+#echo '(No uname command or uname output not recognized.)' 1>&2
+#echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" 1>&2
+
+eval $set_cc_for_build
+cat >$dummy.c <<EOF
+#ifdef _SEQUENT_
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/utsname.h>
+#endif
+main ()
+{
+#if defined (sony)
+#if defined (MIPSEB)
+  /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos".  Perhaps BFD should be changed,
+     I don't know....  */
+  printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#include <sys/param.h>
+  printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n",
+#ifdef NEWSOS4
+          "4"
+#else
+	  ""
+#endif
+         ); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (__arm) && defined (__acorn) && defined (__unix)
+  printf ("arm-acorn-riscix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (hp300) && !defined (hpux)
+  printf ("m68k-hp-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (NeXT)
+#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__)
+#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k"
+#endif
+  int version;
+  version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`;
+  if (version < 4)
+    printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+  else
+    printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+  exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16)
+#if defined (UMAXV)
+  printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#if defined (CMU)
+  printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+  printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (__386BSD__)
+  printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (sequent)
+#if defined (i386)
+  printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#if defined (ns32000)
+  printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (_SEQUENT_)
+    struct utsname un;
+
+    uname(&un);
+
+    if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) {
+	printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0);
+    }
+    if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */
+	printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0);
+    }
+    printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0);
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined (vax)
+# if !defined (ultrix)
+#  include <sys/param.h>
+#  if defined (BSD)
+#   if BSD == 43
+      printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3\n"); exit (0);
+#   else
+#    if BSD == 199006
+      printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3reno\n"); exit (0);
+#    else
+      printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#    endif
+#   endif
+#  else
+    printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#  endif
+# else
+    printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860)
+  printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+  exit (1);
+}
+EOF
+
+$CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` &&
+	{ echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+
+# Apollos put the system type in the environment.
+
+test -d /usr/apollo && { echo ${ISP}-apollo-${SYSTYPE}; exit; }
+
+# Convex versions that predate uname can use getsysinfo(1)
+
+if [ -x /usr/convex/getsysinfo ]
+then
+    case `getsysinfo -f cpu_type` in
+    c1*)
+	echo c1-convex-bsd
+	exit ;;
+    c2*)
+	if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
+	then echo c32-convex-bsd
+	else echo c2-convex-bsd
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    c34*)
+	echo c34-convex-bsd
+	exit ;;
+    c38*)
+	echo c38-convex-bsd
+	exit ;;
+    c4*)
+	echo c4-convex-bsd
+	exit ;;
+    esac
+fi
+
+cat >&2 <<EOF
+$0: unable to guess system type
+
+This script, last modified $timestamp, has failed to recognize
+the operating system you are using. It is advised that you
+download the most up to date version of the config scripts from
+
+  http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess;hb=HEAD
+and
+  http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub;hb=HEAD
+
+If the version you run ($0) is already up to date, please
+send the following data and any information you think might be
+pertinent to <config-patches@gnu.org> in order to provide the needed
+information to handle your system.
+
+config.guess timestamp = $timestamp
+
+uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+
+/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/uname -X     = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null`
+
+hostinfo               = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/universe          = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/bin/arch -k       = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/arch              = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/bin/oslevel       = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null`
+
+UNAME_MACHINE = ${UNAME_MACHINE}
+UNAME_RELEASE = ${UNAME_RELEASE}
+UNAME_SYSTEM  = ${UNAME_SYSTEM}
+UNAME_VERSION = ${UNAME_VERSION}
+EOF
+
+exit 1
+
+# Local variables:
+# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp)
+# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
+# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
+# time-stamp-end: "'"
+# End:
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.h b/crypto/openssh/config.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5430244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1452 @@
+/* config.h.  Generated from config.h.in by configure.  */
+/* config.h.in.  Generated from configure.ac by autoheader.  */
+
+/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
+   */
+/* #undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
+
+/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
+/* #undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG */
+
+/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
+/* #undef AU_IPv4 */
+
+/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
+/* #undef BIND_8_COMPAT */
+
+/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
+/* #undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE */
+
+/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
+/* #undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO */
+
+/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
+/* #undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS */
+
+/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
+#define BROKEN_GLOB 1
+
+/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
+/* #undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA */
+
+/* ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet */
+/* #undef BROKEN_LIBIAF */
+
+/* Ultrix mmap can't map files */
+/* #undef BROKEN_MMAP */
+
+/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
+   */
+/* #undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME */
+
+/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
+/* #undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON */
+
+/* Define if you have a broken realpath. */
+/* #undef BROKEN_REALPATH */
+
+/* Needed for NeXT */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS */
+
+/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETREGID */
+
+/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETRESGID */
+
+/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETRESUID */
+
+/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETREUID */
+
+/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETVBUF */
+
+/* QNX shadow support is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+
+/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF */
+
+/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
+/* #undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */
+
+/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
+/* #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX */
+
+/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
+/* #undef BSD_AUTH */
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
+/* #undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE */
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmpx file */
+/* #undef CONF_UTMPX_FILE */
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
+#define CONF_UTMP_FILE "/var/run/utmp"
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
+/* #undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE */
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
+#define CONF_WTMP_FILE "/var/log/wtmp"
+
+/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */
+/* #undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
+/* #undef DISABLE_LASTLOG */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
+/* #undef DISABLE_LOGIN */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
+/* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
+/* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
+/* #undef DISABLE_SHADOW */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
+/* #undef DISABLE_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
+#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
+/* #undef DISABLE_WTMP */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
+#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1
+
+/* Builtin PRNG command timeout */
+#define ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC 200
+
+/* fsid_t has member val */
+/* #undef FSID_HAS_VAL */
+
+/* fsid_t has member __val */
+/* #undef FSID_HAS___VAL */
+
+/* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */
+#define GETPGRP_VOID 1
+
+/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
+/* #undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS */
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
+#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
+#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1
+
+/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
+/* #undef GSSAPI */
+
+/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
+/* #undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+
+/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
+/* #undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
+#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
+#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
+#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
+#define HAVE_ASPRINTF 1
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
+/* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ */
+
+/* Have attribute nonnull */
+#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
+/* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_B64_NTOP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_B64_PTON */
+
+/* Define if you have the basename function. */
+#define HAVE_BASENAME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
+#define HAVE_BCOPY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
+#define HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BSTRING_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
+#define HAVE_CLOCK 1
+
+/* define if you have clock_t data type */
+#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
+#define HAVE_CLOSEFROM 1
+
+/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
+#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1
+
+/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
+#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_CRYPT_H */
+
+/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
+/* #undef HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
+/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
+#define HAVE_DAEMON 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
+   you don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
+   */
+#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG 0
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT 0
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
+#define HAVE_DEV_PTMX 1
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
+/* #undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_DIRENT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DIRFD */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
+#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_ENDUTENT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT */
+
+/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
+/* #undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_SHA256 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
+#define HAVE_FCHMOD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
+#define HAVE_FCHOWN 1
+
+/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
+/* #undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_FCNTL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FEATURES_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
+#define HAVE_FREEADDRINFO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
+#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
+#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
+#define HAVE_FSTATVFS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
+#define HAVE_FUTIMES 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
+#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETADDRINFO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETCWD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETGRSET */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETLUID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETNAMEINFO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETOPT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_GETOPT_H 1
+
+/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
+#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1
+
+/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
+#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETPEEREID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETPWANAM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETRLIMIT 1
+
+/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrusage' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETRUSAGE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETTTYENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTENT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTLINE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTXENT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTXID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
+#define HAVE_GLOB 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_GLOB_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */
+
+/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
+#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
+#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_IAF_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_IA_H */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
+#define HAVE_INET_ATON 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
+#define HAVE_INET_NTOA 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
+#define HAVE_INET_NTOP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
+#define HAVE_INNETGR 1
+
+/* define if you have int64_t data type */
+#define HAVE_INT64_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_INTTYPES_H 1
+
+/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
+#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
+#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
+#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBBSM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBDL */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
+
+/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBIAF */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsl' library (-lnsl). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBNSL */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
+#define HAVE_LIBPAM 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sectok' library (-lsectok). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBSECTOK */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LIBUTIL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBXNET */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
+#define HAVE_LIBZ 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LIMITS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H */
+
+/* Define if your libraries define login() */
+#define HAVE_LOGIN 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
+#define HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LOGIN_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
+#define HAVE_LOGOUT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
+#define HAVE_LOGWTMP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
+#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
+#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT */
+
+/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
+/* #undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
+#define HAVE_MEMMOVE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_MEMORY_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
+#define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mmap' function. */
+#define HAVE_MMAP 1
+
+/* define if you have mode_t data type */
+#define HAVE_MODE_T 1
+
+/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
+#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_NDIR_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_NETDB_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H 1
+
+/* Define if you are on NeXT */
+/* #undef HAVE_NEXT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_NSLEEP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO */
+
+/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
+   pam_strerror */
+/* #undef HAVE_OLD_PAM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
+#define HAVE_OPENPTY 1
+
+/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include <openssl/header.h> */
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1
+
+/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
+/* #undef HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
+#define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
+#define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_PATHS_H 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* define if you have pid_t data type */
+#define HAVE_PID_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
+#define HAVE_POLL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_POLL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PRCTL */
+
+/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
+/* #undef HAVE_PROC_PID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PSTAT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PTY_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_change field */
+#define HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD 1
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_class field */
+#define HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD 1
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_expire field */
+#define HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
+#define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
+#define HAVE_REALPATH 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
+#define HAVE_RECVMSG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
+#define HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF 1
+
+/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
+#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sectok.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SECTOK_H */
+
+/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
+/* #undef HAVE_SECUREWARE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
+#define HAVE_SENDMSG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETEGID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETENV 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETEUID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETGROUPS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETLOGIN 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETLUID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETPCRED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETPROCTITLE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETREGID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETRESGID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETRESUID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETREUID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETRLIMIT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETSID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETUTENT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETUTXENT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETVBUF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SET_ID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */
+#define HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SHA2_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SHADOW_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
+#define HAVE_SIGACTION 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
+#define HAVE_SIGVEC 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
+#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1
+
+/* define if you have size_t data type */
+#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
+#define HAVE_SNPRINTF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
+#define HAVE_SOCKETPAIR 1
+
+/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
+/* #undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED */
+
+/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
+#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
+#define HAVE_STATFS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
+#define HAVE_STATVFS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STDDEF_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STDINT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRDUP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRERROR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1
+
+/* Silly mkstemp() */
+/* #undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STRINGS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STRING_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRLCAT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRLCPY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRMODE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_STRNVIS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRSEP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRTOLL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRTONUM 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRTOUL 1
+
+/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1
+
+/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is member of `struct stat'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1
+
+/* define if you have struct timeval */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SWAP32 */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
+#define HAVE_SYSCONF 1
+
+/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_DIR_H 1
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
+#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H */
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
+#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_POLL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_STAT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H */
+
+/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_TIME_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
+#define HAVE_TCGETPGRP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
+#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
+#define HAVE_TIME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_TIME_H 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
+#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
+#define HAVE_TRUNCATE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_TTYENT_H 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UCRED_H */
+
+/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
+#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_UNISTD_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
+#define HAVE_UNSETENV 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
+#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_USERSEC_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UTIL_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
+#define HAVE_UTIMES 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_UTIME_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UTMPNAME */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UTMPX_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_UTMP_H 1
+
+/* define if you have u_char data type */
+#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1
+
+/* define if you have u_int data type */
+#define HAVE_U_INT 1
+
+/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
+#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1
+
+/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
+#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
+#define HAVE_VASPRINTF 1
+
+/* Define if va_copy exists */
+#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vhangup' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_VHANGUP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_VIS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
+#define HAVE_VSNPRINTF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
+#define HAVE_WAITPID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
+#define HAVE__GETLONG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE__GETPTY */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
+#define HAVE__GETSHORT 1
+
+/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
+#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
+#define HAVE___B64_NTOP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
+#define HAVE___B64_PTON 1
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
+#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1
+
+/* Define if libc defines __progname */
+#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+/* #undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS */
+
+/* Define if __va_copy exists */
+#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
+#define HAVE___func__ 1
+
+/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
+/* #undef HEIMDAL */
+
+/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
+/* #undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */
+
+/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
+/* #undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 */
+
+/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
+/* #undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
+
+/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
+/* #undef KRB5 */
+
+/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
+/* #undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+/* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */
+#define LIBWRAP 1
+
+/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
+   EOPNOTSUPP. */
+/* #undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO */
+
+/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
+/* #undef LLONG_MAX */
+
+/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
+/* #undef LLONG_MIN */
+
+/* Account locked with pw(1) */
+#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX "*LOCKED*"
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+/* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING */
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+/* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR */
+
+/* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */
+/* #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */
+
+/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
+/* #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--") */
+/* #undef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT */
+
+/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected)
+   from environment and PATH */
+#define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "/usr/bin/login"
+
+/* Set this to your mail directory if you don't have maillock.h */
+/* #undef MAIL_DIRECTORY */
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+/* #undef MISSING_FD_MASK */
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+/* #undef MISSING_HOWMANY */
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+/* #undef MISSING_NFDBITS */
+
+/* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */
+/* #undef NEED_SETPGRP */
+
+/* Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known */
+/* #undef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c */
+/* #undef NO_SSH_LASTLOG */
+
+/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
+/* #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS */
+
+/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
+/* #undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID */
+
+/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
+/* #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES */
+
+/* Define if you want OpenSSL's internally seeded PRNG only */
+#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1
+
+/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
+#define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org"
+
+/* Define to the full name of this package. */
+#define PACKAGE_NAME "OpenSSH"
+
+/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
+#define PACKAGE_STRING "OpenSSH Portable"
+
+/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
+#define PACKAGE_TARNAME "openssh"
+
+/* Define to the version of this package. */
+#define PACKAGE_VERSION "Portable"
+
+/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
+   the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
+/* #undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE */
+
+/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
+/* #undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE */
+
+/* must supply username to passwd */
+/* #undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME */
+
+/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+/* #undef PRNGD_PORT */
+
+/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+/* #undef PRNGD_SOCKET */
+
+/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
+/* #undef PTY_ZEROREAD */
+
+/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
+/* #undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID */
+
+/* The size of `char', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_CHAR 1
+
+/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_INT 4
+
+/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT 4
+
+/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT 8
+
+/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT 2
+
+/* Define if you want S/Key support */
+/* #undef SKEY */
+
+/* Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD) */
+/* #undef SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG */
+
+/* Define if you want smartcard support */
+/* #undef SMARTCARD */
+
+/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
+#define SNPRINTF_CONST const
+
+/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
+   bsd-setproctitle.c */
+/* #undef SPT_TYPE */
+
+/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
+/* #undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY */
+
+/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
+/* #undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID */
+
+/* Use audit debugging module */
+/* #undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
+/* #undef SSH_IOBUFSZ */
+
+/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
+#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd"
+
+/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF */
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
+#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_LINUX */
+
+/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 */
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD */
+
+/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
+#define STDC_HEADERS 1
+
+/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
+/* #undef SUPERUSER_PATH */
+
+/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
+/* #undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND */
+
+/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
+/* #undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+
+/* Specify default $PATH */
+/* #undef USER_PATH */
+
+/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
+/* #undef USE_AFS */
+
+/* Use BSM audit module */
+/* #undef USE_BSM_AUDIT */
+
+/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+/* #undef USE_BTMP */
+
+/* Use libedit for sftp */
+#define USE_LIBEDIT 1
+
+/* Define if you want smartcard support using OpenSC */
+/* #undef USE_OPENSC */
+
+/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
+#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1
+
+/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
+#define USE_PAM 1
+
+/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+/* #undef USE_PIPES */
+
+/* Define if you want smartcard support using sectok */
+/* #undef USE_SECTOK */
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
+/* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS */
+
+/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
+/* #undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY */
+
+/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
+/* #undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C
+   arrays) */
+/* #undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
+/* #undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
+/* #undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
+/* #undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+
+/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
+/* #undef WITH_SELINUX */
+
+/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
+   significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel and VAX). */
+#if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
+# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
+#elif ! defined __LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+/* # undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#endif
+
+/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
+/* #undef XAUTH_PATH */
+
+/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
+/* #undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS */
+
+/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
+/* #undef _LARGE_FILES */
+
+/* log for bad login attempts */
+/* #undef _PATH_BTMP */
+
+/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
+#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd"
+
+/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
+#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run"
+
+/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
+/* #undef __res_state */
+
+/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
+   calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name.  */
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+/* #undef inline */
+#endif
+
+/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
+/* #undef socklen_t */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.h.in b/crypto/openssh/config.h.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc195ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h.in
@@ -0,0 +1,1458 @@
+/* config.h.in.  Generated from configure.ac by autoheader.  */
+
+/* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */
+#undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
+
+/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
+   */
+#undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK
+
+/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
+#undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
+
+/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
+#undef AU_IPv4
+
+/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
+#undef BIND_8_COMPAT
+
+/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
+#undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
+
+/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
+#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
+
+/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
+#undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+
+/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
+#undef BROKEN_GLOB
+
+/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
+#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA
+
+/* ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet */
+#undef BROKEN_LIBIAF
+
+/* Ultrix mmap can't map files */
+#undef BROKEN_MMAP
+
+/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
+   */
+#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
+
+/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
+#undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+
+/* Define if you have a broken realpath. */
+#undef BROKEN_REALPATH
+
+/* Needed for NeXT */
+#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS
+
+/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETREGID
+
+/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETRESGID
+
+/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETRESUID
+
+/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETREUID
+
+/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
+#undef BROKEN_SETVBUF
+
+/* QNX shadow support is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
+#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+
+/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
+#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
+
+/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
+#undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
+#undef BSD_AUTH
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
+#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmpx file */
+#undef CONF_UTMPX_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
+#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
+#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
+#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+
+/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */
+#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
+#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
+#undef DISABLE_LOGIN
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
+#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
+#undef DISABLE_SHADOW
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
+#undef DISABLE_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
+#undef DISABLE_WTMP
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_WTMPX
+
+/* Builtin PRNG command timeout */
+#undef ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC
+
+/* fsid_t has member val */
+#undef FSID_HAS_VAL
+
+/* fsid_t has member __val */
+#undef FSID_HAS___VAL
+
+/* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */
+#undef GETPGRP_VOID
+
+/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
+#undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC
+
+/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
+#undef GSSAPI
+
+/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
+#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
+#undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__
+
+/* Have attribute nonnull */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
+#undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE_B64_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
+#undef HAVE_B64_PTON
+
+/* Define if you have the basename function. */
+#undef HAVE_BASENAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BCOPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BSTRING_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK
+
+/* define if you have clock_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+
+/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
+#undef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
+
+/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
+#undef HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+
+/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
+#undef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
+#undef HAVE_DAEMON
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
+   you don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
+   */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRFD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
+
+/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
+#undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+
+/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHMOD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHOWN
+
+/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
+#undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FEATURES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FUTIMES
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETCWD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETGRSET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETLUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT_H
+
+/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+
+/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
+#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPEEREID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT
+
+/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
+#undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrusage' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETTTYENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GLOB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GLOB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+
+/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
+#undef HAVE_HEADER_AD
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_IAF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_IA_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_ATON
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_NTOA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INNETGR
+
+/* define if you have int64_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_INT64_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
+
+/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_INTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBBSM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBDL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+
+/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
+#undef HAVE_LIBIAF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsl' library (-lnsl). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNSL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sectok' library (-lsectok). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBSECTOK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBXNET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBZ
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H
+
+/* Define if your libraries define login() */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGOUT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
+#undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
+#undef HAVE_LONG_LONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT
+
+/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
+#undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MKDTEMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mmap' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MMAP
+
+/* define if you have mode_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_MODE_T
+
+/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
+#undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NDIR_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NETDB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
+
+/* Define if you are on NeXT */
+#undef HAVE_NEXT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
+#undef HAVE_NSLEEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
+   pam_strerror */
+#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENPTY
+
+/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include <openssl/header.h> */
+#undef HAVE_OPENSSL
+
+/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
+#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PATHS_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+
+/* define if you have pid_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_PID_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
+#undef HAVE_POLL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_POLL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PRCTL
+
+/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
+#undef HAVE_PROC_PID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PSTAT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PTY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_change field */
+#undef HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_class field */
+#undef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_expire field */
+#undef HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
+#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
+#undef HAVE_REALPATH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RECVMSG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+
+/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sectok.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SECTOK_H
+
+/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
+#undef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SENDMSG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETEGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETEUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETGROUPS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETLUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPCRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETREGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRESGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRESUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETREUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETSID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETUTXENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETVBUF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SET_ID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SHA2_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SIGACTION
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SIGVEC
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+
+/* define if you have size_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SIZE_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
+
+/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
+#undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED
+
+/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STATFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STATVFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDDEF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDINT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRDUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRERROR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRFTIME
+
+/* Silly mkstemp() */
+#undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STRING_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRLCAT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRLCPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRMODE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRNVIS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRSEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTOLL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTONUM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTOUL
+
+/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+
+/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+
+/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
+
+/* define if you have struct timeval */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SWAP32
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SYSCONF
+
+/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
+
+/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TIME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TTYENT_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UCRED_H
+
+/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UNSETENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
+#undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UPDWTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_USERSEC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIMES
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIME_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMP_H
+
+/* define if you have u_char data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_CHAR
+
+/* define if you have u_int data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INT
+
+/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+
+/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+
+/* Define if va_copy exists */
+#undef HAVE_VA_COPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vhangup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_VHANGUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_VIS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_WAITPID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETLONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETPTY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETSHORT
+
+/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
+#undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE___B64_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
+#undef HAVE___B64_PTON
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
+#undef HAVE___FUNCTION__
+
+/* Define if libc defines __progname */
+#undef HAVE___PROGNAME
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+
+/* Define if __va_copy exists */
+#undef HAVE___VA_COPY
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
+#undef HAVE___func__
+
+/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
+#undef HEIMDAL
+
+/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
+#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+
+/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
+#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+
+/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
+#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
+
+/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
+#undef KRB5
+
+/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
+#undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */
+#undef LIBWRAP
+
+/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
+   EOPNOTSUPP. */
+#undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+
+/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
+#undef LLONG_MAX
+
+/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
+#undef LLONG_MIN
+
+/* Account locked with pw(1) */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
+
+/* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */
+#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
+
+/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
+#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--") */
+#undef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT
+
+/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected)
+   from environment and PATH */
+#undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+
+/* Set this to your mail directory if you don't have maillock.h */
+#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+#undef MISSING_FD_MASK
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+#undef MISSING_HOWMANY
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+#undef MISSING_NFDBITS
+
+/* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */
+#undef NEED_SETPGRP
+
+/* Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known */
+#undef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c */
+#undef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
+
+/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
+#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
+
+/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
+#undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+
+/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
+#undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES
+
+/* Define if you want OpenSSL's internally seeded PRNG only */
+#undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+
+/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
+#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
+
+/* Define to the full name of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_NAME
+
+/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_STRING
+
+/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME
+
+/* Define to the version of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_VERSION
+
+/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
+   the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
+#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+
+/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
+#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+
+/* must supply username to passwd */
+#undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+
+/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+#undef PRNGD_PORT
+
+/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+#undef PRNGD_SOCKET
+
+/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
+#undef PTY_ZEROREAD
+
+/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
+#undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+
+/* The size of `char', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_CHAR
+
+/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_INT
+
+/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_LONG_INT
+
+/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT
+
+/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_SHORT_INT
+
+/* Define if you want S/Key support */
+#undef SKEY
+
+/* Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD) */
+#undef SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG
+
+/* Define if you want smartcard support */
+#undef SMARTCARD
+
+/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
+#undef SNPRINTF_CONST
+
+/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
+   bsd-setproctitle.c */
+#undef SPT_TYPE
+
+/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
+#undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
+
+/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
+#undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
+
+/* Use audit debugging module */
+#undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+
+/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
+#undef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+
+/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
+#undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+
+/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
+#undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_LINUX
+
+/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
+#undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+
+/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
+#undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
+#undef STDC_HEADERS
+
+/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
+#undef SUPERUSER_PATH
+
+/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
+#undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+
+/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
+#undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+
+/* Specify default $PATH */
+#undef USER_PATH
+
+/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
+#undef USE_AFS
+
+/* Use BSM audit module */
+#undef USE_BSM_AUDIT
+
+/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+#undef USE_BTMP
+
+/* Use libedit for sftp */
+#undef USE_LIBEDIT
+
+/* Define if you want smartcard support using OpenSC */
+#undef USE_OPENSC
+
+/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
+#undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+
+/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
+#undef USE_PAM
+
+/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+#undef USE_PIPES
+
+/* Define if you want smartcard support using sectok */
+#undef USE_SECTOK
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
+#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
+#undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+
+/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
+#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+
+/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C
+   arrays) */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+
+/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
+#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
+/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
+   significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
+#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
+# if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
+#  define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
+# endif
+#else
+# ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+#  undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
+#undef XAUTH_PATH
+
+/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
+#undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
+
+/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
+#undef _LARGE_FILES
+
+/* log for bad login attempts */
+#undef _PATH_BTMP
+
+/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
+#undef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+
+/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
+#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+
+/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
+#undef __res_state
+
+/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
+   calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name.  */
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+#undef inline
+#endif
+
+/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
+#undef socklen_t
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/crc32.c b/crypto/openssh/crc32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c192eb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/crc32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.11 2006/04/22 18:29:33 stevesk Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "crc32.h"
+
+static const u_int32_t crc32tab[] = {
+	0x00000000L, 0x77073096L, 0xee0e612cL, 0x990951baL,
+	0x076dc419L, 0x706af48fL, 0xe963a535L, 0x9e6495a3L,
+	0x0edb8832L, 0x79dcb8a4L, 0xe0d5e91eL, 0x97d2d988L,
+	0x09b64c2bL, 0x7eb17cbdL, 0xe7b82d07L, 0x90bf1d91L,
+	0x1db71064L, 0x6ab020f2L, 0xf3b97148L, 0x84be41deL,
+	0x1adad47dL, 0x6ddde4ebL, 0xf4d4b551L, 0x83d385c7L,
+	0x136c9856L, 0x646ba8c0L, 0xfd62f97aL, 0x8a65c9ecL,
+	0x14015c4fL, 0x63066cd9L, 0xfa0f3d63L, 0x8d080df5L,
+	0x3b6e20c8L, 0x4c69105eL, 0xd56041e4L, 0xa2677172L,
+	0x3c03e4d1L, 0x4b04d447L, 0xd20d85fdL, 0xa50ab56bL,
+	0x35b5a8faL, 0x42b2986cL, 0xdbbbc9d6L, 0xacbcf940L,
+	0x32d86ce3L, 0x45df5c75L, 0xdcd60dcfL, 0xabd13d59L,
+	0x26d930acL, 0x51de003aL, 0xc8d75180L, 0xbfd06116L,
+	0x21b4f4b5L, 0x56b3c423L, 0xcfba9599L, 0xb8bda50fL,
+	0x2802b89eL, 0x5f058808L, 0xc60cd9b2L, 0xb10be924L,
+	0x2f6f7c87L, 0x58684c11L, 0xc1611dabL, 0xb6662d3dL,
+	0x76dc4190L, 0x01db7106L, 0x98d220bcL, 0xefd5102aL,
+	0x71b18589L, 0x06b6b51fL, 0x9fbfe4a5L, 0xe8b8d433L,
+	0x7807c9a2L, 0x0f00f934L, 0x9609a88eL, 0xe10e9818L,
+	0x7f6a0dbbL, 0x086d3d2dL, 0x91646c97L, 0xe6635c01L,
+	0x6b6b51f4L, 0x1c6c6162L, 0x856530d8L, 0xf262004eL,
+	0x6c0695edL, 0x1b01a57bL, 0x8208f4c1L, 0xf50fc457L,
+	0x65b0d9c6L, 0x12b7e950L, 0x8bbeb8eaL, 0xfcb9887cL,
+	0x62dd1ddfL, 0x15da2d49L, 0x8cd37cf3L, 0xfbd44c65L,
+	0x4db26158L, 0x3ab551ceL, 0xa3bc0074L, 0xd4bb30e2L,
+	0x4adfa541L, 0x3dd895d7L, 0xa4d1c46dL, 0xd3d6f4fbL,
+	0x4369e96aL, 0x346ed9fcL, 0xad678846L, 0xda60b8d0L,
+	0x44042d73L, 0x33031de5L, 0xaa0a4c5fL, 0xdd0d7cc9L,
+	0x5005713cL, 0x270241aaL, 0xbe0b1010L, 0xc90c2086L,
+	0x5768b525L, 0x206f85b3L, 0xb966d409L, 0xce61e49fL,
+	0x5edef90eL, 0x29d9c998L, 0xb0d09822L, 0xc7d7a8b4L,
+	0x59b33d17L, 0x2eb40d81L, 0xb7bd5c3bL, 0xc0ba6cadL,
+	0xedb88320L, 0x9abfb3b6L, 0x03b6e20cL, 0x74b1d29aL,
+	0xead54739L, 0x9dd277afL, 0x04db2615L, 0x73dc1683L,
+	0xe3630b12L, 0x94643b84L, 0x0d6d6a3eL, 0x7a6a5aa8L,
+	0xe40ecf0bL, 0x9309ff9dL, 0x0a00ae27L, 0x7d079eb1L,
+	0xf00f9344L, 0x8708a3d2L, 0x1e01f268L, 0x6906c2feL,
+	0xf762575dL, 0x806567cbL, 0x196c3671L, 0x6e6b06e7L,
+	0xfed41b76L, 0x89d32be0L, 0x10da7a5aL, 0x67dd4accL,
+	0xf9b9df6fL, 0x8ebeeff9L, 0x17b7be43L, 0x60b08ed5L,
+	0xd6d6a3e8L, 0xa1d1937eL, 0x38d8c2c4L, 0x4fdff252L,
+	0xd1bb67f1L, 0xa6bc5767L, 0x3fb506ddL, 0x48b2364bL,
+	0xd80d2bdaL, 0xaf0a1b4cL, 0x36034af6L, 0x41047a60L,
+	0xdf60efc3L, 0xa867df55L, 0x316e8eefL, 0x4669be79L,
+	0xcb61b38cL, 0xbc66831aL, 0x256fd2a0L, 0x5268e236L,
+	0xcc0c7795L, 0xbb0b4703L, 0x220216b9L, 0x5505262fL,
+	0xc5ba3bbeL, 0xb2bd0b28L, 0x2bb45a92L, 0x5cb36a04L,
+	0xc2d7ffa7L, 0xb5d0cf31L, 0x2cd99e8bL, 0x5bdeae1dL,
+	0x9b64c2b0L, 0xec63f226L, 0x756aa39cL, 0x026d930aL,
+	0x9c0906a9L, 0xeb0e363fL, 0x72076785L, 0x05005713L,
+	0x95bf4a82L, 0xe2b87a14L, 0x7bb12baeL, 0x0cb61b38L,
+	0x92d28e9bL, 0xe5d5be0dL, 0x7cdcefb7L, 0x0bdbdf21L,
+	0x86d3d2d4L, 0xf1d4e242L, 0x68ddb3f8L, 0x1fda836eL,
+	0x81be16cdL, 0xf6b9265bL, 0x6fb077e1L, 0x18b74777L,
+	0x88085ae6L, 0xff0f6a70L, 0x66063bcaL, 0x11010b5cL,
+	0x8f659effL, 0xf862ae69L, 0x616bffd3L, 0x166ccf45L,
+	0xa00ae278L, 0xd70dd2eeL, 0x4e048354L, 0x3903b3c2L,
+	0xa7672661L, 0xd06016f7L, 0x4969474dL, 0x3e6e77dbL,
+	0xaed16a4aL, 0xd9d65adcL, 0x40df0b66L, 0x37d83bf0L,
+	0xa9bcae53L, 0xdebb9ec5L, 0x47b2cf7fL, 0x30b5ffe9L,
+	0xbdbdf21cL, 0xcabac28aL, 0x53b39330L, 0x24b4a3a6L,
+	0xbad03605L, 0xcdd70693L, 0x54de5729L, 0x23d967bfL,
+	0xb3667a2eL, 0xc4614ab8L, 0x5d681b02L, 0x2a6f2b94L,
+	0xb40bbe37L, 0xc30c8ea1L, 0x5a05df1bL, 0x2d02ef8dL
+};
+
+u_int32_t
+ssh_crc32(const u_char *buf, u_int32_t size)
+{
+	u_int32_t i, crc;
+
+	crc = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		crc = crc32tab[(crc ^ buf[i]) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8);
+	return crc;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/crc32.h b/crypto/openssh/crc32.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d7131a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/crc32.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.15 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSH_CRC32_H
+#define SSH_CRC32_H
+u_int32_t	 ssh_crc32(const u_char *, u_int32_t);
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/deattack.c b/crypto/openssh/deattack.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b37e4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/deattack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.30 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+ * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+ * this copyright notice is retained.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
+ * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "deattack.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "crc32.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * CRC attack detection has a worst-case behaviour that is O(N^3) over
+ * the number of identical blocks in a packet. This behaviour can be 
+ * exploited to create a limited denial of service attack. 
+ * 
+ * However, because we are dealing with encrypted data, identical
+ * blocks should only occur every 2^35 maximally-sized packets or so. 
+ * Consequently, we can detect this DoS by looking for identical blocks
+ * in a packet.
+ *
+ * The parameter below determines how many identical blocks we will
+ * accept in a single packet, trading off between attack detection and
+ * likelihood of terminating a legitimate connection. A value of 32 
+ * corresponds to an average of 2^40 messages before an attack is
+ * misdetected
+ */
+#define MAX_IDENTICAL	32
+
+/* SSH Constants */
+#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS	(32 * 1024)
+#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE	(8)
+
+/* Hashing constants */
+#define HASH_MINSIZE	(8 * 1024)
+#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE	(2)
+#define HASH_FACTOR(x)	((x)*3/2)
+#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR	(0xff)
+#define HASH_UNUSED	(0xffff)
+#define HASH_IV		(0xfffe)
+
+#define HASH_MINBLOCKS	(7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE)
+
+
+/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
+#define HASH(x)		get_u32(x)
+
+#define CMP(a, b)	(memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
+
+static void
+crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b)
+{
+	b ^= *a;
+	*a = ssh_crc32((u_char *)&b, sizeof(b));
+}
+
+/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
+static int
+check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t crc;
+	u_char *c;
+
+	crc = 0;
+	for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+		if (!CMP(S, c)) {
+			crc_update(&crc, 1);
+			crc_update(&crc, 0);
+		} else {
+			crc_update(&crc, 0);
+			crc_update(&crc, 0);
+		}
+	}
+	return (crc == 0);
+}
+
+
+/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
+int
+detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
+	static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
+	u_int32_t i, j;
+	u_int32_t l, same;
+	u_char *c;
+	u_char *d;
+
+	if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
+	    len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) {
+		fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len);
+	}
+	for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
+		;
+
+	if (h == NULL) {
+		debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector.");
+		h = (u_int16_t *) xcalloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+		n = l;
+	} else {
+		if (l > n) {
+			h = (u_int16_t *)xrealloc(h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+			n = l;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
+		for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+			for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+				if (!CMP(c, d)) {
+					if ((check_crc(c, buf, len)))
+						return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
+					else
+						break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return (DEATTACK_OK);
+	}
+	memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+
+	for (c = buf, same = j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
+		for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
+		    i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
+			if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
+				if (++same > MAX_IDENTICAL)
+					return (DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED);
+				if (check_crc(c, buf, len))
+					return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
+				else
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+		h[i] = j;
+	}
+	return (DEATTACK_OK);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/deattack.h b/crypto/openssh/deattack.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0316fb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/deattack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.10 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - Header file
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+ * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+ * this copyright notice is retained.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
+ * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DEATTACK_H
+#define _DEATTACK_H
+
+/* Return codes */
+#define DEATTACK_OK		0
+#define DEATTACK_DETECTED	1
+#define DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED	2
+
+int	 detect_attack(u_char *, u_int32_t);
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/defines.h b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ddfd96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
@@ -0,0 +1,756 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DEFINES_H
+#define _DEFINES_H
+
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.156 2009/08/28 01:21:07 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+
+/* Constants */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
+enum
+{
+  SHUT_RD = 0,		/* No more receptions.  */
+  SHUT_WR,			/* No more transmissions.  */
+  SHUT_RDWR			/* No more receptions or transmissions.  */
+};
+# define SHUT_RD   SHUT_RD
+# define SHUT_WR   SHUT_WR
+# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
+#endif
+
+#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
+# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY          0x10
+# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT        0x08
+# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY       0x04
+# define IPTOS_LOWCOST           0x02
+# define IPTOS_MINCOST           IPTOS_LOWCOST
+#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
+
+#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
+# ifdef PATH_MAX
+#  define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
+# else /* PATH_MAX */
+#  define MAXPATHLEN 64
+/* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */
+#  ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH
+#   define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+#  endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */
+# endif /* PATH_MAX */
+#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
+
+#ifndef PATH_MAX
+# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
+# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
+#endif
+
+#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
+# define STDIN_FILENO    0
+#endif
+#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
+# define STDOUT_FILENO   1
+#endif
+#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
+# define STDERR_FILENO   2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX	/* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
+#ifdef NGROUPS
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+#else
+#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
+# define O_NONBLOCK      00004	/* Non Blocking Open */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef S_ISDIR
+# define S_ISDIR(mode)	(((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
+#endif /* S_ISDIR */
+
+#ifndef S_ISREG
+# define S_ISREG(mode)	(((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
+#endif /* S_ISREG */
+
+#ifndef S_ISLNK
+# define S_ISLNK(mode)	(((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
+#endif /* S_ISLNK */
+
+#ifndef S_IXUSR
+# define S_IXUSR			0000100	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXGRP			0000010	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXOTH			0000001	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define _S_IWUSR			0000200	/* write permission, */
+# define S_IWUSR			_S_IWUSR	/* write permission, owner */
+# define S_IWGRP			0000020	/* write permission, group */
+# define S_IWOTH			0000002	/* write permission, other */
+# define S_IRUSR			0000400	/* read permission, owner */
+# define S_IRGRP			0000040	/* read permission, group */
+# define S_IROTH			0000004	/* read permission, other */
+# define S_IRWXU			0000700	/* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXG			0000070	/* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXO			0000007	/* read, write, execute */
+#endif /* S_IXUSR */
+
+#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
+#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAP_FAILED
+# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
+#endif
+
+/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this constant in the system headers */
+#ifdef MISSING_NFDBITS
+# define	NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
+#endif
+
+/*
+SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but
+including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
+*/
+#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK
+#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
+#endif
+
+/* Types */
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+/* (or die trying) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
+# if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1)
+typedef char int8_t;
+# else
+#  error "8 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef short int int16_t;
+# else
+#  ifdef _UNICOS
+#   if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4)
+typedef short int16_t;
+#   else
+typedef long  int16_t;
+#   endif
+#  else
+#   error "16 bit int type not found."
+#  endif /* _UNICOS */
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef int int32_t;
+# else
+#  ifdef _UNICOS
+typedef long  int32_t;
+#  else
+#   error "32 bit int type not found."
+#  endif /* _UNICOS */
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
+typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
+typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
+# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+# else
+#  if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1)
+typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
+#  else
+#   error "8 bit int type not found."
+#  endif
+#  if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
+#  else
+#   ifdef _UNICOS
+#    if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4)
+typedef unsigned short u_int16_t;
+#    else
+typedef unsigned long  u_int16_t;
+#    endif
+#   else
+#    error "16 bit int type not found."
+#   endif
+#  endif
+#  if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
+#  else
+#   ifdef _UNICOS
+typedef unsigned long  u_int32_t;
+#   else
+#    error "32 bit int type not found."
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
+#endif
+
+/* 64-bit types */
+#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long int int64_t;
+# else
+#  if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long long int int64_t;
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
+# else
+#  if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
+typedef unsigned char u_char;
+# define HAVE_U_CHAR
+#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
+
+#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
+#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
+#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
+typedef unsigned int size_t;
+# define HAVE_SIZE_T
+# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX
+#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+typedef int ssize_t;
+# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+typedef long clock_t;
+# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+typedef int sa_family_t;
+# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
+typedef int pid_t;
+# define HAVE_PID_T
+#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+typedef int sig_atomic_t;
+# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
+typedef int mode_t;
+# define HAVE_MODE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
+# define ss_family __ss_family
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+struct	sockaddr_un {
+	short	sun_family;		/* AF_UNIX */
+	char	sun_path[108];		/* path name (gag) */
+};
+#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
+typedef u_int32_t	in_addr_t;
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+typedef u_int16_t	in_port_t;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
+#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
+struct winsize {
+      unsigned short ws_row;          /* rows, in characters */
+      unsigned short ws_col;          /* columns, in character */
+      unsigned short ws_xpixel;       /* horizontal size, pixels */
+      unsigned short ws_ypixel;       /* vertical size, pixels */
+};
+#endif
+
+/* *-*-nto-qnx does not define this type in the system headers */
+#ifdef MISSING_FD_MASK
+ typedef unsigned long int	fd_mask;
+#endif
+
+/* Paths */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
+# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USER_PATH
+# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
+#  undef _PATH_STDPATH
+# endif
+# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH
+# define SUPERUSER_PATH	_PATH_STDPATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
+# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+# define MAIL_DIRECTORY "/var/spool/mail"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAILDIR
+# define MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR)
+# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAILDIR
+#endif /* !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR) */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
+# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
+#endif
+
+/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
+#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
+#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
+
+/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */
+#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
+#  ifdef __hpux
+#    define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u"
+#  else
+#    define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
+#  endif
+#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */
+#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH
+
+#ifndef _PATH_TTY
+# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
+#endif
+
+/* Macros */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
+# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
+# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef roundup
+# define roundup(x, y)   ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef timersub
+#define timersub(a, b, result)					\
+   do {								\
+      (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec;		\
+      (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec;		\
+      if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) {				\
+	 --(result)->tv_sec;					\
+	 (result)->tv_usec += 1000000;				\
+      }								\
+   } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
+#define	TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) {					\
+	(ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec;					\
+	(ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000;				\
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
+#define	TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) {					\
+	(tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec;					\
+	(tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000;				\
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __P
+# define __P(x) x
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
+	((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
+	 (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
+#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
+
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
+# define __attribute__(x)
+#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
+# define __sentinel__
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__)
+# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
+# define __nonnull__(x)
+#endif
+
+/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this macro in the system headers */
+#ifdef MISSING_HOWMANY
+# define howmany(x,y)	(((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES
+#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES	(sizeof(int) - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN
+#define	__CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES)
+#endif
+
+/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */
+#ifndef CMSG_LEN
+#define	CMSG_LEN(len)	(__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len))
+#endif
+
+/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */
+#ifndef CMSG_SPACE
+#define	CMSG_SPACE(len)	(__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len))
+#endif
+
+/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */
+#ifndef CMSG_DATA
+#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
+#endif /* CMSG_DATA */
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns
+ * an empty list for some reasons.
+ */
+#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR
+#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \
+	((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
+	 (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \
+	 (struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
+#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
+# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
+#endif
+
+/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
+/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
+#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
+# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#  define LITTLE_ENDIAN  1234
+# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
+# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
+#  define BIG_ENDIAN     4321
+# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
+# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+#  define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#  define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
+
+/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
+# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+# undef getopt
+# undef opterr
+# undef optind
+# undef optopt
+# undef optreset
+# undef optarg
+# define getopt(ac, av, o)  BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
+# define opterr             BSDopterr
+# define optind             BSDoptind
+# define optopt             BSDoptopt
+# define optreset           BSDoptreset
+# define optarg             BSDoptarg
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
+# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
+# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
+    defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
+# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
+# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+#  define USE_VHANGUP
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */
+
+#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
+# include <unistd.h>
+# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT
+# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__)
+#  define __func__ __FUNCTION__
+#elif !defined(HAVE___func__)
+#  define __func__ ""
+#endif
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+#  define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG)
+# define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c,d)
+#else
+# define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c)
+#endif
+
+/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
+# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
+#else
+# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
+#endif
+
+#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL
+/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value  */
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+	((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+	    ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+	((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+	    ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#else
+# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__Lynx__)
+ /*
+  * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
+  * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
+  */
+# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
+# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
+  /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
+  int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
+  int mkstemp (char *);
+  char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
+  int seteuid (uid_t);
+  int setegid (gid_t);
+  char *mkdtemp (char *);
+  int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
+  int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
+ * client program.  Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
+ *
+ * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
+ * but you may need to set it yourself
+ */
+/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
+
+/**
+ ** login recorder definitions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
+#ifndef UTMP_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_UTMP
+#    define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+#      define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+#ifndef WTMP_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_WTMP
+#    define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+#      define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
+#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
+#    define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+#      define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+# define USE_SHADOW
+#endif
+
+/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
+#  define USE_LOGIN
+
+#else
+/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
+/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
+#  if defined(UTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
+#    define USE_UTMPX
+#  endif
+#  if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
+#    define USE_UTMP
+#  endif
+#  if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
+#    define USE_WTMPX
+#  endif
+#  if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
+#    define USE_WTMP
+#  endif
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UT_LINESIZE
+# define UT_LINESIZE 8
+#endif
+
+/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
+#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+#  define USE_LASTLOG
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+# ifdef USE_SHADOW
+#  undef USE_SHADOW
+# endif
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+# define USE_LIBIAF
+#endif
+
+/* HP-UX 11.11 */
+#ifdef BTMP_FILE
+# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
+# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+#endif
+
+/** end of login recorder definitions */
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
+# undef HAVE_MMAP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef IOV_MAX
+# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
+#  define	IOV_MAX		_XOPEN_IOV_MAX
+# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
+#  define	IOV_MAX		DEF_IOV_MAX
+# else
+#  define	IOV_MAX		16
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK
+# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN	/* for non IPv6 machines */
+#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.c b/crypto/openssh/dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b766053
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.47 2008/06/26 09:19:39 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static int
+parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
+{
+	char *cp, *arg;
+	char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
+	long long n;
+
+	cp = line;
+	if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* Ignore leading whitespace */
+	if (*arg == '\0')
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+	if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
+		return 0;
+
+	/* time */
+	if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+		goto fail;
+	arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */
+	if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+		goto fail;
+	/* Ensure this is a safe prime */
+	n = strtonum(arg, 0, 5, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL || n != MODULI_TYPE_SAFE)
+		goto fail;
+	arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */
+	if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+		goto fail;
+	/* Ensure prime has been tested and is not composite */
+	n = strtonum(arg, 0, 0x1f, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL ||
+	    (n & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) || !(n & ~MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE))
+		goto fail;
+	arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */
+	if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+		goto fail;
+	n = strtonum(arg, 0, 1<<30, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL || n == 0)
+		goto fail;
+	strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */
+	if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' ||
+	    (dhg->size = (u_int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 ||
+	    errstr)
+		goto fail;
+	/* The whole group is one bit larger */
+	dhg->size++;
+	gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */
+	if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0')
+		goto fail;
+	prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */
+	if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0')
+		goto fail;
+
+	if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
+	if ((dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0)
+		goto failclean;
+
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0)
+		goto failclean;
+
+	if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size)
+		goto failclean;
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(dhg->g) || BN_is_one(dhg->g))
+		goto failclean;
+
+	return (1);
+
+ failclean:
+	BN_clear_free(dhg->g);
+	BN_clear_free(dhg->p);
+ fail:
+	error("Bad prime description in line %d", linenum);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+DH *
+choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char line[4096];
+	int best, bestcount, which;
+	int linenum;
+	struct dhgroup dhg;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL &&
+	    (f = fopen(_PATH_DH_PRIMES, "r")) == NULL) {
+		logit("WARNING: %s does not exist, using fixed modulus",
+		    _PATH_DH_MODULI);
+		return (dh_new_group14());
+	}
+
+	linenum = 0;
+	best = bestcount = 0;
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+		linenum++;
+		if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
+			continue;
+		BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
+		BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
+
+		if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min)
+			continue;
+
+		if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) ||
+		    (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) {
+			best = dhg.size;
+			bestcount = 0;
+		}
+		if (dhg.size == best)
+			bestcount++;
+	}
+	rewind(f);
+
+	if (bestcount == 0) {
+		fclose(f);
+		logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
+		return (dh_new_group14());
+	}
+
+	linenum = 0;
+	which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount);
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+		if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
+			continue;
+		if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) ||
+		    dhg.size != best ||
+		    linenum++ != which) {
+			BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
+			BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	if (linenum != which+1)
+		fatal("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up",
+		    which, _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
+
+	return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p));
+}
+
+/* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */
+
+int
+dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+{
+	int i;
+	int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
+	int bits_set = 0;
+	BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+	if (dh_pub->neg) {
+		logit("invalid public DH value: negative");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) {	/* pub_exp <= 1 */
+		logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+	    BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) {		/* pub_exp > p-2 */
+		BN_clear_free(tmp);
+		logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
+		if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
+			bits_set++;
+	debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+
+	/* if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial */
+	if (bits_set > 1)
+		return 1;
+
+	logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+{
+	int i, bits_set, tries = 0;
+
+	if (dh->p == NULL)
+		fatal("dh_gen_key: dh->p == NULL");
+	if (need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need >= BN_num_bits(dh->p))
+		fatal("dh_gen_key: group too small: %d (2*need %d)",
+		    BN_num_bits(dh->p), 2*need);
+	do {
+		if (dh->priv_key != NULL)
+			BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
+		if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_new failed");
+		/* generate a 2*need bits random private exponent */
+		if (!BN_rand(dh->priv_key, 2*need, 0, 0))
+			fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_rand failed");
+		if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+			fatal("DH_generate_key");
+		for (i = 0, bits_set = 0; i <= BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key); i++)
+			if (BN_is_bit_set(dh->priv_key, i))
+				bits_set++;
+		debug2("dh_gen_key: priv key bits set: %d/%d",
+		    bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key));
+		if (tries++ > 10)
+			fatal("dh_gen_key: too many bad keys: giving up");
+	} while (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key));
+}
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
+{
+	DH *dh;
+
+	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("dh_new_group_asc: DH_new");
+
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0)
+		fatal("BN_hex2bn p");
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0)
+		fatal("BN_hex2bn g");
+
+	return (dh);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange
+ * value.
+ */
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
+{
+	DH *dh;
+
+	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("dh_new_group: DH_new");
+	dh->p = modulus;
+	dh->g = gen;
+
+	return (dh);
+}
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group1(void)
+{
+	static char *gen = "2", *group1 =
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+	    "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+	    "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+	    "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+	    "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381"
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+	return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1));
+}
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group14(void)
+{
+	static char *gen = "2", *group14 =
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+	    "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+	    "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+	    "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+	    "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
+	    "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
+	    "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
+	    "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
+	    "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
+	    "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
+	    "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+	return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
+ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).  Estimate
+ * with:  O(exp(1.9223 * (ln q)^(1/3) (ln ln q)^(2/3)))
+ */
+
+int
+dh_estimate(int bits)
+{
+
+	if (bits <= 128)
+		return (1024);	/* O(2**86) */
+	if (bits <= 192)
+		return (2048);	/* O(2**116) */
+	return (4096);		/* O(2**156) */
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.h b/crypto/openssh/dh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfc1480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.10 2008/06/26 09:19:40 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef DH_H
+#define DH_H
+
+struct dhgroup {
+	int size;
+	BIGNUM *g;
+	BIGNUM *p;
+};
+
+DH	*choose_dh(int, int, int);
+DH	*dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *);
+DH	*dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
+DH	*dh_new_group1(void);
+DH	*dh_new_group14(void);
+
+void	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
+
+int	 dh_estimate(int);
+
+#define DH_GRP_MIN	1024
+#define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
+
+/*
+ * Values for "type" field of moduli(5)
+ * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
+ */
+#define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN		(0)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED	(1)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE		(2)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR		(3)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN	(4)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG		(5)
+
+/*
+ * Values for "tests" field of moduli(5)
+ * Specifies the methods used in checking for primality.
+ * Usually, more than one test is used.
+ */
+#define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED		(0x00)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE		(0x01)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE		(0x02)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN	(0x04)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI		(0x08)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC		(0x10)
+
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64bb809
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.22 2008/10/31 15:05:34 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+
+#define DISPATCH_MAX	255
+
+dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
+
+void
+dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+	if (!compat20)
+		fatal("protocol error");
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
+	packet_put_int(seq);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+}
+void
+dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+}
+void
+dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *dflt)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++)
+		dispatch[i] = dflt;
+}
+void
+dispatch_range(u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = from; i <= to; i++) {
+		if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX)
+			break;
+		dispatch[i] = fn;
+	}
+}
+void
+dispatch_set(int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
+{
+	dispatch[type] = fn;
+}
+void
+dispatch_run(int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, void *ctxt)
+{
+	for (;;) {
+		int type;
+		u_int32_t seqnr;
+
+		if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) {
+			type = packet_read_seqnr(&seqnr);
+		} else {
+			type = packet_read_poll_seqnr(&seqnr);
+			if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE)
+				return;
+		}
+		if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && dispatch[type] != NULL)
+			(*dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ctxt);
+		else
+			packet_disconnect("protocol error: rcvd type %d", type);
+		if (done != NULL && *done)
+			return;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e3d1a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.11 2006/04/20 09:27:09 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <signal.h>
+
+enum {
+	DISPATCH_BLOCK,
+	DISPATCH_NONBLOCK
+};
+
+typedef void dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+void	 dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *);
+void	 dispatch_set(int, dispatch_fn *);
+void	 dispatch_range(u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *);
+void	 dispatch_run(int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *);
+void	 dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, void *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.c b/crypto/openssh/dns.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7da03f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.25 2008/06/12 00:03:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static const char *errset_text[] = {
+	"success",		/* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */
+	"out of memory",	/* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */
+	"general failure",	/* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */
+	"invalid parameter",	/* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */
+	"name does not exist",	/* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */
+	"data does not exist",	/* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */
+};
+
+static const char *
+dns_result_totext(unsigned int res)
+{
+	switch (res) {
+	case ERRSET_SUCCESS:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS];
+	case ERRSET_NOMEMORY:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY];
+	case ERRSET_FAIL:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL];
+	case ERRSET_INVAL:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL];
+	case ERRSET_NONAME:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME];
+	case ERRSET_NODATA:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA];
+	default:
+		return "unknown error";
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer.
+ */
+static int
+dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
+    u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, const Key *key)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA;
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA;
+		break;
+	default:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */
+	}
+
+	if (*algorithm) {
+		*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1;
+		*digest = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, digest_len);
+		if (*digest == NULL)
+			fatal("dns_read_key: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
+		success = 1;
+	} else {
+		*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
+		*digest = NULL;
+		*digest_len = 0;
+		success = 0;
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer.
+ */
+static int
+dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
+    u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+
+	*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED;
+	*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
+
+	if (rdata_len >= 2) {
+		*algorithm = rdata[0];
+		*digest_type = rdata[1];
+		*digest_len = rdata_len - 2;
+
+		if (*digest_len > 0) {
+			*digest = (u_char *) xmalloc(*digest_len);
+			memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len);
+		} else {
+			*digest = (u_char *)xstrdup("");
+		}
+
+		success = 1;
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if hostname is numerical.
+ * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int
+is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+	/*
+	 * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error
+	 * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing.
+	 */
+	if (hostname == NULL) {
+		error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+	if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS.
+ * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise
+ */
+int
+verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
+    const Key *hostkey, int *flags)
+{
+	u_int counter;
+	int result;
+	struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
+
+	u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
+	u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type;
+	u_char *hostkey_digest;
+	u_int hostkey_digest_len;
+
+	u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm;
+	u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type;
+	u_char *dnskey_digest;
+	u_int dnskey_digest_len;
+
+	*flags = 0;
+
+	debug3("verify_host_key_dns");
+	if (hostkey == NULL)
+		fatal("No key to look up!");
+
+	if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) {
+		debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
+	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
+	if (result) {
+		verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) {
+		*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE;
+		debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS",
+		    fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
+	} else {
+		debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS",
+		    fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize host key parameters */
+	if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type,
+	    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+		error("Error calculating host key fingerprint.");
+		freerrset(fingerprints);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas)
+		*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND;
+
+	for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) {
+		/*
+		 * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly
+		 * formatted fingerprints.
+		 */
+		if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type,
+		    &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len,
+		    fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data,
+		    fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) {
+			verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS.");
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */
+		if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm &&
+		    hostkey_digest_type == dnskey_digest_type) {
+
+			if (hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len &&
+			    memcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest,
+			    hostkey_digest_len) == 0) {
+
+				*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH;
+			}
+		}
+		xfree(dnskey_digest);
+	}
+
+	xfree(hostkey_digest); /* from key_fingerprint_raw() */
+	freerrset(fingerprints);
+
+	if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND)
+		if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH)
+			debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+		else
+			debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+	else
+		debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record
+ */
+int
+export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, const Key *key, FILE *f, int generic)
+{
+	u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0;
+	u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1;
+	u_char *rdata_digest;
+	u_int rdata_digest_len;
+
+	u_int i;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type,
+	    &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) {
+
+		if (generic)
+			fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %d %02x %02x ", hostname,
+			    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 2 + rdata_digest_len,
+			    rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
+		else
+			fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname,
+			    rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++)
+			fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]);
+		fprintf(f, "\n");
+		xfree(rdata_digest); /* from key_fingerprint_raw() */
+		success = 1;
+	} else {
+		error("export_dns_rr: unsupported algorithm");
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.h b/crypto/openssh/dns.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2633a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DNS_H
+#define DNS_H
+
+enum sshfp_types {
+	SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED,
+	SSHFP_KEY_RSA,
+	SSHFP_KEY_DSA
+};
+
+enum sshfp_hashes {
+	SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED,
+	SSHFP_HASH_SHA1
+};
+
+#define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN	1
+#define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP	44
+
+#define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND	0x00000001
+#define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH	0x00000002
+#define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE	0x00000004
+
+int	verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, const Key *, int *);
+int	export_dns_rr(const char *, const Key *, FILE *, int);
+
+#endif /* DNS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/entropy.c b/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b70539
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/*
+ * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
+ * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
+ * /dev/random), then we execute a "ssh-rand-helper" program which
+ * collects entropy and writes it to stdout. The child program must
+ * write at least RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes. The child is run with stderr
+ * attached, so error/debugging output should be visible.
+ *
+ * XXX: we should tell the child how many bytes we need.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
+static uid_t original_uid, original_euid;
+#endif
+
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+	int devnull;
+	int p[2];
+	pid_t pid;
+	int ret;
+	unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+	mysig_t old_sigchld;
+
+	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	debug3("Seeding PRNG from %s", SSH_RAND_HELPER);
+
+	if ((devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't open /dev/null: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (pipe(p) == -1)
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	old_sigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO);
+		dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
+		/* Keep stderr open for errors */
+		close(p[0]);
+		close(p[1]);
+		close(devnull);
+
+		if (original_uid != original_euid &&
+		    ( seteuid(getuid()) == -1 ||
+		      setuid(original_uid) == -1) ) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "(rand child) setuid(%li): %s\n",
+			    (long int)original_uid, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+
+		execl(SSH_RAND_HELPER, "ssh-rand-helper", NULL);
+		fprintf(stderr, "(rand child) Couldn't exec '%s': %s\n",
+		    SSH_RAND_HELPER, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+
+	close(devnull);
+	close(p[1]);
+
+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+	ret = atomicio(read, p[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+	if (ret == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't read from ssh-rand-helper: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+	if (ret != sizeof(buf))
+		fatal("ssh-rand-helper child produced insufficient data");
+
+	close(p[0]);
+
+	if (waitpid(pid, &ret, 0) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh-rand-helper completion: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+	signal(SIGCHLD, old_sigchld);
+
+	/* We don't mind if the child exits upon a SIGPIPE */
+	if (!WIFEXITED(ret) &&
+	    (!WIFSIGNALED(ret) || WTERMSIG(ret) != SIGPIPE))
+		fatal("ssh-rand-helper terminated abnormally");
+	if (WEXITSTATUS(ret) != 0)
+		fatal("ssh-rand-helper exit with exit status %d", ret);
+
+	RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+}
+
+void
+init_rng(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+	 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch)
+	 */
+	if ((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & ~0xff0L)
+		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+		    "have %lx", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+	original_uid = getuid();
+	original_euid = geteuid();
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+void
+rexec_send_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+
+	if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) {
+		error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
+		    ERR_get_error());
+		buffer_put_string(m, "", 0);
+	} else 
+		buffer_put_string(m, buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+void
+rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char *buf;
+	u_int len;
+
+	buf = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len);
+	if (buf != NULL) {
+		debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %u bytes", len);
+		RAND_add(buf, len, len);
+	}
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/entropy.h b/crypto/openssh/entropy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec1ebcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/entropy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* $Id: entropy.h,v 1.5 2005/09/27 12:46:32 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef _RANDOMS_H
+#define _RANDOMS_H
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+void seed_rng(void);
+void init_rng(void);
+
+void rexec_send_rng_seed(Buffer *);
+void rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *);
+
+#endif /* _RANDOMS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/fatal.c b/crypto/openssh/fatal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e5aa3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/fatal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* Fatal messages.  This function never returns. */
+
+void
+fatal(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	cleanup_exit(255);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/fixpaths b/crypto/openssh/fixpaths
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..60a6799
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/fixpaths
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# fixpaths  - substitute makefile variables into text files
+# Usage: fixpaths -Dsomething=somethingelse ...
+
+die() {
+	echo $*
+	exit -1
+}
+
+test -n "`echo $1|grep -- -D`" || \
+	die $0: nothing to do - no substitutions listed!
+
+test -n "`echo $1|grep -- '-D[^=]\+=[^ ]\+'`" || \
+	die $0: error in command line arguments.
+
+test -n "`echo $*|grep -- ' [^-]'`" || \
+	die Usage: $0 '[-Dstring=replacement] [[infile] ...]'
+
+sed `echo $*|sed -e 's/-D\([^=]\+\)=\([^ ]*\)/-e s=\1=\2=g/g'`
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/fixprogs b/crypto/openssh/fixprogs
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..af76ee3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/fixprogs
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+#
+# fixprogs  - run through the list of entropy commands and
+#             score out the losers
+#
+
+$entscale = 50; # divisor for optional entropy measurement
+
+sub usage {
+  return("Usage: $0 <command file>\n");
+}
+
+if (($#ARGV == -1) || ($#ARGV>1)) {
+  die(&usage);
+}
+
+# 'undocumented' option - run ent (in second param) on the output
+if ($#ARGV==1) {
+  $entcmd=$ARGV[1]
+} else {
+  $entcmd = ""
+};
+
+$infilename = $ARGV[0];
+
+if (!open(IN, "<".$infilename)) {
+  die("Couldn't open input file");
+}
+$outfilename=$infilename.".out";
+if (!open(OUT, ">$outfilename")) {
+  die("Couldn't open output file $outfilename");
+}
+@infile=<IN>;
+
+select(OUT); $|=1; select(STDOUT);
+
+foreach (@infile) {
+  if (/^\s*\#/ || /^\s*$/) {
+    print OUT;
+    next;
+  }
+  ($cmd, $path, $est) = /^\"([^\"]+)\"\s+([\w\/_-]+)\s+([\d\.\-]+)/o;
+  @args = split(/ /, $cmd);
+   if (! ($pid = fork())) {
+     # child
+     close STDIN; close STDOUT; close STDERR;
+     open (STDIN,  "</dev/null");
+     open (STDOUT, ">/dev/null");
+     open (STDERR, ">/dev/null");
+     exec $path @args;
+     exit 1; # shouldn't be here
+   }
+   # parent
+   waitpid ($pid, 0); $ret=$? >> 8;
+
+  if ($ret != 0) {
+    $path = "undef";
+  } else {
+    if ($entcmd ne "") {
+      # now try to run ent on the command
+      $mostargs=join(" ", splice(@args,1));
+      print "Evaluating '$path $mostargs'\n";
+      @ent = qx{$path $mostargs | $entcmd -b -t};
+      @ent = grep(/^1,/, @ent);
+      ($null, $null, $rate) = split(/,/, $ent[0]);
+      $est = $rate / $entscale;		# scale the estimate back
+    }
+  }
+  print OUT "\"$cmd\" $path $est\n";
+}
+
+close(IN);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2381aeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.13 2008/07/04 03:44:59 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static int ngroups;
+static char **groups_byname;
+
+/*
+ * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and
+ * supplementary groups.  Return the number of groups in the list.
+ */
+int
+ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base)
+{
+	gid_t *groups_bygid;
+	int i, j;
+	struct group *gr;
+
+	if (ngroups > 0)
+		ga_free();
+
+	ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX;
+#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)
+	ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX));
+#endif
+
+	groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
+	groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname));
+
+	if (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1)
+		logit("getgrouplist: groups list too small");
+	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+		if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL)
+			groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name);
+	xfree(groups_bygid);
+	return (ngroups = j);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups.
+ * Return 0 otherwise.  Use match_pattern() for string comparison.
+ */
+int
+ga_match(char * const *groups, int n)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+		for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+			if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j]))
+				return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list.
+ * Return 0 on negated or no match.
+ */
+int
+ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern)
+{
+	int i, found = 0;
+	size_t len = strlen(group_pattern);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
+		switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i],
+		    group_pattern, len, 0)) {
+		case -1:
+			return 0;	/* Negated match wins */
+		case 0:
+			continue;
+		case 1:
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return found;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free memory allocated for group access list.
+ */
+void
+ga_free(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (ngroups > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+			xfree(groups_byname[i]);
+		ngroups = 0;
+		xfree(groups_byname);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.h b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..000578e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.h,v 1.8 2008/07/04 03:44:59 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GROUPACCESS_H
+#define GROUPACCESS_H
+
+int	 ga_init(const char *, gid_t);
+int	 ga_match(char * const *, int);
+int	 ga_match_pattern_list(const char *);
+void	 ga_free(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..842f385
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
+/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
+	    ctx->oid->length == len &&
+	    memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0);
+}
+
+/* Set the contexts OID from a data stream */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	if (ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
+		xfree(ctx->oid->elements);
+		xfree(ctx->oid);
+	}
+	ctx->oid = xmalloc(sizeof(gss_OID_desc));
+	ctx->oid->length = len;
+	ctx->oid->elements = xmalloc(len);
+	memcpy(ctx->oid->elements, data, len);
+}
+
+/* Set the contexts OID */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid)
+{
+	ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(ctx, oid->elements, oid->length);
+}
+
+/* All this effort to report an error ... */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	char *s;
+
+	s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL);
+	debug("%s", s);
+	xfree(s);
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status,
+    OM_uint32 *minor_status)
+{
+	OM_uint32 lmin;
+	gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	OM_uint32 ctx;
+	Buffer b;
+	char *ret;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+
+	if (major_status != NULL)
+		*major_status = ctxt->major;
+	if (minor_status != NULL)
+		*minor_status = ctxt->minor;
+
+	ctx = 0;
+	/* The GSSAPI error */
+	do {
+		gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major,
+		    GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
+
+		buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
+		buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
+
+		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
+	} while (ctx != 0);
+
+	/* The mechanism specific error */
+	do {
+		gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor,
+		    GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
+
+		buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
+		buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
+
+		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
+	} while (ctx != 0);
+
+	buffer_put_char(&b, '\0');
+	ret = xmalloc(buffer_len(&b));
+	buffer_get(&b, ret, buffer_len(&b));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise our GSSAPI context. We use this opaque structure to contain all
+ * of the data which both the client and server need to persist across
+ * {accept,init}_sec_context calls, so that when we do it from the userauth
+ * stuff life is a little easier
+ */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+{
+	*ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt));
+	(*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+	(*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+	(*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+	(*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+	(*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+	(*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+}
+
+/* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+{
+	OM_uint32 ms;
+
+	if ((*ctx) == NULL)
+		return;
+	if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+		gss_delete_sec_context(&ms, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+	if ((*ctx)->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+		gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->name);
+	if ((*ctx)->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
+		xfree((*ctx)->oid->elements);
+		xfree((*ctx)->oid);
+		(*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+	}
+	if ((*ctx)->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+		gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->creds);
+	if ((*ctx)->client != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+		gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client);
+	if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+		gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds);
+
+	xfree(*ctx);
+	*ctx = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper to init_sec_context
+ * Requires that the context contains:
+ *	oid
+ *	server name (from ssh_gssapi_import_name)
+ */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+    gss_buffer_desc* send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
+{
+	int deleg_flag = 0;
+
+	if (deleg_creds) {
+		deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+		debug("Delegating credentials");
+	}
+
+	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+	    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* Create a service name for the given host */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+	char *val;
+
+	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host);
+	gssbuf.value = val;
+	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor,
+	    &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	xfree(gssbuf.value);
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+{
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+    const char *context)
+{
+	buffer_init(b);
+	buffer_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+	buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	buffer_put_cstring(b, user);
+	buffer_put_cstring(b, service);
+	buffer_put_cstring(b, context);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
+	gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+
+	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+	    (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0))
+		return 0; /* false */
+
+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+		    NULL);
+		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
+		if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+			gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context,
+			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+	}
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+	return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a625ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef KRB5
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+# include <krb5.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+#  include <gssapi_krb5.h>
+# elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+#  include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
+
+/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+{
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+
+	if (krb_context != NULL)
+		return 1;
+
+	problem = krb5_init_context(&krb_context);
+	if (problem) {
+		logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+ * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+ * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+ */
+
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+{
+	krb5_principal princ;
+	int retval;
+
+	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value,
+	    &princ))) {
+		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, retval));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
+		retval = 1;
+		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+	} else
+		retval = 0;
+
+	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+
+/* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+ * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+
+static void
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+	krb5_ccache ccache;
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+	krb5_principal princ;
+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+	int len;
+
+	if (client->creds == NULL) {
+		debug("No credentials stored");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+		return;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+	if ((problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(krb_context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache))) {
+		logit("krb5_cc_gen_new(): %.100s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+		return;
+	}
+#else
+	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
+		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+		return;
+	}
+#endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
+
+	if ((problem = krb5_parse_name(krb_context,
+	    client->exportedname.value, &princ))) {
+		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
+		logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+
+	if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status,
+	    client->creds, ccache))) {
+		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
+		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
+	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+	len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+	client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+	snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
+#endif
+
+	krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+	"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+	"Kerberos",
+	{9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
+	NULL,
+	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+	NULL,
+	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+};
+
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ec7ea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+#endif
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
+#ifdef KRB5
+	&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
+#endif
+	&gssapi_null_mech,
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
+ * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
+ */
+
+/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
+/* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
+{
+	OM_uint32 status;
+	char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+	gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+	if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+	    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+{
+	if (*ctx)
+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+	return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+	OM_uint32 min_status;
+	int present;
+	gss_OID_set supported;
+
+	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+	gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
+
+	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+		    &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present)))
+			present = 0;
+		if (present)
+			gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+			    &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset);
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
+}
+
+
+/* Wrapper around accept_sec_context
+ * Requires that the context contains:
+ *    oid
+ *    credentials	(from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred)
+ */
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+    gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
+{
+	OM_uint32 status;
+	gss_OID mech;
+
+	ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+	    &ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok,
+	    GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech,
+	    send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	if (ctx->client_creds)
+		debug("Received some client credentials");
+	else
+		debug("Got no client credentials");
+
+	status = ctx->major;
+
+	/* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
+	 * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
+	 */
+
+	if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
+	    (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
+		if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
+			fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
+	}
+
+	return (status);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion
+ * to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism
+ * originally selected.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+{
+	u_char *tok;
+	OM_uint32 offset;
+	OM_uint32 oidl;
+
+	tok = ename->value;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
+	 * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
+	 */
+
+	if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition
+	 * and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things
+	 * there are two lengths - the first including these, and the
+	 * second without.
+	 */
+
+	oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
+	oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */
+
+	/*
+	 * Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the
+	 * string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context
+	 */
+	if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl ||
+	    ename->length < oidl+6 ||
+	    !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	offset = oidl+6;
+
+	if (ename->length < offset+4)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	name->length = get_u32(tok+offset);
+	offset += 4;
+
+	if (ename->length < offset+name->length)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1);
+	memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length);
+	((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+ * be called once for a context */
+
+/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	gss_buffer_desc ename;
+
+	client->mech = NULL;
+
+	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+		if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length &&
+		    (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements,
+		    ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0))
+			client->mech = supported_mechs[i];
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	if (client->mech == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+	    &ename))) {
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
+	    &client->exportedname))) {
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+
+	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* As user - called on fatal/exit */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+{
+	if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
+		/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
+		debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+		    gssapi_client.store.filename);
+		unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
+	}
+}
+
+/* As user */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+{
+	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+	} else
+		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
+}
+
+/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based
+ * on the passed authentication process and credentials.
+ */
+/* As user */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+{
+
+	if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL &&
+	    gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) {
+		debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+		    gssapi_client.store.envval);
+		child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+		    gssapi_client.store.envval);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+{
+	OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+	if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
+	    gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
+		debug("No suitable client data");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+			return 1;
+		else {
+			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
+			memset(&gssapi_client, 0, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cceb35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.45 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static int
+extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, char *salt, size_t salt_len)
+{
+	char *p, *b64salt;
+	u_int b64len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: string too short");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
+	l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
+	if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	b64len = p - s;
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len);
+	memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len);
+	b64salt[b64len] = '\0';
+
+	ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len);
+	xfree(b64salt);
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (ret != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %d, got %d",
+		    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, ret);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+char *
+host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
+{
+	const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha1();
+	HMAC_CTX mac_ctx;
+	char salt[256], result[256], uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
+	static char encoded[1024];
+	u_int i, len;
+
+	len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+	if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
+		/* Create new salt */
+		for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+			salt[i] = arc4random();
+	} else {
+		/* Extract salt from known host entry */
+		if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt,
+		    sizeof(salt)) == -1)
+			return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	HMAC_Init(&mac_ctx, salt, len, md);
+	HMAC_Update(&mac_ctx, host, strlen(host));
+	HMAC_Final(&mac_ctx, result, NULL);
+	HMAC_cleanup(&mac_ctx);
+
+	if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
+	    __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
+		fatal("host_hash: __b64_ntop failed");
+
+	snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt,
+	    HASH_DELIM, uu_result);
+
+	return (encoded);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string.  Moves the
+ * pointer over the key.  Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end.
+ */
+
+int
+hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, Key *ret)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	/* Skip leading whitespace. */
+	for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+		;
+
+	if (key_read(ret, &cp) != 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Skip trailing whitespace. */
+	for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+		;
+
+	/* Return results. */
+	*cpp = cp;
+	*bitsp = key_size(ret);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host, const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL)
+		return 1;
+	if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) {
+		logit("Warning: %s, line %d: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
+		    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
+		    filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+		logit("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %d.",
+		    bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum);
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether the given host (which must be in all lowercase) is already
+ * in the list of our known hosts. Returns HOST_OK if the host is known and
+ * has the specified key, HOST_NEW if the host is not known, and HOST_CHANGED
+ * if the host is known but used to have a different host key.
+ *
+ * If no 'key' has been specified and a key of type 'keytype' is known
+ * for the specified host, then HOST_FOUND is returned.
+ */
+
+static HostStatus
+check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename,
+    const char *host, const Key *key, int keytype, Key *found, int *numret)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char line[8192];
+	int linenum = 0;
+	u_int kbits;
+	char *cp, *cp2, *hashed_host;
+	HostStatus end_return;
+
+	debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: filename %s", filename);
+
+	/* Open the file containing the list of known hosts. */
+	f = fopen(filename, "r");
+	if (!f)
+		return HOST_NEW;
+
+	/*
+	 * Return value when the loop terminates.  This is set to
+	 * HOST_CHANGED if we have seen a different key for the host and have
+	 * not found the proper one.
+	 */
+	end_return = HOST_NEW;
+
+	/* Go through the file. */
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+		cp = line;
+		linenum++;
+
+		/* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
+		for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
+			continue;
+
+		/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
+		for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
+			;
+
+		/* Check if the host name matches. */
+		if (match_hostname(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 1) {
+			if (*cp != HASH_DELIM)
+				continue;
+			hashed_host = host_hash(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp));
+			if (hashed_host == NULL) {
+				debug("Invalid hashed host line %d of %s",
+				    linenum, filename);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (strncmp(hashed_host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 0)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Got a match.  Skip host name. */
+		cp = cp2;
+
+		/*
+		 * Extract the key from the line.  This will skip any leading
+		 * whitespace.  Ignore badly formatted lines.
+		 */
+		if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, found))
+			continue;
+
+		if (numret != NULL)
+			*numret = linenum;
+
+		if (key == NULL) {
+			/* we found a key of the requested type */
+			if (found->type == keytype) {
+				fclose(f);
+				return HOST_FOUND;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, found, host, filename, linenum))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Check if the current key is the same as the given key. */
+		if (key_equal(key, found)) {
+			/* Ok, they match. */
+			debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: match line %d", linenum);
+			fclose(f);
+			return HOST_OK;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * They do not match.  We will continue to go through the
+		 * file; however, we note that we will not return that it is
+		 * new.
+		 */
+		end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
+	}
+	/* Clear variables and close the file. */
+	fclose(f);
+
+	/*
+	 * Return either HOST_NEW or HOST_CHANGED, depending on whether we
+	 * saw a different key for the host.
+	 */
+	return end_return;
+}
+
+HostStatus
+check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key,
+    Key *found, int *numret)
+{
+	if (key == NULL)
+		fatal("no key to look up");
+	return (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, key, 0,
+	    found, numret));
+}
+
+int
+lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *filename, const char *host,
+    int keytype, Key *found, int *numret)
+{
+	return (check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(filename, host, NULL,
+	    keytype, found, numret) == HOST_FOUND);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Appends an entry to the host file.  Returns false if the entry could not
+ * be appended.
+ */
+
+int
+add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key,
+    int store_hash)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int success = 0;
+	char *hashed_host = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return 1;	/* XXX ? */
+	f = fopen(filename, "a");
+	if (!f)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (store_hash) {
+		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+			error("add_host_to_hostfile: host_hash failed");
+			fclose(f);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	fprintf(f, "%s ", store_hash ? hashed_host : host);
+
+	if (key_write(key, f)) {
+		success = 1;
+	} else {
+		error("add_host_to_hostfile: saving key in %s failed", filename);
+	}
+	fprintf(f, "\n");
+	fclose(f);
+	return success;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1983b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef HOSTFILE_H
+#define HOSTFILE_H
+
+typedef enum {
+	HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_FOUND
+}       HostStatus;
+
+int	 hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, Key *);
+HostStatus check_host_in_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
+	    const Key *, Key *, int *);
+int	add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, const Key *, int);
+int	lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *, const char *,
+	    int, Key *, int *);
+
+#define HASH_MAGIC	"|1|"
+#define HASH_DELIM	'|'
+
+char	*host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/includes.h b/crypto/openssh/includes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6bb9878
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/includes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file includes most of the needed system headers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef INCLUDES_H
+#define INCLUDES_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h> /* For CMSG_* */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H
+# include <bstring.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
+    defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && \
+    defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) &&  HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
+    !defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+# include <glob.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+# include <endian.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H
+# include <ttyent.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H
+# include <utime.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+# include <maillock.h> /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+# include <libc.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+# include <strings.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#  include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#  include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#  include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
+# include <sys/bsdtty.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <termios.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+# include <sys/bitypes.h> /* For u_intXX_t */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+# include <sys/cdefs.h> /* For __P() */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h> /* For S_* constants and macros */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h> /* For MIN, MAX, etc */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+#include <sys/mman.h> /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
+#include <sys/strtio.h>	/* for TIOCCBRK on HP-UX */
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H) && defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+# if defined(HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H)
+#  include <sys/stream.h>	/* reqd for queue_t on Solaris 2.5.1 */
+# endif
+#include <sys/ptms.h>	/* for grantpt() and friends */
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h> /* For typedefs */
+#ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
+# include <rpc/types.h> /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+# include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
+# include <readpassphrase.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IA_H
+# include <ia.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IAF_H
+# include <iaf.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
+# include <tmpdir.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+# include <libutil.h> /* Openpty on FreeBSD at least */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+# include <krb5.h>
+# include <kafs.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H)
+# include <sys/syslog.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+/*
+ * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations
+ * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here.
+ */
+#ifdef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
+# ifdef _INCLUDE__STDC__
+#  undef _INCLUDE__STDC__
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#include "platform.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h"
+
+#include "entropy.h"
+
+#endif /* INCLUDES_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/jpake.c b/crypto/openssh/jpake.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1306610
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/jpake.c
@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.2 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Shared components of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
+ * as described in:
+ *
+ * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
+ * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
+ *
+ * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "jpake.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+
+/* RFC3526 group 5, 1536 bits */
+#define JPAKE_GROUP_G "2"
+#define JPAKE_GROUP_P \
+	"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74" \
+	"020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F1437" \
+	"4FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \
+	"EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF05" \
+	"98DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB" \
+	"9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA237327FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
+
+struct modp_group *
+jpake_default_group(void)
+{
+	return modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(JPAKE_GROUP_G, JPAKE_GROUP_P);
+}
+
+struct jpake_ctx *
+jpake_new(void)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *ret;
+
+	ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
+
+	ret->grp = jpake_default_group();
+
+	ret->s = ret->k = NULL;
+	ret->x1 = ret->x2 = ret->x3 = ret->x4 = NULL;
+	ret->g_x1 = ret->g_x2 = ret->g_x3 = ret->g_x4 = NULL;
+	ret->a = ret->b = NULL;
+
+	ret->client_id = ret->server_id = NULL;
+	ret->h_k_cid_sessid = ret->h_k_sid_sessid = NULL;
+
+	debug3("%s: alloc %p", __func__, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *pctx)
+{
+	debug3("%s: free %p", __func__, pctx);
+
+#define JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(v)			\
+	do {					\
+		if ((v) != NULL) {		\
+			BN_clear_free(v);	\
+			(v) = NULL;		\
+		}				\
+	} while (0)
+#define JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(v, l)		\
+	do {					\
+		if ((v) != NULL) {		\
+			bzero((v), (l));	\
+			xfree(v);		\
+			(v) = NULL;		\
+			(l) = 0;		\
+		}				\
+	} while (0)
+
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->s);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->k);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x1);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x2);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x3);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->x4);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x1);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x2);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x3);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->g_x4);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->a);
+	JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->b);
+
+	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
+	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+	JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+#undef JPAKE_BN_CLEAR_FREE
+#undef JPAKE_BUF_CLEAR_FREE
+
+	bzero(pctx, sizeof(pctx));
+	xfree(pctx);
+}
+
+/* dump entire jpake_ctx. NB. includes private values! */
+void
+jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *pctx, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *out;
+	va_list args;
+
+	out = NULL;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (out == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+	debug3("%s: %s (ctx at %p)", __func__, out, pctx);
+	if (pctx == NULL) {
+		free(out);
+		return;
+	}
+
+#define JPAKE_DUMP_BN(a)	do { \
+		if ((a) != NULL) \
+			JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(((a), "%s = ", #a)); \
+	} while (0)
+#define JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(a, b)	do { \
+		if ((a) != NULL) \
+			JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((a, b, "%s", #a)); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->s);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->k);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x1);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x2);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x3);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->x4);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x1);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x2);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x3);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->g_x4);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->a);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BN(pctx->b);
+
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+	JPAKE_DUMP_BUF(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+	debug3("%s: %s done", __func__, out);
+	free(out);
+}
+
+/* Shared parts of step 1 exchange calculation */
+void
+jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
+    u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
+    BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
+    u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
+    u_char **priv2_proof, u_int *priv2_proof_len)
+{
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Random nonce to prevent replay */
+	*id = xmalloc(KZP_ID_LEN);
+	*id_len = KZP_ID_LEN;
+	arc4random_buf(*id, *id_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * x1/x3 is a random element of Zq
+	 * x2/x4 is a random element of Z*q
+	 * We also exclude [1] from x1/x3 candidates and [0, 1] from
+	 * x2/x4 candiates to avoid possible degeneracy (i.e. g^0, g^1).
+	 */
+	if ((*priv1 = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp->q)) == NULL ||
+	    (*priv2 = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp->q)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: bn_rand_range_gt_one", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * client: g_x1 = g^x1 mod p / server: g_x3 = g^x3 mod p
+	 * client: g_x2 = g^x2 mod p / server: g_x4 = g^x4 mod p
+	 */
+	if ((*g_priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*g_priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_exp(*g_priv1, grp->g, *priv1, grp->p, bn_ctx) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_exp(*g_priv2, grp->g, *priv2, grp->p, bn_ctx) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
+
+	/* Generate proofs for holding x1/x3 and x2/x4 */
+	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
+	    *priv1, *g_priv1, *id, *id_len,
+	    priv1_proof, priv1_proof_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
+	    *priv2, *g_priv2, *id, *id_len,
+	    priv2_proof, priv2_proof_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
+
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+}
+
+/* Shared parts of step 2 exchange calculation */
+void
+jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
+    BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
+    const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
+    const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
+    const u_char *theirpub1_proof, u_int theirpub1_proof_len,
+    const u_char *theirpub2_proof, u_int theirpub2_proof_len,
+    BIGNUM **newpub,
+    u_char **newpub_exponent_proof, u_int *newpub_exponent_proof_len)
+{
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+	BIGNUM *tmp, *exponent;
+
+	/* Validate peer's step 1 values */
+	if (BN_cmp(theirpub1, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: theirpub1 <= 1", __func__);
+	if (BN_cmp(theirpub2, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: theirpub2 <= 1", __func__);
+
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub1,
+	    theirid, theirid_len, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub1 failed", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub2,
+	    theirid, theirid_len, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub2 failed", __func__);
+
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+
+	if ((*newpub = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * client: exponent = x2 * s mod p
+	 * server: exponent = x4 * s mod p
+	 */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(exponent, mypriv2, s, grp->q, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (exponent = mypriv2 * s mod p)",
+		    __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * client: tmp = g^(x1 + x3 + x4) mod p
+	 * server: tmp = g^(x1 + x2 + x3) mod p
+	 */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, mypub1, theirpub1, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = mypub1 * theirpub1 mod p)",
+		    __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, theirpub2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * theirpub2 mod p)", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * client: a = tmp^exponent = g^((x1+x3+x4) * x2 * s) mod p
+	 * server: b = tmp^exponent = g^((x1+x2+x3) * x4 * s) mod p
+	 */
+	if (BN_mod_exp(*newpub, tmp, exponent, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (newpub = tmp^exponent mod p)", __func__);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((exponent, "%s: exponent = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Note the generator here is 'tmp', not g */
+	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, exponent, *newpub,
+	    myid, myid_len,
+	    newpub_exponent_proof, newpub_exponent_proof_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign newpub", __func__);
+
+	BN_clear_free(tmp); /* XXX stash for later use? */
+	BN_clear_free(exponent); /* XXX stash for later use? (yes, in conf) */
+
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+}
+
+/* Confirmation hash calculation */
+void
+jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *k,
+    const u_char *endpoint_id, u_int endpoint_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate confirmation proof:
+	 *     client: H(k || client_id || session_id)
+	 *     server: H(k || server_id || session_id)
+	 */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, endpoint_id, endpoint_id_len);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, sess_id, sess_id_len);
+	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
+	    confirm_hash, confirm_hash_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+}
+
+/* Shared parts of key derivation and confirmation calculation */
+void
+jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
+    BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
+    BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
+    const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
+    const u_char *their_id, u_int their_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    const u_char *theirpriv2_s_proof, u_int theirpriv2_s_proof_len,
+    BIGNUM **k,
+    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+	BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*k = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Validate step 2 values */
+	if (BN_cmp(step2_val, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: step2_val <= 1", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * theirpriv2_s_proof is calculated with a different generator:
+	 * tmp = g^(mypriv1+mypriv2+theirpub1) = g^mypub1*g^mypub2*g^theirpub1
+	 * Calculate it here so we can check the signature.
+	 */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, mypub1, mypub2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = mypub1 * mypub2 mod p)", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, theirpub1, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * theirpub1 mod p)", __func__);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
+
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, step2_val, 
+	    their_id, their_id_len,
+	    theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpriv2_s_proof failed", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * Derive shared key:
+	 *     client: k = (b / g^(x2*x4*s))^x2 = g^((x1+x3)*x2*x4*s)
+	 *     server: k = (a / g^(x2*x4*s))^x4 = g^((x1+x3)*x2*x4*s)
+	 *
+	 * Computed as:
+	 *     client: k = (g_x4^(q - (x2 * s)) * b)^x2 mod p
+	 *     server: k = (g_x2^(q - (x4 * s)) * b)^x4 mod p
+	 */
+	if (BN_mul(tmp, mypriv2, s, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mul (tmp = mypriv2 * s)", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_sub(tmp, grp->q, tmp, grp->q, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_sub (tmp = q - tmp mod q)", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_exp(tmp, theirpub2, tmp, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp (tmp = theirpub2^tmp) mod p", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, step2_val, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = tmp * step2_val) mod p", __func__);
+	if (BN_mod_exp(*k, tmp, mypriv2, grp->p, bn_ctx) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp (k = tmp^mypriv2) mod p", __func__);
+	
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+	jpake_confirm_hash(*k, my_id, my_id_len, sess_id, sess_id_len,
+	    confirm_hash, confirm_hash_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate and check confirmation hash from peer. Returns 1 on success
+ * 0 on failure/mismatch.
+ */
+int
+jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
+    const u_char *peer_id, u_int peer_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    const u_char *peer_confirm_hash, u_int peer_confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	u_char *expected_confirm_hash;
+	u_int expected_confirm_hash_len;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	/* Calculate and verify expected confirmation hash */
+	jpake_confirm_hash(k, peer_id, peer_id_len, sess_id, sess_id_len,
+	    &expected_confirm_hash, &expected_confirm_hash_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len,
+	    "%s: expected confirm hash", __func__));
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF((peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len,
+	    "%s: received confirm hash", __func__));
+
+	if (peer_confirm_hash_len != expected_confirm_hash_len)
+		error("%s: confirmation length mismatch (my %u them %u)",
+		    __func__, expected_confirm_hash_len, peer_confirm_hash_len);
+	else if (memcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
+	    expected_confirm_hash_len) == 0)
+		success = 1;
+	bzero(expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len);
+	xfree(expected_confirm_hash);
+	debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
+	return success;
+}
+
+/* XXX main() function with tests */
+
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/jpake.h b/crypto/openssh/jpake.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3f2cf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/jpake.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: jpake.h,v 1.2 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef JPAKE_H
+#define JPAKE_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/* Set JPAKE_DEBUG in CFLAGS for privacy-violating debugging */
+#ifndef JPAKE_DEBUG
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(a)
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX(a)
+#else
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(a)	debug3_bn a
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)	debug3_buf a
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX(a)	jpake_dump a
+#endif /* JPAKE_DEBUG */
+
+#define KZP_ID_LEN	16	/* Length of client and server IDs */
+
+struct jpake_ctx {
+	/* Parameters */
+	struct modp_group *grp;
+
+	/* Private values shared by client and server */
+	BIGNUM *s;			/* Secret (salted, crypted password) */
+	BIGNUM *k;			/* Derived key */
+
+	/* Client private values (NULL for server) */
+	BIGNUM *x1;			/* random in Zq */
+	BIGNUM *x2;			/* random in Z*q */
+
+	/* Server private values (NULL for server) */
+	BIGNUM *x3;			/* random in Zq */
+	BIGNUM *x4;			/* random in Z*q */
+
+	/* Step 1: C->S */
+	u_char *client_id;		/* Anti-replay nonce */
+	u_int client_id_len;
+	BIGNUM *g_x1;			/* g^x1 */
+	BIGNUM *g_x2;			/* g^x2 */
+
+	/* Step 1: S->C */
+	u_char *server_id;		/* Anti-replay nonce */
+	u_int server_id_len;
+	BIGNUM *g_x3;			/* g^x3 */
+	BIGNUM *g_x4;			/* g^x4 */
+
+	/* Step 2: C->S */
+	BIGNUM *a;			/* g^((x1+x3+x4)*x2*s) */
+
+	/* Step 2: S->C */
+	BIGNUM *b;			/* g^((x1+x2+x3)*x4*s) */
+
+	/* Confirmation: C->S */
+	u_char *h_k_cid_sessid;		/* H(k || client_id || session_id) */
+	u_int h_k_cid_sessid_len;
+
+	/* Confirmation: S->C */
+	u_char *h_k_sid_sessid;		/* H(k || server_id || session_id) */
+	u_int h_k_sid_sessid_len;
+};
+
+/* jpake.c */
+struct modp_group *jpake_default_group(void);
+void jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+struct jpake_ctx *jpake_new(void);
+void jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *);
+
+void jpake_step1(struct modp_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
+    BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
+    u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void jpake_step2(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int,
+    u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+int jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+#endif /* JPAKE_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4f44f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,567 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.81 2009/05/27 06:34:36 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+# else
+extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* prototype */
+static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *);
+static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
+
+/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
+static void
+kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	buffer_clear(b);
+	/*
+	 * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
+	 * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
+		buffer_put_char(b, 0);
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+		buffer_put_cstring(b, proposal[i]);
+	buffer_put_char(b, 0);			/* first_kex_packet_follows */
+	buffer_put_int(b, 0);			/* uint32 reserved */
+}
+
+/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
+static char **
+kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw, int *first_kex_follows)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	u_int i;
+	char **proposal;
+
+	proposal = xcalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *));
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(raw), buffer_len(raw));
+	/* skip cookie */
+	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
+		buffer_get_char(&b);
+	/* extract kex init proposal strings */
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+		proposal[i] = buffer_get_string(&b,NULL);
+		debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: %s", proposal[i]);
+	}
+	/* first kex follows / reserved */
+	i = buffer_get_char(&b);
+	if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
+		*first_kex_follows = i;
+	debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", i);
+	i = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %u ", i);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return proposal;
+}
+
+static void
+kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+		xfree(proposal[i]);
+	xfree(proposal);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	error("Hm, kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+}
+
+static void
+kex_reset_dispatch(void)
+{
+	dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
+	    SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+}
+
+void
+kex_finish(Kex *kex)
+{
+	kex_reset_dispatch();
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+	packet_send();
+	/* packet_write_wait(); */
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
+	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
+
+	kex->done = 1;
+	buffer_clear(&kex->peer);
+	/* buffer_clear(&kex->my); */
+	kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
+	xfree(kex->name);
+	kex->name = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex)
+{
+	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+	u_char *cookie;
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (kex == NULL) {
+		error("kex_send_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) {
+		debug("KEX_INIT_SENT");
+		return;
+	}
+	kex->done = 0;
+
+	/* generate a random cookie */
+	if (buffer_len(&kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN)
+		fatal("kex_send_kexinit: kex proposal too short");
+	cookie = buffer_ptr(&kex->my);
+	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
+		if (i % 4 == 0)
+			rnd = arc4random();
+		cookie[i] = rnd;
+		rnd >>= 8;
+	}
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+	packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
+	packet_send();
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
+	kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	u_int i, dlen;
+	Kex *kex = (Kex *)ctxt;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
+	if (kex == NULL)
+		fatal("kex_input_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
+
+	ptr = packet_get_raw(&dlen);
+	buffer_append(&kex->peer, ptr, dlen);
+
+	/* discard packet */
+	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
+		packet_get_char();
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+		xfree(packet_get_string(NULL));
+	(void) packet_get_char();
+	(void) packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	kex_kexinit_finish(kex);
+}
+
+Kex *
+kex_setup(char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+	Kex *kex;
+
+	kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
+	buffer_init(&kex->peer);
+	buffer_init(&kex->my);
+	kex_prop2buf(&kex->my, proposal);
+	kex->done = 0;
+
+	kex_send_kexinit(kex);					/* we start */
+	kex_reset_dispatch();
+
+	return kex;
+}
+
+static void
+kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex)
+{
+	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+		kex_send_kexinit(kex);
+
+	kex_choose_conf(kex);
+
+	if (kex->kex_type >= 0 && kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX &&
+	    kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) {
+		(kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(kex);
+	} else {
+		fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+	if (name == NULL)
+		fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
+		    client, server);
+	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
+		fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
+	enc->name = name;
+	enc->enabled = 0;
+	enc->iv = NULL;
+	enc->key = NULL;
+	enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
+	enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
+}
+
+static void
+choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+	if (name == NULL)
+		fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
+		    client, server);
+	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
+		fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
+	/* truncate the key */
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
+		mac->key_len = 16;
+	mac->name = name;
+	mac->key = NULL;
+	mac->enabled = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+	if (name == NULL)
+		fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+		comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
+	} else {
+		fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
+	}
+	comp->name = name;
+}
+
+static void
+choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+	if (k->name == NULL)
+		fatal("Unable to negotiate a key exchange method");
+	if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DH1) == 0) {
+		k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1;
+		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+	} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DH14) == 0) {
+		k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1;
+		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+	} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA1) == 0) {
+		k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1;
+		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+	} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
+		k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
+		k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
+#endif
+	} else
+		fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
+}
+
+static void
+choose_hostkeyalg(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	char *hostkeyalg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+	if (hostkeyalg == NULL)
+		fatal("no hostkey alg");
+	k->hostkey_type = key_type_from_name(hostkeyalg);
+	if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		fatal("bad hostkey alg '%s'", hostkeyalg);
+	xfree(hostkeyalg);
+}
+
+static int
+proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+	static int check[] = {
+		PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1
+	};
+	int *idx;
+	char *p;
+
+	for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) {
+		if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
+			*p = '\0';
+		if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
+			*p = '\0';
+		if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) {
+			debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s",
+			    my[*idx], peer[*idx]);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+	debug2("proposals match");
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
+{
+	Newkeys *newkeys;
+	char **my, **peer;
+	char **cprop, **sprop;
+	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+	u_int mode, ctos, need;
+	int first_kex_follows, type;
+
+	my   = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my, NULL);
+	peer = kex_buf2prop(&kex->peer, &first_kex_follows);
+
+	if (kex->server) {
+		cprop=peer;
+		sprop=my;
+	} else {
+		cprop=my;
+		sprop=peer;
+	}
+
+	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		newkeys = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys));
+		kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
+		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+		    (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+		nenc  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
+		nmac  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
+		ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
+		choose_enc (&newkeys->enc,  cprop[nenc],  sprop[nenc]);
+		choose_mac (&newkeys->mac,  cprop[nmac],  sprop[nmac]);
+		choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]);
+		debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
+		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+		    newkeys->enc.name,
+		    newkeys->mac.name,
+		    newkeys->comp.name);
+	}
+	choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+	choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+	    sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
+	need = 0;
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
+		if (need < newkeys->enc.key_len)
+			need = newkeys->enc.key_len;
+		if (need < newkeys->enc.block_size)
+			need = newkeys->enc.block_size;
+		if (need < newkeys->mac.key_len)
+			need = newkeys->mac.key_len;
+	}
+	/* XXX need runden? */
+	kex->we_need = need;
+
+	/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
+	if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) &&
+	    !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
+		type = packet_read();
+		debug2("skipping next packet (type %u)", type);
+	}
+
+	kex_prop_free(my);
+	kex_prop_free(peer);
+}
+
+static u_char *
+derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+    BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+	char c = id;
+	u_int have;
+	int mdsz;
+	u_char *digest;
+
+	if ((mdsz = EVP_MD_size(kex->evp_md)) <= 0)
+		fatal("bad kex md size %d", mdsz);
+	digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+
+	/* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, kex->evp_md);
+	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY))
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, hashlen);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, &c, 1);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * expand key:
+	 * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
+	 * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
+	 */
+	for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
+		EVP_DigestInit(&md, kex->evp_md);
+		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY))
+			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, hashlen);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, digest, have);
+		EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest + have, NULL);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&b);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
+	dump_digest("key", digest, need);
+#endif
+	return digest;
+}
+
+Newkeys *current_keys[MODE_MAX];
+
+#define NKEYS	6
+void
+kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+{
+	u_char *keys[NKEYS];
+	u_int i, mode, ctos;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
+		keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
+		    shared_secret);
+	}
+
+	debug2("kex_derive_keys");
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		current_keys[mode] = kex->newkeys[mode];
+		kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+		    (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+		current_keys[mode]->enc.iv  = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
+		current_keys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
+		current_keys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
+	}
+}
+
+Newkeys *
+kex_get_newkeys(int mode)
+{
+	Newkeys *ret;
+
+	ret = current_keys[mode];
+	current_keys[mode] = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
+    u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16])
+{
+	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+	u_int8_t nbuf[2048], obuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	int len;
+
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+
+	len = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus);
+	if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
+		fatal("%s: bad host modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
+	BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, nbuf);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, nbuf, len);
+
+	len = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus);
+	if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
+		fatal("%s: bad server modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
+	BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, nbuf);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, nbuf, len);
+
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, cookie, 8);
+
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, obuf, NULL);
+	memcpy(id, obuf, 16);
+
+	memset(nbuf, 0, sizeof(nbuf));
+	memset(obuf, 0, sizeof(obuf));
+	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
+}
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH)
+void
+dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%02x", digest[i]);
+		if (i%32 == 31)
+			fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+		else if (i%8 == 7)
+			fprintf(stderr, " ");
+	}
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.h b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68c80c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.47 2009/05/27 06:34:36 andreas Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef KEX_H
+#define KEX_H
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN	16
+
+#define	KEX_DH1			"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#define	KEX_DH14		"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+#define	KEX_DHGEX_SHA1		"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+#define	KEX_DHGEX_SHA256	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
+
+#define COMP_NONE	0
+#define COMP_ZLIB	1
+#define COMP_DELAYED	2
+
+enum kex_init_proposals {
+	PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
+	PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
+	PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS,
+	PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC,
+	PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS,
+	PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC,
+	PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS,
+	PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC,
+	PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS,
+	PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC,
+	PROPOSAL_MAX
+};
+
+enum kex_modes {
+	MODE_IN,
+	MODE_OUT,
+	MODE_MAX
+};
+
+enum kex_exchange {
+	KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1,
+	KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
+	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+	KEX_MAX
+};
+
+#define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
+
+typedef struct Kex Kex;
+typedef struct Mac Mac;
+typedef struct Comp Comp;
+typedef struct Enc Enc;
+typedef struct Newkeys Newkeys;
+
+struct Enc {
+	char	*name;
+	Cipher	*cipher;
+	int	enabled;
+	u_int	key_len;
+	u_int	block_size;
+	u_char	*key;
+	u_char	*iv;
+};
+struct Mac {
+	char	*name;
+	int	enabled;
+	u_int	mac_len;
+	u_char	*key;
+	u_int	key_len;
+	int	type;
+	const EVP_MD	*evp_md;
+	HMAC_CTX	evp_ctx;
+	struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx;
+};
+struct Comp {
+	int	type;
+	int	enabled;
+	char	*name;
+};
+struct Newkeys {
+	Enc	enc;
+	Mac	mac;
+	Comp	comp;
+};
+struct Kex {
+	u_char	*session_id;
+	u_int	session_id_len;
+	Newkeys	*newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+	u_int	we_need;
+	int	server;
+	char	*name;
+	int	hostkey_type;
+	int	kex_type;
+	Buffer	my;
+	Buffer	peer;
+	sig_atomic_t done;
+	int	flags;
+	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+	char	*client_version_string;
+	char	*server_version_string;
+	int	(*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+	Key	*(*load_host_key)(int);
+	int	(*host_key_index)(Key *);
+	void	(*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *);
+};
+
+Kex	*kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+void	 kex_finish(Kex *);
+
+void	 kex_send_kexinit(Kex *);
+void	 kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 kex_derive_keys(Kex *, u_char *, u_int, BIGNUM *);
+
+Newkeys *kex_get_newkeys(int);
+
+void	 kexdh_client(Kex *);
+void	 kexdh_server(Kex *);
+void	 kexgex_client(Kex *);
+void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
+
+void
+kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+void
+kexgex_hash(const EVP_MD *, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
+    int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void
+derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH)
+void	dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56e22f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.23 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+
+void
+kex_dh_hash(
+    char *client_version_string,
+    char *server_version_string,
+    char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
+    char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
+    u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
+    BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+    BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+    BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+    u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	static u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
+
+	/* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+	buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
+	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+	buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
+	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+	buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
+
+	buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+	buffer_free(&b);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	dump_digest("hash", digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md));
+#endif
+	*hash = digest;
+	*hashlen = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d384c80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.11 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+void
+kexdh_client(Kex *kex)
+{
+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+	DH *dh;
+	Key *server_host_key;
+	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
+	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+	int kout;
+
+	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
+	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+		dh = dh_new_group1();
+		break;
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+		dh = dh_new_group14();
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+	}
+	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
+	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+	packet_send();
+
+	debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
+	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
+
+	/* key, cert */
+	server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
+	server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+	if (server_host_key == NULL)
+		fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
+	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
+		fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
+	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
+		fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
+	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
+		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
+
+	/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
+	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+	packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
+#endif
+
+	/* signed H */
+	signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+		packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+	klen = DH_size(dh);
+	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh)) < 0)
+		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_new failed");
+	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
+	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	xfree(kbuf);
+
+	/* calc and verify H */
+	kex_dh_hash(
+	    kex->client_version_string,
+	    kex->server_version_string,
+	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+	    dh->pub_key,
+	    dh_server_pub,
+	    shared_secret,
+	    &hash, &hashlen
+	);
+	xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+	DH_free(dh);
+
+	if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
+		fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
+	key_free(server_host_key);
+	xfree(signature);
+
+	/* save session id */
+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+	}
+
+	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+	kex_finish(kex);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6719f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.10 2009/06/21 07:37:15 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+void
+kexdh_server(Kex *kex)
+{
+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+	DH *dh;
+	Key *server_host_key;
+	u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	u_int sbloblen, klen, hashlen, slen;
+	int kout;
+
+	/* generate server DH public key */
+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
+	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+		dh = dh_new_group1();
+		break;
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+		dh = dh_new_group14();
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+	}
+	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
+	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
+
+	if (kex->load_host_key == NULL)
+		fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
+	server_host_key = kex->load_host_key(kex->hostkey_type);
+	if (server_host_key == NULL)
+		fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
+
+	/* key, cert */
+	if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+	packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+	klen = DH_size(dh);
+	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh)) < 0)
+		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("kexdh_server: BN_new failed");
+	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+		fatal("kexdh_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
+	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	xfree(kbuf);
+
+	key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
+
+	/* calc H */
+	kex_dh_hash(
+	    kex->client_version_string,
+	    kex->server_version_string,
+	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+	    dh_client_pub,
+	    dh->pub_key,
+	    shared_secret,
+	    &hash, &hashlen
+	);
+	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+	/* save session id := H */
+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+	}
+
+	/* sign H */
+	if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash,
+	    hashlen)) < 0)
+		fatal("kexdh_server: key_sign failed");
+
+	/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+
+	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
+	packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);	/* f */
+	packet_put_string(signature, slen);
+	packet_send();
+
+	xfree(signature);
+	xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+	/* have keys, free DH */
+	DH_free(dh);
+
+	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+	kex_finish(kex);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b60ab5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.27 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+void
+kexgex_hash(
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+    char *client_version_string,
+    char *server_version_string,
+    char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
+    char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
+    u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
+    int min, int wantbits, int max, BIGNUM *prime, BIGNUM *gen,
+    BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+    BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+    BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+    u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	static u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
+
+	/* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+	buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
+	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+	buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
+	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+	buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
+
+	buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
+	if (min == -1 || max == -1)
+		buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits);
+	else {
+		buffer_put_int(&b, min);
+		buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits);
+		buffer_put_int(&b, max);
+	}
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, prime);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, gen);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	*hash = digest;
+	*hashlen = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	dump_digest("hash", digest, *hashlen);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adb973d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.11 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+
+void
+kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
+{
+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
+	Key *server_host_key;
+	u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+	int kout;
+	int min, max, nbits;
+	DH *dh;
+
+	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) {
+		/* Old GEX request */
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
+		packet_put_int(nbits);
+		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+
+		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits);
+	} else {
+		/* New GEX request */
+		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
+		packet_put_int(min);
+		packet_put_int(nbits);
+		packet_put_int(max);
+
+		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
+		    min, nbits, max);
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
+	    min, nbits, max);
+#endif
+	packet_send();
+
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
+	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
+
+	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new");
+	packet_get_bignum2(p);
+	if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new");
+	packet_get_bignum2(g);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
+		fatal("DH_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
+		    min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
+
+	dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
+	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
+	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
+	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+	packet_send();
+
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
+	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
+
+	/* key, cert */
+	server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
+	server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+	if (server_host_key == NULL)
+		fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
+	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
+		fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
+	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
+		fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
+	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
+		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
+
+	/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
+	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+	packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
+#endif
+
+	/* signed H */
+	signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+		packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+	klen = DH_size(dh);
+	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh)) < 0)
+		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("kexgex_client: BN_new failed");
+	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+		fatal("kexgex_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
+	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	xfree(kbuf);
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
+		min = max = -1;
+
+	/* calc and verify H */
+	kexgex_hash(
+	    kex->evp_md,
+	    kex->client_version_string,
+	    kex->server_version_string,
+	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+	    min, nbits, max,
+	    dh->p, dh->g,
+	    dh->pub_key,
+	    dh_server_pub,
+	    shared_secret,
+	    &hash, &hashlen
+	);
+
+	/* have keys, free DH */
+	DH_free(dh);
+	xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+
+	if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
+		fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
+	key_free(server_host_key);
+	xfree(signature);
+
+	/* save session id */
+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+	}
+	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+
+	kex_finish(kex);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8515568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.12 2009/06/21 07:37:15 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+void
+kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
+{
+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+	Key *server_host_key;
+	DH *dh;
+	u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	u_int sbloblen, klen, slen, hashlen;
+	int omin = -1, min = -1, omax = -1, max = -1, onbits = -1, nbits = -1;
+	int type, kout;
+
+	if (kex->load_host_key == NULL)
+		fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
+	server_host_key = kex->load_host_key(kex->hostkey_type);
+	if (server_host_key == NULL)
+		fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
+
+	type = packet_read();
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST:
+		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
+		omin = min = packet_get_int();
+		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
+		omax = max = packet_get_int();
+		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+		nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+		nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
+		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
+		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
+		/* unused for old GEX */
+		omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+		omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("protocol error during kex, no DH_GEX_REQUEST: %d", type);
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (omax < omin || onbits < omin || omax < onbits)
+		fatal("DH_GEX_REQUEST, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+		    omin, onbits, omax);
+
+	/* Contact privileged parent */
+	dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+	if (dh == NULL)
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching DH grp found");
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
+	packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
+	packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
+	packet_send();
+
+	/* flush */
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
+	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT");
+	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
+
+	/* key, cert */
+	if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+	packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+	klen = DH_size(dh);
+	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh)) < 0)
+		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("kexgex_server: BN_new failed");
+	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+		fatal("kexgex_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
+	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+	xfree(kbuf);
+
+	key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
+
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)
+		omin = min = omax = max = -1;
+
+	/* calc H */
+	kexgex_hash(
+	    kex->evp_md,
+	    kex->client_version_string,
+	    kex->server_version_string,
+	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+	    omin, onbits, omax,
+	    dh->p, dh->g,
+	    dh_client_pub,
+	    dh->pub_key,
+	    shared_secret,
+	    &hash, &hashlen
+	);
+	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+	/* save session id := H */
+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+	}
+
+	/* sign H */
+	if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash,
+	    hashlen)) < 0)
+		fatal("kexgex_server: key_sign failed");
+
+	/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+
+	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY sent");
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
+	packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);	/* f */
+	packet_put_string(signature, slen);
+	packet_send();
+
+	xfree(signature);
+	xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+	/* have keys, free DH */
+	DH_free(dh);
+
+	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+
+	kex_finish(kex);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.c b/crypto/openssh/key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e17da6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,982 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.80 2008/10/10 05:00:12 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * read_bignum():
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+Key *
+key_new(int type)
+{
+	Key *k;
+	RSA *rsa;
+	DSA *dsa;
+	k = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k));
+	k->type = type;
+	k->dsa = NULL;
+	k->rsa = NULL;
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed");
+		if ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+		if ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+		k->rsa = rsa;
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed");
+		if ((dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+		if ((dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+		if ((dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+		if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+		k->dsa = dsa;
+		break;
+	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_new: bad key type %d", k->type);
+		break;
+	}
+	return k;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_new_private(int type)
+{
+	Key *k = key_new(type);
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+		if ((k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+		if ((k->rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+		if ((k->rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+		if ((k->rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+		if ((k->rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+		break;
+	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return k;
+}
+
+void
+key_free(Key *k)
+{
+	if (k == NULL)
+		fatal("key_free: key is NULL");
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if (k->rsa != NULL)
+			RSA_free(k->rsa);
+		k->rsa = NULL;
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if (k->dsa != NULL)
+			DSA_free(k->dsa);
+		k->dsa = NULL;
+		break;
+	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
+		break;
+	}
+	xfree(k);
+}
+
+int
+key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b)
+{
+	if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
+		return 0;
+	switch (a->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
+		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
+		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
+		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
+		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
+		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
+		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+u_char*
+key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
+    u_int *dgst_raw_length)
+{
+	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+	u_char *blob = NULL;
+	u_char *retval = NULL;
+	u_int len = 0;
+	int nlen, elen;
+
+	*dgst_raw_length = 0;
+
+	switch (dgst_type) {
+	case SSH_FP_MD5:
+		md = EVP_md5();
+		break;
+	case SSH_FP_SHA1:
+		md = EVP_sha1();
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: bad digest type %d",
+		    dgst_type);
+	}
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
+		elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
+		len = nlen + elen;
+		blob = xmalloc(len);
+		BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob);
+		BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len);
+		break;
+	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+		return retval;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: bad key type %d", k->type);
+		break;
+	}
+	if (blob != NULL) {
+		retval = xmalloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+		EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, md);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, blob, len);
+		EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, retval, dgst_raw_length);
+		memset(blob, 0, len);
+		xfree(blob);
+	} else {
+		fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: blob is null");
+	}
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static char *
+key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
+{
+	char *retval;
+	u_int i;
+
+	retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
+	for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+		char hex[4];
+		snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
+		strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
+	}
+
+	/* Remove the trailing ':' character */
+	retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0';
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static char *
+key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
+{
+	char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
+	char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
+	    'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
+	u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
+	char *retval;
+
+	rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
+	retval = xcalloc((rounds * 6), sizeof(char));
+	retval[j++] = 'x';
+	for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
+		u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
+		if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
+			idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
+			    seed) % 6;
+			idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
+			idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
+			    (seed / 6)) % 6;
+			retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+			retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+			retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+			if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
+				idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
+				idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
+				retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
+				retval[j++] = '-';
+				retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
+				seed = ((seed * 5) +
+				    ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
+				    ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
+			}
+		} else {
+			idx0 = seed % 6;
+			idx1 = 16;
+			idx2 = seed / 6;
+			retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+			retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+			retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+		}
+	}
+	retval[j++] = 'x';
+	retval[j++] = '\0';
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can
+ * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability.
+ * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some
+ * scientific publications like this original paper:
+ *
+ * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
+ * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+ * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
+ * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
+ *
+ * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too.
+ *
+ * If you see the picture is different, the key is different.
+ * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing.
+ *
+ * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
+ * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
+ * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise.  Bumping into walls
+ * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn.
+ * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be
+ * walked in either direction.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Field sizes for the random art.  Have to be odd, so the starting point
+ * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
+ * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
+ * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
+ */
+#define	FLDBASE		8
+#define	FLDSIZE_Y	(FLDBASE + 1)
+#define	FLDSIZE_X	(FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
+static char *
+key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
+	 * intersects with itself.  Matter of taste.
+	 */
+	char	*augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
+	char	*retval, *p;
+	u_char	 field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
+	u_int	 i, b;
+	int	 x, y;
+	size_t	 len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1;
+
+	retval = xcalloc(1, (FLDSIZE_X + 3) * (FLDSIZE_Y + 2));
+
+	/* initialize field */
+	memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char));
+	x = FLDSIZE_X / 2;
+	y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2;
+
+	/* process raw key */
+	for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+		int input;
+		/* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */
+		input = dgst_raw[i];
+		for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
+			/* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */
+			x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1;
+			y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
+
+			/* assure we are still in bounds */
+			x = MAX(x, 0);
+			y = MAX(y, 0);
+			x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
+			y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
+
+			/* augment the field */
+			if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
+				field[x][y]++;
+			input = input >> 2;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* mark starting point and end point*/
+	field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1;
+	field[x][y] = len;
+
+	/* fill in retval */
+	snprintf(retval, FLDSIZE_X, "+--[%4s %4u]", key_type(k), key_size(k));
+	p = strchr(retval, '\0');
+
+	/* output upper border */
+	for (i = p - retval - 1; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+		*p++ = '-';
+	*p++ = '+';
+	*p++ = '\n';
+
+	/* output content */
+	for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
+		*p++ = '|';
+		for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
+			*p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)];
+		*p++ = '|';
+		*p++ = '\n';
+	}
+
+	/* output lower border */
+	*p++ = '+';
+	for (i = 0; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+		*p++ = '-';
+	*p++ = '+';
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+char *
+key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
+{
+	char *retval = NULL;
+	u_char *dgst_raw;
+	u_int dgst_raw_len;
+
+	dgst_raw = key_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw_len);
+	if (!dgst_raw)
+		fatal("key_fingerprint: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
+	switch (dgst_rep) {
+	case SSH_FP_HEX:
+		retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+		break;
+	case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
+		retval = key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+		break;
+	case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
+		retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_fingerprint: bad digest representation %d",
+		    dgst_rep);
+		break;
+	}
+	memset(dgst_raw, 0, dgst_raw_len);
+	xfree(dgst_raw);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
+ * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
+ * permitted to modify the buffer.  This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
+ * last processed (and maybe modified) character.  Note that this may modify
+ * the buffer containing the number.
+ */
+static int
+read_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM * value)
+{
+	char *cp = *cpp;
+	int old;
+
+	/* Skip any leading whitespace. */
+	for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+		;
+
+	/* Check that it begins with a decimal digit. */
+	if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9')
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Save starting position. */
+	*cpp = cp;
+
+	/* Move forward until all decimal digits skipped. */
+	for (; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++)
+		;
+
+	/* Save the old terminating character, and replace it by \0. */
+	old = *cp;
+	*cp = 0;
+
+	/* Parse the number. */
+	if (BN_dec2bn(&value, *cpp) == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Restore old terminating character. */
+	*cp = old;
+
+	/* Move beyond the number and return success. */
+	*cpp = cp;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+write_bignum(FILE *f, BIGNUM *num)
+{
+	char *buf = BN_bn2dec(num);
+	if (buf == NULL) {
+		error("write_bignum: BN_bn2dec() failed");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	fprintf(f, " %s", buf);
+	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* returns 1 ok, -1 error */
+int
+key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
+{
+	Key *k;
+	int success = -1;
+	char *cp, *space;
+	int len, n, type;
+	u_int bits;
+	u_char *blob;
+
+	cp = *cpp;
+
+	switch (ret->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		/* Get number of bits. */
+		if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9')
+			return -1;	/* Bad bit count... */
+		for (bits = 0; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++)
+			bits = 10 * bits + *cp - '0';
+		if (bits == 0)
+			return -1;
+		*cpp = cp;
+		/* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
+		if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->e))
+			return -1;
+		if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->n))
+			return -1;
+		success = 1;
+		break;
+	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		space = strchr(cp, ' ');
+		if (space == NULL) {
+			debug3("key_read: missing whitespace");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*space = '\0';
+		type = key_type_from_name(cp);
+		*space = ' ';
+		if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+			debug3("key_read: missing keytype");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		cp = space+1;
+		if (*cp == '\0') {
+			debug3("key_read: short string");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (ret->type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+			ret->type = type;
+		} else if (ret->type != type) {
+			/* is a key, but different type */
+			debug3("key_read: type mismatch");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		len = 2*strlen(cp);
+		blob = xmalloc(len);
+		n = uudecode(cp, blob, len);
+		if (n < 0) {
+			error("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp);
+			xfree(blob);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		k = key_from_blob(blob, (u_int)n);
+		xfree(blob);
+		if (k == NULL) {
+			error("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (k->type != type) {
+			error("key_read: type mismatch: encoding error");
+			key_free(k);
+			return -1;
+		}
+/*XXXX*/
+		if (ret->type == KEY_RSA) {
+			if (ret->rsa != NULL)
+				RSA_free(ret->rsa);
+			ret->rsa = k->rsa;
+			k->rsa = NULL;
+			success = 1;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+			RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+		} else {
+			if (ret->dsa != NULL)
+				DSA_free(ret->dsa);
+			ret->dsa = k->dsa;
+			k->dsa = NULL;
+			success = 1;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+			DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+		}
+/*XXXX*/
+		key_free(k);
+		if (success != 1)
+			break;
+		/* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
+		while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
+			cp++;
+		while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')
+			cp++;
+		*cpp = cp;
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_read: bad key type: %d", ret->type);
+		break;
+	}
+	return success;
+}
+
+int
+key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
+{
+	int n, success = 0;
+	u_int len, bits = 0;
+	u_char *blob;
+	char *uu;
+
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1 && key->rsa != NULL) {
+		/* size of modulus 'n' */
+		bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+		fprintf(f, "%u", bits);
+		if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) &&
+		    write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n)) {
+			success = 1;
+		} else {
+			error("key_write: failed for RSA key");
+		}
+	} else if ((key->type == KEY_DSA && key->dsa != NULL) ||
+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && key->rsa != NULL)) {
+		key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len);
+		uu = xmalloc(2*len);
+		n = uuencode(blob, len, uu, 2*len);
+		if (n > 0) {
+			fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu);
+			success = 1;
+		}
+		xfree(blob);
+		xfree(uu);
+	}
+	return success;
+}
+
+const char *
+key_type(const Key *k)
+{
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		return "RSA1";
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		return "RSA";
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		return "DSA";
+	}
+	return "unknown";
+}
+
+const char *
+key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
+{
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		return "ssh-rsa";
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		return "ssh-dss";
+	}
+	return "ssh-unknown";
+}
+
+u_int
+key_size(const Key *k)
+{
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static RSA *
+rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
+{
+	RSA *private;
+
+	private = RSA_generate_key(bits, 35, NULL, NULL);
+	if (private == NULL)
+		fatal("rsa_generate_private_key: key generation failed.");
+	return private;
+}
+
+static DSA*
+dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
+{
+	DSA *private = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+	if (private == NULL)
+		fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: DSA_generate_parameters failed");
+	if (!DSA_generate_key(private))
+		fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: DSA_generate_key failed.");
+	if (private == NULL)
+		fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: NULL.");
+	return private;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_generate(int type, u_int bits)
+{
+	Key *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		k->dsa = dsa_generate_private_key(bits);
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_generate: unknown type %d", type);
+	}
+	k->type = type;
+	return k;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_from_private(const Key *k)
+{
+	Key *n = NULL;
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		n = key_new(k->type);
+		if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
+		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) ||
+		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) ||
+		    (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL))
+			fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		n = key_new(k->type);
+		if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
+		    (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL))
+			fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_from_private: unknown type %d", k->type);
+		break;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+int
+key_type_from_name(char *name)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, "rsa1") == 0) {
+		return KEY_RSA1;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "rsa") == 0) {
+		return KEY_RSA;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "dsa") == 0) {
+		return KEY_DSA;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa") == 0) {
+		return KEY_RSA;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
+		return KEY_DSA;
+	}
+	debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
+	return KEY_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+int
+key_names_valid2(const char *names)
+{
+	char *s, *cp, *p;
+
+	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+		return 0;
+	s = cp = xstrdup(names);
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+		switch (key_type_from_name(p)) {
+		case KEY_RSA1:
+		case KEY_UNSPEC:
+			xfree(s);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	debug3("key names ok: [%s]", names);
+	xfree(s);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	int rlen, type;
+	char *ktype = NULL;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
+#endif
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
+	if ((ktype = buffer_get_string_ret(&b, NULL)) == NULL) {
+		error("key_from_blob: can't read key type");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	type = key_type_from_name(ktype);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		key = key_new(type);
+		if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 ||
+		    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) {
+			error("key_from_blob: can't read rsa key");
+			key_free(key);
+			key = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		key = key_new(type);
+		if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 ||
+		    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 ||
+		    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->g) == -1 ||
+		    buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) {
+			error("key_from_blob: can't read dsa key");
+			key_free(key);
+			key = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+		break;
+	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+		key = key_new(type);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("key_from_blob: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+	if (key != NULL && rlen != 0)
+		error("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
+ out:
+	if (ktype != NULL)
+		xfree(ktype);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return key;
+}
+
+int
+key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	int len;
+
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error("key_to_blob: key == NULL");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("key_to_blob: unsupported key type %d", key->type);
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	len = buffer_len(&b);
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	if (blobp != NULL) {
+		*blobp = xmalloc(len);
+		memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+	}
+	memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return len;
+}
+
+int
+key_sign(
+    const Key *key,
+    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+	default:
+		error("key_sign: invalid key type %d", key->type);
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * key_verify returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for an incorrect signature
+ * and -1 on error.
+ */
+int
+key_verify(
+    const Key *key,
+    const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	if (signaturelen == 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+	default:
+		error("key_verify: invalid key type %d", key->type);
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Converts a private to a public key */
+Key *
+key_demote(const Key *k)
+{
+	Key *pk;
+
+	pk = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pk));
+	pk->type = k->type;
+	pk->flags = k->flags;
+	pk->dsa = NULL;
+	pk->rsa = NULL;
+
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: RSA_new failed");
+		if ((pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed");
+		if ((pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		if ((pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		if ((pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		if ((pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return (pk);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.h b/crypto/openssh/key.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14aac79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/key.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.27 2008/06/11 21:01:35 grunk Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef KEY_H
+#define KEY_H
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+typedef struct Key Key;
+enum types {
+	KEY_RSA1,
+	KEY_RSA,
+	KEY_DSA,
+	KEY_UNSPEC
+};
+enum fp_type {
+	SSH_FP_SHA1,
+	SSH_FP_MD5
+};
+enum fp_rep {
+	SSH_FP_HEX,
+	SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
+	SSH_FP_RANDOMART
+};
+
+/* key is stored in external hardware */
+#define KEY_FLAG_EXT		0x0001
+
+struct Key {
+	int	 type;
+	int	 flags;
+	RSA	*rsa;
+	DSA	*dsa;
+};
+
+Key		*key_new(int);
+Key		*key_new_private(int);
+void		 key_free(Key *);
+Key		*key_demote(const Key *);
+int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
+char		*key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
+u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
+const char	*key_type(const Key *);
+int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
+int		 key_read(Key *, char **);
+u_int		 key_size(const Key *);
+
+Key	*key_generate(int, u_int);
+Key	*key_from_private(const Key *);
+int	 key_type_from_name(char *);
+
+Key		*key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int);
+int		 key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *);
+const char	*key_ssh_name(const Key *);
+int		 key_names_valid2(const char *);
+
+int	 key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
+int	 key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+int	 ssh_dss_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
+int	 ssh_dss_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+int	 ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
+int	 ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.c b/crypto/openssh/log.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a8239b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/log.c
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.41 2008/06/10 04:50:25 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+static int log_on_stderr = 1;
+static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+static char *argv0;
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS	(VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
+#define LOG_STDERR_VIS	(VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
+
+/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */
+
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	SyslogFacility val;
+} log_facilities[] = {
+	{ "DAEMON",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON },
+	{ "USER",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER },
+	{ "AUTH",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH },
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+	{ "AUTHPRIV",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV },
+#endif
+	{ "LOCAL0",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 },
+	{ "LOCAL1",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 },
+	{ "LOCAL2",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 },
+	{ "LOCAL3",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 },
+	{ "LOCAL4",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 },
+	{ "LOCAL5",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 },
+	{ "LOCAL6",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 },
+	{ "LOCAL7",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 },
+	{ NULL,		SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET }
+};
+
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	LogLevel val;
+} log_levels[] =
+{
+	{ "QUIET",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
+	{ "FATAL",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
+	{ "ERROR",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
+	{ "INFO",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO },
+	{ "VERBOSE",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE },
+	{ "DEBUG",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
+	{ "DEBUG1",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
+	{ "DEBUG2",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 },
+	{ "DEBUG3",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 },
+	{ NULL,		SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET }
+};
+
+SyslogFacility
+log_facility_number(char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (name != NULL)
+		for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
+			if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0)
+				return log_facilities[i].val;
+	return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+const char *
+log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0;  log_facilities[i].name; i++)
+		if (log_facilities[i].val == facility)
+			return log_facilities[i].name;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+LogLevel
+log_level_number(char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (name != NULL)
+		for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++)
+			if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0)
+				return log_levels[i].val;
+	return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+const char *
+log_level_name(LogLevel level)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++)
+		if (log_levels[i].val == level)
+			return log_levels[i].name;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Error messages that should be logged. */
+
+void
+error(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+sigdie(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+#ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+#endif
+	_exit(1);
+}
+
+
+/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */
+
+void
+logit(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+/* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */
+
+void
+verbose(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+/* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */
+
+void
+debug(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+debug2(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the log.
+ */
+
+void
+log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+#endif
+
+	argv0 = av0;
+
+	switch (level) {
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
+		log_level = level;
+		break;
+	default:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n",
+		    (int) level);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+	if (on_stderr)
+		return;
+
+	switch (facility) {
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON:
+		log_facility = LOG_DAEMON;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER:
+		log_facility = LOG_USER;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH:
+		log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+		break;
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV:
+		log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV;
+		break;
+#endif
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7;
+		break;
+	default:
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n",
+		    (int) facility);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog
+	 * immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong
+	 * facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here.
+	 */
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+	openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
+	closelog_r(&sdata);
+#else
+	openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+	closelog();
+#endif
+}
+
+#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
+
+void
+do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+#endif
+	char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+	char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+	char *txt = NULL;
+	int pri = LOG_INFO;
+	int saved_errno = errno;
+
+	if (level > log_level)
+		return;
+
+	switch (level) {
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+		if (!log_on_stderr)
+			txt = "fatal";
+		pri = LOG_CRIT;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+		if (!log_on_stderr)
+			txt = "error";
+		pri = LOG_ERR;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
+		pri = LOG_INFO;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
+		pri = LOG_INFO;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
+		txt = "debug1";
+		pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
+		txt = "debug2";
+		pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
+		txt = "debug3";
+		pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+		break;
+	default:
+		txt = "internal error";
+		pri = LOG_ERR;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (txt != NULL) {
+		snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt);
+		vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args);
+	} else {
+		vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args);
+	}
+	strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
+	    log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS);
+	if (log_on_stderr) {
+		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
+		write(STDERR_FILENO, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
+	} else {
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+		openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
+		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+		closelog_r(&sdata);
+#else
+		openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+		closelog();
+#endif
+	}
+	errno = saved_errno;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.h b/crypto/openssh/log.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6505827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/log.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.17 2008/06/13 00:12:02 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSH_LOG_H
+#define SSH_LOG_H
+
+/* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */
+typedef enum {
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH,
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV,
+#endif
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET = -1
+}       SyslogFacility;
+
+typedef enum {
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1
+}       LogLevel;
+
+void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+
+SyslogFacility	log_facility_number(char *);
+const char * 	log_facility_name(SyslogFacility);
+LogLevel	log_level_number(char *);
+const char *	log_level_name(LogLevel);
+
+void     fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     sigdie(const char *, ...)  __attribute__((noreturn))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     logit(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+
+void	 do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
+void	 cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4af067
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1688 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under
+ * the the following license:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
+ * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+ * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation,
+ * advertising materials, and other materials related to such
+ * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed
+ * by the University of California, Berkeley.  The name of the
+ * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.c:  platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+/*
+ *  The new login code explained
+ *  ============================
+ *
+ *  This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording
+ *  (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval.
+ *
+ *  Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a
+ *  union of all the useful fields in the various different types of
+ *  system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants.
+ *
+ *  We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be
+ *  used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures
+ *  on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code
+ *  gets compiled here.
+ *
+ *  The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular
+ *  recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so
+ *  many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in
+ *  the old code.
+ *
+ *  For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as
+ *  these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems
+ *  this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably
+ *  in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back
+ *  to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method
+ *  requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing
+ *  information. These files and their access methods are very system
+ *  specific indeed.
+ *
+ *  For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are
+ *  setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have
+ *  these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such
+ *  a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp
+ *  code should suffice.
+ *
+ *  Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even
+ *  more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a
+ *  simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a
+ *  relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in
+ *  a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the
+ *  information separately at all. For systems in the latter category,
+ *  we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry
+ *  for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could
+ *  incur a significant performance penalty.
+ *
+ *  Calling the new code
+ *  --------------------
+ *
+ *  In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in
+ *  login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c
+ *  program there are more examples.
+ *
+ *  Internal handler calling method
+ *  -------------------------------
+ *
+ *  When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both
+ *  routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in,
+ *  or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which
+ *  calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf
+ *  selects for the local system.
+ *
+ *  The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both
+ *  struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see
+ *  construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems
+ *  that introduce new features to either structure.
+ *
+ *  While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar
+ *  code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to
+ *  write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining
+ *  support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is
+ *  a difficult and time-consuming task.
+ *
+ *  Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog()
+ *  (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call
+ *  getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last
+ *  login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can,
+ *  otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0,
+ *  meaning "tilt".
+ *
+ *  Maintenance
+ *  -----------
+ *
+ *  In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct
+ *  methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection
+ *  code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_<method> or CONF_<method>_FILE
+ *  symbols for the platform.
+ *
+ *  Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying
+ *  configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself
+ *  with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.)
+ *
+ *  Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful!
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+# include <libutil.h>
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
+ **/
+
+#if HAVE_UTMP_H
+void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+#endif
+
+int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* pick the shortest string */
+#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2))
+
+/**
+ ** platform-independent login functions
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login
+ *
+ * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
+ * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0 if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+	return (login_write(li));
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout
+ *
+ * Call as with login_login()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0 if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
+	return (login_write(li));
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time
+ *
+ * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the
+ * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back
+ * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 on failure, or if user has never logged in
+ *   Time in seconds from the epoch if successful
+ *
+ * Useful preprocessor symbols:
+ *   DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog
+ *                    info
+ *   USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog
+ *                facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set,
+ *                try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx.
+ */
+unsigned int
+login_get_lastlog_time(const int uid)
+{
+	struct logininfo li;
+
+	if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid))
+		return (li.tv_sec);
+	else
+		return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int)   - Retrieve a lastlog entry
+ *
+ * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with
+ * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no
+ * system lastlog information exists.
+ *
+ * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+struct logininfo *
+login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const int uid)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li));
+	li->uid = uid;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to
+	 * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see
+	 * wtmp_get_entry().)
+	 */
+	pw = getpwuid(uid);
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %i", __func__, uid);
+
+	/* No MIN_SIZEOF here - we absolutely *must not* truncate the
+	 * username (XXX - so check for trunc!) */
+	strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username));
+
+	if (getlast_entry(li))
+		return (li);
+	else
+		return (NULL);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*)    - Allocate and initialise
+ *                                                  a logininfo structure
+ *
+ * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure
+ * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory
+ * allocation fails, the program halts.
+ */
+struct
+logininfo *login_alloc_entry(int pid, const char *username,
+    const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+	struct logininfo *newli;
+
+	newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli));
+	login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line);
+	return (newli);
+}
+
+
+/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *)    - free struct memory */
+void
+login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	xfree(li);
+}
+
+
+/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*)
+ *                                        - initialise a struct logininfo
+ *
+ * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry
+ * the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1
+ */
+int
+login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, int pid, const char *username,
+    const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li));
+
+	li->pid = pid;
+
+	/* set the line information */
+	if (line)
+		line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line));
+
+	if (username) {
+		strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
+		pw = getpwnam(li->username);
+		if (pw == NULL) {
+			fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__,
+			    li->username);
+		}
+		li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	}
+
+	if (hostname)
+		strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname));
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *)    - set the current time
+ *
+ * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
+ * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for
+ * time handling.
+ */
+void
+login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct timeval tv;
+
+	gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+
+	li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+}
+
+/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */
+void
+login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+    const unsigned int sa_size)
+{
+	unsigned int bufsize = sa_size;
+
+	/* make sure we don't overrun our union */
+	if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size)
+		bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr);
+
+	memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
+ ** results
+ **/
+int
+login_write(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (geteuid() != 0) {
+		logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
+		return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* set the timestamp */
+	login_set_current_time(li);
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+	syslogin_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+		lastlog_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+	utmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+	wtmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	utmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
+	    !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
+	    &loginmsg))
+		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+		audit_session_open(li->line);
+	else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		audit_session_close(li->line);
+#endif
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int
+login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+	login_set_current_time(li);
+# ifdef USE_UTMP
+	utmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMP
+	wtmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	utmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login
+ **                time.
+ **/
+
+/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */
+int
+getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	return(lastlog_get_entry(li));
+#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */
+
+#if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+	/* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login
+	 * time, e.g. AIX */
+	return (0);
+# elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \
+    (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP))
+	/* retrieve last login time from utmp */
+	return (wtmp_get_entry(li));
+# elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \
+    (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX))
+	/* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */
+	return (wtmpx_get_entry(li));
+# else
+	/* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */
+	return (0);
+# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * 'line' string utility functions
+ *
+ * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
+ *
+ * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
+ * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
+ * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
+ *                               /dev/pts/1  -> ts/1 )
+ *
+ * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
+ * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
+ * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
+ * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
+ */
+
+
+/*
+ * line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make
+ * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh)
+ */
+char *
+line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize)
+{
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+	if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5)))
+		strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+	else {
+		strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize);
+		strlcat(dst, src, dstsize);
+	}
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */
+char *
+line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+		strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize);
+	else
+		strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/*
+ * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
+ * form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
+ * full name.)
+ *
+ * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero
+ * termination
+ */
+char *
+line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+
+	/* Always skip prefix if present */
+	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+		src += 5;
+
+#ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+	if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
+		src += 3;
+#endif
+
+	len = strlen(src);
+
+	if (len > 0) {
+		if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
+			src +=  ((int)len - dstsize);
+
+		/* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
+		strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize);
+	}
+
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/**
+ ** utmp utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences
+ ** into account.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN)
+
+/* build the utmp structure */
+void
+set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)
+	ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+	ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP)
+	ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+		    struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+# endif
+
+	memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut));
+
+	/* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+	line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+	/* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+		cray_set_tmpdir(ut);
+#endif
+		break;
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+		cray_retain_utmp(ut, li->pid);
+#endif
+		break;
+	}
+# endif
+	set_utmp_time(li, ut);
+
+	line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+	ut->ut_pid = li->pid;
+# endif
+
+	/* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+	 * for logouts.
+	 */
+
+	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
+	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+		ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
+		memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+		if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+		}
+	}
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */
+
+/**
+ ** utmpx utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system
+ ** variations.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX)
+/* build the utmpx structure */
+void
+set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+	utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+	utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+	utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+#  endif
+	memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+	line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+	/* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+		break;
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+		break;
+	}
+	line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line));
+	set_utmpx_time(li, utx);
+	utx->ut_pid = li->pid;
+
+	/* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */
+	strncpy(utx->ut_name, li->username,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_name, li->username));
+
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+	 * for logouts.
+	 */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+	strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+	/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+		utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
+		memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+		if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+		}
+	}
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+	/* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */
+	utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host));
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmp functions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+
+/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \
+	defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE)
+#  define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	setutent();
+	pututline(ut);
+#  ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT
+	endutent();
+#  endif
+	return (1);
+}
+# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/*
+ * Write a utmp entry direct to the file
+ * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c
+ */
+static int
+utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	struct utmp old_ut;
+	register int fd;
+	int tty;
+
+	/* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT)
+	struct ttyent *ty;
+
+	tty=0;
+	setttyent();
+	while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) {
+		tty++;
+		if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)))
+			break;
+	}
+	endttyent();
+
+	if (NULL == ty) {
+		logit("%s: tty not found", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+#else /* FIXME */
+
+	tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */
+
+	if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) {
+		off_t pos, ret;
+
+		pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp);
+		if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
+			logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (ret != pos) {
+			logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
+			    __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host.
+		 * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not
+		 * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line.
+		 */
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) &&
+		    (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') &&
+		    (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) &&
+		    (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0))
+			memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host));
+
+		if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
+			logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (ret != pos) {
+			logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
+			    __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+			logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		}
+
+		close(fd);
+		return (1);
+	} else {
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+int
+utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (utmp_perform_login(li));
+
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (utmp_perform_logout(li));
+
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmpx functions
+ **/
+
+/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+
+/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \
+	defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE)
+#  define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	setutxent();
+	pututxline(utx);
+
+#  ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
+	endutxent();
+#  endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
+static int
+utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__);
+	return (0);
+}
+# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+	line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+	utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+	utmpx_write_library(li, &utx);
+# else
+	utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx);
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+int
+utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (utmpx_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (utmpx_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmp functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+
+/*
+ * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file
+ * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
+ */
+static int
+wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	struct stat buf;
+	int fd, ret = 1;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+			ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+			logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+	close(fd);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+	return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+	return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (wtmp_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (wtmp_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
+ *
+ * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
+ * username on a given tty line.  However, some systems (HP-UX is one)
+ * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS.
+ *
+ * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username
+ * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for
+ * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.)
+ *
+ * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS
+ * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also,
+ * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in
+ * place and not have ut_type.
+ */
+
+/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+		if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS)
+			return (1);
+# else
+		return (1);
+# endif
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	struct utmp ut;
+	int fd, found = 0;
+
+	/* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */
+	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */
+	if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) {
+		/* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	while (!found) {
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
+			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			close (fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if ( wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) {
+			found = 1;
+			/*
+			 * We've already checked for a time in struct
+			 * utmp, in login_getlast()
+			 */
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+			li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time;
+# else
+#  if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+			li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+#  endif
+# endif
+			line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+			strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host));
+# endif
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */
+		if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+			/* We've found the start of the file, so quit */
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */
+	close(fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+# endif /* USE_WTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmpx functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+/*
+ * Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file
+ * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
+ */
+static int
+wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+	struct stat buf;
+	int fd, ret = 1;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
+			ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+			logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+	close(fd);
+
+	return (ret);
+#else
+	updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx);
+	return (1);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+	return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+	return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (wtmpx_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the
+   next two functions */
+
+/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_name,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_name)) == 0 ) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+		if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
+			return (1);
+# else
+		return (1);
+# endif
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	struct utmpx utx;
+	int fd, found=0;
+
+	/* Clear the time entries */
+	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */
+	if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) {
+		/* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	while (!found) {
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
+			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			close (fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular
+		 * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx
+		 */
+		if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) {
+			found = 1;
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+			li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+			li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time;
+# endif
+			line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line));
+# if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX)
+			strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host));
+# endif
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	close(fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif /* USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level libutil login() functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+static int
+syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp *ut;
+
+	ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut));
+	construct_utmp(li, ut);
+	login(ut);
+	free(ut);
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT
+	char line[UT_LINESIZE];
+
+	(void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
+
+	if (!logout(line))
+		logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__);
+#  ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
+	else
+		logwtmp(line, "", "");
+#  endif
+	/* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have
+	 * login, but no logout?  what if logout but no logwtmp? All
+	 * routines are in libutil so they should all be there,
+	 * but... */
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+int
+syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (syslogin_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (syslogin_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_LOGIN */
+
+/* end of file log-syslogin.c */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level lastlog functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+
+#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME)
+/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
+static int
+lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
+{
+	off_t offset;
+	char lastlog_file[1024];
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+		snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
+	} else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
+	} else {
+		logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	*fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600);
+	if (*fd < 0) {
+		debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__,
+		    lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		/* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
+		offset = (off_t) ((long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
+
+		if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) {
+			logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__,
+			    lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+
+#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
+	default:
+		logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlog last;
+	int fd;
+
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		/* create our struct lastlog */
+		memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+		line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line));
+		strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname,
+		    MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname));
+		last.ll_time = li->tv_sec;
+	
+		if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
+			return (0);
+	
+		/* write the entry */
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
+			close(fd);
+			logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
+			    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			return (0);
+		}
+	
+		close(fd);
+		return (1);
+	default:
+		logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlogx l, *ll;
+
+	if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
+		memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
+		ll = &l;
+	}
+	line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+	strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
+		MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
+	li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
+	return (1);
+}
+#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlog last;
+	int fd, ret;
+
+	if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY))
+		return (0);
+
+	ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last));
+	close(fd);
+
+	switch (ret) {
+	case 0:
+		memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+		/* FALLTHRU */
+	case sizeof(last):
+		line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+		strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host,
+		    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host));
+		li->tv_sec = last.ll_time;
+		return (1);
+	case -1:
+		error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d",
+		    __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+
+#ifdef USE_BTMP
+  /*
+   * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists.
+   * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
+   * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that
+   * only root can read it.
+   */
+
+void
+record_failed_login(const char *username, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ttyn)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct utmp ut;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	struct sockaddr_in *a4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *a6;
+	time_t t;
+	struct stat fst;
+
+	if (geteuid() != 0)
+		return;
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) {
+		debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if((fst.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){
+		logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s",
+		    _PATH_BTMP);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+
+	time(&t);
+	ut.ut_time = t;     /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
+	ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
+	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+
+	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+	    getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) {
+		ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+			a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
+			memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr),
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr));
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+			a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
+			memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr),
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr));
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut))
+		error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+out:
+	close(fd);
+}
+#endif	/* USE_BTMP */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..859e1a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+#ifndef _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
+#define _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.h:  platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/**
+ ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * login_netinfo structure
+ */
+
+union login_netinfo {
+	struct sockaddr sa;
+	struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
+	struct sockaddr_storage sa_storage;
+};
+
+/*
+ *   * logininfo structure  *
+ */
+/* types - different to utmp.h 'type' macros */
+/* (though set to the same value as linux, openbsd and others...) */
+#define LTYPE_LOGIN    7
+#define LTYPE_LOGOUT   8
+
+/* string lengths - set very long */
+#define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64
+#define LINFO_LINESIZE 64
+#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 128
+#define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256
+
+struct logininfo {
+	char       progname[LINFO_PROGSIZE];     /* name of program (for PAM) */
+	int        progname_null;
+	short int  type;                         /* type of login (LTYPE_*) */
+	int        pid;                          /* PID of login process */
+	int        uid;                          /* UID of this user */
+	char       line[LINFO_LINESIZE];         /* tty/pty name */
+	char       username[LINFO_NAMESIZE];     /* login username */
+	char       hostname[LINFO_HOSTSIZE];     /* remote hostname */
+	/* 'exit_status' structure components */
+	int        exit;                        /* process exit status */
+	int        termination;                 /* process termination status */
+	/* struct timeval (sys/time.h) isn't always available, if it isn't we'll
+	 * use time_t's value as tv_sec and set tv_usec to 0
+	 */
+	unsigned int tv_sec;
+	unsigned int tv_usec;
+	union login_netinfo hostaddr;       /* caller's host address(es) */
+}; /* struct logininfo */
+
+/*
+ * login recording functions
+ */
+
+/** 'public' functions */
+
+/* construct a new login entry */
+struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(int pid, const char *username,
+				    const char *hostname, const char *line);
+/* free a structure */
+void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+/* fill out a pre-allocated structure with useful information */
+int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, int pid, const char *username,
+		     const char *hostname, const char *line);
+/* place the current time in a logininfo struct */
+void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* record the entry */
+int login_login (struct logininfo *li);
+int login_logout(struct logininfo *li);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li);
+#endif
+
+/** End of public functions */
+
+/* record the entry */
+int login_write (struct logininfo *li);
+int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* set the network address based on network address type */
+void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+		    const unsigned int sa_size);
+
+/*
+ * lastlog retrieval functions
+ */
+/* lastlog *entry* functions fill out a logininfo */
+struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const int uid);
+/* lastlog *time* functions return time_t equivalent (uint) */
+unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const int uid);
+
+/* produce various forms of the line filename */
+char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize);
+char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+
+void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+#endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/logintest.c b/crypto/openssh/logintest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e9fbbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/logintest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** logintest.c:  simple test driver for platform-independent login recording
+ **               and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3
+
+int nologtest = 0;
+int compile_opts_only = 0;
+int be_verbose = 0;
+
+
+/* Dump a logininfo to stdout. Assumes a tab size of 8 chars. */
+void
+dump_logininfo(struct logininfo *li, char *descname)
+{
+	/* yes I know how nasty this is */
+	printf("struct logininfo %s = {\n\t"
+	       "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t"
+	       "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t"
+	       "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t"
+	       "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t"
+	       "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t"
+	       "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t"
+	       "struct sockaddr sa {\n"
+	       "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n"
+	       "\t}\n"
+	       "}\n",
+	       descname, li->progname, li->type,
+	       li->pid, li->uid, li->line,
+	       li->username, li->hostname, li->exit,
+	       li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec,
+	       li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family);
+}
+
+
+int
+testAPI()
+{
+	struct logininfo *li1;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct hostent *he;
+	struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
+	char cmdstring[256], stripline[8];
+	char username[32];
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	time_t t0, t1, t2, logintime, logouttime;
+	char s_t0[64],s_t1[64],s_t2[64];
+	char s_logintime[64], s_logouttime[64]; /* ctime() strings */
+#endif
+
+	printf("**\n** Testing the API...\n**\n");
+
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+
+	/* gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); */
+
+	printf("login_alloc_entry test (no host info):\n");
+
+	/* FIXME fake tty more effectively - this could upset some platforms */
+	li1 = login_alloc_entry((int)getpid(), username, NULL, ttyname(0));
+	strlcpy(li1->progname, "OpenSSH-logintest", sizeof(li1->progname));
+
+	if (be_verbose)
+		dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
+
+	printf("Setting host address info for 'localhost' (may call out):\n");
+	if (! (he = gethostbyname("localhost"))) {
+		printf("Couldn't set hostname(lookup failed)\n");
+	} else {
+		/* NOTE: this is messy, but typically a program wouldn't have to set
+		 *  any of this, a sockaddr_in* would be already prepared */
+		memcpy((void *)&(sa_in4.sin_addr), (void *)&(he->h_addr_list[0][0]),
+		       sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		login_set_addr(li1, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_in4, sizeof(sa_in4));
+		strlcpy(li1->hostname, "localhost", sizeof(li1->hostname));
+	}
+	if (be_verbose)
+		dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
+
+	if ((int)geteuid() != 0) {
+		printf("NOT RUNNING LOGIN TESTS - you are not root!\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (nologtest)
+		return 1;
+
+	line_stripname(stripline, li1->line, sizeof(stripline));
+
+	printf("Performing an invalid login attempt (no type field)\n--\n");
+	login_write(li1);
+	printf("--\n(Should have written errors to stderr)\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&t0);
+	strlcpy(s_t0, ctime(&t0), sizeof(s_t0));
+	t1 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
+	strlcpy(s_t1, ctime(&t1), sizeof(s_t1));
+	printf("Before logging in:\n\tcurrent time is %d - %s\t"
+	       "lastlog time is %d - %s\n",
+	       (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1);
+#endif
+
+	printf("Performing a login on line %s ", stripline);
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&logintime);
+	strlcpy(s_logintime, ctime(&logintime), sizeof(s_logintime));
+	printf("at %d - %s", (int)logintime, s_logintime);
+#endif
+	printf("--\n");
+	login_login(li1);
+
+	snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "who | grep '%s '",
+		 stripline);
+	system(cmdstring);
+
+	printf("--\nPausing for %d second(s)...\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+	sleep(PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+
+	printf("Performing a logout ");
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&logouttime);
+	strlcpy(s_logouttime, ctime(&logouttime), sizeof(s_logouttime));
+	printf("at %d - %s", (int)logouttime, s_logouttime);
+#endif
+	printf("\nThe root login shown above should be gone.\n"
+	       "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n"
+	       "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n"
+	       "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n"
+	       "-- ('who' output follows)\n");
+	login_logout(li1);
+
+	system(cmdstring);
+	printf("-- ('who' output ends)\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	t2 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
+	strlcpy(s_t2, ctime(&t2), sizeof(s_t2));
+	printf("After logging in, lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t2, s_t2);
+	if (t1 == t2)
+		printf("The lastlog times before and after logging in are the "
+		       "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING "
+		       "CORRECTLY **\n");
+	else if (t0 != t2)
+		/* We can be off by a second or so, even when recording works fine.
+		 * I'm not 100% sure why, but it's true. */
+		printf("** The login time and the lastlog time differ.\n"
+		       "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the "
+		       "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n"
+		       "If it's off by less than %d second(s) "
+		       "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+	else
+		printf("lastlog agrees with the login time. This is a good thing.\n");
+
+#endif
+
+	printf("--\nThe output of 'last' shown next should have "
+	       "an entry for root \n  on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n",
+	       stripline);
+	snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "last | grep '%s ' | head -3",
+		 stripline);
+	system(cmdstring);
+
+	printf("--\nEnd of login test.\n");
+
+	login_free_entry(li1);
+
+	return 1;
+} /* testAPI() */
+
+
+void
+testLineName(char *line)
+{
+	/* have to null-terminate - these functions are designed for
+	 * structures with fixed-length char arrays, and don't null-term.*/
+	char full[17], strip[9], abbrev[5];
+
+	memset(full, '\0', sizeof(full));
+	memset(strip, '\0', sizeof(strip));
+	memset(abbrev, '\0', sizeof(abbrev));
+
+	line_fullname(full, line, sizeof(full)-1);
+	line_stripname(strip, full, sizeof(strip)-1);
+	line_abbrevname(abbrev, full, sizeof(abbrev)-1);
+	printf("%s: %s, %s, %s\n", line, full, strip, abbrev);
+
+} /* testLineName() */
+
+
+int
+testOutput()
+{
+	printf("**\n** Testing linename functions\n**\n");
+	testLineName("/dev/pts/1");
+	testLineName("pts/1");
+	testLineName("pts/999");
+	testLineName("/dev/ttyp00");
+	testLineName("ttyp00");
+
+	return 1;
+} /* testOutput() */
+
+
+/* show which options got compiled in */
+void
+showOptions(void)
+{
+	printf("**\n** Compile-time options\n**\n");
+
+	printf("login recording methods selected:\n");
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+	printf("\tUSE_LOGIN\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+	printf("\tUSE_UTMP (UTMP_FILE=%s)\n", UTMP_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	printf("\tUSE_UTMPX (UTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", UTMPX_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+	printf("\tUSE_WTMP (WTMP_FILE=%s)\n", WTMP_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	printf("\tUSE_WTMPX (WTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", WTMPX_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	printf("\tUSE_LASTLOG (LASTLOG_FILE=%s)\n", LASTLOG_FILE);
+#endif
+	printf("\n");
+
+} /* showOptions() */
+
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	printf("Platform-independent login recording test driver\n");
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	if (argc == 2) {
+		if (strncmp(argv[1], "-i", 3) == 0)
+			compile_opts_only = 1;
+		else if (strncmp(argv[1], "-v", 3) == 0)
+			be_verbose=1;
+	}
+
+	if (!compile_opts_only) {
+		if (be_verbose && !testOutput())
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!testAPI())
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	showOptions();
+
+	return 0;
+} /* main() */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mac.c b/crypto/openssh/mac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fabc3ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.15 2008/06/13 00:51:47 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "umac.h"
+
+#define SSH_EVP		1	/* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */
+#define SSH_UMAC	2	/* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
+
+struct {
+	char		*name;
+	int		type;
+	const EVP_MD *	(*mdfunc)(void);
+	int		truncatebits;	/* truncate digest if != 0 */
+	int		key_len;	/* just for UMAC */
+	int		len;		/* just for UMAC */
+} macs[] = {
+	{ "hmac-sha1",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1-96",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 },
+	{ "hmac-md5",			SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, -1, -1 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-96",		SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, -1, -1 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160",		SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
+	{ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
+	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",	SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64 },
+	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
+};
+
+static void
+mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which)
+{
+	int evp_len;
+	mac->type = macs[which].type;
+	if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) {
+		mac->evp_md = (*macs[which].mdfunc)();
+		if ((evp_len = EVP_MD_size(mac->evp_md)) <= 0)
+			fatal("mac %s len %d", mac->name, evp_len);
+		mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = (u_int)evp_len;
+	} else {
+		mac->mac_len = macs[which].len / 8;
+		mac->key_len = macs[which].key_len / 8;
+		mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+	}
+	if (macs[which].truncatebits != 0)
+		mac->mac_len = macs[which].truncatebits / 8;
+}
+
+int
+mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) {
+			if (mac != NULL)
+				mac_setup_by_id(mac, i);
+			debug2("mac_setup: found %s", name);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+	debug2("mac_setup: unknown %s", name);
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+mac_init(Mac *mac)
+{
+	if (mac->key == NULL)
+		fatal("mac_init: no key");
+	switch (mac->type) {
+	case SSH_EVP:
+		if (mac->evp_md == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		HMAC_Init(&mac->evp_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->evp_md);
+		return 0;
+	case SSH_UMAC:
+		mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key);
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+u_char *
+mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+	static u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	u_char b[4], nonce[8];
+
+	if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
+		fatal("mac_compute: mac too long %u %lu",
+		    mac->mac_len, (u_long)sizeof(m));
+
+	switch (mac->type) {
+	case SSH_EVP:
+		put_u32(b, seqno);
+		/* reset HMAC context */
+		HMAC_Init(&mac->evp_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL);
+		HMAC_Update(&mac->evp_ctx, b, sizeof(b));
+		HMAC_Update(&mac->evp_ctx, data, datalen);
+		HMAC_Final(&mac->evp_ctx, m, NULL);
+		break;
+	case SSH_UMAC:
+		put_u64(nonce, seqno);
+		umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
+		umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, m, nonce);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("mac_compute: unknown MAC type");
+	}
+	return (m);
+}
+
+void
+mac_clear(Mac *mac)
+{
+	if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
+		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
+			umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
+	} else if (mac->evp_md != NULL)
+		HMAC_cleanup(&mac->evp_ctx);
+	mac->evp_md = NULL;
+	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
+#define	MAC_SEP	","
+int
+mac_valid(const char *names)
+{
+	char *maclist, *cp, *p;
+
+	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+		return (0);
+	maclist = cp = xstrdup(names);
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
+		if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) {
+			debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names);
+			xfree(maclist);
+			return (0);
+		} else {
+			debug3("mac ok: %s [%s]", p, names);
+		}
+	}
+	debug3("macs ok: [%s]", names);
+	xfree(maclist);
+	return (1);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mac.h b/crypto/openssh/mac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39f564d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.6 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+int	 mac_valid(const char *);
+int	 mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
+int	 mac_init(Mac *);
+u_char	*mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
+void	 mac_clear(Mac *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/match.c b/crypto/openssh/match.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2389477
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/match.c
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.27 2008/06/10 23:06:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
+ * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
+ */
+
+int
+match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
+{
+	for (;;) {
+		/* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
+		if (!*pattern)
+			return !*s;
+
+		if (*pattern == '*') {
+			/* Skip the asterisk. */
+			pattern++;
+
+			/* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
+			if (!*pattern)
+				return 1;
+
+			/* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
+			if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
+				/*
+				 * Look instances of the next character in
+				 * pattern, and try to match starting from
+				 * those.
+				 */
+				for (; *s; s++)
+					if (*s == *pattern &&
+					    match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
+						return 1;
+				/* Failed. */
+				return 0;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Move ahead one character at a time and try to
+			 * match at each position.
+			 */
+			for (; *s; s++)
+				if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
+					return 1;
+			/* Failed. */
+			return 0;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * There must be at least one more character in the string.
+		 * If we are at the end, fail.
+		 */
+		if (!*s)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
+		if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
+		s++;
+		pattern++;
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the string against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation).  Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+
+int
+match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, u_int len,
+    int dolower)
+{
+	char sub[1024];
+	int negated;
+	int got_positive;
+	u_int i, subi;
+
+	got_positive = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < len;) {
+		/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
+		if (pattern[i] == '!') {
+			negated = 1;
+			i++;
+		} else
+			negated = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end.  Convert the
+		 * subpattern to lowercase.
+		 */
+		for (subi = 0;
+		    i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
+		    subi++, i++)
+			sub[subi] = dolower && isupper(pattern[i]) ?
+			    (char)tolower(pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
+		/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
+		if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
+		if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
+			i++;
+
+		/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
+		sub[subi] = '\0';
+
+		/* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
+		if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
+			if (negated)
+				return -1;		/* Negative */
+			else
+				got_positive = 1;	/* Positive */
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Return success if got a positive match.  If there was a negative
+	 * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
+	 */
+	return got_positive;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation).  Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+int
+match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, u_int len)
+{
+	return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, len, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
+ * or if we get no match at all.  returns -1 on error, or 1 on
+ * successful match.
+ */
+int
+match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+    const char *patterns)
+{
+	int mhost, mip;
+
+	/* error in ipaddr match */
+	if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
+		return -1;
+	else if (mip == -1) /* negative ip address match */
+		return 0;
+
+	/* negative hostname match */
+	if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	/* no match at all */
+	if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern
+ */
+int
+match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+    const char *pattern)
+{
+	char *p, *pat;
+	int ret;
+
+	if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
+		return match_pattern(user, pattern);
+
+	pat = xstrdup(pattern);
+	p = strchr(pat, '@');
+	*p++ = '\0';
+
+	if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
+		ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
+	xfree(pat);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
+ * caller must xfree() returned string.
+ */
+#define	MAX_PROP	40
+#define	SEP	","
+char *
+match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
+{
+	char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
+	char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
+	int i, j, nproposals;
+
+	c = cp = xstrdup(client);
+	s = sp = xstrdup(server);
+
+	for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
+		if (i < MAX_PROP)
+			sproposals[i] = p;
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	nproposals = i;
+
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
+			if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
+				ret = xstrdup(p);
+				if (next != NULL)
+					*next = (cp == NULL) ?
+					    strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
+				xfree(c);
+				xfree(s);
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (next != NULL)
+		*next = strlen(c);
+	xfree(c);
+	xfree(s);
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/match.h b/crypto/openssh/match.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18f6830
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/match.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.14 2008/06/10 03:57:27 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef MATCH_H
+#define MATCH_H
+
+int	 match_pattern(const char *, const char *);
+int	 match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, u_int, int);
+int	 match_hostname(const char *, const char *, u_int);
+int	 match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int	 match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+char	*match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
+
+/* addrmatch.c */
+int	 addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/md-sha256.c b/crypto/openssh/md-sha256.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c1b3b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/md-sha256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: md-sha256.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* EVP wrapper for SHA256 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE
+# ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+#  include <sha2.h>
+# elif defined(HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H)
+#  include <crypto/sha2.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
+
+static int
+ssh_sha256_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt)
+{
+	SHA256_Init(ctxt->md_data);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_sha256_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt, const void *data, unsigned long len)
+{
+	SHA256_Update(ctxt->md_data, data, len);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_sha256_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt, unsigned char *digest)
+{
+	SHA256_Final(digest, ctxt->md_data);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_sha256_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt)
+{
+	memset(ctxt->md_data, 0, sizeof(SHA256_CTX));
+	return (1);
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *
+evp_ssh_sha256(void)
+{
+	static EVP_MD ssh_sha256;
+
+	memset(&ssh_sha256, 0, sizeof(ssh_sha256));
+	ssh_sha256.type = NID_undef;
+	ssh_sha256.md_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	ssh_sha256.init = ssh_sha256_init;
+	ssh_sha256.update = ssh_sha256_update;
+	ssh_sha256.final = ssh_sha256_final;
+	ssh_sha256.cleanup = ssh_sha256_cleanup;
+	ssh_sha256.block_size = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	ssh_sha256.ctx_size = sizeof(SHA256_CTX);
+
+	return (&ssh_sha256);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.c b/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22ef989
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this
+ * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some
+ * day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in
+ * return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+/* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */
+static unsigned char itoa64[] =
+    "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+static char *magic = "$1$";
+
+static char *
+to64(unsigned long v, int n)
+{
+	static char buf[5];
+	char *s = buf;
+
+	if (n > 4)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+	while (--n >= 0) {
+		*s++ = itoa64[v&0x3f];
+		v >>= 6;
+	}
+
+	return (buf);
+}
+
+int
+is_md5_salt(const char *salt)
+{
+	return (strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic)) == 0);
+}
+
+char *
+md5_crypt(const char *pw, const char *salt)
+{
+	static char passwd[120], salt_copy[9], *p;
+	static const char *sp, *ep;
+	unsigned char final[16];
+	int sl, pl, i, j;
+	MD5_CTX	ctx, ctx1;
+	unsigned long l;
+
+	/* Refine the Salt first */
+	sp = salt;
+
+	/* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */
+	if(strncmp(sp, magic, strlen(magic)) == 0)
+		sp += strlen(magic);
+
+	/* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */
+	for (ep = sp; *ep != '$'; ep++) {
+		if (*ep == '\0' || ep >= (sp + 8))
+			return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* get the length of the true salt */
+	sl = ep - sp;
+
+	/* Stash the salt */
+	memcpy(salt_copy, sp, sl);
+	salt_copy[sl] = '\0';
+
+	MD5_Init(&ctx);
+
+	/* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */
+	MD5_Update(&ctx, pw, strlen(pw));
+
+	/* Then our magic string */
+	MD5_Update(&ctx, magic, strlen(magic));
+
+	/* Then the raw salt */
+	MD5_Update(&ctx, sp, sl);
+
+	/* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw, salt, pw) */
+	MD5_Init(&ctx1);
+	MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+	MD5_Update(&ctx1, sp, sl);
+	MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+	MD5_Final(final, &ctx1);
+
+	for(pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16)
+		MD5_Update(&ctx, final, pl > 16 ? 16 : pl);
+
+	/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+	memset(final, '\0', sizeof final);
+
+	/* Then something really weird... */
+	for (j = 0, i = strlen(pw); i != 0; i >>= 1)
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx, final + j, 1);
+		else
+			MD5_Update(&ctx, pw + j, 1);
+
+	/* Now make the output string */
+	snprintf(passwd, sizeof(passwd), "%s%s$", magic, salt_copy);
+
+	MD5_Final(final, &ctx);
+
+	/*
+	 * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast
+	 * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would
+	 * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary...
+	 */
+	for(i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+		MD5_Init(&ctx1);
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+		else
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, final, 16);
+
+		if (i % 3)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, sp, sl);
+
+		if (i % 7)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, final, 16);
+		else
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+
+		MD5_Final(final, &ctx1);
+	}
+
+	p = passwd + strlen(passwd);
+
+	l = (final[ 0]<<16) | (final[ 6]<<8) | final[12];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l = (final[ 1]<<16) | (final[ 7]<<8) | final[13];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l = (final[ 2]<<16) | (final[ 8]<<8) | final[14];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l = (final[ 3]<<16) | (final[ 9]<<8) | final[15];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l = (final[ 4]<<16) | (final[10]<<8) | final[ 5];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l =                    final[11]                ;
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 2), sizeof(passwd));
+
+	/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+	memset(final, 0, sizeof(final));
+	memset(salt_copy, 0, sizeof(salt_copy));
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	memset(&ctx1, 0, sizeof(ctx1));
+	(void)to64(0, 4);
+
+	return (passwd);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.h b/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2341e2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this notice you
+ * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
+ * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/* $Id: md5crypt.h,v 1.4 2003/05/18 14:46:46 djm Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef _MD5CRYPT_H
+#define _MD5CRYPT_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+
+int is_md5_salt(const char *);
+char *md5_crypt(const char *, const char *);
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */
+
+#endif /* MD5CRYPT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.c b/crypto/openssh/misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..143dbf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,851 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.71 2009/02/21 19:32:04 tobias Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+#include <net/if.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+/* remove newline at end of string */
+char *
+chop(char *s)
+{
+	char *t = s;
+	while (*t) {
+		if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
+			*t = '\0';
+			return s;
+		}
+		t++;
+	}
+	return s;
+
+}
+
+/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
+int
+set_nonblock(int fd)
+{
+	int val;
+
+	val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+	if (val < 0) {
+		error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (val & O_NONBLOCK) {
+		debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+	val |= O_NONBLOCK;
+	if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
+		debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+unset_nonblock(int fd)
+{
+	int val;
+
+	val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+	if (val < 0) {
+		error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+		debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+	val &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
+	if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
+		debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s",
+		    fd, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr)
+{
+	if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM)
+		return strerror(errno);
+	return gai_strerror(gaierr);
+}
+
+/* disable nagle on socket */
+void
+set_nodelay(int fd)
+{
+	int opt;
+	socklen_t optlen;
+
+	optlen = sizeof opt;
+	if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) {
+		debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (opt == 1) {
+		debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd);
+		return;
+	}
+	opt = 1;
+	debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd);
+	if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1)
+		error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+#define QUOTE	"\""
+
+/* return next token in configuration line */
+char *
+strdelim(char **s)
+{
+	char *old;
+	int wspace = 0;
+
+	if (*s == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	old = *s;
+
+	*s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE QUOTE "=");
+	if (*s == NULL)
+		return (old);
+
+	if (*s[0] == '\"') {
+		memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
+		/* Find matching quote */
+		if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
+			return (NULL);		/* no matching quote */
+		} else {
+			*s[0] = '\0';
+			return (old);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
+	if (*s[0] == '=')
+		wspace = 1;
+	*s[0] = '\0';
+
+	/* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
+	*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+	if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
+		*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+
+	return (old);
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
+
+	copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+	copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
+	copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
+	copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD
+	copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD
+	copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+	copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
+#endif
+	copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+	copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
+	return copy;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
+ * Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
+ * Return -1 if invalid.
+ */
+int
+a2port(const char *s)
+{
+	long long port;
+	const char *errstr;
+
+	port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL)
+		return -1;
+	return (int)port;
+}
+
+int
+a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
+{
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
+	char *sp, *ep;
+	int tun;
+
+	if (remote != NULL) {
+		*remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+		sp = xstrdup(s);
+		if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
+			xfree(sp);
+			return (a2tun(s, NULL));
+		}
+		ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
+		*remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
+		tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
+		xfree(sp);
+		return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
+	}
+
+	if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0)
+		return (SSH_TUNID_ANY);
+
+	tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL)
+		return (SSH_TUNID_ERR);
+
+	return (tun);
+}
+
+#define SECONDS		1
+#define MINUTES		(SECONDS * 60)
+#define HOURS		(MINUTES * 60)
+#define DAYS		(HOURS * 24)
+#define WEEKS		(DAYS * 7)
+
+/*
+ * Convert a time string into seconds; format is
+ * a sequence of:
+ *      time[qualifier]
+ *
+ * Valid time qualifiers are:
+ *      <none>  seconds
+ *      s|S     seconds
+ *      m|M     minutes
+ *      h|H     hours
+ *      d|D     days
+ *      w|W     weeks
+ *
+ * Examples:
+ *      90m     90 minutes
+ *      1h30m   90 minutes
+ *      2d      2 days
+ *      1w      1 week
+ *
+ * Return -1 if time string is invalid.
+ */
+long
+convtime(const char *s)
+{
+	long total, secs;
+	const char *p;
+	char *endp;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	total = 0;
+	p = s;
+
+	if (p == NULL || *p == '\0')
+		return -1;
+
+	while (*p) {
+		secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10);
+		if (p == endp ||
+		    (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) ||
+		    secs < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		switch (*endp++) {
+		case '\0':
+			endp--;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+		case 'S':
+			break;
+		case 'm':
+		case 'M':
+			secs *= MINUTES;
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+		case 'H':
+			secs *= HOURS;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+		case 'D':
+			secs *= DAYS;
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+		case 'W':
+			secs *= WEEKS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -1;
+		}
+		total += secs;
+		if (total < 0)
+			return -1;
+		p = endp;
+	}
+
+	return total;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+	char *hoststr;
+
+	if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
+		return(xstrdup(host));
+	if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0)
+		fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+	debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
+	return hoststr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
+ * Argument may be modified (for termination).
+ * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds.
+ * *cp is set to the start of the next delimiter, if one was found.
+ * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL.
+ */
+char *
+hpdelim(char **cp)
+{
+	char *s, *old;
+
+	if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	old = s = *cp;
+	if (*s == '[') {
+		if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL)
+			return NULL;
+		else
+			s++;
+	} else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL)
+		s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */
+
+	switch (*s) {
+	case '\0':
+		*cp = NULL;	/* no more fields*/
+		break;
+
+	case ':':
+	case '/':
+		*s = '\0';	/* terminate */
+		*cp = s + 1;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return old;
+}
+
+char *
+cleanhostname(char *host)
+{
+	if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') {
+		host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0';
+		return (host + 1);
+	} else
+		return host;
+}
+
+char *
+colon(char *cp)
+{
+	int flag = 0;
+
+	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+		return (0);
+	if (*cp == '[')
+		flag = 1;
+
+	for (; *cp; ++cp) {
+		if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[')
+			flag = 1;
+		if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag)
+			return (cp+1);
+		if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
+			return (cp);
+		if (*cp == '/')
+			return (0);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
+void
+addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	char *cp;
+	u_int nalloc;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (r == -1)
+		fatal("addargs: argument too long");
+
+	nalloc = args->nalloc;
+	if (args->list == NULL) {
+		nalloc = 32;
+		args->num = 0;
+	} else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
+		nalloc *= 2;
+
+	args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
+	args->nalloc = nalloc;
+	args->list[args->num++] = cp;
+	args->list[args->num] = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	char *cp;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (r == -1)
+		fatal("replacearg: argument too long");
+
+	if (which >= args->num)
+		fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
+		    which, args->num);
+	xfree(args->list[which]);
+	args->list[which] = cp;
+}
+
+void
+freeargs(arglist *args)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (args->list != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
+			xfree(args->list[i]);
+		xfree(args->list);
+		args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
+		args->list = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expands tildes in the file name.  Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
+ * Warning: this calls getpw*.
+ */
+char *
+tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
+{
+	const char *path;
+	char user[128], ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	u_int len, slash;
+
+	if (*filename != '~')
+		return (xstrdup(filename));
+	filename++;
+
+	path = strchr(filename, '/');
+	if (path != NULL && path > filename) {		/* ~user/path */
+		slash = path - filename;
+		if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1)
+			fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long");
+		memcpy(user, filename, slash);
+		user[slash] = '\0';
+		if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
+			fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user);
+	} else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL)	/* ~/path */
+		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid);
+
+	if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+	/* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
+	len = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
+	if ((len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/') &&
+	    strlcat(ret, "/", sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+	/* Skip leading '/' from specified path */
+	if (path != NULL)
+		filename = path + 1;
+	if (strlcat(ret, filename, sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+	return (xstrdup(ret));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be
+ * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must
+ * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory
+ * allocated by xmalloc.
+ */
+char *
+percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS	16
+	struct {
+		const char *key;
+		const char *repl;
+	} keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
+	u_int num_keys, i, j;
+	char buf[4096];
+	va_list ap;
+
+	/* Gather keys */
+	va_start(ap, string);
+	for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
+		keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
+		if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
+			break;
+		keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
+		if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
+			fatal("percent_expand: NULL replacement");
+	}
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	if (num_keys >= EXPAND_MAX_KEYS)
+		fatal("percent_expand: too many keys");
+
+	/* Expand string */
+	*buf = '\0';
+	for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
+		if (*string != '%') {
+ append:
+			buf[i++] = *string;
+			if (i >= sizeof(buf))
+				fatal("percent_expand: string too long");
+			buf[i] = '\0';
+			continue;
+		}
+		string++;
+		if (*string == '%')
+			goto append;
+		for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) {
+			if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) {
+				i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf));
+				if (i >= sizeof(buf))
+					fatal("percent_expand: string too long");
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (j >= num_keys)
+			fatal("percent_expand: unknown key %%%c", *string);
+	}
+	return (xstrdup(buf));
+#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read an entire line from a public key file into a static buffer, discarding
+ * lines that exceed the buffer size.  Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz,
+   u_long *lineno)
+{
+	while (fgets(buf, bufsz, f) != NULL) {
+		if (buf[0] == '\0')
+			continue;
+		(*lineno)++;
+		if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n' || feof(f)) {
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			debug("%s: %s line %lu exceeds size limit", __func__,
+			    filename, *lineno);
+			/* discard remainder of line */
+			while (fgetc(f) != '\n' && !feof(f))
+				;	/* nothing */
+		}
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int
+tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+{
+#if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN)
+	return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode));
+#elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD)
+	struct ifreq ifr;
+	char name[100];
+	int fd = -1, sock;
+
+	/* Open the tunnel device */
+	if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+		snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun);
+		fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
+	} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+		for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
+			snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun);
+			if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
+
+	/* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
+	snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "tun%d", tun);
+	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	/* Set interface mode */
+	ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP;
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
+		ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_LINK0;
+	else
+		ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_LINK0;
+	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	/* Bring interface up */
+	ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
+	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	close(sock);
+	return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	if (sock >= 0)
+		close(sock);
+	debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
+	    mode, strerror(errno));
+	return (-1);
+#else
+	error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform");
+	return (-1);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+sanitise_stdfd(void)
+{
+	int nullfd, dupfd;
+
+	if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	while (++dupfd <= 2) {
+		/* Only clobber closed fds */
+		if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL, 0) >= 0)
+			continue;
+		if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+	if (nullfd > 2)
+		close(nullfd);
+}
+
+char *
+tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	char b[3], *r;
+	size_t i, hl;
+
+	if (l > 65536)
+		return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
+
+	hl = l * 2 + 1;
+	r = xcalloc(1, hl);
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
+		strlcat(r, b, hl);
+	}
+	return (r);
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+get_u64(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int64_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+get_u32(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int32_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+u_int16_t
+get_u16(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int16_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+void
+put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
+	p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
+	p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
+	p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+	p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+	p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+	p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+
+void
+put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms)
+{
+	struct timeval diff, finish;
+
+	gettimeofday(&finish, NULL);
+	timersub(&finish, start, &diff);	
+	*ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000);
+}
+
+void
+ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
+{
+	if (ms < 0)
+		ms = 0;
+	tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000;
+	tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000;
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.h b/crypto/openssh/misc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5da170d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.38 2008/06/12 20:38:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MISC_H
+#define _MISC_H
+
+/* misc.c */
+
+char	*chop(char *);
+char	*strdelim(char **);
+int	 set_nonblock(int);
+int	 unset_nonblock(int);
+void	 set_nodelay(int);
+int	 a2port(const char *);
+int	 a2tun(const char *, int *);
+char	*put_host_port(const char *, u_short);
+char	*hpdelim(char **);
+char	*cleanhostname(char *);
+char	*colon(char *);
+long	 convtime(const char *);
+char	*tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
+char	*percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
+char	*tohex(const void *, size_t);
+void	 sanitise_stdfd(void);
+void	 ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
+void	 ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
+
+struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
+const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
+
+typedef struct arglist arglist;
+struct arglist {
+	char    **list;
+	u_int   num;
+	u_int   nalloc;
+};
+void	 addargs(arglist *, char *, ...)
+	     __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void	 replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...)
+	     __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+void	 freeargs(arglist *);
+
+int	 tun_open(int, int);
+
+/* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_NO		0x00
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT	0x01
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET	0x02
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT	SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_YES		(SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
+
+#define SSH_TUNID_ANY		0x7fffffff
+#define SSH_TUNID_ERR		(SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
+#define SSH_TUNID_MAX		(SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
+
+/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
+u_int64_t	get_u64(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
+u_int32_t	get_u32(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+u_int16_t	get_u16(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+void		put_u64(void *, u_int64_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
+void		put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+void		put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+
+
+/* readpass.c */
+
+#define RP_ECHO			0x0001
+#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN		0x0002
+#define RP_ALLOW_EOF		0x0004
+#define RP_USE_ASKPASS		0x0008
+
+char	*read_passphrase(const char *, int);
+int	 ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+int	 read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
+
+#endif /* _MISC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mkinstalldirs b/crypto/openssh/mkinstalldirs
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..47d5f43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mkinstalldirs
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy
+# Author: Noah Friedman <friedman@prep.ai.mit.edu>
+# Created: 1993-05-16
+# Public domain
+
+# $Id: mkinstalldirs,v 1.2 2003/11/21 12:48:55 djm Exp $
+
+errstatus=0
+
+for file
+do
+   set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'`
+   shift
+
+   pathcomp=
+   for d
+   do
+     pathcomp="$pathcomp$d"
+     case "$pathcomp" in
+       -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;;
+     esac
+
+     if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then
+	echo "mkdir $pathcomp"
+
+	mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$?
+
+	if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then
+	  errstatus=$lasterr
+	fi
+     fi
+
+     pathcomp="$pathcomp/"
+   done
+done
+
+exit $errstatus
+
+# mkinstalldirs ends here
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli b/crypto/openssh/moduli
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65d2814
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+#    $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.4 2008/01/01 08:51:20 dtucker Exp $
+# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
+20060827013849 2 6 100 1023 2 DE49FC9069994C379D2B6563EFD37EFAE6785EEB1DD0A12B090AAC272B22DF8C64A4A2AB7B99CE0B77A9A52E0833D52D53B258CEDFFD175DC8A3766A9B9807362646DC9215628C3F4AF0E08D00AB60A3B9E55BAE47E82651DA0C15A27355DDB06365CAE1DDDE4C0C97DC9942FD65E9867FA50E72E1C785411EDD28DE261778F3
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+20060827013924 2 6 100 1023 2 DE49FC9069994C379D2B6563EFD37EFAE6785EEB1DD0A12B090AAC272B22DF8C64A4A2AB7B99CE0B77A9A52E0833D52D53B258CEDFFD175DC8A3766A9B9807362646DC9215628C3F4AF0E08D00AB60A3B9E55BAE47E82651DA0C15A27355DDB06365CAE1DDDE4C0C97DC9942FD65E9867FA50E72E1C785411EDD28DE2621AFA3
+20060827014045 2 6 100 1023 2 DE49FC9069994C379D2B6563EFD37EFAE6785EEB1DD0A12B090AAC272B22DF8C64A4A2AB7B99CE0B77A9A52E0833D52D53B258CEDFFD175DC8A3766A9B9807362646DC9215628C3F4AF0E08D00AB60A3B9E55BAE47E82651DA0C15A27355DDB06365CAE1DDDE4C0C97DC9942FD65E9867FA50E72E1C785411EDD28DE26551B8B
+20060827014056 2 6 100 1023 5 DE49FC9069994C379D2B6563EFD37EFAE6785EEB1DD0A12B090AAC272B22DF8C64A4A2AB7B99CE0B77A9A52E0833D52D53B258CEDFFD175DC8A3766A9B9807362646DC9215628C3F4AF0E08D00AB60A3B9E55BAE47E82651DA0C15A27355DDB06365CAE1DDDE4C0C97DC9942FD65E9867FA50E72E1C785411EDD28DE26556A27
+20060827014115 2 6 100 1023 2 DE49FC9069994C379D2B6563EFD37EFAE6785EEB1DD0A12B090AAC272B22DF8C64A4A2AB7B99CE0B77A9A52E0833D52D53B258CEDFFD175DC8A3766A9B9807362646DC9215628C3F4AF0E08D00AB60A3B9E55BAE47E82651DA0C15A27355DDB06365CAE1DDDE4C0C97DC9942FD65E9867FA50E72E1C785411EDD28DE265B7273
+20060827014137 2 6 100 1023 5 DE49FC9069994C379D2B6563EFD37EFAE6785EEB1DD0A12B090AAC272B22DF8C64A4A2AB7B99CE0B77A9A52E0833D52D53B258CEDFFD175DC8A3766A9B9807362646DC9215628C3F4AF0E08D00AB60A3B9E55BAE47E82651DA0C15A27355DDB06365CAE1DDDE4C0C97DC9942FD65E9867FA50E72E1C785411EDD28DE26644D77
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diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli.5 b/crypto/openssh/moduli.5
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8c9464
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli.5
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: moduli.5,v 1.12 2008/06/26 05:57:54 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+.\"
+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+.\"
+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+.Dd June 26 2008
+.Dt MODULI 5
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm moduli
+.Nd Diffie Hellman moduli
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+The
+.Pa /etc/moduli
+file contains prime numbers and generators for use by 
+.Xr sshd 8
+in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
+.Pp
+New moduli may be generated with
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+using a two-step process.
+An initial
+.Em candidate generation
+pass, using 
+.Ic ssh-keygen -G ,
+calculates numbers that are likely to be useful.
+A second
+.Em primality testing
+pass, using
+.Ic ssh-keygen -T
+provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers are prime and are
+safe for use in Diffie Hellman operations by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+This
+.Nm
+format is used as the output from each pass.
+.Pp
+The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus,
+containing seven space separated fields.
+These fields are as follows:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Description -offset indent
+.It timestamp
+The time that the modulus was last processed as YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.
+.It type
+Decimal number specifying the internal structure of the prime modulus.
+Supported types are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width 0x00 -compact
+.It 0
+Unknown, not tested
+.It 2
+"Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+.It 4
+Sophie Germain; (p+1)*2 is also prime.
+.El
+.Pp
+Moduli candidates initially produced by
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+are Sophie Germain primes (type 4).
+Futher primality testing with
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+produces safe prime moduli (type 2) that are ready for use in
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Other types are not used by OpenSSH.
+.It tests
+Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests that the number
+has been subjected to represented as a bitmask of the following values:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width 0x00 -compact
+.It 0x00
+Not tested
+.It 0x01
+Composite number - not prime.
+.It 0x02
+Sieve of Eratosthenes
+.It 0x04
+Probabalistic Miller-Rabin primality tests.
+.El
+.Pp
+The
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+moduli candidate generation uses the Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02).
+Subsequent
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests (flag 0x04).
+.It trials
+Decimal number indicating of primaility trials that have been performed
+on the modulus.
+.It size
+Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in bits.
+.It generator
+The recommended generator for use with this modulus (hexadecimal).
+.It modulus
+The modulus itself in hexadecimal.
+.El
+.Pp
+When performing Diffie Hellman Group Exchange,
+.Xr sshd 8
+first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
+Diffie Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
+.Xr sshd 8
+then randomly selects a modulus from
+.Fa /etc/moduli
+that best meets the size requirement.
+.Pp
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4419
+.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli.c b/crypto/openssh/moduli.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f737cb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli.c
@@ -0,0 +1,650 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.21 2008/06/26 09:19:40 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
+ * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson@greendragon.com>
+ * Copyright 2000 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX
+ *
+ *  Sieve candidates for "safe" primes,
+ *  suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli;
+ *  that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+ *
+ * First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive)
+ * Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive)
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/*
+ * File output defines
+ */
+
+/* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */
+#define QLINESIZE		(100+8192)
+
+/*
+ * Size: decimal.
+ * Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M).
+ * WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N.
+ */
+#define QSIZE_MINIMUM		(511)
+
+/*
+ * Prime sieving defines
+ */
+
+/* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */
+#define SHIFT_BIT	(3)
+#define SHIFT_BYTE	(2)
+#define SHIFT_WORD	(SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE)
+#define SHIFT_MEGABYTE	(20)
+#define SHIFT_MEGAWORD	(SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE)
+
+/*
+ * Using virtual memory can cause thrashing.  This should be the largest
+ * number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity --
+ * that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks!
+ */
+#define LARGE_MINIMUM	(8UL)	/* megabytes */
+
+/*
+ * Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size.
+ * Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits).
+ */
+#define LARGE_MAXIMUM	(127UL)	/* megabytes */
+
+/*
+ * Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime
+ * has to be less than 2**32.
+ */
+#define SMALL_MAXIMUM	(0xffffffffUL)
+
+/* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */
+#define TINY_NUMBER	(1UL<<16)
+
+/* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */
+#define TEST_MAXIMUM	(1UL<<16)
+#define TEST_MINIMUM	(QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
+/* real TEST_MINIMUM	(1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
+#define TEST_POWER	(3)	/* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
+
+/* bit operations on 32-bit words */
+#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_SET(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_TEST(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+
+/*
+ * Prime testing defines
+ */
+
+/* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */
+#define TRIAL_MINIMUM	(4)
+
+/*
+ * Sieving data (XXX - move to struct)
+ */
+
+/* sieve 2**16 */
+static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits;
+
+/* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */
+static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase;
+
+/* sieve relative to the initial value */
+static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers;
+static u_int32_t largebits, largememory;	/* megabytes */
+static BIGNUM *largebase;
+
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
+int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t);
+
+/*
+ * print moduli out in consistent form,
+ */
+static int
+qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries,
+    u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus)
+{
+	struct tm *gtm;
+	time_t time_now;
+	int res;
+
+	time(&time_now);
+	gtm = gmtime(&time_now);
+
+	res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ",
+	    gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday,
+	    gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec,
+	    otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator);
+
+	if (res < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	res = fprintf(ofile, "\n");
+	fflush(ofile);
+
+	return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ** Sieve p's and q's with small factors
+ */
+static void
+sieve_large(u_int32_t s)
+{
+	u_int32_t r, u;
+
+	debug3("sieve_large %u", s);
+	largetries++;
+	/* r = largebase mod s */
+	r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s);
+	if (r == 0)
+		u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */
+	else
+		u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */
+
+	if (u < largebits * 2) {
+		/*
+		 * The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that
+		 * largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in
+		 * increments of 2*s
+		 */
+		if (u & 0x1)
+			u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */
+
+		/* Mark all multiples of 2*s */
+		for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s)
+			BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
+	}
+
+	/* r = p mod s */
+	r = (2 * r + 1) % s;
+	if (r == 0)
+		u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */
+	else
+		u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */
+
+	if (u < largebits * 4) {
+		/*
+		 * The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that
+		 * largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in
+		 * increments of 4*s
+		 */
+		while (u & 0x3) {
+			if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s)
+				return;
+			u += s;
+		}
+
+		/* Mark all multiples of 4*s */
+		for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s)
+			BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2)
+ * to standard output.
+ * The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30).
+ */
+int
+gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
+{
+	BIGNUM *q;
+	u_int32_t j, r, s, t;
+	u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
+	u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
+	time_t time_start, time_stop;
+	u_int32_t i;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	largememory = memory;
+
+	if (memory != 0 &&
+	    (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
+		error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)",
+		    LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated.
+	 * This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p.
+	 */
+	if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) {
+		error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM);
+		return (-1);
+	} else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) {
+		error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	power--; /* decrement before squaring */
+
+	/*
+	 * The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the
+	 * density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range
+	 * to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not
+	 * guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime.
+	 */
+	largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER));
+
+	/*
+	 * Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all
+	 * of it.
+	 */
+	if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) {
+		logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB",
+		    largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
+		largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM;
+	}
+
+	if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) {
+		logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes",
+		    largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
+		largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
+	} else if (largememory > 0) {
+		logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes",
+		    largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
+		largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
+	}
+
+	TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD;
+
+	SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD;
+
+	/*
+	 * dynamically determine available memory
+	 */
+	while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL)
+		largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */
+
+	largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD;
+	largenumbers = largebits * 2;	/* even numbers excluded */
+
+	/* validation check: count the number of primes tried */
+	largetries = 0;
+	if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new failed");
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use
+	 * specified parameter.
+	 */
+	if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new failed");
+	if (start == NULL) {
+		if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0)
+			fatal("BN_rand failed");
+	} else {
+		if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL)
+			fatal("BN_copy: failed");
+	}
+
+	/* ensure odd */
+	if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0)
+		fatal("BN_set_bit: failed");
+
+	time(&time_start);
+
+	logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start),
+	    largenumbers, power);
+	debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase));
+
+	/*
+	 * TinySieve
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
+		if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
+			continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
+
+		/* The next tiny prime */
+		t = 2 * i + 3;
+
+		/* Mark all multiples of t */
+		for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t)
+			BIT_SET(TinySieve, j);
+
+		sieve_large(t);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid
+	 * fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped.
+	 */
+	for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3;
+	    smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
+	    smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
+		for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
+			if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
+				continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
+
+			/* The next tiny prime */
+			t = 2 * i + 3;
+			r = smallbase % t;
+
+			if (r == 0) {
+				s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */
+			} else {
+				/* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */
+				s = t - r;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that
+			 * smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve
+			 * in increments of 2*t
+			 */
+			if (s & 1)
+				s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */
+
+			/* Mark all multiples of 2*t */
+			for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t)
+				BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * SmallSieve
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) {
+			if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i))
+				continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */
+
+			/* The next small prime */
+			sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase);
+		}
+
+		memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE);
+	}
+
+	time(&time_stop);
+
+	logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %ld seconds",
+	    ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long) (time_stop - time_start));
+
+	for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) {
+		if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j))
+			continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */
+
+		debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j);
+		if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0)
+			fatal("BN_set_word failed");
+		if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0)
+			fatal("BN_add failed");
+		if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN,
+		    MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries,
+		    (power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) {
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r++; /* count q */
+	}
+
+	time(&time_stop);
+
+	xfree(LargeSieve);
+	xfree(SmallSieve);
+	xfree(TinySieve);
+
+	logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * perform a Miller-Rabin primality test
+ * on the list of candidates
+ * (checking both q and p)
+ * The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes
+ */
+int
+prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted)
+{
+	BIGNUM *q, *p, *a;
+	BN_CTX *ctx;
+	char *cp, *lp;
+	u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0;
+	u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size;
+	time_t time_start, time_stop;
+	int res;
+
+	if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) {
+		error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	time(&time_start);
+
+	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new failed");
+	if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new failed");
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_CTX_new failed");
+
+	debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)",
+	    ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted);
+
+	res = 0;
+	lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1);
+	while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL) {
+		count_in++;
+		if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') {
+			debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* XXX - fragile parser */
+		/* time */
+		cp = &lp[14];	/* (skip) */
+
+		/* type */
+		in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+		/* tests */
+		in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+		if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) {
+			debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* tries */
+		in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+		/* size (most significant bit) */
+		in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+		/* generator (hex) */
+		generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16);
+
+		/* Skip white space */
+		cp += strspn(cp, " ");
+
+		/* modulus (hex) */
+		switch (in_type) {
+		case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN:
+			debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type);
+			a = q;
+			if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
+			/* p = 2*q + 1 */
+			if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_lshift failed");
+			if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_add_word failed");
+			in_size += 1;
+			generator_known = 0;
+			break;
+		case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED:
+		case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE:
+		case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR:
+		case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG:
+		case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
+			debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type);
+			a = p;
+			if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
+			/* q = (p-1) / 2 */
+			if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_rshift failed");
+			break;
+		default:
+			debug2("Unknown prime type");
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check
+		 * the proposed bit size.
+		 */
+		if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
+			debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) {
+			debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN)
+			in_tries += trials;
+		else
+			in_tries = trials;
+
+		/*
+		 * guess unknown generator
+		 */
+		if (generator_known == 0) {
+			if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11)
+				generator_known = 2;
+			else if (BN_mod_word(p, 12) == 5)
+				generator_known = 3;
+			else {
+				u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10);
+
+				if (r == 3 || r == 7)
+					generator_known = 5;
+			}
+		}
+		/*
+		 * skip tests when desired generator doesn't match
+		 */
+		if (generator_wanted > 0 &&
+		    generator_wanted != generator_known) {
+			debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d",
+			    count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so
+		 * skip those.
+		 */
+		if (generator_known == 0) {
+			debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		count_possible++;
+
+		/*
+		 * The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is
+		 * extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time
+		 * really verifying that q is prime until after we know
+		 * that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the
+		 * vast majority of composite q's.
+		 */
+		if (BN_is_prime(q, 1, NULL, ctx, NULL) <= 0) {
+			debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test",
+			    count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure
+		 * that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do
+		 * the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that
+		 * will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it
+		 * doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count.
+		 */
+		if (!BN_is_prime(p, trials, NULL, ctx, NULL)) {
+			debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in);
+
+		/* recheck q more rigorously */
+		if (!BN_is_prime(q, trials - 1, NULL, ctx, NULL)) {
+			debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in);
+
+		if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE,
+		    in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN,
+		    in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) {
+			res = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		count_out++;
+	}
+
+	time(&time_stop);
+	xfree(lp);
+	BN_free(p);
+	BN_free(q);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+	logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds",
+	    ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible,
+	    (long) (time_stop - time_start));
+
+	return (res);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ace25c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2211 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.104 2009/06/12 20:43:22 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+#include <skey.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC	/* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
+#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
+#include "zlib.h"
+#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
+#else
+#include "zlib.h"
+#endif
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
+#endif
+
+/* Imports */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+extern u_char session_id[];
+extern Buffer auth_debug;
+extern int auth_debug_init;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* State exported from the child */
+
+struct {
+	z_stream incoming;
+	z_stream outgoing;
+	u_char *keyin;
+	u_int keyinlen;
+	u_char *keyout;
+	u_int keyoutlen;
+	u_char *ivin;
+	u_int ivinlen;
+	u_char *ivout;
+	u_int ivoutlen;
+	u_char *ssh1key;
+	u_int ssh1keylen;
+	int ssh1cipher;
+	int ssh1protoflags;
+	u_char *input;
+	u_int ilen;
+	u_char *output;
+	u_int olen;
+	u_int64_t sent_bytes;
+	u_int64_t recv_bytes;
+} child_state;
+
+/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
+
+int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+static Authctxt *authctxt;
+static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+
+/* local state for key verify */
+static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
+static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
+static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
+static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
+
+struct mon_table {
+	enum monitor_reqtype type;
+	int flags;
+	int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
+};
+
+#define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
+#define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
+#define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
+#define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
+
+#define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
+
+#define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+#endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
+#endif
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+
+/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+
+static void
+monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
+{
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->type == type) {
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+			return;
+		}
+		ent++;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
+{
+	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
+
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+		}
+		ent++;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	struct mon_table *ent;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+
+	authctxt = _authctxt;
+	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+
+	authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+
+		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+	} else {
+		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
+	}
+
+	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+	while (!authenticated) {
+		auth_method = "unknown";
+		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+		if (authenticated) {
+			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
+				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
+				    __func__, ent->type);
+			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+			    !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
+				authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+			/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
+			if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+				Buffer m;
+
+				buffer_init(&m);
+				mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+				    MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+				authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+				buffer_free(&m);
+			}
+#endif
+		}
+
+		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
+			    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+			if (!authenticated)
+				authctxt->failures++;
+		}
+#ifdef JPAKE
+		/* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
+		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+			if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
+				jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+				authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+		fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
+
+	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
+	    __func__, authctxt->user);
+
+	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
+{
+	monitor_child_pid = pid;
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_child_handler(int sig)
+{
+	kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+	signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+	} else {
+		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+	}
+	if (!no_pty_flag) {
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
+	}
+
+	for (;;)
+		monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	if (options.compression) {
+		/* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
+		mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
+    struct mon_table **pent)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int ret;
+	u_char type;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+
+	mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
+
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->type == type)
+			break;
+		ent++;
+	}
+
+	if (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
+			fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
+			    type);
+		ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+
+		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
+		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
+			debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
+			    type);
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+		}
+
+		if (pent != NULL)
+			*pent = ent;
+
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
+
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+/* allowed key state */
+static int
+monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+{
+	/* make sure key is allowed */
+	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
+	    memcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
+		return (0);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_reset_key_state(void)
+{
+	/* reset state */
+	if (key_blob != NULL)
+		xfree(key_blob);
+	if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
+		xfree(hostbased_cuser);
+	if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
+		xfree(hostbased_chost);
+	key_blob = NULL;
+	key_bloblen = 0;
+	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+	hostbased_chost = NULL;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	DH *dh;
+	int min, want, max;
+
+	min = buffer_get_int(m);
+	want = buffer_get_int(m);
+	max = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+	debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
+	    __func__, min, want, max);
+	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
+	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
+		fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
+		    __func__, min, want, max);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
+	if (dh == NULL) {
+		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+		return (0);
+	} else {
+		/* Send first bignum */
+		buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+
+		DH_free(dh);
+	}
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	u_char *p;
+	u_char *signature;
+	u_int siglen, datlen;
+	int keyid;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+
+	keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
+	p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
+
+	/*
+	 * Supported KEX types will only return SHA1 (20 byte) or
+	 * SHA256 (32 byte) hashes
+	 */
+	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32)
+		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
+
+	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
+	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+		session_id2_len = datlen;
+		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+		memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
+	}
+
+	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
+	if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
+
+	debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
+
+	xfree(p);
+	xfree(signature);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+
+	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+
+int
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *username;
+	struct passwd *pwent;
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+
+	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
+		fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
+
+	username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+	pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
+
+	authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
+	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
+	xfree(username);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	if (pwent == NULL) {
+		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	allowed = 1;
+	authctxt->pw = pwent;
+	authctxt->valid = 1;
+
+	buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+	buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
+#endif
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+
+ out:
+	buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
+	if (options.banner != NULL)
+		buffer_put_cstring(m, options.banner);
+	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+
+	/* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
+	if (!compat20)
+		monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+	else {
+		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+	}
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
+#endif
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *banner;
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	banner = auth2_read_banner();
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
+
+	if (banner != NULL)
+		xfree(banner);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+	authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
+	    __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+
+	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+		xfree(authctxt->style);
+		authctxt->style = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	static int call_count;
+	char *passwd;
+	int authenticated;
+	u_int plen;
+
+	passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
+	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
+	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
+	    auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+	memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+	xfree(passwd);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+	call_count++;
+	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
+		auth_method = "none";
+	else
+		auth_method = "password";
+
+	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *name, *infotxt;
+	u_int numprompts;
+	u_int *echo_on;
+	char **prompts;
+	u_int success;
+
+	success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
+	    &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, success);
+	if (success)
+		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+
+	if (success) {
+		xfree(name);
+		xfree(infotxt);
+		xfree(prompts);
+		xfree(echo_on);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *response;
+	int authok;
+
+	if (authctxt->as == 0)
+		fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
+
+	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
+	    auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
+	authctxt->as = NULL;
+	debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
+	xfree(response);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+
+	auth_method = "bsdauth";
+
+	return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+int
+mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct skey skey;
+	char challenge[1024];
+	u_int success;
+
+	success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
+	    sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, success);
+	if (success)
+		buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *response;
+	int authok;
+
+	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+	authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
+	    authctxt->valid &&
+	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
+	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
+
+	xfree(response);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
+
+	auth_method = "skey";
+
+	return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int
+mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+	start_pam(authctxt);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_int ret;
+
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+	ret = do_pam_account();
+
+	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
+		buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+	} else {
+		buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+	}
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *name, *info, **prompts;
+	u_int i, num, *echo_on;
+	int ret;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
+	ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
+	if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
+		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+	if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
+		ret = -1;
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
+	xfree(name);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
+	xfree(info);
+	buffer_put_int(m, num);
+	for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
+		xfree(prompts[i]);
+		buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
+	}
+	if (prompts != NULL)
+		xfree(prompts);
+	if (echo_on != NULL)
+		xfree(echo_on);
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	char **resp;
+	u_int i, num;
+	int ret;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
+	num = buffer_get_int(m);
+	if (num > 0) {
+		resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
+		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+			resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
+		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+			xfree(resp[i]);
+		xfree(resp);
+	} else {
+		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
+	}
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+	if (ret == 0)
+		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+	return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+mm_append_debug(Buffer *m)
+{
+	if (auth_debug_init && buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
+		debug3("%s: Appending debug messages for child", __func__);
+		buffer_append(m, buffer_ptr(&auth_debug),
+		    buffer_len(&auth_debug));
+		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	char *cuser, *chost;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int bloblen;
+	enum mm_keytype type = 0;
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	type = buffer_get_int(m);
+	cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+
+	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+
+	if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
+	    (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
+		fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
+
+	debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
+
+	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
+		switch (type) {
+		case MM_USERKEY:
+			allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
+			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+			auth_method = "publickey";
+			if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
+				auth_clear_options();
+			break;
+		case MM_HOSTKEY:
+			allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
+			    hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+			    cuser, chost, key);
+			auth_method = "hostbased";
+			break;
+		case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
+			key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
+			allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
+			    auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+			    cuser, chost, key);
+			if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
+				auth_clear_options();
+			auth_method = "rsa";
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (key != NULL)
+		key_free(key);
+
+	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	if (allowed) {
+		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+		key_blob = blob;
+		key_bloblen = bloblen;
+		key_blobtype = type;
+		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
+		hostbased_chost = chost;
+	} else {
+		/* Log failed attempt */
+		auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+		xfree(blob);
+		xfree(cuser);
+		xfree(chost);
+	}
+
+	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
+
+	mm_append_debug(m);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+
+	if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	char *p;
+	u_int len;
+	int fail = 0;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+		p = buffer_ptr(&b);
+		len = buffer_len(&b);
+		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+		    (len < session_id2_len) ||
+		    (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+			fail++;
+		buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
+	} else {
+		p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+		    (len != session_id2_len) ||
+		    (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+			fail++;
+		xfree(p);
+	}
+	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+		fail++;
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+		    authctxt->user, p);
+		fail++;
+	}
+	xfree(p);
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+			fail++;
+	} else {
+		p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+		if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
+			fail++;
+		xfree(p);
+		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+			fail++;
+		buffer_skip_string(&b);
+	}
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);
+	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
+    char *chost)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	char *p;
+	u_int len;
+	int fail = 0;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+	    (len != session_id2_len) ||
+	    (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+		fail++;
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+		    authctxt->user, p);
+		fail++;
+	}
+	xfree(p);
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* service */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkalg */
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkblob */
+
+	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
+		p[len - 1] = '\0';
+	if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* verify client user */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+	int verified = 0;
+	int valid_data = 0;
+
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+
+	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+
+	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+	if (key == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
+
+	switch (key_blobtype) {
+	case MM_USERKEY:
+		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+		break;
+	case MM_HOSTKEY:
+		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
+		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+		break;
+	default:
+		valid_data = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!valid_data)
+		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+
+	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+
+	key_free(key);
+	xfree(blob);
+	xfree(signature);
+	xfree(data);
+
+	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
+
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+	return (verified == 1);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+	 */
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+	}
+	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_session_close(Session *s)
+{
+	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+	}
+	session_unused(s->self);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+	Session *s;
+	int res, fd0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	s = session_new();
+	if (s == NULL)
+		goto error;
+	s->authctxt = authctxt;
+	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+	s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
+	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+	if (res == 0)
+		goto error;
+	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+
+	buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
+
+	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
+	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
+
+	mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
+
+	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
+	close(0);
+
+	/* send messages generated by record_login */
+	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
+	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+
+	if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
+	    mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+
+	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
+	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (fd0 != 0)
+		error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
+
+	/* slave is not needed */
+	close(s->ttyfd);
+	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
+	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
+	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+
+	debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+
+	return (0);
+
+ error:
+	if (s != NULL)
+		mm_session_close(s);
+	buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Session *s;
+	char *tty;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
+		mm_session_close(s);
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	xfree(tty);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	BIGNUM *p;
+	int rsafail;
+
+	/* Turn off permissions */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
+
+	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
+
+	rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
+
+	BN_clear_free(p);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
+
+	/* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
+		fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
+
+	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	BIGNUM *client_n;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	u_char *blob = NULL;
+	u_int blen = 0;
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	auth_method = "rsa";
+	if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
+		if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
+		allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
+		BN_clear_free(client_n);
+	}
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
+
+	/* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	if (allowed && key != NULL) {
+		key->type = KEY_RSA;	/* cheat for key_to_blob */
+		if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+			fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
+		buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
+
+		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+		key_blob = blob;
+		key_bloblen = blen;
+		key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
+	}
+	if (key != NULL)
+		key_free(key);
+
+	mm_append_debug(m);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+		fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
+	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
+	if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
+		fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
+	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+	if (ssh1_challenge)
+		BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+	ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
+
+	debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
+
+	xfree(blob);
+	key_free(key);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	u_char *blob, *response;
+	u_int blen, len;
+	int success;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
+	if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
+
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+		fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
+	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
+	response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	if (len != 16)
+		fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
+	success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
+
+	xfree(blob);
+	key_free(key);
+	xfree(response);
+
+	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
+
+	/* reset state */
+	BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+	ssh1_challenge = NULL;
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, success);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
+
+	return (success);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
+{
+	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+	int res, status;
+
+	debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
+
+	/* The child is terminating */
+	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		sshpam_cleanup();
+#endif
+
+	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			exit(1);
+
+	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
+
+	/* Terminate process */
+	exit(res);
+}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+/* Report that an audit event occurred */
+int
+mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	event = buffer_get_int(m);
+	switch(event) {
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+		audit_event(event);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_int len;
+	char *cmd;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
+	audit_run_command(cmd);
+	xfree(cmd);
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+void
+monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	if (compat20) {
+		set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+		set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+	} else {
+		packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
+		packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
+		    child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
+		xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
+	}
+
+	/* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
+	packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
+	xfree(child_state.keyout);
+	packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
+	xfree(child_state.keyin);
+
+	if (!compat20) {
+		packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
+		xfree(child_state.ivout);
+		packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
+		xfree(child_state.ivin);
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
+	    sizeof(incoming_stream));
+	memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
+	    sizeof(outgoing_stream));
+
+	/* Update with new address */
+	if (options.compression)
+		mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
+
+	/* Network I/O buffers */
+	/* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
+	buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
+	buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
+	memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
+	xfree(child_state.input);
+
+	buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
+	buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
+		      child_state.olen);
+	memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
+	xfree(child_state.output);
+
+	/* Roaming */
+	if (compat20)
+		roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
+}
+
+static Kex *
+mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
+{
+	Kex *kex;
+	void *blob;
+	u_int bloblen;
+
+	kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
+	kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
+	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+	    (kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) ||
+	    (memcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+		fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
+	kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+	kex->server = 1;
+	kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+	kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+	buffer_init(&kex->my);
+	buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+	buffer_init(&kex->peer);
+	buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+	kex->done = 1;
+	kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
+	kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
+	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+
+	return (kex);
+}
+
+/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
+
+void
+mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob, *p;
+	u_int bloblen, plen;
+	u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
+	u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
+
+	debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+	if (!compat20) {
+		child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
+		child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
+		child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
+		    &child_state.ssh1keylen);
+		child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
+		    &child_state.ivoutlen);
+		child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
+		goto skip;
+	} else {
+		/* Get the Kex for rekeying */
+		*pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
+	}
+
+	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
+	seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+	packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+	packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
+	seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+	packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+	packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
+
+ skip:
+	/* Get the key context */
+	child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
+	child_state.keyin  = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
+
+	debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
+	/* Get compression state */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+	if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
+		fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
+	memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
+	xfree(p);
+
+	p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+	if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
+		fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
+	memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* Network I/O buffers */
+	debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
+	child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
+	child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
+
+	/* Roaming */
+	if (compat20) {
+		child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+		child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+	}
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+
+/* Allocation functions for zlib */
+void *
+mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
+{
+	size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
+	void *address;
+
+	if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
+		fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
+
+	address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
+
+	return (address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+	mm_free(mm, address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+	outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+	outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+	outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
+
+	incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+	incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+	incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
+}
+
+/* XXX */
+
+#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
+	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) \
+		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
+} while (0)
+
+static void
+monitor_socketpair(int *pair)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: socketpair", __func__);
+#else
+	fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes not supported",
+	    __func__);
+#endif
+	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+}
+
+#define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
+
+struct monitor *
+monitor_init(void)
+{
+	struct monitor *mon;
+	int pair[2];
+
+	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+
+	monitor_socketpair(pair);
+
+	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+
+	/* Used to share zlib space across processes */
+	if (options.compression) {
+		mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
+		mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
+
+		/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
+		mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
+	}
+
+	return mon;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
+{
+	int pair[2];
+
+	monitor_socketpair(pair);
+
+	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int
+mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	gss_OID_desc goid;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+	u_int len;
+
+	goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	goid.length = len;
+
+	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
+
+	xfree(goid.elements);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, major);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
+
+	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc in;
+	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
+	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+	u_int len;
+
+	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	in.length = len;
+	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+	xfree(in.value);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, major);
+	buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
+	buffer_put_int(m, flags);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
+
+	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
+
+	if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
+	OM_uint32 ret;
+	u_int len;
+
+	gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	gssbuf.length = len;
+	mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+	mic.length = len;
+
+	ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
+
+	xfree(gssbuf.value);
+	xfree(mic.value);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
+
+	if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	int authenticated;
+
+	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
+
+	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+
+	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
+	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
+	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
+
+	if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
+		fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
+
+	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
+		fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
+		    __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+	authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
+
+	jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
+	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
+	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
+	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
+	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
+	buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
+
+	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+	xfree(x3_proof);
+	xfree(x4_proof);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	char *hash_scheme, *salt;
+
+	if (pctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+	auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	/* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
+
+	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
+	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
+	xfree(hash_scheme);
+	xfree(salt);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
+	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
+
+	if (pctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
+	pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
+	x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
+	x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
+
+	jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
+	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
+	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->b,
+	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
+
+	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+	xfree(x1_proof);
+	xfree(x2_proof);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
+	buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
+
+	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x4_s_proof);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+	u_char *x2_s_proof;
+	u_int x2_s_proof_len;
+
+	if (pctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
+	x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
+
+	jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
+	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->k,
+	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
+
+	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	/* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
+	buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	int authenticated = 0;
+	u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
+	u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+
+	if (pctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+	peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
+
+	authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
+
+	bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
+	xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
+
+	auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+#endif /* JPAKE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8a2c0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.15 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MONITOR_H_
+#define _MONITOR_H_
+
+enum monitor_reqtype {
+	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
+	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD,
+	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MONITOR_ANS_PTY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SESSID,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
+	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM,
+	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM,
+};
+
+struct mm_master;
+struct monitor {
+	int			 m_recvfd;
+	int			 m_sendfd;
+	struct mm_master	*m_zback;
+	struct mm_master	*m_zlib;
+	struct Kex		**m_pkex;
+	pid_t			 m_pid;
+};
+
+struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
+void monitor_sync(struct monitor *);
+
+struct Authctxt;
+void monitor_child_preauth(struct Authctxt *, struct monitor *);
+void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *);
+
+struct mon_table;
+int monitor_read(struct monitor*, struct mon_table *, struct mon_table **);
+
+/* Prototypes for request sending and receiving */
+void mm_request_send(int, enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
+void mm_request_receive(int, Buffer *);
+void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
+
+#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b9a066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.18 2008/11/30 11:59:26 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+
+int
+mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+	struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	union {
+		struct cmsghdr hdr;
+		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+	} cmsgbuf;
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+	struct iovec vec;
+	char ch = '\0';
+	ssize_t n;
+
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
+	msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
+#else
+	msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
+	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+	cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+	cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+	*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd;
+#endif
+
+	vec.iov_base = &ch;
+	vec.iov_len = 1;
+	msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+
+	while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+	    errno == EINTR))
+		debug3("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno));
+	if (n == -1) {
+		error("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (n != 1) {
+		error("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %ld",
+		    __func__, (long)n);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+#else
+	error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+	return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+mm_receive_fd(int sock)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+	struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	union {
+		struct cmsghdr hdr;
+		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+	} cmsgbuf;
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+	struct iovec vec;
+	ssize_t n;
+	char ch;
+	int fd;
+
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+	vec.iov_base = &ch;
+	vec.iov_len = 1;
+	msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
+	msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
+#else
+	msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
+	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+#endif
+
+	while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+	    errno == EINTR))
+		debug3("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (n == -1) {
+		error("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (n != 1) {
+		error("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %ld",
+		    __func__, (long)n);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) {
+		error("%s: no fd", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#else
+	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	if (cmsg == NULL) {
+		error("%s: no message header", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
+	if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) {
+		error("%s: expected type %d got %d", __func__,
+		    SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+	fd = (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
+#endif
+	return fd;
+#else
+	error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+	return -1;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4b1f63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.4 2007/09/04 03:21:03 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_FDPASS_H_
+#define _MM_FDPASS_H_
+
+int mm_send_fd(int, int);
+int mm_receive_fd(int);
+
+#endif /* _MM_FDPASS_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..faf9f3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.16 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+
+static int
+mm_compare(struct mm_share *a, struct mm_share *b)
+{
+	long diff = (char *)a->address - (char *)b->address;
+
+	if (diff == 0)
+		return (0);
+	else if (diff < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	else
+		return (1);
+}
+
+RB_GENERATE(mmtree, mm_share, next, mm_compare)
+
+static struct mm_share *
+mm_make_entry(struct mm_master *mm, struct mmtree *head,
+    void *address, size_t size)
+{
+	struct mm_share *tmp, *tmp2;
+
+	if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+		tmp = xmalloc(sizeof(struct mm_share));
+	else
+		tmp = mm_xmalloc(mm->mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+	tmp->address = address;
+	tmp->size = size;
+
+	tmp2 = RB_INSERT(mmtree, head, tmp);
+	if (tmp2 != NULL)
+		fatal("mm_make_entry(%p): double address %p->%p(%lu)",
+		    mm, tmp2, address, (u_long)size);
+
+	return (tmp);
+}
+
+/* Creates a shared memory area of a certain size */
+
+struct mm_master *
+mm_create(struct mm_master *mmalloc, size_t size)
+{
+	void *address;
+	struct mm_master *mm;
+
+	if (mmalloc == NULL)
+		mm = xmalloc(sizeof(struct mm_master));
+	else
+		mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+
+	/*
+	 * If the memory map has a mm_master it can be completely
+	 * shared including authentication between the child
+	 * and the client.
+	 */
+	mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+	address = xmmap(size);
+	if (address == (void *)MAP_FAILED)
+		fatal("mmap(%lu): %s", (u_long)size, strerror(errno));
+
+	mm->address = address;
+	mm->size = size;
+
+	RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
+	RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
+
+	mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_free, address, size);
+
+	return (mm);
+}
+
+/* Frees either the allocated or the free list */
+
+static void
+mm_freelist(struct mm_master *mmalloc, struct mmtree *head)
+{
+	struct mm_share *mms, *next;
+
+	for (mms = RB_ROOT(head); mms; mms = next) {
+		next = RB_NEXT(mmtree, head, mms);
+		RB_REMOVE(mmtree, head, mms);
+		if (mmalloc == NULL)
+			xfree(mms);
+		else
+			mm_free(mmalloc, mms);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Destroys a memory mapped area */
+
+void
+mm_destroy(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+	mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_free);
+	mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_allocated);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
+	if (munmap(mm->address, mm->size) == -1)
+		fatal("munmap(%p, %lu): %s", mm->address, (u_long)mm->size,
+		    strerror(errno));
+#else
+	fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported",
+	    __func__);
+#endif
+	if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+		xfree(mm);
+	else
+		mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mm);
+}
+
+void *
+mm_xmalloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size)
+{
+	void *address;
+
+	address = mm_malloc(mm, size);
+	if (address == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: mm_malloc(%lu)", __func__, (u_long)size);
+	return (address);
+}
+
+
+/* Allocates data from a memory mapped area */
+
+void *
+mm_malloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size)
+{
+	struct mm_share *mms, *tmp;
+
+	if (size == 0)
+		fatal("mm_malloc: try to allocate 0 space");
+	if (size > SIZE_T_MAX - MM_MINSIZE + 1)
+		fatal("mm_malloc: size too big");
+
+	size = ((size + (MM_MINSIZE - 1)) / MM_MINSIZE) * MM_MINSIZE;
+
+	RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, &mm->rb_free) {
+		if (mms->size >= size)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (mms == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/* Debug */
+	memset(mms->address, 0xd0, size);
+
+	tmp = mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_allocated, mms->address, size);
+
+	/* Does not change order in RB tree */
+	mms->size -= size;
+	mms->address = (u_char *)mms->address + size;
+
+	if (mms->size == 0) {
+		RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+		if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+			xfree(mms);
+		else
+			mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+	}
+
+	return (tmp->address);
+}
+
+/* Frees memory in a memory mapped area */
+
+void
+mm_free(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+	struct mm_share *mms, *prev, tmp;
+
+	tmp.address = address;
+	mms = RB_FIND(mmtree, &mm->rb_allocated, &tmp);
+	if (mms == NULL)
+		fatal("mm_free(%p): can not find %p", mm, address);
+
+	/* Debug */
+	memset(mms->address, 0xd0, mms->size);
+
+	/* Remove from allocated list and insert in free list */
+	RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_allocated, mms);
+	if (RB_INSERT(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms) != NULL)
+		fatal("mm_free(%p): double address %p", mm, address);
+
+	/* Find previous entry */
+	prev = mms;
+	if (RB_LEFT(prev, next)) {
+		prev = RB_LEFT(prev, next);
+		while (RB_RIGHT(prev, next))
+			prev = RB_RIGHT(prev, next);
+	} else {
+		if (RB_PARENT(prev, next) &&
+		    (prev == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(prev, next), next)))
+			prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+		else {
+			while (RB_PARENT(prev, next) &&
+			    (prev == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(prev, next), next)))
+				prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+			prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check if range does not overlap */
+	if (prev != NULL && MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) > address)
+		fatal("mm_free: memory corruption: %p(%lu) > %p",
+		    prev->address, (u_long)prev->size, address);
+
+	/* See if we can merge backwards */
+	if (prev != NULL && MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) == address) {
+		prev->size += mms->size;
+		RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+		if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+			xfree(mms);
+		else
+			mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+	} else
+		prev = mms;
+
+	if (prev == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* Check if we can merge forwards */
+	mms = RB_NEXT(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, prev);
+	if (mms == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) > mms->address)
+		fatal("mm_free: memory corruption: %p < %p(%lu)",
+		    mms->address, prev->address, (u_long)prev->size);
+	if (MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) != mms->address)
+		return;
+
+	prev->size += mms->size;
+	RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+
+	if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+		xfree(mms);
+	else
+		mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_sync_list(struct mmtree *oldtree, struct mmtree *newtree,
+    struct mm_master *mm, struct mm_master *mmold)
+{
+	struct mm_master *mmalloc = mm->mmalloc;
+	struct mm_share *mms, *new;
+
+	/* Sync free list */
+	RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, oldtree) {
+		/* Check the values */
+		mm_memvalid(mmold, mms, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+		mm_memvalid(mm, mms->address, mms->size);
+
+		new = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+		memcpy(new, mms, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+		RB_INSERT(mmtree, newtree, new);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+mm_share_sync(struct mm_master **pmm, struct mm_master **pmmalloc)
+{
+	struct mm_master *mm;
+	struct mm_master *mmalloc;
+	struct mm_master *mmold;
+	struct mmtree rb_free, rb_allocated;
+
+	debug3("%s: Share sync", __func__);
+
+	mm = *pmm;
+	mmold = mm->mmalloc;
+	mm_memvalid(mmold, mm, sizeof(*mm));
+
+	mmalloc = mm_create(NULL, mm->size);
+	mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+	memcpy(mm, *pmm, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+	mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+	rb_free = mm->rb_free;
+	rb_allocated = mm->rb_allocated;
+
+	RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
+	RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
+
+	mm_sync_list(&rb_free, &mm->rb_free, mm, mmold);
+	mm_sync_list(&rb_allocated, &mm->rb_allocated, mm, mmold);
+
+	mm_destroy(mmold);
+
+	*pmm = mm;
+	*pmmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+	debug3("%s: Share sync end", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+mm_memvalid(struct mm_master *mm, void *address, size_t size)
+{
+	void *end = (u_char *)address + size;
+
+	if (address < mm->address)
+		fatal("mm_memvalid: address too small: %p", address);
+	if (end < address)
+		fatal("mm_memvalid: end < address: %p < %p", end, address);
+	if (end > (void *)((u_char *)mm->address + mm->size))
+		fatal("mm_memvalid: address too large: %p", address);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c890f77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.h,v 1.5 2008/04/29 11:20:31 otto Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_H_
+#define _MM_H_
+
+struct mm_share {
+	RB_ENTRY(mm_share) next;
+	void *address;
+	size_t size;
+};
+
+struct mm_master {
+	RB_HEAD(mmtree, mm_share) rb_free;
+	struct mmtree rb_allocated;
+	void *address;
+	size_t size;
+
+	struct mm_master *mmalloc;	/* Used to completely share */
+};
+
+RB_PROTOTYPE(mmtree, mm_share, next, mm_compare)
+
+#define MM_MINSIZE		128
+
+#define MM_ADDRESS_END(x)	(void *)((u_char *)(x)->address + (x)->size)
+
+struct mm_master *mm_create(struct mm_master *, size_t);
+void mm_destroy(struct mm_master *);
+
+void mm_share_sync(struct mm_master **, struct mm_master **);
+
+void *mm_malloc(struct mm_master *, size_t);
+void *mm_xmalloc(struct mm_master *, size_t);
+void mm_free(struct mm_master *, void *);
+
+void mm_memvalid(struct mm_master *, void *, size_t);
+#endif /* _MM_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8e8710
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1430 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.68 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC    /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
+#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
+#include "zlib.h"
+#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
+#else
+#include "zlib.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
+
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern int compat20;
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+int
+mm_is_monitor(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
+	 * points to the unprivileged child.
+	 */
+	return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+	u_char buf[5];
+
+	debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
+
+	put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
+	buf[4] = (u_char) type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
+		fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
+		fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[4];
+	u_int msg_len;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+		fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
+	if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len)
+		fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char rtype;
+
+	debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
+
+	mm_request_receive(sock, m);
+	rtype = buffer_get_char(m);
+	if (rtype != type)
+		fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
+		    rtype, type);
+}
+
+DH *
+mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
+{
+	BIGNUM *p, *g;
+	int success = 0;
+	Buffer m;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, min);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, nbits);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, max);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m);
+
+	success = buffer_get_char(&m);
+	if (success == 0)
+		fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__);
+
+	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+	if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g);
+
+	debug3("%s: remaining %d", __func__, buffer_len(&m));
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (dh_new_group(g, p));
+}
+
+int
+mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key));
+	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m);
+	*sigp  = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	u_int len;
+	ServerOptions *newopts;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, username);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m);
+
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) {
+		pw = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+	if (len != sizeof(struct passwd))
+		fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__);
+	pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+	pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+#endif
+	pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+
+out:
+	/* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
+	newopts = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+	if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
+		fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__);
+	if (newopts->banner != NULL)
+		newopts->banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
+	xfree(newopts);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (pw);
+}
+
+char *
+mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	char *banner;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m);
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m);
+	banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	/* treat empty banner as missing banner */
+	if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
+		xfree(banner);
+		banner = NULL;
+	}
+	return (banner);
+}
+
+/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+/* Do the password authentication */
+int
+mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, password);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
+
+	authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
+	    __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+{
+	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key));
+}
+
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host,
+    Key *key)
+{
+	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key));
+}
+
+int
+mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user,
+    char *host, Key *key)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */
+	ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key);
+	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_send_debug(Buffer *m)
+{
+	char *msg;
+
+	while (buffer_len(m)) {
+		msg = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+		debug3("%s: Sending debug: %s", __func__, msg);
+		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
+		xfree(msg);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int len;
+	int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+	if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+		return (0);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, type);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : "");
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : "");
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+	allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	/* fake forced command */
+	auth_clear_options();
+	have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
+
+	/* Send potential debug messages */
+	mm_send_debug(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (allowed);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
+ * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
+ * for authentication.
+ */
+
+int
+mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int len;
+	int verified = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+	if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+		return (0);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+
+	verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (verified);
+}
+
+/* Export key state after authentication */
+Newkeys *
+mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	u_int len;
+	Newkeys *newkey = NULL;
+	Enc *enc;
+	Mac *mac;
+	Comp *comp;
+
+	debug3("%s: %p(%d)", __func__, blob, blen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
+#endif
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
+
+	newkey = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkey));
+	enc = &newkey->enc;
+	mac = &newkey->mac;
+	comp = &newkey->comp;
+
+	/* Enc structure */
+	enc->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	buffer_get(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
+	enc->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	enc->block_size = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	enc->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->key_len);
+	enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+	if (len != enc->block_size)
+		fatal("%s: bad ivlen: expected %u != %u", __func__,
+		    enc->block_size, len);
+
+	if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher)
+		fatal("%s: bad cipher name %s or pointer %p", __func__,
+		    enc->name, enc->cipher);
+
+	/* Mac structure */
+	mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (mac->name == NULL || mac_setup(mac, mac->name) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: can not setup mac %s", __func__, mac->name);
+	mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+	if (len > mac->key_len)
+		fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %u > %d", __func__, len,
+		    mac->key_len);
+	mac->key_len = len;
+
+	/* Comp structure */
+	comp->type = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	comp->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	comp->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+
+	len = buffer_len(&b);
+	if (len != 0)
+		error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %u", len);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return (newkey);
+}
+
+int
+mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	int len;
+	Enc *enc;
+	Mac *mac;
+	Comp *comp;
+	Newkeys *newkey = (Newkeys *)packet_get_newkeys(mode);
+
+	debug3("%s: converting %p", __func__, newkey);
+
+	if (newkey == NULL) {
+		error("%s: newkey == NULL", __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	enc = &newkey->enc;
+	mac = &newkey->mac;
+	comp = &newkey->comp;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	/* Enc structure */
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, enc->name);
+	/* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
+	buffer_append(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
+	buffer_put_int(&b, enc->enabled);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, enc->block_size);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len);
+	packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+
+	/* Mac structure */
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len);
+
+	/* Comp structure */
+	buffer_put_int(&b, comp->type);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, comp->enabled);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, comp->name);
+
+	len = buffer_len(&b);
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	if (blobp != NULL) {
+		*blobp = xmalloc(len);
+		memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+	}
+	memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return len;
+}
+
+static void
+mm_send_kex(Buffer *m, Kex *kex)
+{
+	buffer_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
+	buffer_put_int(m, kex->we_need);
+	buffer_put_int(m, kex->hostkey_type);
+	buffer_put_int(m, kex->kex_type);
+	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
+	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer));
+	buffer_put_int(m, kex->flags);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string);
+	buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string);
+}
+
+void
+mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	Buffer m, *input, *output;
+	u_char *blob, *p;
+	u_int bloblen, plen;
+	u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
+	u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+
+	if (!compat20) {
+		u_char iv[24];
+		u_char *key;
+		u_int ivlen, keylen;
+
+		buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_protocol_flags());
+
+		buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_ssh1_cipher());
+
+		debug3("%s: Sending ssh1 KEY+IV", __func__);
+		keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(NULL);
+		key = xmalloc(keylen+1);	/* add 1 if keylen == 0 */
+		keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(key);
+		buffer_put_string(&m, key, keylen);
+		memset(key, 0, keylen);
+		xfree(key);
+
+		ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
+		packet_get_keyiv(MODE_OUT, iv, ivlen);
+		buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
+		ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT);
+		packet_get_keyiv(MODE_IN, iv, ivlen);
+		buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen);
+		goto skip;
+	} else {
+		/* Kex for rekeying */
+		mm_send_kex(&m, *monitor->m_pkex);
+	}
+
+	debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p",
+	    __func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT),
+	    packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN));
+
+	/* Keys from Kex */
+	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
+		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
+
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
+		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
+
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
+	buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
+	buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
+	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
+	buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
+	buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
+
+	debug3("%s: New keys have been sent", __func__);
+ skip:
+	/* More key context */
+	plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, NULL);
+	p = xmalloc(plen+1);
+	packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, p);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
+	xfree(p);
+
+	plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, NULL);
+	p = xmalloc(plen+1);
+	packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, p);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* Compression state */
+	debug3("%s: Sending compression state", __func__);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, &outgoing_stream, sizeof(outgoing_stream));
+	buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream));
+
+	/* Network I/O buffers */
+	input = (Buffer *)packet_get_input();
+	output = (Buffer *)packet_get_output();
+	buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(input), buffer_len(input));
+	buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(output), buffer_len(output));
+
+	/* Roaming */
+	if (compat20) {
+		buffer_put_int64(&m, get_sent_bytes());
+		buffer_put_int64(&m, get_recv_bytes());
+	}
+
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+	debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	char *p, *msg;
+	int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1;
+
+	/* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
+	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+		if (tmp1 > 0)
+			close(tmp1);
+		if (tmp2 > 0)
+			close(tmp2);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	close(tmp1);
+	close(tmp2);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m);
+
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	if (success == 0) {
+		debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
+	xfree(p);
+
+	buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+	xfree(msg);
+
+	if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+	    (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__);
+
+	/* Success */
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+		return;
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	/* closed dup'ed master */
+	if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
+		error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
+		    s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* unlink pty from session */
+	s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void
+mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, &m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+u_int
+mm_do_pam_account(void)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_int ret;
+	char *msg;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+	ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+	xfree(msg);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+void *
+mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int success;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	if (success == 0) {
+		debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	return (authctxt);
+}
+
+int
+mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+    u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_int i;
+	int ret;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m);
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m);
+	ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
+	*name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	*info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	*num = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
+		    __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
+	*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
+	for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
+		(*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+		(*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_int i;
+	int ret;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, num);
+	for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+		buffer_put_cstring(&m, resp[i]);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, &m);
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, &m);
+	ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m);
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+/* Request process termination */
+
+void
+mm_terminate(void)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
+{
+	int rsafail;
+	Buffer m;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m);
+
+	rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (rsafail);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
+    char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	*name = xstrdup("");
+	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
+	*numprompts = 1;
+	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
+	(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_int success;
+	char *challenge;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
+	    &m);
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	if (success == 0) {
+		debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
+	challenge  = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
+	(*prompts)[0] = challenge;
+
+	debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int authok;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+	if (numresponses != 1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m);
+
+	authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+int
+mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_int success;
+	char *challenge;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
+	    &m);
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	if (success == 0) {
+		debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
+	challenge  = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
+
+	mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
+
+	xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
+	xfree(challenge);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int authok;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+	if (numresponses != 1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m);
+
+	authok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
+}
+#endif /* SKEY */
+
+void
+mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16])
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int i;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	Key *key;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+	int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+	allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	/* fake forced command */
+	auth_clear_options();
+	have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
+
+	if (allowed && rkey != NULL) {
+		blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen);
+		if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__);
+		*rkey = key;
+		xfree(blob);
+	}
+	mm_send_debug(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (allowed);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *
+mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+
+	key->type = KEY_RSA;    /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
+	if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+		fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
+	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
+
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (challenge);
+}
+
+int
+mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int blen;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	key->type = KEY_RSA;    /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
+	if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+		fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
+	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m);
+
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (success);
+}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, event);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+
+	/* Client doesn't get to see the context */
+	*ctx = NULL;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, goid->elements, goid->length);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m);
+
+	major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	return (major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
+    gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+	u_int len;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, &m);
+
+	major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+	out->length = len;
+	if (flags)
+		*flags = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	return (major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
+	    &m);
+
+	major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int authenticated = 0;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+				  &m);
+
+	authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+void
+mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
+    char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, &m);
+
+	*hash_scheme = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+	*salt = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
+    u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
+    BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
+    u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
+    u_char **priv2_proof, u_int *priv2_proof_len)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, &m);
+
+	if ((*priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*g_priv1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (*g_priv2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	*id = buffer_get_string(&m, id_len);
+	/* priv1 and priv2 are, well, private */
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *g_priv1);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *g_priv2);
+	*priv1_proof = buffer_get_string(&m, priv1_proof_len);
+	*priv2_proof = buffer_get_string(&m, priv2_proof_len);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
+    BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
+    const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
+    const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
+    const u_char *theirpub1_proof, u_int theirpub1_proof_len,
+    const u_char *theirpub2_proof, u_int theirpub2_proof_len,
+    BIGNUM **newpub,
+    u_char **newpub_exponent_proof, u_int *newpub_exponent_proof_len)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	/* monitor already has all bignums except theirpub1, theirpub2 */
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, theirpub1);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, theirpub2);
+	/* monitor already knows our id */
+	buffer_put_string(&m, theirid, theirid_len);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len);
+	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, &m);
+
+	if ((*newpub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, *newpub);
+	*newpub_exponent_proof = buffer_get_string(&m,
+	    newpub_exponent_proof_len);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
+    BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
+    BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
+    const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
+    const u_char *their_id, u_int their_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    const u_char *theirpriv2_s_proof, u_int theirpriv2_s_proof_len,
+    BIGNUM **k,
+    u_char **confirm_hash, u_int *confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	/* monitor already has all bignums except step2_val */
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, step2_val);
+	/* monitor already knows all the ids */
+	buffer_put_string(&m, theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len);
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, &m);
+
+	/* 'k' is sensitive and stays in the monitor */
+	*confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(&m, confirm_hash_len);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
+    const u_char *peer_id, u_int peer_id_len,
+    const u_char *sess_id, u_int sess_id_len,
+    const u_char *peer_confirm_hash, u_int peer_confirm_hash_len)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	/* k is dummy in slave, ignored */
+	/* monitor knows all the ids */
+	buffer_put_string(&m, peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, &m);
+
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, &m);
+
+	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: success = %d", __func__, success);
+	return success;
+}
+#endif /* JPAKE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de2d16f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.22 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
+#define _MM_WRAP_H_
+
+extern int use_privsep;
+#define PRIVSEP(x)	(use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
+
+enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY};
+
+struct monitor;
+struct mm_master;
+struct Authctxt;
+
+int mm_is_monitor(void);
+DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
+int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
+BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+   gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void mm_start_pam(struct Authctxt *);
+u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
+void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
+int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#include "audit.h"
+void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+#endif
+
+struct Session;
+void mm_terminate(void);
+int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
+
+/* SSHv1 interfaces */
+void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *);
+int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+
+/* Key export functions */
+struct Newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
+int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *);
+void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *);
+void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*);
+
+/* bsdauth */
+int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+/* skey */
+int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+/* jpake */
+struct modp_group;
+void mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(struct Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
+void mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
+    BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
+    u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
+void mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
+void mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
+    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
+int mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+
+/* zlib allocation hooks */
+
+void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
+void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *, void *);
+void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);
+
+#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/msg.c b/crypto/openssh/msg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd5f98c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/msg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+int
+ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[5];
+	u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+
+	debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
+
+	put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
+	buf[4] = type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		error("ssh_msg_send: write");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) {
+		error("ssh_msg_send: write");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[4];
+	u_int msg_len;
+
+	debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
+
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		if (errno != EPIPE)
+			error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	buffer_clear(m);
+	buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/msg.h b/crypto/openssh/msg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0cb9b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/msg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.4 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_MSG_H
+#define SSH_MSG_H
+
+int	 ssh_msg_send(int, u_char, Buffer *);
+int	 ssh_msg_recv(int, Buffer *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mux.c b/crypto/openssh/mux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79f8376
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,728 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.7 2008/06/13 17:21:20 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* ssh session multiplexing support */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/*
+ * TODO:
+ *   1. partial reads in muxserver_accept_control (maybe make channels
+ *      from accepted connections)
+ *   2. Better signalling from master to slave, especially passing of
+ *      error messages
+ *   3. Better fall-back from mux slave error to new connection.
+ *   3. Add/delete forwardings via slave
+ *   4. ExitOnForwardingFailure (after #3 obviously)
+ *   5. Maybe extension mechanisms for multi-X11/multi-agent forwarding
+ *   6. Document the mux mini-protocol somewhere.
+ *   7. Support ~^Z in mux slaves.
+ *   8. Inspect or control sessions in master.
+ *   9. If we ever support the "signal" channel request, send signals on
+ *      sessions in master.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+# include <libutil.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+
+/* from ssh.c */
+extern int tty_flag;
+extern Options options;
+extern int stdin_null_flag;
+extern char *host;
+int subsystem_flag;
+extern Buffer command;
+
+/* Context for session open confirmation callback */
+struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
+	int want_tty;
+	int want_subsys;
+	int want_x_fwd;
+	int want_agent_fwd;
+	Buffer cmd;
+	char *term;
+	struct termios tio;
+	char **env;
+};
+
+/* fd to control socket */
+int muxserver_sock = -1;
+
+/* Multiplexing control command */
+u_int muxclient_command = 0;
+
+/* Set when signalled. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0;
+
+/* PID of multiplex server */
+static u_int muxserver_pid = 0;
+
+
+/* ** Multiplexing master support */
+
+/* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */
+void
+muxserver_listen(void)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un addr;
+	mode_t old_umask;
+	int addr_len;
+
+	if (options.control_path == NULL ||
+	    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
+		return;
+
+	debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
+
+	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+	    strlen(options.control_path) + 1;
+
+	if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, options.control_path,
+	    sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
+		fatal("ControlPath too long");
+
+	if ((muxserver_sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+		fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	old_umask = umask(0177);
+	if (bind(muxserver_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+		muxserver_sock = -1;
+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EADDRINUSE) {
+			error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
+			    "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
+			close(muxserver_sock);
+			muxserver_sock = -1;
+			xfree(options.control_path);
+			options.control_path = NULL;
+			options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+			return;
+		} else
+			fatal("%s bind(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	umask(old_umask);
+
+	if (listen(muxserver_sock, 64) == -1)
+		fatal("%s listen(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	set_nonblock(muxserver_sock);
+}
+
+/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */
+static void
+mux_session_confirm(int id, void *arg)
+{
+	struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
+	const char *display;
+	Channel *c;
+	int i;
+
+	if (cctx == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
+
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+		char *proto, *data;
+		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+		    options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
+		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
+		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data);
+		/* XXX wait for reply */
+	}
+
+	if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
+		debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+		channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+
+	client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
+	    cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
+
+	c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
+	buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
+	xfree(cctx->term);
+	if (cctx->env != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
+			xfree(cctx->env[i]);
+		xfree(cctx->env);
+	}
+	xfree(cctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Accept a connection on the mux master socket and process the
+ * client's request. Returns flag indicating whether mux master should
+ * begin graceful close.
+ */
+int
+muxserver_accept_control(void)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	Channel *c;
+	int client_fd, new_fd[3], ver, allowed, window, packetmax;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx;
+	char *cmd;
+	u_int i, j, len, env_len, mux_command, flags, escape_char;
+	uid_t euid;
+	gid_t egid;
+	int start_close = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Accept connection on control socket
+	 */
+	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+	addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+	if ((client_fd = accept(muxserver_sock,
+	    (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addrlen)) == -1) {
+		error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (getpeereid(client_fd, &euid, &egid) < 0) {
+		error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(client_fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
+		error("control mode uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
+		    (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
+		close(client_fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* XXX handle asynchronously */
+	unset_nonblock(client_fd);
+
+	/* Read command */
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(client_fd, &m) == -1) {
+		error("%s: client msg_recv failed", __func__);
+		close(client_fd);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((ver = buffer_get_char(&m)) != SSHMUX_VER) {
+		error("%s: wrong client version %d", __func__, ver);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		close(client_fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	allowed = 1;
+	mux_command = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	flags = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+
+	switch (mux_command) {
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
+		if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+		    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK)
+			allowed = ask_permission("Allow shared connection "
+			    "to %s? ", host);
+		/* continue below */
+		break;
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
+		if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+		    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK)
+			allowed = ask_permission("Terminate shared connection "
+			    "to %s? ", host);
+		if (allowed)
+			start_close = 1;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
+		/* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE and ALIVE_CHECK */
+		buffer_clear(&m);
+		buffer_put_int(&m, allowed);
+		buffer_put_int(&m, getpid());
+		if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1) {
+			error("%s: client msg_send failed", __func__);
+			close(client_fd);
+			buffer_free(&m);
+			return start_close;
+		}
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		close(client_fd);
+		return start_close;
+	default:
+		error("Unsupported command %d", mux_command);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		close(client_fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, allowed);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, getpid());
+	if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1) {
+		error("%s: client msg_send failed", __func__);
+		close(client_fd);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!allowed) {
+		error("Refused control connection");
+		close(client_fd);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(client_fd, &m) == -1) {
+		error("%s: client msg_recv failed", __func__);
+		close(client_fd);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((ver = buffer_get_char(&m)) != SSHMUX_VER) {
+		error("%s: wrong client version %d", __func__, ver);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		close(client_fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
+	cctx->want_tty = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY) != 0;
+	cctx->want_subsys = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS) != 0;
+	cctx->want_x_fwd = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD) != 0;
+	cctx->want_agent_fwd = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_AGENT_FWD) != 0;
+	cctx->term = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+	escape_char = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	cmd = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+	buffer_init(&cctx->cmd);
+	buffer_append(&cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd));
+
+	env_len = buffer_get_int(&m);
+	env_len = MIN(env_len, 4096);
+	debug3("%s: receiving %d env vars", __func__, env_len);
+	if (env_len != 0) {
+		cctx->env = xcalloc(env_len + 1, sizeof(*cctx->env));
+		for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
+			cctx->env[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+		cctx->env[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	debug2("%s: accepted tty %d, subsys %d, cmd %s", __func__,
+	    cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cmd);
+	xfree(cmd);
+
+	/* Gather fds from client */
+	for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(client_fd)) == -1) {
+			error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
+			    __func__, i);
+			for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+				close(new_fd[j]);
+			for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
+				xfree(cctx->env[j]);
+			if (env_len > 0)
+				xfree(cctx->env);
+			xfree(cctx->term);
+			buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
+			close(client_fd);
+			xfree(cctx);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	debug2("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__,
+	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]);
+
+	/* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */
+	if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
+		error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* This roundtrip is just for synchronisation of ttymodes */
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+	if (ssh_msg_send(client_fd, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1) {
+		error("%s: client msg_send failed", __func__);
+		close(client_fd);
+		close(new_fd[0]);
+		close(new_fd[1]);
+		close(new_fd[2]);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		xfree(cctx->term);
+		if (env_len != 0) {
+			for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
+				xfree(cctx->env[i]);
+			xfree(cctx->env);
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
+		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
+	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
+		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
+	if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
+		set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
+
+	set_nonblock(client_fd);
+
+	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+	if (cctx->want_tty) {
+		window >>= 1;
+		packetmax >>= 1;
+	}
+	
+	c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
+	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
+	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+
+	c->ctl_fd = client_fd;
+	if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) {
+		channel_register_filter(c->self,
+		    client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
+		    client_filter_cleanup,
+		    client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char));
+	}
+
+	debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self);
+
+	channel_send_open(c->self);
+	channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ** Multiplexing client support */
+
+/* Exit signal handler */
+static void
+control_client_sighandler(int signo)
+{
+	muxclient_terminate = signo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to
+ * mux master.
+ */
+static void
+control_client_sigrelay(int signo)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+
+	if (muxserver_pid > 1)
+		kill(muxserver_pid, signo);
+
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */
+static int
+env_permitted(char *env)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+	char name[1024], *cp;
+
+	if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
+		return (0);
+	ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
+	if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name))
+		fatal("env_permitted: name '%.100s...' too long", env);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
+		if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
+			return (1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* Multiplex client main loop. */
+void
+muxclient(const char *path)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un addr;
+	int i, r, fd, sock, exitval[2], num_env, addr_len;
+	Buffer m;
+	char *term;
+	extern char **environ;
+	u_int allowed, flags;
+
+	if (muxclient_command == 0)
+		muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
+
+	switch (options.control_master) {
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
+		debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+	    strlen(path) + 1;
+
+	if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
+	    sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
+		fatal("ControlPath too long");
+
+	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+		fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+		if (muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN) {
+			fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (errno == ENOENT)
+			debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
+		else {
+			error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+		close(sock);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (stdin_null_flag) {
+		if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+			fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+			fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+			close(fd);
+	}
+
+	term = getenv("TERM");
+
+	flags = 0;
+	if (tty_flag)
+		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY;
+	if (subsystem_flag)
+		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS;
+	if (options.forward_x11)
+		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD;
+	if (options.forward_agent)
+		flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_AGENT_FWD;
+
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+
+	/* Send our command to server */
+	buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_command);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, flags);
+	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1) {
+		error("%s: msg_send", __func__);
+ muxerr:
+		close(sock);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+		if (muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN)
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		logit("Falling back to non-multiplexed connection");
+		xfree(options.control_path);
+		options.control_path = NULL;
+		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+		return;
+	}
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+
+	/* Get authorisation status and PID of controlee */
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(sock, &m) == -1) {
+		error("%s: Did not receive reply from master", __func__);
+		goto muxerr;
+	}
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != SSHMUX_VER) {
+		error("%s: Master replied with wrong version", __func__);
+		goto muxerr;
+	}
+	if (buffer_get_int_ret(&allowed, &m) != 0) {
+		error("%s: bad server reply", __func__);
+		goto muxerr;
+	}
+	if (allowed != 1) {
+		error("Connection to master denied");
+		goto muxerr;
+	}
+	muxserver_pid = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+
+	switch (muxclient_command) {
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%d)\r\n",
+		    muxserver_pid);
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
+		buffer_put_cstring(&m, term ? term : "");
+		if (options.escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
+			buffer_put_int(&m, 0xffffffff);
+		else
+			buffer_put_int(&m, options.escape_char);
+		buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(&command));
+
+		if (options.num_send_env == 0 || environ == NULL) {
+			buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
+		} else {
+			/* Pass environment */
+			num_env = 0;
+			for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+				if (env_permitted(environ[i]))
+					num_env++; /* Count */
+			}
+			buffer_put_int(&m, num_env);
+		for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL && num_env >= 0; i++) {
+				if (env_permitted(environ[i])) {
+					num_env--;
+					buffer_put_cstring(&m, environ[i]);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command);
+	}
+
+	if (ssh_msg_send(sock, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1) {
+		error("%s: msg_send", __func__);
+		goto muxerr;
+	}
+
+	if (mm_send_fd(sock, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+	    mm_send_fd(sock, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
+	    mm_send_fd(sock, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+		error("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+		goto muxerr;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Mux errors are non-recoverable from this point as the master
+	 * has ownership of the session now.
+	 */
+
+	/* Wait for reply, so master has a chance to gather ttymodes */
+	buffer_clear(&m);
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(sock, &m) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: msg_recv", __func__);
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != SSHMUX_VER)
+		fatal("%s: wrong version", __func__);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+	signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+	signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+	signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+
+	if (tty_flag)
+		enter_raw_mode();
+
+	/*
+	 * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
+	 * Before it does, it is expected to write this process' exit
+	 * value (one int). This process must read the value and wait for
+	 * the closure of the client_fd; if this one closes early, the 
+	 * multiplex master will terminate early too (possibly losing data).
+	 */
+	exitval[0] = 0;
+	for (i = 0; !muxclient_terminate && i < (int)sizeof(exitval);) {
+		r = read(sock, (char *)exitval + i, sizeof(exitval) - i);
+		if (r == 0) {
+			debug2("Received EOF from master");
+			break;
+		}
+		if (r == -1) {
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			fatal("%s: read %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		i += r;
+	}
+
+	close(sock);
+	leave_raw_mode();
+	if (i > (int)sizeof(int))
+		fatal("%s: master returned too much data (%d > %lu)",
+		    __func__, i, (u_long)sizeof(int));
+	if (muxclient_terminate) {
+		debug2("Exiting on signal %d", muxclient_terminate);
+		exitval[0] = 255;
+	} else if (i < (int)sizeof(int)) {
+		debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly");
+		exitval[0] = 255;
+	} else
+		debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval[0]);
+
+	if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+		fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
+
+	exit(exitval[0]);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7bca3bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.23 2009/01/23 07:58:11 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/* Old OpenSSL doesn't support what we need for DHGEX-sha256 */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX		\
+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#else
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX		\
+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#endif
+
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	"ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
+
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+	"arcfour256,arcfour128," \
+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
+	"hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160," \
+	"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96"
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
+
+
+static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+	KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_MAC,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_MAC,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG,
+	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
+};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/nchan.c b/crypto/openssh/nchan.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..160445e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/nchan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,522 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.62 2008/11/07 18:50:18 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/*
+ * SSH Protocol 1.5 aka New Channel Protocol
+ * Thanks to Martina, Axel and everyone who left Erlangen, leaving me bored.
+ * Written by Markus Friedl in October 1999
+ *
+ * Protocol versions 1.3 and 1.5 differ in the handshake protocol used for the
+ * tear down of channels:
+ *
+ * 1.3:	strict request-ack-protocol:
+ *	CLOSE	->
+ *		<-  CLOSE_CONFIRM
+ *
+ * 1.5:	uses variations of:
+ *	IEOF	->
+ *		<-  OCLOSE
+ *		<-  IEOF
+ *	OCLOSE	->
+ *	i.e. both sides have to close the channel
+ *
+ * 2.0: the EOF messages are optional
+ *
+ * See the debugging output from 'ssh -v' and 'sshd -d' of
+ * ssh-1.2.27 as an example.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* functions manipulating channel states */
+/*
+ * EVENTS update channel input/output states execute ACTIONS
+ */
+/*
+ * ACTIONS: should never update the channel states
+ */
+static void	chan_send_ieof1(Channel *);
+static void	chan_send_oclose1(Channel *);
+static void	chan_send_close2(Channel *);
+static void	chan_send_eof2(Channel *);
+static void	chan_send_eow2(Channel *);
+
+/* helper */
+static void	chan_shutdown_write(Channel *);
+static void	chan_shutdown_read(Channel *);
+
+static char *ostates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_ieof", "closed" };
+static char *istates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_oclose", "closed" };
+
+static void
+chan_set_istate(Channel *c, u_int next)
+{
+	if (c->istate > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED)
+		fatal("chan_set_istate: bad state %d -> %d", c->istate, next);
+	debug2("channel %d: input %s -> %s", c->self, istates[c->istate],
+	    istates[next]);
+	c->istate = next;
+}
+static void
+chan_set_ostate(Channel *c, u_int next)
+{
+	if (c->ostate > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+		fatal("chan_set_ostate: bad state %d -> %d", c->ostate, next);
+	debug2("channel %d: output %s -> %s", c->self, ostates[c->ostate],
+	    ostates[next]);
+	c->ostate = next;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 specific implementation of event functions
+ */
+
+static void
+chan_rcvd_oclose1(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd oclose", c->self);
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE:
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_shutdown_read(c);
+		chan_send_ieof1(c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		/* both local read_failed and remote write_failed  */
+		chan_send_ieof1(c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: protocol error: rcvd_oclose for istate %d",
+		    c->self, c->istate);
+		return;
+	}
+}
+void
+chan_read_failed(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: read failed", c->self);
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_shutdown_read(c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: chan_read_failed for istate %d",
+		    c->self, c->istate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+void
+chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self);
+	if (buffer_len(&c->input)) {
+		error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer",
+		    c->self);
+		return;
+	}
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		if (compat20) {
+			if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT))
+				chan_send_eof2(c);
+			chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		} else {
+			chan_send_ieof1(c);
+			chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d",
+		    c->self, c->istate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_rcvd_ieof1(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd ieof", c->self);
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
+		break;
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF:
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: protocol error: rcvd_ieof for ostate %d",
+		    c->self, c->ostate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_write_failed1(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: write failed", c->self);
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_shutdown_write(c);
+		chan_send_oclose1(c);
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF);
+		break;
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		chan_shutdown_write(c);
+		chan_send_oclose1(c);
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d",
+		    c->self, c->ostate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+void
+chan_obuf_empty(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self);
+	if (buffer_len(&c->output)) {
+		error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer",
+		    c->self);
+		return;
+	}
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		chan_shutdown_write(c);
+		if (!compat20)
+			chan_send_oclose1(c);
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: internal error: obuf_empty for ostate %d",
+		    c->self, c->ostate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_send_ieof1(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: send ieof", c->self);
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: cannot send ieof for istate %d",
+		    c->self, c->istate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_send_oclose1(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: send oclose", c->self);
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		buffer_clear(&c->output);
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: cannot send oclose for ostate %d",
+		    c->self, c->ostate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * the same for SSH2
+ */
+static void
+chan_rcvd_close2(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd close", c->self);
+	if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)
+		error("channel %d: protocol error: close rcvd twice", c->self);
+	c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD;
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
+		/* tear down larval channels immediately */
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		return;
+	}
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+		/*
+		 * wait until a data from the channel is consumed if a CLOSE
+		 * is received
+		 */
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
+		break;
+	}
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_shutdown_read(c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		chan_send_eof2(c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+void
+chan_rcvd_eow(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd eow", c->self);
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_shutdown_read(c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_rcvd_eof2(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self);
+	c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_RCVD;
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
+}
+static void
+chan_write_failed2(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: write failed", c->self);
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		chan_shutdown_write(c);
+		if (strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
+			chan_send_eow2(c);
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d",
+		    c->self, c->ostate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_send_eof2(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: send eof", c->self);
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+		c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_SENT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d",
+		    c->self, c->istate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_send_close2(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: send close", c->self);
+	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED ||
+	    c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) {
+		error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d",
+		    c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+	} else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) {
+		error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self);
+	} else {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+		c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT;
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_send_eow2(Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: send eow", c->self);
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) {
+		error("channel %d: must not sent eow on closed output",
+		    c->self);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH))
+		return;
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+	packet_put_cstring("eow@openssh.com");
+	packet_put_char(0);
+	packet_send();
+}
+
+/* shared */
+
+void
+chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *c)
+{
+	if (compat20)
+		chan_rcvd_eof2(c);
+	else
+		chan_rcvd_ieof1(c);
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN &&
+	    buffer_len(&c->output) == 0 &&
+	    !CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+		chan_obuf_empty(c);
+}
+void
+chan_rcvd_oclose(Channel *c)
+{
+	if (compat20)
+		chan_rcvd_close2(c);
+	else
+		chan_rcvd_oclose1(c);
+}
+void
+chan_write_failed(Channel *c)
+{
+	if (compat20)
+		chan_write_failed2(c);
+	else
+		chan_write_failed1(c);
+}
+
+void
+chan_mark_dead(Channel *c)
+{
+	c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE;
+}
+
+int
+chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int do_send)
+{
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) {
+		debug2("channel %d: zombie", c->self);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+		return 0;
+	if (!compat20) {
+		debug2("channel %d: is dead", c->self);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) &&
+	    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+	    c->efd != -1 &&
+	    buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %d",
+		    c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
+		if (do_send) {
+			chan_send_close2(c);
+		} else {
+			/* channel would be dead if we sent a close */
+			if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) {
+				debug2("channel %d: almost dead",
+				    c->self);
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if ((c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) &&
+	    (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) {
+		debug2("channel %d: is dead", c->self);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* helper */
+static void
+chan_shutdown_write(Channel *c)
+{
+	buffer_clear(&c->output);
+	if (compat20 && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+		return;
+	/* shutdown failure is allowed if write failed already */
+	debug2("channel %d: close_write", c->self);
+	if (c->sock != -1) {
+		if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) < 0)
+			debug2("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: "
+			    "shutdown() failed for fd %d: %.100s",
+			    c->self, c->sock, strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		if (channel_close_fd(&c->wfd) < 0)
+			logit("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: "
+			    "close() failed for fd %d: %.100s",
+			    c->self, c->wfd, strerror(errno));
+	}
+}
+static void
+chan_shutdown_read(Channel *c)
+{
+	if (compat20 && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+		return;
+	debug2("channel %d: close_read", c->self);
+	if (c->sock != -1) {
+		/*
+		 * shutdown(sock, SHUT_READ) may return ENOTCONN if the
+		 * write side has been closed already. (bug on Linux)
+		 * HP-UX may return ENOTCONN also.
+		 */
+		if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) < 0
+		    && errno != ENOTCONN)
+			error("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: "
+			    "shutdown() failed for fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
+			    c->self, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate,
+			    strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		if (channel_close_fd(&c->rfd) < 0)
+			logit("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: "
+			    "close() failed for fd %d: %.100s",
+			    c->self, c->rfd, strerror(errno));
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e74667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.5 2006/10/21 09:55:03 otto Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
+ *
+ * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
+ * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
+ * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
+ * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
+ * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
+ * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
+ * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
+ * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
+ * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software.  No immunity is
+ * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/base64.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if (!defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP)) || (!defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON))
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "base64.h"
+
+static const char Base64[] =
+	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+static const char Pad64 = '=';
+
+/* (From RFC1521 and draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt)
+   The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein
+   and Freed.  It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for
+   convenience.
+
+   A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be
+   represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=",
+   is used to signify a special processing function.)
+
+   The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output
+   strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a
+   24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups.
+   These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each
+   of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet.
+
+   Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable
+   characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the
+   output string.
+
+                         Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet
+
+      Value Encoding  Value Encoding  Value Encoding  Value Encoding
+          0 A            17 R            34 i            51 z
+          1 B            18 S            35 j            52 0
+          2 C            19 T            36 k            53 1
+          3 D            20 U            37 l            54 2
+          4 E            21 V            38 m            55 3
+          5 F            22 W            39 n            56 4
+          6 G            23 X            40 o            57 5
+          7 H            24 Y            41 p            58 6
+          8 I            25 Z            42 q            59 7
+          9 J            26 a            43 r            60 8
+         10 K            27 b            44 s            61 9
+         11 L            28 c            45 t            62 +
+         12 M            29 d            46 u            63 /
+         13 N            30 e            47 v
+         14 O            31 f            48 w         (pad) =
+         15 P            32 g            49 x
+         16 Q            33 h            50 y
+
+   Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available
+   at the end of the data being encoded.  A full encoding quantum is
+   always completed at the end of a quantity.  When fewer than 24 input
+   bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the
+   right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups.  Padding at the
+   end of the data is performed using the '=' character.
+
+   Since all base64 input is an integral number of octets, only the
+         -------------------------------------------------                       
+   following cases can arise:
+   
+       (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral
+           multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded
+	   output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters
+	   with no "=" padding,
+       (2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits;
+           here, the final unit of encoded output will be two
+	   characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or
+       (3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits;
+           here, the final unit of encoded output will be three
+	   characters followed by one "=" padding character.
+   */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) 
+int
+b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+	size_t datalength = 0;
+	u_char input[3];
+	u_char output[4];
+	u_int i;
+
+	while (2 < srclength) {
+		input[0] = *src++;
+		input[1] = *src++;
+		input[2] = *src++;
+		srclength -= 3;
+
+		output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
+		output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
+		output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
+		output[3] = input[2] & 0x3f;
+
+		if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
+			return (-1);
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[3]];
+	}
+    
+	/* Now we worry about padding. */
+	if (0 != srclength) {
+		/* Get what's left. */
+		input[0] = input[1] = input[2] = '\0';
+		for (i = 0; i < srclength; i++)
+			input[i] = *src++;
+	
+		output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
+		output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
+		output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
+
+		if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
+			return (-1);
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
+		if (srclength == 1)
+			target[datalength++] = Pad64;
+		else
+			target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
+		target[datalength++] = Pad64;
+	}
+	if (datalength >= targsize)
+		return (-1);
+	target[datalength] = '\0';	/* Returned value doesn't count \0. */
+	return (datalength);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON)
+
+/* skips all whitespace anywhere.
+   converts characters, four at a time, starting at (or after)
+   src from base - 64 numbers into three 8 bit bytes in the target area.
+   it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or -1 on error.
+ */
+
+int
+b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+	u_int tarindex, state;
+	int ch;
+	char *pos;
+
+	state = 0;
+	tarindex = 0;
+
+	while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') {
+		if (isspace(ch))	/* Skip whitespace anywhere. */
+			continue;
+
+		if (ch == Pad64)
+			break;
+
+		pos = strchr(Base64, ch);
+		if (pos == 0) 		/* A non-base64 character. */
+			return (-1);
+
+		switch (state) {
+		case 0:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex] = (pos - Base64) << 2;
+			}
+			state = 1;
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex]   |=  (pos - Base64) >> 4;
+				target[tarindex+1]  = ((pos - Base64) & 0x0f)
+							<< 4 ;
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 2;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex]   |=  (pos - Base64) >> 2;
+				target[tarindex+1]  = ((pos - Base64) & 0x03)
+							<< 6;
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 3;
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64);
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We are done decoding Base-64 chars.  Let's see if we ended
+	 * on a byte boundary, and/or with erroneous trailing characters.
+	 */
+
+	if (ch == Pad64) {		/* We got a pad char. */
+		ch = *src++;		/* Skip it, get next. */
+		switch (state) {
+		case 0:		/* Invalid = in first position */
+		case 1:		/* Invalid = in second position */
+			return (-1);
+
+		case 2:		/* Valid, means one byte of info */
+			/* Skip any number of spaces. */
+			for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
+				if (!isspace(ch))
+					break;
+			/* Make sure there is another trailing = sign. */
+			if (ch != Pad64)
+				return (-1);
+			ch = *src++;		/* Skip the = */
+			/* Fall through to "single trailing =" case. */
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+
+		case 3:		/* Valid, means two bytes of info */
+			/*
+			 * We know this char is an =.  Is there anything but
+			 * whitespace after it?
+			 */
+			for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
+				if (!isspace(ch))
+					return (-1);
+
+			/*
+			 * Now make sure for cases 2 and 3 that the "extra"
+			 * bits that slopped past the last full byte were
+			 * zeros.  If we don't check them, they become a
+			 * subliminal channel.
+			 */
+			if (target && target[tarindex] != 0)
+				return (-1);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * We ended by seeing the end of the string.  Make sure we
+		 * have no partial bytes lying around.
+		 */
+		if (state != 0)
+			return (-1);
+	}
+
+	return (tarindex);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON) */
+#endif 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..732c6b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* $Id: base64.h,v 1.6 2003/08/29 16:59:52 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
+ *
+ * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
+ * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
+ * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
+ * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
+ * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
+ * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
+ * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
+ * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
+ * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software.  No immunity is
+ * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_BASE64_H
+#define _BSD_BASE64_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE___B64_NTOP
+# ifndef HAVE_B64_NTOP
+int b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, 
+    size_t targsize);
+# endif /* !HAVE_B64_NTOP */
+# define __b64_ntop(a,b,c,d) b64_ntop(a,b,c,d)
+#endif /* HAVE___B64_NTOP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE___B64_PTON
+# ifndef HAVE_B64_PTON
+int b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize);
+# endif /* !HAVE_B64_PTON */
+# define __b64_pton(a,b,c) b64_pton(a,b,c)
+#endif /* HAVE___B64_PTON */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_BASE64_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffa5c89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: basename.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/basename.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+char *
+basename(const char *path)
+{
+	static char bname[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t len;
+	const char *endp, *startp;
+
+	/* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		bname[0] = '.';
+		bname[1] = '\0';
+		return (bname);
+	}
+
+	/* Strip any trailing slashes */
+	endp = path + strlen(path) - 1;
+	while (endp > path && *endp == '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* All slashes becomes "/" */
+	if (endp == path && *endp == '/') {
+		bname[0] = '/';
+		bname[1] = '\0';
+		return (bname);
+	}
+
+	/* Find the start of the base */
+	startp = endp;
+	while (startp > path && *(startp - 1) != '/')
+		startp--;
+
+	len = endp - startp + 1;
+	if (len >= sizeof(bname)) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	memcpy(bname, startp, len);
+	bname[len] = '\0';
+	return (bname);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BASENAME) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0d5bdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* This file has be substantially modified from the original OpenBSD source */
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.17 2005/12/21 01:40:22 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1996, Jason Downs.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 1998, Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2000, Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/rpc/bindresvport.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define STARTPORT 600
+#define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1)
+#define NPORTS	(ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port
+ */
+int
+bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+{
+	int error, af;
+	struct sockaddr_storage myaddr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *in;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+	u_int16_t *portp;
+	u_int16_t port;
+	socklen_t salen;
+	int i;
+
+	if (sa == NULL) {
+		memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr));
+		sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr;
+
+		if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1)
+			return -1;	/* errno is correctly set */
+
+		af = sa->sa_family;
+		memset(&myaddr, 0, salen);
+	} else
+		af = sa->sa_family;
+
+	if (af == AF_INET) {
+		in = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		portp = &in->sin_port;
+	} else if (af == AF_INET6) {
+		in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		portp = &in6->sin6_port;
+	} else {
+		errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+
+	port = ntohs(*portp);
+	if (port == 0)
+		port = (arc4random() % NPORTS) + STARTPORT;
+
+	/* Avoid warning */
+	error = -1;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) {
+		*portp = htons(port);
+		
+		error = bind(sd, sa, salen);
+
+		/* Terminate on success */
+		if (error == 0)
+			break;
+			
+		/* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */
+		if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL)))
+			break;
+			
+		port++;
+		if (port > ENDPORT)
+			port = STARTPORT;
+	}
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d4c869
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999,2000,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rc4.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+/* Size of key to use */
+#define SEED_SIZE 20
+
+/* Number of bytes to reseed after */
+#define REKEY_BYTES	(1 << 24)
+
+static int rc4_ready = 0;
+static RC4_KEY rc4;
+
+unsigned int
+arc4random(void)
+{
+	unsigned int r = 0;
+	static int first_time = 1;
+
+	if (rc4_ready <= 0) {
+		if (first_time)
+			seed_rng();
+		first_time = 0;
+		arc4random_stir();
+	}
+
+	RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r);
+
+	rc4_ready -= sizeof(r);
+	
+	return(r);
+}
+
+void
+arc4random_stir(void)
+{
+	unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE];
+	int i;
+
+	memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4));
+	if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0)
+		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
+		    ERR_get_error());
+	RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in:
+	 * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
+	 */
+	for(i = 0; i <= 256; i += sizeof(rand_buf))
+		RC4(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf, rand_buf);
+
+	memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf));
+
+	rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+void
+arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	u_int32_t r = 0;
+	char *buf = (char *)_buf;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (i % 4 == 0)
+			r = arc4random();
+		buf[i] = r & 0xff;
+		r >>= 8;
+	}
+	i = r = 0;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */
+
+#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+/*
+ * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
+ * avoiding "modulo bias".
+ *
+ * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
+ * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound).  This
+ * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
+ * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
+ * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
+ */
+u_int32_t
+arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound)
+{
+	u_int32_t r, min;
+
+	if (upper_bound < 2)
+		return 0;
+
+#if (ULONG_MAX > 0xffffffffUL)
+	min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound;
+#else
+	/* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */
+	if (upper_bound > 0x80000000)
+		min = 1 + ~upper_bound;		/* 2**32 - upper_bound */
+	else {
+		/* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */
+		min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
+	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
+	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
+	 * to re-roll.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		r = arc4random();
+		if (r >= min)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r % upper_bound;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3368195
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.
+ *
+ * Based originally on asprintf.c from OpenBSD:
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifndef VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
+#  define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+#  ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+#  else
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#define INIT_SZ	128
+
+int
+vasprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+	va_list ap2;
+	char *string, *newstr;
+	size_t len;
+
+	VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+	if ((string = malloc(INIT_SZ)) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+
+	ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2);
+	if (ret >= 0 && ret < INIT_SZ) { /* succeeded with initial alloc */
+		*str = string;
+	} else if (ret == INT_MAX || ret < 0) { /* Bad length */
+		free(string);
+		goto fail;
+	} else {	/* bigger than initial, realloc allowing for nul */
+		len = (size_t)ret + 1;
+		if ((newstr = realloc(string, len)) == NULL) {
+			free(string);
+			goto fail;
+		} else {
+			va_end(ap2);
+			VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+			ret = vsnprintf(newstr, len, fmt, ap2);
+			if (ret >= 0 && (size_t)ret < len) {
+				*str = newstr;
+			} else { /* failed with realloc'ed string, give up */
+				free(newstr);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	va_end(ap2);
+	return (ret);
+
+fail:
+	*str = NULL;
+	errno = ENOMEM;
+	va_end(ap2);
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+int asprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	int ret;
+	
+	*str = NULL;
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vasprintf(str, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9380b33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2005 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H
+# include <dirent.h>
+# define NAMLEN(dirent) strlen((dirent)->d_name)
+#else
+# define dirent direct
+# define NAMLEN(dirent) (dirent)->d_namlen
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
+#  include <sys/ndir.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
+#  include <sys/dir.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_NDIR_H
+#  include <ndir.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPEN_MAX
+# define OPEN_MAX	256
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+__unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: closefrom.c,v 1.11 2006/08/17 15:26:54 millert Exp $";
+#endif /* lint */
+
+/*
+ * Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to lowfd.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+    (void) fcntl(lowfd, F_CLOSEM, 0);
+}
+#else
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+    long fd, maxfd;
+#if defined(HAVE_DIRFD) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PID)
+    char fdpath[PATH_MAX], *endp;
+    struct dirent *dent;
+    DIR *dirp;
+    int len;
+
+    /* Check for a /proc/$$/fd directory. */
+    len = snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/%ld/fd", (long)getpid());
+    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fdpath) && (dirp = opendir(fdpath))) {
+	while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
+		(void) close((int) fd);
+	}
+	(void) closedir(dirp);
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+	/*
+	 * Fall back on sysconf() or getdtablesize().  We avoid checking
+	 * resource limits since it is possible to open a file descriptor
+	 * and then drop the rlimit such that it is below the open fd.
+	 */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
+	maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX);
+#else
+	maxfd = getdtablesize();
+#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
+	if (maxfd < 0)
+	    maxfd = OPEN_MAX;
+
+	for (fd = lowfd; fd < maxfd; fd++)
+	    (void) close((int) fd);
+    }
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOSEFROM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1bbd7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
@@ -0,0 +1,817 @@
+/* 
+ * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.17 2007/08/15 09:17:43 dtucker Exp $
+ *
+ * bsd-cray.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Cray Inc.  (Wendy Palm <wendyp@cray.com>)
+ * Significant portions provided by 
+ *          Wayne Schroeder, SDSC <schroeder@sdsc.edu>
+ *          William Jones, UTexas <jones@tacc.utexas.edu>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Apr 22 16.34:00 2002 wp
+ *
+ * This file contains functions required for proper execution
+ * on UNICOS systems.
+ *
+ */
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+
+#include <udb.h>
+#include <tmpdir.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/category.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#include <sys/jtab.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/priv.h>
+#include <sys/secparm.h>
+#include <sys/tfm.h>
+#include <sys/usrv.h>
+#include <sys/sysv.h>
+#include <sys/sectab.h>
+#include <sys/secstat.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/session.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ia.h>
+#include <urm.h>
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "sys/types.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+# define      _SS_MAXSIZE     128     /* Implementation specific max size */
+# define       _SS_PADSIZE     (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
+
+# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
+
+#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
+	(((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0 && \
+	 ((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[3] == htonl (1))
+#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
+
+#ifndef AF_INET6
+/* Define it to something that should never appear */
+#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "bsd-cray.h"
+
+#define MAXACID 80
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+char cray_tmpdir[TPATHSIZ + 1];		    /* job TMPDIR path */
+
+struct sysv sysv;	/* system security structure */
+struct usrv usrv;	/* user security structure */
+
+/*
+ * Functions.
+ */
+void cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *, int);
+void cray_delete_tmpdir(char *, int, uid_t);
+void cray_init_job(struct passwd *);
+void cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *);
+void cray_login_failure(char *, int);
+int cray_setup(uid_t, char *, const char *);
+int cray_access_denied(char *);
+
+void
+cray_login_failure(char *username, int errcode)
+{
+	struct udb *ueptr;		/* UDB pointer for username */
+	ia_failure_t fsent;		/* ia_failure structure */
+	ia_failure_ret_t fret;		/* ia_failure return stuff */
+	struct jtab jtab;		/* job table structure */
+	int jid = 0;			/* job id */
+
+	if ((jid = getjtab(&jtab)) < 0)
+		debug("cray_login_failure(): getjtab error");
+
+	getsysudb();
+	if ((ueptr = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL)
+		debug("cray_login_failure(): getudbname() returned NULL");
+	endudb();
+
+	memset(&fsent, '\0', sizeof(fsent));
+	fsent.revision = 0;
+	fsent.uname = username;
+	fsent.host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+	fsent.ttyn = "sshd";
+	fsent.caller = IA_SSHD;
+	fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE;
+	fsent.ueptr = ueptr;
+	fsent.jid = jid;
+	fsent.errcode = errcode;
+	fsent.pwdp = NULL;
+	fsent.exitcode = 0;	/* dont exit in ia_failure() */
+
+	fret.revision = 0;
+	fret.normal = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Call ia_failure because of an login failure.
+	 */
+	ia_failure(&fsent, &fret);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Cray access denied
+ */
+int
+cray_access_denied(char *username)
+{
+	struct udb *ueptr;		/* UDB pointer for username */
+	int errcode;			/* IA errorcode */
+
+	errcode = 0;
+	getsysudb();
+	if ((ueptr = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL)
+		debug("cray_login_failure(): getudbname() returned NULL");
+	endudb();
+
+	if (ueptr != NULL && ueptr->ue_disabled)
+		errcode = IA_DISABLED;
+	if (errcode)
+		cray_login_failure(username, errcode);
+
+	return (errcode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
+ */
+void
+record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname)
+{
+	cray_login_failure((char *)user, IA_UDBERR);
+}
+
+int
+cray_setup (uid_t uid, char *username, const char *command)
+{
+	extern struct udb *getudb();
+	extern char *setlimits();
+
+	int err;			/* error return */
+	time_t system_time;		/* current system clock */
+	time_t expiration_time;		/* password expiration time */
+	int maxattempts;		/* maximum no. of failed login attempts */
+	int SecureSys;			/* unicos security flag */
+	int minslevel = 0;		/* system minimum security level */
+	int i, j;
+	int valid_acct = -1;		/* flag for reading valid acct */
+	char acct_name[MAXACID] = { "" }; /* used to read acct name */
+	struct jtab jtab;		/* Job table struct */
+	struct udb ue;			/* udb entry for logging-in user */
+	struct udb *up;			/* pointer to UDB entry */
+	struct secstat secinfo;		/* file  security attributes */
+	struct servprov init_info;	/* used for sesscntl() call */
+	int jid;			/* job ID */
+	int pid;			/* process ID */
+	char *sr;			/* status return from setlimits() */
+	char *ttyn = NULL;		/* ttyname or command name*/
+	char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+	/* passwd stuff for ia_user */
+	passwd_t pwdacm, pwddialup, pwdudb, pwdwal, pwddce;
+	ia_user_ret_t uret;		/* stuff returned from ia_user */
+	ia_user_t usent;		/* ia_user main structure */
+	int ia_rcode;			/* ia_user return code */
+	ia_failure_t fsent;		/* ia_failure structure */
+	ia_failure_ret_t fret;		/* ia_failure return stuff */
+	ia_success_t ssent;		/* ia_success structure */
+	ia_success_ret_t sret;		/* ia_success return stuff */
+	int ia_mlsrcode;		/* ia_mlsuser return code */
+	int secstatrc;			/* [f]secstat return code */
+
+	if (SecureSys = (int)sysconf(_SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS)) {
+		getsysv(&sysv, sizeof(struct sysv));
+		minslevel = sysv.sy_minlvl;
+		if (getusrv(&usrv) < 0)
+			fatal("getusrv() failed, errno = %d", errno);
+	}
+	hostname[0] = '\0';
+	strlcpy(hostname,
+	   (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns),
+	   MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
+	/*
+	 *  Fetch user's UDB entry.
+	 */
+	getsysudb();
+	if ((up = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL)
+		fatal("cannot fetch user's UDB entry");
+
+	/*
+	 *  Prevent any possible fudging so perform a data
+	 *  safety check and compare the supplied uid against
+	 *  the udb's uid.
+	 */
+	if (up->ue_uid != uid)
+		fatal("IA uid missmatch");
+	endudb();
+
+	if ((jid = getjtab(&jtab)) < 0) {
+		debug("getjtab");
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	pid = getpid();
+	ttyn = ttyname(0);
+	if (SecureSys) {
+		if (ttyn != NULL)
+			secstatrc = secstat(ttyn, &secinfo);
+		else
+			secstatrc = fsecstat(1, &secinfo);
+
+		if (secstatrc == 0)
+			debug("[f]secstat() successful");
+		else
+			fatal("[f]secstat() error, rc = %d", secstatrc);
+	}
+	if ((ttyn == NULL) && ((char *)command != NULL))
+		ttyn = (char *)command;
+	/*
+	 *  Initialize all structures to call ia_user
+	 */
+	usent.revision = 0;
+	usent.uname = username;
+	usent.host = hostname;
+	usent.ttyn = ttyn;
+	usent.caller = IA_SSHD; 
+	usent.pswdlist = &pwdacm;
+	usent.ueptr = &ue;
+	usent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE | IA_FFLAG;
+	pwdacm.atype = IA_SECURID;
+	pwdacm.pwdp = NULL;
+	pwdacm.next = &pwdudb;
+
+	pwdudb.atype = IA_UDB;
+	pwdudb.pwdp = NULL;
+	pwdudb.next = &pwddce;
+
+	pwddce.atype = IA_DCE;
+	pwddce.pwdp = NULL;
+	pwddce.next = &pwddialup;
+
+	pwddialup.atype = IA_DIALUP;
+	pwddialup.pwdp = NULL;
+	/* pwddialup.next = &pwdwal; */
+	pwddialup.next = NULL;
+
+	pwdwal.atype = IA_WAL;
+	pwdwal.pwdp = NULL;
+	pwdwal.next = NULL;
+
+	uret.revision = 0;
+	uret.pswd = NULL;
+	uret.normal = 0;
+
+	ia_rcode = ia_user(&usent, &uret);
+	switch (ia_rcode) {
+	/*
+	 *  These are acceptable return codes from ia_user()
+	 */
+	case IA_UDBWEEK:        /* Password Expires in 1 week */
+		expiration_time = ue.ue_pwage.time + ue.ue_pwage.maxage;
+		printf ("WARNING - your current password will expire %s\n",
+		ctime((const time_t *)&expiration_time));
+		break;
+	case IA_UDBEXPIRED:
+		if (ttyname(0) != NULL) {
+			/* Force a password change */
+			printf("Your password has expired; Choose a new one.\n");
+			execl("/bin/passwd", "passwd", username, 0);
+			exit(9);
+			}
+		break;
+	case IA_NORMAL:         /* Normal Return Code */
+		break;
+	case IA_BACKDOOR:
+		/* XXX: can we memset it to zero here so save some of this */
+		strlcpy(ue.ue_name, "root", sizeof(ue.ue_name));
+		strlcpy(ue.ue_dir, "/", sizeof(ue.ue_dir));
+		strlcpy(ue.ue_shell, "/bin/sh", sizeof(ue.ue_shell));
+
+		ue.ue_passwd[0] = '\0';
+		ue.ue_age[0] = '\0';
+		ue.ue_comment[0] = '\0';
+		ue.ue_loghost[0] = '\0';
+		ue.ue_logline[0] = '\0';
+
+		ue.ue_uid = -1;
+		ue.ue_nice[UDBRC_INTER] = 0;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < MAXVIDS; i++)
+			ue.ue_gids[i] = 0;
+
+		ue.ue_logfails = 0;
+		ue.ue_minlvl = ue.ue_maxlvl = ue.ue_deflvl = minslevel;
+		ue.ue_defcomps = 0;
+		ue.ue_comparts = 0;
+		ue.ue_permits = 0;
+		ue.ue_trap = 0;
+		ue.ue_disabled = 0;
+		ue.ue_logtime = 0;
+		break;
+	case IA_CONSOLE:        /* Superuser not from Console */
+	case IA_TRUSTED:	/* Trusted user */
+		if (options.permit_root_login > PERMIT_NO)
+			break;	/* Accept root login */
+	default:
+	/*
+	 *  These are failed return codes from ia_user()
+	 */
+		switch (ia_rcode) 
+		{
+		case IA_BADAUTH:
+			printf("Bad authorization, access denied.\n");
+			break;
+		case IA_DISABLED:
+			printf("Your login has been disabled. Contact the system ");
+			printf("administrator for assistance.\n");
+			break;
+		case IA_GETSYSV:
+			printf("getsysv() failed - errno = %d\n", errno);
+			break;
+		case IA_MAXLOGS:
+			printf("Maximum number of failed login attempts exceeded.\n");
+			printf("Access denied.\n");
+			break;
+		case IA_UDBPWDNULL:
+			if (SecureSys)
+				printf("NULL Password not allowed on MLS systems.\n");
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *  Authentication failed.
+		 */
+		printf("sshd: Login incorrect, (0%o)\n",
+		    ia_rcode-IA_ERRORCODE);
+
+		/*
+		 *  Initialize structure for ia_failure
+		 *  which will exit.
+		 */
+		fsent.revision = 0;
+		fsent.uname = username;
+		fsent.host = hostname;
+		fsent.ttyn = ttyn;
+		fsent.caller = IA_SSHD;
+		fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE;
+		fsent.ueptr = &ue;
+		fsent.jid = jid;
+		fsent.errcode = ia_rcode;
+		fsent.pwdp = uret.pswd;
+		fsent.exitcode = 1;
+
+		fret.revision = 0;
+		fret.normal = 0;
+
+		/*
+		*  Call ia_failure because of an IA failure.
+		*  There is no return because ia_failure exits.
+		*/
+		ia_failure(&fsent, &fret);
+
+		exit(1); 
+	}
+
+	ia_mlsrcode = IA_NORMAL;
+	if (SecureSys) {
+		debug("calling ia_mlsuser()");
+		ia_mlsrcode = ia_mlsuser(&ue, &secinfo, &usrv, NULL, 0);
+	}
+	if (ia_mlsrcode != IA_NORMAL) {
+		printf("sshd: Login incorrect, (0%o)\n",
+		    ia_mlsrcode-IA_ERRORCODE);
+		/*
+		 *  Initialize structure for ia_failure
+		 *  which will exit.
+		 */
+		fsent.revision = 0;
+		fsent.uname = username;
+		fsent.host = hostname;
+		fsent.ttyn = ttyn;
+		fsent.caller = IA_SSHD;
+		fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE;
+		fsent.ueptr = &ue;
+		fsent.jid  = jid;
+		fsent.errcode = ia_mlsrcode;
+		fsent.pwdp = uret.pswd;
+		fsent.exitcode = 1;
+		fret.revision = 0;
+		fret.normal = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 *  Call ia_failure because of an IA failure.
+		 *  There is no return because ia_failure exits.
+		 */
+		ia_failure(&fsent,&fret);
+		exit(1); 
+	}
+
+	/* Provide login status information */
+	if (options.print_lastlog && ue.ue_logtime != 0) {
+		printf("Last successful login was : %.*s ", 19,
+		    (char *)ctime(&ue.ue_logtime));
+
+		if (*ue.ue_loghost != '\0') {
+			printf("from %.*s\n", sizeof(ue.ue_loghost),
+			    ue.ue_loghost);
+		} else {
+			printf("on %.*s\n", sizeof(ue.ue_logline),
+			    ue.ue_logline);
+		}
+
+		if (SecureSys && (ue.ue_logfails != 0)) {
+			printf("  followed by %d failed attempts\n",
+			    ue.ue_logfails);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Call ia_success to process successful I/A.
+	 */
+	ssent.revision = 0;
+	ssent.uname = username;
+	ssent.host = hostname;
+	ssent.ttyn = ttyn;
+	ssent.caller = IA_SSHD;
+	ssent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE;
+	ssent.ueptr = &ue;
+	ssent.jid = jid;
+	ssent.errcode = ia_rcode;
+	ssent.us = NULL;
+	ssent.time = 1;	/* Set ue_logtime */
+
+	sret.revision = 0;
+	sret.normal = 0;
+
+	ia_success(&ssent, &sret);
+
+	/*
+	 * Query for account, iff > 1 valid acid & askacid permbit
+	 */
+	if (((ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID) ||
+	    (ue.ue_acids[0] >= 0) && (ue.ue_acids[1] >= 0)) &&
+	    ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ASKACID) {
+		if (ttyname(0) != NULL) {
+			debug("cray_setup: ttyname true case, %.100s", ttyname);
+			while (valid_acct == -1) {
+				printf("Account (? for available accounts)"
+				    " [%s]: ", acid2nam(ue.ue_acids[0]));
+				fgets(acct_name, MAXACID, stdin);
+				switch (acct_name[0]) {
+				case EOF:
+					exit(0);
+					break;
+				case '\0':
+					valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0];
+					strlcpy(acct_name, acid2nam(valid_acct), MAXACID);
+					break;
+				case '?':
+					/* Print the list 3 wide */
+					for (i = 0, j = 0; i < MAXVIDS; i++) {
+						if (ue.ue_acids[i] == -1) {
+							printf("\n");
+							break;
+						}
+						if (++j == 4) {
+							j = 1;
+							printf("\n");
+						}
+						printf(" %s",
+						    acid2nam(ue.ue_acids[i]));
+					}
+					if (ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID) {
+						printf("\"acctid\" permbit also allows"
+						    " you to select any valid "
+						    "account name.\n");
+					}
+					printf("\n");
+					break;
+				default:
+					valid_acct = nam2acid(acct_name);
+					if (valid_acct == -1) 
+						printf(
+						    "Account id not found for"
+						    " account name \"%s\"\n\n",
+						    acct_name);
+					break;
+				}
+				/*
+				 * If an account was given, search the user's
+				 * acids array to verify they can use this account.
+				 */
+				if ((valid_acct != -1) &&
+				    !(ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID)) {
+					for (i = 0; i < MAXVIDS; i++) {
+						if (ue.ue_acids[i] == -1)
+							break;
+						if (valid_acct == ue.ue_acids[i])
+							break;
+					}
+					if (i == MAXVIDS ||
+					    ue.ue_acids[i] == -1) {
+						fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set"
+						    " account name to "
+						    "\"%s\", permission "
+						    "denied\n\n", acct_name);
+						valid_acct = -1;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * The client isn't connected to a terminal and can't
+			 * respond to an acid prompt.  Use default acid.
+			 */
+			debug("cray_setup: ttyname false case, %.100s",
+			    ttyname);
+			valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0];
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The user doesn't have the askacid permbit set or
+		 * only has one valid account to use.
+		 */
+		valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0];
+	}
+	if (acctid(0, valid_acct) < 0) {
+		printf ("Bad account id: %d\n", valid_acct);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* 
+	 * Now set shares, quotas, limits, including CPU time for the 
+	 * (interactive) job and process, and set up permissions 
+	 * (for chown etc), etc.
+	 */
+	if (setshares(ue.ue_uid, valid_acct, printf, 0, 0)) {
+		printf("Unable to give %d shares to <%s>(%d/%d)\n",
+		    ue.ue_shares, ue.ue_name, ue.ue_uid, valid_acct);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	sr = setlimits(username, C_PROC, pid, UDBRC_INTER);
+	if (sr != NULL) {
+		debug("%.200s", sr);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	sr = setlimits(username, C_JOB, jid, UDBRC_INTER);
+	if (sr != NULL) {
+		debug("%.200s", sr);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Place the service provider information into
+	 * the session table (Unicos) or job table (Unicos/mk).
+	 * There exist double defines for the job/session table in
+	 * unicos/mk (jtab.h) so no need for a compile time switch.
+	 */
+	memset(&init_info, '\0', sizeof(init_info));
+	init_info.s_sessinit.si_id = URM_SPT_LOGIN;
+	init_info.s_sessinit.si_pid = getpid();
+	init_info.s_sessinit.si_sid = jid;
+	sesscntl(0, S_SETSERVPO, (int)&init_info);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set user and controlling tty security attributes.
+	 */
+	if (SecureSys) {
+		if (setusrv(&usrv) == -1) {
+			debug("setusrv() failed, errno = %d",errno);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The rc.* and /etc/sdaemon methods of starting a program on unicos/unicosmk
+ * can have pal privileges that sshd can inherit which
+ * could allow a user to su to root with out a password.
+ * This subroutine clears all privileges.
+ */
+void
+drop_cray_privs()
+{
+#if defined(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU)
+	priv_proc_t *privstate;
+	int result;
+	extern int priv_set_proc();
+	extern priv_proc_t *priv_init_proc();
+
+	/*
+	 * If ether of theses two flags are not set
+	 * then don't allow this version of ssh to run.
+	 */
+	if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU))
+		fatal("Not PRIV_SU system.");
+	if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_POSIX_PRIV))
+		fatal("Not POSIX_PRIV.");
+
+	debug("Setting MLS labels.");;
+
+	if (sysconf(_SC_CRAY_SECURE_MAC)) {
+		usrv.sv_minlvl = SYSLOW;
+		usrv.sv_actlvl = SYSHIGH;
+		usrv.sv_maxlvl = SYSHIGH;
+	} else {
+		usrv.sv_minlvl = sysv.sy_minlvl;
+		usrv.sv_actlvl = sysv.sy_minlvl;
+		usrv.sv_maxlvl = sysv.sy_maxlvl;
+	}       
+	usrv.sv_actcmp = 0;
+	usrv.sv_valcmp = sysv.sy_valcmp;
+
+	usrv.sv_intcat = TFM_SYSTEM;
+	usrv.sv_valcat |= (TFM_SYSTEM | TFM_SYSFILE);
+
+	if (setusrv(&usrv) < 0) {
+		fatal("%s(%d): setusrv(): %s", __FILE__, __LINE__,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	if ((privstate = priv_init_proc()) != NULL) {
+		result = priv_set_proc(privstate);
+		if (result != 0 ) {
+			fatal("%s(%d): priv_set_proc(): %s",
+			    __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		priv_free_proc(privstate);
+	}
+	debug ("Privileges should be cleared...");
+#else
+	/* XXX: do this differently */
+#	error Cray systems must be run with _SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU on!
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *  Retain utmp/wtmp information - used by cray accounting.
+ */
+void
+cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *ut, int pid)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct utmp utmp;
+
+	if ((fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+		/* XXX use atomicio */
+		while (read(fd, (char *)&utmp, sizeof(utmp)) == sizeof(utmp)) {
+			if (pid == utmp.ut_pid) {
+				ut->ut_jid = utmp.ut_jid;
+				strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, utmp.ut_tpath, sizeof(utmp.ut_tpath));
+				strncpy(ut->ut_host, utmp.ut_host, sizeof(utmp.ut_host));
+				strncpy(ut->ut_name, utmp.ut_name, sizeof(utmp.ut_name));
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		close(fd);
+	} else
+		fatal("Unable to open utmp file");
+}
+
+/*
+ * tmpdir support.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * find and delete jobs tmpdir.
+ */
+void
+cray_delete_tmpdir(char *login, int jid, uid_t uid)
+{
+	static char jtmp[TPATHSIZ];
+	struct stat statbuf;
+	int child, c, wstat;
+
+	for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+		snprintf(jtmp, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c);
+		if (stat(jtmp, &statbuf) == 0 && statbuf.st_uid == uid)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (c > 'z')
+		return;
+
+	if ((child = fork()) == 0) {
+		execl(CLEANTMPCMD, CLEANTMPCMD, login, jtmp, (char *)NULL);
+		fatal("cray_delete_tmpdir: execl of CLEANTMPCMD failed");
+	}
+
+	while (waitpid(child, &wstat, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+		;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove tmpdir on job termination.
+ */
+void
+cray_job_termination_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int jid;
+	char *login = NULL;
+	struct jtab jtab;
+
+	if ((jid = waitjob(&jtab)) == -1 ||
+	    (login = uid2nam(jtab.j_uid)) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	cray_delete_tmpdir(login, jid, jtab.j_uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set job id and create tmpdir directory.
+ */
+void
+cray_init_job(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	int jid;
+	int c;
+
+	jid = setjob(pw->pw_uid, WJSIGNAL);
+	if (jid < 0)
+		fatal("System call setjob failure");
+
+	for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+		snprintf(cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c);
+		if (mkdir(cray_tmpdir, JTMPMODE) != 0)
+			continue;
+		if (chown(cray_tmpdir,	pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+			rmdir(cray_tmpdir);
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (c > 'z')
+		cray_tmpdir[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	int jid;
+	struct jtab jbuf;
+
+	if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set jid and tmpdir in utmp record.
+	 */
+	ut->ut_jid = jid;
+	strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ);
+}
+#endif /* UNICOS */
+
+#ifdef _UNICOSMP
+#include <pwd.h>
+/*
+ * Set job id and create tmpdir directory.
+ */
+void
+cray_init_job(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	initrm_silent(pw->pw_uid);
+	return;
+}
+#endif /* _UNICOSMP */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..774eceb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-cray.h,v 1.12 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Cray Inc.  (Wendy Palm <wendyp@cray.com>)
+ * Significant portions provided by 
+ *          Wayne Schroeder, SDSC <schroeder@sdsc.edu>
+ *          William Jones, UTexas <jones@tacc.utexas.edu>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Apr 22 16.34:00 2002 wp
+ *
+ * This file contains functions required for proper execution
+ * on UNICOS systems.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_CRAY_H
+#define _BSD_CRAY_H
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+
+void cray_init_job(struct passwd *);
+void cray_job_termination_handler(int);
+void cray_login_failure(char *, int );
+int cray_access_denied(char *);
+extern char cray_tmpdir[];
+
+#define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
+
+#ifndef IA_SSHD
+# define IA_SSHD IA_LOGIN
+#endif
+#ifndef MAXHOSTNAMELEN
+# define MAXHOSTNAMELEN  64
+#endif
+#ifndef _CRAYT3E
+# define TIOCGPGRP (tIOC|20)
+#endif
+
+#endif /* UNICOS */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_CRAY_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e90c159
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#if defined(open) && open == binary_open
+# undef open
+#endif
+#if defined(pipe) && open == binary_pipe
+# undef pipe
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <windows.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+int 
+binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	mode_t mode;
+	
+	va_start(ap, flags);
+	mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode));
+}
+
+int 
+binary_pipe(int fd[2])
+{
+	int ret = pipe(fd);
+
+	if (!ret) {
+		setmode(fd[0], O_BINARY);
+		setmode(fd[1], O_BINARY);
+	}
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+check_ntsec(const char *filename)
+{
+	return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS));
+}
+
+#define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1)
+#define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0]))
+
+static struct wenv {
+	const char *name;
+	size_t namelen;
+} wenv_arr[] = {
+	{ NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") },
+	{ NL("COMMONPROGRAMFILES=") },
+	{ NL("COMPUTERNAME=") },
+	{ NL("COMSPEC=") },
+	{ NL("CYGWIN=") },
+	{ NL("NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS=") },
+	{ NL("OS=") },
+	{ NL("PATH=") },
+	{ NL("PATHEXT=") },
+	{ NL("PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE=") },
+	{ NL("PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER=") },
+	{ NL("PROCESSOR_LEVEL=") },
+	{ NL("PROCESSOR_REVISION=") },
+	{ NL("PROGRAMFILES=") },
+	{ NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") },
+	{ NL("SYSTEMROOT=") },
+	{ NL("TMP=") },
+	{ NL("TEMP=") },
+	{ NL("WINDIR=") }
+};
+
+char **
+fetch_windows_environment(void)
+{
+	char **e, **p;
+	unsigned int i, idx = 0;
+
+	p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *));
+	for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) {
+		for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) {
+			if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen))
+				p[idx++] = *e;
+		}
+	}
+	p[idx] = NULL;
+	return p;
+}
+
+void
+free_windows_environment(char **p)
+{
+	xfree(p);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39b8eb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.12 2009/03/08 00:40:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#undef ERROR
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <sys/cygwin.h>
+#include <io.h>
+
+int binary_open(const char *, int , ...);
+int binary_pipe(int fd[2]);
+int check_ntsec(const char *);
+char **fetch_windows_environment(void);
+void free_windows_environment(char **);
+
+#define open binary_open
+#define pipe binary_pipe
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f7e677
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if defined(SO_PEERCRED)
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	struct ucred cred;
+	socklen_t len = sizeof(cred);
+
+	if (getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &len) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	*euid = cred.uid;
+	*gid = cred.gid;
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPEERUCRED)
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UCRED_H
+# include <ucred.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	ucred_t *ucred = NULL;
+
+	if (getpeerucred(s, &ucred) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*euid = ucred_geteuid(ucred)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*gid = ucred_getrgid(ucred)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	ucred_free(ucred);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#else
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	*euid = geteuid();
+	*gid = getgid();
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* defined(SO_PEERCRED) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55f100a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0]
+ * Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle()
+ */
+char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	return xstrdup(__progname);
+#else
+	char *p;
+
+	if (argv0 == NULL)
+		return ("unknown");	/* XXX */
+	p = strrchr(argv0, '/');
+	if (p == NULL)
+		p = argv0;
+	else
+		p++;
+
+	return (xstrdup(p));
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *name)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, 
+            const char *user, const char *domain)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t euid)
+{
+	return (setreuid(-1, euid));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t egid)
+{
+	return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int e)
+{
+	extern int sys_nerr;
+	extern char *sys_errlist[];
+	
+	if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr))
+		return (sys_errlist[e]);
+
+	return ("unlisted error");
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp)
+{
+	struct utimbuf ub;
+
+	ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec;
+	ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec;
+	
+	return (utime(filename, &ub));
+}
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+int truncate(const char *path, off_t length)
+{
+	int fd, ret, saverrno;
+
+	fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	ret = ftruncate(fd, length);
+	saverrno = errno;
+	close(fd);
+	if (ret == -1)
+		errno = saverrno;
+
+	return(ret);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem)
+{
+	int rc, saverrno;
+	extern int errno;
+	struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait;
+
+	TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req)
+	(void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL);
+	rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait);
+	if (rc == -1) {
+		saverrno = errno;
+		(void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL);
+		errno = saverrno;
+		tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec - 
+			(tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec);
+		tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec - 
+			(tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec);
+		tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L;
+		tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L;
+	} else {
+		tremain.tv_sec = 0;
+		tremain.tv_usec = 0;
+	}
+	if (rem != NULL)
+		TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
+
+	return(rc);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+pid_t
+tcgetpgrp(int fd)
+{
+	int ctty_pgrp;
+
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1)
+		return(-1);
+	else
+		return(ctty_pgrp);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+int
+tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration)
+{
+# if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK)
+	struct timeval sleepytime;
+
+	sleepytime.tv_sec = 0;
+	sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000;
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	(void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime);
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	return (0);
+# else
+	return -1;
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */
+
+mysig_t
+mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
+	struct sigaction sa, osa;
+
+	if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1)
+		return (mysig_t) -1;
+	if (osa.sa_handler != act) {
+		memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+		sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+		sa.sa_flags = 0;
+#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT
+		if (sig == SIGALRM)
+			sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT;
+#endif
+		sa.sa_handler = act;
+		if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1)
+			return (mysig_t) -1;
+	}
+	return (osa.sa_handler);
+#else
+	#undef signal
+	return (signal(sig, act));
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP
+char *
+strdup(const char *str)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = strlen(str) + 1;
+	cp = malloc(len);
+	if (cp != NULL)
+		return(memcpy(cp, str, len));
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b61ec42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.18 2005/02/25 23:07:38 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H
+#define _BSD_MISC_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+char *ssh_get_progname(char *);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETSID
+#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid())
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(const char *, const char *, int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int);
+#endif 
+
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+struct timeval {
+	long tv_sec;
+	long tv_usec;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */
+
+int utimes(char *, struct timeval *);
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+int truncate (const char *, off_t);
+#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
+struct timespec {
+	time_t	tv_sec;
+	long	tv_nsec;
+};
+#endif
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+pid_t tcgetpgrp(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+int tcsendbreak(int, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
+void unsetenv(const char *);
+#endif
+
+/* wrapper for signal interface */
+typedef void (*mysig_t)(int);
+mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act);
+
+#define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b)
+
+#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8195af8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include "bsd-nextstep.h"
+
+pid_t 
+posix_wait(int *status)
+{
+	union wait statusp;
+	pid_t wait_pid;
+
+	#undef wait			/* Use NeXT's wait() function */
+	wait_pid = wait(&statusp);
+	if (status)
+		*status = (int) statusp.w_status;
+
+	return (wait_pid);
+}
+
+int
+tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (ioctl(fd, TIOCGETA, t));
+}
+
+int
+tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t)
+{
+	struct termios localterm;
+
+	if (opt & TCSASOFT) {
+		localterm = *t;
+		localterm.c_cflag |= CIGNORE;
+		t = &localterm;
+	}
+	switch (opt & ~TCSASOFT) {
+	case TCSANOW:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETA, t));
+	case TCSADRAIN:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAW, t));
+	case TCSAFLUSH:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAF, t));
+	default:
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+}
+
+int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp)
+{
+	return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSPGRP, &pgrp));
+}
+
+speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (t->c_ospeed);
+}
+
+speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (t->c_ispeed);
+}
+
+int
+cfsetospeed(struct termios *t,int speed)
+{
+	t->c_ospeed = speed;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed)
+{
+	t->c_ispeed = speed;
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca5b4b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-nextstep.h,v 1.9 2003/08/29 16:59:52 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NEXT_POSIX_H
+#define _NEXT_POSIX_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+
+/* NGROUPS_MAX is behind -lposix.  Use the BSD version which is NGROUPS */
+#undef NGROUPS_MAX
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+
+/* NeXT's readdir() is BSD (struct direct) not POSIX (struct dirent) */
+#define dirent direct
+
+/* Swap out NeXT's BSD wait() for a more POSIX complient one */
+pid_t posix_wait(int *);
+#define wait(a) posix_wait(a)
+
+/* #ifdef wrapped functions that need defining for clean compiling */
+pid_t getppid(void);
+void vhangup(void);
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+/* TERMCAP */
+int tcgetattr(int, struct termios *);
+int tcsetattr(int, int, const struct termios *);
+int tcsetpgrp(int, pid_t);
+speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *);
+speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *);
+int cfsetospeed(struct termios *, int);
+int cfsetispeed(struct termios *, int);
+#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */
+#endif /* _NEXT_POSIX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9777eb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/*
+ * Please note: this implementation of openpty() is far from complete.
+ * it is just enough for portable OpenSSH's needs.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H)
+# include <sys/stropts.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+int
+openpty(int *amaster, int *aslave, char *name, struct termios *termp,
+   struct winsize *winp)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE__GETPTY)
+	/*
+	 * _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more
+	 * pty's automagically when needed
+	 */
+	char *slave;
+
+	if ((slave = _getpty(amaster, O_RDWR, 0622, 0)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* Open the slave side. */
+	if ((*aslave = open(slave, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+	/*
+	 * This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x.  (Note that Solaris 2.3
+	 * also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.)
+	 */
+	int ptm;
+	char *pts;
+	mysig_t old_signal;
+
+	if ((ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* XXX: need to close ptm on error? */
+	old_signal = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if (grantpt(ptm) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
+
+	if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if ((pts = ptsname(ptm)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	*amaster = ptm;
+
+	/* Open the slave side. */
+	if ((*aslave = open(pts, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to push the appropriate streams modules, as described 
+	 * in Solaris pts(7).
+	 */
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ptem");
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ldterm");
+# ifndef __hpux
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ttcompat");
+# endif /* __hpux */
+
+	return (0);
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC)
+	/* AIX-style pty code. */
+	const char *ttname;
+
+	if ((*amaster = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((ttname = ttyname(*amaster)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*aslave = open(ttname, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+
+#elif defined(_UNICOS)
+	char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64];
+	int i;
+	int highpty;
+
+	highpty = 128;
+#ifdef _SC_CRAY_NPTY
+	if ((highpty = sysconf(_SC_CRAY_NPTY)) == -1)
+		highpty = 128;
+#endif /* _SC_CRAY_NPTY */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < highpty; i++) {
+		snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty/%03d", i);
+		snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%03d", i);
+		if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+			continue;
+		/* Open the slave side. */
+		if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+			close(*amaster);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		return (0);
+	}
+	return (-1);
+
+#else
+	/* BSD-style pty code. */
+	char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64];
+	int i;
+	const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmno"
+	    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
+	const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef";
+	int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors);
+	int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors;
+	struct termios tio;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) {
+		snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty%c%c", 
+		    ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
+		snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/tty%c%c",
+		    ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
+
+		if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+			/* Try SCO style naming */
+			snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/ptyp%d", i);
+			snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%d", i);
+			if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Open the slave side. */
+		if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+			close(*amaster);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		/* set tty modes to a sane state for broken clients */
+		if (tcgetattr(*amaster, &tio) != -1) {
+			tio.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ISIG | ICANON);
+			tio.c_oflag |= (OPOST | ONLCR);
+			tio.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
+			tcsetattr(*amaster, TCSANOW, &tio);
+		}
+
+		return (0);
+	}
+	return (-1);
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f899d7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-poll.c,v 1.4 2008/08/29 21:32:38 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2007 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_POLL)
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
+
+/*
+ * A minimal implementation of poll(2), built on top of select(2).
+ *
+ * Only supports POLLIN and POLLOUT flags in pfd.events, and POLLIN, POLLOUT
+ * and POLLERR flags in revents.
+ *
+ * Supports pfd.fd = -1 meaning "unused" although it's not standard.
+ */
+
+int
+poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout)
+{
+	nfds_t i;
+	int saved_errno, ret, fd, maxfd = 0;
+	fd_set *readfds = NULL, *writefds = NULL, *exceptfds = NULL;
+	size_t nmemb;
+	struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		if (fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fd);
+	}
+
+	nmemb = howmany(maxfd + 1 , NFDBITS);
+	if ((readfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL ||
+	    (writefds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL ||
+	    (exceptfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL) {
+		saved_errno = ENOMEM;
+		ret = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* populate event bit vectors for the events we're interested in */
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		if (fd == -1)
+			continue;
+		if (fds[i].events & POLLIN) {
+			FD_SET(fd, readfds);
+			FD_SET(fd, exceptfds);
+		}
+		if (fds[i].events & POLLOUT) {
+			FD_SET(fd, writefds);
+			FD_SET(fd, exceptfds);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* poll timeout is msec, select is timeval (sec + usec) */
+	if (timeout >= 0) {
+		tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+		tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
+		tvp = &tv;
+	}
+
+	ret = select(maxfd + 1, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+
+	/* scan through select results and set poll() flags */
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		fds[i].revents = 0;
+		if (fd == -1)
+			continue;
+		if (FD_ISSET(fd, readfds)) {
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLIN;
+		}
+		if (FD_ISSET(fd, writefds)) {
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLOUT;
+		}
+		if (FD_ISSET(fd, exceptfds)) {
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLERR;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (readfds != NULL)
+		free(readfds);
+	if (writefds != NULL)
+		free(writefds);
+	if (exceptfds != NULL)
+		free(exceptfds);
+	if (ret == -1)
+		errno = saved_errno;
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcbb9ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H)
+#ifndef	_COMPAT_POLL_H_
+#define	_COMPAT_POLL_H_
+
+typedef struct pollfd {
+	int 	fd;
+	short	events;
+	short	revents;
+} pollfd_t;
+
+typedef unsigned int	nfds_t;
+
+#define	POLLIN		0x0001
+#define	POLLOUT		0x0004
+#define	POLLERR		0x0008
+#if 0
+/* the following are currently not implemented */
+#define	POLLPRI		0x0002
+#define	POLLHUP		0x0010
+#define	POLLNVAL	0x0020
+#define	POLLRDNORM	0x0040
+#define POLLNORM	POLLRDNORM
+#define POLLWRNORM      POLLOUT
+#define	POLLRDBAND	0x0080
+#define	POLLWRBAND	0x0100
+#endif
+
+#define INFTIM		(-1)	/* not standard */
+
+int   poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int);
+#endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */
+#endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41d2be23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,850 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
+ * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell@astart.com)
+ * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact
+ * on all source code distributions
+ */
+
+/**************************************************************
+ * Original:
+ * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995
+ * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included.
+ * Sigh.  This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with.  Note that
+ * the version here does not include floating point...
+ *
+ * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks
+ * for string length.  This covers a nasty loophole.
+ *
+ * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from
+ * causing nast effects.
+ *
+ * More Recently:
+ *  Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43
+ *  This was ugly.  It is still ugly.  I opted out of floating point
+ *  numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything
+ *  from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from
+ *  the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page.
+ *
+ *  Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1
+ *    Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this
+ *    probably requires libm on most operating systems.  Don't yet
+ *    support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G).  Also, fmtint()
+ *    was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways
+ *    which showed it, so that's been fixed.  Also, formated the code
+ *    to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the
+ *    original.  Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with:
+ *           gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm
+ *    and run snprintf for results.
+ * 
+ *  Thomas Roessler <roessler@guug.de> 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i
+ *    The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. 
+ *    Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work.
+ *
+ *  Michael Elkins <me@cs.hmc.edu> 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8
+ *    The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were
+ *    missing.  Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so
+ *    the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF.
+ *
+ *  Andrew Tridgell (tridge@samba.org) Oct 1998
+ *    fixed handling of %.0f
+ *    added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+ *
+ * tridge@samba.org, idra@samba.org, April 2001
+ *    got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder)
+ *    added C99 semantics
+ *
+ * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31;  author: herb;  state: Exp;  lines: +2 -0
+ * actually print args for %g and %e
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52;  author: jmcd;  state: Exp;  lines: +8 -0
+ * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here.  I don't
+ * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it
+ * locally.  Fixes AIX and Solaris builds.
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24;  author: tridge;  state: Exp;  lines: +5 -13
+ * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of
+ * functions
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22;  author: jmcd;  state: Exp;  lines: +21 -4
+ * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg.  Use __va_copy before using it
+ * when it exists.
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04;  author: idra;  state: Exp;  lines: +20 -14
+ * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp.
+ * Thanks to Ollie Oldham <ollie.oldham@metro-optix.com> for spotting it.
+ * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests.
+ * addedd the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones.
+ *
+ * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) April 2003
+ *    Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source
+ *    tree with less trouble.
+ *    Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition.
+ *
+ * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) May 2003
+ *    Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings.
+ *
+ *    Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even
+ *    if the C library has some snprintf functions already.
+ *
+ * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org) Jan 2007
+ *    Fix integer overflows in return value.
+ *    Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch()
+ *
+ **************************************************************/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF)		/* For those with broken snprintf() */
+# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+#endif
+
+#ifndef VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
+#  define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+#  ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+#  else
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+# define LDOUBLE long double
+#else
+# define LDOUBLE double
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG
+# define LLONG long long
+#else
+# define LLONG long
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf
+ */
+
+/* format read states */
+#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
+#define DP_S_FLAGS   1
+#define DP_S_MIN     2
+#define DP_S_DOT     3
+#define DP_S_MAX     4
+#define DP_S_MOD     5
+#define DP_S_CONV    6
+#define DP_S_DONE    7
+
+/* format flags - Bits */
+#define DP_F_MINUS 	(1 << 0)
+#define DP_F_PLUS  	(1 << 1)
+#define DP_F_SPACE 	(1 << 2)
+#define DP_F_NUM   	(1 << 3)
+#define DP_F_ZERO  	(1 << 4)
+#define DP_F_UP    	(1 << 5)
+#define DP_F_UNSIGNED 	(1 << 6)
+
+/* Conversion Flags */
+#define DP_C_SHORT   1
+#define DP_C_LONG    2
+#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3
+#define DP_C_LLONG   4
+
+#define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0')
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q))
+#endif
+
+#define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \
+	do { \
+		if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \
+			errno = ERANGE; \
+			return -1; \
+		} \
+		if (pos < buflen) \
+			buf[pos] = thechar; \
+		(pos)++; \
+	} while (0)
+
+static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, 
+    va_list args_in);
+static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    char *value, int flags, int min, int max);
+static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    LLONG value, int base, int min, int max, int flags);
+static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags);
+
+static int
+dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in)
+{
+	char ch;
+	LLONG value;
+	LDOUBLE fvalue;
+	char *strvalue;
+	int min;
+	int max;
+	int state;
+	int flags;
+	int cflags;
+	size_t currlen;
+	va_list args;
+
+	VA_COPY(args, args_in);
+	
+	state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+	currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0;
+	max = -1;
+	ch = *format++;
+	
+	while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
+		if (ch == '\0') 
+			state = DP_S_DONE;
+
+		switch(state) {
+		case DP_S_DEFAULT:
+			if (ch == '%') 
+				state = DP_S_FLAGS;
+			else
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
+			ch = *format++;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_FLAGS:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case '-':
+				flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '+':
+				flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case ' ':
+				flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '#':
+				flags |= DP_F_NUM;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '0':
+				flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				state = DP_S_MIN;
+				break;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MIN:
+			if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+				min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch);
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else if (ch == '*') {
+				min = va_arg (args, int);
+				ch = *format++;
+				state = DP_S_DOT;
+			} else {
+				state = DP_S_DOT;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_DOT:
+			if (ch == '.') {
+				state = DP_S_MAX;
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else { 
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MAX:
+			if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+				if (max < 0)
+					max = 0;
+				max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch);
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else if (ch == '*') {
+				max = va_arg (args, int);
+				ch = *format++;
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			} else {
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MOD:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case 'h':
+				cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case 'l':
+				cflags = DP_C_LONG;
+				ch = *format++;
+				if (ch == 'l') {	/* It's a long long */
+					cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
+					ch = *format++;
+				}
+				break;
+			case 'L':
+				cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+			state = DP_S_CONV;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_CONV:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case 'd':
+			case 'i':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) 
+					value = va_arg (args, int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = va_arg (args, long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = va_arg (args, LLONG);
+				else
+					value = va_arg (args, int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'o':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    8, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'u':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    10, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'X':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'x':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    16, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'f':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'E':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'e':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'G':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'g':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'c':
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen,
+				    va_arg (args, int));
+				break;
+			case 's':
+				strvalue = va_arg (args, char *);
+				if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)";
+				if (max == -1) {
+					max = strlen(strvalue);
+				}
+				if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min;
+				if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'p':
+				strvalue = va_arg (args, void *);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'n':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
+					short int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, short int *);
+					*num = currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) {
+					long int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, long int *);
+					*num = (long int)currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) {
+					LLONG *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, LLONG *);
+					*num = (LLONG)currlen;
+				} else {
+					int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, int *);
+					*num = currlen;
+				}
+				break;
+			case '%':
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
+				break;
+			case 'w':
+				/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				/* Unknown, skip */
+				break;
+			}
+			ch = *format++;
+			state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+			flags = cflags = min = 0;
+			max = -1;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_DONE:
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* hmm? */
+			break; /* some picky compilers need this */
+		}
+	}
+	if (maxlen != 0) {
+		if (currlen < maxlen - 1) 
+			buffer[currlen] = '\0';
+		else if (maxlen > 0) 
+			buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0';
+	}
+	
+	return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
+{
+	int padlen, strln;     /* amount to pad */
+	int cnt = 0;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value);
+#endif
+	if (value == 0) {
+		value = "<NULL>";
+	}
+
+	for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */
+	padlen = min - strln;
+	if (padlen < 0) 
+		padlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */
+	
+	while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--padlen;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value);
+		*value++;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++padlen;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */
+
+static int
+fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+		    LLONG value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+	int signvalue = 0;
+	unsigned LLONG uvalue;
+	char convert[20];
+	int place = 0;
+	int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */
+	int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */
+	int caps = 0;
+	
+	if (max < 0)
+		max = 0;
+	
+	uvalue = value;
+	
+	if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
+		if( value < 0 ) {
+			signvalue = '-';
+			uvalue = -value;
+		} else {
+			if (flags & DP_F_PLUS)  /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+				signvalue = '+';
+			else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+				signvalue = ' ';
+		}
+	}
+  
+	if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+
+	do {
+		convert[place++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")
+			[uvalue % (unsigned)base  ];
+		uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base );
+	} while(uvalue && (place < 20));
+	if (place == 20) place--;
+	convert[place] = 0;
+
+	zpadlen = max - place;
+	spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0);
+	if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
+	if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) {
+		zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen);
+		spadlen = 0;
+	}
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n",
+	       zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place);
+#endif
+
+	/* Spaces */
+	while (spadlen > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--spadlen;
+	}
+
+	/* Sign */
+	if (signvalue) 
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+
+	/* Zeros */
+	if (zpadlen > 0) {
+		while (zpadlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--zpadlen;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Digits */
+	while (place > 0) {
+		--place;
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]);
+	}
+  
+	/* Left Justified spaces */
+	while (spadlen < 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++spadlen;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+	LDOUBLE result = value;
+
+	if (value < 0)
+		result = -value;
+	
+	return result;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE POW10(int val)
+{
+	LDOUBLE result = 1;
+	
+	while (val) {
+		result *= 10;
+		val--;
+	}
+  
+	return result;
+}
+
+static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+	LLONG intpart;
+
+	intpart = (LLONG)value;
+	value = value - intpart;
+	if (value >= 0.5) intpart++;
+	
+	return intpart;
+}
+
+/* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should
+   be portable, but slow */
+static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr)
+{
+	int i;
+	long l;
+	double x = x0;
+	double f = 1.0;
+
+	for (i=0;i<100;i++) {
+		l = (long)x;
+		if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break;
+		x *= 0.1;
+		f *= 10.0;
+	}
+
+	if (i == 100) {
+		/*
+		 * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle.
+		 * What do we do?
+		 */
+		(*iptr) = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (i != 0) {
+		double i2;
+		double ret;
+
+		ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2);
+		(*iptr) = l*f + i2;
+		return ret;
+	} 
+
+	(*iptr) = l;
+	return x - (*iptr);
+}
+
+
+static int
+fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+	int signvalue = 0;
+	double ufvalue;
+	char iconvert[311];
+	char fconvert[311];
+	int iplace = 0;
+	int fplace = 0;
+	int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */
+	int zpadlen = 0; 
+	int caps = 0;
+	int idx;
+	double intpart;
+	double fracpart;
+	double temp;
+  
+	/* 
+	 * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default
+	 * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6
+	 */
+	if (max < 0)
+		max = 6;
+
+	ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue);
+
+	if (fvalue < 0) {
+		signvalue = '-';
+	} else {
+		if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+			signvalue = '+';
+		} else {
+			if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+				signvalue = ' ';
+		}
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+	 if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */
+#endif
+
+	/* 
+	 * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our 
+	 * conversion method
+	 */
+	if (max > 16)
+		max = 16;
+
+	/* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by
+	 * multiplying by a factor of 10
+	 */
+
+	temp = ufvalue;
+	my_modf(temp, &intpart);
+
+	fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
+	
+	if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) {
+		intpart++;
+		fracpart -= POW10(max);
+	}
+
+	/* Convert integer part */
+	do {
+		temp = intpart*0.1;
+		my_modf(temp, &intpart);
+		idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0);
+		/* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */
+		/* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */
+		iconvert[iplace++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
+	} while (intpart && (iplace < 311));
+	if (iplace == 311) iplace--;
+	iconvert[iplace] = 0;
+
+	/* Convert fractional part */
+	if (fracpart)
+	{
+		do {
+			temp = fracpart*0.1;
+			my_modf(temp, &fracpart);
+			idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0);
+			/* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */
+			/* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */
+			fconvert[fplace++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
+		} while(fracpart && (fplace < 311));
+		if (fplace == 311) fplace--;
+	}
+	fconvert[fplace] = 0;
+  
+	/* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */
+	padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); 
+	zpadlen = max - fplace;
+	if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
+	if (padlen < 0) 
+		padlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */
+	
+	if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
+		if (signvalue) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+			--padlen;
+			signvalue = 0;
+		}
+		while (padlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--padlen;
+		}
+	}
+	while (padlen > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--padlen;
+	}
+	if (signvalue) 
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+	
+	while (iplace > 0) {
+		--iplace;
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]);
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Decimal point.  This should probably use locale to find the correct
+	 * char to print out.
+	 */
+	if (max > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.');
+		
+		while (zpadlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--zpadlen;
+		}
+
+		while (fplace > 0) {
+			--fplace;
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]);
+		}
+	}
+
+	while (padlen < 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++padlen;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+int
+vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+	return dopr(str, count, fmt, args);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF)
+int
+snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..844d5b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-statvfs.c,v 1.1 2008/06/08 17:32:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
+int statvfs(const char *path, struct statvfs *buf)
+{
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+int fstatvfs(int fd, struct statvfs *buf)
+{
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da215ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-statvfs.h,v 1.1 2008/06/08 17:32:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
+typedef unsigned long fsblkcnt_t;
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
+typedef unsigned long fsfilcnt_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef ST_RDONLY
+#define ST_RDONLY	1
+#endif
+#ifndef ST_NOSUID
+#define ST_NOSUID	2
+#endif
+
+	/* as defined in IEEE Std 1003.1, 2004 Edition */
+struct statvfs {
+	unsigned long f_bsize;	/* File system block size. */
+	unsigned long f_frsize;	/* Fundamental file system block size. */
+	fsblkcnt_t f_blocks;	/* Total number of blocks on file system in */
+				/* units of f_frsize. */
+	fsblkcnt_t    f_bfree;	/* Total number of free blocks. */
+	fsblkcnt_t    f_bavail;	/* Number of free blocks available to  */
+				/* non-privileged process.  */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_files;	/* Total number of file serial numbers. */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_ffree;	/* Total number of free file serial numbers. */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_favail;	/* Number of file serial numbers available to */
+				/* non-privileged process. */
+	unsigned long f_fsid;	/* File system ID. */
+	unsigned long f_flag;	/* BBit mask of f_flag values. */
+	unsigned long f_namemax;/*  Maximum filename length. */
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
+int statvfs(const char *, struct statvfs *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+int fstatvfs(int, struct statvfs *);
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40e6ffa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID 
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+
+pid_t
+waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options)
+{
+	union wait statusp;
+	pid_t wait_pid;
+
+	if (pid <= 0) {
+		if (pid != -1) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		/* wait4() wants pid=0 for indiscriminate wait. */
+		pid = 0;
+	}
+        wait_pid = wait4(pid, &statusp, options, NULL);
+	if (stat_loc)
+        	*stat_loc = (int) statusp.w_status;            
+
+        return (wait_pid);                               
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d853db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-waitpid.h,v 1.5 2003/08/29 16:59:52 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_WAITPID_H
+#define _BSD_WAITPID_H
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID
+/* Clean out any potental issues */
+#undef WIFEXITED
+#undef WIFSTOPPED
+#undef WIFSIGNALED
+
+/* Define required functions to mimic a POSIX look and feel */
+#define _W_INT(w)	(*(int*)&(w))	/* convert union wait to int */
+#define WIFEXITED(w)	(!((_W_INT(w)) & 0377))
+#define WIFSTOPPED(w)	((_W_INT(w)) & 0100)
+#define WIFSIGNALED(w)	(!WIFEXITED(w) && !WIFSTOPPED(w))
+#define WEXITSTATUS(w)	(int)(WIFEXITED(w) ? ((_W_INT(w) >> 8) & 0377) : -1)
+#define WTERMSIG(w)	(int)(WIFSIGNALED(w) ? (_W_INT(w) & 0177) : -1)
+#define WCOREFLAG	0x80
+#define WCOREDUMP(w) 	((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG)
+
+/* Prototype */
+pid_t waitpid(int, int *, int);
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
+#endif /* _BSD_WAITPID_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3efe14c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: daemon.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/daemon.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+daemon(int nochdir, int noclose)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	switch (fork()) {
+	case -1:
+		return (-1);
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	default:
+		_exit(0);
+	}
+
+	if (setsid() == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (!nochdir)
+		(void)chdir("/");
+
+	if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
+		if (fd > 2)
+			(void)close (fd);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30fcb49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/dirname.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/dirname.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+char *
+dirname(const char *path)
+{
+	static char dname[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t len;
+	const char *endp;
+
+	/* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		dname[0] = '.';
+		dname[1] = '\0';
+		return (dname);
+	}
+
+	/* Strip any trailing slashes */
+	endp = path + strlen(path) - 1;
+	while (endp > path && *endp == '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* Find the start of the dir */
+	while (endp > path && *endp != '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* Either the dir is "/" or there are no slashes */
+	if (endp == path) {
+		dname[0] = *endp == '/' ? '/' : '.';
+		dname[1] = '\0';
+		return (dname);
+	} else {
+		/* Move forward past the separating slashes */
+		do {
+			endp--;
+		} while (endp > path && *endp == '/');
+	}
+
+	len = endp - path + 1;
+	if (len >= sizeof(dname)) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	memcpy(dname, path, len);
+	dname[len] = '\0';
+	return (dname);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..096d9e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, 
+                size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+	struct hostent *hp;
+	char tmpserv[16];
+
+	if (sa->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC && sa->sa_family != AF_INET)
+		return (EAI_FAMILY);
+	if (serv != NULL) {
+		snprintf(tmpserv, sizeof(tmpserv), "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port));
+		if (strlcpy(serv, tmpserv, servlen) >= servlen)
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+	}
+
+	if (host != NULL) {
+		if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) {
+			if (strlcpy(host, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr),
+			    hostlen) >= hostlen)
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			else
+				return (0);
+		} else {
+			hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&sin->sin_addr, 
+			    sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
+			if (hp == NULL)
+				return (EAI_NODATA);
+			
+			if (strlcpy(host, hp->h_name, hostlen) >= hostlen)
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			else
+				return (0);
+		}
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+#ifdef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
+const char *
+#else
+char *
+#endif
+gai_strerror(int err)
+{
+	switch (err) {
+	case EAI_NODATA:
+		return ("no address associated with name");
+	case EAI_MEMORY:
+		return ("memory allocation failure.");
+	case EAI_NONAME:
+		return ("nodename nor servname provided, or not known");
+	case EAI_FAMILY:
+		return ("ai_family not supported");
+	default:
+		return ("unknown/invalid error.");
+	}
+}    
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+void
+freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *next;
+
+	for(; ai != NULL;) {
+		next = ai->ai_next;
+		free(ai);
+		ai = next;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+static struct
+addrinfo *malloc_ai(int port, u_long addr, const struct addrinfo *hints)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+
+	ai = malloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+	if (ai == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	
+	memset(ai, '\0', sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+	
+	ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
+	/* XXX -- ssh doesn't use sa_len */
+	ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+	ai->ai_addr->sa_family = ai->ai_family = AF_INET;
+
+	((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_port = port;
+	((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = addr;
+	
+	/* XXX: the following is not generally correct, but does what we want */
+	if (hints->ai_socktype)
+		ai->ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype;
+	else
+		ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+
+	if (hints->ai_protocol)
+		ai->ai_protocol = hints->ai_protocol;
+
+	return (ai);
+}
+
+int
+getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname, 
+    const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res)
+{
+	struct hostent *hp;
+	struct servent *sp;
+	struct in_addr in;
+	int i;
+	long int port;
+	u_long addr;
+
+	port = 0;
+	if (hints && hints->ai_family != AF_UNSPEC &&
+	    hints->ai_family != AF_INET)
+		return (EAI_FAMILY);
+	if (servname != NULL) {
+		char *cp;
+
+		port = strtol(servname, &cp, 10);
+		if (port > 0 && port <= 65535 && *cp == '\0')
+			port = htons(port);
+		else if ((sp = getservbyname(servname, NULL)) != NULL)
+			port = sp->s_port;
+		else
+			port = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) {
+		addr = htonl(0x00000000);
+		if (hostname && inet_aton(hostname, &in) != 0)
+			addr = in.s_addr;
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, addr, hints);
+		if (*res == NULL) 
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+		
+	if (!hostname) {
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x7f000001), hints);
+		if (*res == NULL) 
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	
+	if (inet_aton(hostname, &in)) {
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, in.s_addr, hints);
+		if (*res == NULL) 
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	
+	/* Don't try DNS if AI_NUMERICHOST is set */
+	if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST)
+		return (EAI_NONAME);
+	
+	hp = gethostbyname(hostname);
+	if (hp && hp->h_name && hp->h_name[0] && hp->h_addr_list[0]) {
+		struct addrinfo *cur, *prev;
+
+		cur = prev = *res = NULL;
+		for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) {
+			struct in_addr *in = (struct in_addr *)hp->h_addr_list[i];
+
+			cur = malloc_ai(port, in->s_addr, hints);
+			if (cur == NULL) {
+				if (*res != NULL)
+					freeaddrinfo(*res);
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			}
+			if (prev)
+				prev->ai_next = cur;
+			else
+				*res = cur;
+
+			prev = cur;
+		}
+		return (0);
+	}
+	
+	return (EAI_NODATA);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e9090f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.16 2008/07/14 11:37:37 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _FAKE_RFC2553_H
+#define _FAKE_RFC2553_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * First, socket and INET6 related definitions 
+ */
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+# define	_SS_MAXSIZE	128	/* Implementation specific max size */
+# define       _SS_PADSIZE     (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
+struct sockaddr_storage {
+	struct sockaddr	ss_sa;
+	char		__ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE];
+};
+# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
+
+#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
+	(((u_int32_t *)(a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[1] == 0 && \
+	 ((u_int32_t *)(a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[3] == htonl(1))
+#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+struct in6_addr {
+	u_int8_t	s6_addr[16];
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+struct sockaddr_in6 {
+	unsigned short	sin6_family;
+	u_int16_t	sin6_port;
+	u_int32_t	sin6_flowinfo;
+	struct in6_addr	sin6_addr;
+	u_int32_t	sin6_scope_id;
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */
+
+#ifndef AF_INET6
+/* Define it to something that should never appear */
+#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Next, RFC2553 name / address resolution API
+ */
+
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST
+# define NI_NUMERICHOST    (1)
+#endif
+#ifndef NI_NAMEREQD
+# define NI_NAMEREQD       (1<<1)
+#endif
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICSERV
+# define NI_NUMERICSERV    (1<<2)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AI_PASSIVE
+# define AI_PASSIVE		(1)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_CANONNAME
+# define AI_CANONNAME		(1<<1)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST
+# define AI_NUMERICHOST		(1<<2)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NI_MAXSERV
+# define NI_MAXSERV 32
+#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */
+#ifndef NI_MAXHOST
+# define NI_MAXHOST 1025
+#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
+
+#ifndef EAI_NODATA
+# define EAI_NODATA	(INT_MAX - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_MEMORY
+# define EAI_MEMORY	(INT_MAX - 2)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_NONAME
+# define EAI_NONAME	(INT_MAX - 3)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_SYSTEM
+# define EAI_SYSTEM	(INT_MAX - 4)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_FAMILY
+# define EAI_FAMILY	(INT_MAX - 5)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+struct addrinfo {
+	int	ai_flags;	/* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */
+	int	ai_family;	/* PF_xxx */
+	int	ai_socktype;	/* SOCK_xxx */
+	int	ai_protocol;	/* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */
+	size_t	ai_addrlen;	/* length of ai_addr */
+	char	*ai_canonname;	/* canonical name for hostname */
+	struct sockaddr *ai_addr;	/* binary address */
+	struct addrinfo *ai_next;	/* next structure in linked list */
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#ifdef getaddrinfo
+# undef getaddrinfo
+#endif
+#define getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d)	(ssh_getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d))
+int getaddrinfo(const char *, const char *, 
+    const struct addrinfo *, struct addrinfo **);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) && !defined(HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO)
+#define gai_strerror(a)		(_ssh_compat_gai_strerror(a))
+char *gai_strerror(int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#define freeaddrinfo(a)		(ssh_freeaddrinfo(a))
+void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *);
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+#define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (ssh_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t, 
+    char *, size_t, int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
+
+#endif /* !_FAKE_RFC2553_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..edd682a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.9 2007/03/20 03:42:52 tedu Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libutil/fmt_scaled.c */
+
+/*
+ * fmt_scaled: Format numbers scaled for human comprehension
+ * scan_scaled: Scan numbers in this format.
+ *
+ * "Human-readable" output uses 4 digits max, and puts a unit suffix at
+ * the end.  Makes output compact and easy-to-read esp. on huge disks.
+ * Formatting code was originally in OpenBSD "df", converted to library routine.
+ * Scanning code written for OpenBSD libutil.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+typedef enum {
+	NONE = 0, KILO = 1, MEGA = 2, GIGA = 3, TERA = 4, PETA = 5, EXA = 6
+} unit_type;
+
+/* These three arrays MUST be in sync!  XXX make a struct */
+static unit_type units[] = { NONE, KILO, MEGA, GIGA, TERA, PETA, EXA };
+static char scale_chars[] = "BKMGTPE";
+static long long scale_factors[] = {
+	1LL,
+	1024LL,
+	1024LL*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024*1024,
+};
+#define	SCALE_LENGTH (sizeof(units)/sizeof(units[0]))
+
+#define MAX_DIGITS (SCALE_LENGTH * 3)	/* XXX strlen(sprintf("%lld", -1)? */
+
+/** Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set on error.
+ */
+int
+scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
+{
+	char *p = scaled;
+	int sign = 0;
+	unsigned int i, ndigits = 0, fract_digits = 0;
+	long long scale_fact = 1, whole = 0, fpart = 0;
+
+	/* Skip leading whitespace */
+	while (isascii(*p) && isspace(*p))
+		++p;
+
+	/* Then at most one leading + or - */
+	while (*p == '-' || *p == '+') {
+		if (*p == '-') {
+			if (sign) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			sign = -1;
+			++p;
+		} else if (*p == '+') {
+			if (sign) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			sign = +1;
+			++p;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Main loop: Scan digits, find decimal point, if present.
+	 * We don't allow exponentials, so no scientific notation
+	 * (but note that E for Exa might look like e to some!).
+	 * Advance 'p' to end, to get scale factor.
+	 */
+	for (; isascii(*p) && (isdigit(*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
+		if (*p == '.') {
+			if (fract_digits > 0) {	/* oops, more than one '.' */
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			fract_digits = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		i = (*p) - '0';			/* whew! finally a digit we can use */
+		if (fract_digits > 0) {
+			if (fract_digits >= MAX_DIGITS-1)
+				/* ignore extra fractional digits */
+				continue;
+			fract_digits++;		/* for later scaling */
+			fpart *= 10;
+			fpart += i;
+		} else {				/* normal digit */
+			if (++ndigits >= MAX_DIGITS) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			whole *= 10;
+			whole += i;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sign) {
+		whole *= sign;
+		fpart *= sign;
+	}
+
+	/* If no scale factor given, we're done. fraction is discarded. */
+	if (!*p) {
+		*result = whole;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Validate scale factor, and scale whole and fraction by it. */
+	for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {
+
+		/** Are we there yet? */
+		if (*p == scale_chars[i] ||
+			*p == tolower(scale_chars[i])) {
+
+			/* If it ends with alphanumerics after the scale char, bad. */
+			if (isalnum(*(p+1))) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			scale_fact = scale_factors[i];
+
+			/* scale whole part */
+			whole *= scale_fact;
+
+			/* truncate fpart so it does't overflow.
+			 * then scale fractional part.
+			 */
+			while (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact) {
+				fpart /= 10;
+				fract_digits--;
+			}
+			fpart *= scale_fact;
+			if (fract_digits > 0) {
+				for (i = 0; i < fract_digits -1; i++)
+					fpart /= 10;
+			}
+			whole += fpart;
+			*result = whole;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	errno = ERANGE;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Format the given "number" into human-readable form in "result".
+ * Result must point to an allocated buffer of length FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE.
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set if error.
+ */
+int
+fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result)
+{
+	long long abval, fract = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
+	unit_type unit = NONE;
+
+	abval = (number < 0LL) ? -number : number;	/* no long long_abs yet */
+
+	/* Not every negative long long has a positive representation.
+	 * Also check for numbers that are just too darned big to format
+	 */
+	if (abval < 0 || abval / 1024 >= scale_factors[SCALE_LENGTH-1]) {
+		errno = ERANGE;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* scale whole part; get unscaled fraction */
+	for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {
+		if (abval/1024 < scale_factors[i]) {
+			unit = units[i];
+			fract = (i == 0) ? 0 : abval % scale_factors[i];
+			number /= scale_factors[i];
+			if (i > 0)
+				fract /= scale_factors[i - 1];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	fract = (10 * fract + 512) / 1024;
+	/* if the result would be >= 10, round main number */
+	if (fract == 10) {
+		if (number >= 0)
+			number++;
+		else
+			number--;
+		fract = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (number == 0)
+		strlcpy(result, "0B", FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE);
+	else if (unit == NONE || number >= 100 || number <= -100) {
+		if (fract >= 5) {
+			if (number >= 0)
+				number++;
+			else
+				number--;
+		}
+		(void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld%c",
+			number, scale_chars[unit]);
+	} else
+		(void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld.%1lld%c",
+			number, fract, scale_chars[unit]);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef	MAIN
+/*
+ * This is the original version of the program in the man page.
+ * Copy-and-paste whatever you need from it.
+ */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *cinput = "1.5K", buf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	long long ninput = 10483892, result;
+
+	if (scan_scaled(cinput, &result) == 0)
+		printf("\"%s\" -> %lld\n", cinput, result);
+	else
+		perror(cinput);
+
+	if (fmt_scaled(ninput, buf) == 0)
+		printf("%lld -> \"%s\"\n", ninput, buf);
+	else
+		fprintf(stderr, "%lld invalid (%s)\n", ninput, strerror(errno));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_FMT_SCALED */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..711cb9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getcwd.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getcwd.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD)
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define	ISDOT(dp) \
+	(dp->d_name[0] == '.' && (dp->d_name[1] == '\0' || \
+	    (dp->d_name[1] == '.' && dp->d_name[2] == '\0')))
+
+char *
+getcwd(char *pt, size_t size)
+{
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	DIR *dir = NULL;
+	dev_t dev;
+	ino_t ino;
+	int first;
+	char *bpt, *bup;
+	struct stat s;
+	dev_t root_dev;
+	ino_t root_ino;
+	size_t ptsize, upsize;
+	int save_errno;
+	char *ept, *eup, *up;
+
+	/*
+	 * If no buffer specified by the user, allocate one as necessary.
+	 * If a buffer is specified, the size has to be non-zero.  The path
+	 * is built from the end of the buffer backwards.
+	 */
+	if (pt) {
+		ptsize = 0;
+		if (!size) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		ept = pt + size;
+	} else {
+		if ((pt = malloc(ptsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL)
+			return (NULL);
+		ept = pt + ptsize;
+	}
+	bpt = ept - 1;
+	*bpt = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate bytes for the string of "../"'s.
+	 * Should always be enough (it's 340 levels).  If it's not, allocate
+	 * as necessary.  Special * case the first stat, it's ".", not "..".
+	 */
+	if ((up = malloc(upsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	eup = up + upsize;
+	bup = up;
+	up[0] = '.';
+	up[1] = '\0';
+
+	/* Save root values, so know when to stop. */
+	if (stat("/", &s))
+		goto err;
+	root_dev = s.st_dev;
+	root_ino = s.st_ino;
+
+	errno = 0;			/* XXX readdir has no error return. */
+
+	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+		/* Stat the current level. */
+		if (lstat(up, &s))
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Save current node values. */
+		ino = s.st_ino;
+		dev = s.st_dev;
+
+		/* Check for reaching root. */
+		if (root_dev == dev && root_ino == ino) {
+			*--bpt = '/';
+			/*
+			 * It's unclear that it's a requirement to copy the
+			 * path to the beginning of the buffer, but it's always
+			 * been that way and stuff would probably break.
+			 */
+			memmove(pt, bpt, ept - bpt);
+			free(up);
+			return (pt);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Build pointer to the parent directory, allocating memory
+		 * as necessary.  Max length is 3 for "../", the largest
+		 * possible component name, plus a trailing NUL.
+		 */
+		if (bup + 3  + MAXNAMLEN + 1 >= eup) {
+			char *nup;
+
+			if ((nup = realloc(up, upsize *= 2)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			bup = nup + (bup - up);
+			up = nup;
+			eup = up + upsize;
+		}
+		*bup++ = '.';
+		*bup++ = '.';
+		*bup = '\0';
+
+		/* Open and stat parent directory. */
+		if (!(dir = opendir(up)) || fstat(dirfd(dir), &s))
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Add trailing slash for next directory. */
+		*bup++ = '/';
+
+		/*
+		 * If it's a mount point, have to stat each element because
+		 * the inode number in the directory is for the entry in the
+		 * parent directory, not the inode number of the mounted file.
+		 */
+		save_errno = 0;
+		if (s.st_dev == dev) {
+			for (;;) {
+				if (!(dp = readdir(dir)))
+					goto notfound;
+				if (dp->d_fileno == ino)
+					break;
+			}
+		} else
+			for (;;) {
+				if (!(dp = readdir(dir)))
+					goto notfound;
+				if (ISDOT(dp))
+					continue;
+				memcpy(bup, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen + 1);
+
+				/* Save the first error for later. */
+				if (lstat(up, &s)) {
+					if (!save_errno)
+						save_errno = errno;
+					errno = 0;
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (s.st_dev == dev && s.st_ino == ino)
+					break;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Check for length of the current name, preceding slash,
+		 * leading slash.
+		 */
+		if (bpt - pt < dp->d_namlen + (first ? 1 : 2)) {
+			size_t len;
+			char *npt;
+
+			if (!ptsize) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			len = ept - bpt;
+			if ((npt = realloc(pt, ptsize *= 2)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			bpt = npt + (bpt - pt);
+			pt = npt;
+			ept = pt + ptsize;
+			memmove(ept - len, bpt, len);
+			bpt = ept - len;
+		}
+		if (!first)
+			*--bpt = '/';
+		bpt -= dp->d_namlen;
+		memcpy(bpt, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen);
+		(void)closedir(dir);
+
+		/* Truncate any file name. */
+		*bup = '\0';
+	}
+
+notfound:
+	/*
+	 * If readdir set errno, use it, not any saved error; otherwise,
+	 * didn't find the current directory in its parent directory, set
+	 * errno to ENOENT.
+	 */
+	if (!errno)
+		errno = save_errno ? save_errno : ENOENT;
+	/* FALLTHROUGH */
+err:
+	save_errno = errno;
+
+	if (ptsize)
+		free(pt);
+	free(up);
+	if (dir)
+		(void)closedir(dir);
+
+	errno = save_errno;
+
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a57d7d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getgrouplist.c,v 1.12 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getgrouplist.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+
+/*
+ * get credential
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+
+int
+getgrouplist(const char *uname, gid_t agroup, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt)
+{
+	struct group *grp;
+	int i, ngroups;
+	int ret, maxgroups;
+	int bail;
+
+	ret = 0;
+	ngroups = 0;
+	maxgroups = *grpcnt;
+
+	/*
+	 * install primary group
+	 */
+	if (ngroups >= maxgroups) {
+		*grpcnt = ngroups;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	groups[ngroups++] = agroup;
+
+	/*
+	 * Scan the group file to find additional groups.
+	 */
+	setgrent();
+	while ((grp = getgrent())) {
+		if (grp->gr_gid == agroup)
+			continue;
+		for (bail = 0, i = 0; bail == 0 && i < ngroups; i++)
+			if (groups[i] == grp->gr_gid)
+				bail = 1;
+		if (bail)
+			continue;
+		for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
+			if (!strcmp(grp->gr_mem[i], uname)) {
+				if (ngroups >= maxgroups) {
+					ret = -1;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				groups[ngroups++] = grp->gr_gid;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	endgrent();
+	*grpcnt = ngroups;
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETGROUPLIST */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5450e43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987, 1993, 1994
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/getopt.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: getopt.c,v 1.5 2003/06/02 20:18:37 millert Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int	BSDopterr = 1,		/* if error message should be printed */
+	BSDoptind = 1,		/* index into parent argv vector */
+	BSDoptopt,		/* character checked for validity */
+	BSDoptreset;		/* reset getopt */
+char	*BSDoptarg;		/* argument associated with option */
+
+#define	BADCH	(int)'?'
+#define	BADARG	(int)':'
+#define	EMSG	""
+
+/*
+ * getopt --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.
+ */
+int
+BSDgetopt(nargc, nargv, ostr)
+	int nargc;
+	char * const *nargv;
+	const char *ostr;
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+	static char *place = EMSG;		/* option letter processing */
+	char *oli;				/* option letter list index */
+
+	if (ostr == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (BSDoptreset || !*place) {		/* update scanning pointer */
+		BSDoptreset = 0;
+		if (BSDoptind >= nargc || *(place = nargv[BSDoptind]) != '-') {
+			place = EMSG;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		if (place[1] && *++place == '-') {	/* found "--" */
+			++BSDoptind;
+			place = EMSG;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}					/* option letter okay? */
+	if ((BSDoptopt = (int)*place++) == (int)':' ||
+	    !(oli = strchr(ostr, BSDoptopt))) {
+		/*
+		 * if the user didn't specify '-' as an option,
+		 * assume it means -1.
+		 */
+		if (BSDoptopt == (int)'-')
+			return (-1);
+		if (!*place)
+			++BSDoptind;
+		if (BSDopterr && *ostr != ':')
+			(void)fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: illegal option -- %c\n", __progname, BSDoptopt);
+		return (BADCH);
+	}
+	if (*++oli != ':') {			/* don't need argument */
+		BSDoptarg = NULL;
+		if (!*place)
+			++BSDoptind;
+	}
+	else {					/* need an argument */
+		if (*place)			/* no white space */
+			BSDoptarg = place;
+		else if (nargc <= ++BSDoptind) {	/* no arg */
+			place = EMSG;
+			if (*ostr == ':')
+				return (BADARG);
+			if (BSDopterr)
+				(void)fprintf(stderr,
+				    "%s: option requires an argument -- %c\n",
+				    __progname, BSDoptopt);
+			return (BADCH);
+		}
+	 	else				/* white space */
+			BSDoptarg = nargv[BSDoptind];
+		place = EMSG;
+		++BSDoptind;
+	}
+	return (BSDoptopt);			/* dump back option letter */
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9887667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.11 2007/10/11 18:36:41 jakob Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/getrrsetbyname.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO) && !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
+extern int h_errno;
+#endif
+
+/* We don't need multithread support here */
+#ifdef _THREAD_PRIVATE
+# undef _THREAD_PRIVATE
+#endif
+#define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c)
+
+#ifndef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
+struct __res_state _res;
+#endif
+
+/* Necessary functions and macros */
+
+/*
+ * Inline versions of get/put short/long.  Pointer is advanced.
+ *
+ * These macros demonstrate the property of C whereby it can be
+ * portable or it can be elegant but rarely both.
+ */
+
+#ifndef INT32SZ
+# define INT32SZ	4
+#endif
+#ifndef INT16SZ
+# define INT16SZ	2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef GETSHORT
+#define GETSHORT(s, cp) { \
+	register u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \
+	(s) = ((u_int16_t)t_cp[0] << 8) \
+	    | ((u_int16_t)t_cp[1]) \
+	    ; \
+	(cp) += INT16SZ; \
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef GETLONG
+#define GETLONG(l, cp) { \
+	register u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \
+	(l) = ((u_int32_t)t_cp[0] << 24) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[1] << 16) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[2] << 8) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[3]) \
+	    ; \
+	(cp) += INT32SZ; \
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Routines to insert/extract short/long's.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE__GETSHORT
+static u_int16_t
+_getshort(msgp)
+	register const u_char *msgp;
+{
+	register u_int16_t u;
+
+	GETSHORT(u, msgp);
+	return (u);
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT) && (HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT == 0)
+u_int16_t _getshort(register const u_char *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE__GETLONG
+static u_int32_t
+_getlong(msgp)
+	register const u_char *msgp;
+{
+	register u_int32_t u;
+
+	GETLONG(u, msgp);
+	return (u);
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETLONG) && (HAVE_DECL__GETLONG == 0)
+u_int32_t _getlong(register const u_char *);
+#endif
+
+/* ************** */
+
+#define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 0xffff
+
+struct dns_query {
+	char			*name;
+	u_int16_t		type;
+	u_int16_t		class;
+	struct dns_query	*next;
+};
+
+struct dns_rr {
+	char			*name;
+	u_int16_t		type;
+	u_int16_t		class;
+	u_int16_t		ttl;
+	u_int16_t		size;
+	void			*rdata;
+	struct dns_rr		*next;
+};
+
+struct dns_response {
+	HEADER			header;
+	struct dns_query	*query;
+	struct dns_rr		*answer;
+	struct dns_rr		*authority;
+	struct dns_rr		*additional;
+};
+
+static struct dns_response *parse_dns_response(const u_char *, int);
+static struct dns_query *parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *, int,
+    const u_char **, int);
+static struct dns_rr *parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *, int, const u_char **,
+    int);
+
+static void free_dns_query(struct dns_query *);
+static void free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *);
+static void free_dns_response(struct dns_response *);
+
+static int count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *, u_int16_t, u_int16_t);
+
+int
+getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+    unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags,
+    struct rrsetinfo **res)
+{
+	struct __res_state *_resp = _THREAD_PRIVATE(_res, _res, &_res);
+	int result;
+	struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL;
+	struct dns_response *response = NULL;
+	struct dns_rr *rr;
+	struct rdatainfo *rdata;
+	int length;
+	unsigned int index_ans, index_sig;
+	u_char answer[ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+	/* check for invalid class and type */
+	if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */
+	if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+	if (flags) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* initialize resolver */
+	if ((_resp->options & RES_INIT) == 0 && res_init() == -1) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	_resp->options |= RES_DEBUG;
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+#ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
+	/* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
+	if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
+		_resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
+#endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
+
+	/* make query */
+	length = res_query(hostname, (signed int) rdclass, (signed int) rdtype,
+	    answer, sizeof(answer));
+	if (length < 0) {
+		switch(h_errno) {
+		case HOST_NOT_FOUND:
+			result = ERRSET_NONAME;
+			goto fail;
+		case NO_DATA:
+			result = ERRSET_NODATA;
+			goto fail;
+		default:
+			result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* parse result */
+	response = parse_dns_response(answer, length);
+	if (response == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (response->header.qdcount != 1) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* initialize rrset */
+	rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo));
+	if (rrset == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	rrset->rri_rdclass = response->query->class;
+	rrset->rri_rdtype = response->query->type;
+	rrset->rri_ttl = response->answer->ttl;
+	rrset->rri_nrdatas = response->header.ancount;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_HEADER_AD
+	/* check for authenticated data */
+	if (response->header.ad == 1)
+		rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+#endif
+
+	/* copy name from answer section */
+	rrset->rri_name = strdup(response->answer->name);
+	if (rrset->rri_name == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* count answers */
+	rrset->rri_nrdatas = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass,
+	    rrset->rri_rdtype);
+	rrset->rri_nsigs = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass,
+	    T_RRSIG);
+
+	/* allocate memory for answers */
+	rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas,
+	    sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate memory for signatures */
+	if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) {
+		rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs, sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+		if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) {
+			result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* copy answers & signatures */
+	for (rr = response->answer, index_ans = 0, index_sig = 0;
+	    rr; rr = rr->next) {
+
+		rdata = NULL;
+
+		if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    rr->type  == rrset->rri_rdtype)
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++];
+
+		if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    rr->type  == T_RRSIG)
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++];
+
+		if (rdata) {
+			rdata->rdi_length = rr->size;
+			rdata->rdi_data   = malloc(rr->size);
+
+			if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) {
+				result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			memcpy(rdata->rdi_data, rr->rdata, rr->size);
+		}
+	}
+	free_dns_response(response);
+
+	*res = rrset;
+	return (ERRSET_SUCCESS);
+
+fail:
+	if (rrset != NULL)
+		freerrset(rrset);
+	if (response != NULL)
+		free_dns_response(response);
+	return (result);
+}
+
+void
+freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	if (rrset == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_rdatas);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_sigs) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_sigs);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_name)
+		free(rrset->rri_name);
+	free(rrset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DNS response parsing routines
+ */
+static struct dns_response *
+parse_dns_response(const u_char *answer, int size)
+{
+	struct dns_response *resp;
+	const u_char *cp;
+
+	/* allocate memory for the response */
+	resp = calloc(1, sizeof(*resp));
+	if (resp == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/* initialize current pointer */
+	cp = answer;
+
+	/* copy header */
+	memcpy(&resp->header, cp, HFIXEDSZ);
+	cp += HFIXEDSZ;
+
+	/* fix header byte order */
+	resp->header.qdcount = ntohs(resp->header.qdcount);
+	resp->header.ancount = ntohs(resp->header.ancount);
+	resp->header.nscount = ntohs(resp->header.nscount);
+	resp->header.arcount = ntohs(resp->header.arcount);
+
+	/* there must be at least one query */
+	if (resp->header.qdcount < 1) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse query section */
+	resp->query = parse_dns_qsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.qdcount);
+	if (resp->header.qdcount && resp->query == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse answer section */
+	resp->answer = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.ancount);
+	if (resp->header.ancount && resp->answer == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse authority section */
+	resp->authority = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.nscount);
+	if (resp->header.nscount && resp->authority == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse additional section */
+	resp->additional = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.arcount);
+	if (resp->header.arcount && resp->additional == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	return (resp);
+}
+
+static struct dns_query *
+parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, int count)
+{
+	struct dns_query *head, *curr, *prev;
+	int i, length;
+	char name[MAXDNAME];
+
+	for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) {
+
+		/* allocate and initialize struct */
+		curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_query));
+		if (curr == NULL) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (head == NULL)
+			head = curr;
+		if (prev != NULL)
+			prev->next = curr;
+
+		/* name */
+		length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name,
+		    sizeof(name));
+		if (length < 0) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		curr->name = strdup(name);
+		if (curr->name == NULL) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		*cp += length;
+
+		/* type */
+		curr->type = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* class */
+		curr->class = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+	}
+
+	return (head);
+}
+
+static struct dns_rr *
+parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp,
+    int count)
+{
+	struct dns_rr *head, *curr, *prev;
+	int i, length;
+	char name[MAXDNAME];
+
+	for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) {
+
+		/* allocate and initialize struct */
+		curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_rr));
+		if (curr == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (head == NULL)
+			head = curr;
+		if (prev != NULL)
+			prev->next = curr;
+
+		/* name */
+		length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name,
+		    sizeof(name));
+		if (length < 0) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		curr->name = strdup(name);
+		if (curr->name == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		*cp += length;
+
+		/* type */
+		curr->type = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* class */
+		curr->class = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* ttl */
+		curr->ttl = _getlong(*cp);
+		*cp += INT32SZ;
+
+		/* rdata size */
+		curr->size = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* rdata itself */
+		curr->rdata = malloc(curr->size);
+		if (curr->rdata == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		memcpy(curr->rdata, *cp, curr->size);
+		*cp += curr->size;
+	}
+
+	return (head);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_query(struct dns_query *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (p->name)
+		free(p->name);
+	free_dns_query(p->next);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (p->name)
+		free(p->name);
+	if (p->rdata)
+		free(p->rdata);
+	free_dns_rr(p->next);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_response(struct dns_response *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	free_dns_query(p->query);
+	free_dns_rr(p->answer);
+	free_dns_rr(p->authority);
+	free_dns_rr(p->additional);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static int
+count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p, u_int16_t class, u_int16_t type)
+{
+	int n = 0;
+
+	while(p) {
+		if (p->class == class && p->type == type)
+			n++;
+		p = p->next;
+	}
+
+	return (n);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1283f55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/* OPENBSD BASED ON : include/netdb.h */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.4 2001/08/16 18:16:43 ho Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GETRRSETBYNAME_H
+#define _GETRRSETBYNAME_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+#ifndef HFIXEDSZ
+#define HFIXEDSZ 12
+#endif
+
+#ifndef T_RRSIG
+#define T_RRSIG 46
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Flags for getrrsetbyname()
+ */
+#ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
+# define RRSET_VALIDATED	1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
+ */
+#ifndef ERRSET_SUCCESS
+# define ERRSET_SUCCESS		0
+# define ERRSET_NOMEMORY	1
+# define ERRSET_FAIL		2
+# define ERRSET_INVAL		3
+# define ERRSET_NONAME		4
+# define ERRSET_NODATA		5
+#endif
+
+struct rdatainfo {
+	unsigned int		rdi_length;	/* length of data */
+	unsigned char		*rdi_data;	/* record data */
+};
+
+struct rrsetinfo {
+	unsigned int		rri_flags;	/* RRSET_VALIDATED ... */
+	unsigned int		rri_rdclass;	/* class number */
+	unsigned int		rri_rdtype;	/* RR type number */
+	unsigned int		rri_ttl;	/* time to live */
+	unsigned int		rri_nrdatas;	/* size of rdatas array */
+	unsigned int		rri_nsigs;	/* size of sigs array */
+	char			*rri_name;	/* canonical name */
+	struct rdatainfo	*rri_rdatas;	/* individual records */
+	struct rdatainfo	*rri_sigs;	/* individual signatures */
+};
+
+int		getrrsetbyname(const char *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, struct rrsetinfo **);
+void		freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) */
+
+#endif /* _GETRRSETBYNAME_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74b5064
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c
@@ -0,0 +1,874 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.26 2005/11/28 17:50:12 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
+    defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+
+static long
+get_arg_max(void)
+{
+#ifdef ARG_MAX
+	return(ARG_MAX);
+#elif defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_ARG_MAX)
+	return(sysconf(_SC_ARG_MAX));
+#else
+	return(256); /* XXX: arbitrary */
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
+ *
+ * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh).
+ *
+ * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX:
+ *
+ * GLOB_QUOTE:
+ *	Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following
+ *	character might have (except \ at end of string is retained).
+ * GLOB_MAGCHAR:
+ *	Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character.
+ * GLOB_NOMAGIC:
+ *	Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did
+ *	not contain any magic characters.  [Used in csh style globbing]
+ * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC:
+ *	Use alternately specified directory access functions.
+ * GLOB_TILDE:
+ *	expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo
+ * GLOB_BRACE:
+ *	expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b
+ * gl_matchc:
+ *	Number of matches in the current invocation of glob.
+ */
+
+
+#define	DOLLAR		'$'
+#define	DOT		'.'
+#define	EOS		'\0'
+#define	LBRACKET	'['
+#define	NOT		'!'
+#define	QUESTION	'?'
+#define	QUOTE		'\\'
+#define	RANGE		'-'
+#define	RBRACKET	']'
+#define	SEP		'/'
+#define	STAR		'*'
+#undef TILDE			/* Some platforms may already define it */
+#define	TILDE		'~'
+#define	UNDERSCORE	'_'
+#define	LBRACE		'{'
+#define	RBRACE		'}'
+#define	SLASH		'/'
+#define	COMMA		','
+
+#ifndef DEBUG
+
+#define	M_QUOTE		0x8000
+#define	M_PROTECT	0x4000
+#define	M_MASK		0xffff
+#define	M_ASCII		0x00ff
+
+typedef u_short Char;
+
+#else
+
+#define	M_QUOTE		0x80
+#define	M_PROTECT	0x40
+#define	M_MASK		0xff
+#define	M_ASCII		0x7f
+
+typedef char Char;
+
+#endif
+
+
+#define	CHAR(c)		((Char)((c)&M_ASCII))
+#define	META(c)		((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE))
+#define	M_ALL		META('*')
+#define	M_END		META(']')
+#define	M_NOT		META('!')
+#define	M_ONE		META('?')
+#define	M_RNG		META('-')
+#define	M_SET		META('[')
+#define	ismeta(c)	(((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
+
+
+static int	 compare(const void *, const void *);
+static int	 g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int);
+static int	 g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
+static DIR	*g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *);
+static Char	*g_strchr(Char *, int);
+static int	 g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
+static int	 glob0(const Char *, glob_t *);
+static int	 glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
+static int	 glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+		    glob_t *, size_t *);
+static int	 glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+		    Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
+static int	 globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
+static const Char *
+		 globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *);
+static int	 globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *);
+static int	 globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *);
+static int	 match(Char *, Char *, Char *);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void	 qprintf(const char *, Char *);
+#endif
+
+int
+glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int),
+    glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	const u_char *patnext;
+	int c;
+	Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	patnext = (u_char *) pattern;
+	if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) {
+		pglob->gl_pathc = 0;
+		pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+		if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS))
+			pglob->gl_offs = 0;
+	}
+	pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+	pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
+	pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
+
+	bufnext = patbuf;
+	bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1;
+	if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE)
+		while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+			*bufnext++ = c;
+	else {
+		/* Protect the quoted characters. */
+		while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+			if (c == QUOTE) {
+				if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) {
+					c = QUOTE;
+					--patnext;
+				}
+				*bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT;
+			} else
+				*bufnext++ = c;
+	}
+	*bufnext = EOS;
+
+	if (flags & GLOB_BRACE)
+		return globexp1(patbuf, pglob);
+	else
+		return glob0(patbuf, pglob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion
+ * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic
+ * characters
+ */
+static int
+globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	const Char* ptr = pattern;
+	int rv;
+
+	/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
+	if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
+		return glob0(pattern, pglob);
+
+	while ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr((Char *) ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL)
+		if (!globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, &rv))
+			return rv;
+
+	return glob0(pattern, pglob);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace.
+ * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern.
+ * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
+ */
+static int
+globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, int *rv)
+{
+	int     i;
+	Char   *lm, *ls;
+	const Char *pe, *pm, *pl;
+	Char    patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	/* copy part up to the brace */
+	for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++)
+		;
+	*lm = EOS;
+	ls = lm;
+
+	/* Find the balanced brace */
+	for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++)
+		if (*pe == LBRACKET) {
+			/* Ignore everything between [] */
+			for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++)
+				;
+			if (*pe == EOS) {
+				/*
+				 * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+				 * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+				 */
+				pe = pm;
+			}
+		} else if (*pe == LBRACE)
+			i++;
+		else if (*pe == RBRACE) {
+			if (i == 0)
+				break;
+			i--;
+		}
+
+	/* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */
+	if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS) {
+		*rv = glob0(patbuf, pglob);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) {
+		switch (*pm) {
+		case LBRACKET:
+			/* Ignore everything between [] */
+			for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++)
+				;
+			if (*pm == EOS) {
+				/*
+				 * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+				 * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+				 */
+				pm = pl;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case LBRACE:
+			i++;
+			break;
+
+		case RBRACE:
+			if (i) {
+				i--;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case COMMA:
+			if (i && *pm == COMMA)
+				break;
+			else {
+				/* Append the current string */
+				for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++)
+					;
+
+				/*
+				 * Append the rest of the pattern after the
+				 * closing brace
+				 */
+				for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; )
+					;
+
+				/* Expand the current pattern */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+				qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf);
+#endif
+				*rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob);
+
+				/* move after the comma, to the next string */
+				pl = pm + 1;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	*rv = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * expand tilde from the passwd file.
+ */
+static const Char *
+globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd;
+	char *h;
+	const Char *p;
+	Char *b, *eb;
+
+	if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE))
+		return pattern;
+
+	/* Copy up to the end of the string or / */
+	eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1];
+	for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf;
+	    h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++)
+		;
+
+	*h = EOS;
+
+#if 0
+	if (h == (char *)eb)
+		return what;
+#endif
+
+	if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) {
+		/*
+		 * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME
+		 * first and then trying the password file
+		 */
+#if 0
+		if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+#endif
+		if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+			if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
+				return pattern;
+			else
+				h = pwd->pw_dir;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Expand a ~user
+		 */
+		if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL)
+			return pattern;
+		else
+			h = pwd->pw_dir;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy the home directory */
+	for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++)
+		;
+
+	/* Append the rest of the pattern */
+	while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS)
+		;
+	*b = EOS;
+
+	return patbuf;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing
+ * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally
+ * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested).  Returns 0
+ * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred.  It is not an error
+ * to find no matches.
+ */
+static int
+glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	const Char *qpatnext;
+	int c, err, oldpathc;
+	Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t limit = 0;
+
+	qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob);
+	oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc;
+	bufnext = patbuf;
+
+	/* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */
+	while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) {
+		switch (c) {
+		case LBRACKET:
+			c = *qpatnext;
+			if (c == NOT)
+				++qpatnext;
+			if (*qpatnext == EOS ||
+			    g_strchr((Char *) qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) {
+				*bufnext++ = LBRACKET;
+				if (c == NOT)
+					--qpatnext;
+				break;
+			}
+			*bufnext++ = M_SET;
+			if (c == NOT)
+				*bufnext++ = M_NOT;
+			c = *qpatnext++;
+			do {
+				*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+				if (*qpatnext == RANGE &&
+				    (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) {
+					*bufnext++ = M_RNG;
+					*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+					qpatnext += 2;
+				}
+			} while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET);
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			*bufnext++ = M_END;
+			break;
+		case QUESTION:
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			*bufnext++ = M_ONE;
+			break;
+		case STAR:
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			/* collapse adjacent stars to one,
+			 * to avoid exponential behavior
+			 */
+			if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL)
+				*bufnext++ = M_ALL;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	*bufnext = EOS;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	qprintf("glob0:", patbuf);
+#endif
+
+	if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, &limit)) != 0)
+		return(err);
+
+	/*
+	 * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern
+	 * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified
+	 * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters
+	 * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh.
+	 */
+	if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) {
+		if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) ||
+		    ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) &&
+		    !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))
+			return(globextend(pattern, pglob, &limit));
+		else
+			return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+	}
+	if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT))
+		qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc,
+		    pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *), compare);
+	return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+compare(const void *p, const void *q)
+{
+	return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q));
+}
+
+static int
+glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limitp)
+{
+	Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	/* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */
+	if (*pattern == EOS)
+		return(0);
+	return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+	    pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+	    pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level
+ * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more
+ * meta characters.
+ */
+static int
+glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
+    Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limitp)
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+	Char *p, *q;
+	int anymeta;
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until
+	 * segment with meta character found.
+	 */
+	for (anymeta = 0;;) {
+		if (*pattern == EOS) {		/* End of pattern? */
+			*pathend = EOS;
+			if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
+				return(0);
+
+			if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
+			    pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ||
+			    (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
+			    (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) &&
+			    S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
+				if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+					return (1);
+				*pathend++ = SEP;
+				*pathend = EOS;
+			}
+			++pglob->gl_matchc;
+			return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp));
+		}
+
+		/* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */
+		q = pathend;
+		p = pattern;
+		while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) {
+			if (ismeta(*p))
+				anymeta = 1;
+			if (q+1 > pathend_last)
+				return (1);
+			*q++ = *p++;
+		}
+
+		if (!anymeta) {		/* No expansion, do next segment. */
+			pathend = q;
+			pattern = p;
+			while (*pattern == SEP) {
+				if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+					return (1);
+				*pathend++ = *pattern++;
+			}
+		} else
+			/* Need expansion, recurse. */
+			return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend,
+			    pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last,
+			    pglob, limitp));
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static int
+glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
+    Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob,
+    size_t *limitp)
+{
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	DIR *dirp;
+	int err;
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	/*
+	 * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is
+	 * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h
+	 * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque
+	 * structures.
+	 */
+	struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *);
+
+	if (pathend > pathend_last)
+		return (1);
+	*pathend = EOS;
+	errno = 0;
+
+	if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) {
+		/* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */
+		if (pglob->gl_errfunc) {
+			if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+				return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+			if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) ||
+			    pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR)
+				return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+		}
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+	err = 0;
+
+	/* Search directory for matching names. */
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir;
+	else
+		readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir;
+	while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) {
+		u_char *sc;
+		Char *dc;
+
+		/* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
+		if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
+			continue;
+		dc = pathend;
+		sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name;
+		while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS)
+			;
+		if (dc >= pathend_last) {
+			*dc = EOS;
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) {
+			*pathend = EOS;
+			continue;
+		}
+		err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last,
+		    restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp);
+		if (err)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		(*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp);
+	else
+		closedir(dirp);
+	return(err);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item,
+ * add the new item, and update gl_pathc.
+ *
+ * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size
+ * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic
+ * behavior.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated.
+ *
+ * Invariant of the glob_t structure:
+ *	Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and
+ *	gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
+ */
+static int
+globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limitp)
+{
+	char **pathv;
+	int i;
+	u_int newsize, len;
+	char *copy;
+	const Char *p;
+
+	newsize = sizeof(*pathv) * (2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs);
+	pathv = pglob->gl_pathv ? realloc((char *)pglob->gl_pathv, newsize) :
+	    malloc(newsize);
+	if (pathv == NULL) {
+		if (pglob->gl_pathv) {
+			free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+			pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+		}
+		return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+	}
+
+	if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
+		/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
+		pathv += pglob->gl_offs;
+		for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
+			*--pathv = NULL;
+	}
+	pglob->gl_pathv = pathv;
+
+	for (p = path; *p++;)
+		;
+	len = (size_t)(p - path);
+	*limitp += len;
+	if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
+		if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
+			free(copy);
+			return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+		}
+		pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy;
+	}
+	pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
+
+	if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+	    newsize + *limitp >= (u_int) get_arg_max()) {
+		errno = 0;
+		return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+	}
+
+	return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * pattern matching function for filenames.  Each occurrence of the *
+ * pattern causes a recursion level.
+ */
+static int
+match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend)
+{
+	int ok, negate_range;
+	Char c, k;
+
+	while (pat < patend) {
+		c = *pat++;
+		switch (c & M_MASK) {
+		case M_ALL:
+			if (pat == patend)
+				return(1);
+			do {
+			    if (match(name, pat, patend))
+				    return(1);
+			} while (*name++ != EOS);
+			return(0);
+		case M_ONE:
+			if (*name++ == EOS)
+				return(0);
+			break;
+		case M_SET:
+			ok = 0;
+			if ((k = *name++) == EOS)
+				return(0);
+			if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS)
+				++pat;
+			while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END)
+				if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) {
+					if (c <= k && k <= pat[1])
+						ok = 1;
+					pat += 2;
+				} else if (c == k)
+					ok = 1;
+			if (ok == negate_range)
+				return(0);
+			break;
+		default:
+			if (*name++ != c)
+				return(0);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return(*name == EOS);
+}
+
+/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */
+void
+globfree(glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	int i;
+	char **pp;
+
+	if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) {
+		pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs;
+		for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp)
+			if (*pp)
+				free(*pp);
+		free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+		pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static DIR *
+g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	if (!*str)
+		strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf);
+	else {
+		if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+			return(NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf));
+
+	return(opendir(buf));
+}
+
+static int
+g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+		return(-1);
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb));
+	return(lstat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static int
+g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+		return(-1);
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb));
+	return(stat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static Char *
+g_strchr(Char *str, int ch)
+{
+	do {
+		if (*str == ch)
+			return (str);
+	} while (*str++);
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+
+	while (len--) {
+		if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS)
+			return (0);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void
+qprintf(const char *str, Char *s)
+{
+	Char *p;
+
+	(void)printf("%s:\n", str);
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p));
+	(void)printf("\n");
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' ');
+	(void)printf("\n");
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' ');
+	(void)printf("\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
+          !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2b36f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.10 2005/12/13 00:35:22 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)glob.h	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
+    defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+
+#ifndef _GLOB_H_
+#define	_GLOB_H_
+
+struct stat;
+typedef struct {
+	int gl_pathc;		/* Count of total paths so far. */
+	int gl_matchc;		/* Count of paths matching pattern. */
+	int gl_offs;		/* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
+	int gl_flags;		/* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */
+	char **gl_pathv;	/* List of paths matching pattern. */
+				/* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */
+	int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int);
+
+	/*
+	 * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement
+	 * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2)
+	 * and lstat(2).
+	 */
+	void (*gl_closedir)(void *);
+	struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *);	
+	void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *);
+	int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *);
+	int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *);
+} glob_t;
+
+#define	GLOB_APPEND	0x0001	/* Append to output from previous call. */
+#define	GLOB_DOOFFS	0x0002	/* Use gl_offs. */
+#define	GLOB_ERR	0x0004	/* Return on error. */
+#define	GLOB_MARK	0x0008	/* Append / to matching directories. */
+#define	GLOB_NOCHECK	0x0010	/* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */
+#define	GLOB_NOSORT	0x0020	/* Don't sort. */
+#define	GLOB_NOESCAPE	0x1000	/* Disable backslash escaping. */
+
+/* Error values returned by glob(3) */
+#define	GLOB_NOSPACE	(-1)	/* Malloc call failed. */
+#define	GLOB_ABORTED	(-2)	/* Unignored error. */
+#define	GLOB_NOMATCH	(-3)	/* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */
+#define	GLOB_NOSYS	(-4)	/* Function not supported. */
+#define GLOB_ABEND	GLOB_ABORTED
+
+#define	GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC	0x0040	/* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */
+#define	GLOB_BRACE	0x0080	/* Expand braces ala csh. */
+#define	GLOB_MAGCHAR	0x0100	/* Pattern had globbing characters. */
+#define	GLOB_NOMAGIC	0x0200	/* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */
+#define	GLOB_QUOTE	0x0400	/* Quote special chars with \. */
+#define	GLOB_TILDE	0x0800	/* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */
+#define GLOB_LIMIT	0x2000	/* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */
+
+int	glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
+void	globfree(glob_t *);
+
+#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC)  ||
+	  !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..130597e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.9 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993
+ *    The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * -
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation.
+ * 
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that
+ * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or
+ * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without
+ * specific, written prior permission.
+ * 
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL
+ * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS.   IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
+ * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ * -
+ * --Copyright--
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_addr.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * Ascii internet address interpretation routine.
+ * The value returned is in network order.
+ */
+in_addr_t
+inet_addr(const char *cp)
+{
+	struct in_addr val;
+
+	if (inet_aton(cp, &val))
+		return (val.s_addr);
+	return (INADDR_NONE);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* 
+ * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation
+ * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address.
+ * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not.
+ * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which
+ * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address.
+ */
+int
+inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr)
+{
+	u_int32_t val;
+	int base, n;
+	char c;
+	u_int parts[4];
+	u_int *pp = parts;
+
+	c = *cp;
+	for (;;) {
+		/*
+		 * Collect number up to ``.''.
+		 * Values are specified as for C:
+		 * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal.
+		 */
+		if (!isdigit(c))
+			return (0);
+		val = 0; base = 10;
+		if (c == '0') {
+			c = *++cp;
+			if (c == 'x' || c == 'X')
+				base = 16, c = *++cp;
+			else
+				base = 8;
+		}
+		for (;;) {
+			if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) {
+				val = (val * base) + (c - '0');
+				c = *++cp;
+			} else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) {
+				val = (val << 4) |
+					(c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A'));
+				c = *++cp;
+			} else
+				break;
+		}
+		if (c == '.') {
+			/*
+			 * Internet format:
+			 *	a.b.c.d
+			 *	a.b.c	(with c treated as 16 bits)
+			 *	a.b	(with b treated as 24 bits)
+			 */
+			if (pp >= parts + 3)
+				return (0);
+			*pp++ = val;
+			c = *++cp;
+		} else
+			break;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Check for trailing characters.
+	 */
+	if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c)))
+		return (0);
+	/*
+	 * Concoct the address according to
+	 * the number of parts specified.
+	 */
+	n = pp - parts + 1;
+	switch (n) {
+
+	case 0:
+		return (0);		/* initial nondigit */
+
+	case 1:				/* a -- 32 bits */
+		break;
+
+	case 2:				/* a.b -- 8.24 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= parts[0] << 24;
+		break;
+
+	case 3:				/* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16);
+		break;
+
+	case 4:				/* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8);
+		break;
+	}
+	if (addr)
+		addr->s_addr = htonl(val);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0eb7b3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.6 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntoa.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+
+/*
+ * Convert network-format internet address
+ * to base 256 d.d.d.d representation.
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+char *
+inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in)
+{
+	static char b[18];
+	char *p;
+
+	p = (char *)&in;
+#define	UC(b)	(((int)b)&0xff)
+	(void)snprintf(b, sizeof(b),
+	    "%u.%u.%u.%u", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3]));
+	return (b);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7ca4b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.7 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntop.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifndef IN6ADDRSZ
+#define IN6ADDRSZ   16   /* IPv6 T_AAAA */                 
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INT16SZ
+#define INT16SZ     2    /* for systems without 16-bit ints */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where
+ * sizeof(int) < 4.  sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX.
+ */
+
+static const char *inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size);
+static const char *inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size);
+
+/* char *
+ * inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size)
+ *	convert a network format address to presentation format.
+ * return:
+ *	pointer to presentation format address (`dst'), or NULL (see errno).
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+const char *
+inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size)
+{
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return (inet_ntop4(src, dst, size));
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return (inet_ntop6(src, dst, size));
+	default:
+		errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/* const char *
+ * inet_ntop4(src, dst, size)
+ *	format an IPv4 address, more or less like inet_ntoa()
+ * return:
+ *	`dst' (as a const)
+ * notes:
+ *	(1) uses no statics
+ *	(2) takes a u_char* not an in_addr as input
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static const char *
+inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)
+{
+	static const char fmt[] = "%u.%u.%u.%u";
+	char tmp[sizeof "255.255.255.255"];
+	int l;
+
+	l = snprintf(tmp, size, fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2], src[3]);
+	if (l <= 0 || l >= size) {
+		errno = ENOSPC;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	strlcpy(dst, tmp, size);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/* const char *
+ * inet_ntop6(src, dst, size)
+ *	convert IPv6 binary address into presentation (printable) format
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static const char *
+inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note that int32_t and int16_t need only be "at least" large enough
+	 * to contain a value of the specified size.  On some systems, like
+	 * Crays, there is no such thing as an integer variable with 16 bits.
+	 * Keep this in mind if you think this function should have been coded
+	 * to use pointer overlays.  All the world's not a VAX.
+	 */
+	char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"];
+	char *tp, *ep;
+	struct { int base, len; } best, cur;
+	u_int words[IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ];
+	int i;
+	int advance;
+
+	/*
+	 * Preprocess:
+	 *	Copy the input (bytewise) array into a wordwise array.
+	 *	Find the longest run of 0x00's in src[] for :: shorthanding.
+	 */
+	memset(words, '\0', sizeof words);
+	for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++)
+		words[i / 2] |= (src[i] << ((1 - (i % 2)) << 3));
+	best.base = -1;
+	cur.base = -1;
+	for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) {
+		if (words[i] == 0) {
+			if (cur.base == -1)
+				cur.base = i, cur.len = 1;
+			else
+				cur.len++;
+		} else {
+			if (cur.base != -1) {
+				if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len)
+					best = cur;
+				cur.base = -1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (cur.base != -1) {
+		if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len)
+			best = cur;
+	}
+	if (best.base != -1 && best.len < 2)
+		best.base = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Format the result.
+	 */
+	tp = tmp;
+	ep = tmp + sizeof(tmp);
+	for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ) && tp < ep; i++) {
+		/* Are we inside the best run of 0x00's? */
+		if (best.base != -1 && i >= best.base &&
+		    i < (best.base + best.len)) {
+			if (i == best.base) {
+				if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+					return (NULL);
+				*tp++ = ':';
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Are we following an initial run of 0x00s or any real hex? */
+		if (i != 0) {
+			if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+				return (NULL);
+			*tp++ = ':';
+		}
+		/* Is this address an encapsulated IPv4? */
+		if (i == 6 && best.base == 0 &&
+		    (best.len == 6 || (best.len == 5 && words[5] == 0xffff))) {
+			if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, (size_t)(ep - tp)))
+				return (NULL);
+			tp += strlen(tp);
+			break;
+		}
+		advance = snprintf(tp, ep - tp, "%x", words[i]);
+		if (advance <= 0 || advance >= ep - tp)
+			return (NULL);
+		tp += advance;
+	}
+	/* Was it a trailing run of 0x00's? */
+	if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ)) {
+		if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+			return (NULL);
+		*tp++ = ':';
+	}
+	if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+		return (NULL);
+	*tp++ = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for overflow, copy, and we're done.
+	 */
+	if ((size_t)(tp - tmp) > size) {
+		errno = ENOSPC;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	strlcpy(dst, tmp, size);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2285c84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */
+/* Changes: Removed mktemp */
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.19 2005/08/08 08:05:36 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdio/mktemp.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+
+static int _gettemp(char *, int *, int, int);
+
+int
+mkstemps(char *path, int slen)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	return (_gettemp(path, &fd, 0, slen) ? fd : -1);
+}
+
+int
+mkstemp(char *path)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	return (_gettemp(path, &fd, 0, 0) ? fd : -1);
+}
+
+char *
+mkdtemp(char *path)
+{
+	return(_gettemp(path, (int *)NULL, 1, 0) ? path : (char *)NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+_gettemp(path, doopen, domkdir, slen)
+	char *path;
+	register int *doopen;
+	int domkdir;
+	int slen;
+{
+	register char *start, *trv, *suffp;
+	struct stat sbuf;
+	int rval;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	if (doopen && domkdir) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+	for (trv = path; *trv; ++trv)
+		;
+	trv -= slen;
+	suffp = trv;
+	--trv;
+	if (trv < path) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (0);
+	}
+	pid = getpid();
+	while (trv >= path && *trv == 'X' && pid != 0) {
+		*trv-- = (pid % 10) + '0';
+		pid /= 10;
+	}
+	while (trv >= path && *trv == 'X') {
+		char c;
+
+		pid = (arc4random() & 0xffff) % (26+26);
+		if (pid < 26)
+			c = pid + 'A';
+		else
+			c = (pid - 26) + 'a';
+		*trv-- = c;
+	}
+	start = trv + 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * check the target directory; if you have six X's and it
+	 * doesn't exist this runs for a *very* long time.
+	 */
+	if (doopen || domkdir) {
+		for (;; --trv) {
+			if (trv <= path)
+				break;
+			if (*trv == '/') {
+				*trv = '\0';
+				rval = stat(path, &sbuf);
+				*trv = '/';
+				if (rval != 0)
+					return(0);
+				if (!S_ISDIR(sbuf.st_mode)) {
+					errno = ENOTDIR;
+					return(0);
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (doopen) {
+			if ((*doopen =
+			    open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, 0600)) >= 0)
+				return(1);
+			if (errno != EEXIST)
+				return(0);
+		} else if (domkdir) {
+			if (mkdir(path, 0700) == 0)
+				return(1);
+			if (errno != EEXIST)
+				return(0);
+		} else if (lstat(path, &sbuf))
+			return(errno == ENOENT ? 1 : 0);
+
+		/* tricky little algorithm for backward compatibility */
+		for (trv = start;;) {
+			if (!*trv)
+				return (0);
+			if (*trv == 'Z') {
+				if (trv == suffp)
+					return (0);
+				*trv++ = 'a';
+			} else {
+				if (isdigit(*trv))
+					*trv = 'a';
+				else if (*trv == 'z')	/* inc from z to A */
+					*trv = 'A';
+				else {
+					if (trv == suffp)
+						return (0);
+					++*trv;
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/*NOTREACHED*/
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50c6d99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.46 2008/06/08 17:32:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
+#define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+/* OpenBSD function replacements */
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "sigact.h"
+#include "glob.h"
+#include "readpassphrase.h"
+#include "vis.h"
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+#include "sha2.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+char *basename(const char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+void closefrom(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETCWD
+char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
+#endif 
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? */
+size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? */
+size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+void strmode(int mode, char *p);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
+int mkstemp(char *path);
+char *mkdtemp(char *path);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+char *dirname(const char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+#define	FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE	7
+int	fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
+int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
+char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
+void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+/* #include <grp.h> XXXX Still needed ? */
+int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/uio.h>
+int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
+#endif
+
+/* Home grown routines */
+#include "bsd-misc.h"
+#include "bsd-statvfs.h"
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
+int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+unsigned int arc4random(void);
+void arc4random_stir(void);
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>	/* for struct winsize */
+int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
+
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX needed? For size_t */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
+long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+# include <stdarg.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list);
+#endif
+
+void *xmmap(size_t size);
+char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
+char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
+
+/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
+#include "fake-rfc2553.h"
+
+/* Routines for a single OS platform */
+#include "bsd-cray.h"
+#include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
+
+#include "port-aix.h"
+#include "port-irix.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "port-solaris.h"
+#include "port-tun.h"
+#include "port-uw.h"
+
+#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd326c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.8 2009/03/07 11:22:35 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
+#include "openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+int
+ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
+    unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+	EVP_CipherInit(evp, type, key, iv, enc);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, char *dst, char *src, int len)
+{
+	EVP_Cipher(evp, dst, src, len);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp)
+{
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(evp);
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+int
+ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt)
+{
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, d, cnt);
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef	USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+void
+ssh_SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(void)
+{
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	/* Enable use of crypto hardware */
+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcc7628
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.14 2009/03/07 11:22:35 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+/* OPENSSL_free() is Free() in versions before OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090600f)
+# define OPENSSL_free(x) Free(x)
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L
+# define SSH_OLD_EVP
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e)		((e)->app_data)
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) || defined(OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES)
+# define USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+# include "rijndael.h"
+# define AES_KEY rijndael_ctx
+# define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+# define AES_encrypt(a, b, c)		rijndael_encrypt(c, a, b)
+# define AES_set_encrypt_key(a, b, c)	rijndael_set_key(c, (char *)a, b, 1)
+# define EVP_aes_128_cbc evp_rijndael
+# define EVP_aes_192_cbc evp_rijndael
+# define EVP_aes_256_cbc evp_rijndael
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
+extern void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE)
+# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#  define USE_CIPHER_ACSS 1
+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_acss(void);
+#  define EVP_acss evp_acss
+# else
+#  define EVP_acss NULL
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* OpenSSL 0.9.8e returns cipher key len not context key len */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x0090805fL)
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(c) ((c)->key_len)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We overload some of the OpenSSL crypto functions with ssh_* equivalents
+ * which cater for older and/or less featureful OpenSSL version.
+ *
+ * In order for the compat library to call the real functions, it must
+ * define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and
+ * implement the ssh_* equivalents.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
+
+# ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
+#  ifdef EVP_Cipher
+#   undef EVP_Cipher
+#  endif
+#  define EVP_CipherInit(a,b,c,d,e)	ssh_EVP_CipherInit((a),(b),(c),(d),(e))
+#  define EVP_Cipher(a,b,c,d)		ssh_EVP_Cipher((a),(b),(c),(d))
+#  define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(a)	ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup((a))
+# endif /* SSH_OLD_EVP */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+#  define EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)	ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate((a),(b),(c))
+#  endif
+
+# ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+#  ifdef SSLeay_add_all_algorithms
+#   undef SSLeay_add_all_algorithms
+#  endif
+#  define SSLeay_add_all_algorithms()  ssh_SSLeay_add_all_algorithms()
+# endif
+
+int ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, const EVP_CIPHER *, unsigned char *,
+    unsigned char *, int);
+int ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, int);
+int ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+void ssh_SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(void);
+#endif	/* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9c0876
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+#include <uinfo.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# include <login.h>
+# include <userpw.h>
+# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+# endif
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "port-aix.h"
+
+static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+
+# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = "";
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored -
+ * a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set
+ *
+ * NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to
+ * acquire due to privsep code.  We will just drop support.
+ */
+void
+aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = sizeof("LOGNAME= NAME= ") + (2 * strlen(pw->pw_name));
+	cp = xmalloc(len);
+
+	i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0',
+	    pw->pw_name, '\0');
+	if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno));
+	debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i);
+
+	xfree(cp);
+}
+
+# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+/*
+ * Remove embedded newlines in string (if any).
+ * Used before logging messages returned by AIX authentication functions
+ * so the message is logged on one line.
+ */
+void
+aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (; *p; p++) {
+		if (*p == '\n')
+			*p = ' ';
+	}
+	/* Remove trailing whitespace */
+	if (*--p == ' ')
+		*p = '\0';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test specifically for the case where SYSTEM == NONE and AUTH1 contains
+ * anything other than NONE or SYSTEM, which indicates that the admin has
+ * configured the account for purely AUTH1-type authentication.
+ *
+ * Since authenticate() doesn't check AUTH1, and sshd can't sanely support
+ * AUTH1 itself, in such a case authenticate() will allow access without
+ * authentation, which is almost certainly not what the admin intends.
+ *
+ * (The native tools, eg login, will process the AUTH1 list in addition to
+ * the SYSTEM list by using ckuserID(), however ckuserID() and AUTH1 methods
+ * have been deprecated since AIX 4.2.x and would be very difficult for sshd
+ * to support.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if an unsupportable combination is found, 1 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+aix_valid_authentications(const char *user)
+{
+	char *auth1, *sys, *p;
+	int valid = 1;
+
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTHSYSTEM, &sys, SEC_CHAR) != 0) {
+		logit("Can't retrieve attribute SYSTEM for %s: %.100s",
+		    user, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	debug3("AIX SYSTEM attribute %s", sys);
+	if (strcmp(sys, "NONE") != 0)
+		return 1;	/* not "NONE", so is OK */
+
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTH1, &auth1, SEC_LIST) != 0) {
+		logit("Can't retrieve attribute auth1 for %s: %.100s",
+		    user, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	p = auth1;
+	/* A SEC_LIST is concatenated strings, ending with two NULs. */
+	while (p[0] != '\0' && p[1] != '\0') {
+		debug3("AIX auth1 attribute list member %s", p);
+		if (strcmp(p, "NONE") != 0 && strcmp(p, "SYSTEM")) {
+			logit("Account %s has unsupported auth1 value '%s'",
+			    user, p);
+			valid = 0;
+		}
+		p += strlen(p) + 1;
+	}
+
+	return (valid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do authentication via AIX's authenticate routine.  We loop until the
+ * reenter parameter is 0, but normally authenticate is called only once.
+ *
+ * Note: this function returns 1 on success, whereas AIX's authenticate()
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *ctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	char *authmsg = NULL, *msg = NULL, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
+	int authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result;
+
+	do {
+		result = authenticate((char *)name, (char *)password, &reenter,
+		    &authmsg);
+		aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg);	
+		debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, authmsg %.100s", result,
+		    authmsg);
+	} while (reenter);
+
+	if (!aix_valid_authentications(name))
+		result = -1;
+
+	if (result == 0) {
+		authsuccess = 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Record successful login.  We don't have a pty yet, so just
+		 * label the line as "ssh"
+		 */
+		aix_setauthdb(name);
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if the user's password is expired.
+		 */
+		expired = passwdexpired(name, &msg);
+		if (msg && *msg) {
+			buffer_append(ctxt->loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+			aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
+		}
+		debug3("AIX/passwdexpired returned %d msg %.100s", expired, msg);
+
+		switch (expired) {
+		case 0: /* password not expired */
+			break;
+		case 1: /* expired, password change required */
+			ctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+			break;
+		default: /* user can't change(2) or other error (-1) */
+			logit("Password can't be changed for user %s: %.100s",
+			    name, msg);
+			if (msg)
+				xfree(msg);
+			authsuccess = 0;
+		}
+
+		aix_restoreauthdb();
+	}
+
+	if (authmsg != NULL)
+		xfree(authmsg);
+
+	return authsuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if specified account is permitted to log in.
+ * Returns 1 if login is allowed, 0 if not allowed.
+ */
+int
+sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw, Buffer *loginmsg)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int result, permitted = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't perform checks for root account (PermitRootLogin controls
+	 * logins via ssh) or if running as non-root user (since
+	 * loginrestrictions will always fail due to insufficient privilege).
+	 */
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || geteuid() != 0) {
+		debug3("%s: not checking", __func__);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	result = loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg);
+	if (result == 0)
+		permitted = 1;
+	/*
+	 * If restricted because /etc/nologin exists, the login will be denied
+	 * in session.c after the nologin message is sent, so allow for now
+	 * and do not append the returned message.
+	 */
+	if (result == -1 && errno == EPERM && stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0)
+		permitted = 1;
+	else if (msg != NULL)
+		buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+	if (msg == NULL)
+		msg = xstrdup("(none)");
+	aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
+	debug3("AIX/loginrestrictions returned %d msg %.100s", result, msg);
+
+	if (!permitted)
+		logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, msg);
+	xfree(msg);
+	return permitted;
+}
+
+int
+sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
+    Buffer *loginmsg)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	aix_setauthdb(user);
+	if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
+		success = 1;
+		if (msg != NULL) {
+			debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
+			if (lastlogin_msg == NULL)
+				lastlogin_msg = msg;
+		}
+	}
+	aix_restoreauthdb();
+	return (success);
+}
+
+char *
+sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char *msg = lastlogin_msg;
+
+	lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+	return msg;
+}
+
+#  ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+/*
+ * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
+ */
+void
+record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname)
+{
+	if (geteuid() != 0)
+		return;
+
+	aix_setauthdb(user);
+#   ifdef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
+	loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname,
+	    AUDIT_FAIL_AUTH);
+#   else
+	loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname);
+#   endif
+	aix_restoreauthdb();
+}
+#  endif /* CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN */
+
+/*
+ * If we have setauthdb, retrieve the password registry for the user's
+ * account then feed it to setauthdb.  This will mean that subsequent AIX auth
+ * functions will only use the specified loadable module.  If we don't have
+ * setauthdb this is a no-op.
+ */
+void
+aix_setauthdb(const char *user)
+{
+#  ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+	char *registry;
+
+	if (setuserdb(S_READ) == -1) {
+		debug3("%s: Could not open userdb to read", __func__);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_REGISTRY, &registry, SEC_CHAR) == 0) {
+		if (setauthdb(registry, old_registry) == 0)
+			debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s'", registry);
+		else 
+			debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s' failed: %s",
+			    registry, strerror(errno));
+	} else
+		debug3("%s: Could not read S_REGISTRY for user: %s", __func__,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	enduserdb();
+#  endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore the user's registry settings from old_registry.
+ * Note that if the first aix_setauthdb fails, setauthdb("") is still safe
+ * (it restores the system default behaviour).  If we don't have setauthdb,
+ * this is a no-op.
+ */
+void
+aix_restoreauthdb(void)
+{
+#  ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+	if (setauthdb(old_registry, NULL) == 0)
+		debug3("%s: restoring old registry '%s'", __func__,
+		    old_registry);
+	else
+		debug3("%s: failed to restore old registry %s", __func__,
+		    old_registry);
+#  endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
+}
+
+# endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+# if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_ADDRINFO)
+# undef getnameinfo
+/*
+ * For some reason, AIX's getnameinfo will refuse to resolve the all-zeros
+ * IPv6 address into its textual representation ("::"), so we wrap it
+ * with a function that will.
+ */
+int
+sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
+    size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+	u_int32_t *a6;
+
+	if (flags & (NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) &&
+	    sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+		a6 = sa6->sin6_addr.u6_addr.u6_addr32;
+
+		if (a6[0] == 0 && a6[1] == 0 && a6[2] == 0 && a6[3] == 0) {
+			strlcpy(host, "::", hostlen);
+			snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", sa6->sin6_port);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags);
+}
+# endif /* AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
+
+# if defined(USE_GETGRSET)
+#  include <stdlib.h>
+int
+getgrouplist(const char *user, gid_t pgid, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt)
+{
+	char *cp, *grplist, *grp;
+	gid_t gid;
+	int ret = 0, ngroups = 0, maxgroups;
+	long l;
+
+	maxgroups = *grpcnt;
+
+	if ((cp = grplist = getgrset(user)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* handle zero-length case */
+	if (maxgroups <= 0) {
+		*grpcnt = 0;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* copy primary group */
+	groups[ngroups++] = pgid;
+
+	/* copy each entry from getgrset into group list */
+	while ((grp = strsep(&grplist, ",")) != NULL) {
+		l = strtol(grp, NULL, 10);
+		if (ngroups >= maxgroups || l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) {
+			ret = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		gid = (gid_t)l;
+		if (gid == pgid)
+			continue;	/* we have already added primary gid */
+		groups[ngroups++] = gid;
+	}
+out:
+	free(cp);
+	*grpcnt = ngroups;
+	return ret;
+}
+# endif	/* USE_GETGRSET */
+
+#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ac76ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.31 2009/08/20 06:20:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/* These should be in the system headers but are not. */
+int usrinfo(int, char *, int);
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB) && (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0)
+int setauthdb(const char *, char *);
+#endif
+/* these may or may not be in the headers depending on the version */
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE) && (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0)
+int authenticate(char *, char *, int *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0)
+int loginfailed(char *, char *, char *);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0)
+int loginrestrictions(char *, int, char *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0)
+int loginsuccess(char *, char *, char *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED) && (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0)
+int passwdexpired(char *, char **);
+#endif
+
+/* Some versions define r_type in the above headers, which causes a conflict */
+#ifdef r_type
+# undef r_type
+#endif
+
+/* AIX 4.2.x doesn't have nanosleep but does have nsleep which is equivalent */
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+# define nanosleep(a,b) nsleep(a,b)
+#endif
+
+/* For struct timespec on AIX 4.2.x */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
+# include <sys/timers.h>
+#endif
+
+/* for setpcred and friends */
+#ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * According to the setauthdb man page, AIX password registries must be 15
+ * chars or less plus terminating NUL.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+# define REGISTRY_SIZE	16
+#endif
+
+void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *);
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 1
+int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, Buffer *);
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1
+int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *, Buffer *);
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+char *sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *, uid_t);
+# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
+#endif
+
+void aix_setauthdb(const char *);
+void aix_restoreauthdb(void);
+void aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *);
+
+#if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+# ifdef getnameinfo
+#  undef getnameinfo
+# endif
+int sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t,
+    char *, size_t, int);
+# define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (sshaix_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We use getgrset in preference to multiple getgrent calls for efficiency
+ * plus it supports NIS and LDAP groups.
+ */
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETGROUPLIST) && defined(HAVE_GETGRSET)
+# define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+# define USE_GETGRSET
+int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba751a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+# include <proj.h>
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+# include <sys/resource.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+# include <sat.h>
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+
+void
+irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+        prid_t projid;
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+        jid_t jid = 0;
+#elif defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+        int jid = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+        jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive");
+        if (jid == -1)
+                fatal("Failed to create job container: %.100s",
+                    strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+        /* initialize array session */
+        if (jid == 0  && newarraysess() != 0)
+                fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s",
+                    strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+        /* initialize irix project info */
+        if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) {
+                debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0");
+                projid = 0;
+        }
+        if (setprid(projid))
+                fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s",
+                    (int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+        if (sysconf(_SC_AUDIT)) {
+                debug("Setting sat id to %d", (int) pw->pw_uid);
+                if (satsetid(pw->pw_uid))
+                        debug("error setting satid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+        }
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+}
+
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67c4863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* $Id: port-irix.h,v 1.4 2003/08/29 16:59:52 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_IRIX_H
+#define _PORT_IRIX_H
+
+#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+
+void irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw);
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+
+#endif /* ! _PORT_IRIX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad26275
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.5 2008/03/26 20:27:21 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include "log.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+int
+ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+	static int enabled = -1;
+
+	if (enabled == -1) {
+		enabled = is_selinux_enabled();
+		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+	}
+
+	return (enabled);
+}
+
+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
+static security_context_t
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+{
+	security_context_t sc;
+	char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
+		return NULL;
+#else
+	sename = pwname;
+	lvl = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+#else
+	r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+#endif
+
+	if (r != 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+			    "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+		case 0:
+			error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+			    "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+			    __func__, pwname);
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	if (sename != NULL)
+		xfree(sename);
+	if (lvl != NULL)
+		xfree(lvl);
+#endif
+
+	return (sc);
+}
+
+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+{
+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+		case 0:
+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+		}
+	}
+	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+{
+	security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+	security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+
+	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+
+	if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx,
+	    SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) {
+		error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0)
+		error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ out:
+	if (new_tty_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(new_tty_ctx);
+	if (old_tty_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(old_tty_ctx);
+	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cd39bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.h,v 1.2 2008/03/26 20:27:21 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
+#define _PORT_LINUX_H
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ab64d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/* $Id: port-solaris.c,v 1.3 2006/10/31 23:28:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <libcontract.h>
+#include <sys/contract/process.h>
+#include <sys/ctfs.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define CT_TEMPLATE	CTFS_ROOT "/process/template"
+#define CT_LATEST	CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest"
+
+static int tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+/* Lookup the latest process contract */
+static ctid_t
+get_active_process_contract_id(void)
+{
+	int stat_fd;
+	ctid_t ctid = -1;
+	ct_stathdl_t stathdl;
+
+	if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process "
+		    "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error reading process contract "
+		    "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ct_status_free(stathdl);
+ out:
+	close(stat_fd);
+	return ctid;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_pre_fork(void)
+{
+	if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
+		    CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d",
+	    __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	/* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */
+	if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set "
+		    "(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Now make this the active template for this process. */
+	if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error activating process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	return;
+
+ fail:
+	if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+		close(tmpl_fd);
+		tmpl_fd = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_child()
+{
+	debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d",
+	    __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	/* Clear the active template. */
+	if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0)
+		error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	close(tmpl_fd);
+	tmpl_fd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid)
+{
+	ctid_t ctid;
+	char ctl_path[256];
+	int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1;
+
+	debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	if (tmpl_fd == -1)
+		return;
+
+	/* First clear the active template. */
+	if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0)
+		error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	close(tmpl_fd);
+	tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing
+	 * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing
+	 * more do.
+	 */
+	if (r != 0 || pid <= 0)
+		return;
+
+	/* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */
+	ctid = get_active_process_contract_id();
+
+	debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid);
+
+	snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path),
+	    CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid);
+	if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error opening process contract "
+		    "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	close(ctl_fd);
+	return;
+
+ fail:
+	if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+		close(tmpl_fd);
+		tmpl_fd = -1;
+	}
+	if (stat_fd != -1)
+		close(stat_fd);
+	if (ctl_fd != -1)
+		close(ctl_fd);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c32487
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $Id: port-solaris.h,v 1.1 2006/08/30 17:24:42 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ddc92d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
+ * uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific
+ * settings.
+ *
+ * SSH_TUN_LINUX	Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_FREEBSD	Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF	Translate the OpenBSD address family
+ * SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF	Prepend/remove the address family
+ */
+
+/*
+ * System-specific tunnel open function
+ */
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#include <linux/if_tun.h>
+
+int
+sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+{
+	struct ifreq ifr;
+	int fd = -1;
+	const char *name = NULL;
+
+	if ((fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control interface: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr));	
+
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
+		ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP;
+		name = "tap%d";
+	} else {
+		ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN;
+		name = "tun%d";
+	}
+	ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
+
+	if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+		if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+			debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__,
+			    tun, strerror(errno));
+			goto failed;
+		}
+		snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun);
+	}
+
+	if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__,
+		    mode, strerror(errno));
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
+		debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd);
+	else
+		debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd);
+
+	return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+	close(fd);
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */
+
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <net/if.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
+#include <net/if_tun.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+{
+	struct ifreq ifr;
+	char name[100];
+	int fd = -1, sock, flag;
+	const char *tunbase = "tun";
+
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
+		debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__);
+		return (-1);
+#else
+		tunbase = "tap";
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* Open the tunnel device */
+	if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+		snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+		fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
+	} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+		for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
+			snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
+			    tunbase, tun);
+			if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Turn on tunnel headers */
+	flag = 1;
+#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET &&
+	    ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
+
+	/* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
+	snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+	ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
+	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	close(sock);
+	return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	if (sock >= 0)
+		close(sock);
+	debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
+	    mode, strerror(errno));
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
+
+/*
+ * System-specific channel filters
+ */
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+#define OPENBSD_AF_INET		2
+#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6	24
+
+int
+sys_tun_infilter(struct Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF];
+	struct ip *iph;
+#endif
+	u_int32_t *af;
+	char *ptr = buf;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	if (len <= 0 || len > (int)(sizeof(rbuf) - sizeof(*af)))
+		return (-1);
+	ptr = (char *)&rbuf[0];
+	bcopy(buf, ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t), len);
+	len += sizeof(u_int32_t);
+	af = (u_int32_t *)ptr;
+
+	iph = (struct ip *)(ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	switch (iph->ip_v) {
+	case 6:
+		*af = AF_INET6;
+		break;
+	case 4:
+	default:
+		*af = AF_INET;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+	if (len < (int)sizeof(u_int32_t))
+		return (-1);
+
+	af = (u_int32_t *)ptr;
+	if (*af == htonl(AF_INET6))
+		*af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET6);
+	else
+		*af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET);
+#endif
+
+	buffer_put_string(&c->input, ptr, len);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+u_char *
+sys_tun_outfilter(struct Channel *c, u_char **data, u_int *dlen)
+{
+	u_char *buf;
+	u_int32_t *af;
+
+	*data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, dlen);
+	if (*dlen < sizeof(*af))
+		return (NULL);
+	buf = *data;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	*dlen -= sizeof(u_int32_t);
+	buf = *data + sizeof(u_int32_t);
+#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+	af = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)buf);
+	if (*af == OPENBSD_AF_INET6)
+		*af = htonl(AF_INET6);
+	else
+		*af = htonl(AF_INET);
+#endif
+
+	return (buf);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c53df01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_TUN_H
+#define _PORT_TUN_H
+
+struct Channel;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN
+int	  sys_tun_open(int, int);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+# define SSH_TUN_FILTER
+int	 sys_tun_infilter(struct Channel *, char *, int);
+u_char	*sys_tun_outfilter(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *);
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be9905a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+int nischeck(char *);
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	char *salt;
+	int result;
+
+	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+
+	/* Check for users with no password. */
+	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+	salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx";
+
+	/*
+	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+	 * are identical.
+	 */
+#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+	if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) {
+		result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)
+		||  (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0));
+	}
+	else
+#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+		result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0);
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+	if (authctxt->valid)
+		free(pw_password);
+#endif
+	return(result);
+}
+
+#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+int
+nischeck(char *namep)
+{
+	char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd";
+	FILE *fd;
+	struct passwd *ent = NULL;
+
+	if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * If the passwd file has dissapeared we are in a bad state.
+		 * However, returning 0 will send us back through the
+		 * authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for
+		 * passwords earlier.
+		 */
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain
+	 * that the user is local.
+	 */
+	while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) {
+		if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) {
+			/* Local user */
+			fclose (fd);
+			return(0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	fclose (fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+
+/*
+	NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2
+	functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free
+ */
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+char *
+get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *pw_password = NULL;
+
+	uinfo_t uinfo;
+	if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) {
+		ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password);
+		if (pw_password == NULL)
+			fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd");
+		ia_closeinfo(uinfo);
+	 	return pw_password;
+	}
+	else
+		fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file");
+}
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..263d8b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw);
+#endif
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11bd8f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.18 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <readpassphrase.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef TCSASOFT
+# define _T_FLUSH	(TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT)
+#else
+# define _T_FLUSH	(TCSAFLUSH)
+#endif
+
+/* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */
+#if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE)
+#  define _POSIX_VDISABLE       VDISABLE
+#endif
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t signo;
+
+static void handler(int);
+
+char *
+readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags)
+{
+	ssize_t nr;
+	int input, output, save_errno;
+	char ch, *p, *end;
+	struct termios term, oterm;
+	struct sigaction sa, savealrm, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm;
+	struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou, savepipe;
+
+	/* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */
+	if (bufsiz == 0) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+restart:
+	signo = 0;
+	/*
+	 * Read and write to /dev/tty if available.  If not, read from
+	 * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required.
+	 */
+	if ((flags & RPP_STDIN) ||
+	    (input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) {
+			errno = ENOTTY;
+			return(NULL);
+		}
+		input = STDIN_FILENO;
+		output = STDERR_FILENO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end
+	 * up with echo turned off in the shell.  Don't worry about
+	 * things like SIGXCPU and SIGVTALRM for now.
+	 */
+	sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+	sa.sa_flags = 0;		/* don't restart system calls */
+	sa.sa_handler = handler;
+	(void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &savealrm);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &savehup);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, &savepipe);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &savequit);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &saveterm);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &savetstp);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &sa, &savettin);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &sa, &savettou);
+
+	/* Turn off echo if possible. */
+	if (input != STDIN_FILENO && tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) {
+		memcpy(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term));
+		if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON))
+			term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHONL);
+#ifdef VSTATUS
+		if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+			term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif
+		(void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term);
+	} else {
+		memset(&term, 0, sizeof(term));
+		term.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+		memset(&oterm, 0, sizeof(oterm));
+		oterm.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & RPP_STDIN))
+		(void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt));
+	end = buf + bufsiz - 1;
+	for (p = buf; (nr = read(input, &ch, 1)) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r';) {
+		if (p < end) {
+			if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT))
+				ch &= 0x7f;
+			if (isalpha(ch)) {
+				if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER))
+					ch = tolower(ch);
+				if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER))
+					ch = toupper(ch);
+			}
+			*p++ = ch;
+		}
+	}
+	*p = '\0';
+	save_errno = errno;
+	if (!(term.c_lflag & ECHO))
+		(void)write(output, "\n", 1);
+
+	/* Restore old terminal settings and signals. */
+	if (memcmp(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)) != 0) {
+		while (tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &oterm) == -1 &&
+		    errno == EINTR)
+			continue;
+	}
+	(void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &savealrm, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &savehup, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &savequit, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &savepipe, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &saveterm, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &savetstp, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &savettin, NULL);
+	if (input != STDIN_FILENO)
+		(void)close(input);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we were interrupted by a signal, resend it to ourselves
+	 * now that we have restored the signal handlers.
+	 */
+	if (signo) {
+		kill(getpid(), signo);
+		switch (signo) {
+		case SIGTSTP:
+		case SIGTTIN:
+		case SIGTTOU:
+			goto restart;
+		}
+	}
+
+	errno = save_errno;
+	return(nr == -1 ? NULL : buf);
+}
+  
+#if 0
+char *
+getpass(const char *prompt)
+{
+	static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1];
+
+	return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF));
+}
+#endif
+
+static void handler(int s)
+{
+
+	signo = s;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fd7c5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.5 2003/06/17 21:56:23 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/readpassphrase.h */
+
+#ifndef _READPASSPHRASE_H_
+#define _READPASSPHRASE_H_
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#define RPP_ECHO_OFF    0x00		/* Turn off echo (default). */
+#define RPP_ECHO_ON     0x01		/* Leave echo on. */
+#define RPP_REQUIRE_TTY 0x02		/* Fail if there is no tty. */
+#define RPP_FORCELOWER  0x04		/* Force input to lower case. */
+#define RPP_FORCEUPPER  0x08		/* Force input to upper case. */
+#define RPP_SEVENBIT    0x10		/* Strip the high bit from input. */
+#define RPP_STDIN       0x20		/* Read from stdin, not /dev/tty */
+
+char * readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
+
+#endif /* !_READPASSPHRASE_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6120d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ *    permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/realpath.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/*
+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
+ *
+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
+ * components.  Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
+ */
+char *
+realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX])
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+	char *p, *q, *s;
+	size_t left_len, resolved_len;
+	unsigned symlinks;
+	int serrno, slen;
+	char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
+
+	serrno = errno;
+	symlinks = 0;
+	if (path[0] == '/') {
+		resolved[0] = '/';
+		resolved[1] = '\0';
+		if (path[1] == '\0')
+			return (resolved);
+		resolved_len = 1;
+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
+	} else {
+		if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
+			strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
+	}
+	if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Iterate over path components in `left'.
+	 */
+	while (left_len != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
+		 * and its length.
+		 */
+		p = strchr(left, '/');
+		s = p ? p : left + left_len;
+		if (s - left >= sizeof(next_token)) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
+		next_token[s - left] = '\0';
+		left_len -= s - left;
+		if (p != NULL)
+			memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
+		if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
+			if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+				return (NULL);
+			}
+			resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
+			resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
+		}
+		if (next_token[0] == '\0')
+			continue;
+		else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
+			continue;
+		else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Strip the last path component except when we have
+			 * single "/"
+			 */
+			if (resolved_len > 1) {
+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+				*q = '\0';
+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
+		 * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
+		 * there are no more path components left.
+		 */
+		resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
+		if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
+			if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
+				errno = serrno;
+				return (resolved);
+			}
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
+			if (symlinks++ > MAXSYMLINKS) {
+				errno = ELOOP;
+				return (NULL);
+			}
+			slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
+			if (slen < 0)
+				return (NULL);
+			symlink[slen] = '\0';
+			if (symlink[0] == '/') {
+				resolved[1] = 0;
+				resolved_len = 1;
+			} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
+				/* Strip the last path component. */
+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+				*q = '\0';
+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * If there are any path components left, then
+			 * append them to symlink. The result is placed
+			 * in `left'.
+			 */
+			if (p != NULL) {
+				if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
+					if (slen + 1 >= sizeof(symlink)) {
+						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+						return (NULL);
+					}
+					symlink[slen] = '/';
+					symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
+				}
+				left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(left));
+				if (left_len >= sizeof(left)) {
+					errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+					return (NULL);
+				}
+			}
+			left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
+	 * is a single "/".
+	 */
+	if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
+		resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+	return (resolved);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1cd61e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rresvport.c,v 1.9 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1998 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/rresvport.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if 0
+int
+rresvport(int *alport)
+{
+	return rresvport_af(alport, AF_INET);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+	struct sockaddr *sa;
+	u_int16_t *portp;
+	int s;
+	socklen_t salen;
+
+	memset(&ss, '\0', sizeof ss);
+	sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
+
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		portp = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		portp = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port;
+		break;
+	default:
+		errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+	
+	s = socket(af, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (s < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	*portp = htons(*alport);
+	if (*alport < IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) {
+		if (bind(s, sa, salen) >= 0)
+			return (s);
+		if (errno != EADDRINUSE) {
+			(void)close(s);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	*portp = 0;
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+	if (bindresvport_sa(s, sa) == -1) {
+		(void)close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	*alport = ntohs(*portp);
+	return (s);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2a8b6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: setenv.c,v 1.9 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/setenv.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV)
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern char **environ;
+
+/* OpenSSH Portable: __findenv is from getenv.c rev 1.8, made static */
+/*
+ * __findenv --
+ *	Returns pointer to value associated with name, if any, else NULL.
+ *	Sets offset to be the offset of the name/value combination in the
+ *	environmental array, for use by setenv(3) and unsetenv(3).
+ *	Explicitly removes '=' in argument name.
+ */
+static char *
+__findenv(const char *name, size_t *offset)
+{
+	extern char **environ;
+	int len, i;
+	const char *np;
+	char **p, *cp;
+
+	if (name == NULL || environ == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np)
+		;
+	len = np - name;
+	for (p = environ; (cp = *p) != NULL; ++p) {
+		for (np = name, i = len; i && *cp; i--)
+			if (*cp++ != *np++)
+				break;
+		if (i == 0 && *cp++ == '=') {
+			*offset = p - environ;
+			return (cp);
+		}
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+/*
+ * setenv --
+ *	Set the value of the environmental variable "name" to be
+ *	"value".  If rewrite is set, replace any current value.
+ */
+int
+setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int rewrite)
+{
+	static char **lastenv;			/* last value of environ */
+	char *C;
+	size_t l_value, offset;
+
+	if (*value == '=')			/* no `=' in value */
+		++value;
+	l_value = strlen(value);
+	if ((C = __findenv(name, &offset))) {	/* find if already exists */
+		if (!rewrite)
+			return (0);
+		if (strlen(C) >= l_value) {	/* old larger; copy over */
+			while ((*C++ = *value++))
+				;
+			return (0);
+		}
+	} else {					/* create new slot */
+		size_t cnt;
+		char **P;
+
+		for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++)
+			;
+		cnt = P - environ;
+		P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2));
+		if (!P)
+			return (-1);
+		if (lastenv != environ)
+			memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *));
+		lastenv = environ = P;
+		offset = cnt;
+		environ[cnt + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+	for (C = (char *)name; *C && *C != '='; ++C)
+		;				/* no `=' in name */
+	if (!(environ[offset] =			/* name + `=' + value */
+	    malloc((size_t)((int)(C - name) + l_value + 2))))
+		return (-1);
+	for (C = environ[offset]; (*C = *name++) && *C != '='; ++C)
+		;
+	for (*C++ = '='; (*C++ = *value++); )
+		;
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
+/*
+ * unsetenv(name) --
+ *	Delete environmental variable "name".
+ */
+void
+unsetenv(const char *name)
+{
+	char **P;
+	size_t offset;
+
+	while (__findenv(name, &offset))	/* if set multiple times */
+		for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P)
+			if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
+				break;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_UNSETENV */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2965f68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/* Based on conf.c from UCB sendmail 8.8.8 */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003 Damien Miller
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1995-1997 Eric P. Allman
+ * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
+#include <sys/pstat.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <vis.h>
+
+#define SPT_NONE	0	/* don't use it at all */
+#define SPT_PSTAT	1	/* use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) */
+#define SPT_REUSEARGV	2	/* cover argv with title information */
+
+#ifndef SPT_TYPE
+# define SPT_TYPE	SPT_NONE
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SPT_PADCHAR
+# define SPT_PADCHAR	'\0'
+#endif
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+static char *argv_start = NULL;
+static size_t argv_env_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
+
+void
+compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+#if defined(SPT_TYPE) && SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+	extern char **environ;
+	char *lastargv = NULL;
+	char **envp = environ;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * NB: This assumes that argv has already been copied out of the
+	 * way. This is true for sshd, but may not be true for other 
+	 * programs. Beware.
+	 */
+
+	if (argc == 0 || argv[0] == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* Fail if we can't allocate room for the new environment */
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
+		;
+	if ((environ = calloc(i + 1, sizeof(*environ))) == NULL) {
+		environ = envp;	/* put it back */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Find the last argv string or environment variable within 
+	 * our process memory area.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (lastargv == NULL || lastargv + 1 == argv[i])
+			lastargv = argv[i] + strlen(argv[i]);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (lastargv + 1 == envp[i])
+			lastargv = envp[i] + strlen(envp[i]);
+	}
+
+	argv[1] = NULL;
+	argv_start = argv[0];
+	argv_env_len = lastargv - argv[0] - 1;
+
+	/* 
+	 * Copy environment 
+	 * XXX - will truncate env on strdup fail
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
+		environ[i] = strdup(envp[i]);
+	environ[i] = NULL;
+#endif /* SPT_REUSEARGV */
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+void
+setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE
+	va_list ap;
+	char buf[1024], ptitle[1024];
+	size_t len;
+	extern char *__progname;
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+	union pstun pst;
+#endif
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+	if (argv_env_len <= 0)
+		return;
+#endif
+
+	strlcpy(buf, __progname, sizeof(buf));
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	if (fmt != NULL) {
+		len = strlcat(buf, ": ", sizeof(buf));
+		if (len < sizeof(buf))
+			vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len , fmt, ap);
+	}
+	va_end(ap);
+	strnvis(ptitle, buf, sizeof(ptitle),
+	    VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL);
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+	pst.pst_command = ptitle;
+	pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, pst, strlen(ptitle), 0, 0);
+#elif SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+/*	debug("setproctitle: copy \"%s\" into len %d", 
+	    buf, argv_env_len); */
+	len = strlcpy(argv_start, ptitle, argv_env_len);
+	for(; len < argv_env_len; len++)
+		argv_start[len] = SPT_PADCHAR;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SPT_NONE */
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..cf8e0ad6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,882 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.11 2005/08/08 08:05:35 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * FILE:	sha2.c
+ * AUTHOR:	Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
+    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "sha2.h"
+
+/*
+ * UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
+ * You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
+ * loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros
+ * later in this file).  Either define on the command line, for example:
+ *
+ *   cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c
+ *
+ * or define below:
+ *
+ *   #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+ *
+ */
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
+/*
+ * BYTE_ORDER NOTE:
+ *
+ * Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER.  If your
+ * architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines
+ * LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are
+ * equivilent.
+ *
+ * If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by
+ * hand like this:
+ *
+ *   #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
+ *   #define BIG_ENDIAN    4321
+ *
+ * And for little-endian machines, add:
+ *
+ *   #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN 
+ *
+ * Or for big-endian machines:
+ *
+ *   #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+ *
+ * The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER
+ * appropriately by including <sys/types.h> (which in turn includes
+ * <machine/endian.h> where the appropriate definitions are actually
+ * made).
+ */
+#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN)
+#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN
+#endif
+
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */
+#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
+#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+
+/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/
+#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do {					\
+	(dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) |	\
+	    ((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24);	\
+} while(0)
+
+#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do {					\
+	(dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do {					\
+	(cp)[0] = (src) >> 56;						\
+        (cp)[1] = (src) >> 48;						\
+	(cp)[2] = (src) >> 40;						\
+	(cp)[3] = (src) >> 32;						\
+	(cp)[4] = (src) >> 24;						\
+	(cp)[5] = (src) >> 16;						\
+	(cp)[6] = (src) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[7] = (src);						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do {					\
+	(cp)[0] = (src) >> 24;						\
+	(cp)[1] = (src) >> 16;						\
+	(cp)[2] = (src) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[3] = (src);						\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the
+ * unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of
+ * 64-bit words):
+ */
+#define ADDINC128(w,n) do {						\
+	(w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n);					\
+	if ((w)[0] < (n)) {						\
+		(w)[1]++;						\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/
+/*
+ * Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions:
+ *
+ *   NOTE:  The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and
+ *   S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-256/384/512 description document
+ *   (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this
+ *   same "backwards" definition.
+ */
+/* Shift-right (used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
+#define R(b,x) 		((x) >> (b))
+/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-256): */
+#define S32(b,x)	(((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b))))
+/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */
+#define S64(b,x)	(((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b))))
+
+/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
+#define Ch(x,y,z)	(((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
+#define Maj(x,y,z)	(((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-256: */
+#define Sigma0_256(x)	(S32(2,  (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_256(x)	(S32(6,  (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x)))
+#define sigma0_256(x)	(S32(7,  (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 ,   (x)))
+#define sigma1_256(x)	(S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10,   (x)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+#define Sigma0_512(x)	(S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_512(x)	(S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x)))
+#define sigma0_512(x)	(S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7,   (x)))
+#define sigma1_512(x)	(S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6,   (x)))
+
+
+/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-256: */
+const static u_int32_t K256[64] = {
+	0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
+	0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
+	0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
+	0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
+	0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
+	0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
+	0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
+	0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
+	0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
+	0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
+	0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
+	0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
+	0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
+	0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
+	0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
+	0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */
+const static u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x6a09e667UL,
+	0xbb67ae85UL,
+	0x3c6ef372UL,
+	0xa54ff53aUL,
+	0x510e527fUL,
+	0x9b05688cUL,
+	0x1f83d9abUL,
+	0x5be0cd19UL
+};
+
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+const static u_int64_t K512[80] = {
+	0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL,
+	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL,
+	0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
+	0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,
+	0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL,
+	0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
+	0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,
+	0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL,
+	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
+	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,
+	0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL,
+	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
+	0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,
+	0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL,
+	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
+	0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,
+	0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL,
+	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
+	0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,
+	0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL,
+	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
+	0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,
+	0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL,
+	0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
+	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,
+	0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL,
+	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
+	0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,
+	0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL,
+	0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
+	0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,
+	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL,
+	0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
+	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,
+	0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL,
+	0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
+	0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,
+	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL,
+	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
+	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */
+const static u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL,
+	0x629a292a367cd507ULL,
+	0x9159015a3070dd17ULL,
+	0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL,
+	0x67332667ffc00b31ULL,
+	0x8eb44a8768581511ULL,
+	0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL,
+	0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
+const static u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
+	0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
+	0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
+	0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
+	0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
+	0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
+	0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
+	0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
+};
+
+
+/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha256_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount = 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {				    \
+	BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);					    \
+	data += 4;							    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {					    \
+	s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];						    \
+	s0 = sigma0_256(s0);						    \
+	s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];						    \
+	s1 = sigma1_256(s1);						    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] +	    \
+	     (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);		    \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int32_t	T1, W256[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */
+	do {
+		ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 64);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int32_t	T1, T2, W256[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);
+		data += 4;
+		/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j];
+		T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	do {
+		/* Part of the message block expansion: */
+		s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];
+		s0 = sigma0_256(s0);
+		s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];	
+		s1 = sigma1_256(s1);
+
+		/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + 
+		     (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+		T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 64);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t	freespace, usedspace;
+
+	/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+		freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+		if (len >= freespace) {
+			/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+			context->bitcount += freespace << 3;
+			len -= freespace;
+			data += freespace;
+			SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		} else {
+			/* The buffer is not yet full */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+			context->bitcount += len << 3;
+			/* Clean up: */
+			usedspace = freespace = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+		/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+		SHA256_Transform(context->state, data);
+		context->bitcount += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
+		len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > 0) {
+		/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+		memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+		context->bitcount += len << 3;
+	}
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	unsigned int	usedspace;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+		if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+			    SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+		} else {
+			if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+				memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+				    SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+			}
+			/* Do second-to-last transform: */
+			SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+			/* Prepare for last transform: */
+			memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+		memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		*context->buffer = 0x80;
+	}
+	/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+	    context->bitcount);
+
+	/* Final transform: */
+	SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA256_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA256_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+			BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+		memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha512_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] =  0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {				    \
+	BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);					    \
+	data += 8;							    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+
+#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {					    \
+	s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];						    \
+	s0 = sigma0_512(s0);						    \
+	s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];						    \
+	s1 = sigma1_512(s1);						    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] +	    \
+             (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);		    \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int64_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int64_t	T1, W512[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */
+	do {
+		ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 80);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int64_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int64_t	T1, T2, W512[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);
+		data += 8;
+		/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j];
+		T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	do {
+		/* Part of the message block expansion: */
+		s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];
+		s0 = sigma0_512(s0);
+		s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];
+		s1 =  sigma1_512(s1);
+
+		/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] +
+		     (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+		T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 80);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t	freespace, usedspace;
+
+	/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+		freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+		if (len >= freespace) {
+			/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+			ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3);
+			len -= freespace;
+			data += freespace;
+			SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		} else {
+			/* The buffer is not yet full */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+			ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+			/* Clean up: */
+			usedspace = freespace = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+		/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+		SHA512_Transform(context->state, data);
+		ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3);
+		len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > 0) {
+		/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+		memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+		ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+	}
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	unsigned int	usedspace;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+		if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+		} else {
+			if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+				memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+			}
+			/* Do second-to-last transform: */
+			SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+			/* And set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Prepare for final transform: */
+		memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		*context->buffer = 0x80;
+	}
+	/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+	    context->bitcount[1]);
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8],
+	    context->bitcount[0]);
+
+	/* Final transform: */
+	SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA512_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA512_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+			BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+		memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+	}
+}
+
+
+#if 0
+/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha384_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
+}
+
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Transform, SHA512_Transform);
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Update, SHA512_Update);
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Pad, SHA512_Pad);
+
+void
+SHA384_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA384_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+			BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* Zero out state data */
+	memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
+    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..821f2dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.6 2004/06/22 01:57:30 jfb Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * FILE:	sha2.h
+ * AUTHOR:	Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */
+
+#ifndef _SSHSHA2_H
+#define _SSHSHA2_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
+    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH		32
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH		48
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Context Structures *******************************/
+typedef struct _SHA256_CTX {
+	u_int32_t	state[8];
+	u_int64_t	bitcount;
+	u_int8_t	buffer[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA256_CTX;
+typedef struct _SHA512_CTX {
+	u_int64_t	state[8];
+	u_int64_t	bitcount[2];
+	u_int8_t	buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA512_CTX;
+
+#if 0
+typedef SHA512_CTX SHA384_CTX;
+#endif
+
+void SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *);
+void SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *);
+void SHA256_Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_End(SHA256_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#if 0
+void SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *);
+void SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA384_Update(SHA384_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA384_Pad(SHA384_CTX *);
+void SHA384_Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_End(SHA384_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+void SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *);
+void SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *);
+void SHA512_Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_End(SHA512_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
+    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */
+
+#endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d67845c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sigaction.c,v 1.4 2001/01/22 18:01:48 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+ * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+ * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+ * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+ * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+ * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+ * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+ * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+ * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+ * authorization.                                                           *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ *  Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim <zmbenhal@netcom.com> 1992,1995               *
+ *     and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>                         *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/base/sigaction.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include "sigact.h"
+
+/* This file provides sigaction() emulation using sigvec() */
+/* Use only if this is non POSIX system */
+
+#if !HAVE_SIGACTION && HAVE_SIGVEC
+
+int
+sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact)
+{
+	return sigvec(sig, sigact ? &sigact->sv : NULL,
+	    osigact ? &osigact->sv : NULL);
+}
+
+int
+sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigprocmask (int mode, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask)
+{
+	sigset_t current = sigsetmask(0);
+
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (omask)
+		*omask = current;
+
+	if (mode == SIG_BLOCK)
+		current |= *mask;
+	else if (mode == SIG_UNBLOCK)
+		current &= ~*mask;
+	else if (mode == SIG_SETMASK)
+	current = *mask;
+
+	sigsetmask(current);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return sigpause(*mask);
+}
+
+int
+sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask &= ~sigmask(sig);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask |= sigmask(sig);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigismember (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return (*mask & sigmask(sig)) != 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db96d0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sigact.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: SigAction.h,v 1.3 2001/01/22 18:01:32 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+ * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+ * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+ * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+ * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+ * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+ * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+ * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+ * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+ * authorization.                                                           *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ *  Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim <zmbenhal@netcom.com> 1992,1995               *
+ *     and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>                         *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * $From: SigAction.h,v 1.6 2000/12/10 02:36:10 tom Exp $
+ *
+ * This file exists to handle non-POSIX systems which don't have <unistd.h>,
+ * and usually no sigaction() nor <termios.h>
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/SigAction.h */
+
+#ifndef _SIGACTION_H
+#define _SIGACTION_H
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC)
+
+#undef  SIG_BLOCK
+#define SIG_BLOCK       00
+
+#undef  SIG_UNBLOCK
+#define SIG_UNBLOCK     01
+
+#undef  SIG_SETMASK
+#define SIG_SETMASK     02
+
+/*
+ * <bsd/signal.h> is in the Linux 1.2.8 + gcc 2.7.0 configuration,
+ * and is useful for testing this header file.
+ */
+#if HAVE_BSD_SIGNAL_H
+# include <bsd/signal.h>
+#endif
+
+struct sigaction
+{
+	struct sigvec sv;
+};
+
+typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+
+#undef  sa_mask
+#define sa_mask sv.sv_mask
+#undef  sa_handler
+#define sa_handler sv.sv_handler
+#undef  sa_flags
+#define sa_flags sv.sv_flags
+
+int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact);
+int sigprocmask (int how, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask);
+int sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask);
+int sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask);
+int sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig);
+int sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SIGACTION_H) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bcc1b61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcat.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Appends src to string dst of size siz (unlike strncat, siz is the
+ * full size of dst, not space left).  At most siz-1 characters
+ * will be copied.  Always NUL terminates (unless siz <= strlen(dst)).
+ * Returns strlen(src) + MIN(siz, strlen(initial dst)).
+ * If retval >= siz, truncation occurred.
+ */
+size_t
+strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz)
+{
+	char *d = dst;
+	const char *s = src;
+	size_t n = siz;
+	size_t dlen;
+
+	/* Find the end of dst and adjust bytes left but don't go past end */
+	while (n-- != 0 && *d != '\0')
+		d++;
+	dlen = d - dst;
+	n = siz - dlen;
+
+	if (n == 0)
+		return(dlen + strlen(s));
+	while (*s != '\0') {
+		if (n != 1) {
+			*d++ = *s;
+			n--;
+		}
+		s++;
+	}
+	*d = '\0';
+
+	return(dlen + (s - src));	/* count does not include NUL */
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..679a5b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.10 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcpy.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Copy src to string dst of size siz.  At most siz-1 characters
+ * will be copied.  Always NUL terminates (unless siz == 0).
+ * Returns strlen(src); if retval >= siz, truncation occurred.
+ */
+size_t
+strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz)
+{
+	char *d = dst;
+	const char *s = src;
+	size_t n = siz;
+
+	/* Copy as many bytes as will fit */
+	if (n != 0 && --n != 0) {
+		do {
+			if ((*d++ = *s++) == 0)
+				break;
+		} while (--n != 0);
+	}
+
+	/* Not enough room in dst, add NUL and traverse rest of src */
+	if (n == 0) {
+		if (siz != 0)
+			*d = '\0';		/* NUL-terminate dst */
+		while (*s++)
+			;
+	}
+
+	return(s - src - 1);	/* count does not include NUL */
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a81614
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strmode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strmode.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strmode.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* XXX mode should be mode_t */
+
+void
+strmode(int mode, char *p)
+{
+	 /* print type */
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFDIR:			/* directory */
+		*p++ = 'd';
+		break;
+	case S_IFCHR:			/* character special */
+		*p++ = 'c';
+		break;
+	case S_IFBLK:			/* block special */
+		*p++ = 'b';
+		break;
+	case S_IFREG:			/* regular */
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IFLNK:			/* symbolic link */
+		*p++ = 'l';
+		break;
+#ifdef S_IFSOCK
+	case S_IFSOCK:			/* socket */
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+#endif
+#ifdef S_IFIFO
+	case S_IFIFO:			/* fifo */
+		*p++ = 'p';
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:			/* unknown */
+		*p++ = '?';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* usr */
+	if (mode & S_IRUSR)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWUSR)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_ISUID)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXUSR:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISUID:
+		*p++ = 'S';
+		break;
+	case S_IXUSR | S_ISUID:
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* group */
+	if (mode & S_IRGRP)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWGRP)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXGRP | S_ISGID)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXGRP:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISGID:
+		*p++ = 'S';
+		break;
+	case S_IXGRP | S_ISGID:
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* other */
+	if (mode & S_IROTH)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWOTH)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXOTH:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISVTX:
+		*p++ = 'T';
+		break;
+	case S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX:
+		*p++ = 't';
+		break;
+	}
+	*p++ = ' ';		/* will be a '+' if ACL's implemented */
+	*p = '\0';
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b36eb8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strsep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strsep.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP)
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/*
+ * Get next token from string *stringp, where tokens are possibly-empty
+ * strings separated by characters from delim.  
+ *
+ * Writes NULs into the string at *stringp to end tokens.
+ * delim need not remain constant from call to call.
+ * On return, *stringp points past the last NUL written (if there might
+ * be further tokens), or is NULL (if there are definitely no more tokens).
+ *
+ * If *stringp is NULL, strsep returns NULL.
+ */
+char *
+strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim)
+{
+	char *s;
+	const char *spanp;
+	int c, sc;
+	char *tok;
+
+	if ((s = *stringp) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	for (tok = s;;) {
+		c = *s++;
+		spanp = delim;
+		do {
+			if ((sc = *spanp++) == c) {
+				if (c == 0)
+					s = NULL;
+				else
+					s[-1] = 0;
+				*stringp = s;
+				return (tok);
+			}
+		} while (sc != 0);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f629303
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: strtoll.c,v 1.6 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoll.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to a long long.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+long long
+strtoll(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	long long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip white space and pick up leading +/- sign if any.
+	 * If base is 0, allow 0x for hex and 0 for octal, else
+	 * assume decimal; if base is already 16, allow 0x.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else {
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the cutoff value between legal numbers and illegal
+	 * numbers.  That is the largest legal value, divided by the
+	 * base.  An input number that is greater than this value, if
+	 * followed by a legal input character, is too big.  One that
+	 * is equal to this value may be valid or not; the limit
+	 * between valid and invalid numbers is then based on the last
+	 * digit.  For instance, if the range for long longs is
+	 * [-9223372036854775808..9223372036854775807] and the input base
+	 * is 10, cutoff will be set to 922337203685477580 and cutlim to
+	 * either 7 (neg==0) or 8 (neg==1), meaning that if we have
+	 * accumulated a value > 922337203685477580, or equal but the
+	 * next digit is > 7 (or 8), the number is too big, and we will
+	 * return a range error.
+	 *
+	 * Set any if any `digits' consumed; make it negative to indicate
+	 * overflow.
+	 */
+	cutoff = neg ? LLONG_MIN : LLONG_MAX;
+	cutlim = cutoff % base;
+	cutoff /= base;
+	if (neg) {
+		if (cutlim > 0) {
+			cutlim -= base;
+			cutoff += 1;
+		}
+		cutlim = -cutlim;
+	}
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (neg) {
+			if (acc < cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+				any = -1;
+				acc = LLONG_MIN;
+				errno = ERANGE;
+			} else {
+				any = 1;
+				acc *= base;
+				acc -= c;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+				any = -1;
+				acc = LLONG_MAX;
+				errno = ERANGE;
+			} else {
+				any = 1;
+				acc *= base;
+				acc += c;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_STRTOLL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87f2f24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtonum.c,v 1.6 2004/08/03 19:38:01 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Ted Unangst and Todd Miller
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtonum.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#define INVALID 	1
+#define TOOSMALL 	2
+#define TOOLARGE 	3
+
+long long
+strtonum(const char *numstr, long long minval, long long maxval,
+    const char **errstrp)
+{
+	long long ll = 0;
+	char *ep;
+	int error = 0;
+	struct errval {
+		const char *errstr;
+		int err;
+	} ev[4] = {
+		{ NULL,		0 },
+		{ "invalid",	EINVAL },
+		{ "too small",	ERANGE },
+		{ "too large",	ERANGE },
+	};
+
+	ev[0].err = errno;
+	errno = 0;
+	if (minval > maxval)
+		error = INVALID;
+	else {
+		ll = strtoll(numstr, &ep, 10);
+		if (numstr == ep || *ep != '\0')
+			error = INVALID;
+		else if ((ll == LLONG_MIN && errno == ERANGE) || ll < minval)
+			error = TOOSMALL;
+		else if ((ll == LLONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) || ll > maxval)
+			error = TOOLARGE;
+	}
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = ev[error].errstr;
+	errno = ev[error].err;
+	if (error)
+		ll = 0;
+
+	return (ll);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_STRTONUM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8219c83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtoul.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoul.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to an unsigned long integer.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+unsigned long
+strtoul(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	unsigned long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * See strtol for comments as to the logic used.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else {
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	cutoff = ULONG_MAX / (unsigned long)base;
+	cutlim = ULONG_MAX % (unsigned long)base;
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (acc > cutoff || acc == cutoff && c > cutlim) {
+			any = -1;
+			acc = ULONG_MAX;
+			errno = ERANGE;
+		} else {
+			any = 1;
+			acc *= (unsigned long)base;
+			acc += c;
+		}
+	}
+	if (neg && any > 0)
+		acc = -acc;
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRTOUL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cf0587
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.32 2007/04/30 18:42:34 pedro Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)queue.h	8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/queue.h */
+
+#ifndef	_FAKE_QUEUE_H_
+#define	_FAKE_QUEUE_H_
+
+/*
+ * Require for OS/X and other platforms that have old/broken/incomplete
+ * <sys/queue.h>.
+ */
+#undef SLIST_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SLIST_ENTRY
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR
+#undef SLIST_FIRST
+#undef SLIST_END
+#undef SLIST_EMPTY
+#undef SLIST_NEXT
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH
+#undef SLIST_INIT
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT
+#undef LIST_HEAD
+#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef LIST_ENTRY
+#undef LIST_FIRST
+#undef LIST_END
+#undef LIST_EMPTY
+#undef LIST_NEXT
+#undef LIST_FOREACH
+#undef LIST_INIT
+#undef LIST_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef LIST_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef LIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef LIST_REMOVE
+#undef LIST_REPLACE
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_ENTRY
+#undef SIMPLEQ_FIRST
+#undef SIMPLEQ_END
+#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INIT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef TAILQ_ENTRY
+#undef TAILQ_FIRST
+#undef TAILQ_END
+#undef TAILQ_NEXT
+#undef TAILQ_LAST
+#undef TAILQ_PREV
+#undef TAILQ_EMPTY
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
+#undef TAILQ_INIT
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef TAILQ_REMOVE
+#undef TAILQ_REPLACE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_END
+#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV
+#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE
+
+/*
+ * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists, 
+ * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues.
+ *
+ *
+ * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements
+ * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at
+ * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be
+ * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list.
+ * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit
+ * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may
+ * only be traversed in the forward direction.  Singly-linked lists are ideal
+ * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for
+ * implementing a LIFO queue.
+ *
+ * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward
+ * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked
+ * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before
+ * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list
+ * may only be traversed in the forward direction.
+ *
+ * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly
+ * linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the
+ * head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
+ * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the
+ * list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction.
+ *
+ * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
+ * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or
+ * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of
+ * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction.
+ *
+ * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
+ * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
+ * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list.
+ * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more
+ * complex end of list detection.
+ *
+ * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page.
+ */
+
+#if defined(QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG) || (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(DIAGNOSTIC))
+#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = ((void *)-1)
+#else
+#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List definitions.
+ */
+#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *slh_first;	/* first element */			\
+}
+ 
+#define	SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL }
+ 
+#define SLIST_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *sle_next;	/* next element */			\
+}
+ 
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List access methods.
+ */
+#define	SLIST_FIRST(head)	((head)->slh_first)
+#define	SLIST_END(head)		NULL
+#define	SLIST_EMPTY(head)	(SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head))
+#define	SLIST_NEXT(elm, field)	((elm)->field.sle_next)
+
+#define	SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != SLIST_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR(var, varp, head, field)			\
+	for ((varp) = &SLIST_FIRST((head));				\
+	    ((var) = *(varp)) != SLIST_END(head);			\
+	    (varp) = &SLIST_NEXT((var), field))
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List functions.
+ */
+#define	SLIST_INIT(head) {						\
+	SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head);				\
+}
+
+#define	SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next;		\
+	(slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first;			\
+	(head)->slh_first = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (elm)->field.sle_next->field.sle_next;	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do {				\
+	(head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do {			\
+	if ((head)->slh_first == (elm)) {				\
+		SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		struct type *curelm = (head)->slh_first;		\
+									\
+		while (curelm->field.sle_next != (elm))			\
+			curelm = curelm->field.sle_next;		\
+		curelm->field.sle_next =				\
+		    curelm->field.sle_next->field.sle_next;		\
+		_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next);			\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * List definitions.
+ */
+#define LIST_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *lh_first;	/* first element */			\
+}
+
+#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define LIST_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *le_next;	/* next element */			\
+	struct type **le_prev;	/* address of previous next element */	\
+}
+
+/*
+ * List access methods
+ */
+#define	LIST_FIRST(head)		((head)->lh_first)
+#define	LIST_END(head)			NULL
+#define	LIST_EMPTY(head)		(LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head))
+#define	LIST_NEXT(elm, field)		((elm)->field.le_next)
+
+#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var)!= LIST_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field))
+
+/*
+ * List functions.
+ */
+#define	LIST_INIT(head) do {						\
+	LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL)	\
+		(listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =		\
+		    &(elm)->field.le_next;				\
+	(listelm)->field.le_next = (elm);				\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev;		\
+	(elm)->field.le_next = (listelm);				\
+	*(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm);				\
+	(listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL)		\
+		(head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\
+	(head)->lh_first = (elm);					\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do {					\
+	if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL)				\
+		(elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =			\
+		    (elm)->field.le_prev;				\
+	*(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next;			\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL)	\
+		(elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =			\
+		    &(elm2)->field.le_next;				\
+	(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev;			\
+	*(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue definitions.
+ */
+#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type)					\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *sqh_first;	/* first element */			\
+	struct type **sqh_last;	/* addr of last next element */		\
+}
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL, &(head).sqh_first }
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *sqe_next;	/* next element */			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue access methods.
+ */
+#define	SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head)	    ((head)->sqh_first)
+#define	SIMPLEQ_END(head)	    NULL
+#define	SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head)	    (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head))
+#define	SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field)    ((elm)->field.sqe_next)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)				\
+	for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue functions.
+ */
+#define	SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do {						\
+	(head)->sqh_first = NULL;					\
+	(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first;				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL)	\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+	(head)->sqh_first = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL;					\
+	*(head)->sqh_last = (elm);					\
+	(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+	(listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do {			\
+	if (((head)->sqh_first = (head)->sqh_first->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue definitions.
+ */
+#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *tqh_first;	/* first element */			\
+	struct type **tqh_last;	/* addr of last next element */		\
+}
+
+#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL, &(head).tqh_first }
+
+#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *tqe_next;	/* next element */			\
+	struct type **tqe_prev;	/* address of previous next element */	\
+}
+
+/* 
+ * tail queue access methods 
+ */
+#define	TAILQ_FIRST(head)		((head)->tqh_first)
+#define	TAILQ_END(head)			NULL
+#define	TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field)		((elm)->field.tqe_next)
+#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname)					\
+	(*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last))
+/* XXX */
+#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field)				\
+	(*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last))
+#define	TAILQ_EMPTY(head)						\
+	(TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head))
+
+#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field)		\
+	for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname);				\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field))
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue functions.
+ */
+#define	TAILQ_INIT(head) do {						\
+	(head)->tqh_first = NULL;					\
+	(head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first;				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL)	\
+		(head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    &(elm)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(head)->tqh_first = (elm);					\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL;					\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last;			\
+	*(head)->tqh_last = (elm);					\
+	(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\
+		(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    &(elm)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm);				\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev;		\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm);				\
+	*(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm);				\
+	(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)				\
+		(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    (elm)->field.tqe_prev;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev;		\
+	*(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next;			\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)	\
+		(elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =		\
+		    &(elm2)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev;			\
+	*(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue definitions.
+ */
+#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type)					\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *cqh_first;		/* first element */		\
+	struct type *cqh_last;		/* last element */		\
+}
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) }
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *cqe_next;		/* next element */		\
+	struct type *cqe_prev;		/* previous element */		\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue access methods 
+ */
+#define	CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head)		((head)->cqh_first)
+#define	CIRCLEQ_LAST(head)		((head)->cqh_last)
+#define	CIRCLEQ_END(head)		((void *)(head))
+#define	CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field)	((elm)->field.cqe_next)
+#define	CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field)	((elm)->field.cqe_prev)
+#define	CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head)						\
+	(CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head))
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)				\
+	for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field)			\
+	for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head);					\
+	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field))
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue functions.
+ */
+#define	CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do {						\
+	(head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head);				\
+	(head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next;		\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm);				\
+	if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head))		\
+		(head)->cqh_last = (elm);				\
+	else								\
+		(listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm);	\
+	(listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm);				\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev;		\
+	if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head))		\
+		(head)->cqh_first = (elm);				\
+	else								\
+		(listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm);	\
+	(listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first;			\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head);			\
+	if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head))			\
+		(head)->cqh_last = (elm);				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm);		\
+	(head)->cqh_first = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head);			\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last;			\
+	if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head))			\
+		(head)->cqh_first = (elm);				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm);		\
+	(head)->cqh_last = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do {				\
+	if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head))			\
+		(head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev;		\
+	else								\
+		(elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev =			\
+		    (elm)->field.cqe_prev;				\
+	if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head))			\
+		(head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next;		\
+	else								\
+		(elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next =			\
+		    (elm)->field.cqe_next;				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) ==		\
+	    CIRCLEQ_END(head))						\
+		(head).cqh_last = (elm2);				\
+	else								\
+		(elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2);	\
+	if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) ==		\
+	    CIRCLEQ_END(head))						\
+		(head).cqh_first = (elm2);				\
+	else								\
+		(elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2);	\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#endif	/* !_FAKE_QUEUE_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4949b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
@@ -0,0 +1,679 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.10 2007/10/29 23:49:41 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/tree.h */
+
+#ifndef	_SYS_TREE_H_
+#define	_SYS_TREE_H_
+
+/*
+ * This file defines data structures for different types of trees:
+ * splay trees and red-black trees.
+ *
+ * A splay tree is a self-organizing data structure.  Every operation
+ * on the tree causes a splay to happen.  The splay moves the requested
+ * node to the root of the tree and partly rebalances it.
+ *
+ * This has the benefit that request locality causes faster lookups as
+ * the requested nodes move to the top of the tree.  On the other hand,
+ * every lookup causes memory writes.
+ *
+ * The Balance Theorem bounds the total access time for m operations
+ * and n inserts on an initially empty tree as O((m + n)lg n).  The
+ * amortized cost for a sequence of m accesses to a splay tree is O(lg n);
+ *
+ * A red-black tree is a binary search tree with the node color as an
+ * extra attribute.  It fulfills a set of conditions:
+ *	- every search path from the root to a leaf consists of the
+ *	  same number of black nodes,
+ *	- each red node (except for the root) has a black parent,
+ *	- each leaf node is black.
+ *
+ * Every operation on a red-black tree is bounded as O(lg n).
+ * The maximum height of a red-black tree is 2lg (n+1).
+ */
+
+#define SPLAY_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *sph_root; /* root of the tree */			\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_INITIALIZER(root)						\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define SPLAY_INIT(root) do {						\
+	(root)->sph_root = NULL;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *spe_left; /* left element */			\
+	struct type *spe_right; /* right element */			\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.spe_left
+#define SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.spe_right
+#define SPLAY_ROOT(head)		(head)->sph_root
+#define SPLAY_EMPTY(head)		(SPLAY_ROOT(head) == NULL)
+
+/* SPLAY_ROTATE_{LEFT,RIGHT} expect that tmp hold SPLAY_{RIGHT,LEFT} */
+#define SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, field) do {			\
+	SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field);	\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	(head)->sph_root = tmp;						\
+} while (0)
+	
+#define SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, field) do {			\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field);	\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	(head)->sph_root = tmp;						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, tmp, field) do {				\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	tmp = (head)->sph_root;						\
+	(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, tmp, field) do {				\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	tmp = (head)->sph_root;						\
+	(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, node, left, right, field) do {		\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(left, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(right, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+	SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(node, field);	\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(node, field);	\
+} while (0)
+
+/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */
+
+#define SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+void name##_SPLAY(struct name *, struct type *);			\
+void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *, int);				\
+struct type *name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+struct type *name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+									\
+/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */				\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head))						\
+		return(NULL);						\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0)				\
+		return (head->sph_root);				\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_NEXT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if (SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) != NULL) {				\
+		elm = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while (SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) != NULL) {		\
+			elm = SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	} else								\
+		elm = NULL;						\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(struct name *head, int val)			\
+{									\
+	name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(head, val);					\
+        return (SPLAY_ROOT(head));					\
+}
+
+/* Main splay operation.
+ * Moves node close to the key of elm to top
+ */
+#define SPLAY_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+struct type *								\
+name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+    if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) {						\
+	    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL;	\
+    } else {								\
+	    int __comp;							\
+	    name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	    __comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root);			\
+	    if(__comp < 0) {						\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root;		\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL;		\
+	    } else if (__comp > 0) {					\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root;		\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL;	\
+	    } else							\
+		    return ((head)->sph_root);				\
+    }									\
+    (head)->sph_root = (elm);						\
+    return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+struct type *								\
+name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+	struct type *__tmp;						\
+	if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head))						\
+		return (NULL);						\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) {			\
+		if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL) {	\
+			(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		} else {						\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+			name##_SPLAY(head, elm);			\
+			SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = __tmp;	\
+		}							\
+		return (elm);						\
+	}								\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+void									\
+name##_SPLAY(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp;			\
+	int __comp;							\
+\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\
+	__left = __right = &__node;					\
+\
+	while ((__comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root))) {		\
+		if (__comp < 0) {					\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) < 0){			\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field);		\
+		} else if (__comp > 0) {				\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) > 0){			\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field);		\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field);		\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Splay with either the minimum or the maximum element			\
+ * Used to find minimum or maximum element in tree.			\
+ */									\
+void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *head, int __comp) \
+{									\
+	struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp;			\
+\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\
+	__left = __right = &__node;					\
+\
+	while (1) {							\
+		if (__comp < 0) {					\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if (__comp < 0){				\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field);		\
+		} else if (__comp > 0) {				\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if (__comp > 0) {				\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field);		\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field);		\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_NEGINF	-1
+#define SPLAY_INF	1
+
+#define SPLAY_INSERT(name, x, y)	name##_SPLAY_INSERT(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_REMOVE(name, x, y)	name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_FIND(name, x, y)		name##_SPLAY_FIND(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_NEXT(name, x, y)		name##_SPLAY_NEXT(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_MIN(name, x)		(SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL	\
+					: name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_NEGINF))
+#define SPLAY_MAX(name, x)		(SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL	\
+					: name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_INF))
+
+#define SPLAY_FOREACH(x, name, head)					\
+	for ((x) = SPLAY_MIN(name, head);				\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = SPLAY_NEXT(name, head, x))
+
+/* Macros that define a red-black tree */
+#define RB_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *rbh_root; /* root of the tree */			\
+}
+
+#define RB_INITIALIZER(root)						\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define RB_INIT(root) do {						\
+	(root)->rbh_root = NULL;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_BLACK	0
+#define RB_RED		1
+#define RB_ENTRY(type)							\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *rbe_left;		/* left element */		\
+	struct type *rbe_right;		/* right element */		\
+	struct type *rbe_parent;	/* parent element */		\
+	int rbe_color;			/* node color */		\
+}
+
+#define RB_LEFT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_left
+#define RB_RIGHT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_right
+#define RB_PARENT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_parent
+#define RB_COLOR(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_color
+#define RB_ROOT(head)			(head)->rbh_root
+#define RB_EMPTY(head)			(RB_ROOT(head) == NULL)
+
+#define RB_SET(elm, parent, field) do {					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = parent;					\
+	RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL;		\
+	RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_RED;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_SET_BLACKRED(black, red, field) do {				\
+	RB_COLOR(black, field) = RB_BLACK;				\
+	RB_COLOR(red, field) = RB_RED;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#ifndef RB_AUGMENT
+#define RB_AUGMENT(x)
+#endif
+
+#define RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, elm, tmp, field) do {			\
+	(tmp) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);					\
+	if ((RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = RB_LEFT(tmp, field))) {		\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = (elm);		\
+	}								\
+	RB_AUGMENT(elm);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) {		\
+		if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))	\
+			RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+	} else								\
+		(head)->rbh_root = (tmp);				\
+	RB_LEFT(tmp, field) = (elm);					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp);					\
+	RB_AUGMENT(tmp);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field)))					\
+		RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field));			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, elm, tmp, field) do {			\
+	(tmp) = RB_LEFT(elm, field);					\
+	if ((RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))) {		\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = (elm);		\
+	}								\
+	RB_AUGMENT(elm);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) {		\
+		if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))	\
+			RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+	} else								\
+		(head)->rbh_root = (tmp);				\
+	RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (elm);					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp);					\
+	RB_AUGMENT(tmp);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field)))					\
+		RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field));			\
+} while (0)
+
+/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */
+#define RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+void name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+void name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *, struct type *);\
+struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *);				\
+struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int);			
+
+
+/* Main rb operation.
+ * Moves node close to the key of elm to top
+ */
+#define RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+void									\
+name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+	struct type *parent, *gparent, *tmp;				\
+	while ((parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field)) &&			\
+	    RB_COLOR(parent, field) == RB_RED) {			\
+		gparent = RB_PARENT(parent, field);			\
+		if (parent == RB_LEFT(gparent, field)) {		\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(gparent, field);			\
+			if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {	\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\
+				elm = gparent;				\
+				continue;				\
+			}						\
+			if (RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm) {		\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = parent;				\
+				parent = elm;				\
+				elm = tmp;				\
+			}						\
+			RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);	\
+			RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, gparent, tmp, field);	\
+		} else {						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(gparent, field);			\
+			if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {	\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\
+				elm = gparent;				\
+				continue;				\
+			}						\
+			if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) {		\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = parent;				\
+				parent = elm;				\
+				elm = tmp;				\
+			}						\
+			RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);	\
+			RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, gparent, tmp, field);	\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	RB_COLOR(head->rbh_root, field) = RB_BLACK;			\
+}									\
+									\
+void									\
+name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp;						\
+	while ((elm == NULL || RB_COLOR(elm, field) == RB_BLACK) &&	\
+	    elm != RB_ROOT(head)) {					\
+		if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) {			\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);			\
+			if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {		\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field);	\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);		\
+			}						\
+			if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\
+			    (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;		\
+				elm = parent;				\
+				parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			} else {					\
+				if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||	\
+				    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\
+					struct type *oleft;		\
+					if ((oleft = RB_LEFT(tmp, field)))\
+						RB_COLOR(oleft, field) = RB_BLACK;\
+					RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;	\
+					RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, oleft, field);\
+					tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);	\
+				}					\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\
+				RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))		\
+					RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				elm = RB_ROOT(head);			\
+				break;					\
+			}						\
+		} else {						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);			\
+			if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {		\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field);	\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);		\
+			}						\
+			if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\
+			    (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;		\
+				elm = parent;				\
+				parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			} else {					\
+				if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||	\
+				    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\
+					struct type *oright;		\
+					if ((oright = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)))\
+						RB_COLOR(oright, field) = RB_BLACK;\
+					RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;	\
+					RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, oright, field);\
+					tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);	\
+				}					\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\
+				RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field))		\
+					RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				elm = RB_ROOT(head);			\
+				break;					\
+			}						\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	if (elm)							\
+		RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_BLACK;			\
+}									\
+									\
+struct type *								\
+name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *child, *parent, *old = elm;			\
+	int color;							\
+	if (RB_LEFT(elm, field) == NULL)				\
+		child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+	else if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field) == NULL)				\
+		child = RB_LEFT(elm, field);				\
+	else {								\
+		struct type *left;					\
+		elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while ((left = RB_LEFT(elm, field)))			\
+			elm = left;					\
+		child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);				\
+		color = RB_COLOR(elm, field);				\
+		if (child)						\
+			RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent;		\
+		if (parent) {						\
+			if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm)		\
+				RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child;		\
+			else						\
+				RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child;	\
+			RB_AUGMENT(parent);				\
+		} else							\
+			RB_ROOT(head) = child;				\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) == old)			\
+			parent = elm;					\
+		(elm)->field = (old)->field;				\
+		if (RB_PARENT(old, field)) {				\
+			if (RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) == old)\
+				RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\
+			else						\
+				RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\
+			RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(old, field));		\
+		} else							\
+			RB_ROOT(head) = elm;				\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(old, field), field) = elm;		\
+		if (RB_RIGHT(old, field))				\
+			RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(old, field), field) = elm;	\
+		if (parent) {						\
+			left = parent;					\
+			do {						\
+				RB_AUGMENT(left);			\
+			} while ((left = RB_PARENT(left, field)));	\
+		}							\
+		goto color;						\
+	}								\
+	parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);					\
+	color = RB_COLOR(elm, field);					\
+	if (child)							\
+		RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent;			\
+	if (parent) {							\
+		if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm)			\
+			RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child;			\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child;		\
+		RB_AUGMENT(parent);					\
+	} else								\
+		RB_ROOT(head) = child;					\
+color:									\
+	if (color == RB_BLACK)						\
+		name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(head, parent, child);		\
+	return (old);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Inserts a node into the RB tree */					\
+struct type *								\
+name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp;						\
+	struct type *parent = NULL;					\
+	int comp = 0;							\
+	tmp = RB_ROOT(head);						\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		parent = tmp;						\
+		comp = (cmp)(elm, parent);				\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	RB_SET(elm, parent, field);					\
+	if (parent != NULL) {						\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			RB_LEFT(parent, field) = elm;			\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = elm;			\
+		RB_AUGMENT(parent);					\
+	} else								\
+		RB_ROOT(head) = elm;					\
+	name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(head, elm);				\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */				\
+struct type *								\
+name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	int comp;							\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		comp = cmp(elm, tmp);					\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+struct type *								\
+name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *elm)					\
+{									\
+	if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) {					\
+		elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while (RB_LEFT(elm, field))				\
+			elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&				\
+		    (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))	\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		else {							\
+			while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&			\
+			    (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\
+				elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+struct type *								\
+name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val)				\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	struct type *parent = NULL;					\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		parent = tmp;						\
+		if (val < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+	}								\
+	return (parent);						\
+}
+
+#define RB_NEGINF	-1
+#define RB_INF	1
+
+#define RB_INSERT(name, x, y)	name##_RB_INSERT(x, y)
+#define RB_REMOVE(name, x, y)	name##_RB_REMOVE(x, y)
+#define RB_FIND(name, x, y)	name##_RB_FIND(x, y)
+#define RB_NEXT(name, x, y)	name##_RB_NEXT(y)
+#define RB_MIN(name, x)		name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_NEGINF)
+#define RB_MAX(name, x)		name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_INF)
+
+#define RB_FOREACH(x, name, head)					\
+	for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head);					\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = name##_RB_NEXT(x))
+
+#endif	/* _SYS_TREE_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/vis.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/vis.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a087b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/vis.c
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: vis.c,v 1.19 2005/09/01 17:15:49 millert Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/vis.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS)
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "vis.h"
+
+#define	isoctal(c)	(((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7')
+#define	isvisible(c)							\
+	(((u_int)(c) <= UCHAR_MAX && isascii((u_char)(c)) &&		\
+	(((c) != '*' && (c) != '?' && (c) != '[' && (c) != '#') ||	\
+		(flag & VIS_GLOB) == 0) && isgraph((u_char)(c))) ||	\
+	((flag & VIS_SP) == 0 && (c) == ' ') ||				\
+	((flag & VIS_TAB) == 0 && (c) == '\t') ||			\
+	((flag & VIS_NL) == 0 && (c) == '\n') ||			\
+	((flag & VIS_SAFE) && ((c) == '\b' ||				\
+		(c) == '\007' || (c) == '\r' ||				\
+		isgraph((u_char)(c)))))
+
+/*
+ * vis - visually encode characters
+ */
+char *
+vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc)
+{
+	if (isvisible(c)) {
+		*dst++ = c;
+		if (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+		*dst = '\0';
+		return (dst);
+	}
+
+	if (flag & VIS_CSTYLE) {
+		switch(c) {
+		case '\n':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'n';
+			goto done;
+		case '\r':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'r';
+			goto done;
+		case '\b':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'b';
+			goto done;
+		case '\a':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'a';
+			goto done;
+		case '\v':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'v';
+			goto done;
+		case '\t':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 't';
+			goto done;
+		case '\f':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'f';
+			goto done;
+		case ' ':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 's';
+			goto done;
+		case '\0':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = '0';
+			if (isoctal(nextc)) {
+				*dst++ = '0';
+				*dst++ = '0';
+			}
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	if (((c & 0177) == ' ') || (flag & VIS_OCTAL) ||
+	    ((flag & VIS_GLOB) && (c == '*' || c == '?' || c == '[' || c == '#'))) {
+		*dst++ = '\\';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 6 & 07) + '0';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 3 & 07) + '0';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c & 07) + '0';
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)
+		*dst++ = '\\';
+	if (c & 0200) {
+		c &= 0177;
+		*dst++ = 'M';
+	}
+	if (iscntrl((u_char)c)) {
+		*dst++ = '^';
+		if (c == 0177)
+			*dst++ = '?';
+		else
+			*dst++ = c + '@';
+	} else {
+		*dst++ = '-';
+		*dst++ = c;
+	}
+done:
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/*
+ * strvis, strnvis, strvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst
+ *	
+ *	Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible
+ *	expansion.  The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL,
+ *	is returned. 
+ *
+ *	Strnvis will write no more than siz-1 bytes (and will NULL terminate).
+ *	The number of bytes needed to fully encode the string is returned.
+ *
+ *	Strvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst.
+ *	This is useful for encoding a block of data.
+ */
+int
+strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag)
+{
+	char c;
+	char *start;
+
+	for (start = dst; (c = *src);)
+		dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+
+int
+strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz, int flag)
+{
+	char *start, *end;
+	char tbuf[5];
+	int c, i;
+
+	i = 0;
+	for (start = dst, end = start + siz - 1; (c = *src) && dst < end; ) {
+		if (isvisible(c)) {
+			i = 1;
+			*dst++ = c;
+			if (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0) {
+				/* need space for the extra '\\' */
+				if (dst < end)
+					*dst++ = '\\';
+				else {
+					dst--;
+					i = 2;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			src++;
+		} else {
+			i = vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
+			if (dst + i <= end) {
+				memcpy(dst, tbuf, i);
+				dst += i;
+			} else {
+				src--;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (siz > 0)
+		*dst = '\0';
+	if (dst + i > end) {
+		/* adjust return value for truncation */
+		while ((c = *src))
+			dst += vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
+	}
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+
+int
+strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag)
+{
+	char c;
+	char *start;
+
+	for (start = dst; len > 1; len--) {
+		c = *src;
+		dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
+	}
+	if (len)
+		dst = vis(dst, *src, flag, '\0');
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/vis.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/vis.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3898a9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/vis.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: vis.h,v 1.11 2005/08/09 19:38:31 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: vis.h,v 1.4 1994/10/26 00:56:41 cgd Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)vis.h	5.9 (Berkeley) 4/3/91
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/vis.h */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS)
+
+#ifndef _VIS_H_
+#define	_VIS_H_
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+/*
+ * to select alternate encoding format
+ */
+#define	VIS_OCTAL	0x01	/* use octal \ddd format */
+#define	VIS_CSTYLE	0x02	/* use \[nrft0..] where appropriate */
+
+/*
+ * to alter set of characters encoded (default is to encode all
+ * non-graphic except space, tab, and newline).
+ */
+#define	VIS_SP		0x04	/* also encode space */
+#define	VIS_TAB		0x08	/* also encode tab */
+#define	VIS_NL		0x10	/* also encode newline */
+#define	VIS_WHITE	(VIS_SP | VIS_TAB | VIS_NL)
+#define	VIS_SAFE	0x20	/* only encode "unsafe" characters */
+
+/*
+ * other
+ */
+#define	VIS_NOSLASH	0x40	/* inhibit printing '\' */
+#define	VIS_GLOB	0x100	/* encode glob(3) magics and '#' */
+
+/*
+ * unvis return codes
+ */
+#define	UNVIS_VALID	 1	/* character valid */
+#define	UNVIS_VALIDPUSH	 2	/* character valid, push back passed char */
+#define	UNVIS_NOCHAR	 3	/* valid sequence, no character produced */
+#define	UNVIS_SYNBAD	-1	/* unrecognized escape sequence */
+#define	UNVIS_ERROR	-2	/* decoder in unknown state (unrecoverable) */
+
+/*
+ * unvis flags
+ */
+#define	UNVIS_END	1	/* no more characters */
+
+char	*vis(char *, int, int, int);
+int	strvis(char *, const char *, int);
+int	strnvis(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+int	strvisx(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+int	strunvis(char *, const char *);
+int	unvis(char *, char, int *, int);
+ssize_t strnunvis(char *, const char *, size_t)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+
+#endif /* !_VIS_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6291e28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+# if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+#  include <crypt.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef __hpux
+#  include <hpsecurity.h>
+#  include <prot.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+#  include <sys/security.h>
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+#  include <prot.h>
+# endif 
+
+# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+#  include <shadow.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+#  include <sys/label.h>
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+#  include <pwdadj.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+#  include "md5crypt.h"
+# endif 
+
+char *
+xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
+{
+	char *crypted;
+
+# ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+        if (is_md5_salt(salt))
+                crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
+        else
+                crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	if (iscomsec())
+                crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+        else
+                crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+        crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+# else
+        crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# endif 
+
+	return crypted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle shadowed password systems in a cleaner way for portable
+ * version.
+ */
+
+char *
+shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *pw_password = pw->pw_passwd;
+
+# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	struct spwd *spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+
+	if (spw != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
+# endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+	return(get_iaf_password(pw));
+#endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	struct passwd_adjunct *spw;
+	if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd;
+# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	struct pr_passwd *spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name);
+
+	if (spw != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+# endif
+
+	return pw_password;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04c6bab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
+ * MAP_FAILED code by Solar Designer.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* $Id: xmmap.c,v 1.15 2009/02/16 04:21:40 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+void *
+xmmap(size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
+	void *address;
+
+# ifdef MAP_ANON
+	address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED,
+	    -1, (off_t)0);
+# else
+	address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED,
+	    open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR), (off_t)0);
+# endif
+
+#define MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE "/var/run/sshd.mm.XXXXXXXX"
+	if (address == (void *)MAP_FAILED) {
+		char tmpname[sizeof(MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE)] = MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE;
+		int tmpfd;
+		mode_t old_umask;
+
+		old_umask = umask(0177);
+		tmpfd = mkstemp(tmpname);
+		umask(old_umask);
+		if (tmpfd == -1)
+			fatal("mkstemp(\"%s\"): %s",
+			    MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
+		unlink(tmpname);
+		if (ftruncate(tmpfd, size) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: ftruncate: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED,
+		    tmpfd, (off_t)0);
+		close(tmpfd);
+	}
+
+	return (address);
+#else
+	fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported",
+	    __func__);
+#endif /* HAVE_MMAP */
+
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..994e35b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1939 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.166 2009/06/27 09:29:06 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
+ * with the other side.  This same code is used both on client and server side.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+ 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "crc32.h"
+#include "compress.h"
+#include "deattack.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+#define DBG(x) x
+#else
+#define DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
+
+struct packet_state {
+	u_int32_t seqnr;
+	u_int32_t packets;
+	u_int64_t blocks;
+	u_int64_t bytes;
+};
+
+struct packet {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
+	u_char type;
+	Buffer payload;
+};
+
+struct session_state {
+	/*
+	 * This variable contains the file descriptors used for
+	 * communicating with the other side.  connection_in is used for
+	 * reading; connection_out for writing.  These can be the same
+	 * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
+	 */
+	int connection_in;
+	int connection_out;
+
+	/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
+	u_int remote_protocol_flags;
+
+	/* Encryption context for receiving data.  Only used for decryption. */
+	CipherContext receive_context;
+
+	/* Encryption context for sending data.  Only used for encryption. */
+	CipherContext send_context;
+
+	/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
+	Buffer input;
+
+	/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
+	Buffer output;
+
+	/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
+	Buffer outgoing_packet;
+
+	/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
+	Buffer incoming_packet;
+
+	/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
+	Buffer compression_buffer;
+	int compression_buffer_ready;
+
+	/*
+	 * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is
+	 * enabled.
+	 */
+	int packet_compression;
+
+	/* default maximum packet size */
+	u_int max_packet_size;
+
+	/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
+	int initialized;
+
+	/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
+	int interactive_mode;
+
+	/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
+	int server_side;
+
+	/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
+	int after_authentication;
+
+	int keep_alive_timeouts;
+
+	/* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
+	int packet_timeout_ms;
+
+	/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
+	Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+	struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
+
+	u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out;
+	u_int32_t rekey_limit;
+
+	/* Session key for protocol v1 */
+	u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+	u_int ssh1_keylen;
+
+	/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
+	u_char extra_pad;
+
+	/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
+	u_int packet_discard;
+	Mac *packet_discard_mac;
+
+	/* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
+	u_int packlen;
+
+	/* Used in packet_send2 */
+	int rekeying;
+
+	/* Used in packet_set_interactive */
+	int set_interactive_called;
+
+	/* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
+	int set_maxsize_called;
+
+	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+};
+
+static struct session_state *active_state, *backup_state;
+
+static struct session_state *
+alloc_session_state(void)
+{
+    struct session_state *s = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*s));
+
+    s->connection_in = -1;
+    s->connection_out = -1;
+    s->max_packet_size = 32768;
+    s->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+    return s;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the descriptors used for communication.  Disables encryption until
+ * packet_set_encryption_key is called.
+ */
+void
+packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
+{
+	Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+
+	if (none == NULL)
+		fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
+	if (active_state == NULL)
+		active_state = alloc_session_state();
+	active_state->connection_in = fd_in;
+	active_state->connection_out = fd_out;
+	cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
+	    0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
+	cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
+	    0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
+	active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+	if (!active_state->initialized) {
+		active_state->initialized = 1;
+		buffer_init(&active_state->input);
+		buffer_init(&active_state->output);
+		buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+		buffer_init(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		TAILQ_INIT(&active_state->outgoing);
+		active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_read.packets = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_timeout(int timeout, int count)
+{
+	if (timeout == 0 || count == 0) {
+		active_state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
+		active_state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
+	else
+		active_state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
+}
+
+static void
+packet_stop_discard(void)
+{
+	if (active_state->packet_discard_mac) {
+		char buf[1024];
+		
+		memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
+		while (buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) <
+		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+			buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet, buf,
+			    sizeof(buf));
+		(void) mac_compute(active_state->packet_discard_mac,
+		    active_state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
+		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
+	}
+	logit("Finished discarding for %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+	cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+static void
+packet_start_discard(Enc *enc, Mac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard)
+{
+	if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher))
+		packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
+	if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled)
+		active_state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) >= discard)
+		packet_stop_discard();
+	active_state->packet_discard = discard -
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->input);
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
+
+int
+packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+
+	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
+	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
+		return 1;
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	if (getpeername(active_state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+	    &fromlen) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	tolen = sizeof(to);
+	memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+	if (getpeername(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+	    &tolen) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
+ * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
+ * process.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_get_keyiv(int mode, u_char *iv, u_int len)
+{
+	CipherContext *cc;
+
+	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
+	else
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
+
+	cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len);
+}
+
+int
+packet_get_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
+{
+	CipherContext *cc;
+
+	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
+	else
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
+
+	return (cipher_get_keycontext(cc, dat));
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
+{
+	CipherContext *cc;
+
+	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
+	else
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
+
+	cipher_set_keycontext(cc, dat);
+}
+
+int
+packet_get_keyiv_len(int mode)
+{
+	CipherContext *cc;
+
+	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
+	else
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
+
+	return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc));
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
+{
+	CipherContext *cc;
+
+	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
+	else
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
+
+	cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
+}
+
+int
+packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void)
+{
+	return (cipher_get_number(active_state->receive_context.cipher));
+}
+
+void
+packet_get_state(int mode, u_int32_t *seqnr, u_int64_t *blocks, u_int32_t *packets,
+    u_int64_t *bytes)
+{
+	struct packet_state *state;
+
+	state = (mode == MODE_IN) ?
+	    &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send;
+	if (seqnr)
+		*seqnr = state->seqnr;
+	if (blocks)
+		*blocks = state->blocks;
+	if (packets)
+		*packets = state->packets;
+	if (bytes)
+		*bytes = state->bytes;
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_state(int mode, u_int32_t seqnr, u_int64_t blocks, u_int32_t packets,
+    u_int64_t bytes)
+{
+	struct packet_state *state;
+
+	state = (mode == MODE_IN) ?
+	    &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send;
+	state->seqnr = seqnr;
+	state->blocks = blocks;
+	state->packets = packets;
+	state->bytes = bytes;
+}
+
+/* returns 1 if connection is via ipv4 */
+
+int
+packet_connection_is_ipv4(void)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage to;
+	socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
+
+	memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+	if (getsockname(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+	    &tolen) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (to.ss_family == AF_INET)
+		return 1;
+#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+	if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
+	    IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
+
+void
+packet_set_nonblocking(void)
+{
+	/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
+	set_nonblock(active_state->connection_in);
+
+	if (active_state->connection_out != active_state->connection_in)
+		set_nonblock(active_state->connection_out);
+}
+
+/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
+
+int
+packet_get_connection_in(void)
+{
+	return active_state->connection_in;
+}
+
+/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
+
+int
+packet_get_connection_out(void)
+{
+	return active_state->connection_out;
+}
+
+/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
+
+void
+packet_close(void)
+{
+	if (!active_state->initialized)
+		return;
+	active_state->initialized = 0;
+	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+		close(active_state->connection_out);
+	} else {
+		close(active_state->connection_in);
+		close(active_state->connection_out);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&active_state->input);
+	buffer_free(&active_state->output);
+	buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_free(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+	if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready) {
+		buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_compress_uninit();
+	}
+	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+}
+
+/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
+
+void
+packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
+{
+	active_state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
+}
+
+/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
+
+u_int
+packet_get_protocol_flags(void)
+{
+	return active_state->remote_protocol_flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
+ * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
+ */
+
+static void
+packet_init_compression(void)
+{
+	if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready == 1)
+		return;
+	active_state->compression_buffer_ready = 1;
+	buffer_init(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+}
+
+void
+packet_start_compression(int level)
+{
+	if (active_state->packet_compression && !compat20)
+		fatal("Compression already enabled.");
+	active_state->packet_compression = 1;
+	packet_init_compression();
+	buffer_compress_init_send(level);
+	buffer_compress_init_recv();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key.  The same
+ * key is used for both sending and reception.  However, both directions are
+ * encrypted independently of each other.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen,
+    int number)
+{
+	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
+
+	if (cipher == NULL)
+		fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number);
+	if (keylen < 20)
+		fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen);
+	if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
+		fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen);
+	memcpy(active_state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
+	active_state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
+	cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
+	    0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
+	cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
+	    0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+u_int
+packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *key)
+{
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return (active_state->ssh1_keylen);
+	memcpy(key, active_state->ssh1_key, active_state->ssh1_keylen);
+	return (active_state->ssh1_keylen);
+}
+
+/* Start constructing a packet to send. */
+void
+packet_start(u_char type)
+{
+	u_char buf[9];
+	int len;
+
+	DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
+	len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
+	memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
+	buf[len - 1] = type;
+	buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+}
+
+/* Append payload. */
+void
+packet_put_char(int value)
+{
+	char ch = value;
+
+	buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_int(u_int value)
+{
+	buffer_put_int(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value)
+{
+	buffer_put_int64(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+	buffer_put_string(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
+{
+	buffer_put_cstring(&active_state->outgoing_packet, str);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+	buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
+{
+	buffer_put_bignum(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
+{
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalizes and sends the packet.  If the encryption key has been set,
+ * encrypts the packet before sending.
+ */
+
+static void
+packet_send1(void)
+{
+	u_char buf[8], *cp;
+	int i, padding, len;
+	u_int checksum;
+	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
+	 * packet.
+	 */
+	if (active_state->packet_compression) {
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+		/* Skip padding. */
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8);
+		/* padding */
+		buffer_append(&active_state->compression_buffer,
+		    "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
+		buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+		    &active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
+	}
+	/* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
+	len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
+
+	/* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
+	padding = 8 - len % 8;
+	if (!active_state->send_context.plaintext) {
+		cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+		for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
+			if (i % 4 == 0)
+				rnd = arc4random();
+			cp[7 - i] = rnd & 0xff;
+			rnd >>= 8;
+		}
+	}
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
+
+	/* Add check bytes. */
+	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	put_u32(buf, checksum);
+	buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+#endif
+
+	/* Append to output. */
+	put_u32(buf, len);
+	buffer_append(&active_state->output, buf, 4);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output,
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
+#endif
+	active_state->p_send.packets++;
+	active_state->p_send.bytes += len +
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output.  It won't be
+	 * actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is
+	 * called.
+	 */
+}
+
+void
+set_newkeys(int mode)
+{
+	Enc *enc;
+	Mac *mac;
+	Comp *comp;
+	CipherContext *cc;
+	u_int64_t *max_blocks;
+	int crypt_type;
+
+	debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
+
+	if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
+		crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
+		active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_send.blocks = 0;
+		max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_out;
+	} else {
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
+		crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
+		active_state->p_read.packets = active_state->p_read.blocks = 0;
+		max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_in;
+	}
+	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
+		debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
+		cipher_cleanup(cc);
+		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+		mac_clear(mac);
+		xfree(enc->name);
+		xfree(enc->iv);
+		xfree(enc->key);
+		xfree(mac->name);
+		xfree(mac->key);
+		xfree(comp->name);
+		xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
+	}
+	active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
+	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+		fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
+	enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+	mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+	comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+	if (mac_init(mac) == 0)
+		mac->enabled = 1;
+	DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
+	cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
+	    enc->iv, enc->block_size, crypt_type);
+	/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
+	/* memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
+	   memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+	   memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); */
+	if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
+	    (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
+	     active_state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
+		packet_init_compression();
+		if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+			buffer_compress_init_send(6);
+		else
+			buffer_compress_init_recv();
+		comp->enabled = 1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
+	 * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
+	 */
+	if (enc->block_size >= 16)
+		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
+	else
+		*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
+	if (active_state->rekey_limit)
+		*max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks,
+		    active_state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
+ * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
+ * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
+ */
+static void
+packet_enable_delayed_compress(void)
+{
+	Comp *comp = NULL;
+	int mode;
+
+	/*
+	 * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
+	 * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
+	 */
+	active_state->after_authentication = 1;
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		/* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
+		if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+		if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
+			packet_init_compression();
+			if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+				buffer_compress_init_send(6);
+			else
+				buffer_compress_init_recv();
+			comp->enabled = 1;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
+ */
+static void
+packet_send2_wrapped(void)
+{
+	u_char type, *cp, *macbuf = NULL;
+	u_char padlen, pad;
+	u_int packet_length = 0;
+	u_int i, len;
+	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+	Enc *enc   = NULL;
+	Mac *mac   = NULL;
+	Comp *comp = NULL;
+	int block_size;
+
+	if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
+		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
+		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
+		comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
+	}
+	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
+
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	type = cp[5];
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "plain:     ");
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+#endif
+
+	if (comp && comp->enabled) {
+		len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+		/* skip header, compress only payload */
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 5);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+		    &active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
+		DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len,
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet)));
+	}
+
+	/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
+	len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+
+	/*
+	 * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
+	 * minimum padding is 4 bytes
+	 */
+	padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
+	if (padlen < 4)
+		padlen += block_size;
+	if (active_state->extra_pad) {
+		/* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */
+		active_state->extra_pad =
+		    roundup(active_state->extra_pad, block_size);
+		pad = active_state->extra_pad -
+		    ((len + padlen) % active_state->extra_pad);
+		debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
+		    pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad);
+		padlen += pad;
+		active_state->extra_pad = 0;
+	}
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->outgoing_packet, padlen);
+	if (enc && !active_state->send_context.plaintext) {
+		/* random padding */
+		for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) {
+			if (i % 4 == 0)
+				rnd = arc4random();
+			cp[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+			rnd >>= 8;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* clear padding */
+		memset(cp, 0, padlen);
+	}
+	/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
+	packet_length = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) - 4;
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	put_u32(cp, packet_length);
+	cp[4] = padlen;
+	DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
+
+	/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
+	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_send.seqnr,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+		DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", active_state->p_send.seqnr));
+	}
+	/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output,
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	/* append unencrypted MAC */
+	if (mac && mac->enabled)
+		buffer_append(&active_state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
+#endif
+	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+	if (++active_state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
+		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+	if (++active_state->p_send.packets == 0)
+		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+			fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
+	active_state->p_send.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
+	active_state->p_send.bytes += packet_length + 4;
+	buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+		set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && active_state->server_side)
+		packet_enable_delayed_compress();
+}
+
+static void
+packet_send2(void)
+{
+	struct packet *p;
+	u_char type, *cp;
+
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	type = cp[5];
+
+	/* during rekeying we can only send key exchange messages */
+	if (active_state->rekeying) {
+		if (!((type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN) &&
+		    (type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX))) {
+			debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
+			p = xmalloc(sizeof(*p));
+			p->type = type;
+			memcpy(&p->payload, &active_state->outgoing_packet,
+			    sizeof(Buffer));
+			buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&active_state->outgoing, p, next);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
+		active_state->rekeying = 1;
+
+	packet_send2_wrapped();
+
+	/* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
+		active_state->rekeying = 0;
+		while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&active_state->outgoing))) {
+			type = p->type;
+			debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
+			buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+			memcpy(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &p->payload,
+			    sizeof(Buffer));
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&active_state->outgoing, p, next);
+			xfree(p);
+			packet_send2_wrapped();
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void
+packet_send(void)
+{
+	if (compat20)
+		packet_send2();
+	else
+		packet_send1();
+	DBG(debug("packet_send done"));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type.  Note that
+ * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
+ * be used during the interactive session.
+ */
+
+int
+packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+	int type, len, ret, ms_remain, cont;
+	fd_set *setp;
+	char buf[8192];
+	struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
+
+	DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
+
+	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1,
+	    NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+	/* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+	for (;;) {
+		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+		type = packet_read_poll_seqnr(seqnr_p);
+		if (!compat20 && (
+		    type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
+		    || type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
+		    || type == SSH_CMSG_EOF
+		    || type == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
+			packet_check_eom();
+		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
+		if (type != SSH_MSG_NONE) {
+			xfree(setp);
+			return type;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
+		 * buffer, and try again.
+		 */
+		memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1,
+		    NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
+		FD_SET(active_state->connection_in, setp);
+
+		if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+			ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms;
+			timeoutp = &timeout;
+		}
+		/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
+		for (;;) {
+			if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+				ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
+				gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
+			}
+			if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_in + 1, setp,
+			    NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
+				break;
+			if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+			    errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+				break;
+			if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+				continue;
+			ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
+			if (ms_remain <= 0) {
+				ret = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (ret == 0) {
+			logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while "
+			    "waiting to read", get_remote_ipaddr());
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+		/* Read data from the socket. */
+		do {
+			cont = 0;
+			len = roaming_read(active_state->connection_in, buf,
+			    sizeof(buf), &cont);
+		} while (len == 0 && cont);
+		if (len == 0) {
+			logit("Connection closed by %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+		if (len < 0)
+			fatal("Read from socket failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		/* Append it to the buffer. */
+		packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+int
+packet_read(void)
+{
+	return packet_read_seqnr(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
+ * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_read_expect(int expected_type)
+{
+	int type;
+
+	type = packet_read();
+	if (type != expected_type)
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
+		    expected_type, type);
+}
+
+/* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via
+ * packet_process_incoming.  If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns
+ * SSH_MSG_NONE.  This does not wait for data from the connection.
+ *
+ * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here.  Also,
+ * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned
+ * to higher levels.
+ */
+
+static int
+packet_read_poll1(void)
+{
+	u_int len, padded_len;
+	u_char *cp, type;
+	u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
+
+	/* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + 8)
+		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+	/* Get length of incoming packet. */
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->input);
+	len = get_u32(cp);
+	if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
+		packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
+	padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
+
+	/* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
+		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+
+	/* The entire packet is in buffer. */
+
+	/* Consume packet length. */
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, 4);
+
+	/*
+	 * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
+	 * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
+	 * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
+	 */
+	if (!active_state->receive_context.plaintext) {
+		switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
+		    padded_len)) {
+		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
+			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
+			    "network attack detected");
+		case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
+			packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
+			    "service detected");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
+	buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, padded_len);
+	cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len);
+
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, padded_len);
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+#endif
+
+	/* Compute packet checksum. */
+	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) - 4);
+
+	/* Skip padding. */
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
+
+	/* Test check bytes. */
+	if (len != buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet))
+		packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll1: len %d != buffer_len %d.",
+		    len, buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
+
+	cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
+	stored_checksum = get_u32(cp);
+	if (checksum != stored_checksum)
+		packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
+	buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4);
+
+	if (active_state->packet_compression) {
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    &active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
+	}
+	active_state->p_read.packets++;
+	active_state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
+	type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+	if (type < SSH_MSG_MIN || type > SSH_MSG_MAX)
+		packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", type);
+	return type;
+}
+
+static int
+packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+	u_int padlen, need;
+	u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
+	u_int maclen, block_size;
+	Enc *enc   = NULL;
+	Mac *mac   = NULL;
+	Comp *comp = NULL;
+
+	if (active_state->packet_discard)
+		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+
+	if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
+		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
+		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
+		comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
+	}
+	maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
+	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
+
+	if (active_state->packlen == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
+		 * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
+		 */
+		if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < block_size)
+			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    block_size);
+		cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size);
+		cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		active_state->packlen = get_u32(cp);
+		if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+		    active_state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+			buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+#endif
+			logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen);
+			packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
+			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+		}
+		DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", active_state->packlen+4));
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->input, block_size);
+	}
+	/* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */
+	need = 4 + active_state->packlen - block_size;
+	DBG(debug("partial packet %d, need %d, maclen %d", block_size,
+	    need, maclen));
+	if (need % block_size != 0) {
+		logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
+		    need, block_size, need % block_size);
+		packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
+		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
+		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * check if the entire packet has been received and
+	 * decrypt into incoming_packet
+	 */
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < need + maclen)
+		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->input);
+#endif
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, need);
+	cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, need);
+	/*
+	 * compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
+	 * increment sequence number for incoming packet
+	 */
+	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
+		if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
+		    mac->mac_len) != 0) {
+			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+			if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+				fatal("internal error need %d", need);
+			packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
+			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+		}
+				
+		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", active_state->p_read.seqnr));
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->input, mac->mac_len);
+	}
+	/* XXX now it's safe to use fatal/packet_disconnect */
+	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+		*seqnr_p = active_state->p_read.seqnr;
+	if (++active_state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
+		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+	if (++active_state->p_read.packets == 0)
+		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+			fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
+	active_state->p_read.blocks += (active_state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
+	active_state->p_read.bytes += active_state->packlen + 4;
+
+	/* get padlen */
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+	padlen = cp[4];
+	DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
+	if (padlen < 4)
+		packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen);
+
+	/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
+	buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, padlen);
+
+	DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d",
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)));
+	if (comp && comp->enabled) {
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    &active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
+		DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d",
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)));
+	}
+	/*
+	 * get packet type, implies consume.
+	 * return length of payload (without type field)
+	 */
+	type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+	if (type < SSH2_MSG_MIN || type >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN)
+		packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", type);
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+		set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS &&
+	    !active_state->server_side)
+		packet_enable_delayed_compress();
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type);
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+#endif
+	/* reset for next packet */
+	active_state->packlen = 0;
+	return type;
+}
+
+int
+packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+	u_int reason, seqnr;
+	u_char type;
+	char *msg;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (compat20) {
+			type = packet_read_poll2(seqnr_p);
+			if (type) {
+				active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+				DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
+			}
+			switch (type) {
+			case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+				debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+				break;
+			case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
+				packet_get_char();
+				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+				debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+				xfree(msg);
+				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+				xfree(msg);
+				break;
+			case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+				reason = packet_get_int();
+				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+				logit("Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s",
+				    get_remote_ipaddr(), reason, msg);
+				xfree(msg);
+				cleanup_exit(255);
+				break;
+			case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+				seqnr = packet_get_int();
+				debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
+				    seqnr);
+				break;
+			default:
+				return type;
+			}
+		} else {
+			type = packet_read_poll1();
+			switch (type) {
+			case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
+				break;
+			case SSH_MSG_DEBUG:
+				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+				debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+				xfree(msg);
+				break;
+			case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+				logit("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
+				    get_remote_ipaddr(), msg);
+				cleanup_exit(255);
+				break;
+			default:
+				if (type)
+					DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
+				return type;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int
+packet_read_poll(void)
+{
+	return packet_read_poll_seqnr(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Buffers the given amount of input characters.  This is intended to be used
+ * together with packet_read_poll.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+	if (active_state->packet_discard) {
+		active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
+		if (len >= active_state->packet_discard)
+			packet_stop_discard();
+		active_state->packet_discard -= len;
+		return;
+	}
+	buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
+}
+
+/* Returns a character from the packet. */
+
+u_int
+packet_get_char(void)
+{
+	char ch;
+
+	buffer_get(&active_state->incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
+	return (u_char) ch;
+}
+
+/* Returns an integer from the packet data. */
+
+u_int
+packet_get_int(void)
+{
+	return buffer_get_int(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/* Returns an 64 bit integer from the packet data. */
+
+u_int64_t
+packet_get_int64(void)
+{
+	return buffer_get_int64(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns an arbitrary precision integer from the packet data.  The integer
+ * must have been initialized before this call.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
+{
+	buffer_get_bignum(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
+}
+
+void
+packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
+{
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+	u_int bytes = buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+
+	if (length_ptr != NULL)
+		*length_ptr = bytes;
+	return buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+int
+packet_remaining(void)
+{
+	return buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a string from the packet data.  The string is allocated using
+ * xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling program to free it when
+ * no longer needed.  The length_ptr argument may be NULL, or point to an
+ * integer into which the length of the string is stored.
+ */
+
+void *
+packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+	return buffer_get_string(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+	return buffer_get_string_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client.  This message
+ * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
+ * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
+ * in verbose mode.  These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
+ * authentication problems.   The length of the formatted message must not
+ * exceed 1024 bytes.  This will automatically call packet_write_wait.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	va_list args;
+
+	if (compat20 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
+		return;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
+		packet_put_char(0);	/* bool: always display */
+		packet_put_cstring(buf);
+		packet_put_cstring("");
+	} else {
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_DEBUG);
+		packet_put_cstring(buf);
+	}
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
+ * connection, and exits.  This function never returns. The error message
+ * should not contain a newline.  The length of the formatted message must
+ * not exceed 1024 bytes.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	va_list args;
+	static int disconnecting = 0;
+
+	if (disconnecting)	/* Guard against recursive invocations. */
+		fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
+	disconnecting = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Format the message.  Note that the caller must make sure the
+	 * message is of limited size.
+	 */
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	/* Display the error locally */
+	logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
+
+	/* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait for it to get sent. */
+	if (compat20) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+		packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+		packet_put_cstring(buf);
+		packet_put_cstring("");
+	} else {
+		packet_start(SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+		packet_put_cstring(buf);
+	}
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/* Stop listening for connections. */
+	channel_close_all();
+
+	/* Close the connection. */
+	packet_close();
+	cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+/* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of the output. */
+
+void
+packet_write_poll(void)
+{
+	int len = buffer_len(&active_state->output);
+	int cont;
+
+	if (len > 0) {
+		cont = 0;
+		len = roaming_write(active_state->connection_out,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->output), len, &cont);
+		if (len == -1) {
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+				return;
+			fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (len == 0 && !cont)
+			fatal("Write connection closed");
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->output, len);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
+ * written.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_write_wait(void)
+{
+	fd_set *setp;
+	int ret, ms_remain;
+	struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
+
+	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+	    NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
+	packet_write_poll();
+	while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
+		memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+		    NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
+		FD_SET(active_state->connection_out, setp);
+
+		if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+			ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms;
+			timeoutp = &timeout;
+		}
+		for (;;) {
+			if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+				ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
+				gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
+			}
+			if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+			    NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
+				break;
+			if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+			    errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+				break;
+			if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+				continue;
+			ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
+			if (ms_remain <= 0) {
+				ret = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (ret == 0) {
+			logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while "
+			    "waiting to write", get_remote_ipaddr());
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+		packet_write_poll();
+	}
+	xfree(setp);
+}
+
+/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
+
+int
+packet_have_data_to_write(void)
+{
+	return buffer_len(&active_state->output) != 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
+
+int
+packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void)
+{
+	if (active_state->interactive_mode)
+		return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 16384;
+	else
+		return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 128 * 1024;
+}
+
+static void
+packet_set_tos(int interactive)
+{
+#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+	int tos = interactive ? IPTOS_LOWDELAY : IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
+
+	if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket() ||
+	    !packet_connection_is_ipv4())
+		return;
+	if (setsockopt(active_state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos,
+	    sizeof(tos)) < 0)
+		error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
+		    tos, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Informs that the current session is interactive.  Sets IP flags for that. */
+
+void
+packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
+{
+	if (active_state->set_interactive_called)
+		return;
+	active_state->set_interactive_called = 1;
+
+	/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
+	active_state->interactive_mode = interactive;
+
+	/* Only set socket options if using a socket.  */
+	if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+		return;
+	set_nodelay(active_state->connection_in);
+	packet_set_tos(interactive);
+}
+
+/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
+
+int
+packet_is_interactive(void)
+{
+	return active_state->interactive_mode;
+}
+
+int
+packet_set_maxsize(u_int s)
+{
+	if (active_state->set_maxsize_called) {
+		logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
+		    active_state->max_packet_size, s);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
+		logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	active_state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
+	debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
+	active_state->max_packet_size = s;
+	return s;
+}
+
+int
+packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void)
+{
+	return ++active_state->keep_alive_timeouts;
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_alive_timeouts(int ka)
+{
+	active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
+}
+
+u_int
+packet_get_maxsize(void)
+{
+	return active_state->max_packet_size;
+}
+
+/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
+void
+packet_add_padding(u_char pad)
+{
+	active_state->extra_pad = pad;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 9.2.  Ignored Data Message
+ *
+ *   byte      SSH_MSG_IGNORE
+ *   string    data
+ *
+ * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
+ * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
+ * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
+ * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
+ */
+void
+packet_send_ignore(int nbytes)
+{
+	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE);
+	packet_put_int(nbytes);
+	for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
+		if (i % 4 == 0)
+			rnd = arc4random();
+		packet_put_char((u_char)rnd & 0xff);
+		rnd >>= 8;
+	}
+}
+
+#define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
+int
+packet_need_rekeying(void)
+{
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+		return 0;
+	return
+	    (active_state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
+	    (active_state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
+	    (active_state->max_blocks_out &&
+	        (active_state->p_send.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_out)) ||
+	    (active_state->max_blocks_in &&
+	        (active_state->p_read.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_in));
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t bytes)
+{
+	active_state->rekey_limit = bytes;
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_server(void)
+{
+	active_state->server_side = 1;
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_authenticated(void)
+{
+	active_state->after_authentication = 1;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_input(void)
+{
+	return (void *)&active_state->input;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_output(void)
+{
+	return (void *)&active_state->output;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
+{
+	return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
+ * resuming a suspended connection.
+ */
+void
+packet_backup_state(void)
+{
+	struct session_state *tmp;
+
+	close(active_state->connection_in);
+	active_state->connection_in = -1;
+	close(active_state->connection_out);
+	active_state->connection_out = -1;
+	if (backup_state)
+		tmp = backup_state;
+	else
+		tmp = alloc_session_state();
+	backup_state = active_state;
+	active_state = tmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion.
+ */
+void
+packet_restore_state(void)
+{
+	struct session_state *tmp;
+	void *buf;
+	u_int len;
+
+	tmp = backup_state;
+	backup_state = active_state;
+	active_state = tmp;
+	active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
+	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+	active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
+	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+	len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
+	if (len > 0) {
+		buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
+		buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
+		add_recv_bytes(len);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.h b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33523d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.52 2009/06/27 09:29:06 andreas Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Interface for the packet protocol functions.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef PACKET_H
+#define PACKET_H
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+void     packet_set_connection(int, int);
+void     packet_set_timeout(int, int);
+void     packet_set_nonblocking(void);
+int      packet_get_connection_in(void);
+int      packet_get_connection_out(void);
+void     packet_close(void);
+void	 packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *, u_int, int);
+u_int	 packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *);
+void     packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int);
+u_int	 packet_get_protocol_flags(void);
+void     packet_start_compression(int);
+void     packet_set_interactive(int);
+int      packet_is_interactive(void);
+void     packet_set_server(void);
+void     packet_set_authenticated(void);
+
+void     packet_start(u_char);
+void     packet_put_char(int ch);
+void     packet_put_int(u_int value);
+void     packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value);
+void     packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
+void     packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
+void     packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len);
+void     packet_put_cstring(const char *str);
+void     packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len);
+void     packet_send(void);
+
+int      packet_read(void);
+void     packet_read_expect(int type);
+int      packet_read_poll(void);
+void     packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len);
+int      packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+int      packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+
+u_int	 packet_get_char(void);
+u_int	 packet_get_int(void);
+u_int64_t packet_get_int64(void);
+void     packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
+void     packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
+void	*packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr);
+void	*packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
+void	*packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr);
+void     packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+
+void	 set_newkeys(int mode);
+int	 packet_get_keyiv_len(int);
+void	 packet_get_keyiv(int, u_char *, u_int);
+int	 packet_get_keycontext(int, u_char *);
+void	 packet_set_keycontext(int, u_char *);
+void	 packet_get_state(int, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *);
+void	 packet_set_state(int, u_int32_t, u_int64_t, u_int32_t, u_int64_t);
+int	 packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void);
+void	 packet_set_iv(int, u_char *);
+void	*packet_get_newkeys(int);
+
+void     packet_write_poll(void);
+void     packet_write_wait(void);
+int      packet_have_data_to_write(void);
+int      packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void);
+
+int	 packet_connection_is_on_socket(void);
+int	 packet_connection_is_ipv4(void);
+int	 packet_remaining(void);
+void	 packet_send_ignore(int);
+void	 packet_add_padding(u_char);
+
+void	 tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *);
+void	 tty_parse_modes(int, int *);
+
+void	 packet_set_alive_timeouts(int);
+int	 packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void);
+int	 packet_set_maxsize(u_int);
+u_int	 packet_get_maxsize(void);
+
+/* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */
+#define packet_check_eom() \
+do { \
+	int _len = packet_remaining(); \
+	if (_len > 0) { \
+		logit("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \
+		    _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \
+		packet_disconnect("Packet integrity error."); \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+
+int	 packet_need_rekeying(void);
+void	 packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t);
+
+void	 packet_backup_state(void);
+void	 packet_restore_state(void);
+
+void	*packet_get_input(void);
+void	*packet_get_output(void);
+
+#endif				/* PACKET_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc4f66a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.17 2008/12/29 02:23:26 stevesk Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#define ETCDIR				"/etc"
+
+#ifndef SSHDIR
+#define SSHDIR				ETCDIR "/ssh"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR		"/var/run"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts.  This file should be
+ * world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts"
+/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2	SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2"
+
+/*
+ * Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config
+ * should be world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE	SSHDIR "/sshd_config"
+#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_config"
+#define _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+#define _PATH_DH_MODULI			SSHDIR "/moduli"
+/* Backwards compatibility */
+#define _PATH_DH_PRIMES			SSHDIR "/primes"
+
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
+#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
+ * make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE	_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid"
+
+/*
+ * The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The
+ * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are).
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR		".ssh"
+
+/*
+ * Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts.  This file need not be
+ * readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not
+ * contain anything particularly secret.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE		"~/.ssh/known_hosts"
+/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2	"~/.ssh/known_hosts2"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This
+ * file should only be readable by the user him/herself.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY	".ssh/identity"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA		".ssh/id_dsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA		".ssh/id_rsa"
+
+/*
+ * Configuration file in user's home directory.  This file need not be
+ * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything
+ * particularly secret.  If the user's home directory resides on an NFS
+ * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE		".ssh/config"
+
+/*
+ * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this
+ * user.  This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself,
+ * but does not contain anything particularly secret.  If the user's home
+ * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this
+ * may need to be world-readable.  (This file is read by the daemon which is
+ * running as root.)
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS	".ssh/authorized_keys"
+
+/* backward compat for protocol v2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2	".ssh/authorized_keys2"
+
+/*
+ * Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files.  These files are executed with
+ * /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist.  They will be
+ * passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in
+ * use.  xauth will be run if neither of these exists.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC		".ssh/rc"
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC		SSHDIR "/sshrc"
+
+/*
+ * Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv.  Additionally, the daemon may use
+ * ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV		SSHDIR "/shosts.equiv"
+#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV		"/etc/hosts.equiv"
+
+/*
+ * Default location of askpass
+ */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT
+#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT	"/usr/local/bin/ssh-askpass"
+#endif
+
+/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN
+#define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN		"/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign"
+#endif
+
+/* xauth for X11 forwarding */
+#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH			"/usr/local/bin/xauth"
+#endif
+
+/* UNIX domain socket for X11 server; displaynum will replace %u */
+#ifndef _PATH_UNIX_X
+#define _PATH_UNIX_X "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
+#endif
+
+/* for scp */
+#ifndef _PATH_CP
+#define _PATH_CP			"cp"
+#endif
+
+/* for sftp */
+#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER
+#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER		"/usr/libexec/sftp-server"
+#endif
+
+/* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */
+#ifndef _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
+#define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR	"/var/empty"
+#endif
+
+/* for passwd change */
+#ifndef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG             "/usr/bin/passwd"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_LS
+#define _PATH_LS			"ls"
+#endif
+
+/* path to login program */
+#ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM
+# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+#  define LOGIN_PROGRAM         LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+# else
+#  define LOGIN_PROGRAM         "/usr/bin/login"
+# endif
+#endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */
+
+/* Askpass program define */
+#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
+#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM         "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
+#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/platform.c b/crypto/openssh/platform.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aee4b01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/platform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.1 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "platform.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+
+void
+platform_pre_fork(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_pre_fork();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_child(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_post_fork_child();
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/platform.h b/crypto/openssh/platform.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf93bc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/platform.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* $Id: platform.h,v 1.1 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+void platform_pre_fork(void);
+void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
+void platform_post_fork_child(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f95222
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.37 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80
+#define MAX_WINSIZE 512
+#define PADDING 1		/* padding between the progress indicators */
+#define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1	/* update the progress meter every second */
+#define STALL_TIME 5		/* we're stalled after this many seconds */
+
+/* determines whether we can output to the terminal */
+static int can_output(void);
+
+/* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */
+static void format_size(char *, int, off_t);
+static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
+
+/* window resizing */
+static void sig_winch(int);
+static void setscreensize(void);
+
+/* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */
+void refresh_progress_meter(void);
+
+/* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
+static void update_progress_meter(int);
+
+static time_t start;		/* start progress */
+static time_t last_update;	/* last progress update */
+static char *file;		/* name of the file being transferred */
+static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
+static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
+static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
+static long stalled;		/* how long we have been stalled */
+static int bytes_per_second;	/* current speed in bytes per second */
+static int win_size;		/* terminal window size */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
+
+/* units for format_size */
+static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
+
+static int
+can_output(void)
+{
+	return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO));
+}
+
+static void
+format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	bytes *= 100;
+	for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
+		bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+	if (i == 0) {
+		i++;
+		bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+	}
+	snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s",
+	    (long long) (bytes + 5) / 100,
+	    (long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10,
+	    unit[i],
+	    i ? "B" : " ");
+}
+
+static void
+format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
+		bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+	snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s",
+	    (long long) bytes,
+	    unit[i],
+	    i ? "B" : " ");
+}
+
+void
+refresh_progress_meter(void)
+{
+	char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
+	time_t now;
+	off_t transferred;
+	double elapsed;
+	int percent;
+	off_t bytes_left;
+	int cur_speed;
+	int hours, minutes, seconds;
+	int i, len;
+	int file_len;
+
+	transferred = *counter - cur_pos;
+	cur_pos = *counter;
+	now = time(NULL);
+	bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
+
+	if (bytes_left > 0)
+		elapsed = now - last_update;
+	else {
+		elapsed = now - start;
+		/* Calculate true total speed when done */
+		transferred = end_pos;
+		bytes_per_second = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate speed */
+	if (elapsed != 0)
+		cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed);
+	else
+		cur_speed = transferred;
+
+#define AGE_FACTOR 0.9
+	if (bytes_per_second != 0) {
+		bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) +
+		    (cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR));
+	} else
+		bytes_per_second = cur_speed;
+
+	/* filename */
+	buf[0] = '\0';
+	file_len = win_size - 35;
+	if (file_len > 0) {
+		len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
+		if (len < 0)
+			len = 0;
+		if (len >= file_len + 1)
+			len = file_len;
+		for (i = len; i < file_len; i++)
+			buf[i] = ' ';
+		buf[file_len] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	/* percent of transfer done */
+	if (end_pos != 0)
+		percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100;
+	else
+		percent = 100;
+	snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+	    " %3d%% ", percent);
+
+	/* amount transferred */
+	format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+	    cur_pos);
+	strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
+
+	/* bandwidth usage */
+	format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+	    (off_t)bytes_per_second);
+	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
+
+	/* ETA */
+	if (!transferred)
+		stalled += elapsed;
+	else
+		stalled = 0;
+
+	if (stalled >= STALL_TIME)
+		strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size);
+	else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left)
+		strlcat(buf, "  --:-- ETA", win_size);
+	else {
+		if (bytes_left > 0)
+			seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second;
+		else
+			seconds = elapsed;
+
+		hours = seconds / 3600;
+		seconds -= hours * 3600;
+		minutes = seconds / 60;
+		seconds -= minutes * 60;
+
+		if (hours != 0)
+			snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+			    "%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds);
+		else
+			snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+			    "  %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds);
+
+		if (bytes_left > 0)
+			strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size);
+		else
+			strlcat(buf, "    ", win_size);
+	}
+
+	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
+	last_update = now;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+update_progress_meter(int ignore)
+{
+	int save_errno;
+
+	save_errno = errno;
+
+	if (win_resized) {
+		setscreensize();
+		win_resized = 0;
+	}
+	if (can_output())
+		refresh_progress_meter();
+
+	signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+	alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+void
+start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
+{
+	start = last_update = time(NULL);
+	file = f;
+	end_pos = filesize;
+	cur_pos = 0;
+	counter = ctr;
+	stalled = 0;
+	bytes_per_second = 0;
+
+	setscreensize();
+	if (can_output())
+		refresh_progress_meter();
+
+	signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+	signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
+	alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
+}
+
+void
+stop_progress_meter(void)
+{
+	alarm(0);
+
+	if (!can_output())
+		return;
+
+	/* Ensure we complete the progress */
+	if (cur_pos != end_pos)
+		refresh_progress_meter();
+
+	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sig_winch(int sig)
+{
+	win_resized = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+setscreensize(void)
+{
+	struct winsize winsize;
+
+	if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
+	    winsize.ws_col != 0) {
+		if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
+			win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
+		else
+			win_size = winsize.ws_col;
+	} else
+		win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
+	win_size += 1;					/* trailing \0 */
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10bab99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.2 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+void	start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *);
+void	stop_progress_meter(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d3fc40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1342 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.177 2009/06/27 09:35:06 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for reading the configuration files.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "version.h"
+
+/* Format of the configuration file:
+
+   # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+   #  1. command line options
+   #  2. user-specific file
+   #  3. system-wide file
+   # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+   # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+   # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+   # Host-specific declarations.  These may override anything above.  A single
+   # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order
+   # that they are given in.
+
+   Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
+     User foo
+
+   Host fake.com
+     HostName another.host.name.real.org
+     User blaah
+     Port 34289
+     ForwardX11 no
+     ForwardAgent no
+
+   Host books.com
+     RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
+     Cipher 3des
+
+   Host fascist.blob.com
+     Port 23123
+     User tylonen
+     PasswordAuthentication no
+
+   Host puukko.hut.fi
+     User t35124p
+     ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
+
+   Host *.fr
+     PublicKeyAuthentication no
+
+   Host *.su
+     Cipher none
+     PasswordAuthentication no
+
+   Host vpn.fake.com
+     Tunnel yes
+     TunnelDevice 3
+
+   # Defaults for various options
+   Host *
+     ForwardAgent no
+     ForwardX11 no
+     PasswordAuthentication yes
+     RSAAuthentication yes
+     RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
+     StrictHostKeyChecking yes
+     TcpKeepAlive no
+     IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+     Port 22
+     EscapeChar ~
+
+*/
+
+/* Keyword tokens. */
+
+typedef enum {
+	oBadOption,
+	oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oGatewayPorts,
+	oExitOnForwardFailure,
+	oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
+	oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
+	oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
+	oUser, oHost, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand,
+	oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
+	oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression,
+	oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
+	oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs,
+	oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication,
+	oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
+	oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
+	oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice,
+	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
+	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+	oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+	oVersionAddendum,
+	oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+} OpCodes;
+
+/* Textual representations of the tokens. */
+
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	OpCodes opcode;
+} keywords[] = {
+	{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
+	{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
+	{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
+	{ "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
+	{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
+	{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
+	{ "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
+	{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
+	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
+	{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
+	{ "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
+	{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
+	{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },		    /* alias */
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
+	{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
+	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
+	{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
+	{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },  /* alias */
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+#else
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
+	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* obsolete */
+	{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
+	{ "hostname", oHostName },
+	{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
+	{ "proxycommand", oProxyCommand },
+	{ "port", oPort },
+	{ "cipher", oCipher },
+	{ "ciphers", oCiphers },
+	{ "macs", oMacs },
+	{ "protocol", oProtocol },
+	{ "remoteforward", oRemoteForward },
+	{ "localforward", oLocalForward },
+	{ "user", oUser },
+	{ "host", oHost },
+	{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
+	{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
+	{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oGlobalKnownHostsFile2 },	/* obsolete */
+	{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
+	{ "userknownhostsfile2", oUserKnownHostsFile2 },	/* obsolete */
+	{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
+	{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
+	{ "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
+	{ "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
+	{ "compression", oCompression },
+	{ "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
+	{ "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
+	{ "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },				/* obsolete */
+	{ "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
+	{ "loglevel", oLogLevel },
+	{ "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward },
+	{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
+	{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
+	{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oSmartcardDevice },
+#else
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+	{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
+	{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
+	{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
+	{ "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
+	{ "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit },
+	{ "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout },
+	{ "addressfamily", oAddressFamily },
+	{ "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval },
+	{ "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax },
+	{ "sendenv", oSendEnv },
+	{ "controlpath", oControlPath },
+	{ "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
+	{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
+	{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
+	{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
+	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
+	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
+	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+	{ "useroaming", oUseRoaming },
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication",
+	    oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication },
+#else
+	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+
+	{ "versionaddendum", oVersionAddendum },
+	{ NULL, oBadOption }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options.  Never returns if there is an
+ * error.
+ */
+
+void
+add_local_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
+{
+	Forward *fwd;
+#ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
+	extern uid_t original_real_uid;
+	int ipport_reserved;
+#ifdef __FreeBSD__
+	size_t len_ipport_reserved = sizeof(ipport_reserved);
+
+	if (sysctlbyname("net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh",
+	    &ipport_reserved, &len_ipport_reserved, NULL, 0) != 0)
+		ipport_reserved = IPPORT_RESERVED;
+	else
+		ipport_reserved++;
+#else
+	ipport_reserved = IPPORT_RESERVED;
+#endif
+	if (newfwd->listen_port < ipport_reserved && original_real_uid != 0)
+		fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root.");
+#endif
+	if (options->num_local_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+		fatal("Too many local forwards (max %d).", SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
+	fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
+
+	fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
+	fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
+	fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
+	fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options.  Never returns if there is
+ * an error.
+ */
+
+void
+add_remote_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
+{
+	Forward *fwd;
+	if (options->num_remote_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+		fatal("Too many remote forwards (max %d).",
+		    SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
+	fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
+
+	fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
+	fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
+	fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
+	fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
+}
+
+static void
+clear_forwardings(Options *options)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		if (options->local_forwards[i].listen_host != NULL)
+			xfree(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
+		xfree(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
+	}
+	options->num_local_forwards = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		if (options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host != NULL)
+			xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
+		xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
+	}
+	options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+	options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
+ */
+
+static OpCodes
+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
+			return keywords[i].opcode;
+
+	error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
+	    filename, linenum, cp);
+	return oBadOption;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
+ * only sets those values that have not already been set.
+ */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+int
+process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
+		    char *line, const char *filename, int linenum,
+		    int *activep)
+{
+	char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2, fwdarg[256];
+	int opcode, *intptr, value, value2, scale;
+	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
+	long long orig, val64;
+	size_t len;
+	Forward fwd;
+
+	/* Strip trailing whitespace */
+	for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
+		if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
+			break;
+		line[len] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	s = line;
+	/* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
+	if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* Ignore leading whitespace. */
+	if (*keyword == '\0')
+		keyword = strdelim(&s);
+	if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#')
+		return 0;
+
+	opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum);
+
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case oBadOption:
+		/* don't panic, but count bad options */
+		return -1;
+		/* NOTREACHED */
+	case oConnectTimeout:
+		intptr = &options->connection_timeout;
+parse_time:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oForwardAgent:
+		intptr = &options->forward_agent;
+parse_flag:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* To avoid compiler warning... */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+			value = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+			value = 0;
+		else
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oForwardX11:
+		intptr = &options->forward_x11;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oForwardX11Trusted:
+		intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oGatewayPorts:
+		intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oExitOnForwardFailure:
+		intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oUsePrivilegedPort:
+		intptr = &options->use_privileged_port;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oPasswordAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oKbdInteractiveDevices:
+		charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oPubkeyAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oRSAAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->rsa_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oRhostsRSAAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oHostbasedAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oGssAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oGssDelegateCreds:
+		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oBatchMode:
+		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oCheckHostIP:
+		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+		intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
+		goto parse_yesnoask;
+
+	case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
+		intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
+parse_yesnoask:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no/ask argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* To avoid compiler warning... */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+			value = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+			value = 0;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "ask") == 0)
+			value = 2;
+		else
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no/ask argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oCompression:
+		intptr = &options->compression;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oTCPKeepAlive:
+		intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost:
+		intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts:
+		intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oCompressionLevel:
+		intptr = &options->compression_level;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oRekeyLimit:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+		orig = val64 = strtoll(arg, &endofnumber, 10);
+		if (arg == endofnumber)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+		switch (toupper(*endofnumber)) {
+		case '\0':
+			scale = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'K':
+			scale = 1<<10;
+			break;
+		case 'M':
+			scale = 1<<20;
+			break;
+		case 'G':
+			scale = 1<<30;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid RekeyLimit suffix",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		}
+		val64 *= scale;
+		/* detect integer wrap and too-large limits */
+		if ((val64 / scale) != orig || val64 > UINT_MAX)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (val64 < 16)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
+			options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64;
+		break;
+
+	case oIdentityFile:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep) {
+			intptr = &options->num_identity_files;
+			if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).",
+				    filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+			charptr = &options->identity_files[*intptr];
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+			*intptr = *intptr + 1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oXAuthLocation:
+		charptr=&options->xauth_location;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oUser:
+		charptr = &options->user;
+parse_string:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oGlobalKnownHostsFile:
+		charptr = &options->system_hostfile;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oUserKnownHostsFile:
+		charptr = &options->user_hostfile;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oGlobalKnownHostsFile2:
+		charptr = &options->system_hostfile2;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oUserKnownHostsFile2:
+		charptr = &options->user_hostfile2;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oHostName:
+		charptr = &options->hostname;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oHostKeyAlias:
+		charptr = &options->host_key_alias;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oPreferredAuthentications:
+		charptr = &options->preferred_authentications;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oBindAddress:
+		charptr = &options->bind_address;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oSmartcardDevice:
+		charptr = &options->smartcard_device;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oProxyCommand:
+		charptr = &options->proxy_command;
+parse_command:
+		if (s == NULL)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(s + len);
+		return 0;
+
+	case oPort:
+		intptr = &options->port;
+parse_int:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+
+		/* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */
+		value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0);
+		if (arg == endofnumber)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oConnectionAttempts:
+		intptr = &options->connection_attempts;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oCipher:
+		intptr = &options->cipher;
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = cipher_number(arg);
+		if (value == -1)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oCiphers:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (!ciphers_valid(arg))
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
+			options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oMacs:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (!mac_valid(arg))
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
+			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (!key_names_valid2(arg))
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol 2 host key algorithms '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && options->hostkeyalgorithms == NULL)
+			options->hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oProtocol:
+		intptr = &options->protocol;
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = proto_spec(arg);
+		if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oLogLevel:
+		log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		value = log_level_number(arg);
+		if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+			*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
+		break;
+
+	case oLocalForward:
+	case oRemoteForward:
+	case oDynamicForward:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+
+		if (opcode == oLocalForward ||
+		    opcode == oRemoteForward) {
+			arg2 = strdelim(&s);
+			if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0')
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+
+			/* construct a string for parse_forward */
+			snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2);
+		} else if (opcode == oDynamicForward) {
+			strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg));
+		}
+
+		if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg,
+		    opcode == oDynamicForward ? 1 : 0,
+		    opcode == oRemoteForward ? 1 : 0) == 0)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+
+		if (*activep) {
+			if (opcode == oLocalForward ||
+			    opcode == oDynamicForward)
+				add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
+			else if (opcode == oRemoteForward)
+				add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oClearAllForwardings:
+		intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oHost:
+		*activep = 0;
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
+			if (match_pattern(host, arg)) {
+				debug("Applying options for %.100s", arg);
+				*activep = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		/* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */
+		return 0;
+
+	case oEscapeChar:
+		intptr = &options->escape_char;
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
+		    (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
+			value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
+		else if (strlen(arg) == 1)
+			value = (u_char) arg[0];
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+			value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+		else {
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+			value = 0;	/* Avoid compiler warning. */
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oAddressFamily:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing address family.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		intptr = &options->address_family;
+		if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet6") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET6;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "any") == 0)
+			value = AF_UNSPEC;
+		else
+			fatal("Unsupported AddressFamily \"%s\"", arg);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oEnableSSHKeysign:
+		intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oIdentitiesOnly:
+		intptr = &options->identities_only;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oServerAliveInterval:
+		intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
+		goto parse_time;
+
+	case oServerAliveCountMax:
+		intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oSendEnv:
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+			if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			if (!*activep)
+				continue;
+			if (options->num_send_env >= MAX_SEND_ENV)
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] =
+			    xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oControlPath:
+		charptr = &options->control_path;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oControlMaster:
+		intptr = &options->control_master;
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlMaster argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* To avoid compiler warning... */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "auto") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "ask") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "autoask") == 0)
+			value = SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK;
+		else
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlMaster argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oHashKnownHosts:
+		intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oTunnel:
+		intptr = &options->tun_open;
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/"
+			    "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* silence compiler */
+		if (strcasecmp(arg, "ethernet") == 0)
+			value = SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "point-to-point") == 0)
+			value = SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+			value = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+			value = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
+			    "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*activep)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oTunnelDevice:
+		arg = strdelim(&s);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = a2tun(arg, &value2);
+		if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep) {
+			options->tun_local = value;
+			options->tun_remote = value2;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oLocalCommand:
+		charptr = &options->local_command;
+		goto parse_command;
+
+	case oPermitLocalCommand:
+		intptr = &options->permit_local_command;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oVisualHostKey:
+		intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oUseRoaming:
+		intptr = &options->use_roaming;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oVersionAddendum:
+		ssh_version_set_addendum(strtok(s, "\n"));
+		do {
+			arg = strdelim(&s);
+		} while (arg != NULL && *arg != '\0');
+		break;
+
+	case oDeprecated:
+		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		return 0;
+
+	case oUnsupported:
+		error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		return 0;
+
+	default:
+		fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode);
+	}
+
+	/* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
+	if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+		fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
+		    filename, linenum, arg);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly.  Options
+ * should already be initialized before this call.  This never returns if
+ * there is an error.  If the file does not exist, this returns 0.
+ */
+
+int
+read_config_file(const char *filename, const char *host, Options *options,
+    int checkperm)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char line[1024];
+	int active, linenum;
+	int bad_options = 0;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (checkperm) {
+		struct stat sb;
+
+		if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
+			fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
+		if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
+		    (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
+			fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
+	}
+
+	debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark that we are now processing the options.  This flag is turned
+	 * on/off by Host specifications.
+	 */
+	active = 1;
+	linenum = 0;
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+		/* Update line number counter. */
+		linenum++;
+		if (process_config_line(options, host, line, filename, linenum, &active) != 0)
+			bad_options++;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	if (bad_options > 0)
+		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+		    filename, bad_options);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
+ * been set.  Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
+ * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file,
+ * system config file.  Last, fill_default_options is called.
+ */
+
+void
+initialize_options(Options * options)
+{
+	memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options));
+	options->forward_agent = -1;
+	options->forward_x11 = -1;
+	options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
+	options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
+	options->xauth_location = NULL;
+	options->gateway_ports = -1;
+	options->use_privileged_port = -1;
+	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
+	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+	options->password_authentication = -1;
+	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+	options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
+	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+	options->batch_mode = -1;
+	options->check_host_ip = -1;
+	options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
+	options->compression = -1;
+	options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
+	options->compression_level = -1;
+	options->port = -1;
+	options->address_family = -1;
+	options->connection_attempts = -1;
+	options->connection_timeout = -1;
+	options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
+	options->cipher = -1;
+	options->ciphers = NULL;
+	options->macs = NULL;
+	options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+	options->num_identity_files = 0;
+	options->hostname = NULL;
+	options->host_key_alias = NULL;
+	options->proxy_command = NULL;
+	options->user = NULL;
+	options->escape_char = -1;
+	options->system_hostfile = NULL;
+	options->user_hostfile = NULL;
+	options->system_hostfile2 = NULL;
+	options->user_hostfile2 = NULL;
+	options->num_local_forwards = 0;
+	options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+	options->clear_forwardings = -1;
+	options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+	options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
+	options->bind_address = NULL;
+	options->smartcard_device = NULL;
+	options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
+	options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
+	options->identities_only = - 1;
+	options->rekey_limit = - 1;
+	options->verify_host_key_dns = -1;
+	options->server_alive_interval = -1;
+	options->server_alive_count_max = -1;
+	options->num_send_env = 0;
+	options->control_path = NULL;
+	options->control_master = -1;
+	options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
+	options->tun_open = -1;
+	options->tun_local = -1;
+	options->tun_remote = -1;
+	options->local_command = NULL;
+	options->permit_local_command = -1;
+	options->use_roaming = -1;
+	options->visual_host_key = -1;
+	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
+ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
+ */
+
+void
+fill_default_options(Options * options)
+{
+	int len;
+
+	if (options->forward_agent == -1)
+		options->forward_agent = 0;
+	if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
+		options->forward_x11 = 0;
+	if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
+		options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+	if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
+		options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0;
+	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+		options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
+	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
+		options->gateway_ports = 0;
+	if (options->use_privileged_port == -1)
+		options->use_privileged_port = 0;
+	if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
+		options->rsa_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+		options->password_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
+		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+		options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->batch_mode == -1)
+		options->batch_mode = 0;
+	if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
+		options->check_host_ip = 0;
+	if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1)
+		options->strict_host_key_checking = 2;	/* 2 is default */
+	if (options->compression == -1)
+		options->compression = 0;
+	if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
+		options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
+	if (options->compression_level == -1)
+		options->compression_level = 6;
+	if (options->port == -1)
+		options->port = 0;	/* Filled in ssh_connect. */
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+	if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
+		options->connection_attempts = 1;
+	if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
+		options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
+	/* Selected in ssh_login(). */
+	if (options->cipher == -1)
+		options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
+	/* options->ciphers, default set in myproposals.h */
+	/* options->macs, default set in myproposals.h */
+	/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
+	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2;
+	if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
+		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
+			len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY) + 1;
+			options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] =
+			    xmalloc(len);
+			snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++],
+			    len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY);
+		}
+		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+			len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA) + 1;
+			options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] =
+			    xmalloc(len);
+			snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++],
+			    len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA);
+
+			len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA) + 1;
+			options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] =
+			    xmalloc(len);
+			snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++],
+			    len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA);
+		}
+	}
+	if (options->escape_char == -1)
+		options->escape_char = '~';
+	if (options->system_hostfile == NULL)
+		options->system_hostfile = _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE;
+	if (options->user_hostfile == NULL)
+		options->user_hostfile = _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE;
+	if (options->system_hostfile2 == NULL)
+		options->system_hostfile2 = _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2;
+	if (options->user_hostfile2 == NULL)
+		options->user_hostfile2 = _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2;
+	if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+		options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	if (options->clear_forwardings == 1)
+		clear_forwardings(options);
+	if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
+		options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
+	if (options->identities_only == -1)
+		options->identities_only = 0;
+	if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
+		options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
+	if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
+		options->rekey_limit = 0;
+	if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
+		options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
+	if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
+		options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+	if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+		options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
+	if (options->control_master == -1)
+		options->control_master = 0;
+	if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
+		options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
+	if (options->tun_open == -1)
+		options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+	if (options->tun_local == -1)
+		options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+	if (options->tun_remote == -1)
+		options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+	if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
+		options->permit_local_command = 0;
+	if (options->use_roaming == -1)
+		options->use_roaming = 1;
+	if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
+		options->visual_host_key = 0;
+	if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
+		options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = 0;
+	/* options->local_command should not be set by default */
+	/* options->proxy_command should not be set by default */
+	/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+	/* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+	/* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
+	/* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse_forward
+ * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
+ *   dynamicfwd == 0
+ *	[listenhost:]listenport:connecthost:connectport
+ *   dynamicfwd == 1
+ *	[listenhost:]listenport
+ * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
+ */
+int
+parse_forward(Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd)
+{
+	int i;
+	char *p, *cp, *fwdarg[4];
+
+	memset(fwd, '\0', sizeof(*fwd));
+
+	cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec);
+
+	/* skip leading spaces */
+	while (isspace(*cp))
+		cp++;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
+		if ((fwdarg[i] = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+			break;
+
+	/* Check for trailing garbage */
+	if (cp != NULL)
+		i = 0;	/* failure */
+
+	switch (i) {
+	case 1:
+		fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
+		break;
+
+	case 2:
+		fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[0]));
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[1]);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
+		break;
+
+	case 3:
+		fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[1]));
+		fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdarg[2]);
+		break;
+
+	case 4:
+		fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[0]));
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[1]);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[2]));
+		fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdarg[3]);
+		break;
+	default:
+		i = 0; /* failure */
+	}
+
+	xfree(p);
+
+	if (dynamicfwd) {
+		if (!(i == 1 || i == 2))
+			goto fail_free;
+	} else {
+		if (!(i == 3 || i == 4))
+			goto fail_free;
+		if (fwd->connect_port <= 0)
+			goto fail_free;
+	}
+
+	if (fwd->listen_port < 0 || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0))
+		goto fail_free;
+
+	if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
+	    strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+		goto fail_free;
+	if (fwd->listen_host != NULL &&
+	    strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+		goto fail_free;
+
+
+	return (i);
+
+ fail_free:
+	if (fwd->connect_host != NULL) {
+		xfree(fwd->connect_host);
+		fwd->connect_host = NULL;
+	}
+	if (fwd->listen_host != NULL) {
+		xfree(fwd->listen_host);
+		fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ebfebe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.79 2009/06/27 09:35:06 andreas Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for reading the configuration file.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef READCONF_H
+#define READCONF_H
+
+/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
+
+typedef struct {
+	char	 *listen_host;		/* Host (address) to listen on. */
+	int	  listen_port;		/* Port to forward. */
+	char	 *connect_host;		/* Host to connect. */
+	int	  connect_port;		/* Port to connect on connect_host. */
+}       Forward;
+/* Data structure for representing option data. */
+
+#define MAX_SEND_ENV	256
+
+typedef struct {
+	int     forward_agent;	/* Forward authentication agent. */
+	int     forward_x11;	/* Forward X11 display. */
+	int     forward_x11_trusted;	/* Trust Forward X11 display. */
+	int     exit_on_forward_failure;	/* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
+	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location for xauth program */
+	int     gateway_ports;	/* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
+	int     use_privileged_port;	/* Don't use privileged port if false. */
+	int     rhosts_rsa_authentication;	/* Try rhosts with RSA
+						 * authentication. */
+	int     rsa_authentication;	/* Try RSA authentication. */
+	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
+	int     challenge_response_authentication;
+					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
+	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+						 * authentication. */
+	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+	char	*kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
+	int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;	/* Try jpake */
+	int     batch_mode;	/* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
+	int     check_host_ip;	/* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
+	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
+	int     compression;	/* Compress packets in both directions. */
+	int     compression_level;	/* Compression level 1 (fast) to 9
+					 * (best). */
+	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
+	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for logging. */
+
+	int     port;		/* Port to connect. */
+	int     address_family;
+	int     connection_attempts;	/* Max attempts (seconds) before
+					 * giving up */
+	int     connection_timeout;	/* Max time (seconds) before
+					 * aborting connection attempt */
+	int     number_of_password_prompts;	/* Max number of password
+						 * prompts. */
+	int     cipher;		/* Cipher to use. */
+	char   *ciphers;	/* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
+	char   *macs;		/* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
+	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
+	int	protocol;	/* Protocol in order of preference. */
+	char   *hostname;	/* Real host to connect. */
+	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
+	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
+	char   *user;		/* User to log in as. */
+	int     escape_char;	/* Escape character; -2 = none */
+
+	char   *system_hostfile;/* Path for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts. */
+	char   *user_hostfile;	/* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. */
+	char   *system_hostfile2;
+	char   *user_hostfile2;
+	char   *preferred_authentications;
+	char   *bind_address;	/* local socket address for connection to sshd */
+	char   *smartcard_device; /* Smartcard reader device */
+	int	verify_host_key_dns;	/* Verify host key using DNS */
+
+	int     num_identity_files;	/* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
+	char   *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	Key    *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+
+	/* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
+	int     num_local_forwards;
+	Forward local_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+
+	/* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
+	int     num_remote_forwards;
+	Forward remote_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+	int	clear_forwardings;
+
+	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
+	int64_t rekey_limit;
+	int	no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+	int	identities_only;
+	int	server_alive_interval;
+	int	server_alive_count_max;
+
+	int     num_send_env;
+	char   *send_env[MAX_SEND_ENV];
+
+	char	*control_path;
+	int	control_master;
+
+	int	hash_known_hosts;
+
+	int	tun_open;	/* tun(4) */
+	int     tun_local;	/* force tun device (optional) */
+	int     tun_remote;	/* force tun device (optional) */
+
+	char	*local_command;
+	int	permit_local_command;
+	int	visual_host_key;
+
+	int	use_roaming;
+
+}       Options;
+
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO	0
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES	1
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO	2
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK	3
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK	4
+
+void     initialize_options(Options *);
+void     fill_default_options(Options *);
+int	 read_config_file(const char *, const char *, Options *, int);
+int	 parse_forward(Forward *, const char *, int, int);
+
+int
+process_config_line(Options *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *);
+
+void	 add_local_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
+void	 add_remote_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
+
+#endif				/* READCONF_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readpass.c b/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd144c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.47 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+static char *
+ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+	size_t len;
+	char *pass;
+	int p[2], status, ret;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
+		error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (askpass == NULL)
+		fatal("internal error: askpass undefined");
+	if (pipe(p) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
+		close(p[0]);
+		if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+			fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *) 0);
+		fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	close(p[1]);
+
+	len = ret = 0;
+	do {
+		ret = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len);
+		if (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+			continue;
+		if (ret <= 0)
+			break;
+		len += ret;
+	} while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0);
+	buf[len] = '\0';
+
+	close(p[0]);
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+		memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+	pass = xstrdup(buf);
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	return pass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on.  Returns the
+ * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc).  Exits if EOF is encountered. If
+ * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no
+ * tty is available
+ */
+char *
+read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
+{
+	char *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
+	int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd;
+
+	rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF;
+	if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
+		use_askpass = 1;
+	else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
+		if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+			debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty");
+			use_askpass = 1;
+		}
+	} else {
+		rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
+		ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
+		if (ttyfd >= 0)
+			close(ttyfd);
+		else {
+			debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			use_askpass = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL)
+		return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup("");
+
+	if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) {
+		if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV))
+			askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV);
+		else
+			askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
+		if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt)) == NULL)
+			if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF))
+				return xstrdup("");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) {
+		if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)
+			return NULL;
+		return xstrdup("");
+	}
+
+	ret = xstrdup(buf);
+	memset(buf, 'x', sizeof buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	char *p, prompt[1024];
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+	if (p != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Accept empty responses and responses consisting
+		 * of the word "yes" as affirmative.
+		 */
+		if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' ||
+		    strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
+			allowed = 1;
+		xfree(p);
+	}
+
+	return (allowed);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c b/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7432ea2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1244 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.16 2004/06/23 00:39:38 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.c
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+
+#define FULL_UNROLL
+
+/*
+Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
+Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
+Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
+Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
+Te4[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
+
+Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
+Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
+Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
+Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
+Td4[x] = Si[x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
+*/
+
+static const u32 Te0[256] = {
+    0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
+    0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
+    0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU,
+    0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU,
+    0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U,
+    0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU,
+    0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU,
+    0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU,
+    0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU,
+    0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU,
+    0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U,
+    0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU,
+    0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU,
+    0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U,
+    0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU,
+    0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU,
+    0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU,
+    0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU,
+    0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU,
+    0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U,
+    0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU,
+    0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU,
+    0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU,
+    0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU,
+    0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U,
+    0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U,
+    0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U,
+    0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U,
+    0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU,
+    0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U,
+    0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U,
+    0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU,
+    0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU,
+    0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U,
+    0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U,
+    0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U,
+    0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU,
+    0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U,
+    0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU,
+    0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U,
+    0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU,
+    0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U,
+    0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U,
+    0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU,
+    0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U,
+    0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U,
+    0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U,
+    0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U,
+    0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U,
+    0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U,
+    0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U,
+    0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U,
+    0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU,
+    0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U,
+    0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U,
+    0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U,
+    0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U,
+    0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U,
+    0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U,
+    0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU,
+    0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U,
+    0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U,
+    0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U,
+    0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU,
+};
+static const u32 Te1[256] = {
+    0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU,
+    0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U,
+    0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU,
+    0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U,
+    0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU,
+    0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U,
+    0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU,
+    0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U,
+    0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U,
+    0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU,
+    0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U,
+    0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U,
+    0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U,
+    0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU,
+    0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U,
+    0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U,
+    0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU,
+    0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U,
+    0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U,
+    0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U,
+    0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU,
+    0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU,
+    0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U,
+    0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU,
+    0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU,
+    0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U,
+    0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU,
+    0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U,
+    0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU,
+    0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U,
+    0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U,
+    0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U,
+    0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU,
+    0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U,
+    0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU,
+    0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U,
+    0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU,
+    0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U,
+    0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U,
+    0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU,
+    0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU,
+    0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU,
+    0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U,
+    0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U,
+    0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU,
+    0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U,
+    0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU,
+    0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U,
+    0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU,
+    0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U,
+    0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU,
+    0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU,
+    0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U,
+    0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU,
+    0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U,
+    0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU,
+    0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U,
+    0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U,
+    0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U,
+    0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU,
+    0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU,
+    0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U,
+    0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU,
+    0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U,
+};
+static const u32 Te2[256] = {
+    0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU,
+    0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U,
+    0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU,
+    0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U,
+    0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU,
+    0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U,
+    0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU,
+    0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U,
+    0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U,
+    0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU,
+    0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U,
+    0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U,
+    0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U,
+    0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU,
+    0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U,
+    0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U,
+    0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU,
+    0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U,
+    0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U,
+    0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U,
+    0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU,
+    0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU,
+    0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U,
+    0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU,
+    0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU,
+    0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U,
+    0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU,
+    0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U,
+    0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU,
+    0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U,
+    0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U,
+    0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U,
+    0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU,
+    0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U,
+    0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU,
+    0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U,
+    0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU,
+    0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U,
+    0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U,
+    0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU,
+    0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU,
+    0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU,
+    0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U,
+    0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U,
+    0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU,
+    0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U,
+    0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU,
+    0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U,
+    0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU,
+    0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U,
+    0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU,
+    0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU,
+    0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U,
+    0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU,
+    0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U,
+    0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU,
+    0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U,
+    0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U,
+    0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U,
+    0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU,
+    0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU,
+    0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U,
+    0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU,
+    0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U,
+};
+static const u32 Te3[256] = {
+
+    0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U,
+    0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U,
+    0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U,
+    0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU,
+    0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU,
+    0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU,
+    0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U,
+    0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU,
+    0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU,
+    0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U,
+    0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U,
+    0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU,
+    0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU,
+    0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU,
+    0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU,
+    0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU,
+    0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U,
+    0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU,
+    0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU,
+    0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U,
+    0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U,
+    0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U,
+    0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U,
+    0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U,
+    0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU,
+    0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U,
+    0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU,
+    0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU,
+    0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U,
+    0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U,
+    0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U,
+    0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU,
+    0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U,
+    0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU,
+    0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU,
+    0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U,
+    0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U,
+    0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU,
+    0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U,
+    0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU,
+    0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U,
+    0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U,
+    0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U,
+    0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U,
+    0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU,
+    0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U,
+    0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU,
+    0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U,
+    0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU,
+    0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U,
+    0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU,
+    0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU,
+    0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU,
+    0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU,
+    0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U,
+    0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U,
+    0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U,
+    0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U,
+    0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U,
+    0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U,
+    0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU,
+    0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U,
+    0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU,
+    0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU,
+};
+static const u32 Te4[256] = {
+    0x63636363U, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0x77777777U, 0x7b7b7b7bU,
+    0xf2f2f2f2U, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xc5c5c5c5U,
+    0x30303030U, 0x01010101U, 0x67676767U, 0x2b2b2b2bU,
+    0xfefefefeU, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xababababU, 0x76767676U,
+    0xcacacacaU, 0x82828282U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
+    0xfafafafaU, 0x59595959U, 0x47474747U, 0xf0f0f0f0U,
+    0xadadadadU, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0xafafafafU,
+    0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x72727272U, 0xc0c0c0c0U,
+    0xb7b7b7b7U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0x93939393U, 0x26262626U,
+    0x36363636U, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xccccccccU,
+    0x34343434U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0xf1f1f1f1U,
+    0x71717171U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0x31313131U, 0x15151515U,
+    0x04040404U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x23232323U, 0xc3c3c3c3U,
+    0x18181818U, 0x96969696U, 0x05050505U, 0x9a9a9a9aU,
+    0x07070707U, 0x12121212U, 0x80808080U, 0xe2e2e2e2U,
+    0xebebebebU, 0x27272727U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x75757575U,
+    0x09090909U, 0x83838383U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1a1a1a1aU,
+    0x1b1b1b1bU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xa0a0a0a0U,
+    0x52525252U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0xb3b3b3b3U,
+    0x29292929U, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0x84848484U,
+    0x53535353U, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xededededU,
+    0x20202020U, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x5b5b5b5bU,
+    0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0xbebebebeU, 0x39393939U,
+    0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x58585858U, 0xcfcfcfcfU,
+    0xd0d0d0d0U, 0xefefefefU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
+    0x43434343U, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0x33333333U, 0x85858585U,
+    0x45454545U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x02020202U, 0x7f7f7f7fU,
+    0x50505050U, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0xa8a8a8a8U,
+    0x51515151U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x40404040U, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
+    0x92929292U, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x38383838U, 0xf5f5f5f5U,
+    0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x21212121U,
+    0x10101010U, 0xffffffffU, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd2d2d2d2U,
+    0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x13131313U, 0xececececU,
+    0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x97979797U, 0x44444444U, 0x17171717U,
+    0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
+    0x64646464U, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x19191919U, 0x73737373U,
+    0x60606060U, 0x81818181U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0xdcdcdcdcU,
+    0x22222222U, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0x90909090U, 0x88888888U,
+    0x46464646U, 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0x14141414U,
+    0xdedededeU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0xdbdbdbdbU,
+    0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x32323232U, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
+    0x49494949U, 0x06060606U, 0x24242424U, 0x5c5c5c5cU,
+    0xc2c2c2c2U, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0xacacacacU, 0x62626262U,
+    0x91919191U, 0x95959595U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x79797979U,
+    0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0x37373737U, 0x6d6d6d6dU,
+    0x8d8d8d8dU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
+    0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x56565656U, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
+    0x65656565U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x08080808U,
+    0xbabababaU, 0x78787878U, 0x25252525U, 0x2e2e2e2eU,
+    0x1c1c1c1cU, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xc6c6c6c6U,
+    0xe8e8e8e8U, 0xddddddddU, 0x74747474U, 0x1f1f1f1fU,
+    0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0x8a8a8a8aU,
+    0x70707070U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x66666666U,
+    0x48484848U, 0x03030303U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
+    0x61616161U, 0x35353535U, 0x57575757U, 0xb9b9b9b9U,
+    0x86868686U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
+    0xe1e1e1e1U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0x98989898U, 0x11111111U,
+    0x69696969U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x94949494U,
+    0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x87878787U, 0xe9e9e9e9U,
+    0xcecececeU, 0x55555555U, 0x28282828U, 0xdfdfdfdfU,
+    0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x89898989U, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
+    0xbfbfbfbfU, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x42424242U, 0x68686868U,
+    0x41414141U, 0x99999999U, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0x0f0f0f0fU,
+    0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x54545454U, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x16161616U,
+};
+static const u32 Td0[256] = {
+    0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U,
+    0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U,
+    0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U,
+    0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU,
+    0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U,
+    0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U,
+    0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU,
+    0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U,
+    0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU,
+    0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U,
+    0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U,
+    0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U,
+    0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U,
+    0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU,
+    0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U,
+    0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU,
+    0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U,
+    0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU,
+    0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U,
+    0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U,
+    0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U,
+    0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU,
+    0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U,
+    0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU,
+    0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU,
+    0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U,
+    0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU,
+    0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU,
+    0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U,
+    0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU,
+    0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U,
+    0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU,
+    0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U,
+    0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U,
+    0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U,
+    0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU,
+    0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U,
+    0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U,
+    0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU,
+    0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U,
+    0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U,
+    0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U,
+    0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U,
+    0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U,
+    0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU,
+    0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U,
+    0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U,
+    0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U,
+    0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U,
+    0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U,
+    0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU,
+    0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU,
+    0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU,
+    0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU,
+    0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U,
+    0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U,
+    0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU,
+    0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU,
+    0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U,
+    0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU,
+    0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U,
+    0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U,
+    0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U,
+};
+static const u32 Td1[256] = {
+    0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU,
+    0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U,
+    0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU,
+    0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U,
+    0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U,
+    0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U,
+    0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U,
+    0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U,
+    0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U,
+    0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU,
+    0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU,
+    0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU,
+    0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U,
+    0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU,
+    0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U,
+    0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U,
+    0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U,
+    0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU,
+    0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU,
+    0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U,
+    0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU,
+    0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U,
+    0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU,
+    0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU,
+    0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U,
+    0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U,
+    0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U,
+    0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU,
+    0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U,
+    0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU,
+    0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U,
+    0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U,
+    0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U,
+    0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU,
+    0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U,
+    0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U,
+    0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U,
+    0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U,
+    0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U,
+    0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U,
+    0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU,
+    0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU,
+    0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U,
+    0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU,
+    0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U,
+    0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU,
+    0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU,
+    0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U,
+    0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU,
+    0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U,
+    0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U,
+    0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U,
+    0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U,
+    0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U,
+    0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U,
+    0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U,
+    0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU,
+    0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U,
+    0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U,
+    0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU,
+    0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U,
+    0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U,
+    0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U,
+    0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U,
+};
+static const u32 Td2[256] = {
+    0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U,
+    0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U,
+    0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U,
+    0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U,
+    0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU,
+    0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U,
+    0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U,
+    0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U,
+    0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U,
+    0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU,
+    0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U,
+    0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U,
+    0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU,
+    0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U,
+    0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U,
+    0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U,
+    0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U,
+    0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U,
+    0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U,
+    0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU,
+
+    0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U,
+    0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U,
+    0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U,
+    0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U,
+    0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU,
+    0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU,
+    0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U,
+    0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU,
+    0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U,
+    0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU,
+    0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU,
+    0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU,
+    0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU,
+    0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U,
+    0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U,
+    0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U,
+    0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U,
+    0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U,
+    0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U,
+    0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U,
+    0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU,
+    0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU,
+    0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U,
+    0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U,
+    0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU,
+    0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU,
+    0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U,
+    0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U,
+    0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U,
+    0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U,
+    0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U,
+    0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U,
+    0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U,
+    0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU,
+    0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U,
+    0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U,
+    0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U,
+    0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U,
+    0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U,
+    0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U,
+    0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU,
+    0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U,
+    0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U,
+};
+static const u32 Td3[256] = {
+    0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU,
+    0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU,
+    0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U,
+    0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U,
+    0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU,
+    0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU,
+    0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U,
+    0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU,
+    0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U,
+    0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU,
+    0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U,
+    0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U,
+    0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U,
+    0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U,
+    0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U,
+    0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU,
+    0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU,
+    0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U,
+    0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U,
+    0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU,
+    0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU,
+    0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U,
+    0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U,
+    0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U,
+    0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU,
+    0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U,
+    0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U,
+    0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU,
+    0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU,
+    0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U,
+    0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U,
+    0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U,
+    0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU,
+    0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U,
+    0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U,
+    0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U,
+    0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U,
+    0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U,
+    0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U,
+    0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U,
+    0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU,
+    0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U,
+    0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U,
+    0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU,
+    0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU,
+    0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U,
+    0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU,
+    0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U,
+    0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U,
+    0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U,
+    0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U,
+    0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U,
+    0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U,
+    0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU,
+    0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU,
+    0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU,
+    0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU,
+    0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U,
+    0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U,
+    0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U,
+    0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU,
+    0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U,
+    0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U,
+};
+static const u32 Td4[256] = {
+    0x52525252U, 0x09090909U, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xd5d5d5d5U,
+    0x30303030U, 0x36363636U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0x38383838U,
+    0xbfbfbfbfU, 0x40404040U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
+    0x81818181U, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
+    0x7c7c7c7cU, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x39393939U, 0x82828282U,
+    0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0xffffffffU, 0x87878787U,
+    0x34343434U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x43434343U, 0x44444444U,
+    0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xdedededeU, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcbcbcbcbU,
+    0x54545454U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0x94949494U, 0x32323232U,
+    0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0x23232323U, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
+    0xeeeeeeeeU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x95959595U, 0x0b0b0b0bU,
+    0x42424242U, 0xfafafafaU, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x4e4e4e4eU,
+    0x08080808U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x66666666U,
+    0x28282828U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x24242424U, 0xb2b2b2b2U,
+    0x76767676U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0x49494949U,
+    0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x25252525U,
+    0x72727272U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x64646464U,
+    0x86868686U, 0x68686868U, 0x98989898U, 0x16161616U,
+    0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xccccccccU,
+    0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x65656565U, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0x92929292U,
+    0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x70707070U, 0x48484848U, 0x50505050U,
+    0xfdfdfdfdU, 0xededededU, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0xdadadadaU,
+    0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x15151515U, 0x46464646U, 0x57575757U,
+    0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x84848484U,
+    0x90909090U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0xababababU, 0x00000000U,
+    0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
+    0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x58585858U, 0x05050505U,
+    0xb8b8b8b8U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x45454545U, 0x06060606U,
+    0xd0d0d0d0U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
+    0xcacacacaU, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0x02020202U,
+    0xc1c1c1c1U, 0xafafafafU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x03030303U,
+    0x01010101U, 0x13131313U, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x6b6b6b6bU,
+    0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x91919191U, 0x11111111U, 0x41414141U,
+    0x4f4f4f4fU, 0x67676767U, 0xdcdcdcdcU, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
+    0x97979797U, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xcecececeU,
+    0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x73737373U,
+    0x96969696U, 0xacacacacU, 0x74747474U, 0x22222222U,
+    0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xadadadadU, 0x35353535U, 0x85858585U,
+    0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x37373737U, 0xe8e8e8e8U,
+    0x1c1c1c1cU, 0x75757575U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x6e6e6e6eU,
+    0x47474747U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x71717171U,
+    0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x29292929U, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x89898989U,
+    0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0x62626262U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
+    0xaaaaaaaaU, 0x18181818U, 0xbebebebeU, 0x1b1b1b1bU,
+    0xfcfcfcfcU, 0x56565656U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0x4b4b4b4bU,
+    0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0x79797979U, 0x20202020U,
+    0x9a9a9a9aU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xfefefefeU,
+    0x78787878U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xf4f4f4f4U,
+    0x1f1f1f1fU, 0xddddddddU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x33333333U,
+    0x88888888U, 0x07070707U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x31313131U,
+    0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x12121212U, 0x10101010U, 0x59595959U,
+    0x27272727U, 0x80808080U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU,
+    0x60606060U, 0x51515151U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
+    0x19191919U, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
+    0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0x9f9f9f9fU,
+    0x93939393U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xefefefefU,
+    0xa0a0a0a0U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0x4d4d4d4dU,
+    0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xb0b0b0b0U,
+    0xc8c8c8c8U, 0xebebebebU, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x3c3c3c3cU,
+    0x83838383U, 0x53535353U, 0x99999999U, 0x61616161U,
+    0x17171717U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0x04040404U, 0x7e7e7e7eU,
+    0xbabababaU, 0x77777777U, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0x26262626U,
+    0xe1e1e1e1U, 0x69696969U, 0x14141414U, 0x63636363U,
+    0x55555555U, 0x21212121U, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
+};
+static const u32 rcon[] = {
+	0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
+	0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000,
+	0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */
+};
+
+#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] <<  8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3]))
+#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >>  8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); }
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
+ *
+ * @return	the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
+ */
+static int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) {
+	int i = 0;
+	u32 temp;
+
+	rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey     );
+	rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey +  4);
+	rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey +  8);
+	rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12);
+	if (keyBits == 128) {
+		for (;;) {
+			temp  = rk[3];
+			rk[4] = rk[0] ^
+				(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+				(Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+				(Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+				(Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+				rcon[i];
+			rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
+			rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
+			rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
+			if (++i == 10) {
+				return 10;
+			}
+			rk += 4;
+		}
+	}
+	rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16);
+	rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20);
+	if (keyBits == 192) {
+		for (;;) {
+			temp = rk[ 5];
+			rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
+				(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+				(Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+				(Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+				(Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+				rcon[i];
+			rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
+			rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
+			rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8];
+			if (++i == 8) {
+				return 12;
+			}
+			rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9];
+			rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10];
+			rk += 6;
+		}
+	}
+	rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24);
+	rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28);
+	if (keyBits == 256) {
+		for (;;) {
+			temp = rk[ 7];
+			rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
+				(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+				(Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+				(Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+				(Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+				rcon[i];
+			rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
+			rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
+			rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
+				if (++i == 7) {
+					return 14;
+				}
+			temp = rk[11];
+			rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
+				(Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+				(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+				(Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+				(Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
+			rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
+			rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
+			rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
+			rk += 8;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
+ *
+ * @return	the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
+ */
+static int
+rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits,
+    int have_encrypt) {
+	int Nr, i, j;
+	u32 temp;
+
+	if (have_encrypt) {
+		Nr = have_encrypt;
+	} else {
+		/* expand the cipher key: */
+		Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits);
+	}
+	/* invert the order of the round keys: */
+	for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
+		temp = rk[i    ]; rk[i    ] = rk[j    ]; rk[j    ] = temp;
+		temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
+		temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
+		temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
+	}
+	/* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */
+	for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) {
+		rk += 4;
+		rk[0] =
+			Td0[Te4[(rk[0] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+			Td1[Te4[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td2[Te4[(rk[0] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td3[Te4[(rk[0]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+		rk[1] =
+			Td0[Te4[(rk[1] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+			Td1[Te4[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td2[Te4[(rk[1] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td3[Te4[(rk[1]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+		rk[2] =
+			Td0[Te4[(rk[2] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+			Td1[Te4[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td2[Te4[(rk[2] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td3[Te4[(rk[2]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+		rk[3] =
+			Td0[Te4[(rk[3] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+			Td1[Te4[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td2[Te4[(rk[3] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td3[Te4[(rk[3]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+	}
+	return Nr;
+}
+
+static void rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) {
+	u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+    int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+    /*
+	 * map byte array block to cipher state
+	 * and add initial round key:
+	 */
+	s0 = GETU32(pt     ) ^ rk[0];
+	s1 = GETU32(pt +  4) ^ rk[1];
+	s2 = GETU32(pt +  8) ^ rk[2];
+	s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+    /* round 1: */
+	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+	/* round 2: */
+	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+    /* round 3: */
+	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+	/* round 4: */
+	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+    /* round 5: */
+	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+	/* round 6: */
+	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+    /* round 7: */
+	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+	/* round 8: */
+	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+    /* round 9: */
+	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+    if (Nr > 10) {
+	/* round 10: */
+	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+	/* round 11: */
+	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+	if (Nr > 12) {
+	    /* round 12: */
+	    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+	    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+	    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+	    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+	    /* round 13: */
+	    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+	    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+	    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+	    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+	}
+    }
+    rk += Nr << 2;
+#else  /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+	 * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+	 */
+    r = Nr >> 1;
+    for (;;) {
+	t0 =
+	    Te0[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[4];
+	t1 =
+	    Te0[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[5];
+	t2 =
+	    Te0[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[6];
+	t3 =
+	    Te0[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[7];
+
+	rk += 8;
+	if (--r == 0) {
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	s0 =
+	    Te0[(t0 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(t3      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[0];
+	s1 =
+	    Te0[(t1 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(t0      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[1];
+	s2 =
+	    Te0[(t2 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(t1      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[2];
+	s3 =
+	    Te0[(t3 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(t2      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[3];
+    }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+	 * apply last round and
+	 * map cipher state to byte array block:
+	 */
+	s0 =
+		(Te4[(t0 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Te4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Te4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Te4[(t3      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[0];
+	PUTU32(ct     , s0);
+	s1 =
+		(Te4[(t1 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Te4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Te4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Te4[(t0      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[1];
+	PUTU32(ct +  4, s1);
+	s2 =
+		(Te4[(t2 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Te4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Te4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Te4[(t1      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[2];
+	PUTU32(ct +  8, s2);
+	s3 =
+		(Te4[(t3 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Te4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Te4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Te4[(t2      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[3];
+	PUTU32(ct + 12, s3);
+}
+
+static void rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]) {
+	u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+    int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+    /*
+	 * map byte array block to cipher state
+	 * and add initial round key:
+	 */
+    s0 = GETU32(ct     ) ^ rk[0];
+    s1 = GETU32(ct +  4) ^ rk[1];
+    s2 = GETU32(ct +  8) ^ rk[2];
+    s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+    /* round 1: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+    /* round 2: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+    /* round 3: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+    /* round 4: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+    /* round 5: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+    /* round 6: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+    /* round 7: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+    /* round 8: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+    /* round 9: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+    if (Nr > 10) {
+	/* round 10: */
+	s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+	s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+	s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+	s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+	/* round 11: */
+	t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+	t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+	t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+	t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+	if (Nr > 12) {
+	    /* round 12: */
+	    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+	    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+	    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+	    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+	    /* round 13: */
+	    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+	    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+	    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+	    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+	}
+    }
+	rk += Nr << 2;
+#else  /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+     * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+     */
+    r = Nr >> 1;
+    for (;;) {
+	t0 =
+	    Td0[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[4];
+	t1 =
+	    Td0[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[5];
+	t2 =
+	    Td0[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[6];
+	t3 =
+	    Td0[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[7];
+
+	rk += 8;
+	if (--r == 0) {
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	s0 =
+	    Td0[(t0 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(t1      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[0];
+	s1 =
+	    Td0[(t1 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(t2      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[1];
+	s2 =
+	    Td0[(t2 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(t3      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[2];
+	s3 =
+	    Td0[(t3 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(t0      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[3];
+    }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+	 * apply last round and
+	 * map cipher state to byte array block:
+	 */
+	s0 =
+		(Td4[(t0 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Td4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Td4[(t1      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[0];
+	PUTU32(pt     , s0);
+	s1 =
+		(Td4[(t1 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Td4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Td4[(t2      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[1];
+	PUTU32(pt +  4, s1);
+	s2 =
+		(Td4[(t2 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Td4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Td4[(t3      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[2];
+	PUTU32(pt +  8, s2);
+	s3 =
+		(Td4[(t3 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Td4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Td4[(t0      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[3];
+	PUTU32(pt + 12, s3);
+}
+
+void
+rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *key, int bits, int do_encrypt)
+{
+	ctx->Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->ek, key, bits);
+	if (do_encrypt) {
+		ctx->decrypt = 0;
+		memset(ctx->dk, 0, sizeof(ctx->dk));
+	} else {
+		ctx->decrypt = 1;
+		memcpy(ctx->dk, ctx->ek, sizeof(ctx->dk));
+		rijndaelKeySetupDec(ctx->dk, key, bits, ctx->Nr);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst)
+{
+	rijndaelDecrypt(ctx->dk, ctx->Nr, src, dst);
+}
+
+void
+rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst)
+{
+	rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->ek, ctx->Nr, src, dst);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rijndael.h b/crypto/openssh/rijndael.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c614bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/rijndael.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.12 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.h
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef __RIJNDAEL_H
+#define __RIJNDAEL_H
+
+#define MAXKC	(256/32)
+#define MAXKB	(256/8)
+#define MAXNR	14
+
+typedef unsigned char	u8;
+typedef unsigned short	u16;
+typedef unsigned int	u32;
+
+/*  The structure for key information */
+typedef struct {
+	int	decrypt;
+	int	Nr;			/* key-length-dependent number of rounds */
+	u32	ek[4*(MAXNR + 1)];	/* encrypt key schedule */
+	u32	dk[4*(MAXNR + 1)];	/* decrypt key schedule */
+} rijndael_ctx;
+
+void	 rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int);
+void	 rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
+void	 rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
+
+#endif /* __RIJNDAEL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/roaming.h b/crypto/openssh/roaming.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e517161
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/roaming.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: roaming.h,v 1.4 2009/06/27 09:32:43 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ROAMING_H
+#define ROAMING_H
+
+#define DEFAULT_ROAMBUF 65536
+
+extern int resume_in_progress;
+
+int	get_snd_buf_size(void);
+int	get_recv_buf_size(void);
+void	add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t);
+void	set_out_buffer_size(size_t);
+ssize_t	roaming_write(int, const void *, size_t, int *);
+ssize_t	roaming_read(int, void *, size_t, int *);
+size_t	roaming_atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
+u_int64_t	get_recv_bytes(void);
+u_int64_t	get_sent_bytes(void);
+void	roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t, u_int64_t);
+void	resend_bytes(int, u_int64_t *);
+int	resume_kex(void);
+
+#endif /* ROAMING */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c b/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73db09d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: roaming_common.c,v 1.5 2009/06/27 09:32:43 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+static size_t out_buf_size = 0;
+static char *out_buf = NULL;
+static size_t out_start;
+static size_t out_last;
+
+static u_int64_t write_bytes = 0;
+static u_int64_t read_bytes = 0;
+
+int roaming_enabled = 0;
+int resume_in_progress = 0;
+
+int
+get_snd_buf_size()
+{
+	int fd = packet_get_connection_out();
+	int optval, optvallen;
+
+	optvallen = sizeof(optval);
+	if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &optval, &optvallen) != 0)
+		optval = DEFAULT_ROAMBUF;
+	return optval;
+}
+
+int
+get_recv_buf_size()
+{
+	int fd = packet_get_connection_in();
+	int optval, optvallen;
+
+	optvallen = sizeof(optval);
+	if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &optval, &optvallen) != 0)
+		optval = DEFAULT_ROAMBUF;
+	return optval;
+}
+
+void
+set_out_buffer_size(size_t size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The buffer size can only be set once and the buffer will live
+	 * as long as the session lives.
+	 */
+	if (out_buf == NULL) {
+		out_buf_size = size;
+		out_buf = xmalloc(size);
+		out_start = 0;
+		out_last = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+get_recv_bytes(void)
+{
+	return read_bytes;
+}
+
+void
+add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t num)
+{
+	read_bytes += num;
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+get_sent_bytes(void)
+{
+	return write_bytes;
+}
+
+void
+roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t sent, u_int64_t recvd)
+{
+	read_bytes = recvd;
+	write_bytes = sent;
+}
+
+static void
+buf_append(const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	if (count > out_buf_size) {
+		buf += count - out_buf_size;
+		count = out_buf_size;
+	}
+	if (count < out_buf_size - out_last) {
+		memcpy(out_buf + out_last, buf, count);
+		if (out_start > out_last)
+			out_start += count;
+		out_last += count;
+	} else {
+		/* data will wrap */
+		size_t chunk = out_buf_size - out_last;
+		memcpy(out_buf + out_last, buf, chunk);
+		memcpy(out_buf, buf + chunk, count - chunk);
+		out_last = count - chunk;
+		out_start = out_last + 1;
+	}
+}
+
+ssize_t
+roaming_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
+{
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	ret = write(fd, buf, count);
+	if (ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
+		write_bytes += ret;
+		if (out_buf_size > 0)
+			buf_append(buf, ret);
+	}
+	debug3("Wrote %ld bytes for a total of %llu", (long)ret,
+	    (unsigned long long)write_bytes);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+roaming_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
+{
+	ssize_t ret = read(fd, buf, count);
+	if (ret > 0) {
+		if (!resume_in_progress) {
+			read_bytes += ret;
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+size_t
+roaming_atomicio(ssize_t(*f)(int, void*, size_t), int fd, void *buf,
+    size_t count)
+{
+	size_t ret = atomicio(f, fd, buf, count);
+
+	if (f == vwrite && ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
+		write_bytes += ret;
+	} else if (f == read && ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
+		read_bytes += ret;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+resend_bytes(int fd, u_int64_t *offset)
+{
+	size_t available, needed;
+
+	if (out_start < out_last)
+		available = out_last - out_start;
+	else
+		available = out_buf_size;
+	needed = write_bytes - *offset;
+	debug3("resend_bytes: resend %lu bytes from %llu",
+	    (unsigned long)needed, (unsigned long long)*offset);
+	if (needed > available)
+		fatal("Needed to resend more data than in the cache");
+	if (out_last < needed) {
+		int chunkend = needed - out_last;
+		atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf + out_buf_size - chunkend,
+		    chunkend);
+		atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf, out_last);
+	} else {
+		atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf + (out_last - needed), needed);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c b/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45c4008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: roaming_dummy.c,v 1.3 2009/06/21 09:04:03 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file is included in the client programs which should not
+ * support roaming.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+int resume_in_progress = 0;
+
+u_int64_t
+get_recv_bytes(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+roaming_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
+{
+	return write(fd, buf, count);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+roaming_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
+{
+	if (cont)
+		*cont = 0;
+	return read(fd, buf, count);
+}
+
+void
+add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t num)
+{
+}
+
+int
+resume_kex(void)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bec1d19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.29 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *
+ * Description of the RSA algorithm can be found e.g. from the following
+ * sources:
+ *
+ *   Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography.  John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
+ *
+ *   Jennifer Seberry and Josed Pieprzyk: Cryptography: An Introduction to
+ *   Computer Security.  Prentice-Hall, 1989.
+ *
+ *   Man Young Rhee: Cryptography and Secure Data Communications.  McGraw-Hill,
+ *   1994.
+ *
+ *   R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic Communications
+ *   System and Method.  US Patent 4,405,829, 1983.
+ *
+ *   Hans Riesel: Prime Numbers and Computer Methods for Factorization.
+ *   Birkhauser, 1994.
+ *
+ *   The RSA Frequently Asked Questions document by RSA Data Security,
+ *   Inc., 1995.
+ *
+ *   RSA in 3 lines of perl by Adam Back <aba@atlax.ex.ac.uk>, 1995, as
+ * included below:
+ *
+ *     [gone - had to be deleted - what a pity]
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+void
+rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
+{
+	u_char *inbuf, *outbuf;
+	int len, ilen, olen;
+
+	if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
+		fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() exponent too small or not odd");
+
+	olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	outbuf = xmalloc(olen);
+
+	ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
+	inbuf = xmalloc(ilen);
+	BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
+
+	if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
+	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
+		fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() failed");
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL)
+		fatal("rsa_public_encrypt: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+	memset(outbuf, 0, olen);
+	memset(inbuf, 0, ilen);
+	xfree(outbuf);
+	xfree(inbuf);
+}
+
+int
+rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
+{
+	u_char *inbuf, *outbuf;
+	int len, ilen, olen;
+
+	olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	outbuf = xmalloc(olen);
+
+	ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
+	inbuf = xmalloc(ilen);
+	BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
+
+	if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
+	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) {
+		error("rsa_private_decrypt() failed");
+	} else {
+		if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL)
+			fatal("rsa_private_decrypt: BN_bin2bn failed");
+	}
+	memset(outbuf, 0, olen);
+	memset(inbuf, 0, ilen);
+	xfree(outbuf);
+	xfree(inbuf);
+	return len;
+}
+
+/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
+void
+rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa)
+{
+	BIGNUM *aux;
+	BN_CTX *ctx;
+
+	if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_new failed");
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_CTX_new failed");
+
+	if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0))
+		fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_sub/mod failed");
+
+	BN_clear_free(aux);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rsa.h b/crypto/openssh/rsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b841ea4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/rsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * RSA key generation, encryption and decryption.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef RSA_H
+#define RSA_H
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+void	 rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
+int	 rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
+void	 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *);
+
+#endif				/* RSA_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scard-opensc.c b/crypto/openssh/scard-opensc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36dae05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scard-opensc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,532 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Juha Yrjölä.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if defined(SMARTCARD) && defined(USE_OPENSC)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <opensc/opensc.h>
+#include <opensc/pkcs15.h>
+
+#include "key.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "scard.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L && defined(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE)
+#define USE_ENGINE
+#define RSA_get_default_method RSA_get_default_openssl_method
+#else
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#define sc_get_rsa sc_get_engine
+#else
+#define sc_get_rsa sc_get_rsa_method
+#endif
+
+static int sc_reader_id;
+static sc_context_t *ctx = NULL;
+static sc_card_t *card = NULL;
+static sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card = NULL;
+
+static char *sc_pin = NULL;
+
+struct sc_priv_data
+{
+	struct sc_pkcs15_id cert_id;
+	int ref_count;
+};
+
+void
+sc_close(void)
+{
+	if (p15card) {
+		sc_pkcs15_unbind(p15card);
+		p15card = NULL;
+	}
+	if (card) {
+		sc_disconnect_card(card, 0);
+		card = NULL;
+	}
+	if (ctx) {
+		sc_release_context(ctx);
+		ctx = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+sc_init(void)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = sc_establish_context(&ctx, "openssh");
+	if (r)
+		goto err;
+	if (sc_reader_id >= ctx->reader_count) {
+		r = SC_ERROR_NO_READERS_FOUND;
+		error("Illegal reader number %d (max %d)", sc_reader_id,
+		    ctx->reader_count -1);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	r = sc_connect_card(ctx->reader[sc_reader_id], 0, &card);
+	if (r)
+		goto err;
+	r = sc_pkcs15_bind(card, &p15card);
+	if (r)
+		goto err;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	sc_close();
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* private key operations */
+
+static int
+sc_prkey_op_init(RSA *rsa, struct sc_pkcs15_object **key_obj_out,
+	unsigned int usage)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct sc_priv_data *priv;
+	struct sc_pkcs15_object *key_obj;
+	struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_info *key;
+	struct sc_pkcs15_object *pin_obj;
+	struct sc_pkcs15_pin_info *pin;
+
+	priv = (struct sc_priv_data *) RSA_get_app_data(rsa);
+	if (priv == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	if (p15card == NULL) {
+		sc_close();
+		r = sc_init();
+		if (r) {
+			error("SmartCard init failed: %s", sc_strerror(r));
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+	r = sc_pkcs15_find_prkey_by_id_usage(p15card, &priv->cert_id,
+		usage, &key_obj);
+	if (r) {
+		error("Unable to find private key from SmartCard: %s",
+		      sc_strerror(r));
+		goto err;
+	}
+	key = key_obj->data;
+	r = sc_pkcs15_find_pin_by_auth_id(p15card, &key_obj->auth_id,
+					  &pin_obj);
+	if (r == SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND) {
+		/* no pin required */
+		r = sc_lock(card);
+		if (r) {
+			error("Unable to lock smartcard: %s", sc_strerror(r));
+			goto err;
+		}
+		*key_obj_out = key_obj;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (r) {
+		error("Unable to find PIN object from SmartCard: %s",
+		      sc_strerror(r));
+		goto err;
+	}
+	pin = pin_obj->data;
+	r = sc_lock(card);
+	if (r) {
+		error("Unable to lock smartcard: %s", sc_strerror(r));
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (sc_pin != NULL) {
+		r = sc_pkcs15_verify_pin(p15card, pin, sc_pin,
+					 strlen(sc_pin));
+		if (r) {
+			sc_unlock(card);
+			error("PIN code verification failed: %s",
+			      sc_strerror(r));
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+	*key_obj_out = key_obj;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	sc_close();
+	return -1;
+}
+
+#define SC_USAGE_DECRYPT	SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | \
+				SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_UNWRAP
+
+static int
+sc_private_decrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+    int padding)
+{
+	struct sc_pkcs15_object *key_obj;
+	int r;
+
+	if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+		return -1;
+	r = sc_prkey_op_init(rsa, &key_obj, SC_USAGE_DECRYPT);
+	if (r)
+		return -1;
+	r = sc_pkcs15_decipher(p15card, key_obj, SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1,
+	    from, flen, to, flen);
+	sc_unlock(card);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		error("sc_pkcs15_decipher() failed: %s", sc_strerror(r));
+		goto err;
+	}
+	return r;
+err:
+	sc_close();
+	return -1;
+}
+
+#define SC_USAGE_SIGN 		SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_SIGN | \
+				SC_PKCS15_PRKEY_USAGE_SIGNRECOVER
+
+static int
+sc_sign(int type, u_char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+	struct sc_pkcs15_object *key_obj;
+	int r;
+	unsigned long flags = 0;
+
+	/* XXX: sc_prkey_op_init will search for a pkcs15 private
+	 * key object with the sign or signrecover usage flag set.
+	 * If the signing key has only the non-repudiation flag set
+	 * the key will be rejected as using a non-repudiation key
+	 * for authentication is not recommended. Note: This does not
+	 * prevent the use of a non-repudiation key for authentication
+	 * if the sign or signrecover flag is set as well.
+	 */
+	r = sc_prkey_op_init(rsa, &key_obj, SC_USAGE_SIGN);
+	if (r)
+		return -1;
+	/* FIXME: length of sigret correct? */
+	/* FIXME: check 'type' and modify flags accordingly */
+	flags = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1 | SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA1;
+	r = sc_pkcs15_compute_signature(p15card, key_obj, flags,
+					m, m_len, sigret, RSA_size(rsa));
+	sc_unlock(card);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		error("sc_pkcs15_compute_signature() failed: %s",
+		      sc_strerror(r));
+		goto err;
+	}
+	*siglen = r;
+	return 1;
+err:
+	sc_close();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sc_private_encrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+    int padding)
+{
+	error("Private key encryption not supported");
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* called on free */
+
+static int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa) = NULL;
+
+static int
+sc_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+	struct sc_priv_data *priv;
+
+	priv = RSA_get_app_data(rsa);
+	priv->ref_count--;
+	if (priv->ref_count == 0) {
+		free(priv);
+		sc_close();
+	}
+	if (orig_finish)
+		orig_finish(rsa);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* engine for overloading private key operations */
+
+static RSA_METHOD *
+sc_get_rsa_method(void)
+{
+	static RSA_METHOD smart_rsa;
+	const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method();
+
+	/* use the OpenSSL version */
+	memcpy(&smart_rsa, def, sizeof(smart_rsa));
+
+	smart_rsa.name		= "opensc";
+
+	/* overload */
+	smart_rsa.rsa_priv_enc	= sc_private_encrypt;
+	smart_rsa.rsa_priv_dec	= sc_private_decrypt;
+	smart_rsa.rsa_sign	= sc_sign;
+
+	/* save original */
+	orig_finish		= def->finish;
+	smart_rsa.finish	= sc_finish;
+
+	return &smart_rsa;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_ENGINE
+static ENGINE *
+sc_get_engine(void)
+{
+	static ENGINE *smart_engine = NULL;
+
+	if ((smart_engine = ENGINE_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("ENGINE_new failed");
+
+	ENGINE_set_id(smart_engine, "opensc");
+	ENGINE_set_name(smart_engine, "OpenSC");
+
+	ENGINE_set_RSA(smart_engine, sc_get_rsa_method());
+	ENGINE_set_DSA(smart_engine, DSA_get_default_openssl_method());
+	ENGINE_set_DH(smart_engine, DH_get_default_openssl_method());
+	ENGINE_set_RAND(smart_engine, RAND_SSLeay());
+	ENGINE_set_BN_mod_exp(smart_engine, BN_mod_exp);
+
+	return smart_engine;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+convert_rsa_to_rsa1(Key * in, Key * out)
+{
+	struct sc_priv_data *priv;
+
+	out->rsa->flags = in->rsa->flags;
+	out->flags = in->flags;
+	RSA_set_method(out->rsa, RSA_get_method(in->rsa));
+	BN_copy(out->rsa->n, in->rsa->n);
+	BN_copy(out->rsa->e, in->rsa->e);
+	priv = RSA_get_app_data(in->rsa);
+	priv->ref_count++;
+	RSA_set_app_data(out->rsa, priv);
+	return;
+}
+
+static int
+sc_read_pubkey(Key * k, const struct sc_pkcs15_object *cert_obj)
+{
+	int r;
+	sc_pkcs15_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+	struct sc_priv_data *priv = NULL;
+	sc_pkcs15_cert_info_t *cinfo = cert_obj->data;
+
+	X509 *x509 = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+	u8 *p;
+	char *tmp;
+
+	debug("sc_read_pubkey() with cert id %02X", cinfo->id.value[0]);
+	r = sc_pkcs15_read_certificate(p15card, cinfo, &cert);
+	if (r) {
+		logit("Certificate read failed: %s", sc_strerror(r));
+		goto err;
+	}
+	x509 = X509_new();
+	if (x509 == NULL) {
+		r = -1;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	p = cert->data;
+	if (!d2i_X509(&x509, &p, cert->data_len)) {
+		logit("Unable to parse X.509 certificate");
+		r = -1;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	sc_pkcs15_free_certificate(cert);
+	cert = NULL;
+	pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+	X509_free(x509);
+	x509 = NULL;
+	if (pubkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+		logit("Public key is of unknown type");
+		r = -1;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	k->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+
+	k->rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
+	RSA_set_method(k->rsa, sc_get_rsa_method());
+	priv = xmalloc(sizeof(struct sc_priv_data));
+	priv->cert_id = cinfo->id;
+	priv->ref_count = 1;
+	RSA_set_app_data(k->rsa, priv);
+
+	k->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT;
+	tmp = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	debug("fingerprint %d %s", key_size(k), tmp);
+	xfree(tmp);
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	if (cert)
+		sc_pkcs15_free_certificate(cert);
+	if (pubkey)
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+	if (x509)
+		X509_free(x509);
+	return r;
+}
+
+Key **
+sc_get_keys(const char *id, const char *pin)
+{
+	Key *k, **keys;
+	int i, r, real_count = 0, key_count;
+	sc_pkcs15_id_t cert_id;
+	sc_pkcs15_object_t *certs[32];
+	char *buf = xstrdup(id), *p;
+
+	debug("sc_get_keys called: id = %s", id);
+
+	if (sc_pin != NULL)
+		xfree(sc_pin);
+	sc_pin = (pin == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(pin);
+
+	cert_id.len = 0;
+	if ((p = strchr(buf, ':')) != NULL) {
+		*p = 0;
+		p++;
+		sc_pkcs15_hex_string_to_id(p, &cert_id);
+	}
+	r = sscanf(buf, "%d", &sc_reader_id);
+	xfree(buf);
+	if (r != 1)
+		goto err;
+	if (p15card == NULL) {
+		sc_close();
+		r = sc_init();
+		if (r) {
+			error("Smartcard init failed: %s", sc_strerror(r));
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+	if (cert_id.len) {
+		r = sc_pkcs15_find_cert_by_id(p15card, &cert_id, &certs[0]);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto err;
+		key_count = 1;
+	} else {
+		r = sc_pkcs15_get_objects(p15card, SC_PKCS15_TYPE_CERT_X509,
+					  certs, 32);
+		if (r == 0) {
+			logit("No certificates found on smartcard");
+			r = -1;
+			goto err;
+		} else if (r < 0) {
+			error("Certificate enumeration failed: %s",
+			      sc_strerror(r));
+			goto err;
+		}
+		key_count = r;
+	}
+	if (key_count > 1024)
+		fatal("Too many keys (%u), expected <= 1024", key_count);
+	keys = xcalloc(key_count * 2 + 1, sizeof(Key *));
+	for (i = 0; i < key_count; i++) {
+		sc_pkcs15_object_t *tmp_obj = NULL;
+		cert_id = ((sc_pkcs15_cert_info_t *)(certs[i]->data))->id;
+		if (sc_pkcs15_find_prkey_by_id(p15card, &cert_id, &tmp_obj))
+			/* skip the public key (certificate) if no
+			 * corresponding private key is present */
+			continue;
+		k = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+		if (k == NULL)
+			break;
+		r = sc_read_pubkey(k, certs[i]);
+		if (r) {
+			error("sc_read_pubkey failed: %s", sc_strerror(r));
+			key_free(k);
+			continue;
+		}
+		keys[real_count] = k;
+		real_count++;
+		k = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+		if (k == NULL)
+			break;
+		convert_rsa_to_rsa1(keys[real_count-1], k);
+		keys[real_count] = k;
+		real_count++;
+	}
+	keys[real_count] = NULL;
+
+	return keys;
+err:
+	sc_close();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+sc_put_key(Key *prv, const char *id)
+{
+	error("key uploading not yet supported");
+	return -1;
+}
+
+char *
+sc_get_key_label(Key *key)
+{
+	int r;
+	const struct sc_priv_data *priv;
+	struct sc_pkcs15_object *key_obj;
+
+	priv = (const struct sc_priv_data *) RSA_get_app_data(key->rsa);
+	if (priv == NULL || p15card == NULL) {
+		logit("SmartCard key not loaded");
+		/* internal error => return default label */
+		return xstrdup("smartcard key");
+	}
+	r = sc_pkcs15_find_prkey_by_id(p15card, &priv->cert_id, &key_obj);
+	if (r) {
+		logit("Unable to find private key from SmartCard: %s",
+		      sc_strerror(r));
+		return xstrdup("smartcard key");
+	}
+	if (key_obj == NULL || key_obj->label == NULL)
+		/* the optional PKCS#15 label does not exists
+		 * => return the default label */
+		return xstrdup("smartcard key");
+	return xstrdup(key_obj->label);
+}
+
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scard.c b/crypto/openssh/scard.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fd3ca1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scard.c
@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: scard.c,v 1.36 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if defined(SMARTCARD) && defined(USE_SECTOK)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <sectok.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "scard.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+#define USE_ENGINE
+#define RSA_get_default_method RSA_get_default_openssl_method
+#else
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#define sc_get_rsa sc_get_engine
+#else
+#define sc_get_rsa sc_get_rsa_method
+#endif
+
+#define CLA_SSH 0x05
+#define INS_DECRYPT 0x10
+#define INS_GET_KEYLENGTH 0x20
+#define INS_GET_PUBKEY 0x30
+#define INS_GET_RESPONSE 0xc0
+
+#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 256
+
+u_char DEFAUT0[] = {0xad, 0x9f, 0x61, 0xfe, 0xfa, 0x20, 0xce, 0x63};
+
+static int sc_fd = -1;
+static char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
+static char *sc_pin = NULL;
+static int cla = 0x00;	/* class */
+
+static void sc_mk_digest(const char *pin, u_char *digest);
+static int get_AUT0(u_char *aut0);
+static int try_AUT0(void);
+
+/* interface to libsectok */
+
+static int
+sc_open(void)
+{
+	int sw;
+
+	if (sc_fd >= 0)
+		return sc_fd;
+
+	sc_fd = sectok_friendly_open(sc_reader_id, STONOWAIT, &sw);
+	if (sc_fd < 0) {
+		error("sectok_open failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		return SCARD_ERROR_FAIL;
+	}
+	if (! sectok_cardpresent(sc_fd)) {
+		debug("smartcard in reader %s not present, skipping",
+		    sc_reader_id);
+		sc_close();
+		return SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD;
+	}
+	if (sectok_reset(sc_fd, 0, NULL, &sw) <= 0) {
+		error("sectok_reset failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		sc_fd = -1;
+		return SCARD_ERROR_FAIL;
+	}
+	if ((cla = cyberflex_inq_class(sc_fd)) < 0)
+		cla = 0;
+
+	debug("sc_open ok %d", sc_fd);
+	return sc_fd;
+}
+
+static int
+sc_enable_applet(void)
+{
+	static u_char aid[] = {0xfc, 0x53, 0x73, 0x68, 0x2e, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e};
+	int sw = 0;
+
+	/* select applet id */
+	sectok_apdu(sc_fd, cla, 0xa4, 0x04, 0, sizeof aid, aid, 0, NULL, &sw);
+	if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+		error("sectok_apdu failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		sc_close();
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sc_init(void)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	status = sc_open();
+	if (status == SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD) {
+		return SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD;
+	}
+	if (status < 0) {
+		error("sc_open failed");
+		return status;
+	}
+	if (sc_enable_applet() < 0) {
+		error("sc_enable_applet failed");
+		return SCARD_ERROR_APPLET;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sc_read_pubkey(Key * k)
+{
+	u_char buf[2], *n;
+	char *p;
+	int len, sw, status = -1;
+
+	len = sw = 0;
+	n = NULL;
+
+	if (sc_fd < 0) {
+		if (sc_init() < 0)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* get key size */
+	sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_KEYLENGTH, 0, 0, 0, NULL,
+	    sizeof(buf), buf, &sw);
+	if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+		error("could not obtain key length: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		goto err;
+	}
+	len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
+	len /= 8;
+	debug("INS_GET_KEYLENGTH: len %d sw %s", len, sectok_get_sw(sw));
+
+	n = xmalloc(len);
+	/* get n */
+	sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_PUBKEY, 0, 0, 0, NULL, len, n, &sw);
+
+	if (sw == 0x6982) {
+		if (try_AUT0() < 0)
+			goto err;
+		sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_PUBKEY, 0, 0, 0, NULL, len, n, &sw);
+	}
+	if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+		error("could not obtain public key: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	debug("INS_GET_KEYLENGTH: sw %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->rsa->n) == NULL) {
+		error("c_read_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed");
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* currently the java applet just stores 'n' */
+	if (!BN_set_word(k->rsa->e, 35)) {
+		error("c_read_pubkey: BN_set_word(e, 35) failed");
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	status = 0;
+	p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	debug("fingerprint %u %s", key_size(k), p);
+	xfree(p);
+
+err:
+	if (n != NULL)
+		xfree(n);
+	sc_close();
+	return status;
+}
+
+/* private key operations */
+
+static int
+sc_private_decrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+    int padding)
+{
+	u_char *padded = NULL;
+	int sw, len, olen, status = -1;
+
+	debug("sc_private_decrypt called");
+
+	olen = len = sw = 0;
+	if (sc_fd < 0) {
+		status = sc_init();
+		if (status < 0)
+			goto err;
+	}
+	if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+		goto err;
+
+	len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	padded = xmalloc(len);
+
+	sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_DECRYPT, 0, 0, len, from, len, padded, &sw);
+
+	if (sw == 0x6982) {
+		if (try_AUT0() < 0)
+			goto err;
+		sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_DECRYPT, 0, 0, len, from, len, padded, &sw);
+	}
+	if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+		error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_DECRYPT failed: %s",
+		    sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		goto err;
+	}
+	olen = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, len, padded + 1, len - 1,
+	    len);
+err:
+	if (padded)
+		xfree(padded);
+	sc_close();
+	return (olen >= 0 ? olen : status);
+}
+
+static int
+sc_private_encrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+    int padding)
+{
+	u_char *padded = NULL;
+	int sw, len, status = -1;
+
+	len = sw = 0;
+	if (sc_fd < 0) {
+		status = sc_init();
+		if (status < 0)
+			goto err;
+	}
+	if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+		goto err;
+
+	debug("sc_private_encrypt called");
+	len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	padded = xmalloc(len);
+
+	if (RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(padded, len, (u_char *)from, flen) <= 0) {
+		error("RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1 failed");
+		goto err;
+	}
+	sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_DECRYPT, 0, 0, len, padded, len, to, &sw);
+	if (sw == 0x6982) {
+		if (try_AUT0() < 0)
+			goto err;
+		sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_DECRYPT, 0, 0, len, padded, len, to, &sw);
+	}
+	if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+		error("sc_private_encrypt: INS_DECRYPT failed: %s",
+		    sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		goto err;
+	}
+err:
+	if (padded)
+		xfree(padded);
+	sc_close();
+	return (len >= 0 ? len : status);
+}
+
+/* called on free */
+
+static int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa) = NULL;
+
+static int
+sc_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+	if (orig_finish)
+		orig_finish(rsa);
+	sc_close();
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* engine for overloading private key operations */
+
+static RSA_METHOD *
+sc_get_rsa_method(void)
+{
+	static RSA_METHOD smart_rsa;
+	const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method();
+
+	/* use the OpenSSL version */
+	memcpy(&smart_rsa, def, sizeof(smart_rsa));
+
+	smart_rsa.name		= "sectok";
+
+	/* overload */
+	smart_rsa.rsa_priv_enc	= sc_private_encrypt;
+	smart_rsa.rsa_priv_dec	= sc_private_decrypt;
+
+	/* save original */
+	orig_finish		= def->finish;
+	smart_rsa.finish	= sc_finish;
+
+	return &smart_rsa;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_ENGINE
+static ENGINE *
+sc_get_engine(void)
+{
+	static ENGINE *smart_engine = NULL;
+
+	if ((smart_engine = ENGINE_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("ENGINE_new failed");
+
+	ENGINE_set_id(smart_engine, "sectok");
+	ENGINE_set_name(smart_engine, "libsectok");
+
+	ENGINE_set_RSA(smart_engine, sc_get_rsa_method());
+	ENGINE_set_DSA(smart_engine, DSA_get_default_openssl_method());
+	ENGINE_set_DH(smart_engine, DH_get_default_openssl_method());
+	ENGINE_set_RAND(smart_engine, RAND_SSLeay());
+	ENGINE_set_BN_mod_exp(smart_engine, BN_mod_exp);
+
+	return smart_engine;
+}
+#endif
+
+void
+sc_close(void)
+{
+	if (sc_fd >= 0) {
+		sectok_close(sc_fd);
+		sc_fd = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+Key **
+sc_get_keys(const char *id, const char *pin)
+{
+	Key *k, *n, **keys;
+	int status, nkeys = 2;
+
+	if (sc_reader_id != NULL)
+		xfree(sc_reader_id);
+	sc_reader_id = xstrdup(id);
+
+	if (sc_pin != NULL)
+		xfree(sc_pin);
+	sc_pin = (pin == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(pin);
+
+	k = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+	if (k == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	status = sc_read_pubkey(k);
+	if (status == SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD) {
+		key_free(k);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (status < 0) {
+		error("sc_read_pubkey failed");
+		key_free(k);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	keys = xcalloc((nkeys+1), sizeof(Key *));
+
+	n = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
+	    (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL))
+		fatal("sc_get_keys: BN_copy failed");
+	RSA_set_method(n->rsa, sc_get_rsa());
+	n->flags |= KEY_FLAG_EXT;
+	keys[0] = n;
+
+	n = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+	if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
+	    (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL))
+		fatal("sc_get_keys: BN_copy failed");
+	RSA_set_method(n->rsa, sc_get_rsa());
+	n->flags |= KEY_FLAG_EXT;
+	keys[1] = n;
+
+	keys[2] = NULL;
+
+	key_free(k);
+	return keys;
+}
+
+#define NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS 5+1
+#define COPY_RSA_KEY(x, i) \
+	do { \
+		len = BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->x); \
+		elements[i] = xmalloc(len); \
+		debug("#bytes %d", len); \
+		if (BN_bn2bin(prv->rsa->x, elements[i]) < 0) \
+			goto done; \
+	} while (0)
+
+static void
+sc_mk_digest(const char *pin, u_char *digest)
+{
+	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, pin, strlen(pin));
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+get_AUT0(u_char *aut0)
+{
+	char *pass;
+
+	pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for smartcard: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	if (pass == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	if (!strcmp(pass, "-")) {
+		memcpy(aut0, DEFAUT0, sizeof DEFAUT0);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	sc_mk_digest(pass, aut0);
+	memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
+	xfree(pass);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+try_AUT0(void)
+{
+	u_char aut0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+	/* permission denied; try PIN if provided */
+	if (sc_pin && strlen(sc_pin) > 0) {
+		sc_mk_digest(sc_pin, aut0);
+		if (cyberflex_verify_AUT0(sc_fd, cla, aut0, 8) < 0) {
+			error("smartcard passphrase incorrect");
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* try default AUT0 key */
+		if (cyberflex_verify_AUT0(sc_fd, cla, DEFAUT0, 8) < 0) {
+			/* default AUT0 key failed; prompt for passphrase */
+			if (get_AUT0(aut0) < 0 ||
+			    cyberflex_verify_AUT0(sc_fd, cla, aut0, 8) < 0) {
+				error("smartcard passphrase incorrect");
+				return (-1);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+sc_put_key(Key *prv, const char *id)
+{
+	u_char *elements[NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS];
+	u_char key_fid[2];
+	u_char AUT0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	int len, status = -1, i, fd = -1, ret;
+	int sw = 0, cla = 0x00;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS; i++)
+		elements[i] = NULL;
+
+	COPY_RSA_KEY(q, 0);
+	COPY_RSA_KEY(p, 1);
+	COPY_RSA_KEY(iqmp, 2);
+	COPY_RSA_KEY(dmq1, 3);
+	COPY_RSA_KEY(dmp1, 4);
+	COPY_RSA_KEY(n, 5);
+	len = BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->n);
+	fd = sectok_friendly_open(id, STONOWAIT, &sw);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		error("sectok_open failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (! sectok_cardpresent(fd)) {
+		error("smartcard in reader %s not present", id);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	ret = sectok_reset(fd, 0, NULL, &sw);
+	if (ret <= 0) {
+		error("sectok_reset failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((cla = cyberflex_inq_class(fd)) < 0) {
+		error("cyberflex_inq_class failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	memcpy(AUT0, DEFAUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0));
+	if (cyberflex_verify_AUT0(fd, cla, AUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0)) < 0) {
+		if (get_AUT0(AUT0) < 0 ||
+		    cyberflex_verify_AUT0(fd, cla, AUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0)) < 0) {
+			memset(AUT0, 0, sizeof(DEFAUT0));
+			error("smartcard passphrase incorrect");
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	memset(AUT0, 0, sizeof(DEFAUT0));
+	key_fid[0] = 0x00;
+	key_fid[1] = 0x12;
+	if (cyberflex_load_rsa_priv(fd, cla, key_fid, 5, 8*len, elements,
+	    &sw) < 0) {
+		error("cyberflex_load_rsa_priv failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (!sectok_swOK(sw))
+		goto done;
+	logit("cyberflex_load_rsa_priv done");
+	key_fid[0] = 0x73;
+	key_fid[1] = 0x68;
+	if (cyberflex_load_rsa_pub(fd, cla, key_fid, len, elements[5],
+	    &sw) < 0) {
+		error("cyberflex_load_rsa_pub failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (!sectok_swOK(sw))
+		goto done;
+	logit("cyberflex_load_rsa_pub done");
+	status = 0;
+
+done:
+	memset(elements[0], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->q));
+	memset(elements[1], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->p));
+	memset(elements[2], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->iqmp));
+	memset(elements[3], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->dmq1));
+	memset(elements[4], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->dmp1));
+	memset(elements[5], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->n));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS; i++)
+		if (elements[i])
+			xfree(elements[i]);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		sectok_close(fd);
+	return (status);
+}
+
+char *
+sc_get_key_label(Key *key)
+{
+	return xstrdup("smartcard key");
+}
+
+#endif /* SMARTCARD && USE_SECTOK */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scard.h b/crypto/openssh/scard.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82efe48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scard.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: scard.h,v 1.14 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SCARD_H
+#define SCARD_H
+
+#define SCARD_ERROR_FAIL	-1
+#define SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD	-2
+#define SCARD_ERROR_APPLET	-3
+
+Key	**sc_get_keys(const char *, const char *);
+void	 sc_close(void);
+int	 sc_put_key(Key *, const char *);
+char	*sc_get_key_label(Key *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/schnorr.c b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..daeec06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,653 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.c,v 1.3 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $FreeBSD$ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of Schnorr signatures / zero-knowledge proofs, based on
+ * description in:
+ * 	
+ * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
+ * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
+ *
+ * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "schnorr.h"
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+/* #define SCHNORR_DEBUG */		/* Privacy-violating debugging */
+/* #define SCHNORR_MAIN */		/* Include main() selftest */
+
+#ifndef SCHNORR_DEBUG
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a)
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a)
+#else
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a)	debug3_bn a
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a)	debug3_buf a
+#endif /* SCHNORR_DEBUG */
+
+/*
+ * Calculate hash component of Schnorr signature H(g || g^v || g^x || id)
+ * using the hash function defined by "evp_md". Returns signature as
+ * bignum or NULL on error.
+ */
+static BIGNUM *
+schnorr_hash(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *g,
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *g_v, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+    const u_char *id, u_int idlen)
+{
+	u_char *digest;
+	u_int digest_len;
+	BIGNUM *h;
+	Buffer b;
+	int success = -1;
+
+	if ((h = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+
+	/* h = H(g || p || q || g^v || g^x || id) */
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, p);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, q);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g_v);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g_x);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, id, idlen);
+
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
+	    "%s: hashblob", __func__));
+	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), evp_md,
+	    &digest, &digest_len) != 0) {
+		error("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_bin2bn(digest, (int)digest_len, h) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_bin2bn", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	success = 0;
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((h, "%s: h = ", __func__));
+ out:
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	bzero(digest, digest_len);
+	xfree(digest);
+	digest_len = 0;
+	if (success == 0)
+		return h;
+	BN_clear_free(h);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
+ * in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
+ * using the hash function "evp_md".
+ * 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
+ * replay salt.
+ * 
+ * On success, 0 is returned. The signature values are returned as *e_p
+ * (g^v mod p) and *r_p (v - xh mod q). The caller must free these values.
+ * On failure, -1 is returned.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+    const u_char *id, u_int idlen, BIGNUM **r_p, BIGNUM **e_p)
+{
+	int success = -1;
+	BIGNUM *h, *tmp, *v, *g_v, *r;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((x, "%s: x = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_x, "%s: g_x = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Avoid degenerate cases: g^0 yields a spoofable signature */
+	if (BN_cmp(g_x, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
+		error("%s: g_x < 1", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	h = g_v = r = tmp = v = NULL;
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((g_v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * v must be a random element of Zq, so 1 <= v < q
+	 * we also exclude v = 1, since g^1 looks dangerous
+	 */
+	if ((v = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp_p)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: bn_rand_range2", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((v, "%s: v = ", __func__));
+
+	/* g_v = g^v mod p */
+	if (BN_mod_exp(g_v, grp_g, v, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_exp (g^v mod p)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));
+
+	/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
+	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, evp_md, g_v, g_x,
+	    id, idlen)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* r = v - xh mod q */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, x, h, grp_q, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = xv mod q)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_mod_sub(r, v, tmp, grp_q, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (r = v - tmp)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: e = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));
+
+	*e_p = g_v;
+	*r_p = r;
+
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	if (h != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(h);
+	if (v != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(v);
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
+ * in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
+ * using a SHA256 hash.
+ * 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
+ * replay salt.
+ * On success, 0 is returned and *siglen bytes of signature are returned in
+ * *sig (caller to free). Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_sign_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    u_char **sig, u_int *siglen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	BIGNUM *r, *e;
+
+	if (schnorr_sign(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, EVP_sha256(),
+	    x, g_x, id, idlen, &r, &e) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Signature is (e, r) */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	/* XXX sigtype-hash as string? */
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, e);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, r);
+	*siglen = buffer_len(&b);
+	*sig = xmalloc(*siglen);
+	memcpy(*sig, buffer_ptr(&b), *siglen);
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
+	    "%s: sigblob", __func__));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+
+	BN_clear_free(r);
+	BN_clear_free(e);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify Schnorr signature { r (v - xh mod q), e (g^v mod p) } against
+ * public exponent g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and
+ * 'grp_g' using hash "evp_md".
+ * Signature hash will be salted with 'idlen' bytes from 'id'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure, 0 on incorrect signature or 1 on matching signature.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *e)
+{
+	int success = -1;
+	BIGNUM *h, *g_xh, *g_r, *expected;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_x, "%s: g_x = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Avoid degenerate cases: g^0 yields a spoofable signature */
+	if (BN_cmp(g_x, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
+		error("%s: g_x < 1", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	h = g_xh = g_r = expected = NULL;
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((g_xh = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (g_r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (expected = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((e, "%s: e = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));
+
+	/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
+	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, evp_md, e, g_x,
+	    id, idlen)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* g_xh = (g^x)^h */
+	if (BN_mod_exp(g_xh, g_x, h, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_exp (g_x^h mod p)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_xh, "%s: g_xh = ", __func__));
+
+	/* g_r = g^r */
+	if (BN_mod_exp(g_r, grp_g, r, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_exp (g_x^h mod p)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_r, "%s: g_r = ", __func__));
+
+	/* expected = g^r * g_xh */
+	if (BN_mod_mul(expected, g_r, g_xh, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (expected = g_r mod p)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((expected, "%s: expected = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Check e == expected */
+	success = BN_cmp(expected, e) == 0;
+ out:
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	if (h != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(h);
+	BN_clear_free(g_xh);
+	BN_clear_free(g_r);
+	BN_clear_free(expected);
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify Schnorr signature 'sig' of length 'siglen' against public exponent
+ * g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g' using a
+ * SHA256 hash.
+ * Signature hash will be salted with 'idlen' bytes from 'id'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure, 0 on incorrect signature or 1 on matching signature.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_verify_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
+    const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const u_char *sig, u_int siglen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	int ret = -1;
+	u_int rlen;
+	BIGNUM *r, *e;
+
+	e = r = NULL;
+	if ((e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Extract g^v and r from signature blob */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, sig, siglen);
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
+	    "%s: sigblob", __func__));
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&b, e);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&b, r);
+	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (rlen != 0) {
+		error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, EVP_sha256(),
+	    g_x, id, idlen, r, e);
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(e);
+	BN_clear_free(r);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Helper functions */
+
+/*
+ * Generate uniformly distributed random number in range (1, high).
+ * Return number on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+BIGNUM *
+bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high)
+{
+	BIGNUM *r, *tmp;
+	int success = -1;
+
+	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
+		error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_sub(tmp, high, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_sub failed (tmp = high - 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_rand_range(r, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_rand_range failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
+		error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_add(r, r, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_add failed (r = r + 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+	if (success == 0)
+		return r;
+	BN_clear_free(r);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hash contents of buffer 'b' with hash 'md'. Returns 0 on success,
+ * with digest via 'digestp' (caller to free) and length via 'lenp'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+hash_buffer(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const EVP_MD *md,
+    u_char **digestp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	u_int digest_len;
+	EVP_MD_CTX evp_md_ctx;
+	int success = -1;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&evp_md_ctx);
+
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&evp_md_ctx, md, NULL) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestInit_ex", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&evp_md_ctx, buf, len) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestUpdate", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&evp_md_ctx, digest, &digest_len) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestFinal_ex", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*digestp = xmalloc(digest_len);
+	*lenp = digest_len;
+	memcpy(*digestp, digest, *lenp);
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&evp_md_ctx);
+	bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	digest_len = 0;
+	return success;
+}
+
+/* print formatted string followed by bignum */
+void
+debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *n, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *out, *h;
+	va_list args;
+
+	out = NULL;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (out == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+	if (n == NULL)
+		debug3("%s(null)", out);
+	else {
+		h = BN_bn2hex(n);
+		debug3("%s0x%s", out, h);
+		free(h);
+	}
+	free(out);
+}
+
+/* print formatted string followed by buffer contents in hex */
+void
+debug3_buf(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *out, h[65];
+	u_int i, j;
+	va_list args;
+
+	out = NULL;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (out == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+	debug3("%s length %u%s", out, len, buf == NULL ? " (null)" : "");
+	free(out);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	*h = '\0';
+	for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		snprintf(h + j, sizeof(h) - j, "%02x", buf[i]);
+		j += 2;
+		if (j >= sizeof(h) - 1 || i == len - 1) {
+			debug3("    %s", h);
+			*h = '\0';
+			j = 0;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a MODP group from hex strings p (which must be a safe
+ * prime) and g, automatically calculating subgroup q as (p / 2)
+ */
+struct modp_group *
+modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(const char *grp_g, const char *grp_p)
+{
+	struct modp_group *ret;
+
+	ret = xmalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+	ret->p = ret->q = ret->g = NULL;
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&ret->p, grp_p) == 0 ||
+	    BN_hex2bn(&ret->g, grp_g) == 0)
+		fatal("%s: BN_hex2bn", __func__);
+	/* Subgroup order is p/2 (p is a safe prime) */
+	if ((ret->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	if (BN_rshift1(ret->q, ret->p) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_rshift1", __func__);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+modp_group_free(struct modp_group *grp)
+{
+	if (grp->g != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(grp->g);
+	if (grp->p != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(grp->p);
+	if (grp->q != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(grp->q);
+	bzero(grp, sizeof(*grp));
+	xfree(grp);
+}
+
+/* main() function for self-test */
+
+#ifdef SCHNORR_MAIN
+static void
+schnorr_selftest_one(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
+    const BIGNUM *grp_g, const BIGNUM *x)
+{
+	BIGNUM *g_x;
+	u_char *sig;
+	u_int siglen;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+
+	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
+	if ((g_x = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	if (BN_mod_exp(g_x, grp_g, x, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: g_x", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, x, g_x, "junk", 4,
+	    &sig, &siglen))
+		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
+	    sig, siglen) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: verify fail", __func__);
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "JUNK", 4,
+	    sig, siglen) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: verify should have failed (bad ID)", __func__);
+	sig[4] ^= 1;
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
+	    sig, siglen) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: verify should have failed (bit error)", __func__);
+	xfree(sig);
+	BN_free(g_x);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+schnorr_selftest(void)
+{
+	BIGNUM *x;
+	struct modp_group *grp;
+	u_int i;
+	char *hh;
+
+	grp = jpake_default_group();
+	if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((grp->p, "%s: grp->p = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((grp->q, "%s: grp->q = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((grp->g, "%s: grp->g = ", __func__));
+
+	/* [1, 20) */
+	for (i = 1; i < 20; i++) {
+		printf("x = %u\n", i);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		if (BN_set_word(x, i) != 1)
+			fatal("%s: set x word", __func__);
+		schnorr_selftest_one(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, x);
+	}
+
+	/* 100 x random [0, p) */
+	for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+		if (BN_rand_range(x, grp->p) != 1)
+			fatal("%s: BN_rand_range", __func__);
+		hh = BN_bn2hex(x);
+		printf("x = (random) 0x%s\n", hh);
+		free(hh);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		schnorr_selftest_one(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, x);
+	}
+
+	/* [q-20, q) */
+	if (BN_set_word(x, 20) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_set_word (x = 20)", __func__);
+	if (BN_sub(x, grp->q, x) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_sub (q - x)", __func__);
+	for (i = 0; i < 19; i++) {
+		hh = BN_bn2hex(x);
+		printf("x = (q - %d) 0x%s\n", 20 - i, hh);
+		free(hh);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		schnorr_selftest_one(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, x);
+		if (BN_add(x, x, BN_value_one()) != 1)
+			fatal("%s: BN_add (x + 1)", __func__);
+	}
+	BN_free(x);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	schnorr_selftest();
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9730b47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.h,v 1.1 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SCHNORR_H
+#define SCHNORR_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+struct modp_group {
+	BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
+};
+
+BIGNUM *bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high);
+int hash_buffer(const u_char *, u_int, const EVP_MD *, u_char **, u_int *);
+void debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void debug3_buf(const u_char *, u_int, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+struct modp_group *modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(const char *, const char *);
+void modp_group_free(struct modp_group *);
+
+/* Signature and verification functions */
+int
+schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+    const u_char *id, u_int idlen, BIGNUM **r_p, BIGNUM **e_p);
+int
+schnorr_sign_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    u_char **sig, u_int *siglen);
+int
+schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *e);
+int
+schnorr_verify_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
+    const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const u_char *sig, u_int siglen);
+
+#endif /* JPAKE_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.1 b/crypto/openssh/scp.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..611beea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.1
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+.\"  -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" scp.1
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.46 2008/07/12 05:33:41 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.Dd July 12 2008
+.Dt SCP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm scp
+.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm scp
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 1246BCpqrv
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher
+.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl l Ar limit
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Fl P Ar port
+.Op Fl S Ar program
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Op Ar user No @
+.Ar host1 No :
+.Oc Ns Ar file1
+.Sm on
+.Ar ...
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Op Ar user No @
+.Ar host2 No :
+.Oc Ar file2
+.Sm on
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+copies files between hosts on a network.
+It uses
+.Xr ssh 1
+for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
+same security as
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+Unlike
+.Xr rcp 1 ,
+.Nm
+will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
+authentication.
+.Pp
+File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate
+that the file is to be copied to/from that host.
+Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames
+to avoid
+.Nm
+treating file names containing
+.Sq :\&
+as host specifiers.
+Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use protocol 1.
+.It Fl 2
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use protocol 2.
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl B
+Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases).
+.It Fl C
+Compression enable.
+Passes the
+.Fl C
+flag to
+.Xr ssh 1
+to enable compression.
+.It Fl c Ar cipher
+Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+Specifies an alternative
+per-user configuration file for
+.Nm ssh .
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
+authentication is read.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl l Ar limit
+Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+Can be used to pass options to
+.Nm ssh
+in the format used in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+This is useful for specifying options
+for which there is no separate
+.Nm scp
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Cipher
+.It Ciphers
+.It Compression
+.It CompressionLevel
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It HostName
+.It IdentityFile
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It Protocol
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
+.It RSAAuthentication
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It SmartcardDevice
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It UsePrivilegedPort
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.El
+.It Fl P Ar port
+Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+Note that this option is written with a capital
+.Sq P ,
+because
+.Fl p
+is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file in
+.Xr rcp 1 .
+.It Fl p
+Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+original file.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic
+messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl r
+Recursively copy entire directories.
+Note that
+.Nm
+follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
+.It Fl S Ar program
+Name of
+.Ar program
+to use for the encrypted connection.
+The program must understand
+.Xr ssh 1
+options.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+and
+.Xr ssh 1
+to print debugging messages about their progress.
+This is helpful in
+debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+.El
+.Pp
+.Ex -std scp
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr rcp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+is based on the
+.Xr rcp 1
+program in BSD source code from the Regents of the University of
+California.
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Timo Rinne Aq tri@iki.fi
+.An Tatu Ylonen Aq ylo@cs.hut.fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.c b/crypto/openssh/scp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3237478
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1287 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.164 2008/10/10 04:55:16 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
+ * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
+ *
+ * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root.  (This uses ssh to
+ * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.)
+ *
+ * 1995 Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>, Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parts from:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define COPY_BUFLEN	16384
+
+int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
+
+void bwlimit(int);
+
+/* Struct for addargs */
+arglist args;
+
+/* Bandwidth limit */
+off_t limit_rate = 0;
+
+/* Name of current file being transferred. */
+char *curfile;
+
+/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */
+int verbose_mode = 0;
+
+/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+int showprogress = 1;
+
+/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
+char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
+
+/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
+pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
+
+static void
+killchild(int signo)
+{
+	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	if (signo)
+		_exit(1);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+static int
+do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int status;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	if (a->num == 0)
+		fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments");
+
+	if (verbose_mode) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
+		for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
+			fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	}
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
+		fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		execvp(a->list[0], a->list);
+		perror(a->list[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	do_cmd_pid = pid;
+	signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+	signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+	signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	do_cmd_pid = -1;
+
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
+ * given host.  This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This
+ * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success.
+ */
+
+int
+do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
+{
+	int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
+
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
+		    ssh_program, host,
+		    remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
+	 * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
+	 */
+	if (pipe(reserved) < 0)
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
+	if (pipe(pin) < 0)
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (pipe(pout) < 0)
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Free the reserved descriptors. */
+	close(reserved[0]);
+	close(reserved[1]);
+
+	/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
+	do_cmd_pid = fork();
+	if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {
+		/* Child. */
+		close(pin[1]);
+		close(pout[0]);
+		dup2(pin[0], 0);
+		dup2(pout[1], 1);
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pout[1]);
+
+		replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+		if (remuser != NULL)
+			addargs(&args, "-l%s", remuser);
+		addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+		addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
+
+		execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
+		perror(ssh_program);
+		exit(1);
+	} else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) {
+		fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+	/* Parent.  Close the other side, and return the local side. */
+	close(pin[0]);
+	*fdout = pin[1];
+	close(pout[1]);
+	*fdin = pout[0];
+	signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+	signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+	signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+	size_t cnt;
+	char *buf;
+} BUF;
+
+BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
+void lostconn(int);
+int okname(char *);
+void run_err(const char *,...);
+void verifydir(char *);
+
+struct passwd *pwd;
+uid_t userid;
+int errs, remin, remout;
+int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+
+#define	CMDNEEDS	64
+char cmd[CMDNEEDS];		/* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
+
+int response(void);
+void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
+void sink(int, char *[]);
+void source(int, char *[]);
+void tolocal(int, char *[]);
+void toremote(char *, int, char *[]);
+size_t scpio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t, off_t *);
+void usage(void);
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n;
+	double speed;
+	char *targ, *endp, **newargv;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern int optind;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	/* Copy argv, because we modify it */
+	newargv = xcalloc(MAX(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
+	for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
+		newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
+	argv = newargv;
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+	memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
+	args.list = NULL;
+	addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
+	addargs(&args, "-x");
+	addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+	addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
+	addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+
+	fflag = tflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
+		switch (ch) {
+		/* User-visible flags. */
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '4':
+		case '6':
+		case 'C':
+			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+			break;
+		case 'o':
+		case 'c':
+		case 'i':
+		case 'F':
+			addargs(&args, "-%c%s", ch, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			addargs(&args, "-p%s", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'B':
+			addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode yes");
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			speed = strtod(optarg, &endp);
+			if (speed <= 0 || *endp != '\0')
+				usage();
+			limit_rate = speed * 1024;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			pflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			iamrecursive = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			addargs(&args, "-v");
+			verbose_mode = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			addargs(&args, "-q");
+			showprogress = 0;
+			break;
+
+		/* Server options. */
+		case 'd':
+			targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':	/* "from" */
+			iamremote = 1;
+			fflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 't':	/* "to" */
+			iamremote = 1;
+			tflag = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+			setmode(0, O_BINARY);
+#endif
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	argc -= optind;
+	argv += optind;
+
+	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
+		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
+
+	if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
+		showprogress = 0;
+
+	remin = STDIN_FILENO;
+	remout = STDOUT_FILENO;
+
+	if (fflag) {
+		/* Follow "protocol", send data. */
+		(void) response();
+		source(argc, argv);
+		exit(errs != 0);
+	}
+	if (tflag) {
+		/* Receive data. */
+		sink(argc, argv);
+		exit(errs != 0);
+	}
+	if (argc < 2)
+		usage();
+	if (argc > 2)
+		targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+
+	remin = remout = -1;
+	do_cmd_pid = -1;
+	/* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
+	(void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
+	    verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
+	    iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
+	    targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
+
+	(void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
+
+	if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1])))	/* Dest is remote host. */
+		toremote(targ, argc, argv);
+	else {
+		if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+			verifydir(argv[argc - 1]);
+		tolocal(argc, argv);	/* Dest is local host. */
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
+	 * and no error has occurred yet
+	 */
+	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
+		if (remin != -1)
+		    (void) close(remin);
+		if (remout != -1)
+		    (void) close(remout);
+		if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+			errs = 1;
+		else {
+			if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+				errs = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	exit(errs != 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * atomicio-like wrapper that also applies bandwidth limits and updates
+ * the progressmeter counter.
+ */
+size_t
+scpio(ssize_t (*f)(int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_p, size_t l, off_t *c)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)_p;
+	size_t offset;
+	ssize_t r;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+	pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+	for (offset = 0; offset < l;) {
+		r = f(fd, p + offset, l - offset);
+		if (r == 0) {
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return offset;
+		}
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* Ignore errors */
+				continue;
+			}
+			return offset;
+		}
+		offset += (size_t)r;
+		*c += (off_t)r;
+		if (limit_rate)
+			bwlimit(r);
+	}
+	return offset;
+}
+
+void
+toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg;
+	arglist alist;
+	int i;
+
+	memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
+	alist.list = NULL;
+
+	*targ++ = 0;
+	if (*targ == 0)
+		targ = ".";
+
+	arg = xstrdup(argv[argc - 1]);
+	if ((thost = strrchr(arg, '@'))) {
+		/* user@host */
+		*thost++ = 0;
+		tuser = arg;
+		if (*tuser == '\0')
+			tuser = NULL;
+	} else {
+		thost = arg;
+		tuser = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) {
+		xfree(arg);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+		src = colon(argv[i]);
+		if (src) {	/* remote to remote */
+			freeargs(&alist);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+			if (verbose_mode)
+				addargs(&alist, "-v");
+			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+			addargs(&alist, "-n");
+
+			*src++ = 0;
+			if (*src == 0)
+				src = ".";
+			host = strrchr(argv[i], '@');
+
+			if (host) {
+				*host++ = 0;
+				host = cleanhostname(host);
+				suser = argv[i];
+				if (*suser == '\0')
+					suser = pwd->pw_name;
+				else if (!okname(suser))
+					continue;
+				addargs(&alist, "-l");
+				addargs(&alist, "%s", suser);
+			} else {
+				host = cleanhostname(argv[i]);
+			}
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
+			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+			    thost, targ);
+			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+				errs = 1;
+		} else {	/* local to remote */
+			if (remin == -1) {
+				xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ);
+				host = cleanhostname(thost);
+				if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin,
+				    &remout) < 0)
+					exit(1);
+				if (response() < 0)
+					exit(1);
+				(void) xfree(bp);
+			}
+			source(1, argv + i);
+		}
+	}
+	xfree(arg);
+}
+
+void
+tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *bp, *host, *src, *suser;
+	arglist alist;
+	int i;
+
+	memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
+	alist.list = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+		if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) {	/* Local to local. */
+			freeargs(&alist);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP);
+			if (iamrecursive)
+				addargs(&alist, "-r");
+			if (pflag)
+				addargs(&alist, "-p");
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]);
+			if (do_local_cmd(&alist))
+				++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		*src++ = 0;
+		if (*src == 0)
+			src = ".";
+		if ((host = strrchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) {
+			host = argv[i];
+			suser = NULL;
+		} else {
+			*host++ = 0;
+			suser = argv[i];
+			if (*suser == '\0')
+				suser = pwd->pw_name;
+		}
+		host = cleanhostname(host);
+		xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s", cmd, src);
+		if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) {
+			(void) xfree(bp);
+			++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		xfree(bp);
+		sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
+		(void) close(remin);
+		remin = remout = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+source(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct stat stb;
+	static BUF buffer;
+	BUF *bp;
+	off_t i, statbytes;
+	size_t amt;
+	int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
+	char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[MAXPATHLEN];
+	int len;
+
+	for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
+		name = argv[indx];
+		statbytes = 0;
+		len = strlen(name);
+		while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
+			name[--len] = '\0';
+		if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0)
+			goto syserr;
+		if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
+			strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
+			name = encname;
+		}
+		if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+syserr:			run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+			goto next;
+		}
+		if (stb.st_size < 0) {
+			run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size");
+			goto next;
+		}
+		unset_nonblock(fd);
+		switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
+		case S_IFREG:
+			break;
+		case S_IFDIR:
+			if (iamrecursive) {
+				rsource(name, &stb);
+				goto next;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		default:
+			run_err("%s: not a regular file", name);
+			goto next;
+		}
+		if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL)
+			last = name;
+		else
+			++last;
+		curfile = last;
+		if (pflag) {
+			/*
+			 * Make it compatible with possible future
+			 * versions expecting microseconds.
+			 */
+			(void) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n",
+			    (u_long) (stb.st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : stb.st_mtime),
+			    (u_long) (stb.st_atime < 0 ? 0 : stb.st_atime));
+			if (verbose_mode) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %ld atime %ld\n",
+				    (long)stb.st_mtime, (long)stb.st_atime);
+				fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s",
+				    buf);
+			}
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+			if (response() < 0)
+				goto next;
+		}
+#define	FILEMODEMASK	(S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
+		    (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
+		    (long long)stb.st_size, last);
+		if (verbose_mode) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
+		}
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+		if (response() < 0)
+			goto next;
+		if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
+next:			if (fd != -1) {
+				(void) close(fd);
+				fd = -1;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (showprogress)
+			start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes);
+		set_nonblock(remout);
+		for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
+			amt = bp->cnt;
+			if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size)
+				amt = stb.st_size - i;
+			if (!haderr) {
+				if (atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt) != amt)
+					haderr = errno;
+			}
+			/* Keep writing after error to retain sync */
+			if (haderr) {
+				(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (scpio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt,
+			    &statbytes) != amt)
+				haderr = errno;
+		}
+		unset_nonblock(remout);
+		if (showprogress)
+			stop_progress_meter();
+
+		if (fd != -1) {
+			if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr)
+				haderr = errno;
+			fd = -1;
+		}
+		if (!haderr)
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+		else
+			run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
+		(void) response();
+	}
+}
+
+void
+rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+{
+	DIR *dirp;
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	char *last, *vect[1], path[1100];
+
+	if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) {
+		run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	last = strrchr(name, '/');
+	if (last == 0)
+		last = name;
+	else
+		last++;
+	if (pflag) {
+		(void) snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n",
+		    (u_long) statp->st_mtime,
+		    (u_long) statp->st_atime);
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
+		if (response() < 0) {
+			closedir(dirp);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n",
+	    (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
+	if (response() < 0) {
+		closedir(dirp);
+		return;
+	}
+	while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+		if (dp->d_ino == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, ".."))
+			continue;
+		if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) {
+			run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name);
+			continue;
+		}
+		(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name);
+		vect[0] = path;
+		source(1, vect);
+	}
+	(void) closedir(dirp);
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2);
+	(void) response();
+}
+
+void
+bwlimit(int amount)
+{
+	static struct timeval bwstart, bwend;
+	static int lamt, thresh = 16384;
+	u_int64_t waitlen;
+	struct timespec ts, rm;
+
+	if (!timerisset(&bwstart)) {
+		gettimeofday(&bwstart, NULL);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	lamt += amount;
+	if (lamt < thresh)
+		return;
+
+	gettimeofday(&bwend, NULL);
+	timersub(&bwend, &bwstart, &bwend);
+	if (!timerisset(&bwend))
+		return;
+
+	lamt *= 8;
+	waitlen = (double)1000000L * lamt / limit_rate;
+
+	bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L;
+	bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L;
+
+	if (timercmp(&bwstart, &bwend, >)) {
+		timersub(&bwstart, &bwend, &bwend);
+
+		/* Adjust the wait time */
+		if (bwend.tv_sec) {
+			thresh /= 2;
+			if (thresh < 2048)
+				thresh = 2048;
+		} else if (bwend.tv_usec < 10000) {
+			thresh *= 2;
+			if (thresh > COPY_BUFLEN * 4)
+				thresh = COPY_BUFLEN * 4;
+		}
+
+		TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bwend, &ts);
+		while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+			ts = rm;
+		}
+	}
+
+	lamt = 0;
+	gettimeofday(&bwstart, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+sink(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	static BUF buffer;
+	struct stat stb;
+	enum {
+		YES, NO, DISPLAYED
+	} wrerr;
+	BUF *bp;
+	off_t i;
+	size_t j, count;
+	int amt, exists, first, ofd;
+	mode_t mode, omode, mask;
+	off_t size, statbytes;
+	int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
+	struct timeval tv[2];
+
+#define	atime	tv[0]
+#define	mtime	tv[1]
+#define	SCREWUP(str)	{ why = str; goto screwup; }
+
+	setimes = targisdir = 0;
+	mask = umask(0);
+	if (!pflag)
+		(void) umask(mask);
+	if (argc != 1) {
+		run_err("ambiguous target");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	targ = *argv;
+	if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+		verifydir(targ);
+
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+	if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+		targisdir = 1;
+	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+		cp = buf;
+		if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
+			return;
+		if (*cp++ == '\n')
+			SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
+		do {
+			if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
+				SCREWUP("lost connection");
+			*cp++ = ch;
+		} while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
+		*cp = 0;
+		if (verbose_mode)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf);
+
+		if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
+			if (iamremote == 0)
+				(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
+				    buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1));
+			if (buf[0] == '\02')
+				exit(1);
+			++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (buf[0] == 'E') {
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+			return;
+		}
+		if (ch == '\n')
+			*--cp = 0;
+
+		cp = buf;
+		if (*cp == 'T') {
+			setimes++;
+			cp++;
+			mtime.tv_sec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+			if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+				SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited");
+			mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+			if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+				SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited");
+			atime.tv_sec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+			if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+				SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited");
+			atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+			if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0')
+				SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
+			/*
+			 * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
+			 * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned
+			 * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is
+			 * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't
+			 * followed.
+			 */
+			if (first) {
+				run_err("%s", cp);
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			SCREWUP("expected control record");
+		}
+		mode = 0;
+		for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
+			if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
+				SCREWUP("bad mode");
+			mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0');
+		}
+		if (*cp++ != ' ')
+			SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
+
+		for (size = 0; isdigit(*cp);)
+			size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0');
+		if (*cp++ != ' ')
+			SCREWUP("size not delimited");
+		if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) {
+			run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		if (targisdir) {
+			static char *namebuf;
+			static size_t cursize;
+			size_t need;
+
+			need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
+			if (need > cursize) {
+				if (namebuf)
+					xfree(namebuf);
+				namebuf = xmalloc(need);
+				cursize = need;
+			}
+			(void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ,
+			    strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp);
+			np = namebuf;
+		} else
+			np = targ;
+		curfile = cp;
+		exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
+		if (buf[0] == 'D') {
+			int mod_flag = pflag;
+			if (!iamrecursive)
+				SCREWUP("received directory without -r");
+			if (exists) {
+				if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) {
+					errno = ENOTDIR;
+					goto bad;
+				}
+				if (pflag)
+					(void) chmod(np, mode);
+			} else {
+				/* Handle copying from a read-only
+				   directory */
+				mod_flag = 1;
+				if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0)
+					goto bad;
+			}
+			vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
+			sink(1, vect);
+			if (setimes) {
+				setimes = 0;
+				if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
+					run_err("%s: set times: %s",
+					    vect[0], strerror(errno));
+			}
+			if (mod_flag)
+				(void) chmod(vect[0], mode);
+			if (vect[0])
+				xfree(vect[0]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		omode = mode;
+		mode |= S_IWRITE;
+		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
+bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+		if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
+			(void) close(ofd);
+			continue;
+		}
+		cp = bp->buf;
+		wrerr = NO;
+
+		statbytes = 0;
+		if (showprogress)
+			start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes);
+		set_nonblock(remin);
+		for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) {
+			amt = bp->cnt;
+			if (i + amt > size)
+				amt = size - i;
+			count += amt;
+			do {
+				j = scpio(read, remin, cp, amt, &statbytes);
+				if (j == 0) {
+					run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ?
+					    strerror(errno) :
+					    "dropped connection");
+					exit(1);
+				}
+				amt -= j;
+				cp += j;
+			} while (amt > 0);
+
+			if (count == bp->cnt) {
+				/* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
+				if (wrerr == NO) {
+					if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf,
+					    count) != count) {
+						wrerr = YES;
+						wrerrno = errno;
+					}
+				}
+				count = 0;
+				cp = bp->buf;
+			}
+		}
+		unset_nonblock(remin);
+		if (showprogress)
+			stop_progress_meter();
+		if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
+		    atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
+			wrerr = YES;
+			wrerrno = errno;
+		}
+		if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
+		    ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) {
+			run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+			wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+		}
+		if (pflag) {
+			if (exists || omode != mode)
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+				if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) {
+#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+				if (chmod(np, omode)) {
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+					run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+					    np, strerror(errno));
+					wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+				}
+		} else {
+			if (!exists && omode != mode)
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+				if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) {
+#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+				if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) {
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+					run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+					    np, strerror(errno));
+					wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+				}
+		}
+		if (close(ofd) == -1) {
+			wrerr = YES;
+			wrerrno = errno;
+		}
+		(void) response();
+		if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
+			setimes = 0;
+			if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
+				run_err("%s: set times: %s",
+				    np, strerror(errno));
+				wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+			}
+		}
+		switch (wrerr) {
+		case YES:
+			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno));
+			break;
+		case NO:
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+			break;
+		case DISPLAYED:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+screwup:
+	run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+response(void)
+{
+	char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048];
+
+	if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp))
+		lostconn(0);
+
+	cp = rbuf;
+	switch (resp) {
+	case 0:		/* ok */
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		*cp++ = resp;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case 1:		/* error, followed by error msg */
+	case 2:		/* fatal error, "" */
+		do {
+			if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
+				lostconn(0);
+			*cp++ = ch;
+		} while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
+
+		if (!iamremote)
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf);
+		++errs;
+		if (resp == 1)
+			return (-1);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+void
+usage(void)
+{
+	(void) fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: scp [-1246BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
+	    "           [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n"
+	    "           [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+run_err(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	static FILE *fp;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	++errs;
+	if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
+		va_start(ap, fmt);
+		(void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
+		va_end(ap);
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
+		(void) fflush(fp);
+	}
+
+	if (!iamremote) {
+		va_start(ap, fmt);
+		vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+		va_end(ap);
+		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	}
+}
+
+void
+verifydir(char *cp)
+{
+	struct stat stb;
+
+	if (!stat(cp, &stb)) {
+		if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+			return;
+		errno = ENOTDIR;
+	}
+	run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
+	killchild(0);
+}
+
+int
+okname(char *cp0)
+{
+	int c;
+	char *cp;
+
+	cp = cp0;
+	do {
+		c = (int)*cp;
+		if (c & 0200)
+			goto bad;
+		if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit(c)) {
+			switch (c) {
+			case '\'':
+			case '"':
+			case '`':
+			case ' ':
+			case '#':
+				goto bad;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	} while (*++cp);
+	return (1);
+
+bad:	fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+BUF *
+allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
+{
+	size_t size;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
+	struct stat stb;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+		run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	size = roundup(stb.st_blksize, blksize);
+	if (size == 0)
+		size = blksize;
+#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
+	size = blksize;
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
+	if (bp->cnt >= size)
+		return (bp);
+	if (bp->buf == NULL)
+		bp->buf = xmalloc(size);
+	else
+		bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, 1, size);
+	memset(bp->buf, 0, size);
+	bp->cnt = size;
+	return (bp);
+}
+
+void
+lostconn(int signo)
+{
+	if (!iamremote)
+		write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
+	if (signo)
+		_exit(1);
+	else
+		exit(1);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad25fef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1669 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.195 2009/04/14 21:10:54 jj Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+
+static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+
+/* Use of privilege separation or not */
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern Buffer cfg;
+
+/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
+
+void
+initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+	memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
+
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+	options->use_pam = -1;
+
+	/* Standard Options */
+	options->num_ports = 0;
+	options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
+	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
+	options->address_family = -1;
+	options->num_host_key_files = 0;
+	options->pid_file = NULL;
+	options->server_key_bits = -1;
+	options->login_grace_time = -1;
+	options->key_regeneration_time = -1;
+	options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET;
+	options->ignore_rhosts = -1;
+	options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1;
+	options->print_motd = -1;
+	options->print_lastlog = -1;
+	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
+	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+	options->xauth_location = NULL;
+	options->strict_modes = -1;
+	options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
+	options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
+	options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+	options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
+	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+	options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
+	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
+	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+	options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
+	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+	options->password_authentication = -1;
+	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+	options->permit_user_env = -1;
+	options->use_login = -1;
+	options->compression = -1;
+	options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
+	options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
+	options->num_allow_users = 0;
+	options->num_deny_users = 0;
+	options->num_allow_groups = 0;
+	options->num_deny_groups = 0;
+	options->ciphers = NULL;
+	options->macs = NULL;
+	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+	options->gateway_ports = -1;
+	options->num_subsystems = 0;
+	options->max_startups_begin = -1;
+	options->max_startups_rate = -1;
+	options->max_startups = -1;
+	options->max_authtries = -1;
+	options->max_sessions = -1;
+	options->banner = NULL;
+	options->use_dns = -1;
+	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+	options->authorized_keys_file = NULL;
+	options->authorized_keys_file2 = NULL;
+	options->num_accept_env = 0;
+	options->permit_tun = -1;
+	options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
+	options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
+	options->chroot_directory = NULL;
+	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
+}
+
+void
+fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+		options->use_pam = 1;
+
+	/* Standard Options */
+	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+			    _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE;
+		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+                            _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE;
+			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
+			    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
+		}
+	}
+	if (options->num_ports == 0)
+		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
+		add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0);
+	if (options->pid_file == NULL)
+		options->pid_file = _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE;
+	if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
+		options->server_key_bits = 1024;
+	if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+		options->login_grace_time = 120;
+	if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
+		options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
+	if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO;
+	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+		options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
+	if (options->print_motd == -1)
+		options->print_motd = 1;
+	if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
+		options->print_lastlog = 1;
+	if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
+		options->x11_forwarding = 1;
+	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
+	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+		options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
+	if (options->strict_modes == -1)
+		options->strict_modes = 1;
+	if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
+		options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
+	if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+		options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+	if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+		options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
+		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+		options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
+		options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
+	if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
+		options->rsa_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
+		options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
+		options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
+	if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
+		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+		options->password_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
+		options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
+	if (options->permit_user_env == -1)
+		options->permit_user_env = 0;
+	if (options->use_login == -1)
+		options->use_login = 0;
+	if (options->compression == -1)
+		options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
+	if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
+		options->allow_tcp_forwarding = 1;
+	if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
+		options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
+	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
+		options->gateway_ports = 0;
+	if (options->max_startups == -1)
+		options->max_startups = 10;
+	if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
+		options->max_startups_rate = 100;		/* 100% */
+	if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
+		options->max_startups_begin = options->max_startups;
+	if (options->max_authtries == -1)
+		options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
+	if (options->max_sessions == -1)
+		options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
+	if (options->use_dns == -1)
+		options->use_dns = 1;
+	if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
+		options->client_alive_interval = 0;
+	if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
+		options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
+	if (options->authorized_keys_file2 == NULL) {
+		/* authorized_keys_file2 falls back to authorized_keys_file */
+		if (options->authorized_keys_file != NULL)
+			options->authorized_keys_file2 = options->authorized_keys_file;
+		else
+			options->authorized_keys_file2 = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2;
+	}
+	if (options->authorized_keys_file == NULL)
+		options->authorized_keys_file = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS;
+	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+	if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
+		options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = 0;
+
+	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
+	if (use_privsep == -1)
+		use_privsep = 1;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MMAP
+	if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
+		error("This platform does not support both privilege "
+		    "separation and compression");
+		error("Compression disabled");
+		options->compression = 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
+}
+
+/* Keyword tokens. */
+typedef enum {
+	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+	sUsePAM,
+	/* Standard Options */
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
+	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+	sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+	sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+	sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
+	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
+	sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+	sVersionAddendum,
+	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+} ServerOpCodes;
+
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH	0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL	(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+
+/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	ServerOpCodes opcode;
+	u_int flags;
+} keywords[] = {
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	/* Standard Options */
+	{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },		/* alias */
+	{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+#ifdef KRB5
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef USE_AFS
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+#else
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+#else
+	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+#endif
+	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },	/* obsolete alias */
+	{ "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "protocol", sProtocol, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
+	{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+};
+
+static struct {
+	int val;
+	char *text;
+} tunmode_desc[] = {
+	{ SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
+	{ SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" },
+	{ SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" },
+	{ SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" },
+	{ -1, NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption.
+ */
+
+static ServerOpCodes
+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
+	    int linenum, u_int *flags)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
+			*flags = keywords[i].flags;
+			return keywords[i].opcode;
+		}
+
+	error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
+	    filename, linenum, cp);
+	return sBadOption;
+}
+
+static void
+add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (options->num_ports == 0)
+		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+	if (port == 0)
+		for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++)
+			add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]);
+	else
+		add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port);
+}
+
+static void
+add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int gaierr;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+		fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
+		    addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
+		    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+	for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next)
+		;
+	ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs;
+	options->listen_addrs = aitop;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
+ *
+ * The first time is at startup.  activep is initialized to 1 and the
+ * directives in the global context are processed and acted on.  Hitting a
+ * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
+ * checked for syntax only.
+ *
+ * The second time is after a connection has been established but before
+ * authentication.  activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
+ * are ignored since they have already been processed.  If the criteria in a
+ * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
+ * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it.  Any
+ * options set are copied into the main server config.
+ *
+ * Potential additions/improvements:
+ *  - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg Protocol, Ciphers.
+ *
+ *  - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
+ *	Match Address 192.168.0.*
+ *		Tag trusted
+ *	Match Group wheel
+ *		Tag trusted
+ *	Match Tag trusted
+ *		AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ *		GatewayPorts clientspecified
+ *		[...]
+ *
+ *  - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
+ *	Match Group shell
+ *		PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
+ */
+
+static int
+match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	if (user == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+		debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
+		    "not exist", line, user);
+	} else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
+		debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
+		    "at line %d", user, line);
+	} else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
+		debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d",
+		    user, grps, line);
+	} else {
+		debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user,
+		    grps, line);
+		result = 1;
+	}
+out:
+	ga_free();
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int
+match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, const char *user, const char *host,
+    const char *address)
+{
+	int result = 1;
+	char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (user == NULL)
+		debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
+	else
+		debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s", cp,
+		    user ? user : "(null)", host ? host : "(null)",
+		    address ? address : "(null)");
+
+	while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+		if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		len = strlen(arg);
+		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+			if (!user) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (match_pattern_list(user, arg, len, 0) != 1)
+				result = 0;
+			else
+				debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
+				    "line %d", user, arg, line);
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
+			switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, user)) {
+			case -1:
+				return -1;
+			case 0:
+				result = 0;
+			}
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+			if (!host) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (match_hostname(host, arg, len) != 1)
+				result = 0;
+			else
+				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
+				    "%.100s' at line %d", host, arg, line);
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
+			switch (addr_match_list(address, arg)) {
+			case 1:
+				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
+				    "%.100s' at line %d", address, arg, line);
+				break;
+			case 0:
+			case -1:
+				result = 0;
+				break;
+			case -2:
+				return -1;
+			}
+		} else {
+			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (user != NULL)
+		debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+	*condition = cp;
+	return result;
+}
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+int
+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, const char *user,
+    const char *host, const char *address)
+{
+	char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
+	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, n;
+	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
+	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
+	ServerOpCodes opcode;
+	int port;
+	u_int i, flags = 0;
+	size_t len;
+
+	cp = line;
+	if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* Ignore leading whitespace */
+	if (*arg == '\0')
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+	if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
+		return 0;
+	intptr = NULL;
+	charptr = NULL;
+	opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
+
+	if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
+		cmdline = 1;
+		activep = &cmdline;
+	}
+	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
+		debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
+	if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
+		if (user == NULL) {
+			fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
+			    "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
+		} else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
+			while (arg)
+				arg = strdelim(&cp);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (opcode) {
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+	case sUsePAM:
+		intptr = &options->use_pam;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	/* Standard Options */
+	case sBadOption:
+		return -1;
+	case sPort:
+		/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
+		if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
+			return 0;
+		if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
+			fatal("%s line %d: ports must be specified before "
+			    "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum);
+		if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
+			fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
+		if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		break;
+
+	case sServerKeyBits:
+		intptr = &options->server_key_bits;
+ parse_int:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		value = atoi(arg);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sLoginGraceTime:
+		intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
+ parse_time:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sKeyRegenerationTime:
+		intptr = &options->key_regeneration_time;
+		goto parse_time;
+
+	case sListenAddress:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		/* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
+		if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
+		    && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
+			add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+			break;
+		}
+		p = hpdelim(&arg);
+		if (p == NULL)
+			fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		p = cleanhostname(p);
+		if (arg == NULL)
+			port = 0;
+		else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
+			fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum);
+
+		add_listen_addr(options, p, port);
+
+		break;
+
+	case sAddressFamily:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing address family.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		intptr = &options->address_family;
+		if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
+			fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified before "
+			    "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum);
+		if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet6") == 0)
+			value = AF_INET6;
+		else if (strcasecmp(arg, "any") == 0)
+			value = AF_UNSPEC;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: unsupported address family \"%s\".",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sHostKeyFile:
+		intptr = &options->num_host_key_files;
+		if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
+			fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).",
+			    filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS);
+		charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr];
+ parse_filename:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+			/* increase optional counter */
+			if (intptr != NULL)
+				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sPidFile:
+		charptr = &options->pid_file;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	case sPermitRootLogin:
+		intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/"
+			    "without-password/forced-commands-only/no "
+			    "argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* silence compiler */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "without-password") == 0)
+			value = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "forced-commands-only") == 0)
+			value = PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+			value = PERMIT_YES;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+			value = PERMIT_NO;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/"
+			    "without-password/forced-commands-only/no "
+			    "argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sIgnoreRhosts:
+		intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
+ parse_flag:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* silence compiler */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+			value = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+			value = 0;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s",
+				filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
+		intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sRhostsRSAAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sHostbasedAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
+		intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sRSAAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->rsa_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPubkeyAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKerberosAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKerberosGetAFSToken:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sGssAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sGssCleanupCreds:
+		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sChallengeResponseAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPrintMotd:
+		intptr = &options->print_motd;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPrintLastLog:
+		intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sX11Forwarding:
+		intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sX11DisplayOffset:
+		intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case sX11UseLocalhost:
+		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sXAuthLocation:
+		charptr = &options->xauth_location;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	case sStrictModes:
+		intptr = &options->strict_modes;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sTCPKeepAlive:
+		intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sEmptyPasswd:
+		intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPermitUserEnvironment:
+		intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sUseLogin:
+		intptr = &options->use_login;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sCompression:
+		intptr = &options->compression;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no/delayed "
+			    "argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* silence compiler */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "delayed") == 0)
+			value = COMP_DELAYED;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+			value = COMP_ZLIB;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+			value = COMP_NONE;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no/delayed "
+			    "argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sGatewayPorts:
+		intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no/clientspecified "
+			    "argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = 0;	/* silence compiler */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "clientspecified") == 0)
+			value = 2;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+			value = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+			value = 0;
+		else
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no/clientspecified "
+			    "argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sUseDNS:
+		intptr = &options->use_dns;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sLogFacility:
+		log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		value = log_facility_number(arg);
+		if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
+			*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
+		break;
+
+	case sLogLevel:
+		log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		value = log_level_number(arg);
+		if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*log_level_ptr == -1)
+			*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
+		break;
+
+	case sAllowTcpForwarding:
+		intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sAllowAgentForwarding:
+		intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
+		intptr = &use_privsep;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sAllowUsers:
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
+			    xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sDenyUsers:
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+			if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
+			    xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sAllowGroups:
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+			if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS)
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] =
+			    xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sDenyGroups:
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+			if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS)
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] = xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sCiphers:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (!ciphers_valid(arg))
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (options->ciphers == NULL)
+			options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sMacs:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		if (!mac_valid(arg))
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (options->macs == NULL)
+			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sProtocol:
+		intptr = &options->protocol;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = proto_spec(arg);
+		if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sSubsystem:
+		if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
+			fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		}
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (!*activep) {
+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
+			break;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+			if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
+				fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
+				    filename, linenum, arg);
+		options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+
+		/* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
+		p = xstrdup(arg);
+		len = strlen(p) + 1;
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+			len += 1 + strlen(arg);
+			p = xrealloc(p, 1, len);
+			strlcat(p, " ", len);
+			strlcat(p, arg, len);
+		}
+		options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
+		options->num_subsystems++;
+		break;
+
+	case sMaxStartups:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
+		    &options->max_startups_begin,
+		    &options->max_startups_rate,
+		    &options->max_startups)) == 3) {
+			if (options->max_startups_begin >
+			    options->max_startups ||
+			    options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
+			    options->max_startups_rate < 1)
+				fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+		} else if (n != 1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		else
+			options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
+		break;
+
+	case sMaxAuthTries:
+		intptr = &options->max_authtries;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case sMaxSessions:
+		intptr = &options->max_sessions;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case sBanner:
+		charptr = &options->banner;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	/*
+	 * These options can contain %X options expanded at
+	 * connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
+	 *
+	 * AuthorizedKeysFile	/etc/ssh_keys/%u
+	 */
+	case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
+	case sAuthorizedKeysFile2:
+		charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile) ?
+		    &options->authorized_keys_file :
+		    &options->authorized_keys_file2;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	case sClientAliveInterval:
+		intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
+		goto parse_time;
+
+	case sClientAliveCountMax:
+		intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case sAcceptEnv:
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+			if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV)
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			if (!*activep)
+				break;
+			options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] =
+			    xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sPermitTunnel:
+		intptr = &options->permit_tun;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/"
+			    "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum);
+		value = -1;
+		for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
+			if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) {
+				value = tunmode_desc[i].val;
+				break;
+			}
+		if (value == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
+			    "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+			   "option");
+		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, user, host, address);
+		if (value < 0)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+			    linenum);
+		*activep = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sPermitOpen:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		n = options->num_permitted_opens;	/* modified later */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+			if (*activep && n == -1) {
+				channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+				options->num_permitted_opens = 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+		if (*activep && n == -1)
+			channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+		for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
+			p = hpdelim(&arg);
+			if (p == NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			p = cleanhostname(p);
+			if (arg == NULL || (port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
+				fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
+				    "PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
+			if (*activep && n == -1)
+				options->num_permitted_opens =
+				    channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sForceCommand:
+		if (cp == NULL)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+			    linenum);
+		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+		if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
+			options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
+		return 0;
+
+	case sChrootDirectory:
+		charptr = &options->chroot_directory;
+
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sVersionAddendum:
+                ssh_version_set_addendum(strtok(cp, "\n"));
+                do {
+                        arg = strdelim(&cp);
+                } while (arg != NULL && *arg != '\0');
+		break;
+
+	case sDeprecated:
+		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
+		    filename, linenum, arg);
+		while (arg)
+		    arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		break;
+
+	case sUnsupported:
+		logit("%s line %d: Unsupported option %s",
+		    filename, linenum, arg);
+		while (arg)
+		    arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
+		    filename, linenum, arg, opcode);
+	}
+	if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
+		fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
+		    filename, linenum, arg);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Reads the server configuration file. */
+
+void
+load_server_config(const char *filename, Buffer *conf)
+{
+	char line[1024], *cp;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename);
+	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
+		perror(filename);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	buffer_clear(conf);
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+		/*
+		 * Trim out comments and strip whitespace
+		 * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
+		 * line numbers later for error messages
+		 */
+		if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL)
+			memcpy(cp, "\n", 2);
+		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r");
+
+		buffer_append(conf, cp, strlen(cp));
+	}
+	buffer_append(conf, "\0", 1);
+	fclose(f);
+	debug2("%s: done config len = %d", __func__, buffer_len(conf));
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *user,
+    const char *host, const char *address)
+{
+	ServerOptions mo;
+
+	initialize_server_options(&mo);
+	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", &cfg, user, host, address);
+	copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
+}
+
+/* Helper macros */
+#define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\
+	if (src->n != -1) \
+		dst->n = src->n; \
+} while (0)
+#define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\
+	if (src->n != NULL) { \
+		if (dst->n != NULL) \
+			xfree(dst->n); \
+		dst->n = src->n; \
+	} \
+} while(0)
+
+/*
+ * Copy any supported values that are set.
+ *
+ * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
+ * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
+ * do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
+ */
+void
+copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+{
+	M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
+
+	M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(gateway_ports);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
+
+	M_CP_STROPT(banner);
+	if (preauth)
+		return;
+	M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command);
+	M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory);
+}
+
+#undef M_CP_INTOPT
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf,
+    const char *user, const char *host, const char *address)
+{
+	int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
+	char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
+
+	debug2("%s: config %s len %d", __func__, filename, buffer_len(conf));
+
+	obuf = cbuf = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(conf));
+	active = user ? 0 : 1;
+	linenum = 1;
+	while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
+		if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
+		    linenum++, &active, user, host, address) != 0)
+			bad_options++;
+	}
+	xfree(obuf);
+	if (bad_options > 0)
+		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+		    filename, bad_options);
+}
+
+static const char *
+fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	if (code == sAddressFamily) {
+		switch (val) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			return "inet";
+		case AF_INET6:
+			return "inet6";
+		case AF_UNSPEC:
+			return "any";
+		default:
+			return "UNKNOWN";
+		}
+	}
+	if (code == sPermitRootLogin) {
+		switch (val) {
+		case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+			return "without-password";
+		case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
+			return "forced-commands-only";
+		case PERMIT_YES:
+			return "yes";
+		}
+	}
+	if (code == sProtocol) {
+		switch (val) {
+		case SSH_PROTO_1:
+			return "1";
+		case SSH_PROTO_2:
+			return "2";
+		case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2):
+			return "2,1";
+		default:
+			return "UNKNOWN";
+		}
+	}
+	if (code == sGatewayPorts && val == 2)
+		return "clientspecified";
+	if (code == sCompression && val == COMP_DELAYED)
+		return "delayed";
+	switch (val) {
+	case -1:
+		return "unset";
+	case 0:
+		return "no";
+	case 1:
+		return "yes";
+	}
+	return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static const char *
+lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
+		if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
+			return(keywords[i].name);
+	return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
+{
+	if (val == NULL)
+		return;
+	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),  vals[i]);
+}
+
+void
+dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int ret;
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+	char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV], *s = NULL;
+
+	/* these are usually at the top of the config */
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++)
+		printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sProtocol, o->protocol);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family);
+
+	/* ListenAddress must be after Port */
+	for (ai = o->listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr,
+		    sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+			error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+			    (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
+			    strerror(errno));
+		} else {
+			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+				printf("listenaddress [%s]:%s\n", addr, port);
+			else
+				printf("listenaddress %s:%s\n", addr, port);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* integer arguments */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	dump_cfg_int(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
+#endif
+	dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits);
+	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+	dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time);
+	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
+	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
+
+	/* formatted integer arguments */
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
+	    o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
+#ifdef KRB5
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup);
+# ifdef USE_AFS
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+#endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+	    o->zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
+#endif
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	    o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+	    o->challenge_response_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+
+	/* string arguments */
+	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->authorized_keys_file);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysFile2, o->authorized_keys_file2);
+	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+
+	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
+	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
+	dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
+
+	/* string array arguments */
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
+	     o->host_key_files);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
+
+	/* other arguments */
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
+		printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i],
+		    o->subsystem_args[i]);
+
+	printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin,
+	    o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups);
+
+	for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
+		if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) {
+			s = tunmode_desc[i].text;
+			break;
+		}
+	dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s);
+
+	channel_print_adm_permitted_opens();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3ac7da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.87 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef SERVCONF_H
+#define SERVCONF_H
+
+#define MAX_PORTS		256	/* Max # ports. */
+
+#define MAX_ALLOW_USERS		256	/* Max # users on allow list. */
+#define MAX_DENY_USERS		256	/* Max # users on deny list. */
+#define MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS	256	/* Max # groups on allow list. */
+#define MAX_DENY_GROUPS		256	/* Max # groups on deny list. */
+#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS		256	/* Max # subsystems. */
+#define MAX_HOSTKEYS		256	/* Max # hostkeys. */
+#define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV		256	/* Max # of env vars. */
+#define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS	256	/* Max # of groups for Match. */
+
+/* permit_root_login */
+#define	PERMIT_NOT_SET		-1
+#define	PERMIT_NO		0
+#define	PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY	1
+#define	PERMIT_NO_PASSWD	2
+#define	PERMIT_YES		3
+
+#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
+
+/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
+
+typedef struct {
+	u_int	num_ports;
+	u_int	ports_from_cmdline;
+	int	ports[MAX_PORTS];	/* Port number to listen on. */
+	char   *listen_addr;		/* Address on which the server listens. */
+	struct addrinfo *listen_addrs;	/* Addresses on which the server listens. */
+	int     address_family;		/* Address family used by the server. */
+	char   *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS];	/* Files containing host keys. */
+	int     num_host_key_files;     /* Number of files for host keys. */
+	char   *pid_file;	/* Where to put our pid */
+	int     server_key_bits;/* Size of the server key. */
+	int     login_grace_time;	/* Disconnect if no auth in this time
+					 * (sec). */
+	int     key_regeneration_time;	/* Server key lifetime (seconds). */
+	int     permit_root_login;	/* PERMIT_*, see above */
+	int     ignore_rhosts;	/* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
+	int     ignore_user_known_hosts;	/* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+						 * for RhostsRsaAuth */
+	int     print_motd;	/* If true, print /etc/motd. */
+	int	print_lastlog;	/* If true, print lastlog */
+	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
+					 * searching at */
+	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
+	int     strict_modes;	/* If true, require string home dir modes. */
+	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
+	char   *ciphers;	/* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
+	char   *macs;		/* Supported SSH2 macs. */
+	int	protocol;	/* Supported protocol versions. */
+	int     gateway_ports;	/* If true, allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
+	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
+	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for system logging. */
+	int     rhosts_rsa_authentication;	/* If true, permit rhosts RSA
+						 * authentication. */
+	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
+	int     hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
+	int     rsa_authentication;	/* If true, permit RSA authentication. */
+	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+	int     kerberos_authentication;	/* If true, permit Kerberos
+						 * authentication. */
+	int     kerberos_or_local_passwd;	/* If true, permit kerberos
+						 * and any other password
+						 * authentication mechanism,
+						 * such as SecurID or
+						 * /etc/passwd */
+	int     kerberos_ticket_cleanup;	/* If true, destroy ticket
+						 * file on logout. */
+	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
+						 * authentication. */
+	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
+	int     challenge_response_authentication;
+	int     zero_knowledge_password_authentication;
+					/* If true, permit jpake auth */
+	int     permit_empty_passwd;	/* If false, do not permit empty
+					 * passwords. */
+	int     permit_user_env;	/* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
+	int     use_login;	/* If true, login(1) is used */
+	int     compression;	/* If true, compression is allowed */
+	int	allow_tcp_forwarding;
+	int	allow_agent_forwarding;
+	u_int num_allow_users;
+	char   *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS];
+	u_int num_deny_users;
+	char   *deny_users[MAX_DENY_USERS];
+	u_int num_allow_groups;
+	char   *allow_groups[MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS];
+	u_int num_deny_groups;
+	char   *deny_groups[MAX_DENY_GROUPS];
+
+	u_int num_subsystems;
+	char   *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+	char   *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+	char   *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+
+	u_int num_accept_env;
+	char   *accept_env[MAX_ACCEPT_ENV];
+
+	int	max_startups_begin;
+	int	max_startups_rate;
+	int	max_startups;
+	int	max_authtries;
+	int	max_sessions;
+	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
+	int	use_dns;
+	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
+					 * poke the client this often to
+					 * see if it's still there
+					 */
+	int	client_alive_count_max;	/*
+					 * If the client is unresponsive
+					 * for this many intervals above,
+					 * disconnect the session
+					 */
+
+	char   *authorized_keys_file;	/* File containing public keys */
+	char   *authorized_keys_file2;
+
+	char   *adm_forced_command;
+
+	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
+
+	int	permit_tun;
+
+	int	num_permitted_opens;
+
+	char   *chroot_directory;
+}       ServerOptions;
+
+void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+void	 fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+int	 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
+	     int *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+void	 load_server_config(const char *, Buffer *);
+void	 parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *,
+	     const char *, const char *, const char *);
+void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *,
+	     const char *);
+void	 copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
+void	 dump_config(ServerOptions *);
+
+#endif				/* SERVCONF_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8be01c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1254 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.159 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Server main loop for handling the interactive session.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/* XXX */
+extern Kex *xxx_kex;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern int use_privsep;
+
+static Buffer stdin_buffer;	/* Buffer for stdin data. */
+static Buffer stdout_buffer;	/* Buffer for stdout data. */
+static Buffer stderr_buffer;	/* Buffer for stderr data. */
+static int fdin;		/* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */
+static int fdout;		/* Descriptor for stdout (for reading);
+				   May be same number as fdin. */
+static int fderr;		/* Descriptor for stderr.  May be -1. */
+static long stdin_bytes = 0;	/* Number of bytes written to stdin. */
+static long stdout_bytes = 0;	/* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */
+static long stderr_bytes = 0;	/* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */
+static long fdout_bytes = 0;	/* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */
+static int stdin_eof = 0;	/* EOF message received from client. */
+static int fdout_eof = 0;	/* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */
+static int fderr_eof = 0;	/* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */
+static int fdin_is_tty = 0;	/* fdin points to a tty. */
+static int connection_in;	/* Connection to client (input). */
+static int connection_out;	/* Connection to client (output). */
+static int connection_closed = 0;	/* Connection to client closed. */
+static u_int buffer_high;	/* "Soft" max buffer size. */
+static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
+
+/*
+ * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits.  The server
+ * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated.
+ */
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0;	/* The child has terminated. */
+
+/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+
+/* prototypes */
+static void server_init_dispatch(void);
+
+/*
+ * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid
+ * the race between select() and child_terminated
+ */
+static int notify_pipe[2];
+static void
+notify_setup(void)
+{
+	if (pipe(notify_pipe) < 0) {
+		error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno));
+	} else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, 1) == -1) ||
+	    (fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, 1) == -1)) {
+		error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(notify_pipe[0]);
+		close(notify_pipe[1]);
+	} else {
+		set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]);
+		set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	notify_pipe[0] = -1;	/* read end */
+	notify_pipe[1] = -1;	/* write end */
+}
+static void
+notify_parent(void)
+{
+	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+		write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+}
+static void
+notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+{
+	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+}
+static void
+notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+{
+	char c;
+
+	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
+			debug2("notify_done: reading");
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+	child_terminated = 1;
+#ifndef _UNICOS
+	mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+#endif
+	notify_parent();
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigterm_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_sigterm = sig;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending
+ * to the client.
+ */
+static void
+make_packets_from_stderr_data(void)
+{
+	u_int len;
+
+	/* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */
+	while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 &&
+	    packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+		len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
+		if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+			if (len > 512)
+				len = 512;
+		} else {
+			/* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+			if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+				len = packet_get_maxsize();
+		}
+		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
+		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len);
+		packet_send();
+		buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+		stderr_bytes += len;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the
+ * client.
+ */
+static void
+make_packets_from_stdout_data(void)
+{
+	u_int len;
+
+	/* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */
+	while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 &&
+	    packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+		len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+		if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+			if (len > 512)
+				len = 512;
+		} else {
+			/* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+			if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+				len = packet_get_maxsize();
+		}
+		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
+		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len);
+		packet_send();
+		buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+		stdout_bytes += len;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+client_alive_check(void)
+{
+	int channel_id;
+
+	/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
+	if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) {
+		logit("Timeout, client not responding.");
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply",
+	 * we should get back a failure
+	 */
+	if ((channel_id = channel_find_open()) == -1) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+		packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
+		packet_put_char(1);	/* boolean: want reply */
+	} else {
+		channel_request_start(channel_id, "keepalive@openssh.com", 1);
+	}
+	packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sleep in select() until we can do something.  This will initialize the
+ * select masks.  Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors
+ * have data or can accept data.  Optionally, a maximum time can be specified
+ * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
+ */
+static void
+wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+    u_int *nallocp, u_int max_time_milliseconds)
+{
+	struct timeval tv, *tvp;
+	int ret;
+	int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
+	int program_alive_scheduled = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
+	 * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
+	 * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
+	 *
+	 * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
+	 * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
+	 */
+	if (compat20 &&
+	    max_time_milliseconds == 0 && options.client_alive_interval) {
+		client_alive_scheduled = 1;
+		max_time_milliseconds = options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
+	channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, 0);
+
+	if (compat20) {
+#if 0
+		/* wrong: bad condition XXX */
+		if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+#endif
+		FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Read packets from the client unless we have too much
+		 * buffered stdin or channel data.
+		 */
+		if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+		    channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+			FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+		/*
+		 * If there is not too much data already buffered going to
+		 * the client, try to get some more data from the program.
+		 */
+		if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+			program_alive_scheduled = child_terminated;
+			if (!fdout_eof)
+				FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
+			if (!fderr_eof)
+				FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
+		 * to the program.
+		 */
+		if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
+			FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
+	}
+	notify_prepare(*readsetp);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that
+	 * descriptor.
+	 */
+	if (packet_have_data_to_write())
+		FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
+
+	/*
+	 * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
+	 * from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
+	 */
+	if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+		if (max_time_milliseconds == 0 || client_alive_scheduled)
+			max_time_milliseconds = 100;
+
+	if (max_time_milliseconds == 0)
+		tvp = NULL;
+	else {
+		tv.tv_sec = max_time_milliseconds / 1000;
+		tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_milliseconds % 1000);
+		tvp = &tv;
+	}
+
+	/* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
+	ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+		memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled)
+			client_alive_check();
+		if (!compat20 && program_alive_scheduled && fdin_is_tty) {
+			if (!fdout_eof)
+				FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
+			if (!fderr_eof)
+				FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	notify_done(*readsetp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Processes input from the client and the program.  Input data is stored
+ * in buffers and processed later.
+ */
+static void
+process_input(fd_set *readset)
+{
+	int len;
+	char buf[16384];
+
+	/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
+	if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+		int cont = 0;
+		len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont);
+		if (len == 0) {
+			if (cont)
+				return;
+			verbose("Connection closed by %.100s",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr());
+			connection_closed = 1;
+			if (compat20)
+				return;
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		} else if (len < 0) {
+			if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
+			    errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
+				verbose("Read error from remote host "
+				    "%.100s: %.100s",
+				    get_remote_ipaddr(), strerror(errno));
+				cleanup_exit(255);
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* Buffer any received data. */
+			packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+		}
+	}
+	if (compat20)
+		return;
+
+	/* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */
+	if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) {
+		errno = 0;
+		len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
+		    errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) {
+			/* do nothing */
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
+		} else if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+		} else if ((!isatty(fdout) && len <= 0) ||
+		    (isatty(fdout) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
+			fdout_eof = 1;
+		} else {
+			buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len);
+			fdout_bytes += len;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */
+	if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) {
+		errno = 0;
+		len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
+		    errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) {
+			/* do nothing */
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
+		} else if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+		} else if ((!isatty(fderr) && len <= 0) ||
+		    (isatty(fderr) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
+			fderr_eof = 1;
+		} else {
+			buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
+ */
+static void
+process_output(fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+	u_char *data;
+	u_int dlen;
+	int len;
+
+	/* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
+	if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
+		data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
+		dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
+		len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
+		if (len < 0 &&
+		    (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) {
+			/* do nothing */
+		} else if (len <= 0) {
+			if (fdin != fdout)
+				close(fdin);
+			else
+				shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
+			fdin = -1;
+		} else {
+			/* Successful write. */
+			if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' &&
+			    tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 &&
+			    !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
+				/*
+				 * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
+				 * traffic analysis
+				 */
+				packet_send_ignore(len);
+				packet_send();
+			}
+			/* Consume the data from the buffer. */
+			buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
+			/* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */
+			stdin_bytes += len;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
+	if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
+		packet_write_poll();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client.
+ * This is used when the program terminates.
+ */
+static void
+drain_output(void)
+{
+	/* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */
+	if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
+		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
+		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
+				  buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+		packet_send();
+		/* Update the count of sent bytes. */
+		stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+	}
+	/* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */
+	if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
+		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
+		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
+				  buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+		packet_send();
+		/* Update the count of sent bytes. */
+		stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
+	}
+	/* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */
+	packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+static void
+process_buffered_input_packets(void)
+{
+	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the interactive session.  This handles data transmission between
+ * the client and the program.  Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
+ * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to
+ * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the
+ * child program).
+ */
+void
+server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
+{
+	fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+	int max_fd = 0;
+	u_int nalloc = 0;
+	int wait_status;	/* Status returned by wait(). */
+	pid_t wait_pid;		/* pid returned by wait(). */
+	int waiting_termination = 0;	/* Have displayed waiting close message. */
+	u_int max_time_milliseconds;
+	u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes;
+	u_int stdout_buffer_bytes;
+	int type;
+
+	debug("Entering interactive session.");
+
+	/* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */
+	child_terminated = 0;
+	mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+
+	if (!use_privsep) {
+		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+		signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
+		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize our global variables. */
+	fdin = fdin_arg;
+	fdout = fdout_arg;
+	fderr = fderr_arg;
+
+	/* nonblocking IO */
+	set_nonblock(fdin);
+	set_nonblock(fdout);
+	/* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
+	if (fderr != -1)
+		set_nonblock(fderr);
+
+	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
+		fdin_is_tty = 1;
+
+	connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+	connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+
+	notify_setup();
+
+	previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0;
+
+	/* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */
+	if (packet_is_interactive())
+		buffer_high = 4096;
+	else
+		buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
+
+#if 0
+	/* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */
+	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
+	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
+	if (fderr != -1)
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
+#endif
+
+	/* Initialize Initialize buffers. */
+	buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
+	buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
+	buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty
+	 * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and
+	 * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr.  This way
+	 * we don't need to check the descriptor everywhere.
+	 */
+	if (fderr == -1)
+		fderr_eof = 1;
+
+	server_init_dispatch();
+
+	/* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */
+	for (;;) {
+
+		/* Process buffered packets from the client. */
+		process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+		/*
+		 * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
+		 * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
+		 */
+		if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+			if (fdin != fdout)
+				close(fdin);
+			else
+				shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
+			fdin = -1;
+		}
+		/* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */
+		make_packets_from_stderr_data();
+
+		/*
+		 * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the
+		 * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to
+		 * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we
+		 * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems
+		 * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character.
+		 */
+		max_time_milliseconds = 0;
+		stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+		if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 &&
+		    stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) {
+			/* try again after a while */
+			max_time_milliseconds = 10;
+		} else {
+			/* Send it now. */
+			make_packets_from_stdout_data();
+		}
+		previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+
+		/* Send channel data to the client. */
+		if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+			channel_output_poll();
+
+		/*
+		 * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output
+		 * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the
+		 * client, and there is no pending buffered data.
+		 */
+		if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() &&
+		    buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) {
+			if (!channel_still_open())
+				break;
+			if (!waiting_termination) {
+				const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
+				char *cp;
+				waiting_termination = 1;
+				buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
+
+				/* Display list of open channels. */
+				cp = channel_open_message();
+				buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp));
+				xfree(cp);
+			}
+		}
+		max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
+		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
+
+		/* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */
+		wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
+		    &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds);
+
+		if (received_sigterm) {
+			logit("Exiting on signal %d", received_sigterm);
+			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+
+		/* Process any channel events. */
+		channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
+		/* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */
+		process_input(readset);
+
+		/* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */
+		process_output(writeset);
+	}
+	if (readset)
+		xfree(readset);
+	if (writeset)
+		xfree(writeset);
+
+	/* Cleanup and termination code. */
+
+	/* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */
+	drain_output();
+
+	debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.",
+	    stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes);
+
+	/* Free and clear the buffers. */
+	buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
+	buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
+	buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
+
+	/* Close the file descriptors. */
+	if (fdout != -1)
+		close(fdout);
+	fdout = -1;
+	fdout_eof = 1;
+	if (fderr != -1)
+		close(fderr);
+	fderr = -1;
+	fderr_eof = 1;
+	if (fdin != -1)
+		close(fdin);
+	fdin = -1;
+
+	channel_free_all();
+
+	/* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */
+	mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+	while ((wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0)) < 0)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	if (wait_pid != pid)
+		error("Strange, wait returned pid %ld, expected %ld",
+		    (long)wait_pid, (long)pid);
+
+	/* Check if it exited normally. */
+	if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) {
+		/* Yes, normal exit.  Get exit status and send it to the client. */
+		debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
+		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS);
+		packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		/*
+		 * Wait for exit confirmation.  Note that there might be
+		 * other packets coming before it; however, the program has
+		 * already died so we just ignore them.  The client is
+		 * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives
+		 * the exit status.
+		 */
+		do {
+			type = packet_read();
+		}
+		while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
+
+		debug("Received exit confirmation.");
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status))
+		packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.",
+				  WTERMSIG(wait_status));
+
+	/* Some weird exit cause.  Just exit. */
+	packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status);
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static void
+collect_children(void)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+	sigset_t oset, nset;
+	int status;
+
+	/* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */
+	sigemptyset(&nset);
+	sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
+	sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
+	if (child_terminated) {
+		debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
+		while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+		    (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+			if (pid > 0)
+				session_close_by_pid(pid, status);
+		child_terminated = 0;
+	}
+	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+	int rekeying = 0, max_fd, nalloc = 0;
+
+	debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
+
+	mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+	child_terminated = 0;
+	connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+	connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+
+	if (!use_privsep) {
+		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+		signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
+		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+	}
+
+	notify_setup();
+
+	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
+
+	server_init_dispatch();
+
+	for (;;) {
+		process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+		rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done);
+
+		if (!rekeying && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+			channel_output_poll();
+		wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
+		    &nalloc, 0);
+
+		if (received_sigterm) {
+			logit("Exiting on signal %d", received_sigterm);
+			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+
+		collect_children();
+		if (!rekeying) {
+			channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+			if (packet_need_rekeying()) {
+				debug("need rekeying");
+				xxx_kex->done = 0;
+				kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex);
+			}
+		}
+		process_input(readset);
+		if (connection_closed)
+			break;
+		process_output(writeset);
+	}
+	collect_children();
+
+	if (readset)
+		xfree(readset);
+	if (writeset)
+		xfree(writeset);
+
+	/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
+	channel_free_all();
+
+	/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
+	session_destroy_all(NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq);
+	/*
+	 * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client.
+	 * even if this was generated by something other than
+	 * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
+	 */
+	packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_stdin_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	char *data;
+	u_int data_len;
+
+	/* Stdin data from the client.  Append it to the buffer. */
+	/* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */
+	if (fdin == -1)
+		return;
+	data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len);
+	memset(data, 0, data_len);
+	xfree(data);
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_eof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Eof from the client.  The stdin descriptor to the
+	 * program will be closed when all buffered data has
+	 * drained.
+	 */
+	debug("EOF received for stdin.");
+	packet_check_eom();
+	stdin_eof = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	u_int row = packet_get_int();
+	u_int col = packet_get_int();
+	u_int xpixel = packet_get_int();
+	u_int ypixel = packet_get_int();
+
+	debug("Window change received.");
+	packet_check_eom();
+	if (fdin != -1)
+		pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	char *target, *originator;
+	u_short target_port, originator_port;
+
+	target = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	target_port = packet_get_int();
+	originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	originator_port = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s "
+	    "port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+
+	/* XXX check permission */
+	c = channel_connect_to(target, target_port,
+	    "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip");
+
+	xfree(originator);
+	xfree(target);
+
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_tun(void)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	int mode, tun;
+	int sock;
+
+	mode = packet_get_int();
+	switch (mode) {
+	case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT:
+	case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET:
+		break;
+	default:
+		packet_send_debug("Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
+		packet_send_debug("Server has rejected tunnel device "
+		    "forwarding");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	tun = packet_get_int();
+	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
+		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+			goto done;
+		tun = forced_tun_device;
+	}
+	sock = tun_open(tun, mode);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		goto done;
+	c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+	c->datagram = 1;
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
+		channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
+		    sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ done:
+	if (c == NULL)
+		packet_send_debug("Failed to open the tunnel device.");
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_session(void)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	debug("input_session_request");
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (no_more_sessions) {
+		packet_disconnect("Possible attack: attempt to open a session "
+		    "after additional sessions disabled");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A server session has no fd to read or write until a
+	 * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
+	 * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL.  Additionally, a callback for handling all
+	 * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
+	 */
+	c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
+	    -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+	    0, "server-session", 1);
+	if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
+		debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
+		channel_free(c);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0);
+	return c;
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *ctype;
+	int rchan;
+	u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
+
+	ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
+	rchan = packet_get_int();
+	rwindow = packet_get_int();
+	rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
+
+	debug("server_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
+	    ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
+
+	if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
+		c = server_request_session();
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
+		c = server_request_direct_tcpip();
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		c = server_request_tun();
+	}
+	if (c != NULL) {
+		debug("server_input_channel_open: confirm %s", ctype);
+		c->remote_id = rchan;
+		c->remote_window = rwindow;
+		c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
+		if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+			packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+			packet_put_int(c->self);
+			packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+			packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+			packet_send();
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype);
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+		packet_put_int(rchan);
+		packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
+		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+			packet_put_cstring("open failed");
+			packet_put_cstring("");
+		}
+		packet_send();
+	}
+	xfree(ctype);
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	char *rtype;
+	int want_reply;
+	int success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
+
+	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	want_reply = packet_get_char();
+	debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply);
+
+	/* -R style forwarding */
+	if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
+		struct passwd *pw;
+		char *listen_address;
+		u_short listen_port;
+
+		pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+		if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+			fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
+		listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
+		listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
+		debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d",
+		    listen_address, listen_port);
+
+		/* check permissions */
+		if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding ||
+		    no_port_forwarding_flag ||
+		    (!want_reply && listen_port == 0)
+#ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
+		    || (listen_port != 0 && listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED &&
+                    pw->pw_uid != 0)
+#endif
+		    ) {
+			success = 0;
+			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+		} else {
+			/* Start listening on the port */
+			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
+			    listen_address, listen_port,
+			    &allocated_listen_port, options.gateway_ports);
+		}
+		xfree(listen_address);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
+		char *cancel_address;
+		u_short cancel_port;
+
+		cancel_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
+		cancel_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
+		debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__,
+		    cancel_address, cancel_port);
+
+		success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(cancel_address,
+		    cancel_port);
+		xfree(cancel_address);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		no_more_sessions = 1;
+		success = 1;
+	}
+	if (want_reply) {
+		packet_start(success ?
+		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+		if (success && allocated_listen_port > 0)
+			packet_put_int(allocated_listen_port);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+	}
+	xfree(rtype);
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int id, reply, success = 0;
+	char *rtype;
+
+	id = packet_get_int();
+	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	reply = packet_get_char();
+
+	debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %d request %s reply %d",
+	    id, rtype, reply);
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL)
+		packet_disconnect("server_input_channel_req: "
+		    "unknown channel %d", id);
+	if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) {
+		packet_check_eom();
+		chan_rcvd_eow(c);
+	} else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL ||
+	    c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
+		success = session_input_channel_req(c, rtype);
+	if (reply) {
+		packet_start(success ?
+		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
+		packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+	xfree(rtype);
+}
+
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_20(void)
+{
+	debug("server_init_dispatch_20");
+	dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
+	/* client_alive */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	/* rekeying */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_13(void)
+{
+	debug("server_init_dispatch_13");
+	dispatch_init(NULL);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_15(void)
+{
+	server_init_dispatch_13();
+	debug("server_init_dispatch_15");
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
+	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch(void)
+{
+	if (compat20)
+		server_init_dispatch_20();
+	else if (compat13)
+		server_init_dispatch_13();
+	else
+		server_init_dispatch_15();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.h b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7311558
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.6 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Performs the interactive session.  This handles data transmission between
+ * the client and the program.  Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
+ * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to stdin
+ * (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the child
+ * program).
+ */
+#ifndef SERVERLOOP_H
+#define SERVERLOOP_H
+
+void    server_loop(pid_t, int, int, int);
+void    server_loop2(Authctxt *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51cca49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2781 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.246 2009/04/17 19:23:06 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+#include <kafs.h>
+#endif
+
+#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
+	(!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
+	 (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
+	  c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
+	  c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
+
+/* func */
+
+Session *session_new(void);
+void	session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int);
+void	session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
+void	session_proctitle(Session *);
+int	session_setup_x11fwd(Session *);
+int	do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *);
+int	do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *);
+int	do_exec(Session *, const char *);
+void	do_login(Session *, const char *);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+static void	do_pre_login(Session *s);
+#endif
+void	do_child(Session *, const char *);
+void	do_motd(void);
+int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+
+static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
+static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
+
+static int session_pty_req(Session *);
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern char *__progname;
+extern int log_stderr;
+extern int debug_flag;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern int startup_pipe;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* original command from peer. */
+const char *original_command = NULL;
+
+/* data */
+static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
+static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
+static Session *sessions = NULL;
+
+#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE		0
+#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT		1
+#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP	2
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+static int is_child = 0;
+
+/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+
+/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
+
+static void
+auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+		unlink(auth_sock_name);
+		rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+		auth_sock_name = NULL;
+		restore_uid();
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	int sock = -1;
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+		error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	/* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
+	auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
+
+	/* Create private directory for socket */
+	if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
+		packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: "
+		    "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		xfree(auth_sock_dir);
+		auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+		goto authsock_err;
+	}
+
+	xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
+	    auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
+
+	/* Create the socket. */
+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock < 0) {
+		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		goto authsock_err;
+	}
+
+	/* Bind it to the name. */
+	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+		error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		goto authsock_err;
+	}
+
+	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	/* Start listening on the socket. */
+	if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
+		error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		goto authsock_err;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
+	nc = channel_new("auth socket",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+	    0, "auth socket", 1);
+	nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
+	return 1;
+
+ authsock_err:
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
+		xfree(auth_sock_name);
+	if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
+		rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+		xfree(auth_sock_dir);
+	}
+	if (sock != -1)
+		close(sock);
+	auth_sock_name = NULL;
+	auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+display_loginmsg(void)
+{
+	if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+		printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+
+	/* setup the channel layer */
+	if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
+		channel_permit_all_opens();
+
+	if (compat20)
+		do_authenticated2(authctxt);
+	else
+		do_authenticated1(authctxt);
+
+	do_cleanup(authctxt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepares for an interactive session.  This is called after the user has
+ * been successfully authenticated.  During this message exchange, pseudo
+ * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings
+ * are requested, etc.
+ */
+static void
+do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Session *s;
+	char *command;
+	int success, type, screen_flag;
+	int enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
+	u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0;
+
+	s = session_new();
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		error("no more sessions");
+		return;
+	}
+	s->authctxt = authctxt;
+	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+
+	/*
+	 * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
+	 * or a command.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		success = 0;
+
+		/* Get a packet from the client. */
+		type = packet_read();
+
+		/* Process the packet. */
+		switch (type) {
+		case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION:
+			compression_level = packet_get_int();
+			packet_check_eom();
+			if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) {
+				packet_send_debug("Received invalid compression level %d.",
+				    compression_level);
+				break;
+			}
+			if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+				debug2("compression disabled");
+				break;
+			}
+			/* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */
+			enable_compression_after_reply = 1;
+			success = 1;
+			break;
+
+		case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY:
+			success = session_pty_req(s);
+			break;
+
+		case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
+			s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len);
+			s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+
+			screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+			    SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
+			debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag);
+
+			if (packet_remaining() == 4) {
+				if (!screen_flag)
+					debug2("Buggy client: "
+					    "X11 screen flag missing");
+				s->screen = packet_get_int();
+			} else {
+				s->screen = 0;
+			}
+			packet_check_eom();
+			success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
+			if (!success) {
+				xfree(s->auth_proto);
+				xfree(s->auth_data);
+				s->auth_proto = NULL;
+				s->auth_data = NULL;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
+			if (!options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
+			    no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) {
+				debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
+				break;
+			}
+			debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request.");
+			success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
+			break;
+
+		case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST:
+			if (no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+				debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
+				break;
+			}
+			if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding) {
+				debug("Port forwarding not permitted.");
+				break;
+			}
+			debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
+			if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0,
+			    options.gateway_ports) < 0) {
+				debug("Port forwarding failed.");
+				break;
+			}
+			success = 1;
+			break;
+
+		case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE:
+			if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0)
+				success = 1;
+			break;
+
+		case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
+		case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
+			if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) {
+				command = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+				debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command);
+				if (do_exec(s, command) != 0)
+					packet_disconnect(
+					    "command execution failed");
+				xfree(command);
+			} else {
+				if (do_exec(s, NULL) != 0)
+					packet_disconnect(
+					    "shell execution failed");
+			}
+			packet_check_eom();
+			session_close(s);
+			return;
+
+		default:
+			/*
+			 * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
+			 * and a failure message is returned.
+			 */
+			logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
+		}
+		packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		/* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */
+		if (enable_compression_after_reply) {
+			enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
+			packet_start_compression(compression_level);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+#define USE_PIPES
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors and such.
+ */
+int
+do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+	int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
+
+	/* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
+	if (pipe(pin) < 0) {
+		error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pipe(pout) < 0) {
+		error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pin[1]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pipe(perr) < 0) {
+		error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pin[1]);
+		close(pout[0]);
+		close(pout[1]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#else
+	int inout[2], err[2];
+
+	/* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) {
+		error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) {
+		error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(inout[0]);
+		close(inout[1]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (s == NULL)
+		fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
+
+	session_proctitle(s);
+
+	/* Fork the child. */
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pin[1]);
+		close(pout[0]);
+		close(pout[1]);
+		close(perr[0]);
+		close(perr[1]);
+#else
+		close(inout[0]);
+		close(inout[1]);
+		close(err[0]);
+		close(err[1]);
+#endif
+		return -1;
+	case 0:
+		is_child = 1;
+
+		/* Child.  Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
+		log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+		    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+		/*
+		 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+		 * setlogin() affects the entire process group.
+		 */
+		if (setsid() < 0)
+			error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+		/*
+		 * Redirect stdin.  We close the parent side of the socket
+		 * pair, and make the child side the standard input.
+		 */
+		close(pin[1]);
+		if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
+			perror("dup2 stdin");
+		close(pin[0]);
+
+		/* Redirect stdout. */
+		close(pout[0]);
+		if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
+			perror("dup2 stdout");
+		close(pout[1]);
+
+		/* Redirect stderr. */
+		close(perr[0]);
+		if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0)
+			perror("dup2 stderr");
+		close(perr[1]);
+#else
+		/*
+		 * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr.  Stdin and stdout will
+		 * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
+		 * seem to depend on it.
+		 */
+		close(inout[1]);
+		close(err[1]);
+		if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0)	/* stdin */
+			perror("dup2 stdin");
+		if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0)	/* stdout (same as stdin) */
+			perror("dup2 stdout");
+		close(inout[0]);
+		if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0)	/* stderr */
+			perror("dup2 stderr");
+		close(err[0]);
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+		cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+#endif
+
+		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+		do_child(s, command);
+		/* NOTREACHED */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+	signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+
+	s->pid = pid;
+	/* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
+	packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
+	 * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
+	 * multiple copies of the login messages.
+	 */
+	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+	/* We are the parent.  Close the child sides of the pipes. */
+	close(pin[0]);
+	close(pout[1]);
+	close(perr[1]);
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		if (s->is_subsystem) {
+			close(perr[0]);
+			perr[0] = -1;
+		}
+		session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], 0);
+	} else {
+		/* Enter the interactive session. */
+		server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]);
+		/* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */
+	}
+#else
+	/* We are the parent.  Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
+	close(inout[0]);
+	close(err[0]);
+
+	/*
+	 * Enter the interactive session.  Note: server_loop must be able to
+	 * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
+	 */
+	if (compat20) {
+		session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1],
+		    s->is_subsystem ? -1 : err[1], 0);
+		if (s->is_subsystem)
+			close(err[1]);
+	} else {
+		server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
+		/* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty.  This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
+ * lastlog, and other such operations.
+ */
+int
+do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	if (s == NULL)
+		fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
+	ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
+	ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
+	 * standard input.  We could use the original descriptor, but this
+	 * simplifies code in server_loop.  The descriptor is bidirectional.
+	 * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
+	 * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
+	 */
+	if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(ttyfd);
+		close(ptyfd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* we keep a reference to the pty master */
+	if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(ttyfd);
+		close(ptyfd);
+		close(fdout);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Fork the child. */
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		close(fdout);
+		close(ptymaster);
+		close(ttyfd);
+		close(ptyfd);
+		return -1;
+	case 0:
+		is_child = 1;
+
+		close(fdout);
+		close(ptymaster);
+
+		/* Child.  Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
+		log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+		    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+		/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
+		close(ptyfd);
+
+		/* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
+		pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
+
+		/* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
+		if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0)
+			error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0)
+			error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0)
+			error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+		close(ttyfd);
+
+		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+		if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) {
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+			cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+			do_login(s, command);
+		}
+# ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+		else
+			do_pre_login(s);
+# endif
+#endif
+		/*
+		 * Do common processing for the child, such as execing
+		 * the command.
+		 */
+		do_child(s, command);
+		/* NOTREACHED */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+	signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+
+	s->pid = pid;
+
+	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+	close(ttyfd);
+
+	/* Enter interactive session. */
+	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+	packet_set_interactive(1);
+	if (compat20) {
+		session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1);
+	} else {
+		server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
+		/* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+static void
+do_pre_login(Session *s)
+{
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+	/*
+	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+	 */
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+	}
+
+	record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
+	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command.  If another command is
+ * to be forced, execute that instead.
+ */
+int
+do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+		original_command = command;
+		command = options.adm_forced_command;
+		if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command))
+			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
+		else if (s->is_subsystem)
+			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+		debug("Forced command (config) '%.900s'", command);
+	} else if (forced_command) {
+		original_command = command;
+		command = forced_command;
+		if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command))
+			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
+		else if (s->is_subsystem)
+			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+		debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command);
+	}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (command != NULL)
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+	}
+#endif
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+		ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
+	else
+		ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
+
+	original_command = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
+	 * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
+	 * multiple copies of the login messages.
+	 */
+	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
+void
+do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+	pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+	/*
+	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+	 */
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+		    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
+		    options.use_dns),
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	/*
+	 * If password change is needed, do it now.
+	 * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
+	 */
+	if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+		display_loginmsg();
+		do_pam_chauthtok();
+		s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
+		/* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
+		return;
+
+	display_loginmsg();
+
+	do_motd();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Display the message of the day.
+ */
+void
+do_motd(void)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char buf[256];
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	const char *fname;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	fname = login_getcapstr(lc, "copyright", NULL, NULL);
+	if (fname != NULL && (f = fopen(fname, "r")) != NULL) {
+		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL)
+			fputs(buf, stdout);
+			fclose(f);
+	} else
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+		(void)printf("%s\n\t%s %s\n",
+	"Copyright (c) 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994",
+	"The Regents of the University of California. ",
+	"All rights reserved.");
+
+	(void)printf("\n");
+
+	if (options.print_motd) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+		f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
+		    "/etc/motd"), "r");
+#else
+		f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
+#endif
+		if (f) {
+			while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+				fputs(buf, stdout);
+			fclose(f);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
+ */
+int
+check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
+	if (command != NULL)
+		return 1;
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+		return 1;
+#else
+	if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment.  If the variable
+ * already exists, its value is overridden.
+ */
+void
+child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+	const char *value)
+{
+	char **env;
+	u_int envsize;
+	u_int i, namelen;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
+	 * entry before continuing.
+	 */
+	if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
+		*envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+		*envp[0] = NULL;
+		*envsizep = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Find the slot where the value should be stored.  If the variable
+	 * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
+	 * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
+	 */
+	env = *envp;
+	namelen = strlen(name);
+	for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+		if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
+			break;
+	if (env[i]) {
+		/* Reuse the slot. */
+		xfree(env[i]);
+	} else {
+		/* New variable.  Expand if necessary. */
+		envsize = *envsizep;
+		if (i >= envsize - 1) {
+			if (envsize >= 1000)
+				fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
+			envsize += 50;
+			env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
+			*envsizep = envsize;
+		}
+		/* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
+		env[i + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
+	env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
+	snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
+ * into the environment.  If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
+ * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
+ * and assignments of the form name=value.  No other forms are allowed.
+ */
+static void
+read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
+	const char *filename)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char buf[4096];
+	char *cp, *value;
+	u_int lineno = 0;
+
+	f = fopen(filename, "r");
+	if (!f)
+		return;
+
+	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+		if (++lineno > 1000)
+			fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
+		for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
+			continue;
+
+		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+
+		value = strchr(cp, '=');
+		if (value == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
+			    filename);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
+		 * the value string.
+		 */
+		*value = '\0';
+		value++;
+		child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+/*
+ * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
+ */
+static char *
+child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = strlen(name);
+	for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
+		if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
+			return(env[i] + len + 1);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read /etc/default/login.
+ * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
+ */
+static void
+read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
+	u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
+	u_long mask;
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
+	 * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
+	 * interested in.
+	 */
+	read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login");
+
+	if (tmpenv == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (uid == 0)
+		var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
+	else
+		var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
+	if (var != NULL)
+		child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
+
+	if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
+		if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
+			umask((mode_t)mask);
+
+	for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
+		xfree(tmpenv[i]);
+	xfree(tmpenv);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+
+void
+copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+{
+	char *var_name, *var_val;
+	int i;
+
+	if (source == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
+		if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
+			xfree(var_name);
+			continue;
+		}
+		*var_val++ = '\0';
+
+		debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+		child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+
+		xfree(var_name);
+	}
+}
+
+static char **
+do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+	u_int i, envsize;
+	char **env, *laddr;
+	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
+	char *path = NULL;
+#else
+	extern char **environ;
+	char **senv, **var;
+#endif
+
+	/* Initialize the environment. */
+	envsize = 100;
+	env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
+	env[0] = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/*
+	 * The Windows environment contains some setting which are
+	 * important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
+	 */
+	{
+		char **p;
+
+		p = fetch_windows_environment();
+		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+		free_windows_environment(p);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (getenv("TZ"))
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
+	 * the childs environment as they see fit
+	 */
+	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+#endif
+
+	if (!options.use_login) {
+		/* Set basic environment. */
+		for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name,
+			    s->env[i].val);
+
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef _AIX
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
+			 _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", "su");
+		senv = environ;
+		environ = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+		*environ = NULL;
+		(void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+		    LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH);
+		copy_environment(environ, &env, &envsize);
+		for (var = environ; *var != NULL; ++var)
+			xfree(*var);
+		xfree(environ);
+		environ = senv;
+#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+		/*
+		 * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
+		 * important components pointing to the system directories,
+		 * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
+		 * remains intact here.
+		 */
+#  ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+		read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
+		path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
+#  endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+		if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
+			    s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?
+				SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
+		}
+# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+
+		/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
+	}
+
+	/* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
+	if (!options.use_login) {
+		while (custom_environment) {
+			struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
+			char *str = ce->s;
+
+			for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
+				;
+			if (str[i] == '=') {
+				str[i] = 0;
+				child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
+			}
+			custom_environment = ce->next;
+			xfree(ce->s);
+			xfree(ce);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
+	    get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port());
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
+
+	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
+	    get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), laddr, get_local_port());
+	xfree(laddr);
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
+
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
+	if (s->term)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
+	if (s->display)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
+	if (original_command)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
+		    original_command);
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+	if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0')
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
+	 * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
+	 * SIA), so copy it to the child.
+	 */
+	{
+		char *cp;
+
+		if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
+	}
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+	{
+		char *cp;
+
+		if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
+		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	/*
+	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
+	 * been set by PAM.
+	 */
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		char **p;
+
+		p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
+		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+		free_pam_environment(p);
+
+		p = fetch_pam_environment();
+		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+		free_pam_environment(p);
+	}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+		    auth_sock_name);
+
+	/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
+	if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) {
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
+		    strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
+		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
+	}
+	if (debug_flag) {
+		/* dump the environment */
+		fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
+		for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+			fprintf(stderr, "  %.200s\n", env[i]);
+	}
+	return env;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
+ * first in this order).
+ */
+static void
+do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	char cmd[1024];
+	int do_xauth;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	do_xauth =
+	    s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+
+	/* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
+	if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
+	    !no_user_rc && stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
+		snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
+		    shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+		if (debug_flag)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
+		f = popen(cmd, "w");
+		if (f) {
+			if (do_xauth)
+				fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+				    s->auth_data);
+			pclose(f);
+		} else
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+			    _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+	} else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
+		if (debug_flag)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
+			    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+		f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
+		if (f) {
+			if (do_xauth)
+				fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+				    s->auth_data);
+			pclose(f);
+		} else
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+			    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+	} else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
+		/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
+		if (debug_flag) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
+			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
+			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
+			    s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
+		}
+		snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
+		    options.xauth_location);
+		f = popen(cmd, "w");
+		if (f) {
+			fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
+			    s->auth_display);
+			fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
+			    s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
+			    s->auth_data);
+			pclose(f);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+			    cmd);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (!login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) && pw->pw_uid)
+		f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", _PATH_NOLOGIN,
+		    _PATH_NOLOGIN), "r");
+#else
+	if (pw->pw_uid)
+		f = fopen(_PATH_NOLOGIN, "r");
+#endif
+	if (f) {
+		/* /etc/nologin exists.  Print its contents and exit. */
+		logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists",
+		    pw->pw_name, _PATH_NOLOGIN);
+		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+			fputs(buf, stderr);
+		fclose(f);
+		fflush(NULL);
+		exit(254);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
+ * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
+ */
+static void
+safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+	char component[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (*path != '/')
+		fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
+	if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+		fatal("chroot path too long");
+
+	/*
+	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
+	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
+	 */
+	for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
+		if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
+			strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
+		else {
+			cp++;
+			memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+			component[cp - path] = '\0';
+		}
+	
+		debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
+
+		if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+			    component, strerror(errno));
+		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
+			fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
+			    "directory %s\"%s\"", 
+			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+			fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
+			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+
+	}
+
+	if (chdir(path) == -1)
+		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+	if (chroot(path) == -1)
+		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
+	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+		fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+	verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
+}
+
+/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
+void
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *chroot_path, *tmp;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
+	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+	{
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+# ifdef __bsdi__
+		setpgid(0, 0);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_PAM
+		if (options.use_pam) {
+			do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+		}
+# endif /* USE_PAM */
+		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+			perror("unable to set user context");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+#else
+# if defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
+		/* Sets login uid for accounting */
+		if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+			error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
+# endif /* defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) */
+
+		if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
+			error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+			perror("setgid");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		/* Initialize the group list. */
+		if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+			perror("initgroups");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		endgrent();
+# ifdef USE_PAM
+		/*
+		 * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
+		 * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
+		 * Reestablish them here.
+		 */
+		if (options.use_pam) {
+			do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+		}
+# endif /* USE_PAM */
+# if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+		irix_setusercontext(pw);
+# endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+# ifdef _AIX
+		aix_usrinfo(pw);
+# endif /* _AIX */
+# ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+		if (set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) {
+			exit(1);
+		}
+# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+#endif
+
+		if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+                        tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
+			    pw->pw_uid);
+			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+			free(tmp);
+			free(chroot_path);
+		}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
+		if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, (char **)NULL) == -1)
+			fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
+			perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+#else
+		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+		fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+do_pwchange(Session *s)
+{
+	fflush(NULL);
+	fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+#else
+		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
+#endif
+		perror("passwd");
+	} else {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
+	}
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname)
+{
+	/* Launch login(1). */
+
+	execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname,
+#ifdef xxxLOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
+		    (s->term ? s->term : "unknown"),
+#endif /* LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */
+#ifdef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT
+	    "-p", "-f", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+#else
+	    "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+#endif
+
+	/* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
+
+	perror("login");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+child_close_fds(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
+		close(packet_get_connection_in());
+	else {
+		close(packet_get_connection_in());
+		close(packet_get_connection_out());
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Close all descriptors related to channels.  They will still remain
+	 * open in the parent.
+	 */
+	/* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
+	channel_close_all();
+
+	/*
+	 * Close any extra file descriptors.  Note that there may still be
+	 * descriptors left by system functions.  They will be closed later.
+	 */
+	endpwent();
+
+	/*
+	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+	 * descriptors open.
+	 */
+	for (i = 3; i < 64; i++)
+		close(i);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+ * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+ * ids, and executing the command or shell.
+ */
+#define ARGV_MAX 10
+void
+do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	extern char **environ;
+	char **env;
+	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
+	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+	destroy_sensitive_data();
+
+	/* Force a password change */
+	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+		do_setusercontext(pw);
+		child_close_fds();
+		do_pwchange(s);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */
+	if (options.use_login && command != NULL)
+		options.use_login = 0;
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+	cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+
+	/*
+	 * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
+	 * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
+	 */
+	if (!options.use_login) {
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+		session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
+		if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+			do_motd();
+#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+		/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
+		if (!options.use_pam)
+			do_nologin(pw);
+		do_setusercontext(pw);
+		/*
+		 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
+		 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
+		 * login then display them too.
+		 */
+		if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+			display_loginmsg();
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+	}
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login && !is_pam_session_open()) {
+		debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
+		display_loginmsg();
+		exit(254);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is
+	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+	 */
+	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
+	 * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
+	 */
+	env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
+#endif
+
+	/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
+	if (options.use_login)
+		hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
+		    options.use_dns);
+	/*
+	 * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
+	 * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
+	 * that we do not shutdown it.  Note that the descriptors cannot be
+	 * closed before building the environment, as we call
+	 * get_remote_ipaddr there.
+	 */
+	child_close_fds();
+
+	/*
+	 * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
+	 * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
+	 */
+	environ = env;
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+	/*
+	 * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
+	 * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
+	 * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
+	 * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
+	 * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
+	 */
+
+	if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
+	    (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
+		char cell[64];
+
+		debug("Getting AFS token");
+
+		k_setpag();
+
+		if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
+			krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+			    s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
+
+		krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+		    s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
+	if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
+		/* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+		r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
+#endif
+		if (r || options.chroot_directory == NULL)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
+			    "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		if (r)
+			exit(1);
+	}
+
+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+	if (!options.use_login)
+		do_rc_files(s, shell);
+
+	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+
+	if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
+		extern int optind, optreset;
+		int i;
+		char *p, *args;
+
+		setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
+		args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
+		for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
+			if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
+				argv[i++] = p;
+		argv[i] = NULL;
+		optind = optreset = 1;
+		__progname = argv[0];
+		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+	}
+
+	if (options.use_login) {
+		launch_login(pw, hostname);
+		/* NEVERREACHED */
+	}
+
+	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+	if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
+		shell0++;
+	else
+		shell0 = shell;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have no command, execute the shell.  In this case, the shell
+	 * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
+	 * this is a login shell.
+	 */
+	if (!command) {
+		char argv0[256];
+
+		/* Start the shell.  Set initial character to '-'. */
+		argv0[0] = '-';
+
+		if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
+		    >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			perror(shell);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+
+		/* Execute the shell. */
+		argv[0] = argv0;
+		argv[1] = NULL;
+		execve(shell, argv, env);
+
+		/* Executing the shell failed. */
+		perror(shell);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Execute the command using the user's shell.  This uses the -c
+	 * option to execute the command.
+	 */
+	argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
+	argv[1] = "-c";
+	argv[2] = (char *) command;
+	argv[3] = NULL;
+	execve(shell, argv, env);
+	perror(shell);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+session_unused(int id)
+{
+	debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id);
+	if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
+	    id >= sessions_nalloc) {
+		fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
+		    __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
+	}
+	bzero(&sessions[id], sizeof(*sessions));
+	sessions[id].self = id;
+	sessions[id].used = 0;
+	sessions[id].chanid = -1;
+	sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
+	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
+	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
+	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
+	sessions_first_unused = id;
+}
+
+Session *
+session_new(void)
+{
+	Session *s, *tmp;
+
+	if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
+		if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
+			return NULL;
+		debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
+		    __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
+		tmp = xrealloc(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1,
+		    sizeof(*sessions));
+		if (tmp == NULL) {
+			error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions",
+			    __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		sessions = tmp;
+		session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
+	}
+
+	if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
+	    sessions_first_unused < 0) {
+		fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
+		    __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
+		    sessions_nalloc);
+	}
+
+	s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
+	if (s->used) {
+		fatal("%s: session %d already used",
+		    __func__, sessions_first_unused);
+	}
+	sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
+	s->used = 1;
+	s->next_unused = -1;
+	debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
+
+	return s;
+}
+
+static void
+session_dump(void)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+		debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p "
+		    "channel %d pid %ld",
+		    s->used,
+		    s->next_unused,
+		    s->self,
+		    s,
+		    s->chanid,
+		    (long)s->pid);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
+{
+	Session *s = session_new();
+	debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		error("no more sessions");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	s->authctxt = authctxt;
+	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+	if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
+	debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
+	s->chanid = chanid;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+Session *
+session_by_tty(char *tty)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
+			debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
+			return s;
+		}
+	}
+	debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_channel(int id)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
+			debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
+			    i, id);
+			return s;
+		}
+	}
+	debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_x11_channel(int id)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+		if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
+			continue;
+		for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
+			if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
+				debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
+				    "channel %d", s->self, id);
+				return s;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
+{
+	int i;
+	debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
+			return s;
+	}
+	error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+session_window_change_req(Session *s)
+{
+	s->col = packet_get_int();
+	s->row = packet_get_int();
+	s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
+	s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+	pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_pty_req(Session *s)
+{
+	u_int len;
+	int n_bytes;
+
+	if (no_pty_flag) {
+		debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		s->col = packet_get_int();
+		s->row = packet_get_int();
+	} else {
+		s->row = packet_get_int();
+		s->col = packet_get_int();
+	}
+	s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
+	s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
+
+	if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
+		xfree(s->term);
+		s->term = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
+	debug("Allocating pty.");
+	if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
+	    sizeof(s->tty)))) {
+		if (s->term)
+			xfree(s->term);
+		s->term = NULL;
+		s->ptyfd = -1;
+		s->ttyfd = -1;
+		error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+	/* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */
+	if (!compat20)
+		n_bytes = packet_remaining();
+	tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+
+	/* Set window size from the packet. */
+	pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+	session_proctitle(s);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	u_int len;
+	int success = 0;
+	char *prog, *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
+	u_int i;
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+	logit("subsystem request for %.100s", subsys);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
+			prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
+			cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
+			if (!strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog)) {
+				s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
+			} else if (stat(prog, &st) < 0) {
+				error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", prog,
+				    strerror(errno));
+				break;
+			} else {
+				s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+			}
+			debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
+			success = do_exec(s, cmd) == 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!success)
+		logit("subsystem request for %.100s failed, subsystem not found",
+		    subsys);
+
+	xfree(subsys);
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_x11_req(Session *s)
+{
+	int success;
+
+	if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
+		error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
+		    "x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
+	s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	s->screen = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
+	if (!success) {
+		xfree(s->auth_proto);
+		xfree(s->auth_data);
+		s->auth_proto = NULL;
+		s->auth_data = NULL;
+	}
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_shell_req(Session *s)
+{
+	packet_check_eom();
+	return do_exec(s, NULL) == 0;
+}
+
+static int
+session_exec_req(Session *s)
+{
+	u_int len, success;
+
+	char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+	success = do_exec(s, command) == 0;
+	xfree(command);
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_break_req(Session *s)
+{
+
+	packet_get_int();	/* ignored */
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (s->ttyfd == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ttyfd, 0) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_env_req(Session *s)
+{
+	char *name, *val;
+	u_int name_len, val_len, i;
+
+	name = packet_get_string(&name_len);
+	val = packet_get_string(&val_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/* Don't set too many environment variables */
+	if (s->num_env > 128) {
+		debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
+		if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
+			debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
+			s->env = xrealloc(s->env, s->num_env + 1,
+			    sizeof(*s->env));
+			s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
+			s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
+			s->num_env++;
+			return (1);
+		}
+	}
+	debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
+
+ fail:
+	xfree(name);
+	xfree(val);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+session_auth_agent_req(Session *s)
+{
+	static int called = 0;
+	packet_check_eom();
+	if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
+		debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (called) {
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		called = 1;
+		return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+	Session *s;
+
+	if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
+		logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s",
+		    c->self, rtype);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, rtype);
+
+	/*
+	 * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
+	 * or a subsystem is executed
+	 */
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
+		if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
+			success = session_shell_req(s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
+			success = session_exec_req(s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
+			success = session_pty_req(s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
+			success = session_x11_req(s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) {
+			success = session_auth_agent_req(s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
+			success = session_subsystem_req(s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
+			success = session_env_req(s);
+		}
+	}
+	if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
+		success = session_window_change_req(s);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
+		success = session_break_req(s);
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+void
+session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int is_tty)
+{
+	if (!compat20)
+		fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0");
+	/*
+	 * now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
+	 * we can activate our channel and register the fd's
+	 */
+	if (s->chanid == -1)
+		fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
+	channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
+	    fdout, fdin, fderr,
+	    fderr == -1 ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
+	    1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
+ * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
+ */
+void
+session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
+{
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		error("session_pty_cleanup: no session");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+		return;
+
+	debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+	/* Record that the user has logged out. */
+	if (s->pid != 0)
+		record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
+
+	/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
+	if (getuid() == 0)
+		pty_release(s->tty);
+
+	/*
+	 * Close the server side of the socket pairs.  We must do this after
+	 * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
+	 * while we're still cleaning up.
+	 */
+	if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
+		error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
+		    s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* unlink pty from session */
+	s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
+{
+	PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
+}
+
+static char *
+sig2name(int sig)
+{
+#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
+	SSH_SIG(ABRT);
+	SSH_SIG(ALRM);
+	SSH_SIG(FPE);
+	SSH_SIG(HUP);
+	SSH_SIG(ILL);
+	SSH_SIG(INT);
+	SSH_SIG(KILL);
+	SSH_SIG(PIPE);
+	SSH_SIG(QUIT);
+	SSH_SIG(SEGV);
+	SSH_SIG(TERM);
+	SSH_SIG(USR1);
+	SSH_SIG(USR2);
+#undef	SSH_SIG
+	return "SIG@openssh.com";
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_x11(int id)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) {
+		debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id);
+	} else {
+		/* Detach X11 listener */
+		debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id);
+		channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+		if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+			chan_mark_dead(c);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg)
+{
+	Session *s;
+	u_int i;
+
+	debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id);
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+	if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
+		fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id);
+	for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+		debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: "
+		    "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+		/*
+		 * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
+		 * close all of its siblings.
+		 */
+		if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
+			session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
+	}
+	xfree(s->x11_chanids);
+	s->x11_chanids = NULL;
+	if (s->display) {
+		xfree(s->display);
+		s->display = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s->auth_proto) {
+		xfree(s->auth_proto);
+		s->auth_proto = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s->auth_data) {
+		xfree(s->auth_data);
+		s->auth_data = NULL;
+	}
+	if (s->auth_display) {
+		xfree(s->auth_display);
+		s->auth_display = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL)
+		fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d",
+		    s->self, s->chanid);
+	debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld",
+	    s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
+
+	if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+		channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
+		packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		packet_send();
+	} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+		channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
+		packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)));
+#ifdef WCOREDUMP
+		packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0);
+#else /* WCOREDUMP */
+		packet_put_char(0);
+#endif /* WCOREDUMP */
+		packet_put_cstring("");
+		packet_put_cstring("");
+		packet_send();
+	} else {
+		/* Some weird exit cause.  Just exit. */
+		packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status);
+	}
+
+	/* disconnect channel */
+	debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid);
+
+	/*
+	 * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
+	 * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
+	 * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds.
+	 */
+	channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
+	 * interested in data we write.
+	 * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
+	 * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
+	 */
+	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+		chan_write_failed(c);
+}
+
+void
+session_close(Session *s)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+		session_pty_cleanup(s);
+	if (s->term)
+		xfree(s->term);
+	if (s->display)
+		xfree(s->display);
+	if (s->x11_chanids)
+		xfree(s->x11_chanids);
+	if (s->auth_display)
+		xfree(s->auth_display);
+	if (s->auth_data)
+		xfree(s->auth_data);
+	if (s->auth_proto)
+		xfree(s->auth_proto);
+	if (s->env != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
+			xfree(s->env[i].name);
+			xfree(s->env[i].val);
+		}
+		xfree(s->env);
+	}
+	session_proctitle(s);
+	session_unused(s->self);
+}
+
+void
+session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status)
+{
+	Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld",
+		    (long)pid);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (s->chanid != -1)
+		session_exit_message(s, status);
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+		session_pty_cleanup(s);
+	s->pid = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this is called when a channel dies before
+ * the session 'child' itself dies
+ */
+void
+session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg)
+{
+	Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld",
+	    id, (long)s->pid);
+	if (s->pid != 0) {
+		debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id);
+		/*
+		 * delay detach of session, but release pty, since
+		 * the fd's to the child are already closed
+		 */
+		if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+			session_pty_cleanup(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* detach by removing callback */
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid);
+
+	/* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
+	if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+			session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
+			s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	s->chanid = -1;
+	session_close(s);
+}
+
+void
+session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *))
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used) {
+			if (closefunc != NULL)
+				closefunc(s);
+			else
+				session_close(s);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static char *
+session_tty_list(void)
+{
+	static char buf[1024];
+	int i;
+	char *cp;
+
+	buf[0] = '\0';
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
+
+			if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
+				cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
+				cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
+			} else
+				cp = s->tty + 5;
+
+			if (buf[0] != '\0')
+				strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
+			strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
+		}
+	}
+	if (buf[0] == '\0')
+		strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
+	return buf;
+}
+
+void
+session_proctitle(Session *s)
+{
+	if (s->pw == NULL)
+		error("no user for session %d", s->self);
+	else
+		setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
+}
+
+int
+session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	char display[512], auth_display[512];
+	char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+		packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
+		debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!options.xauth_location ||
+	    (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
+		packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (options.use_login) {
+		packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; "
+		    "not compatible with UseLogin=yes.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (s->display != NULL) {
+		debug("X11 display already set.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
+	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+		channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i],
+		    session_close_single_x11, 0);
+	}
+
+	/* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
+	if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
+		fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	/*
+	 * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
+	 * authorization entry is added with xauth(1).  This will be
+	 * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
+	 */
+	if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
+		    s->display_number, s->screen);
+		snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
+		    s->display_number, s->screen);
+		s->display = xstrdup(display);
+		s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
+	} else {
+#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+		struct hostent *he;
+		struct in_addr my_addr;
+
+		he = gethostbyname(hostname);
+		if (he == NULL) {
+			error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+			packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
+		    s->display_number, s->screen);
+#else
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
+		    s->display_number, s->screen);
+#endif
+		s->display = xstrdup(display);
+		s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	server_loop2(authctxt);
+}
+
+void
+do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	static int called = 0;
+
+	debug("do_cleanup");
+
+	/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
+	if (is_child)
+		return;
+
+	/* avoid double cleanup */
+	if (called)
+		return;
+	called = 1;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		return;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		sshpam_cleanup();
+		sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+		return;
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
+	    authctxt->krb5_ctx)
+		krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds)
+		ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
+#endif
+
+	/* remove agent socket */
+	auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+
+	/*
+	 * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
+	 * or if running in monitor.
+	 */
+	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+		session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.h b/crypto/openssh/session.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbb8e3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.h
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.30 2008/05/08 12:21:16 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SESSION_H
+#define SESSION_H
+
+#define TTYSZ 64
+typedef struct Session Session;
+struct Session {
+	int	used;
+	int	self;
+	int	next_unused;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	Authctxt *authctxt;
+	pid_t	pid;
+
+	/* tty */
+	char	*term;
+	int	ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+	u_int	row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
+	char	tty[TTYSZ];
+
+	/* X11 */
+	u_int	display_number;
+	char	*display;
+	u_int	screen;
+	char	*auth_display;
+	char	*auth_proto;
+	char	*auth_data;
+	int	single_connection;
+
+	/* proto 2 */
+	int	chanid;
+	int	*x11_chanids;
+	int	is_subsystem;
+	u_int	num_env;
+	struct {
+		char	*name;
+		char	*val;
+	} *env;
+};
+
+void	 do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
+void	 do_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+
+int	 session_open(Authctxt *, int);
+void	 session_unused(int);
+int	 session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *);
+void	 session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
+void	 session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
+void	 session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
+void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+
+Session	*session_new(void);
+Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
+void	 session_close(Session *);
+void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void	 child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+		       const char *value);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0990b79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1315 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.87 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* XXX: memleaks */
+/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */
+/* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */
+/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted;
+extern int showprogress;
+
+/* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
+#define MIN_READ_SIZE	512
+
+struct sftp_conn {
+	int fd_in;
+	int fd_out;
+	u_int transfer_buflen;
+	u_int num_requests;
+	u_int version;
+	u_int msg_id;
+#define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME	0x00000001
+#define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS	0x00000002
+#define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS	0x00000004
+	u_int exts;
+};
+
+static void
+send_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char mlen[4];
+	struct iovec iov[2];
+
+	if (buffer_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
+		fatal("Outbound message too long %u", buffer_len(m));
+
+	/* Send length first */
+	put_u32(mlen, buffer_len(m));
+	iov[0].iov_base = mlen;
+	iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen);
+	iov[1].iov_base = buffer_ptr(m);
+	iov[1].iov_len = buffer_len(m);
+
+	if (atomiciov(writev, fd, iov, 2) != buffer_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
+		fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+}
+
+static void
+get_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_int msg_len;
+
+	buffer_append_space(m, 4);
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), 4) != 4) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
+			fatal("Connection closed");
+		else
+			fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	msg_len = buffer_get_int(m);
+	if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
+		fatal("Received message too long %u", msg_len);
+
+	buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
+			fatal("Connection closed");
+		else
+			fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+send_string_request(int fd, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
+    u_int len)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len);
+	send_msg(fd, &msg);
+	debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", fd, code, id);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_string_attrs_request(int fd, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
+    u_int len, Attrib *a)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len);
+	encode_attrib(&msg, a);
+	send_msg(fd, &msg);
+	debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", fd, code, id);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static u_int
+get_status(int fd, u_int expected_id)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int type, id, status;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	get_msg(fd, &msg);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+	if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+
+	status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+static char *
+get_handle(int fd, u_int expected_id, u_int *len)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int type, id;
+	char *handle;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	get_msg(fd, &msg);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+		error("Couldn't get handle: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return(NULL);
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE)
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type);
+
+	handle = buffer_get_string(&msg, len);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	return(handle);
+}
+
+static Attrib *
+get_decode_stat(int fd, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int type, id;
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	get_msg(fd, &msg);
+
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+	debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+		if (quiet)
+			debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		else
+			error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return(NULL);
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) {
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type);
+	}
+	a = decode_attrib(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	return(a);
+}
+
+static int
+get_decode_statvfs(int fd, struct sftp_statvfs *st, u_int expected_id,
+    int quiet)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int type, id, flag;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	get_msg(fd, &msg);
+
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+	debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+		if (quiet)
+			debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		else
+			error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return -1;
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) {
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
+	}
+
+	bzero(st, sizeof(*st));
+	st->f_bsize = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_frsize = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_blocks = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_bfree = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_bavail = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_files = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_ffree = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_favail = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_fsid = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	flag = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+	st->f_namemax = buffer_get_int64(&msg);
+
+	st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0;
+	st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0;
+
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct sftp_conn *
+do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests)
+{
+	u_int type, exts = 0;
+	int version;
+	Buffer msg;
+	struct sftp_conn *ret;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION);
+	send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+
+	buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+	get_msg(fd_in, &msg);
+
+	/* Expecting a VERSION reply */
+	if ((type = buffer_get_char(&msg)) != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) {
+		error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)",
+		    type);
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+	version = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+	debug2("Remote version: %d", version);
+
+	/* Check for extensions */
+	while (buffer_len(&msg) > 0) {
+		char *name = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+		char *value = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+		int known = 0;
+
+		if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp(value, "1") == 0) {
+			exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp(value, "2") == 0) {
+			exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS;
+			known = 1;
+		} if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp(value, "2") == 0) {
+			exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS;
+			known = 1;
+		}
+		if (known) {
+			debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s",
+			    name, value);
+		} else {
+			debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name);
+		}
+		xfree(name);
+		xfree(value);
+	}
+
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	ret = xmalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+	ret->fd_in = fd_in;
+	ret->fd_out = fd_out;
+	ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen;
+	ret->num_requests = num_requests;
+	ret->version = version;
+	ret->msg_id = 1;
+	ret->exts = exts;
+
+	/* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */
+	if (version == 0)
+		ret->transfer_buflen = MIN(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480);
+
+	return(ret);
+}
+
+u_int
+sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+	return(conn->version);
+}
+
+int
+do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+	u_int id, status;
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id);
+
+	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
+    SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int count, type, id, handle_len, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
+	char *handle;
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, path);
+	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+
+	buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+	handle = get_handle(conn->fd_in, id, &handle_len);
+	if (handle == NULL)
+		return(-1);
+
+	if (dir) {
+		ents = 0;
+		*dir = xmalloc(sizeof(**dir));
+		(*dir)[0] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (; !interrupted;) {
+		id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+		debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id);
+
+		buffer_clear(&msg);
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR);
+		buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+		buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+		send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+
+		buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+		get_msg(conn->fd_in, &msg);
+
+		type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+		id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+		debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
+
+		if (id != expected_id)
+			fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+		if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+			int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+			debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status);
+
+			if (status == SSH2_FX_EOF) {
+				break;
+			} else {
+				error("Couldn't read directory: %s",
+				    fx2txt(status));
+				do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+				xfree(handle);
+				return(status);
+			}
+		} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+			    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+		count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+		if (count == 0)
+			break;
+		debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+			char *filename, *longname;
+			Attrib *a;
+
+			filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+			longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+			a = decode_attrib(&msg);
+
+			if (printflag)
+				printf("%s\n", longname);
+
+			if (dir) {
+				*dir = xrealloc(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
+				(*dir)[ents] = xmalloc(sizeof(***dir));
+				(*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
+				(*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
+				memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, a, sizeof(*a));
+				(*dir)[++ents] = NULL;
+			}
+
+			xfree(filename);
+			xfree(longname);
+		}
+	}
+
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+	xfree(handle);
+
+	/* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */
+	if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) {
+		free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
+		*dir = xmalloc(sizeof(**dir));
+		**dir = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return(0);
+}
+
+int
+do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+{
+	return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
+}
+
+void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) {
+		xfree(s[i]->filename);
+		xfree(s[i]->longname);
+		xfree(s[i]);
+	}
+	xfree(s);
+}
+
+int
+do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path,
+	    strlen(path));
+	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+	return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_attrs_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path,
+	    strlen(path), a);
+
+	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path,
+	    strlen(path));
+
+	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
+{
+	u_int id;
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+	send_string_request(conn->fd_out, id,
+	    conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT,
+	    path, strlen(path));
+
+	return(get_decode_stat(conn->fd_in, id, quiet));
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
+{
+	u_int id;
+
+	if (conn->version == 0) {
+		if (quiet)
+			debug("Server version does not support lstat operation");
+		else
+			logit("Server version does not support lstat operation");
+		return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet));
+	}
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path,
+	    strlen(path));
+
+	return(get_decode_stat(conn->fd_in, id, quiet));
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+Attrib *
+do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
+{
+	u_int id;
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle,
+	    handle_len);
+
+	return(get_decode_stat(conn->fd_in, id, quiet));
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_attrs_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path,
+	    strlen(path), a);
+
+	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path,
+		    fx2txt(status));
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+    Attrib *a)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_attrs_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle,
+	    handle_len, a);
+
+	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+char *
+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
+	char *filename, *longname;
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path,
+	    strlen(path));
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	get_msg(conn->fd_in, &msg);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+		error("Couldn't canonicalise: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		return(NULL);
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+	count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+	if (count != 1)
+		fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count);
+
+	filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+	longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+	a = decode_attrib(&msg);
+
+	debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s", path, filename);
+
+	xfree(longname);
+
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	return(filename);
+}
+
+int
+do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	/* Send rename request */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME)) {
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED);
+		buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com");
+	} else {
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME);
+		buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	}
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath);
+	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+	debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
+	    (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" :
+	    "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+		    newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	if (conn->version < 3) {
+		error("This server does not support the symlink operation");
+		return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED);
+	}
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	/* Send symlink request */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath);
+	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath,
+	    newpath);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+		    newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+char *
+do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
+	char *filename, *longname;
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn->fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path,
+	    strlen(path));
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	get_msg(conn->fd_in, &msg);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+		error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		return(NULL);
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+	count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+	if (count != 1)
+		fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count);
+
+	filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+	longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+	a = decode_attrib(&msg);
+
+	debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename);
+
+	xfree(longname);
+
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	return(filename);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
+    int quiet)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int id;
+
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) {
+		error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_clear(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "statvfs@openssh.com");
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, path);
+	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	return get_decode_statvfs(conn->fd_in, st, id, quiet);
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+int
+do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+    struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int id;
+
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) {
+		error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_clear(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com");
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	return get_decode_statvfs(conn->fd_in, st, id, quiet);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+send_read_request(int fd_out, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, u_int len,
+    char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_clear(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READ);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, len);
+	send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+int
+do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
+    int pflag)
+{
+	Attrib junk, *a;
+	Buffer msg;
+	char *handle;
+	int local_fd, status = 0, write_error;
+	int read_error, write_errno;
+	u_int64_t offset, size;
+	u_int handle_len, mode, type, id, buflen, num_req, max_req;
+	off_t progress_counter;
+	struct request {
+		u_int id;
+		u_int len;
+		u_int64_t offset;
+		TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq;
+	};
+	TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests;
+	struct request *req;
+
+	TAILQ_INIT(&requests);
+
+	a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0);
+	if (a == NULL)
+		return(-1);
+
+	/* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+		mode = a->perm & 0777;
+	else
+		mode = 0666;
+
+	if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
+	    (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) {
+		error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+		size = a->size;
+	else
+		size = 0;
+
+	buflen = conn->transfer_buflen;
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	/* Send open request */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_READ);
+	attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
+	encode_attrib(&msg, &junk);
+	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
+
+	handle = get_handle(conn->fd_in, id, &handle_len);
+	if (handle == NULL) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+
+	local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC,
+	    mode | S_IWRITE);
+	if (local_fd == -1) {
+		error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
+		    local_path, strerror(errno));
+		do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		xfree(handle);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Read from remote and write to local */
+	write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = offset = 0;
+	max_req = 1;
+	progress_counter = 0;
+
+	if (showprogress && size != 0)
+		start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter);
+
+	while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) {
+		char *data;
+		u_int len;
+
+		/*
+		 * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and
+		 * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully
+		 */
+		if (interrupted) {
+			if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */
+				break;
+			max_req = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Send some more requests */
+		while (num_req < max_req) {
+			debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)",
+			    (unsigned long long)offset,
+			    (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1,
+			    num_req, max_req);
+			req = xmalloc(sizeof(*req));
+			req->id = conn->msg_id++;
+			req->len = buflen;
+			req->offset = offset;
+			offset += buflen;
+			num_req++;
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq);
+			send_read_request(conn->fd_out, req->id, req->offset,
+			    req->len, handle, handle_len);
+		}
+
+		buffer_clear(&msg);
+		get_msg(conn->fd_in, &msg);
+		type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+		id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+		debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req);
+
+		/* Find the request in our queue */
+		for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests);
+		    req != NULL && req->id != id;
+		    req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq))
+			;
+		if (req == NULL)
+			fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id);
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case SSH2_FXP_STATUS:
+			status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+			if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF)
+				read_error = 1;
+			max_req = 0;
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+			xfree(req);
+			num_req--;
+			break;
+		case SSH2_FXP_DATA:
+			data = buffer_get_string(&msg, &len);
+			debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu",
+			    (unsigned long long)req->offset,
+			    (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
+			if (len > req->len)
+				fatal("Received more data than asked for "
+				    "%u > %u", len, req->len);
+			if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
+			    atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) &&
+			    !write_error) {
+				write_errno = errno;
+				write_error = 1;
+				max_req = 0;
+			}
+			progress_counter += len;
+			xfree(data);
+
+			if (len == req->len) {
+				TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+				xfree(req);
+				num_req--;
+			} else {
+				/* Resend the request for the missing data */
+				debug3("Short data block, re-requesting "
+				    "%llu -> %llu (%2d)",
+				    (unsigned long long)req->offset + len,
+				    (unsigned long long)req->offset +
+				    req->len - 1, num_req);
+				req->id = conn->msg_id++;
+				req->len -= len;
+				req->offset += len;
+				send_read_request(conn->fd_out, req->id,
+				    req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len);
+				/* Reduce the request size */
+				if (len < buflen)
+					buflen = MAX(MIN_READ_SIZE, len);
+			}
+			if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */
+				if (size > 0 && offset > size) {
+					/* Only one request at a time
+					 * after the expected EOF */
+					debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)",
+					    (unsigned long long)offset,
+					    num_req);
+					max_req = 1;
+				} else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) {
+					++max_req;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
+			    SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (showprogress && size)
+		stop_progress_meter();
+
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
+		fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
+
+	if (read_error) {
+		error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s",
+		    remote_path, fx2txt(status));
+		do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+	} else if (write_error) {
+		error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+		    strerror(write_errno));
+		status = -1;
+		do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+	} else {
+		status = do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+
+		/* Override umask and utimes if asked */
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+		if (pflag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1)
+#else
+		if (pflag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1)
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+			error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		if (pflag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) {
+			struct timeval tv[2];
+			tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+			tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+			tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+			if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1)
+				error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
+				    local_path, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+	close(local_fd);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	xfree(handle);
+
+	return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
+    int pflag)
+{
+	int local_fd;
+	int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	u_int handle_len, id, type;
+	off_t offset;
+	char *handle, *data;
+	Buffer msg;
+	struct stat sb;
+	Attrib a;
+	u_int32_t startid;
+	u_int32_t ackid;
+	struct outstanding_ack {
+		u_int id;
+		u_int len;
+		off_t offset;
+		TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq;
+	};
+	TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks;
+	struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL;
+
+	TAILQ_INIT(&acks);
+
+	if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) {
+		error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s",
+		    local_path, strerror(errno));
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) {
+		error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s",
+		    local_path, strerror(errno));
+		close(local_fd);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+		error("%s is not a regular file", local_path);
+		close(local_fd);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
+
+	a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+	a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+	a.perm &= 0777;
+	if (!pflag)
+		a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	/* Send open request */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC);
+	encode_attrib(&msg, &a);
+	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
+
+	buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+	handle = get_handle(conn->fd_in, id, &handle_len);
+	if (handle == NULL) {
+		close(local_fd);
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	startid = ackid = id + 1;
+	data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen);
+
+	/* Read from local and write to remote */
+	offset = 0;
+	if (showprogress)
+		start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size, &offset);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		int len;
+
+		/*
+		 * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF,
+		 * thus losing the last block of the file.
+		 * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the
+		 * server to drain.
+		 */
+		if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+			len = 0;
+		else do
+			len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen);
+		while ((len == -1) &&
+		    (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK));
+
+		if (len == -1)
+			fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+
+		if (len != 0) {
+			ack = xmalloc(sizeof(*ack));
+			ack->id = ++id;
+			ack->offset = offset;
+			ack->len = len;
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq);
+
+			buffer_clear(&msg);
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE);
+			buffer_put_int(&msg, ack->id);
+			buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+			buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset);
+			buffer_put_string(&msg, data, len);
+			send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
+			debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u",
+			    id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
+		} else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		if (ack == NULL)
+			fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id);
+
+		if (id == startid || len == 0 ||
+		    id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) {
+			u_int r_id;
+
+			buffer_clear(&msg);
+			get_msg(conn->fd_in, &msg);
+			type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+			r_id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+			if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
+				fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, "
+				    "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+
+			status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+			debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status);
+
+			/* Find the request in our queue */
+			for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks);
+			    ack != NULL && ack->id != r_id;
+			    ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq))
+				;
+			if (ack == NULL)
+				fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", r_id);
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq);
+			debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld",
+			    ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset);
+			++ackid;
+			xfree(ack);
+		}
+		offset += len;
+		if (offset < 0)
+			fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+
+	if (showprogress)
+		stop_progress_meter();
+	xfree(data);
+
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
+		error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s",
+		    remote_path, fx2txt(status));
+		status = -1;
+	}
+
+	if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
+		error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		status = -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Override umask and utimes if asked */
+	if (pflag)
+		do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a);
+
+	if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		status = -1;
+	xfree(handle);
+
+	return status;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..edb4679
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.17 2008/06/08 20:15:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */
+
+#ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H
+#define _SFTP_CLIENT_H
+
+typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT;
+
+struct SFTP_DIRENT {
+	char *filename;
+	char *longname;
+	Attrib a;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the
+ * server's native format may be larger than the client's.
+ */
+struct sftp_statvfs {
+	u_int64_t f_bsize;
+	u_int64_t f_frsize;
+	u_int64_t f_blocks;
+	u_int64_t f_bfree;
+	u_int64_t f_bavail;
+	u_int64_t f_files;
+	u_int64_t f_ffree;
+	u_int64_t f_favail;
+	u_int64_t f_fsid;
+	u_int64_t f_flag;
+	u_int64_t f_namemax;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or
+ * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success.
+ */
+struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int);
+
+u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
+
+/* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
+int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
+
+/* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
+int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
+
+/* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
+void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
+
+/* Delete file 'path' */
+int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
+
+/* Create directory 'path' */
+int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
+
+/* Remove directory 'path' */
+int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
+
+/* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
+Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
+
+/* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
+Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
+
+/* Set file attributes of 'path' */
+int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
+
+/* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
+int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+
+/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
+
+/* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
+int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
+
+/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
+
+/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
+
+/* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */
+
+/*
+ * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+ * if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int);
+
+/*
+ * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+ * if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ebadcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+
+/* Clear contents of attributes structure */
+void
+attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
+{
+	a->flags = 0;
+	a->size = 0;
+	a->uid = 0;
+	a->gid = 0;
+	a->perm = 0;
+	a->atime = 0;
+	a->mtime = 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */
+void
+stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *st, Attrib *a)
+{
+	attrib_clear(a);
+	a->flags = 0;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+	a->size = st->st_size;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+	a->uid = st->st_uid;
+	a->gid = st->st_gid;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+	a->perm = st->st_mode;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+	a->atime = st->st_atime;
+	a->mtime = st->st_mtime;
+}
+
+/* Convert from filexfer attribs to struct stat */
+void
+attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *a, struct stat *st)
+{
+	memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
+
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+		st->st_size = a->size;
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		st->st_uid = a->uid;
+		st->st_gid = a->gid;
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+		st->st_mode = a->perm;
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		st->st_atime = a->atime;
+		st->st_mtime = a->mtime;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Decode attributes in buffer */
+Attrib *
+decode_attrib(Buffer *b)
+{
+	static Attrib a;
+
+	attrib_clear(&a);
+	a.flags = buffer_get_int(b);
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+		a.size = buffer_get_int64(b);
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		a.uid = buffer_get_int(b);
+		a.gid = buffer_get_int(b);
+	}
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+		a.perm = buffer_get_int(b);
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		a.atime = buffer_get_int(b);
+		a.mtime = buffer_get_int(b);
+	}
+	/* vendor-specific extensions */
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) {
+		char *type, *data;
+		int i, count;
+
+		count = buffer_get_int(b);
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+			type = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
+			data = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
+			debug3("Got file attribute \"%s\"", type);
+			xfree(type);
+			xfree(data);
+		}
+	}
+	return &a;
+}
+
+/* Encode attributes to buffer */
+void
+encode_attrib(Buffer *b, const Attrib *a)
+{
+	buffer_put_int(b, a->flags);
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+		buffer_put_int64(b, a->size);
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		buffer_put_int(b, a->uid);
+		buffer_put_int(b, a->gid);
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+		buffer_put_int(b, a->perm);
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		buffer_put_int(b, a->atime);
+		buffer_put_int(b, a->mtime);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */
+const char *
+fx2txt(int status)
+{
+	switch (status) {
+	case SSH2_FX_OK:
+		return("No error");
+	case SSH2_FX_EOF:
+		return("End of file");
+	case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE:
+		return("No such file or directory");
+	case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+		return("Permission denied");
+	case SSH2_FX_FAILURE:
+		return("Failure");
+	case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE:
+		return("Bad message");
+	case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION:
+		return("No connection");
+	case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST:
+		return("Connection lost");
+	case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED:
+		return("Operation unsupported");
+	default:
+		return("Unknown status");
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * drwxr-xr-x    5 markus   markus       1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh
+ */
+char *
+ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote)
+{
+	int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct group *gr;
+	struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
+	char *user, *group;
+	char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
+
+	strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
+	if (!remote && (pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid)) != NULL) {
+		user = pw->pw_name;
+	} else {
+		snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
+		user = ubuf;
+	}
+	if (!remote && (gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid)) != NULL) {
+		group = gr->gr_name;
+	} else {
+		snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
+		group = gbuf;
+	}
+	if (ltime != NULL) {
+		if (time(NULL) - st->st_mtime < (365*24*60*60)/2)
+			sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime);
+		else
+			sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e  %Y", ltime);
+	}
+	if (sz == 0)
+		tbuf[0] = '\0';
+	ulen = MAX(strlen(user), 8);
+	glen = MAX(strlen(group), 8);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3u %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode,
+	    (u_int)st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group,
+	    (unsigned long long)st->st_size, tbuf, name);
+	return xstrdup(buf);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b58484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* Maximum packet that we are willing to send/accept */
+#define SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH	(256 * 1024)
+
+typedef struct Attrib Attrib;
+
+/* File attributes */
+struct Attrib {
+	u_int32_t	flags;
+	u_int64_t	size;
+	u_int32_t	uid;
+	u_int32_t	gid;
+	u_int32_t	perm;
+	u_int32_t	atime;
+	u_int32_t	mtime;
+};
+
+void	 attrib_clear(Attrib *);
+void	 stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *, Attrib *);
+void	 attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *, struct stat *);
+Attrib	*decode_attrib(Buffer *);
+void	 encode_attrib(Buffer *, const Attrib *);
+char	*ls_file(const char *, const struct stat *, int);
+
+const char *fx2txt(int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdc2708
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.22 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+    int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
+
+struct SFTP_OPENDIR {
+	SFTP_DIRENT **dir;
+	int offset;
+};
+
+static struct {
+	struct sftp_conn *conn;
+} cur;
+
+static void *
+fudge_opendir(const char *path)
+{
+	struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r;
+
+	r = xmalloc(sizeof(*r));
+
+	if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char *)path, &r->dir)) {
+		xfree(r);
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+	r->offset = 0;
+
+	return((void *)r);
+}
+
+static struct dirent *
+fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
+{
+	/* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */
+	static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf;
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+	static int inum = 1;
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+
+	if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL)
+		return(NULL);
+
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+	/*
+	 * Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects
+	 * you to hack around it.
+	 */
+#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
+	strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN);
+#else
+	strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename,
+	    sizeof(ret->d_name));
+#endif
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+	/*
+	 * Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with
+	 * ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the
+	 * source... Fake an inode number to appease it.
+	 */
+	ret->d_ino = inum++;
+	if (!inum)
+		inum = 1;
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+
+	return(ret);
+}
+
+static void
+fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
+{
+	free_sftp_dirents(od->dir);
+	xfree(od);
+}
+
+static int
+fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 0)))
+		return(-1);
+
+	attrib_to_stat(a, st);
+
+	return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 0)))
+		return(-1);
+
+	attrib_to_stat(a, st);
+
+	return(0);
+}
+
+int
+remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *pattern, int flags,
+    int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir;
+	pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir;
+	pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir;
+	pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat;
+	pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat;
+
+	memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
+	cur.conn = conn;
+
+	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e644ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.4 2009/02/21 19:32:04 tobias Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct passwd *user_pw;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n",
+		    (u_long)getuid());
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8 b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0201d4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.15 2009/03/26 08:38:39 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd March 26 2009
+.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sftp-server
+.Nd SFTP server subsystem
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sftp-server
+.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
+.Op Fl l Ar log_level
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
+to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
+.Nm
+is not intended to be called directly, but from
+.Xr sshd 8
+using the
+.Cm Subsystem
+option.
+.Pp
+Command-line flags to
+.Nm
+should be specified in the
+.Cm Subsystem
+declaration.
+See
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+Valid options are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl f Ar log_facility
+Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Nm .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is AUTH.
+.It Fl l Ar log_level
+Specifies which messages will be logged by
+.Nm .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
+.Nm
+performs on behalf of the client.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+The default is ERROR.
+.El
+.Pp
+For logging to work,
+.Nm
+must be able to access
+.Pa /dev/log .
+Use of
+.Nm
+in a chroot configuration therefore requires that
+.Xr syslogd 8
+establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
+.%D January 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in
+.Ox 2.8 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Markus Friedl Aq markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d984e60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1467 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.85 2009/04/14 16:33:42 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+
+/* helper */
+#define get_int64()			buffer_get_int64(&iqueue);
+#define get_int()			buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
+#define get_string(lenp)		buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp);
+
+/* Our verbosity */
+LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+
+/* Our client */
+struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+char *client_addr = NULL;
+
+/* input and output queue */
+Buffer iqueue;
+Buffer oqueue;
+
+/* Version of client */
+int version;
+
+/* portable attributes, etc. */
+
+typedef struct Stat Stat;
+
+struct Stat {
+	char *name;
+	char *long_name;
+	Attrib attrib;
+};
+
+static int
+errno_to_portable(int unixerrno)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	switch (unixerrno) {
+	case 0:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		break;
+	case ENOENT:
+	case ENOTDIR:
+	case EBADF:
+	case ELOOP:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
+		break;
+	case EPERM:
+	case EACCES:
+	case EFAULT:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+		break;
+	case ENAMETOOLONG:
+	case EINVAL:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
+		break;
+	case ENOSYS:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+		break;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+flags_from_portable(int pflags)
+{
+	int flags = 0;
+
+	if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) &&
+	    (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) {
+		flags = O_RDWR;
+	} else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) {
+		flags = O_RDONLY;
+	} else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) {
+		flags = O_WRONLY;
+	}
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
+		flags |= O_CREAT;
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
+		flags |= O_TRUNC;
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
+		flags |= O_EXCL;
+	return flags;
+}
+
+static const char *
+string_from_portable(int pflags)
+{
+	static char ret[128];
+
+	*ret = '\0';
+
+#define PAPPEND(str)	{				\
+		if (*ret != '\0')			\
+			strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret));	\
+		strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret));		\
+	}
+
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ)
+		PAPPEND("READ")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)
+		PAPPEND("WRITE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
+		PAPPEND("CREATE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
+		PAPPEND("TRUNCATE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
+		PAPPEND("EXCL")
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static Attrib *
+get_attrib(void)
+{
+	return decode_attrib(&iqueue);
+}
+
+/* handle handles */
+
+typedef struct Handle Handle;
+struct Handle {
+	int use;
+	DIR *dirp;
+	int fd;
+	char *name;
+	u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write;
+	int next_unused;
+};
+
+enum {
+	HANDLE_UNUSED,
+	HANDLE_DIR,
+	HANDLE_FILE
+};
+
+Handle *handles = NULL;
+u_int num_handles = 0;
+int first_unused_handle = -1;
+
+static void handle_unused(int i)
+{
+	handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
+	handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle;
+	first_unused_handle = i;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, DIR *dirp)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (first_unused_handle == -1) {
+		if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles)
+			return -1;
+		num_handles++;
+		handles = xrealloc(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
+		handle_unused(num_handles - 1);
+	}
+
+	i = first_unused_handle;
+	first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused;
+
+	handles[i].use = use;
+	handles[i].dirp = dirp;
+	handles[i].fd = fd;
+	handles[i].name = xstrdup(name);
+	handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0;
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
+{
+	return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_string(int handle, char **stringp, int *hlenp)
+{
+	if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	*stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t));
+	put_u32(*stringp, handle);
+	*hlenp = sizeof(int32_t);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_from_string(const char *handle, u_int hlen)
+{
+	int val;
+
+	if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
+		return -1;
+	val = get_u32(handle);
+	if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
+	    handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
+		return val;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static char *
+handle_to_name(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)||
+	    handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return handles[handle].name;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static DIR *
+handle_to_dir(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR))
+		return handles[handle].dirp;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_fd(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return handles[handle].fd;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
+		handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
+		handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes;
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+handle_bytes_read(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return (handles[handle].bytes_read);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+handle_bytes_write(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return (handles[handle].bytes_write);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_close(int handle)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+		ret = close(handles[handle].fd);
+		xfree(handles[handle].name);
+		handle_unused(handle);
+	} else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) {
+		ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp);
+		xfree(handles[handle].name);
+		handle_unused(handle);
+	} else {
+		errno = ENOENT;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+		logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu",
+		    emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
+		    handle_to_name(handle),
+		    (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle),
+		    (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle));
+	} else {
+		logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"",
+		    emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
+		    handle_to_name(handle));
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+handle_log_exit(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++)
+		if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED)
+			handle_log_close(i, "forced");
+}
+
+static int
+get_handle(void)
+{
+	char *handle;
+	int val = -1;
+	u_int hlen;
+
+	handle = get_string(&hlen);
+	if (hlen < 256)
+		val = handle_from_string(handle, hlen);
+	xfree(handle);
+	return val;
+}
+
+/* send replies */
+
+static void
+send_msg(Buffer *m)
+{
+	int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+
+	buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen);
+	buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen);
+	buffer_consume(m, mlen);
+}
+
+static const char *
+status_to_message(u_int32_t status)
+{
+	const char *status_messages[] = {
+		"Success",			/* SSH_FX_OK */
+		"End of file",			/* SSH_FX_EOF */
+		"No such file",			/* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */
+		"Permission denied",		/* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */
+		"Failure",			/* SSH_FX_FAILURE */
+		"Bad message",			/* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */
+		"No connection",		/* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */
+		"Connection lost",		/* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */
+		"Operation unsupported",	/* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */
+		"Unknown error"			/* Others */
+	};
+	return (status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
+}
+
+static void
+send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status);
+	if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE ||
+	    (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF))
+		logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status));
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, status);
+	if (version >= 3) {
+		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, status_to_message(status));
+		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "");
+	}
+	send_msg(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+static void
+send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const char *data, int dlen)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, data, dlen);
+	send_msg(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_data(u_int32_t id, const char *data, int dlen)
+{
+	debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen);
+	send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
+{
+	char *string;
+	int hlen;
+
+	handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
+	debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle);
+	send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
+	xfree(string);
+}
+
+static void
+send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	int i;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, count);
+	debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count);
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].name);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].long_name);
+		encode_attrib(&msg, &stats[i].attrib);
+	}
+	send_msg(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	encode_attrib(&msg, a);
+	send_msg(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	u_int64_t flag;
+
+	flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0;
+	flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bsize);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_frsize);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_blocks);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bfree);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bavail);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_files);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_ffree);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_favail);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid));
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, flag);
+	buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_namemax);
+	send_msg(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+/* parse incoming */
+
+static void
+process_init(void)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	version = get_int();
+	verbose("received client version %d", version);
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION);
+	/* POSIX rename extension */
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com");
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "1"); /* version */
+	/* statvfs extension */
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "statvfs@openssh.com");
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "2"); /* version */
+	/* fstatvfs extension */
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com");
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "2"); /* version */
+	send_msg(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_open(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t id, pflags;
+	Attrib *a;
+	char *name;
+	int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	name = get_string(NULL);
+	pflags = get_int();		/* portable flags */
+	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+	a = get_attrib();
+	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+	mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
+	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+	fd = open(name, flags, mode);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	} else {
+		handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, NULL);
+		if (handle < 0) {
+			close(fd);
+		} else {
+			send_handle(id, handle);
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		}
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_close(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t id;
+	int handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	handle = get_handle();
+	debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle);
+	handle_log_close(handle, NULL);
+	ret = handle_close(handle);
+	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_read(void)
+{
+	char buf[64*1024];
+	u_int32_t id, len;
+	int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	u_int64_t off;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	handle = get_handle();
+	off = get_int64();
+	len = get_int();
+
+	debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
+	if (len > sizeof buf) {
+		len = sizeof buf;
+		debug2("read change len %d", len);
+	}
+	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+			error("process_read: seek failed");
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		} else {
+			ret = read(fd, buf, len);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			} else if (ret == 0) {
+				status = SSH2_FX_EOF;
+			} else {
+				send_data(id, buf, ret);
+				status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+				handle_update_read(handle, ret);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_write(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t id;
+	u_int64_t off;
+	u_int len;
+	int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	char *data;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	handle = get_handle();
+	off = get_int64();
+	data = get_string(&len);
+
+	debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
+	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			error("process_write: seek failed");
+		} else {
+/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */
+			ret = write(fd, data, len);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				error("process_write: write failed");
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			} else if ((size_t)ret == len) {
+				status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+				handle_update_write(handle, ret);
+			} else {
+				debug2("nothing at all written");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(data);
+}
+
+static void
+process_do_stat(int do_lstat)
+{
+	Attrib a;
+	struct stat st;
+	u_int32_t id;
+	char *name;
+	int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	name = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : "");
+	verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name);
+	ret = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	} else {
+		stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
+		send_attrib(id, &a);
+		status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_stat(void)
+{
+	process_do_stat(0);
+}
+
+static void
+process_lstat(void)
+{
+	process_do_stat(1);
+}
+
+static void
+process_fstat(void)
+{
+	Attrib a;
+	struct stat st;
+	u_int32_t id;
+	int fd, ret, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	handle = get_handle();
+	debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		ret = fstat(fd, &st);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		} else {
+			stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
+			send_attrib(id, &a);
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		}
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static struct timeval *
+attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a)
+{
+	static struct timeval tv[2];
+
+	tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+	tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
+	tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+	tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+	return tv;
+}
+
+static void
+process_setstat(void)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+	u_int32_t id;
+	char *name;
+	int status = SSH2_FX_OK, ret;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	name = get_string(NULL);
+	a = get_attrib();
+	debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
+		    name, (unsigned long long)a->size);
+		ret = truncate(name, a->size);
+		if (ret == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a->perm);
+		ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 07777);
+		if (ret == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		char buf[64];
+		time_t t = a->mtime;
+
+		strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+		    localtime(&t));
+		logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
+		ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a));
+		if (ret == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+		    (u_long)a->uid, (u_long)a->gid);
+		ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid);
+		if (ret == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_fsetstat(void)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+	u_int32_t id;
+	int handle, fd, ret;
+	int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	handle = get_handle();
+	a = get_attrib();
+	debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle);
+	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	} else {
+		char *name = handle_to_name(handle);
+
+		if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
+			    name, (unsigned long long)a->size);
+			ret = ftruncate(fd, a->size);
+			if (ret == -1)
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		}
+		if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a->perm);
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+			ret = fchmod(fd, a->perm & 07777);
+#else
+			ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 07777);
+#endif
+			if (ret == -1)
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		}
+		if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+			char buf[64];
+			time_t t = a->mtime;
+
+			strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+			    localtime(&t));
+			logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
+#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
+			ret = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(a));
+#else
+			ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a));
+#endif
+			if (ret == -1)
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		}
+		if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+			    (u_long)a->uid, (u_long)a->gid);
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
+			ret = fchown(fd, a->uid, a->gid);
+#else
+			ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid);
+#endif
+			if (ret == -1)
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		}
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_opendir(void)
+{
+	DIR *dirp = NULL;
+	char *path;
+	int handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	u_int32_t id;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	path = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: opendir", id);
+	logit("opendir \"%s\"", path);
+	dirp = opendir(path);
+	if (dirp == NULL) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	} else {
+		handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, dirp);
+		if (handle < 0) {
+			closedir(dirp);
+		} else {
+			send_handle(id, handle);
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		}
+
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_readdir(void)
+{
+	DIR *dirp;
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	char *path;
+	int handle;
+	u_int32_t id;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	handle = get_handle();
+	debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id,
+	    handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+	dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
+	path = handle_to_name(handle);
+	if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
+		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
+	} else {
+		struct stat st;
+		char pathname[MAXPATHLEN];
+		Stat *stats;
+		int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
+
+		stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat));
+		while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+			if (count >= nstats) {
+				nstats *= 2;
+				stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
+			}
+/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
+			snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,
+			    strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name);
+			if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0)
+				continue;
+			stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib));
+			stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name);
+			stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0);
+			count++;
+			/* send up to 100 entries in one message */
+			/* XXX check packet size instead */
+			if (count == 100)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (count > 0) {
+			send_names(id, count, stats);
+			for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+				xfree(stats[i].name);
+				xfree(stats[i].long_name);
+			}
+		} else {
+			send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF);
+		}
+		xfree(stats);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove(void)
+{
+	char *name;
+	u_int32_t id;
+	int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	int ret;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	name = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: remove", id);
+	logit("remove name \"%s\"", name);
+	ret = unlink(name);
+	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_mkdir(void)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+	u_int32_t id;
+	char *name;
+	int ret, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	name = get_string(NULL);
+	a = get_attrib();
+	mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
+	    a->perm & 07777 : 0777;
+	debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
+	logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
+	ret = mkdir(name, mode);
+	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_rmdir(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t id;
+	char *name;
+	int ret, status;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	name = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: rmdir", id);
+	logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name);
+	ret = rmdir(name);
+	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_realpath(void)
+{
+	char resolvedname[MAXPATHLEN];
+	u_int32_t id;
+	char *path;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	path = get_string(NULL);
+	if (path[0] == '\0') {
+		xfree(path);
+		path = xstrdup(".");
+	}
+	debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
+	verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
+	if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	} else {
+		Stat s;
+		attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+		s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
+		send_names(id, 1, &s);
+	}
+	xfree(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_rename(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t id;
+	char *oldpath, *newpath;
+	int status;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	oldpath = get_string(NULL);
+	newpath = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: rename", id);
+	logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+	status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1)
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+		/* Race-free rename of regular files */
+		if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS
+#ifdef EXDEV
+			    || errno == EXDEV
+#endif
+#ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+			    || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+#endif
+			    ) {
+				struct stat st;
+
+				/*
+				 * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to
+				 * stat+rename.  This is racy.
+				 */
+				if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
+					if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
+						status =
+						    errno_to_portable(errno);
+					else
+						status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+				}
+			} else {
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			}
+		} else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			/* clean spare link */
+			unlink(newpath);
+		} else
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	} else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) {
+		if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		else
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(oldpath);
+	xfree(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_readlink(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t id;
+	int len;
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+	char *path;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	path = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: readlink", id);
+	verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path);
+	if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1)
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	else {
+		Stat s;
+
+		buf[len] = '\0';
+		attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+		s.name = s.long_name = buf;
+		send_names(id, 1, &s);
+	}
+	xfree(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_symlink(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t id;
+	char *oldpath, *newpath;
+	int ret, status;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	oldpath = get_string(NULL);
+	newpath = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: symlink", id);
+	logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+	/* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */
+	ret = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
+	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	xfree(oldpath);
+	xfree(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *oldpath, *newpath;
+
+	oldpath = get_string(NULL);
+	newpath = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id);
+	logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+	if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	else
+		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OK);
+	xfree(oldpath);
+	xfree(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *path;
+	struct statvfs st;
+
+	path = get_string(NULL);
+	debug3("request %u: statfs", id);
+	logit("statfs \"%s\"", path);
+
+	if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0)
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	else
+		send_statvfs(id, &st);
+        xfree(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	int handle, fd;
+	struct statvfs st;
+
+	handle = get_handle();
+	debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+	if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) {
+		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0)
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	else
+		send_statvfs(id, &st);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t id;
+	char *request;
+
+	id = get_int();
+	request = get_string(NULL);
+	if (strcmp(request, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0)
+		process_extended_posix_rename(id);
+	else if (strcmp(request, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0)
+		process_extended_statvfs(id);
+	else if (strcmp(request, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0)
+		process_extended_fstatvfs(id);
+	else
+		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED);	/* MUST */
+	xfree(request);
+}
+
+/* stolen from ssh-agent */
+
+static void
+process(void)
+{
+	u_int msg_len;
+	u_int buf_len;
+	u_int consumed;
+	u_int type;
+	u_char *cp;
+
+	buf_len = buffer_len(&iqueue);
+	if (buf_len < 5)
+		return;		/* Incomplete message. */
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue);
+	msg_len = get_u32(cp);
+	if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
+		error("bad message from %s local user %s",
+		    client_addr, pw->pw_name);
+		sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11);
+	}
+	if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
+		return;
+	buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4);
+	buf_len -= 4;
+	type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue);
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH2_FXP_INIT:
+		process_init();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_OPEN:
+		process_open();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_CLOSE:
+		process_close();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_READ:
+		process_read();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_WRITE:
+		process_write();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_LSTAT:
+		process_lstat();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_FSTAT:
+		process_fstat();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT:
+		process_setstat();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT:
+		process_fsetstat();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR:
+		process_opendir();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_READDIR:
+		process_readdir();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_REMOVE:
+		process_remove();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_MKDIR:
+		process_mkdir();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_RMDIR:
+		process_rmdir();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_REALPATH:
+		process_realpath();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_STAT:
+		process_stat();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_RENAME:
+		process_rename();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_READLINK:
+		process_readlink();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK:
+		process_symlink();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED:
+		process_extended();
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("Unknown message %d", type);
+		break;
+	}
+	/* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
+	if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue)) {
+		error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
+		sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue);
+	if (msg_len < consumed) {
+		error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed);
+		sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	if (msg_len > consumed)
+		buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed);
+}
+
+/* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */
+void
+sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) {
+		handle_log_exit();
+		logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]",
+		    pw->pw_name, client_addr);
+	}
+	_exit(i);
+}
+
+static void
+sftp_server_usage(void)
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: %s [-he] [-l log_level] [-f log_facility]\n", __progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+{
+	fd_set *rset, *wset;
+	int in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+	ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
+	SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+	char *cp, buf[4*4096];
+
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "f:l:che")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'c':
+			/*
+			 * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a
+			 * shell using "sftp-server -c command"
+			 */
+			skipargs = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			log_stderr = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			log_level = log_level_number(optarg);
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+				error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg);
+			if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+				error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+		default:
+			sftp_server_usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
+		client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
+		if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) {
+			error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"",
+			    getenv("SSH_CONNECTION"));
+			sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+		*cp = '\0';
+	} else
+		client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+
+	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+
+	logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]",
+	    pw->pw_name, client_addr);
+
+	in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+	out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	setmode(in, O_BINARY);
+	setmode(out, O_BINARY);
+#endif
+
+	max = 0;
+	if (in > max)
+		max = in;
+	if (out > max)
+		max = out;
+
+	buffer_init(&iqueue);
+	buffer_init(&oqueue);
+
+	set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+	rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
+	wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		memset(rset, 0, set_size);
+		memset(wset, 0, set_size);
+
+		/*
+		 * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
+		 * the worst-case length packet it can generate,
+		 * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
+		 */
+		if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) &&
+		    buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
+			FD_SET(in, rset);
+
+		olen = buffer_len(&oqueue);
+		if (olen > 0)
+			FD_SET(out, wset);
+
+		if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+			sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2);
+		}
+
+		/* copy stdin to iqueue */
+		if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
+			len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
+			if (len == 0) {
+				debug("read eof");
+				sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0);
+			} else if (len < 0) {
+				error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+				sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
+			} else {
+				buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len);
+			}
+		}
+		/* send oqueue to stdout */
+		if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
+			len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen);
+			if (len < 0) {
+				error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+				sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
+			} else {
+				buffer_consume(&oqueue, len);
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Process requests from client if we can fit the results
+		 * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
+		 * and let the output queue drain.
+		 */
+		if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
+			process();
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 b/crypto/openssh/sftp.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea56e50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.1
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.69 2008/12/09 15:35:00 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd December 9 2008
+.Dt SFTP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sftp
+.Nd secure file transfer program
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sftp
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 1Cv
+.Op Fl B Ar buffer_size
+.Op Fl b Ar batchfile
+.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Fl P Ar sftp_server_path
+.Op Fl R Ar num_requests
+.Op Fl S Ar program
+.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
+.Ar host
+.Ek
+.Nm sftp
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
+.Ar host Ns Op : Ns Ar
+.Nm sftp
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns
+.Ar host Ns Oo : Ns Ar dir Ns
+.Op Ar / Oc
+.Nm sftp
+.Fl b Ar batchfile
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar host
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is an interactive file transfer program, similar to
+.Xr ftp 1 ,
+which performs all operations over an encrypted
+.Xr ssh 1
+transport.
+It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
+compression.
+.Nm
+connects and logs into the specified
+.Ar host ,
+then enters an interactive command mode.
+.Pp
+The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive
+authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
+successful interactive authentication.
+.Pp
+The third usage format allows
+.Nm
+to start in a remote directory.
+.Pp
+The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the
+.Fl b
+option.
+In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive authentication
+to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see
+.Xr sshd 8
+and
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+for details).
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Specify the use of protocol version 1.
+.It Fl B Ar buffer_size
+Specify the size of the buffer that
+.Nm
+uses when transferring files.
+Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher
+memory consumption.
+The default is 32768 bytes.
+.It Fl b Ar batchfile
+Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input
+.Ar batchfile
+instead of
+.Em stdin .
+Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with
+non-interactive authentication.
+A
+.Ar batchfile
+of
+.Sq \-
+may be used to indicate standard input.
+.Nm
+will abort if any of the following
+commands fail:
+.Ic get , put , rename , ln ,
+.Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls ,
+.Ic lchdir , chmod , chown ,
+.Ic chgrp , lpwd , df ,
+and
+.Ic lmkdir .
+Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
+prefixing the command with a
+.Sq \-
+character (for example,
+.Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) .
+.It Fl C
+Enables compression (via ssh's
+.Fl C
+flag).
+.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+Specifies an alternative
+per-user configuration file for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+Can be used to pass options to
+.Nm ssh
+in the format used in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+This is useful for specifying options
+for which there is no separate
+.Nm sftp
+command-line flag.
+For example, to specify an alternate port use:
+.Ic sftp -oPort=24 .
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Cipher
+.It Ciphers
+.It Compression
+.It CompressionLevel
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It HostName
+.It IdentityFile
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It Protocol
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
+.It RSAAuthentication
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It SmartcardDevice
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It UsePrivilegedPort
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.El
+.It Fl P Ar sftp_server_path
+Connect directly to a local sftp server
+(rather than via
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
+.It Fl R Ar num_requests
+Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
+but will increase memory usage.
+The default is 64 outstanding requests.
+.It Fl S Ar program
+Name of the
+.Ar program
+to use for the encrypted connection.
+The program must understand
+.Xr ssh 1
+options.
+.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
+Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server
+on the remote host.
+A path is useful for using
+.Nm
+over protocol version 1, or when the remote
+.Xr sshd 8
+does not have an sftp subsystem configured.
+.It Fl v
+Raise logging level.
+This option is also passed to ssh.
+.El
+.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
+Once in interactive mode,
+.Nm
+understands a set of commands similar to those of
+.Xr ftp 1 .
+Commands are case insensitive.
+Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes.
+Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by
+.Xr glob 3
+must be escaped with backslashes
+.Pq Sq \e .
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ic bye
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Ic cd Ar path
+Change remote directory to
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path
+Change group of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar grp .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Ar grp
+must be a numeric GID.
+.It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path
+Change permissions of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar mode .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.It Ic chown Ar own Ar path
+Change owner of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar own .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Ar own
+must be a numeric UID.
+.It Xo Ic df
+.Op Fl hi
+.Op Ar path
+.Xc
+Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory
+(or
+.Ar path
+if specified).
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using
+"human-readable" suffixes.
+The
+.Fl i
+flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information.
+This command is only supported on servers that implement the
+.Dq statvfs@openssh.com
+extension.
+.It Ic exit
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Xo Ic get
+.Op Fl P
+.Ar remote-path
+.Op Ar local-path
+.Xc
+Retrieve the
+.Ar remote-path
+and store it on the local machine.
+If the local
+path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the
+remote machine.
+.Ar remote-path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+If it does and
+.Ar local-path
+is specified, then
+.Ar local-path
+must specify a directory.
+If the
+.Fl P
+flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
+copied too.
+.It Ic help
+Display help text.
+.It Ic lcd Ar path
+Change local directory to
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path
+Display local directory listing of either
+.Ar path
+or current directory if
+.Ar path
+is not specified.
+.Ar ls-options
+may contain any flags supported by the local system's
+.Xr ls 1
+command.
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.It Ic lmkdir Ar path
+Create local directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic ln Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Create a symbolic link from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic lpwd
+Print local working directory.
+.It Xo Ic ls
+.Op Fl 1aflnrSt
+.Op Ar path
+.Xc
+Display a remote directory listing of either
+.Ar path
+or the current directory if
+.Ar path
+is not specified.
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Pp
+The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of
+.Ic ls
+accordingly:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Produce single columnar output.
+.It Fl a
+List files beginning with a dot
+.Pq Sq \&. .
+.It Fl f
+Do not sort the listing.
+The default sort order is lexicographical.
+.It Fl l
+Display additional details including permissions
+and ownership information.
+.It Fl n
+Produce a long listing with user and group information presented
+numerically.
+.It Fl r
+Reverse the sort order of the listing.
+.It Fl S
+Sort the listing by file size.
+.It Fl t
+Sort the listing by last modification time.
+.El
+.It Ic lumask Ar umask
+Set local umask to
+.Ar umask .
+.It Ic mkdir Ar path
+Create remote directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic progress
+Toggle display of progress meter.
+.It Xo Ic put
+.Op Fl P
+.Ar local-path
+.Op Ar remote-path
+.Xc
+Upload
+.Ar local-path
+and store it on the remote machine.
+If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has
+on the local machine.
+.Ar local-path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 3
+characters and may match multiple files.
+If it does and
+.Ar remote-path
+is specified, then
+.Ar remote-path
+must specify a directory.
+If the
+.Fl P
+flag is specified, then the file's full permission and access time are
+copied too.
+.It Ic pwd
+Display remote working directory.
+.It Ic quit
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Rename remote file from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic rm Ar path
+Delete remote file specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic rmdir Ar path
+Remove remote directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Create a symbolic link from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic version
+Display the
+.Nm
+protocol version.
+.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command
+Execute
+.Ar command
+in local shell.
+.It Ic \&!
+Escape to local shell.
+.It Ic \&?
+Synonym for help.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ftp 1 ,
+.Xr ls 1 ,
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr glob 3 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
+.%D January 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66bd111
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1843 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.107 2009/02/02 11:15:14 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+#include <histedit.h>
+#else
+typedef void EditLine;
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+# include <libutil.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+/* File to read commands from */
+FILE* infile;
+
+/* Are we in batchfile mode? */
+int batchmode = 0;
+
+/* Size of buffer used when copying files */
+size_t copy_buffer_len = 32768;
+
+/* Number of concurrent outstanding requests */
+size_t num_requests = 64;
+
+/* PID of ssh transport process */
+static pid_t sshpid = -1;
+
+/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+int showprogress = 1;
+
+/* SIGINT received during command processing */
+volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
+
+/* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/
+int sort_flag;
+
+int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+    int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Separators for interactive commands */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+/* ls flags */
+#define LS_LONG_VIEW	0x01	/* Full view ala ls -l */
+#define LS_SHORT_VIEW	0x02	/* Single row view ala ls -1 */
+#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW	0x04	/* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
+#define LS_NAME_SORT	0x08	/* Sort by name (default) */
+#define LS_TIME_SORT	0x10	/* Sort by mtime */
+#define LS_SIZE_SORT	0x20	/* Sort by file size */
+#define LS_REVERSE_SORT	0x40	/* Reverse sort order */
+#define LS_SHOW_ALL	0x80	/* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */
+
+#define VIEW_FLAGS	(LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW)
+#define SORT_FLAGS	(LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT)
+
+/* Commands for interactive mode */
+#define I_CHDIR		1
+#define I_CHGRP		2
+#define I_CHMOD		3
+#define I_CHOWN		4
+#define I_DF		24
+#define I_GET		5
+#define I_HELP		6
+#define I_LCHDIR	7
+#define I_LLS		8
+#define I_LMKDIR	9
+#define I_LPWD		10
+#define I_LS		11
+#define I_LUMASK	12
+#define I_MKDIR		13
+#define I_PUT		14
+#define I_PWD		15
+#define I_QUIT		16
+#define I_RENAME	17
+#define I_RM		18
+#define I_RMDIR		19
+#define I_SHELL		20
+#define I_SYMLINK	21
+#define I_VERSION	22
+#define I_PROGRESS	23
+
+struct CMD {
+	const char *c;
+	const int n;
+};
+
+static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
+	{ "bye",	I_QUIT },
+	{ "cd",		I_CHDIR },
+	{ "chdir",	I_CHDIR },
+	{ "chgrp",	I_CHGRP },
+	{ "chmod",	I_CHMOD },
+	{ "chown",	I_CHOWN },
+	{ "df",		I_DF },
+	{ "dir",	I_LS },
+	{ "exit",	I_QUIT },
+	{ "get",	I_GET },
+	{ "mget",	I_GET },
+	{ "help",	I_HELP },
+	{ "lcd",	I_LCHDIR },
+	{ "lchdir",	I_LCHDIR },
+	{ "lls",	I_LLS },
+	{ "lmkdir",	I_LMKDIR },
+	{ "ln",		I_SYMLINK },
+	{ "lpwd",	I_LPWD },
+	{ "ls",		I_LS },
+	{ "lumask",	I_LUMASK },
+	{ "mkdir",	I_MKDIR },
+	{ "progress",	I_PROGRESS },
+	{ "put",	I_PUT },
+	{ "mput",	I_PUT },
+	{ "pwd",	I_PWD },
+	{ "quit",	I_QUIT },
+	{ "rename",	I_RENAME },
+	{ "rm",		I_RM },
+	{ "rmdir",	I_RMDIR },
+	{ "symlink",	I_SYMLINK },
+	{ "version",	I_VERSION },
+	{ "!",		I_SHELL },
+	{ "?",		I_HELP },
+	{ NULL,			-1}
+};
+
+int interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2);
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+killchild(int signo)
+{
+	if (sshpid > 1) {
+		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
+		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	_exit(1);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+cmd_interrupt(int signo)
+{
+	const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt  \n";
+	int olderrno = errno;
+
+	write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+	interrupted = 1;
+	errno = olderrno;
+}
+
+static void
+help(void)
+{
+	printf("Available commands:\n"
+	    "bye                                Quit sftp\n"
+	    "cd path                            Change remote directory to 'path'\n"
+	    "chgrp grp path                     Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
+	    "chmod mode path                    Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
+	    "chown own path                     Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
+	    "df [-hi] [path]                    Display statistics for current directory or\n"
+	    "                                   filesystem containing 'path'\n"
+	    "exit                               Quit sftp\n"
+	    "get [-P] remote-path [local-path]  Download file\n"
+	    "help                               Display this help text\n"
+	    "lcd path                           Change local directory to 'path'\n"
+	    "lls [ls-options [path]]            Display local directory listing\n"
+	    "lmkdir path                        Create local directory\n"
+	    "ln oldpath newpath                 Symlink remote file\n"
+	    "lpwd                               Print local working directory\n"
+	    "ls [-1aflnrSt] [path]              Display remote directory listing\n"
+	    "lumask umask                       Set local umask to 'umask'\n"
+	    "mkdir path                         Create remote directory\n"
+	    "progress                           Toggle display of progress meter\n"
+	    "put [-P] local-path [remote-path]  Upload file\n"
+	    "pwd                                Display remote working directory\n"
+	    "quit                               Quit sftp\n"
+	    "rename oldpath newpath             Rename remote file\n"
+	    "rm path                            Delete remote file\n"
+	    "rmdir path                         Remove remote directory\n"
+	    "symlink oldpath newpath            Symlink remote file\n"
+	    "version                            Show SFTP version\n"
+	    "!command                           Execute 'command' in local shell\n"
+	    "!                                  Escape to local shell\n"
+	    "?                                  Synonym for help\n");
+}
+
+static void
+local_do_shell(const char *args)
+{
+	int status;
+	char *shell;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	if (!*args)
+		args = NULL;
+
+	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		/* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */
+		if (args) {
+			debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+			execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+		} else {
+			debug3("Executing %s", shell);
+			execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL);
+		}
+		fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+		error("Shell exited abnormally");
+	else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
+		error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+static void
+local_do_ls(const char *args)
+{
+	if (!args || !*args)
+		local_do_shell(_PATH_LS);
+	else {
+		int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1;
+		char *buf = xmalloc(len);
+
+		/* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */
+		snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args);
+		local_do_shell(buf);
+		xfree(buf);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
+static char *
+path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (strip == NULL)
+		return (xstrdup(path));
+
+	len = strlen(strip);
+	if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) {
+		if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/')
+			len++;
+		return (xstrdup(path + len));
+	}
+
+	return (xstrdup(path));
+}
+
+static char *
+path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
+{
+	char *ret;
+	size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
+
+	ret = xmalloc(len);
+	strlcpy(ret, p1, len);
+	if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/')
+		strlcat(ret, "/", len);
+	strlcat(ret, p2, len);
+
+	return(ret);
+}
+
+static char *
+make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
+{
+	char *abs_str;
+
+	/* Derelativise */
+	if (p && p[0] != '/') {
+		abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
+		xfree(p);
+		return(abs_str);
+	} else
+		return(p);
+}
+
+static int
+infer_path(const char *p, char **ifp)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	cp = strrchr(p, '/');
+	if (cp == NULL) {
+		*ifp = xstrdup(p);
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+	if (!cp[1]) {
+		error("Invalid path");
+		return(-1);
+	}
+
+	*ifp = xstrdup(cp + 1);
+	return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *pflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*pflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "Pp")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'p':
+		case 'P':
+			*pflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*lflag = LS_NAME_SORT;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Saflnrt")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case '1':
+			*lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
+			*lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+			*lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			*lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			*lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
+			*lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW;
+			break;
+		case 'n':
+			*lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
+			*lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			*lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+			*lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*hflag = *iflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'h':
+			*hflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			*iflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+is_dir(char *path)
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	/* XXX: report errors? */
+	if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
+		return(0);
+
+	return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
+}
+
+static int
+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	/* XXX: report errors? */
+	if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL)
+		return(0);
+	if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
+		return(0);
+	return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
+}
+
+static int
+process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag)
+{
+	char *abs_src = NULL;
+	char *abs_dst = NULL;
+	char *tmp;
+	glob_t g;
+	int err = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	abs_src = xstrdup(src);
+	abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd);
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+	debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src);
+	if (remote_glob(conn, abs_src, 0, NULL, &g)) {
+		error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If multiple matches, dst must be a directory or unspecified */
+	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst && !is_dir(dst)) {
+		error("Multiple files match, but \"%s\" is not a directory",
+		    dst);
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+		if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[i], &tmp)) {
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
+			/* If directory specified, append filename */
+			xfree(tmp);
+			if (is_dir(dst)) {
+				if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &tmp)) {
+					err = 1;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				abs_dst = path_append(dst, tmp);
+				xfree(tmp);
+			} else
+				abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+		} else if (dst) {
+			abs_dst = path_append(dst, tmp);
+			xfree(tmp);
+		} else
+			abs_dst = tmp;
+
+		printf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+		if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag) == -1)
+			err = -1;
+		xfree(abs_dst);
+		abs_dst = NULL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	xfree(abs_src);
+	globfree(&g);
+	return(err);
+}
+
+static int
+process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag)
+{
+	char *tmp_dst = NULL;
+	char *abs_dst = NULL;
+	char *tmp;
+	glob_t g;
+	int err = 0;
+	int i;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	if (dst) {
+		tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+		tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd);
+	}
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+	debug3("Looking up %s", src);
+	if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g)) {
+		error("File \"%s\" not found.", src);
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
+	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst)) {
+		error("Multiple files match, but \"%s\" is not a directory",
+		    tmp_dst);
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+		if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) {
+			err = -1;
+			error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+			error("skipping non-regular file %s",
+			    g.gl_pathv[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[i], &tmp)) {
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) {
+			/* If directory specified, append filename */
+			if (remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst)) {
+				if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &tmp)) {
+					err = 1;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, tmp);
+				xfree(tmp);
+			} else
+				abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst);
+
+		} else if (tmp_dst) {
+			abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, tmp);
+			xfree(tmp);
+		} else
+			abs_dst = make_absolute(tmp, pwd);
+
+		printf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+		if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag) == -1)
+			err = -1;
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (abs_dst)
+		xfree(abs_dst);
+	if (tmp_dst)
+		xfree(tmp_dst);
+	globfree(&g);
+	return(err);
+}
+
+static int
+sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
+{
+	SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa;
+	SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb;
+	int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
+
+#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
+	if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
+		return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename));
+	else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT)
+		return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime));
+	else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
+		return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size));
+
+	fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
+}
+
+/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
+static int
+do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
+{
+	int n;
+	u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
+	SFTP_DIRENT **d;
+
+	if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0)
+		return (n);
+
+	if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
+		u_int m = 0, width = 80;
+		struct winsize ws;
+		char *tmp;
+
+		/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
+		for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) {
+			if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
+				m = MAX(m, strlen(d[n]->filename));
+		}
+
+		/* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */
+		tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path);
+		m += strlen(tmp);
+		xfree(tmp);
+
+		if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
+			width = ws.ws_col;
+
+		columns = width / (m + 2);
+		columns = MAX(columns, 1);
+		colspace = width / columns;
+		colspace = MIN(colspace, width);
+	}
+
+	if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
+		for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++)
+			;	/* count entries */
+		sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
+		qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp);
+	}
+
+	for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) {
+		char *tmp, *fname;
+
+		if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
+			continue;
+
+		tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename);
+		fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path);
+		xfree(tmp);
+
+		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+			if (lflag & LS_NUMERIC_VIEW) {
+				char *lname;
+				struct stat sb;
+
+				memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
+				attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb);
+				lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1);
+				printf("%s\n", lname);
+				xfree(lname);
+			} else
+				printf("%s\n", d[n]->longname);
+		} else {
+			printf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
+			if (c >= columns) {
+				printf("\n");
+				c = 1;
+			} else
+				c++;
+		}
+
+		xfree(fname);
+	}
+
+	if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
+		printf("\n");
+
+	free_sftp_dirents(d);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
+static int
+do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
+    int lflag)
+{
+	glob_t g;
+	u_int i, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
+	Attrib *a = NULL;
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+	if (remote_glob(conn, path, GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE,
+	    NULL, &g) || (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) {
+		if (g.gl_pathc)
+			globfree(&g);
+		error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (interrupted)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory,
+	 * then just list its contents.
+	 */
+	if (g.gl_matchc == 1) {
+		if ((a = do_lstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], 1)) == NULL) {
+			globfree(&g);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
+		    S_ISDIR(a->perm)) {
+			int err;
+
+			err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag);
+			globfree(&g);
+			return (err);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
+		u_int m = 0, width = 80;
+		struct winsize ws;
+
+		/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
+		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++)
+			m = MAX(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i]));
+
+		if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
+			width = ws.ws_col;
+
+		columns = width / (m + 2);
+		columns = MAX(columns, 1);
+		colspace = width / columns;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++, a = NULL) {
+		char *fname;
+
+		fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path);
+
+		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+			char *lname;
+			struct stat sb;
+
+			/*
+			 * XXX: this is slow - 1 roundtrip per path
+			 * A solution to this is to fork glob() and
+			 * build a sftp specific version which keeps the
+			 * attribs (which currently get thrown away)
+			 * that the server returns as well as the filenames.
+			 */
+			memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
+			if (a == NULL)
+				a = do_lstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 1);
+			if (a != NULL)
+				attrib_to_stat(a, &sb);
+			lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1);
+			printf("%s\n", lname);
+			xfree(lname);
+		} else {
+			printf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
+			if (c >= columns) {
+				printf("\n");
+				c = 1;
+			} else
+				c++;
+		}
+		xfree(fname);
+	}
+
+	if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
+		printf("\n");
+
+ out:
+	if (g.gl_pathc)
+		globfree(&g);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
+{
+	struct sftp_statvfs st;
+	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+
+	if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	if (iflag) {
+		printf("     Inodes        Used       Avail      "
+		    "(root)    %%Capacity\n");
+		printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu         %3llu%%\n",
+		    (unsigned long long)st.f_files,
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
+		    (unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
+		    (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree,
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) /
+		    st.f_files));
+	} else if (hflag) {
+		strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
+		strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
+		strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root));
+		strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total));
+		fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used);
+		fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail);
+		fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
+		fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
+		printf("    Size     Used    Avail   (root)    %%Capacity\n");
+		printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB         %3llu%%\n",
+		    s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root,
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
+		    st.f_blocks));
+	} else {
+		printf("        Size         Used        Avail       "
+		    "(root)    %%Capacity\n");
+		printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu         %3llu%%\n",
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
+		    (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
+		    st.f_blocks));
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping
+ * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that
+ * does not glob it.
+ */
+static void
+undo_glob_escape(char *s)
+{
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	for (i = j = 0;;) {
+		if (s[i] == '\0') {
+			s[j] = '\0';
+			return;
+		}
+		if (s[i] != '\\') {
+			s[j++] = s[i++];
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* s[i] == '\\' */
+		++i;
+		switch (s[i]) {
+		case '?':
+		case '[':
+		case '*':
+		case '\\':
+			s[j++] = s[i++];
+			break;
+		case '\0':
+			s[j++] = '\\';
+			s[j] = '\0';
+			return;
+		default:
+			s[j++] = '\\';
+			s[j++] = s[i++];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting,
+ * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3)
+ * wildcards.
+ * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments.
+ */
+#define MAXARGS 	128
+#define MAXARGLEN	8192
+static char **
+makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp)
+{
+	int argc, quot;
+	size_t i, j;
+	static char argvs[MAXARGLEN];
+	static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1];
+	enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q;
+
+	*argcp = argc = 0;
+	if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) {
+ args_too_longs:
+		error("string too long");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	state = MA_START;
+	i = j = 0;
+	for (;;) {
+		if (isspace(arg[i])) {
+			if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
+				/* Terminate current argument */
+				argvs[j++] = '\0';
+				argc++;
+				state = MA_START;
+			} else if (state != MA_START)
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+		} else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') {
+			q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE;
+			if (state == MA_START) {
+				argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+				state = q;
+			} else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) 
+				state = q;
+			else if (state == q)
+				state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+			else
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+		} else if (arg[i] == '\\') {
+			if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
+				quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"';
+				/* Unescape quote we are in */
+				/* XXX support \n and friends? */
+				if (arg[i + 1] == quot) {
+					i++;
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				} else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' ||
+				    arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') {
+					/*
+					 * Special case for sftp: append
+					 * double-escaped glob sequence -
+					 * glob will undo one level of
+					 * escaping. NB. string can grow here.
+					 */
+					if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5)
+						goto args_too_longs;
+					argvs[j++] = '\\';
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+					argvs[j++] = '\\';
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				} else {
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				}
+			} else {
+				if (state == MA_START) {
+					argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+					state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+				}
+				if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' ||
+				    arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') {
+					/*
+					 * Special case for sftp: append
+					 * escaped glob sequence -
+					 * glob will undo one level of
+					 * escaping.
+					 */
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				} else {
+					/* Unescape everything */
+					/* XXX support \n and friends? */
+					i++;
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				}
+			}
+		} else if (arg[i] == '#') {
+			if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE)
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+			else
+				goto string_done;
+		} else if (arg[i] == '\0') {
+			if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
+				error("Unterminated quoted argument");
+				return NULL;
+			}
+ string_done:
+			if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
+				argvs[j++] = '\0';
+				argc++;
+			}
+			break;
+		} else {
+			if (state == MA_START) {
+				argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+				state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+			}
+			if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) &&
+			    (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) {
+				/*
+				 * Special case for sftp: escape quoted
+				 * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow
+				 * here.
+				 */
+				if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3)
+					goto args_too_longs;
+				argvs[j++] = '\\';
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+			} else
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+	*argcp = argc;
+	return argv;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_args(const char **cpp, int *pflag, int *lflag, int *iflag, int *hflag,
+    unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2)
+{
+	const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp;
+	char *cp2, **argv;
+	int base = 0;
+	long l;
+	int i, cmdnum, optidx, argc;
+
+	/* Skip leading whitespace */
+	cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+
+	/* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */
+	if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#')
+		return (0);
+
+	/* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) */
+	*iflag = 0;
+	if (*cp == '-') {
+		*iflag = 1;
+		cp++;
+	}
+
+	if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Figure out which command we have */
+	for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
+	cmd = cmds[i].c;
+
+	/* Special case */
+	if (*cp == '!') {
+		cp++;
+		cmdnum = I_SHELL;
+	} else if (cmdnum == -1) {
+		error("Invalid command.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Get arguments and parse flags */
+	*lflag = *pflag = *hflag = *n_arg = 0;
+	*path1 = *path2 = NULL;
+	optidx = 1;
+	switch (cmdnum) {
+	case I_GET:
+	case I_PUT:
+		if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc, pflag)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		/* Get first pathname (mandatory) */
+		if (argc - optidx < 1) {
+			error("You must specify at least one path after a "
+			    "%s command.", cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+		/* Get second pathname (optional) */
+		if (argc - optidx > 1) {
+			*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+			/* Destination is not globbed */
+			undo_glob_escape(*path2);
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_RENAME:
+	case I_SYMLINK:
+		if (argc - optidx < 2) {
+			error("You must specify two paths after a %s "
+			    "command.", cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+		*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+		/* Paths are not globbed */
+		undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+		undo_glob_escape(*path2);
+		break;
+	case I_RM:
+	case I_MKDIR:
+	case I_RMDIR:
+	case I_CHDIR:
+	case I_LCHDIR:
+	case I_LMKDIR:
+		/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
+		if (argc - optidx < 1) {
+			error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
+			    cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+		/* Only "rm" globs */
+		if (cmdnum != I_RM)
+			undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+		break;
+	case I_DF:
+		if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag,
+		    iflag)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
+		if (argc - optidx < 1)
+			*path1 = NULL;
+		else {
+			*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+			undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_LS:
+		if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
+			return(-1);
+		/* Path is optional */
+		if (argc - optidx > 0)
+			*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+		break;
+	case I_LLS:
+		/* Skip ls command and following whitespace */
+		cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+	case I_SHELL:
+		/* Uses the rest of the line */
+		break;
+	case I_LUMASK:
+	case I_CHMOD:
+		base = 8;
+	case I_CHOWN:
+	case I_CHGRP:
+		/* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */
+		if (argc - optidx < 1)
+			goto need_num_arg;
+		errno = 0;
+		l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base);
+		if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' ||
+		    ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) ||
+		    l < 0) {
+ need_num_arg:
+			error("You must supply a numeric argument "
+			    "to the %s command.", cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*n_arg = l;
+		if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK)
+			break;
+		/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
+		if (argc - optidx < 2) {
+			error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
+			    cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+		break;
+	case I_QUIT:
+	case I_PWD:
+	case I_LPWD:
+	case I_HELP:
+	case I_VERSION:
+	case I_PROGRESS:
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("Command not implemented");
+	}
+
+	*cpp = cp;
+	return(cmdnum);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
+    int err_abort)
+{
+	char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
+	int pflag = 0, lflag = 0, iflag = 0, hflag = 0, cmdnum, i;
+	unsigned long n_arg = 0;
+	Attrib a, *aa;
+	char path_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+	int err = 0;
+	glob_t g;
+
+	path1 = path2 = NULL;
+	cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &pflag, &lflag, &iflag, &hflag, &n_arg,
+	    &path1, &path2);
+
+	if (iflag != 0)
+		err_abort = 0;
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+	/* Perform command */
+	switch (cmdnum) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Blank line */
+		break;
+	case -1:
+		/* Unrecognized command */
+		err = -1;
+		break;
+	case I_GET:
+		err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag);
+		break;
+	case I_PUT:
+		err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag);
+		break;
+	case I_RENAME:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+		err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2);
+		break;
+	case I_SYMLINK:
+		path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+		err = do_symlink(conn, path1, path2);
+		break;
+	case I_RM:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+			printf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+			err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]);
+			if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+				break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_MKDIR:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		attrib_clear(&a);
+		a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+		a.perm = 0777;
+		err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a);
+		break;
+	case I_RMDIR:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		err = do_rmdir(conn, path1);
+		break;
+	case I_CHDIR:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) {
+			xfree(tmp);
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) {
+			error("Can't change directory: Can't check target");
+			xfree(tmp);
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
+			error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not "
+			    "a directory", tmp);
+			xfree(tmp);
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		xfree(*pwd);
+		*pwd = tmp;
+		break;
+	case I_LS:
+		if (!path1) {
+			do_globbed_ls(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */
+		tmp = NULL;
+		if (*path1 != '/')
+			tmp = *pwd;
+
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag);
+		break;
+	case I_DF:
+		/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
+		if (path1 == NULL)
+			path1 = xstrdup(*pwd);
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag);
+		break;
+	case I_LCHDIR:
+		if (chdir(path1) == -1) {
+			error("Couldn't change local directory to "
+			    "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
+			err = 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_LMKDIR:
+		if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) {
+			error("Couldn't create local directory "
+			    "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
+			err = 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_LLS:
+		local_do_ls(cmd);
+		break;
+	case I_SHELL:
+		local_do_shell(cmd);
+		break;
+	case I_LUMASK:
+		umask(n_arg);
+		printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg);
+		break;
+	case I_CHMOD:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		attrib_clear(&a);
+		a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+		a.perm = n_arg;
+		remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+			printf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+			err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
+			if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+				break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_CHOWN:
+	case I_CHGRP:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+			if (!(aa = do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
+				if (err_abort) {
+					err = -1;
+					break;
+				} else
+					continue;
+			}
+			if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
+				error("Can't get current ownership of "
+				    "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+				if (err_abort) {
+					err = -1;
+					break;
+				} else
+					continue;
+			}
+			aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+			if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) {
+				printf("Changing owner on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+				aa->uid = n_arg;
+			} else {
+				printf("Changing group on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+				aa->gid = n_arg;
+			}
+			err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
+			if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+				break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_PWD:
+		printf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd);
+		break;
+	case I_LPWD:
+		if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) {
+			error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno));
+			err = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+		printf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf);
+		break;
+	case I_QUIT:
+		/* Processed below */
+		break;
+	case I_HELP:
+		help();
+		break;
+	case I_VERSION:
+		printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
+		break;
+	case I_PROGRESS:
+		showprogress = !showprogress;
+		if (showprogress)
+			printf("Progress meter enabled\n");
+		else
+			printf("Progress meter disabled\n");
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
+	}
+
+	if (g.gl_pathc)
+		globfree(&g);
+	if (path1)
+		xfree(path1);
+	if (path2)
+		xfree(path2);
+
+	/* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */
+	if (err_abort && err != 0)
+		return (-1);
+	else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT)
+		return (1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+static char *
+prompt(EditLine *el)
+{
+	return ("sftp> ");
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
+{
+	char *pwd;
+	char *dir = NULL;
+	char cmd[2048];
+	struct sftp_conn *conn;
+	int err, interactive;
+	EditLine *el = NULL;
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+	History *hl = NULL;
+	HistEvent hev;
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+		if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL)
+			fatal("Couldn't initialise editline");
+		if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL)
+			fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history");
+		history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100);
+		el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl);
+
+		el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt);
+		el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs");
+		el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL);
+		el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1);
+		el_source(el, NULL);
+	}
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+	conn = do_init(fd_in, fd_out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests);
+	if (conn == NULL)
+		fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server");
+
+	pwd = do_realpath(conn, ".");
+	if (pwd == NULL)
+		fatal("Need cwd");
+
+	if (file1 != NULL) {
+		dir = xstrdup(file1);
+		dir = make_absolute(dir, pwd);
+
+		if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) {
+			printf("Changing to: %s\n", dir);
+			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir);
+			if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &pwd, 1) != 0) {
+				xfree(dir);
+				xfree(pwd);
+				xfree(conn);
+				return (-1);
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (file2 == NULL)
+				snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get %s", dir);
+			else
+				snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get %s %s", dir,
+				    file2);
+
+			err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &pwd, 1);
+			xfree(dir);
+			xfree(pwd);
+			xfree(conn);
+			return (err);
+		}
+		xfree(dir);
+	}
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SETVBUF) && !defined(BROKEN_SETVBUF)
+	setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+	setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+#else
+	setlinebuf(stdout);
+	setlinebuf(infile);
+#endif
+
+	interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
+	err = 0;
+	for (;;) {
+		char *cp;
+
+		signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+
+		if (el == NULL) {
+			if (interactive)
+				printf("sftp> ");
+			if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
+				if (interactive)
+					printf("\n");
+				break;
+			}
+			if (!interactive) { /* Echo command */
+				printf("sftp> %s", cmd);
+				if (strlen(cmd) > 0 &&
+				    cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] != '\n')
+					printf("\n");
+			}
+		} else {
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+			const char *line;
+			int count = 0;
+
+			if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || count <= 0) {
+				printf("\n");
+ 				break;
+			}
+			history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line);
+			if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n");
+				continue;
+			}
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+		}
+
+		cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n');
+		if (cp)
+			*cp = '\0';
+
+		/* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */
+		interrupted = 0;
+		signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
+
+		err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &pwd, batchmode);
+		if (err != 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	xfree(pwd);
+	xfree(conn);
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+	if (el != NULL)
+		el_end(el);
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+	/* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */
+	return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+static void
+connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out)
+{
+	int c_in, c_out;
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+	int pin[2], pout[2];
+
+	if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+	*in = pin[0];
+	*out = pout[1];
+	c_in = pout[0];
+	c_out = pin[1];
+#else /* USE_PIPES */
+	int inout[2];
+
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
+		fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+	*in = *out = inout[0];
+	c_in = c_out = inout[1];
+#endif /* USE_PIPES */
+
+	if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1)
+		fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+	else if (sshpid == 0) {
+		if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+		    (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		close(*in);
+		close(*out);
+		close(c_in);
+		close(c_out);
+
+		/*
+		 * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must
+		 * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands,
+		 * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and
+		 * kill it too
+		 */
+		signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+		execvp(path, args);
+		fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+
+	signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+	signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+	signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+	close(c_in);
+	close(c_out);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: %s [-1Cv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-F ssh_config]\n"
+	    "            [-o ssh_option] [-P sftp_server_path] [-R num_requests]\n"
+	    "            [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host\n"
+	    "       %s [user@]host[:file ...]\n"
+	    "       %s [user@]host[:dir[/]]\n"
+	    "       %s -b batchfile [user@]host\n", __progname, __progname, __progname, __progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int in, out, ch, err;
+	char *host, *userhost, *cp, *file2 = NULL;
+	int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2;
+	char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL;
+	char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL;
+	LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	arglist args;
+	extern int optind;
+	extern char *optarg;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
+	args.list = NULL;
+	addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
+	addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
+	addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+	addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
+	addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+
+	ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	infile = stdin;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1hvCo:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'C':
+			addargs(&args, "-C");
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (debug_level < 3) {
+				addargs(&args, "-v");
+				ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level;
+			}
+			debug_level++;
+			break;
+		case 'F':
+		case 'o':
+			addargs(&args, "-%c%s", ch, optarg);
+			break;
+		case '1':
+			sshver = 1;
+			if (sftp_server == NULL)
+				sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			sftp_server = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			ssh_program = optarg;
+			replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			if (batchmode)
+				fatal("Batch file already specified.");
+
+			/* Allow "-" as stdin */
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 &&
+			    (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
+				fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
+			showprogress = 0;
+			batchmode = 1;
+			addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes");
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			sftp_direct = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'B':
+			copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
+			if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0')
+				fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'R':
+			num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
+			if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0')
+				fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"",
+				    optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
+		showprogress = 0;
+
+	log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
+		if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))
+			usage();
+
+		userhost = xstrdup(argv[optind]);
+		file2 = argv[optind+1];
+
+		if ((host = strrchr(userhost, '@')) == NULL)
+			host = userhost;
+		else {
+			*host++ = '\0';
+			if (!userhost[0]) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Missing username\n");
+				usage();
+			}
+			addargs(&args, "-l%s", userhost);
+		}
+
+		if ((cp = colon(host)) != NULL) {
+			*cp++ = '\0';
+			file1 = cp;
+		}
+
+		host = cleanhostname(host);
+		if (!*host) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n");
+			usage();
+		}
+
+		addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver);
+
+		/* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */
+		if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL)
+			addargs(&args, "-s");
+
+		addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+		addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ?
+		    sftp_server : "sftp"));
+
+		if (!batchmode)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Connecting to %s...\n", host);
+		connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out);
+	} else {
+		args.list = NULL;
+		addargs(&args, "sftp-server");
+
+		if (!batchmode)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Attaching to %s...\n", sftp_direct);
+		connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out);
+	}
+	freeargs(&args);
+
+	err = interactive_loop(in, out, file1, file2);
+
+#if !defined(USE_PIPES)
+	shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
+	shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
+#endif
+
+	close(in);
+	close(out);
+	if (batchmode)
+		fclose(infile);
+
+	while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s",
+			    strerror(errno));
+
+	exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2bde8bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.h,v 1.9 2008/06/13 00:12:02 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01.txt
+ */
+
+/* version */
+#define	SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION		3
+
+/* client to server */
+#define SSH2_FXP_INIT			1
+#define SSH2_FXP_OPEN			3
+#define SSH2_FXP_CLOSE			4
+#define SSH2_FXP_READ			5
+#define SSH2_FXP_WRITE			6
+#define SSH2_FXP_LSTAT			7
+#define SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0		7
+#define SSH2_FXP_FSTAT			8
+#define SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT		9
+#define SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT		10
+#define SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR		11
+#define SSH2_FXP_READDIR		12
+#define SSH2_FXP_REMOVE			13
+#define SSH2_FXP_MKDIR			14
+#define SSH2_FXP_RMDIR			15
+#define SSH2_FXP_REALPATH		16
+#define SSH2_FXP_STAT			17
+#define SSH2_FXP_RENAME			18
+#define SSH2_FXP_READLINK		19
+#define SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK		20
+
+/* server to client */
+#define SSH2_FXP_VERSION		2
+#define SSH2_FXP_STATUS			101
+#define SSH2_FXP_HANDLE			102
+#define SSH2_FXP_DATA			103
+#define SSH2_FXP_NAME			104
+#define SSH2_FXP_ATTRS			105
+
+#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED		200
+#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY		201
+
+/* attributes */
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE		0x00000001
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID	0x00000002
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS	0x00000004
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME	0x00000008
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED	0x80000000
+
+/* portable open modes */
+#define SSH2_FXF_READ			0x00000001
+#define SSH2_FXF_WRITE			0x00000002
+#define SSH2_FXF_APPEND			0x00000004
+#define SSH2_FXF_CREAT			0x00000008
+#define SSH2_FXF_TRUNC			0x00000010
+#define SSH2_FXF_EXCL			0x00000020
+
+/* statvfs@openssh.com f_flag flags */
+#define SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY	0x00000001
+#define SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID	0x00000002
+
+/* status messages */
+#define SSH2_FX_OK			0
+#define SSH2_FX_EOF			1
+#define SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE		2
+#define SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED	3
+#define SSH2_FX_FAILURE			4
+#define SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE		5
+#define SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION		6
+#define SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST		7
+#define SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED		8
+#define SSH2_FX_MAX			8
+
+struct passwd;
+
+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
+void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..464070e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.46 2007/06/12 13:41:03 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\"  -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd June 12 2007
+.Dt SSH-ADD 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Nd adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Op Fl cDdLlXx
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Op Ar
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl s Ar reader
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl e Ar reader
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+When run without arguments, it adds the files
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
+Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
+If any file requires a passphrase,
+.Nm
+asks for the passphrase from the user.
+The passphrase is read from the user's tty.
+.Nm
+retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
+.Pp
+The authentication agent must be running and the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable must contain the name of its socket for
+.Nm
+to work.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl c
+Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before
+being used for authentication.
+Confirmation is performed by the
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+program mentioned below.
+Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+program, rather than text entered into the requester.
+.It Fl D
+Deletes all identities from the agent.
+.It Fl d
+Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
+If
+.Nm
+has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities will
+be removed.
+Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
+public key files and matching keys will be removed from the agent.
+If no public key is found at a given path,
+.Nm
+will append
+.Pa .pub
+and retry.
+.It Fl e Ar reader
+Remove key in smartcard
+.Ar reader .
+.It Fl L
+Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
+by the agent.
+.It Fl l
+Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
+.It Fl s Ar reader
+Add key in smartcard
+.Ar reader .
+.It Fl t Ar life
+Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.
+The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
+specified in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Fl X
+Unlock the agent.
+.It Fl x
+Lock the agent with a password.
+.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS"
+If
+.Nm
+needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
+terminal if it was run from a terminal.
+If
+.Nm
+does not have a terminal associated with it but
+.Ev DISPLAY
+and
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+are set, it will execute the program specified by
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
+This is particularly useful when calling
+.Nm
+from a
+.Pa .xsession
+or related script.
+(Note that on some machines it
+may be necessary to redirect the input from
+.Pa /dev/null
+to make this work.)
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+Identifies the path of a unix-domain socket used to communicate with the
+agent.
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.El
+.Pp
+Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+Note that
+.Nm
+ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
+.Sh DIAGNOSTICS
+Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails,
+and 2 if
+.Nm
+is unable to contact the authentication agent.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a43282
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.90 2007/09/09 11:38:01 sobrado Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* argv0 */
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Default files to add */
+static char *default_files[] = {
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY,
+	NULL
+};
+
+/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
+static int lifetime = 0;
+
+/* User has to confirm key use */
+static int confirm = 0;
+
+/* we keep a cache of one passphrases */
+static char *pass = NULL;
+static void
+clear_pass(void)
+{
+	if (pass) {
+		memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
+		xfree(pass);
+		pass = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
+{
+	Key *public;
+	char *comment = NULL;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	public = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
+	if (public == NULL) {
+		printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, public)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+		ret = 0;
+	} else
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", filename);
+
+	key_free(public);
+	xfree(comment);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
+static int
+delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 1))
+		ret = 0;
+	/* ignore error-code for ssh2 */
+	ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 2);
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
+	else
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n");
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
+{
+	Key *private;
+	char *comment = NULL;
+	char msg[1024];
+	int fd, perms_ok, ret = -1;
+
+	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		perror(filename);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors
+	 * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
+	 */
+	perms_ok = key_perm_ok(fd, filename);
+	close(fd);
+	if (!perms_ok)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* At first, try empty passphrase */
+	private = key_load_private(filename, "", &comment);
+	if (comment == NULL)
+		comment = xstrdup(filename);
+	/* try last */
+	if (private == NULL && pass != NULL)
+		private = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL);
+	if (private == NULL) {
+		/* clear passphrase since it did not work */
+		clear_pass();
+		snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s: ",
+		    comment);
+		for (;;) {
+			pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+			if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) {
+				clear_pass();
+				xfree(comment);
+				return -1;
+			}
+			private = key_load_private(filename, pass, &comment);
+			if (private != NULL)
+				break;
+			clear_pass();
+			snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
+			    "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, lifetime,
+	    confirm)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+		ret = 0;
+		if (lifetime != 0)
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
+		if (confirm != 0)
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "The user has to confirm each use of the key\n");
+	} else if (ssh_add_identity(ac, private, comment)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+		ret = 0;
+	} else {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
+	}
+
+	xfree(comment);
+	key_free(private);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id)
+{
+	char *pin;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for smartcard: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	if (pin == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id, pin, lifetime, confirm)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
+		    add ? "added" : "removed", id);
+		ret = 0;
+	} else {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card: %s\n",
+		    add ? "add" : "remove", id);
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	xfree(pin);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	char *comment, *fp;
+	int had_identities = 0;
+	int version;
+
+	for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) {
+		for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version);
+		    key != NULL;
+		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
+			had_identities = 1;
+			if (do_fp) {
+				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+				    SSH_FP_HEX);
+				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
+				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
+				xfree(fp);
+			} else {
+				if (!key_write(key, stdout))
+					fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
+				fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment);
+			}
+			key_free(key);
+			xfree(comment);
+		}
+	}
+	if (!had_identities) {
+		printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock)
+{
+	char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
+	int passok = 1, ret = -1;
+
+	strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
+	p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	if (lock) {
+		strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt);
+		p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
+			passok = 0;
+		}
+		memset(p2, 0, strlen(p2));
+		xfree(p2);
+	}
+	if (passok && ssh_lock_agent(ac, lock, p1)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
+		ret = 0;
+	} else
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
+	memset(p1, 0, strlen(p1));
+	xfree(p1);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, char *file)
+{
+	if (deleting) {
+		if (delete_file(ac, file) == -1)
+			return -1;
+	} else {
+		if (add_file(ac, file) == -1)
+			return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -l          List fingerprints of all identities.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -L          List public key parameters of all identities.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -d          Delete identity.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -D          Delete all identities.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -x          Lock agent.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -X          Unlock agent.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -t life     Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -c          Require confirmation to sign using identities\n");
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -s reader   Add key in smartcard reader.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -e reader   Remove key in smartcard reader.\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern int optind;
+	AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
+	char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
+	int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	init_rng();
+	seed_rng();
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	/* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
+	ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+	if (ac == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n");
+		exit(2);
+	}
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLcdDxXe:s:t:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'l':
+		case 'L':
+			if (list_identities(ac, ch == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+				ret = 1;
+			goto done;
+		case 'x':
+		case 'X':
+			if (lock_agent(ac, ch == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+				ret = 1;
+			goto done;
+		case 'c':
+			confirm = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			deleting = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			if (delete_all(ac) == -1)
+				ret = 1;
+			goto done;
+		case 's':
+			sc_reader_id = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			deleting = 1;
+			sc_reader_id = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+				ret = 1;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+			ret = 1;
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	argc -= optind;
+	argv += optind;
+	if (sc_reader_id != NULL) {
+		if (update_card(ac, !deleting, sc_reader_id) == -1)
+			ret = 1;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (argc == 0) {
+		char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+		struct passwd *pw;
+		struct stat st;
+		int count = 0;
+
+		if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
+			    (u_int)getuid());
+			ret = 1;
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+			    default_files[i]);
+			if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+				continue;
+			if (do_file(ac, deleting, buf) == -1)
+				ret = 1;
+			else
+				count++;
+		}
+		if (count == 0)
+			ret = 1;
+	} else {
+		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+			if (do_file(ac, deleting, argv[i]) == -1)
+				ret = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	clear_pass();
+
+done:
+	ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc38900
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.47 2009/03/26 08:38:39 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd March 26 2009
+.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Nd authentication agent
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl c Li | Fl s
+.Op Fl d
+.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl c Li | Fl s
+.Fl k
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
+(RSA, DSA).
+The idea is that
+.Nm
+is started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and
+all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent
+program.
+Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
+and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
+machines using
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl a Ar bind_address
+Bind the agent to the unix-domain socket
+.Ar bind_address .
+The default is
+.Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
+.It Fl c
+Generate C-shell commands on
+.Dv stdout .
+This is the default if
+.Ev SHELL
+looks like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl d
+Debug mode.
+When this option is specified
+.Nm
+will not fork.
+.It Fl k
+Kill the current agent (given by the
+.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+environment variable).
+.It Fl s
+Generate Bourne shell commands on
+.Dv stdout .
+This is the default if
+.Ev SHELL
+does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl t Ar life
+Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
+The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+A lifetime specified for an identity with
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+overrides this value.
+Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
+.El
+.Pp
+If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
+When the command dies, so does the agent.
+.Pp
+The agent initially does not have any private keys.
+Keys are added using
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+When executed without arguments,
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+adds the files
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
+If the identity has a passphrase,
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+asks for the passphrase (using a small X11 application if running
+under X11, or from the terminal if running without X).
+It then sends the identity to the agent.
+Several identities can be stored in the
+agent; the agent can automatically use any of these identities.
+.Ic ssh-add -l
+displays the identities currently held by the agent.
+.Pp
+The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
+terminal.
+Authentication data need not be stored on any other
+machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network.
+However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH
+remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the
+identities anywhere in the network in a secure way.
+.Pp
+There are two main ways to get an agent set up:
+The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment
+variables are exported, eg
+.Cm ssh-agent xterm & .
+The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either
+.Xr sh 1
+or
+.Xr csh 1
+syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg
+.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s`
+for Bourne-type shells such as
+.Xr sh 1
+or
+.Xr ksh 1
+and
+.Cm eval `ssh-agent -c`
+for
+.Xr csh 1
+and derivatives.
+.Pp
+Later
+.Xr ssh 1
+looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
+.Pp
+The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
+Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed
+by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester.
+This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
+.Pp
+A unix-domain socket is created
+and the name of this socket is stored in the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment
+variable.
+The socket is made accessible only to the current user.
+This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same
+user.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
+.Pp
+The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
+line terminates.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
+Unix-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
+authentication agent.
+These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1fdf529
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1292 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.161 2009/03/23 19:38:04 tobias Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * The authentication agent program.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+#include "scard.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H)
+#include <sys/prctl.h>	/* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */
+#endif
+
+typedef enum {
+	AUTH_UNUSED,
+	AUTH_SOCKET,
+	AUTH_CONNECTION
+} sock_type;
+
+typedef struct {
+	int fd;
+	sock_type type;
+	Buffer input;
+	Buffer output;
+	Buffer request;
+} SocketEntry;
+
+u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
+SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
+
+typedef struct identity {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+	Key *key;
+	char *comment;
+	u_int death;
+	u_int confirm;
+} Identity;
+
+typedef struct {
+	int nentries;
+	TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
+} Idtab;
+
+/* private key table, one per protocol version */
+Idtab idtable[3];
+
+int max_fd = 0;
+
+/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
+pid_t parent_pid = -1;
+u_int parent_alive_interval = 0;
+
+/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
+char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN];
+char socket_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+/* locking */
+int locked = 0;
+char *lock_passwd = NULL;
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
+static int lifetime = 0;
+
+static void
+close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	close(e->fd);
+	e->fd = -1;
+	e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+	buffer_free(&e->input);
+	buffer_free(&e->output);
+	buffer_free(&e->request);
+}
+
+static void
+idtab_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <=2; i++) {
+		TAILQ_INIT(&idtable[i].idlist);
+		idtable[i].nentries = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/* return private key table for requested protocol version */
+static Idtab *
+idtab_lookup(int version)
+{
+	if (version < 1 || version > 2)
+		fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version);
+	return &idtable[version];
+}
+
+static void
+free_identity(Identity *id)
+{
+	key_free(id->key);
+	xfree(id->comment);
+	xfree(id);
+}
+
+/* return matching private key for given public key */
+static Identity *
+lookup_identity(Key *key, int version)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+
+	Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
+		if (key_equal(key, id->key))
+			return (id);
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
+static int
+confirm_key(Identity *id)
+{
+	char *p;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
+	    id->comment, p))
+		ret = 0;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
+static void
+process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+	Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+	Identity *id;
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, (version == 1) ?
+	    SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, tab->nentries);
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
+		if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+			buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n));
+			buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->e);
+			buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->n);
+		} else {
+			u_char *blob;
+			u_int blen;
+			key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen);
+			buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+			xfree(blob);
+		}
+		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, id->comment);
+	}
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+/* ssh1 only */
+static void
+process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16];
+	u_int response_type;
+	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	Identity *id;
+	int i, len;
+	Buffer msg;
+	MD5_CTX md;
+	Key *key;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("process_authentication_challenge1: BN_new failed");
+
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&e->request);			/* ignored */
+	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, challenge);
+
+	/* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
+	if (buffer_len(&e->request) == 0)
+		goto failure;
+	buffer_get(&e->request, session_id, 16);
+	response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
+	if (response_type != 1)
+		goto failure;
+
+	id = lookup_identity(key, 1);
+	if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) {
+		Key *private = id->key;
+		/* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) <= 0)
+			goto failure;
+
+		/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+		len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+		if (len <= 0 || len > 32) {
+			logit("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
+			goto failure;
+		}
+		memset(buf, 0, 32);
+		BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
+		MD5_Init(&md);
+		MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
+		MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
+		MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+
+		/* Send the response. */
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE);
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, mdbuf[i]);
+		goto send;
+	}
+
+failure:
+	/* Unknown identity or protocol error.  Send failure. */
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+send:
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
+	key_free(key);
+	BN_clear_free(challenge);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+/* ssh2 only */
+static void
+process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
+	u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0;
+	extern int datafellows;
+	int odatafellows;
+	int ok = -1, flags;
+	Buffer msg;
+	Key *key;
+
+	datafellows = 0;
+
+	blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen);
+	data = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &dlen);
+
+	flags = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
+	odatafellows = datafellows;
+	if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE)
+		datafellows = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB;
+
+	key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, 2);
+		if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0))
+			ok = key_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, data, dlen);
+		key_free(key);
+	}
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	if (ok == 0) {
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE);
+		buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen);
+	} else {
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+	}
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg),
+	    buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	xfree(data);
+	xfree(blob);
+	if (signature != NULL)
+		xfree(signature);
+	datafellows = odatafellows;
+}
+
+/* shared */
+static void
+process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+	u_int blen, bits;
+	int success = 0;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	u_char *blob;
+
+	switch (version) {
+	case 1:
+		key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+		bits = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
+
+		if (bits != key_size(key))
+			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %u, announced %u",
+			    key_size(key), bits);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen);
+		key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+		xfree(blob);
+		break;
+	}
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, version);
+		if (id != NULL) {
+			/*
+			 * We have this key.  Free the old key.  Since we
+			 * don't want to leave empty slots in the middle of
+			 * the array, we actually free the key there and move
+			 * all the entries between the empty slot and the end
+			 * of the array.
+			 */
+			Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+			if (tab->nentries < 1)
+				fatal("process_remove_identity: "
+				    "internal error: tab->nentries %d",
+				    tab->nentries);
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+			free_identity(id);
+			tab->nentries--;
+			success = 1;
+		}
+		key_free(key);
+	}
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+	buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+	    success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+	Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+	Identity *id;
+
+	/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id;
+	    id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist)) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+		free_identity(id);
+	}
+
+	/* Mark that there are no identities. */
+	tab->nentries = 0;
+
+	/* Send success. */
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+	buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
+static u_int
+reaper(void)
+{
+	u_int deadline = 0, now = time(NULL);
+	Identity *id, *nxt;
+	int version;
+	Idtab *tab;
+
+	for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
+		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+		for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+			nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
+			if (id->death == 0)
+				continue;
+			if (now >= id->death) {
+				debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
+				TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+				free_identity(id);
+				tab->nentries--;
+			} else
+				deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
+				    MIN(deadline, id->death);
+		}
+	}
+	if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
+		return 0;
+	else
+		return (deadline - now);
+}
+
+static void
+process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+	Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+	Identity *id;
+	int type, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0;
+	char *type_name, *comment;
+	Key *k = NULL;
+
+	switch (version) {
+	case 1:
+		k = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
+		(void) buffer_get_int(&e->request);		/* ignored */
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->n);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->e);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->d);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->iqmp);
+
+		/* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->q);	/* p */
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->p);	/* q */
+
+		/* Generate additional parameters */
+		rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		type_name = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+		type = key_type_from_name(type_name);
+		xfree(type_name);
+		switch (type) {
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			k = key_new_private(type);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->p);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->q);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->g);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->pub_key);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->priv_key);
+			break;
+		case KEY_RSA:
+			k = key_new_private(type);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->n);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->e);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->d);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->iqmp);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->p);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->q);
+
+			/* Generate additional parameters */
+			rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
+			break;
+		default:
+			buffer_clear(&e->request);
+			goto send;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	/* enable blinding */
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+		if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+			error("process_add_identity: RSA_blinding_on failed");
+			key_free(k);
+			goto send;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	comment = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	if (k == NULL) {
+		xfree(comment);
+		goto send;
+	}
+	while (buffer_len(&e->request)) {
+		switch ((type = buffer_get_char(&e->request))) {
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
+			death = time(NULL) + buffer_get_int(&e->request);
+			break;
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
+			confirm = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("process_add_identity: "
+			    "Unknown constraint type %d", type);
+			xfree(comment);
+			key_free(k);
+			goto send;
+		}
+	}
+	success = 1;
+	if (lifetime && !death)
+		death = time(NULL) + lifetime;
+	if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) == NULL) {
+		id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
+		id->key = k;
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+		/* Increment the number of identities. */
+		tab->nentries++;
+	} else {
+		key_free(k);
+		xfree(id->comment);
+	}
+	id->comment = comment;
+	id->death = death;
+	id->confirm = confirm;
+send:
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+	buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+	    success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
+static void
+process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+	char *passwd;
+
+	passwd = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) {
+		locked = 0;
+		memset(lock_passwd, 0, strlen(lock_passwd));
+		xfree(lock_passwd);
+		lock_passwd = NULL;
+		success = 1;
+	} else if (!locked && lock) {
+		locked = 1;
+		lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd);
+		success = 1;
+	}
+	memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+	xfree(passwd);
+
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+	buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+	    success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+static void
+no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg,
+	    (type == SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES) ?
+	    SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, 0);
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+static void
+process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin;
+	int i, type, version, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0;
+	Key **keys, *k;
+	Identity *id;
+	Idtab *tab;
+
+	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+
+	while (buffer_len(&e->request)) {
+		switch ((type = buffer_get_char(&e->request))) {
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
+			death = time(NULL) + buffer_get_int(&e->request);
+			break;
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
+			confirm = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
+			    "Unknown constraint type %d", type);
+			xfree(sc_reader_id);
+			xfree(pin);
+			goto send;
+		}
+	}
+	if (lifetime && !death)
+		death = time(NULL) + lifetime;
+
+	keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, pin);
+	xfree(sc_reader_id);
+	xfree(pin);
+
+	if (keys == NULL || keys[0] == NULL) {
+		error("sc_get_keys failed");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		k = keys[i];
+		version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+		if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
+			id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
+			id->key = k;
+			id->comment = sc_get_key_label(k);
+			id->death = death;
+			id->confirm = confirm;
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+			tab->nentries++;
+			success = 1;
+		} else {
+			key_free(k);
+		}
+		keys[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	xfree(keys);
+send:
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+	buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+	    success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin;
+	int i, version, success = 0;
+	Key **keys, *k = NULL;
+	Identity *id;
+	Idtab *tab;
+
+	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, pin);
+	xfree(sc_reader_id);
+	xfree(pin);
+
+	if (keys == NULL || keys[0] == NULL) {
+		error("sc_get_keys failed");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		k = keys[i];
+		version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+		if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) != NULL) {
+			tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+			tab->nentries--;
+			free_identity(id);
+			success = 1;
+		}
+		key_free(k);
+		keys[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	xfree(keys);
+send:
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+	buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+	    success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+
+/* dispatch incoming messages */
+
+static void
+process_message(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	u_int msg_len, type;
+	u_char *cp;
+
+	if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5)
+		return;		/* Incomplete message. */
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&e->input);
+	msg_len = get_u32(cp);
+	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+		close_socket(e);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (buffer_len(&e->input) < msg_len + 4)
+		return;
+
+	/* move the current input to e->request */
+	buffer_consume(&e->input, 4);
+	buffer_clear(&e->request);
+	buffer_append(&e->request, buffer_ptr(&e->input), msg_len);
+	buffer_consume(&e->input, msg_len);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&e->request);
+
+	/* check wheter agent is locked */
+	if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
+		buffer_clear(&e->request);
+		switch (type) {
+		case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+		case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+			/* send empty lists */
+			no_identities(e, type);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* send a fail message for all other request types */
+			buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+			buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+
+	debug("type %d", type);
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
+	case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
+		process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
+		break;
+	/* ssh1 */
+	case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE:
+		process_authentication_challenge1(e);
+		break;
+	case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+		process_request_identities(e, 1);
+		break;
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY:
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED:
+		process_add_identity(e, 1);
+		break;
+	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY:
+		process_remove_identity(e, 1);
+		break;
+	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+		process_remove_all_identities(e, 1);
+		break;
+	/* ssh2 */
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
+		process_sign_request2(e);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+		process_request_identities(e, 2);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
+		process_add_identity(e, 2);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
+		process_remove_identity(e, 2);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
+		process_remove_all_identities(e, 2);
+		break;
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
+		process_add_smartcard_key(e);
+		break;
+	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+		process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
+		break;
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+	default:
+		/* Unknown message.  Respond with failure. */
+		error("Unknown message %d", type);
+		buffer_clear(&e->request);
+		buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+		buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
+{
+	u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
+
+	set_nonblock(fd);
+
+	if (fd > max_fd)
+		max_fd = fd;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
+		if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
+			sockets[i].fd = fd;
+			buffer_init(&sockets[i].input);
+			buffer_init(&sockets[i].output);
+			buffer_init(&sockets[i].request);
+			sockets[i].type = type;
+			return;
+		}
+	old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
+	new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
+	sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
+	for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
+		sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+	sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
+	sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
+	buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].input);
+	buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].output);
+	buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].request);
+	sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp,
+    struct timeval **tvpp)
+{
+	u_int i, sz, deadline;
+	int n = 0;
+	static struct timeval tv;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+		switch (sockets[i].type) {
+		case AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+			n = MAX(n, sockets[i].fd);
+			break;
+		case AUTH_UNUSED:
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+	if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
+		if (*fdrp)
+			xfree(*fdrp);
+		if (*fdwp)
+			xfree(*fdwp);
+		*fdrp = xmalloc(sz);
+		*fdwp = xmalloc(sz);
+		*nallocp = sz;
+	}
+	if (n < *fdl)
+		debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl);
+	*fdl = n;
+	memset(*fdrp, 0, sz);
+	memset(*fdwp, 0, sz);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+		switch (sockets[i].type) {
+		case AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+			FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp);
+			if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0)
+				FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	deadline = reaper();
+	if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+		deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
+		    MIN(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
+	if (deadline == 0) {
+		*tvpp = NULL;
+	} else {
+		tv.tv_sec = deadline;
+		tv.tv_usec = 0;
+		*tvpp = &tv;
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+	socklen_t slen;
+	char buf[1024];
+	int len, sock;
+	u_int i;
+	uid_t euid;
+	gid_t egid;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
+		switch (sockets[i].type) {
+		case AUTH_UNUSED:
+			break;
+		case AUTH_SOCKET:
+			if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
+				slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
+				sock = accept(sockets[i].fd,
+				    (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
+				if (sock < 0) {
+					error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s",
+					    strerror(errno));
+					break;
+				}
+				if (getpeereid(sock, &euid, &egid) < 0) {
+					error("getpeereid %d failed: %s",
+					    sock, strerror(errno));
+					close(sock);
+					break;
+				}
+				if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
+					error("uid mismatch: "
+					    "peer euid %u != uid %u",
+					    (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
+					close(sock);
+					break;
+				}
+				new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock);
+			}
+			break;
+		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+			if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0 &&
+			    FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) {
+				do {
+					len = write(sockets[i].fd,
+					    buffer_ptr(&sockets[i].output),
+					    buffer_len(&sockets[i].output));
+					if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+					    errno == EINTR ||
+					    errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+						continue;
+					break;
+				} while (1);
+				if (len <= 0) {
+					close_socket(&sockets[i]);
+					break;
+				}
+				buffer_consume(&sockets[i].output, len);
+			}
+			if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
+				do {
+					len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+					if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+					    errno == EINTR ||
+					    errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+						continue;
+					break;
+				} while (1);
+				if (len <= 0) {
+					close_socket(&sockets[i]);
+					break;
+				}
+				buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len);
+				process_message(&sockets[i]);
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type);
+		}
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_socket(void)
+{
+	if (socket_name[0])
+		unlink(socket_name);
+	if (socket_dir[0])
+		rmdir(socket_dir);
+}
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	cleanup_socket();
+	_exit(i);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+cleanup_handler(int sig)
+{
+	cleanup_socket();
+	_exit(2);
+}
+
+static void
+check_parent_exists(void)
+{
+	if (parent_pid != -1 && kill(parent_pid, 0) < 0) {
+		/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
+		cleanup_socket();
+		_exit(2);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [command [arg ...]]\n",
+	    __progname);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -c          Generate C-shell commands on stdout.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -s          Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -k          Kill the current agent.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -d          Debug mode.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -a socket   Bind agent socket to given name.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -t life     Default identity lifetime (seconds).\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
+	int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
+	u_int nalloc;
+	char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
+	fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+	struct rlimit rlim;
+#endif
+	int prev_mask;
+	extern int optind;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
+	struct timeval *tvp = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	/* drop */
+	setegid(getgid());
+	setgid(getgid());
+	setuid(geteuid());
+
+#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
+	/* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
+	prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0);
+#endif
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+	init_rng();
+	seed_rng();
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:t:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'c':
+			if (s_flag)
+				usage();
+			c_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			k_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			if (c_flag)
+				usage();
+			s_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			if (d_flag)
+				usage();
+			d_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			agentsocket = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+				usage();
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+	ac -= optind;
+	av += optind;
+
+	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag))
+		usage();
+
+	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
+		shell = getenv("SHELL");
+		if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
+		    strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+			c_flag = 1;
+	}
+	if (k_flag) {
+		const char *errstr = NULL;
+
+		pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+		if (pidstr == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
+			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
+			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
+			perror("kill");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
+		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+		printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+		printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+	parent_pid = getpid();
+
+	if (agentsocket == NULL) {
+		/* Create private directory for agent socket */
+		strlcpy(socket_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof socket_dir);
+		if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
+			perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
+		    (long)parent_pid);
+	} else {
+		/* Try to use specified agent socket */
+		socket_dir[0] = '\0';
+		strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
+	 * the parent.
+	 */
+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock < 0) {
+		perror("socket");
+		*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+	prev_mask = umask(0177);
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+		perror("bind");
+		*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
+		umask(prev_mask);
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+	umask(prev_mask);
+	if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
+		perror("listen");
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
+	 * the socket data.  The child continues as the authentication agent.
+	 */
+	if (d_flag) {
+		log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+		format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
+		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
+		    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+		printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
+		goto skip;
+	}
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid == -1) {
+		perror("fork");
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+	if (pid != 0) {		/* Parent - execute the given command. */
+		close(sock);
+		snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
+		if (ac == 0) {
+			format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
+			printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
+			    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+			printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
+			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+			printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
+			exit(0);
+		}
+		if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
+		    setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
+			perror("setenv");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		execvp(av[0], av);
+		perror(av[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* child */
+	log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+
+	if (setsid() == -1) {
+		error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+
+	(void)chdir("/");
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+		/* XXX might close listen socket */
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
+		if (fd > 2)
+			close(fd);
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+	/* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
+	rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) {
+		error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+skip:
+	new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
+	if (ac > 0)
+		parent_alive_interval = 10;
+	idtab_init();
+	if (!d_flag)
+		signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+	signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
+	signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+	nalloc = 0;
+
+	while (1) {
+		prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
+		result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+			check_parent_exists();
+		(void) reaper();	/* remove expired keys */
+		if (result < 0) {
+			if (saved_errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			fatal("select: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
+		} else if (result > 0)
+			after_select(readsetp, writesetp);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51a06e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.24 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+
+#define INTBLOB_LEN	20
+#define SIGBLOB_LEN	(2*INTBLOB_LEN)
+
+int
+ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	DSA_SIG *sig;
+	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+	u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen;
+	Buffer b;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+
+	sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa);
+	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+
+	if (sig == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
+	slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
+	if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
+		error("bad sig size %u %u", rlen, slen);
+		DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	memset(sigblob, 0, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+		if (lenp != NULL)
+			*lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN;
+		if (sigp != NULL) {
+			*sigp = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN);
+			memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* ietf-drafts */
+		buffer_init(&b);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-dss");
+		buffer_put_string(&b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+		len = buffer_len(&b);
+		if (lenp != NULL)
+			*lenp = len;
+		if (sigp != NULL) {
+			*sigp = xmalloc(len);
+			memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+		}
+		buffer_free(&b);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+int
+ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	DSA_SIG *sig;
+	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
+	u_int len, dlen;
+	int rlen, ret;
+	Buffer b;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_dss_verify: no DSA key");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* fetch signature */
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+		sigblob = xmalloc(signaturelen);
+		memcpy(sigblob, signature, signaturelen);
+		len = signaturelen;
+	} else {
+		/* ietf-drafts */
+		char *ktype;
+		buffer_init(&b);
+		buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
+		ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+		if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) {
+			error("ssh_dss_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
+			buffer_free(&b);
+			xfree(ktype);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		xfree(ktype);
+		sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+		rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		if (rlen != 0) {
+			error("ssh_dss_verify: "
+			    "remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
+			xfree(sigblob);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) {
+		fatal("bad sigbloblen %u != SIGBLOB_LEN", len);
+	}
+
+	/* parse signature */
+	if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_dss_verify: DSA_SIG_new failed");
+	if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
+	if ((sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
+	if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) ||
+	    (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL))
+		fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+	/* clean up */
+	memset(sigblob, 0, len);
+	xfree(sigblob);
+
+	/* sha1 the data */
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+
+	ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa);
+	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+
+	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+	debug("ssh_dss_verify: signature %s",
+	    ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error");
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c29a1b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSH_GSS_H
+#define _SSH_GSS_H
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+#include <gssapi.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+# ifndef HEIMDAL
+#  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#   include <gssapi_generic.h>
+#  elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
+#   include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#  endif
+
+/* MIT Kerberos doesn't seem to define GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */
+
+#ifndef GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
+#define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
+#endif /* GSS_C_NT_... */
+#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+/* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE		60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN			61
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE	63
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR			64
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK			65
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC			66
+
+#define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
+typedef struct {
+	char *filename;
+	char *envvar;
+	char *envval;
+	void *data;
+} ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+
+typedef struct {
+	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+	gss_cred_id_t creds;
+	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+} ssh_gssapi_client;
+
+typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+	char *enc_name;
+	char *name;
+	gss_OID_desc oid;
+	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+} ssh_gssapi_mech;
+
+typedef struct {
+	OM_uint32	major; /* both */
+	OM_uint32	minor; /* both */
+	gss_ctx_id_t	context; /* both */
+	gss_name_t	name; /* both */
+	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
+	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
+	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
+	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
+} Gssctxt;
+
+extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
+
+int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *, gss_OID);
+void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *);
+ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *);
+
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *, OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *);
+void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+
+/* In the server */
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4247ea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.79 2008/07/24 23:55:30 sthen Exp $
+.\"	$FreeBSD$
+.\"
+.\"  -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd July 24 2008
+.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl q
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Fl t Ar type
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl C Ar comment
+.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
+.Ek
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl p
+.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl i
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl e
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl y
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl c
+.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
+.Op Fl C Ar comment
+.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl l
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl B
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl D Ar reader
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl F Ar hostname
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Op Fl l
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl H
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl R Ar hostname
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl U Ar reader
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl r Ar hostname
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Op Fl g
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl G Ar output_file
+.Op Fl v
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Op Fl M Ar memory
+.Op Fl S Ar start_point
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl T Ar output_file
+.Fl f Ar input_file
+.Op Fl v
+.Op Fl a Ar num_trials
+.Op Fl W Ar generator
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Nm
+can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1 and RSA or DSA
+keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
+The type of key to be generated is specified with the
+.Fl t
+option.
+If invoked without any arguments,
+.Nm
+will generate an RSA key for use in SSH protocol 2 connections.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group
+exchange (DH-GEX).
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for details.
+.Pp
+Normally each user wishing to use SSH
+with RSA or DSA authentication runs this once to create the authentication
+key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
+as seen in
+.Pa /etc/rc .
+.Pp
+Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
+to store the private key.
+The public key is stored in a file with the same name but
+.Dq .pub
+appended.
+The program also asks for a passphrase.
+The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase
+(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of
+arbitrary length.
+A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
+series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
+characters you want.
+Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are
+not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English
+prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad
+passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters,
+numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters.
+The passphrase can be changed later by using the
+.Fl p
+option.
+.Pp
+There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.
+If the passphrase is
+lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and copied to the
+corresponding public key to other machines.
+.Pp
+For RSA1 keys,
+there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for
+convenience to the user to help identify the key.
+The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful.
+The comment is initialized to
+.Dq user@host
+when the key is created, but can be changed using the
+.Fl c
+option.
+.Pp
+After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys
+should be placed to be activated.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl a Ar trials
+Specifies the number of primality tests to perform when screening DH-GEX
+candidates using the
+.Fl T
+command.
+.It Fl B
+Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
+.It Fl b Ar bits
+Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
+For RSA keys, the minimum size is 768 bits and the default is 2048 bits.
+Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient.
+DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
+.It Fl C Ar comment
+Provides a new comment.
+.It Fl c
+Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files.
+This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys.
+The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
+the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
+.It Fl D Ar reader
+Download the RSA public key stored in the smartcard in
+.Ar reader .
+.It Fl e
+This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
+print the key in
+RFC 4716 SSH Public Key File Format
+to stdout.
+This option allows exporting keys for use by several commercial
+SSH implementations.
+.It Fl F Ar hostname
+Search for the specified
+.Ar hostname
+in a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file, listing any occurrences found.
+This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
+used in conjunction with the
+.Fl H
+option to print found keys in a hashed format.
+.It Fl f Ar filename
+Specifies the filename of the key file.
+.It Fl G Ar output_file
+Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX.
+These primes must be screened for
+safety (using the
+.Fl T
+option) before use.
+.It Fl g
+Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the
+.Fl r
+command.
+.It Fl H
+Hash a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations
+within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with
+a .old suffix.
+These hashes may be used normally by
+.Nm ssh
+and
+.Nm sshd ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe
+to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names.
+.It Fl i
+This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
+in SSH2-compatible format and print an OpenSSH compatible private
+(or public) key to stdout.
+.Nm
+also reads the
+RFC 4716 SSH Public Key File Format.
+This option allows importing keys from several commercial
+SSH implementations.
+.It Fl l
+Show fingerprint of specified public key file.
+Private RSA1 keys are also supported.
+For RSA and DSA keys
+.Nm
+tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.
+If combined with
+.Fl v ,
+an ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint.
+.It Fl M Ar memory
+Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
+candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+Provides the new passphrase.
+.It Fl P Ar passphrase
+Provides the (old) passphrase.
+.It Fl p
+Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
+creating a new private key.
+The program will prompt for the file
+containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
+new passphrase.
+.It Fl q
+Silence
+.Nm ssh-keygen .
+Used by
+.Pa /etc/rc
+when creating a new key.
+.It Fl R Ar hostname
+Removes all keys belonging to
+.Ar hostname
+from a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the
+.Fl H
+option above).
+.It Fl r Ar hostname
+Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named
+.Ar hostname
+for the specified public key file.
+.It Fl S Ar start
+Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl T Ar output_file
+Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the
+.Fl G
+option) for safety.
+.It Fl t Ar type
+Specifies the type of key to create.
+The possible values are
+.Dq rsa1
+for protocol version 1 and
+.Dq rsa
+or
+.Dq dsa
+for protocol version 2.
+.It Fl U Ar reader
+Upload an existing RSA private key into the smartcard in
+.Ar reader .
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful for debugging moduli generation.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.It Fl W Ar generator
+Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl y
+This option will read a private
+OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+.El
+.Sh MODULI GENERATION
+.Nm
+may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange
+(DH-GEX) protocol.
+Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate
+primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process.
+These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive
+process).
+.Pp
+Generation of primes is performed using the
+.Fl G
+option.
+The desired length of the primes may be specified by the
+.Fl b
+option.
+For example:
+.Pp
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
+.Pp
+By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the
+desired length range.
+This may be overridden using the
+.Fl S
+option, which specifies a different start point (in hex).
+.Pp
+Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be tested for
+suitability.
+This may be performed using the
+.Fl T
+option.
+In this mode
+.Nm
+will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the
+.Fl f
+option).
+For example:
+.Pp
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
+.Pp
+By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
+This may be overridden using the
+.Fl a
+option.
+The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the
+prime under consideration.
+If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the
+.Fl W
+option.
+Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+.Pp
+Screened DH groups may be installed in
+.Pa /etc/moduli .
+It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
+that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.It Pa /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+The file format is described in
+.Xr moduli 5 .
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr moduli 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4716
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da5db98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1483 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.174 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+#include "scard.h"
+#endif
+
+/* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key.  This value can be set on the command line. */
+#define DEFAULT_BITS		2048
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA	1024
+u_int32_t bits = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase.  This can be
+ * set on the command line.
+ */
+int change_passphrase = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment.  This can be set
+ * on the command line.
+ */
+int change_comment = 0;
+
+int quiet = 0;
+
+int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+
+/* Flag indicating that we want to hash a known_hosts file */
+int hash_hosts = 0;
+/* Flag indicating that we want lookup a host in known_hosts file */
+int find_host = 0;
+/* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */
+int delete_host = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
+int print_fingerprint = 0;
+int print_bubblebabble = 0;
+
+/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
+char identity_file[1024];
+int have_identity = 0;
+
+/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_comment = NULL;
+
+/* Dump public key file in format used by real and the original SSH 2 */
+int convert_to_ssh2 = 0;
+int convert_from_ssh2 = 0;
+int print_public = 0;
+int print_generic = 0;
+
+char *key_type_name = NULL;
+
+/* argv0 */
+extern char *__progname;
+
+char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+
+/* moduli.c */
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
+int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t);
+
+static void
+ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	char *name = NULL;
+
+	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+	else {
+		switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
+		case KEY_RSA1:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY;
+			break;
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
+			break;
+		case KEY_RSA:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "bad key type\n");
+			exit(1);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
+	if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
+		exit(1);
+	buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
+	if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
+		strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
+	have_identity = 1;
+}
+
+static Key *
+load_identity(char *filename)
+{
+	char *pass;
+	Key *prv;
+
+	prv = key_load_private(filename, "", NULL);
+	if (prv == NULL) {
+		if (identity_passphrase)
+			pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+		else
+			pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		prv = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL);
+		memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
+		xfree(pass);
+	}
+	return prv;
+}
+
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN		"---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END		"---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN		"---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
+#define	SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC	0x3f6ff9eb
+
+static void
+do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	Key *k;
+	u_int len;
+	u_char *blob;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+		perror(identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	if ((k = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL) {
+		if ((k = load_identity(identity_file)) == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+	if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "version 1 keys are not supported\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len) <= 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
+	fprintf(stdout,
+	    "Comment: \"%u-bit %s, converted from OpenSSH by %s@%s\"\n",
+	    key_size(k), key_type(k),
+	    pw->pw_name, hostname);
+	dump_base64(stdout, blob, len);
+	fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
+	key_free(k);
+	xfree(blob);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+buffer_get_bignum_bits(Buffer *b, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int bignum_bits = buffer_get_int(b);
+	u_int bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
+
+	if (buffer_len(b) < bytes)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: input buffer too small: "
+		    "need %d have %d", bytes, buffer_len(b));
+	if (BN_bin2bn(buffer_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: BN_bin2bn failed");
+	buffer_consume(b, bytes);
+}
+
+static Key *
+do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	char *type, *cipher;
+	u_char *sig, data[] = "abcde12345";
+	int magic, rlen, ktype, i1, i2, i3, i4;
+	u_int slen;
+	u_long e;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
+
+	magic = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
+		error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	i1 = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	type   = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	cipher = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	i2 = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	i3 = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	i4 = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4);
+	if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
+		error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
+		xfree(cipher);
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		xfree(type);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	xfree(cipher);
+
+	if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
+		ktype = KEY_DSA;
+	} else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
+		ktype = KEY_RSA;
+	} else {
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		xfree(type);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	key = key_new_private(ktype);
+	xfree(type);
+
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->p);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->g);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->q);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		e = buffer_get_char(&b);
+		debug("e %lx", e);
+		if (e < 30) {
+			e <<= 8;
+			e += buffer_get_char(&b);
+			debug("e %lx", e);
+			e <<= 8;
+			e += buffer_get_char(&b);
+			debug("e %lx", e);
+		}
+		if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) {
+			buffer_free(&b);
+			key_free(key);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->d);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->n);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->iqmp);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->q);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->p);
+		rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa);
+		break;
+	}
+	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+	if (rlen != 0)
+		error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: "
+		    "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+
+	/* try the key */
+	key_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data));
+	key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data));
+	xfree(sig);
+	return key;
+}
+
+static int
+get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
+{
+	int c;
+	size_t pos = 0;
+
+	line[0] = '\0';
+	while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
+		if (pos >= len - 1) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		switch (c) {
+		case '\r':
+			c = fgetc(fp);
+			if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "unget: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			return pos;
+		case '\n':
+			return pos;
+		}
+		line[pos++] = c;
+		line[pos] = '\0';
+	}
+	/* We reached EOF */
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	Key *k;
+	int blen;
+	u_int len;
+	char line[1024];
+	u_char blob[8096];
+	char encoded[8096];
+	struct stat st;
+	int escaped = 0, private = 0, ok;
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+		perror(identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	fp = fopen(identity_file, "r");
+	if (fp == NULL) {
+		perror(identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	encoded[0] = '\0';
+	while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
+		if (line[blen - 1] == '\\')
+			escaped++;
+		if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
+		    strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
+			if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
+				private = 1;
+			if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
+				break;
+			}
+			/* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (escaped) {
+			escaped--;
+			/* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
+			continue;
+		}
+		strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
+	}
+	len = strlen(encoded);
+	if (((len % 4) == 3) &&
+	    (encoded[len-1] == '=') &&
+	    (encoded[len-2] == '=') &&
+	    (encoded[len-3] == '='))
+		encoded[len-3] = '\0';
+	blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob));
+	if (blen < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "uudecode failed.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	k = private ?
+	    do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen) :
+	    key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+	if (k == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "decode blob failed.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	ok = private ?
+	    (k->type == KEY_DSA ?
+		 PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) :
+		 PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) :
+	    key_write(k, stdout);
+	if (!ok) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "key write failed\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	key_free(k);
+	if (!private)
+		fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+	fclose(fp);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	Key *prv;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+		perror(identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	prv = load_identity(identity_file);
+	if (prv == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	if (!key_write(prv, stdout))
+		fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
+	key_free(prv);
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+static void
+do_upload(struct passwd *pw, const char *sc_reader_id)
+{
+	Key *prv = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+		perror(identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	prv = load_identity(identity_file);
+	if (prv == NULL) {
+		error("load failed");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	ret = sc_put_key(prv, sc_reader_id);
+	key_free(prv);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		exit(1);
+	logit("loading key done");
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_download(struct passwd *pw, const char *sc_reader_id)
+{
+	Key **keys = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, NULL);
+	if (keys == NULL)
+		fatal("cannot read public key from smartcard");
+	for (i = 0; keys[i]; i++) {
+		key_write(keys[i], stdout);
+		key_free(keys[i]);
+		fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+	}
+	xfree(keys);
+	exit(0);
+}
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+
+static void
+do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	Key *public;
+	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
+	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
+	enum fp_rep rep;
+	enum fp_type fptype;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+		perror(identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
+	if (public != NULL) {
+		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+		ra = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
+		    key_type(public));
+		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+			printf("%s\n", ra);
+		key_free(public);
+		xfree(comment);
+		xfree(ra);
+		xfree(fp);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+	if (comment) {
+		xfree(comment);
+		comment = NULL;
+	}
+
+	f = fopen(identity_file, "r");
+	if (f != NULL) {
+		while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+			if ((cp = strchr(line, '\n')) == NULL) {
+				error("line %d too long: %.40s...",
+				    num + 1, line);
+				skip = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+			num++;
+			if (skip) {
+				skip = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			*cp = '\0';
+
+			/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+			for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+				;
+			if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+				continue;
+			i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
+			if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
+				int quoted = 0;
+				comment = cp;
+				for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
+				    *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+					if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+						cp++;	/* Skip both */
+					else if (*cp == '"')
+						quoted = !quoted;
+				}
+				if (!*cp)
+					continue;
+				*cp++ = '\0';
+			}
+			ep = cp;
+			public = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+			if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
+				cp = ep;
+				key_free(public);
+				public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+				if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
+					key_free(public);
+					continue;
+				}
+			}
+			comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
+			fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+			ra = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+			printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
+			    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
+			if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+				printf("%s\n", ra);
+			xfree(ra);
+			xfree(fp);
+			key_free(public);
+			invalid = 0;
+		}
+		fclose(f);
+	}
+	if (invalid) {
+		printf("%s is not a public key file.\n", identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+print_host(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int hash)
+{
+	if (print_fingerprint) {
+		enum fp_rep rep;
+		enum fp_type fptype;
+		char *fp, *ra;
+
+		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+		ra = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
+		    key_type(public));
+		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+			printf("%s\n", ra);
+		xfree(ra);
+		xfree(fp);
+	} else {
+		if (hash && (name = host_hash(name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+			fatal("hash_host failed");
+		fprintf(f, "%s ", name);
+		if (!key_write(public, f))
+			fatal("key_write failed");
+		fprintf(f, "\n");
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
+{
+	FILE *in, *out = stdout;
+	Key *public;
+	char *cp, *cp2, *kp, *kp2;
+	char line[16*1024], tmp[MAXPATHLEN], old[MAXPATHLEN];
+	int c, skip = 0, inplace = 0, num = 0, invalid = 0, has_unhashed = 0;
+
+	if (!have_identity) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
+		if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
+		    sizeof(identity_file))
+			fatal("Specified known hosts path too long");
+		xfree(cp);
+		have_identity = 1;
+	}
+	if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+		fatal("fopen: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/*
+	 * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place
+	 * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout
+	 */
+	if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) {
+		if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
+		    strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
+		    strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) ||
+		    strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old))
+			fatal("known_hosts path too long");
+		umask(077);
+		if ((c = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1)
+			fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if ((out = fdopen(c, "w")) == NULL) {
+			c = errno;
+			unlink(tmp);
+			fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(c));
+		}
+		inplace = 1;
+	}
+
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), in)) {
+		if ((cp = strchr(line, '\n')) == NULL) {
+			error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num + 1, line);
+			skip = 1;
+			invalid = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		num++;
+		if (skip) {
+			skip = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+		*cp = '\0';
+
+		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') {
+			if (inplace)
+				fprintf(out, "%s\n", cp);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
+		for (kp = cp; *kp && *kp != ' ' && *kp != '\t'; kp++)
+			;
+		if (*kp == '\0' || *(kp + 1) == '\0') {
+			error("line %d missing key: %.40s...",
+			    num, line);
+			invalid = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		*kp++ = '\0';
+		kp2 = kp;
+
+		public = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+		if (key_read(public, &kp) != 1) {
+			kp = kp2;
+			key_free(public);
+			public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+			if (key_read(public, &kp) != 1) {
+				error("line %d invalid key: %.40s...",
+				    num, line);
+				key_free(public);
+				invalid = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (*cp == HASH_DELIM) {
+			if (find_host || delete_host) {
+				cp2 = host_hash(name, cp, strlen(cp));
+				if (cp2 == NULL) {
+					error("line %d: invalid hashed "
+					    "name: %.64s...", num, line);
+					invalid = 1;
+					continue;
+				}
+				c = (strcmp(cp2, cp) == 0);
+				if (find_host && c) {
+					printf("# Host %s found: "
+					    "line %d type %s\n", name,
+					    num, key_type(public));
+					print_host(out, cp, public, 0);
+				}
+				if (delete_host && !c)
+					print_host(out, cp, public, 0);
+			} else if (hash_hosts)
+				print_host(out, cp, public, 0);
+		} else {
+			if (find_host || delete_host) {
+				c = (match_hostname(name, cp,
+				    strlen(cp)) == 1);
+				if (find_host && c) {
+					printf("# Host %s found: "
+					    "line %d type %s\n", name,
+					    num, key_type(public));
+					print_host(out, name, public,
+					    hash_hosts);
+				}
+				if (delete_host && !c)
+					print_host(out, cp, public, 0);
+			} else if (hash_hosts) {
+				for (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",");
+				    cp2 != NULL && *cp2 != '\0';
+				    cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",")) {
+					if (strcspn(cp2, "*?!") != strlen(cp2))
+						fprintf(stderr, "Warning: "
+						    "ignoring host name with "
+						    "metacharacters: %.64s\n",
+						    cp2);
+					else
+						print_host(out, cp2, public, 1);
+				}
+				has_unhashed = 1;
+			}
+		}
+		key_free(public);
+	}
+	fclose(in);
+
+	if (invalid) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid known_hosts file.\n",
+		    identity_file);
+		if (inplace) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Not replacing existing known_hosts "
+			    "file because of errors\n");
+			fclose(out);
+			unlink(tmp);
+		}
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	if (inplace) {
+		fclose(out);
+
+		/* Backup existing file */
+		if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
+			fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno));
+		if (link(identity_file, old) == -1)
+			fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		/* Move new one into place */
+		if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) {
+			error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			unlink(tmp);
+			unlink(old);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s updated.\n", identity_file);
+		fprintf(stderr, "Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
+		if (has_unhashed) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: %s contains unhashed "
+			    "entries\n", old);
+			fprintf(stderr, "Delete this file to ensure privacy "
+			    "of hostnames\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform changing a passphrase.  The argument is the passwd structure
+ * for the current user.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *comment;
+	char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+	struct stat st;
+	Key *private;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+		perror(identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
+	private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment);
+	if (private == NULL) {
+		if (identity_passphrase)
+			old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+		else
+			old_passphrase =
+			    read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		private = key_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
+		    &comment);
+		memset(old_passphrase, 0, strlen(old_passphrase));
+		xfree(old_passphrase);
+		if (private == NULL) {
+			printf("Bad passphrase.\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+	printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+
+	/* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
+	if (identity_new_passphrase) {
+		passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+		passphrase2 = NULL;
+	} else {
+		passphrase1 =
+			read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
+			    "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+		    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+
+		/* Verify that they are the same. */
+		if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+			memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+			memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+			xfree(passphrase1);
+			xfree(passphrase2);
+			printf("Pass phrases do not match.  Try again.\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		/* Destroy the other copy. */
+		memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+		xfree(passphrase2);
+	}
+
+	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+	if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment)) {
+		printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
+		memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+		xfree(passphrase1);
+		key_free(private);
+		xfree(comment);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
+	memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+	xfree(passphrase1);
+	key_free(private);		 /* Destroys contents */
+	xfree(comment);
+
+	printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print the SSHFP RR.
+ */
+static int
+do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname)
+{
+	Key *public;
+	char *comment = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (fname == NULL)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) {
+		if (errno == ENOENT)
+			return 0;
+		perror(fname);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	public = key_load_public(fname, &comment);
+	if (public != NULL) {
+		export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
+		key_free(public);
+		xfree(comment);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (comment)
+		xfree(comment);
+
+	printf("failed to read v2 public key from %s.\n", fname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change the comment of a private key file.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
+	Key *private;
+	Key *public;
+	struct stat st;
+	FILE *f;
+	int fd;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+		perror(identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment);
+	if (private == NULL) {
+		if (identity_passphrase)
+			passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+		else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+			passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+		else
+			passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		/* Try to load using the passphrase. */
+		private = key_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &comment);
+		if (private == NULL) {
+			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+			xfree(passphrase);
+			printf("Bad passphrase.\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	} else {
+		passphrase = xstrdup("");
+	}
+	if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.\n");
+		key_free(private);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+
+	if (identity_comment) {
+		strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
+	} else {
+		printf("Enter new comment: ");
+		fflush(stdout);
+		if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
+			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+			key_free(private);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+	if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment)) {
+		printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
+		memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+		xfree(passphrase);
+		key_free(private);
+		xfree(comment);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+	xfree(passphrase);
+	public = key_from_private(private);
+	key_free(private);
+
+	strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+	fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	f = fdopen(fd, "w");
+	if (f == NULL) {
+		printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	if (!key_write(public, f))
+		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
+	key_free(public);
+	fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment);
+	fclose(f);
+
+	xfree(comment);
+
+	printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n");
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -a trials   Number of trials for screening DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -B          Show bubblebabble digest of key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -b bits     Number of bits in the key to create.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -C comment  Provide new comment.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -c          Change comment in private and public key files.\n");
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -D reader   Download public key from smartcard.\n");
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -e          Convert OpenSSH to RFC 4716 key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -F hostname Find hostname in known hosts file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -f filename Filename of the key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -G file     Generate candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -g          Use generic DNS resource record format.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -H          Hash names in known_hosts file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -i          Convert RFC 4716 to OpenSSH key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -l          Show fingerprint of key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -M memory   Amount of memory (MB) to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -N phrase   Provide new passphrase.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -P phrase   Provide old passphrase.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -p          Change passphrase of private key file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -q          Quiet.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -R hostname Remove host from known_hosts file.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -r hostname Print DNS resource record.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -S start    Start point (hex) for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -T file     Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -t type     Specify type of key to create.\n");
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -U reader   Upload private key to smartcard.\n");
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -v          Verbose.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -W gen      Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -y          Read private key file and print public key.\n");
+
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for key management.
+ */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char dotsshdir[MAXPATHLEN], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+	char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *reader_id = NULL;
+	char *rr_hostname = NULL;
+	Key *private, *public;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct stat st;
+	int opt, type, fd, download = 0;
+	u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0, trials = 100;
+	int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
+	BIGNUM *start = NULL;
+	FILE *f;
+	const char *errstr;
+
+	extern int optind;
+	extern char *optarg;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+	log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	init_rng();
+	seed_rng();
+
+	/* we need this for the home * directory.  */
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	if (!pw) {
+		printf("You don't exist, go away!\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) {
+		perror("gethostname");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv,
+	    "degiqpclBHvxXyF:b:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case 'b':
+			bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 768, 32768, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
+			break;
+		case 'F':
+			find_host = 1;
+			rr_hostname = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'H':
+			hash_hosts = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'R':
+			delete_host = 1;
+			rr_hostname = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			print_fingerprint = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'B':
+			print_bubblebabble = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			change_passphrase = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			change_comment = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
+			    sizeof(identity_file))
+				fatal("Identity filename too long");
+			have_identity = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'g':
+			print_generic = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			identity_passphrase = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'N':
+			identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'C':
+			identity_comment = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			quiet = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+		case 'x':
+			/* export key */
+			convert_to_ssh2 = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+		case 'X':
+			/* import key */
+			convert_from_ssh2 = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'y':
+			print_public = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			key_type_name = "dsa";
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			key_type_name = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			download = 1;
+			/*FALLTHROUGH*/
+		case 'U':
+			reader_id = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			else {
+				if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
+				    log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+					log_level++;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			rr_hostname = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'W':
+			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1,
+			    UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			trials = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Invalid number of trials: %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
+			break;
+		case 'M':
+			memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr) {
+				fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'G':
+			do_gen_candidates = 1;
+			if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
+			    sizeof(out_file))
+				fatal("Output filename too long");
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			do_screen_candidates = 1;
+			if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
+			    sizeof(out_file))
+				fatal("Output filename too long");
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			/* XXX - also compare length against bits */
+			if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0)
+				fatal("Invalid start point.");
+			break;
+		case '?':
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* reinit */
+	log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	if (optind < argc) {
+		printf("Too many arguments.\n");
+		usage();
+	}
+	if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
+		printf("Can only have one of -p and -c.\n");
+		usage();
+	}
+	if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
+		printf("Cannot use -l with -D or -R.\n");
+		usage();
+	}
+	if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host)
+		do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname);
+	if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
+		do_fingerprint(pw);
+	if (change_passphrase)
+		do_change_passphrase(pw);
+	if (change_comment)
+		do_change_comment(pw);
+	if (convert_to_ssh2)
+		do_convert_to_ssh2(pw);
+	if (convert_from_ssh2)
+		do_convert_from_ssh2(pw);
+	if (print_public)
+		do_print_public(pw);
+	if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
+		unsigned int n = 0;
+
+		if (have_identity) {
+			n = do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    identity_file, rr_hostname);
+			if (n == 0) {
+				perror(identity_file);
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			exit(0);
+		} else {
+
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+
+			if (n == 0)
+				fatal("no keys found.");
+			exit(0);
+		}
+	}
+	if (reader_id != NULL) {
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+		if (download)
+			do_download(pw, reader_id);
+		else
+			do_upload(pw, reader_id);
+#else /* SMARTCARD */
+		fatal("no support for smartcards.");
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+	}
+
+	if (do_gen_candidates) {
+		FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
+
+		if (out == NULL) {
+			error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
+			    out_file, strerror(errno));
+			return (1);
+		}
+		if (bits == 0)
+			bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
+		if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0)
+			fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
+
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (do_screen_candidates) {
+		FILE *in;
+		FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
+
+		if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
+			if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+				fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
+				    "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			}
+		} else
+			in = stdin;
+
+		if (out == NULL) {
+			fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
+			    out_file, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (prime_test(in, out, trials, generator_wanted) != 0)
+			fatal("modulus screening failed");
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	arc4random_stir();
+
+	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+		key_type_name = "rsa";
+
+	type = key_type_from_name(key_type_name);
+	if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	if (bits == 0)
+		bits = (type == KEY_DSA) ? DEFAULT_BITS_DSA : DEFAULT_BITS;
+	if (type == KEY_DSA && bits != 1024)
+		fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
+	if (!quiet)
+		printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name);
+	private = key_generate(type, bits);
+	if (private == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	public  = key_from_private(private);
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
+
+	/* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */
+	snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+	if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL &&
+	    stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) {
+		if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0)
+			error("Could not create directory '%s'.", dotsshdir);
+		else if (!quiet)
+			printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir);
+	}
+	/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
+		char yesno[3];
+		printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file);
+		printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
+		fflush(stdout);
+		if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
+			exit(1);
+		if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
+			exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
+	if (identity_passphrase)
+		passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+	else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+		passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+	else {
+passphrase_again:
+		passphrase1 =
+			read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
+			    "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+		    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+			/*
+			 * The passphrases do not match.  Clear them and
+			 * retry.
+			 */
+			memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+			memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+			xfree(passphrase1);
+			xfree(passphrase2);
+			printf("Passphrases do not match.  Try again.\n");
+			goto passphrase_again;
+		}
+		/* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
+		memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+		xfree(passphrase2);
+	}
+
+	if (identity_comment) {
+		strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
+	} else {
+		/* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
+		snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+	}
+
+	/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
+	if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment)) {
+		printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
+		memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+		xfree(passphrase1);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Clear the passphrase. */
+	memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+	xfree(passphrase1);
+
+	/* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */
+	key_free(private);
+	arc4random_stir();
+
+	if (!quiet)
+		printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file);
+
+	strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+	fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	f = fdopen(fd, "w");
+	if (f == NULL) {
+		printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	if (!key_write(public, f))
+		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
+	fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+	fclose(f);
+
+	if (!quiet) {
+		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
+		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+		    identity_file);
+		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
+		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
+		printf("%s\n", ra);
+		xfree(ra);
+		xfree(fp);
+	}
+
+	key_free(public);
+	exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c7ac10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.26 2008/12/29 01:12:36 stevesk Exp $
+.\"	$FreeBSD$
+.\"
+.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+.\"
+.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+.\"
+.Dd December 29 2008
+.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keyscan
+.Nd gather ssh public keys
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-keyscan
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 46Hv
+.Op Fl f Ar file
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl T Ar timeout
+.Op Fl t Ar type
+.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist
+.Ar ...
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a number of
+hosts.
+It was designed to aid in building and verifying
+.Pa ssh_known_hosts
+files.
+.Nm
+provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl
+scripts.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in
+parallel, so it is very efficient.
+The keys from a domain of 1,000
+hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
+hosts are down or do not run ssh.
+For scanning, one does not need
+login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
+scanning process involve any encryption.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl f Ar file
+Read hosts or
+.Pa addrlist namelist
+pairs from this file, one per line.
+If
+.Pa -
+is supplied instead of a filename,
+.Nm
+will read hosts or
+.Pa addrlist namelist
+pairs from the standard input.
+.It Fl H
+Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.
+Hashed names may be used normally by
+.Nm ssh
+and
+.Nm sshd ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Port to connect to on the remote host.
+.It Fl T Ar timeout
+Set the timeout for connection attempts.
+If
+.Pa timeout
+seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
+last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is
+closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
+Default is 5 seconds.
+.It Fl t Ar type
+Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
+The possible values are
+.Dq rsa1
+for protocol version 1 and
+.Dq rsa
+or
+.Dq dsa
+for protocol version 2.
+Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
+The default is
+.Dq rsa .
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+.El
+.Sh SECURITY
+If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using
+.Nm
+without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to
+.Em man in the middle
+attacks.
+On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
+.Nm
+can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle
+attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
+.Sh FILES
+.Pa Input format:
+.Bd -literal
+1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
+.Ed
+.Pp
+.Pa Output format for rsa1 keys:
+.Bd -literal
+host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
+.Ed
+.Pp
+.Pa Output format for rsa and dsa keys:
+.Bd -literal
+host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Where
+.Pa keytype
+is either
+.Dq ssh-rsa
+or
+.Dq ssh-dss .
+.Pp
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+Print the
+.Pa rsa
+host key for machine
+.Pa hostname :
+.Bd -literal
+$ ssh-keyscan hostname
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Find all hosts from the file
+.Pa ssh_hosts
+which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file
+.Pa ssh_known_hosts :
+.Bd -literal
+$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa -f ssh_hosts | \e
+	sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
+.Ed
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An -nosplit
+.An David Mazieres Aq dm@lcs.mit.edu
+wrote the initial version, and
+.An Wayne Davison Aq wayned@users.sourceforge.net
+added support for protocol version 2.
+.Sh BUGS
+It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles
+of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9.
+This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
+key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a91be4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,851 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.78 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+ *
+ * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+ * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+ * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+ 
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
+   Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
+int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+
+#define KT_RSA1	1
+#define KT_DSA	2
+#define KT_RSA	4
+
+int get_keytypes = KT_RSA;	/* Get only RSA keys by default */
+
+int hash_hosts = 0;		/* Hash hostname on output */
+
+#define MAXMAXFD 256
+
+/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
+int timeout = 5;
+
+int maxfd;
+#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+fd_set *read_wait;
+size_t read_wait_nfdset;
+int ncon;
+int nonfatal_fatal = 0;
+jmp_buf kexjmp;
+Key *kexjmp_key;
+
+/*
+ * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor.  The state
+ * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n].
+ */
+typedef struct Connection {
+	u_char c_status;	/* State of connection on this file desc. */
+#define CS_UNUSED 0		/* File descriptor unused */
+#define CS_CON 1		/* Waiting to connect/read greeting */
+#define CS_SIZE 2		/* Waiting to read initial packet size */
+#define CS_KEYS 3		/* Waiting to read public key packet */
+	int c_fd;		/* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */
+	int c_plen;		/* Packet length field for ssh packet */
+	int c_len;		/* Total bytes which must be read. */
+	int c_off;		/* Length of data read so far. */
+	int c_keytype;		/* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */
+	char *c_namebase;	/* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
+	char *c_name;		/* Hostname of connection for errors */
+	char *c_namelist;	/* Pointer to other possible addresses */
+	char *c_output_name;	/* Hostname of connection for output */
+	char *c_data;		/* Data read from this fd */
+	Kex *c_kex;		/* The key-exchange struct for ssh2 */
+	struct timeval c_tv;	/* Time at which connection gets aborted */
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link;	/* List of connections in timeout order. */
+} con;
+
+TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq;	/* Timeout Queue */
+con *fdcon;
+
+/*
+ *  This is just a wrapper around fgets() to make it usable.
+ */
+
+/* Stress-test.  Increase this later. */
+#define LINEBUF_SIZE 16
+
+typedef struct {
+	char *buf;
+	u_int size;
+	int lineno;
+	const char *filename;
+	FILE *stream;
+	void (*errfun) (const char *,...);
+} Linebuf;
+
+static Linebuf *
+Linebuf_alloc(const char *filename, void (*errfun) (const char *,...))
+{
+	Linebuf *lb;
+
+	if (!(lb = malloc(sizeof(*lb)))) {
+		if (errfun)
+			(*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n",
+			    filename ? filename : "(stdin)");
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	if (filename) {
+		lb->filename = filename;
+		if (!(lb->stream = fopen(filename, "r"))) {
+			xfree(lb);
+			if (errfun)
+				(*errfun) ("%s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno));
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+	} else {
+		lb->filename = "(stdin)";
+		lb->stream = stdin;
+	}
+
+	if (!(lb->buf = malloc((lb->size = LINEBUF_SIZE)))) {
+		if (errfun)
+			(*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename);
+		xfree(lb);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	lb->errfun = errfun;
+	lb->lineno = 0;
+	return (lb);
+}
+
+static void
+Linebuf_free(Linebuf * lb)
+{
+	fclose(lb->stream);
+	xfree(lb->buf);
+	xfree(lb);
+}
+
+#if 0
+static void
+Linebuf_restart(Linebuf * lb)
+{
+	clearerr(lb->stream);
+	rewind(lb->stream);
+	lb->lineno = 0;
+}
+
+static int
+Linebuf_lineno(Linebuf * lb)
+{
+	return (lb->lineno);
+}
+#endif
+
+static char *
+Linebuf_getline(Linebuf * lb)
+{
+	size_t n = 0;
+	void *p;
+
+	lb->lineno++;
+	for (;;) {
+		/* Read a line */
+		if (!fgets(&lb->buf[n], lb->size - n, lb->stream)) {
+			if (ferror(lb->stream) && lb->errfun)
+				(*lb->errfun)("%s: %s\n", lb->filename,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		n = strlen(lb->buf);
+
+		/* Return it or an error if it fits */
+		if (n > 0 && lb->buf[n - 1] == '\n') {
+			lb->buf[n - 1] = '\0';
+			return (lb->buf);
+		}
+		if (n != lb->size - 1) {
+			if (lb->errfun)
+				(*lb->errfun)("%s: skipping incomplete last line\n",
+				    lb->filename);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		/* Double the buffer if we need more space */
+		lb->size *= 2;
+		if ((p = realloc(lb->buf, lb->size)) == NULL) {
+			lb->size /= 2;
+			if (lb->errfun)
+				(*lb->errfun)("linebuf (%s): realloc failed\n",
+				    lb->filename);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		lb->buf = p;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+fdlim_get(int hard)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+	struct rlimit rlfd;
+
+	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY)
+		return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
+	else
+		return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur;
+#else
+	return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+fdlim_set(int lim)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+	struct rlimit rlfd;
+#endif
+
+	if (lim <= 0)
+		return (-1);
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	rlfd.rlim_cur = lim;
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE)
+	setdtablesize(lim);
+#endif
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent
+ * separators.  This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the
+ * one in the GNU libc.
+ */
+static char *
+xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim)
+{
+	char *s, *e;
+
+	if (!**str)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	s = *str;
+	e = s + strcspn(s, delim);
+
+	if (*e != '\0')
+		*e++ = '\0';
+	*str = e;
+
+	return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep).  Strsep() will return a
+ * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop.
+ */
+static char *
+strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim)
+{
+	char *tok;
+
+	do {
+		tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim);
+	} while (tok && *tok == '\0');
+	return (tok);
+}
+
+static Key *
+keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
+{
+	static Key *rsa;
+	static Buffer msg;
+
+	if (rsa == NULL) {
+		buffer_init(&msg);
+		rsa = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	}
+	buffer_append(&msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen);
+	buffer_consume(&msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7));	/* padding */
+	if (buffer_get_char(&msg) != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+		error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name);
+		buffer_clear(&msg);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	buffer_consume(&msg, 8);		/* cookie */
+
+	/* server key */
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&msg);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n);
+
+	/* host key */
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&msg);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n);
+
+	buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+	return (rsa);
+}
+
+static int
+hostjump(Key *hostkey)
+{
+	kexjmp_key = hostkey;
+	longjmp(kexjmp, 1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor)
+{
+	switch (remote_major) {
+	case 1:
+		if (remote_minor == 99)
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		return 1;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static Key *
+keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
+{
+	int j;
+
+	packet_set_connection(c->c_fd, c->c_fd);
+	enable_compat20();
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = c->c_keytype == KT_DSA?
+	    "ssh-dss": "ssh-rsa";
+	c->c_kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+	c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+	c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+	c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+	c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+	c->c_kex->verify_host_key = hostjump;
+
+	if (!(j = setjmp(kexjmp))) {
+		nonfatal_fatal = 1;
+		dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_kex->done, c->c_kex);
+		fprintf(stderr, "Impossible! dispatch_run() returned!\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	nonfatal_fatal = 0;
+	xfree(c->c_kex);
+	c->c_kex = NULL;
+	packet_close();
+
+	return j < 0? NULL : kexjmp_key;
+}
+
+static void
+keyprint(con *c, Key *key)
+{
+	char *host = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
+
+	if (!key)
+		return;
+	if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+		fatal("host_hash failed");
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "%s ", host);
+	key_write(key, stdout);
+	fputs("\n", stdout);
+}
+
+static int
+tcpconnect(char *host)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int gaierr, s = -1;
+
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port);
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+		fatal("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (s < 0) {
+			error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (set_nonblock(s) == -1)
+			fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s);
+		if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 &&
+		    errno != EINPROGRESS)
+			error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno));
+		else
+			break;
+		close(s);
+		s = -1;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+	return s;
+}
+
+static int
+conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype)
+{
+	char *namebase, *name, *namelist;
+	int s;
+
+	namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname);
+
+	do {
+		name = xstrsep(&namelist, ",");
+		if (!name) {
+			xfree(namebase);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	} while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0);
+
+	if (s >= maxfd)
+		fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s);
+	if (fdcon[s].c_status)
+		fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s);
+
+	fdcon[s].c_fd = s;
+	fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON;
+	fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase;
+	fdcon[s].c_name = name;
+	fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist;
+	fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname);
+	fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen;
+	fdcon[s].c_len = 4;
+	fdcon[s].c_off = 0;
+	fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype;
+	gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL);
+	fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+	FD_SET(s, read_wait);
+	ncon++;
+	return (s);
+}
+
+static void
+confree(int s)
+{
+	if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED)
+		fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s);
+	close(s);
+	xfree(fdcon[s].c_namebase);
+	xfree(fdcon[s].c_output_name);
+	if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS)
+		xfree(fdcon[s].c_data);
+	fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED;
+	fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0;
+	TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+	FD_CLR(s, read_wait);
+	ncon--;
+}
+
+static void
+contouch(int s)
+{
+	TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+	gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL);
+	fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+}
+
+static int
+conrecycle(int s)
+{
+	con *c = &fdcon[s];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype);
+	confree(s);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+congreet(int s)
+{
+	int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
+	char buf[256], *cp;
+	char remote_version[sizeof buf];
+	size_t bufsiz;
+	con *c = &fdcon[s];
+
+	for (;;) {
+		memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+		bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
+		cp = buf;
+		while (bufsiz-- &&
+		    (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') {
+			if (*cp == '\r')
+				*cp = '\n';
+			cp++;
+		}
+		if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (n == 0) {
+		switch (errno) {
+		case EPIPE:
+			error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
+			break;
+		case ECONNREFUSED:
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+			break;
+		}
+		conrecycle(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+		error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	*cp = '\0';
+	if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+	    &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3)
+		compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+	else
+		datafellows = 0;
+	if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) {
+		if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) {
+			debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name);
+			confree(s);
+			return;
+		}
+	} else if (remote_major != 1) {
+		debug("%s doesn't support ssh1", c->c_name);
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	fprintf(stderr, "# %s %s\n", c->c_name, chop(buf));
+	n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
+	    c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2,
+	    c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
+	if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
+		error("snprintf: buffer too small");
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
+		error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) {
+		keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh2(c));
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->c_status = CS_SIZE;
+	contouch(s);
+}
+
+static void
+conread(int s)
+{
+	con *c = &fdcon[s];
+	size_t n;
+
+	if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
+		congreet(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
+	if (n == 0) {
+		error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->c_off += n;
+
+	if (c->c_off == c->c_len)
+		switch (c->c_status) {
+		case CS_SIZE:
+			c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen);
+			c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7);
+			c->c_off = 0;
+			c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len);
+			c->c_status = CS_KEYS;
+			break;
+		case CS_KEYS:
+			keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c));
+			confree(s);
+			return;
+		default:
+			fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
+			break;
+		}
+
+	contouch(s);
+}
+
+static void
+conloop(void)
+{
+	struct timeval seltime, now;
+	fd_set *r, *e;
+	con *c;
+	int i;
+
+	gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+	c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
+
+	if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec ||
+	    (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) {
+		seltime = c->c_tv;
+		seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec;
+		seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec;
+		if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) {
+			seltime.tv_usec += 1000000;
+			seltime.tv_sec--;
+		}
+	} else
+		seltime.tv_sec = seltime.tv_usec = 0;
+
+	r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+	e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+	memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
+	memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+	while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
+	    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+		;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) {
+		if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) {
+			error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name);
+			confree(i);
+		} else if (FD_ISSET(i, r))
+			conread(i);
+	}
+	xfree(r);
+	xfree(e);
+
+	c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
+	while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
+	    (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) {
+		int s = c->c_fd;
+
+		c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link);
+		conrecycle(s);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+do_host(char *host)
+{
+	char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n");
+	int j;
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_RSA; j *= 2) {
+		if (get_keytypes & j) {
+			while (ncon >= MAXCON)
+				conloop();
+			conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void
+fatal(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (nonfatal_fatal)
+		longjmp(kexjmp, -1);
+	else
+		exit(255);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: %s [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
+	    "\t\t   [host | addrlist namelist] ...\n",
+	    __progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	int opt, fopt_count = 0;
+	char *tname;
+
+	extern int optind;
+	extern char *optarg;
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	init_rng();
+	seed_rng();
+	TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	if (argc <= 1)
+		usage();
+
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "Hv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case 'H':
+			hash_hosts = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
+			if (ssh_port <= 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			timeout = convtime(optarg);
+			if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg);
+				usage();
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (!debug_flag) {
+				debug_flag = 1;
+				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			}
+			else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+				log_level++;
+			else
+				fatal("Too high debugging level.");
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0)
+				optarg = NULL;
+			argv[fopt_count++] = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			get_keytypes = 0;
+			tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
+			while (tname) {
+				int type = key_type_from_name(tname);
+				switch (type) {
+				case KEY_RSA1:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1;
+					break;
+				case KEY_DSA:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
+					break;
+				case KEY_RSA:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
+					break;
+				case KEY_UNSPEC:
+					fatal("unknown key type %s", tname);
+				}
+				tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
+			}
+			break;
+		case '4':
+			IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		case '?':
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+	if (optind == argc && !fopt_count)
+		usage();
+
+	log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	maxfd = fdlim_get(1);
+	if (maxfd < 0)
+		fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname);
+	if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD)
+		maxfd = MAXMAXFD;
+	if (MAXCON <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
+	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+
+	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
+	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+	if (fopt_count) {
+		Linebuf *lb;
+		char *line;
+		int j;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
+			lb = Linebuf_alloc(argv[j], error);
+			if (!lb)
+				continue;
+			while ((line = Linebuf_getline(lb)) != NULL)
+				do_host(line);
+			Linebuf_free(lb);
+		}
+	}
+
+	while (optind < argc)
+		do_host(argv[optind++]);
+
+	while (ncon > 0)
+		conloop();
+
+	return (0);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c56a98d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.9 2007/05/31 19:20:16 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd May 31 2007
+.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keysign
+.Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is used by
+.Xr ssh 1
+to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature
+required during host-based authentication with SSH protocol version 2.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
+global client configuration file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+by setting
+.Cm EnableSSHKeysign
+to
+.Dq yes .
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+See
+.Xr ssh 1
+and
+.Xr sshd 8
+for more information about host-based authentication.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Controls whether
+.Nm
+is enabled.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
+generate the digital signature.
+They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Since they are readable only by root,
+.Nm
+must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in
+.Ox 3.2 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Markus Friedl Aq markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4bc7e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.29 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+/* XXX readconf.c needs these */
+uid_t original_real_uid;
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static int
+valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, Key **ret, u_char *data,
+    u_int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	u_char *pkblob;
+	u_int blen, len;
+	char *pkalg, *p;
+	int pktype, fail;
+
+	fail = 0;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+	/* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+	if (len != 20 && len != 32)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+		fail++;
+
+	/* server user */
+	buffer_skip_string(&b);
+
+	/* service */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* method */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* pubkey */
+	pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	pkblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &blen);
+
+	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		fail++;
+	else if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL)
+		fail++;
+	else if (key->type != pktype)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(pkalg);
+	xfree(pkblob);
+
+	/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+	debug2("valid_request: check expect chost %s got %s", host, p);
+	if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
+		fail++;
+	else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
+		fail++;
+	else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* local user */
+	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+
+	if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, p) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	xfree(p);
+
+	/* end of message */
+	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	buffer_free(&b);
+
+	debug3("valid_request: fail %d", fail);
+
+	if (fail && key != NULL)
+		key_free(key);
+	else
+		*ret = key;
+
+	return (fail ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	Options options;
+	Key *keys[2], *key = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	int key_fd[2], i, found, version = 2, fd;
+	u_char *signature, *data;
+	char *host;
+	u_int slen, dlen;
+	u_int32_t rnd[256];
+
+	/* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2)
+		exit(1);
+	/* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */
+	if (fd > 2)
+		close(fd);
+
+	key_fd[0] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+	key_fd[1] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+
+	original_real_uid = getuid();	/* XXX readconf.c needs this */
+	if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
+		fatal("getpwuid failed");
+	pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+
+	init_rng();
+	seed_rng();
+	arc4random_stir();
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN
+	log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+#endif
+
+	/* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */
+	initialize_options(&options);
+	(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, "", &options, 0);
+	fill_default_options(&options);
+	if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1)
+		fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s",
+		    _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE);
+
+	if (key_fd[0] == -1 && key_fd[1] == -1)
+		fatal("could not open any host key");
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+		rnd[i] = arc4random();
+	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+	found = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+		keys[i] = NULL;
+		if (key_fd[i] == -1)
+			continue;
+		keys[i] = key_load_private_pem(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC,
+		    NULL, NULL);
+		close(key_fd[i]);
+		if (keys[i] != NULL)
+			found = 1;
+	}
+	if (!found)
+		fatal("no hostkey found");
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, &b) < 0)
+		fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
+	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version)
+		fatal("bad version");
+	fd = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	if ((fd == STDIN_FILENO) || (fd == STDOUT_FILENO))
+		fatal("bad fd");
+	if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL)
+		fatal("cannot get sockname for fd");
+
+	data = buffer_get_string(&b, &dlen);
+	if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
+		fatal("not a valid request");
+	xfree(host);
+
+	found = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+		if (keys[i] != NULL &&
+		    key_equal(key, keys[i])) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found)
+		fatal("no matching hostkey found");
+
+	if (key_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen) != 0)
+		fatal("key_sign failed");
+	xfree(data);
+
+	/* send reply */
+	buffer_clear(&b);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen);
+	if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, &b) == -1)
+		fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
+
+	return (0);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.8 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af5a72f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.8
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+.\" $Id: ssh-rand-helper.8,v 1.3 2007/01/22 01:44:53 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd April 14, 2002
+.Dt SSH-RAND-HELPER 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-rand-helper
+.Nd random number gatherer for OpenSSH
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-rand-hlper
+.Op Fl vxXh
+.Op Fl b Ar bytes
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a small helper program used by
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1
+and
+.Xr sshd 8
+to gather random numbers of cryptographic quality if the
+.Xr openssl 4
+library has not been configured to provide them itself.
+.Pp
+Normally
+.Nm
+will generate a strong random seed and provide it to the calling
+program via standard output. If standard output is a tty,
+.Nm
+will instead print the seed in hexidecimal format unless told otherwise.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+will by default gather random numbers from the system commands listed
+in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_prng_cmds .
+The output of each of the commands listed will be hashed and used to
+generate a random seed for the calling program.
+.Nm
+will also store seed files in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/prng_seed
+between executions.
+.Pp
+Alternately,
+.Nm
+may be configured at build time to collect random numbers from a
+EGD/PRNGd server via a unix domain or localhost tcp socket.
+.Pp
+This program is not intended to be run by the end-user, so the few
+commandline options are for debugging purposes only.
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl b Ar bytes
+Specify the number of random bytes to include in the output.
+.It Fl x
+Output a hexidecimal instead of a binary seed.
+.It Fl X
+Force output of a binary seed, even if standard output is a tty
+.It Fl v
+Turn on debugging message. Multiple
+.Fl v
+options will increase the debugging level.
+.It Fl h
+Display a summary of options.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b1c4b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,925 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2002 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+/* SunOS 4.4.4 needs this */
+#ifdef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
+# include <floatingpoint.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H */
+
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* Number of bytes we write out */
+#define OUTPUT_SEED_SIZE	48
+
+/* Length of on-disk seedfiles */
+#define SEED_FILE_SIZE		1024
+
+/* Maximum number of command-line arguments to read from file */
+#define NUM_ARGS		10
+
+/* Minimum number of usable commands to be considered sufficient */
+#define MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES	16
+
+/* Path to on-disk seed file (relative to user's home directory */
+#ifndef SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE
+# define SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE      _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR"/prng_seed"
+#endif
+
+/* Path to PRNG commands list */
+#ifndef SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE
+# define SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE   SSHDIR "/ssh_prng_cmds"
+#endif
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\n"
+
+#ifndef RUSAGE_SELF
+# define RUSAGE_SELF 0
+#endif
+#ifndef RUSAGE_CHILDREN
+# define RUSAGE_CHILDREN 0
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(PRNGD_SOCKET) && !defined(PRNGD_PORT)
+# define USE_SEED_FILES
+#endif
+
+typedef struct {
+	/* Proportion of data that is entropy */
+	double rate;
+	/* Counter goes positive if this command times out */
+	unsigned int badness;
+	/* Increases by factor of two each timeout */
+	unsigned int sticky_badness;
+	/* Path to executable */
+	char *path;
+	/* argv to pass to executable */
+	char *args[NUM_ARGS]; /* XXX: arbitrary limit */
+	/* full command string (debug) */
+	char *cmdstring;
+} entropy_cmd_t;
+
+/* slow command timeouts (all in milliseconds) */
+/* static int entropy_timeout_default = ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC; */
+static int entropy_timeout_current = ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC;
+
+/* this is initialised from a file, by prng_read_commands() */
+static entropy_cmd_t *entropy_cmds = NULL;
+
+/* Prototypes */
+double stir_from_system(void);
+double stir_from_programs(void);
+double stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate);
+double stir_clock(double entropy_estimate);
+double stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate);
+double hash_command_output(entropy_cmd_t *src, unsigned char *hash);
+int get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
+    unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path);
+
+/*
+ * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon
+ * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at *
+ * 'socket_path'.
+ * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be
+ * supplied.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error
+ */
+int
+get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
+    unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
+{
+	int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
+	u_char msg[2];
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
+	struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
+	mysig_t old_sigpipe;
+
+	/* Sanity checks */
+	if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0)
+		fatal("You must specify a port or a socket");
+	if (socket_path != NULL &&
+	    strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
+		fatal("Random pool path is too long");
+	if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
+		fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
+
+	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+
+	if (tcp_port != 0) {
+		addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET;
+		addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+		addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port);
+		addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in);
+	} else {
+		addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+		strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path,
+		    sizeof(addr_un->sun_path));
+		addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+		    strlen(socket_path) + 1;
+	}
+
+	old_sigpipe = mysignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	errors = 0;
+	rval = -1;
+reopen:
+	fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+		if (tcp_port != 0) {
+			error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
+			    tcp_port, strerror(errno));
+		} else {
+			error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
+			    addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
+	msg[0] = 0x02;
+	msg[1] = len;
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+			close(fd);
+			errors++;
+			goto reopen;
+		}
+		error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+			close(fd);
+			errors++;
+			goto reopen;
+		}
+		error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	rval = 0;
+done:
+	mysignal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		close(fd);
+	return rval;
+}
+
+static int
+seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+	debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT);
+	if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0)
+		return 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET
+	debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET);
+	if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0)
+		return 0;
+#endif
+	return -1;
+}
+
+double
+stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate)
+{
+	struct timeval tv;
+
+	if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't gettimeofday: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	RAND_add(&tv, sizeof(tv), entropy_estimate);
+
+	return entropy_estimate;
+}
+
+double
+stir_clock(double entropy_estimate)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CLOCK
+	clock_t c;
+
+	c = clock();
+	RAND_add(&c, sizeof(c), entropy_estimate);
+
+	return entropy_estimate;
+#else /* _HAVE_CLOCK */
+	return 0;
+#endif /* _HAVE_CLOCK */
+}
+
+double
+stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
+	struct rusage ru;
+
+	if (getrusage(who, &ru) == -1)
+		return 0;
+
+	RAND_add(&ru, sizeof(ru), entropy_estimate);
+
+	return entropy_estimate;
+#else /* _HAVE_GETRUSAGE */
+	return 0;
+#endif /* _HAVE_GETRUSAGE */
+}
+
+static int
+timeval_diff(struct timeval *t1, struct timeval *t2)
+{
+	int secdiff, usecdiff;
+
+	secdiff = t2->tv_sec - t1->tv_sec;
+	usecdiff = (secdiff*1000000) + (t2->tv_usec - t1->tv_usec);
+	return (int)(usecdiff / 1000);
+}
+
+double
+hash_command_output(entropy_cmd_t *src, unsigned char *hash)
+{
+	char buf[8192];
+	fd_set rdset;
+	int bytes_read, cmd_eof, error_abort, msec_elapsed, p[2];
+	int status, total_bytes_read;
+	static int devnull = -1;
+	pid_t pid;
+	SHA_CTX sha;
+	struct timeval tv_start, tv_current;
+
+	debug3("Reading output from \'%s\'", src->cmdstring);
+
+	if (devnull == -1) {
+		devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
+		if (devnull == -1)
+			fatal("Couldn't open /dev/null: %s",
+			    strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	if (pipe(p) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't open pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	(void)gettimeofday(&tv_start, NULL); /* record start time */
+
+	switch (pid = fork()) {
+		case -1: /* Error */
+			close(p[0]);
+			close(p[1]);
+			fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		case 0: /* Child */
+			dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO);
+			dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
+			dup2(p[1], STDERR_FILENO);
+			close(p[0]);
+			close(p[1]);
+			close(devnull);
+
+			execv(src->path, (char**)(src->args));
+
+			debug("(child) Couldn't exec '%s': %s",
+			    src->cmdstring, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(-1);
+		default: /* Parent */
+			break;
+	}
+
+	RAND_add(&pid, sizeof(&pid), 0.0);
+
+	close(p[1]);
+
+	/* Hash output from child */
+	SHA1_Init(&sha);
+
+	cmd_eof = error_abort = msec_elapsed = total_bytes_read = 0;
+	while (!error_abort && !cmd_eof) {
+		int ret;
+		struct timeval tv;
+		int msec_remaining;
+
+		(void) gettimeofday(&tv_current, 0);
+		msec_elapsed = timeval_diff(&tv_start, &tv_current);
+		if (msec_elapsed >= entropy_timeout_current) {
+			error_abort=1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		msec_remaining = entropy_timeout_current - msec_elapsed;
+
+		FD_ZERO(&rdset);
+		FD_SET(p[0], &rdset);
+		tv.tv_sec = msec_remaining / 1000;
+		tv.tv_usec = (msec_remaining % 1000) * 1000;
+
+		ret = select(p[0] + 1, &rdset, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+
+		RAND_add(&tv, sizeof(tv), 0.0);
+
+		switch (ret) {
+		case 0:
+			/* timer expired */
+			error_abort = 1;
+			kill(pid, SIGINT);
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			/* command input */
+			do {
+				bytes_read = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+			} while (bytes_read == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+			RAND_add(&bytes_read, sizeof(&bytes_read), 0.0);
+			if (bytes_read == -1) {
+				error_abort = 1;
+				break;
+			} else if (bytes_read) {
+				SHA1_Update(&sha, buf, bytes_read);
+				total_bytes_read += bytes_read;
+			} else {
+				cmd_eof = 1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case -1:
+		default:
+			/* error */
+			debug("Command '%s': select() failed: %s",
+			    src->cmdstring, strerror(errno));
+			error_abort = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	SHA1_Final(hash, &sha);
+
+	close(p[0]);
+
+	debug3("Time elapsed: %d msec", msec_elapsed);
+
+	if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		error("Couldn't wait for child '%s' completion: %s",
+		    src->cmdstring, strerror(errno));
+		return 0.0;
+	}
+
+	RAND_add(&status, sizeof(&status), 0.0);
+
+	if (error_abort) {
+		/*
+		 * Closing p[0] on timeout causes the entropy command to
+		 * SIGPIPE. Take whatever output we got, and mark this
+		 * command as slow
+		 */
+		debug2("Command '%s' timed out", src->cmdstring);
+		src->sticky_badness *= 2;
+		src->badness = src->sticky_badness;
+		return total_bytes_read;
+	}
+
+	if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+		if (WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) {
+			return total_bytes_read;
+		} else {
+			debug2("Command '%s' exit status was %d",
+			    src->cmdstring, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+			src->badness = src->sticky_badness = 128;
+			return 0.0;
+		}
+	} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+		debug2("Command '%s' returned on uncaught signal %d !",
+		    src->cmdstring, status);
+		src->badness = src->sticky_badness = 128;
+		return 0.0;
+	} else
+		return 0.0;
+}
+
+double
+stir_from_system(void)
+{
+	double total_entropy_estimate;
+	long int i;
+
+	total_entropy_estimate = 0;
+
+	i = getpid();
+	RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.5);
+	total_entropy_estimate += 0.1;
+
+	i = getppid();
+	RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.5);
+	total_entropy_estimate += 0.1;
+
+	i = getuid();
+	RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.0);
+	i = getgid();
+	RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.0);
+
+	total_entropy_estimate += stir_gettimeofday(1.0);
+	total_entropy_estimate += stir_clock(0.5);
+	total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_SELF, 2.0);
+
+	return total_entropy_estimate;
+}
+
+double
+stir_from_programs(void)
+{
+	int c;
+	double entropy, total_entropy;
+	unsigned char hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+	total_entropy = 0;
+	for(c = 0; entropy_cmds[c].path != NULL; c++) {
+		if (!entropy_cmds[c].badness) {
+			/* Hash output from command */
+			entropy = hash_command_output(&entropy_cmds[c],
+			    hash);
+
+			/* Scale back estimate by command's rate */
+			entropy *= entropy_cmds[c].rate;
+
+			/* Upper bound of entropy is SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+			if (entropy > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+				entropy = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+			/* Stir it in */
+			RAND_add(hash, sizeof(hash), entropy);
+
+			debug3("Got %0.2f bytes of entropy from '%s'",
+			    entropy, entropy_cmds[c].cmdstring);
+
+			total_entropy += entropy;
+
+			/* Execution time should be a bit unpredictable */
+			total_entropy += stir_gettimeofday(0.05);
+			total_entropy += stir_clock(0.05);
+			total_entropy += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_SELF, 0.1);
+			total_entropy += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, 0.1);
+		} else {
+			debug2("Command '%s' disabled (badness %d)",
+			    entropy_cmds[c].cmdstring,
+			    entropy_cmds[c].badness);
+
+			if (entropy_cmds[c].badness > 0)
+				entropy_cmds[c].badness--;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return total_entropy;
+}
+
+/*
+ * prng seedfile functions
+ */
+int
+prng_check_seedfile(char *filename)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX raceable: eg replace seed between this stat and subsequent
+	 * open. Not such a problem because we don't really trust the
+	 * seed file anyway.
+	 * XXX: use secure path checking as elsewhere in OpenSSH
+	 */
+	if (lstat(filename, &st) == -1) {
+		/* Give up on hard errors */
+		if (errno != ENOENT)
+			debug("WARNING: Couldn't stat random seed file "
+			    "\"%.100s\": %s", filename, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* regular file? */
+	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+		fatal("PRNG seedfile %.100s is not a regular file",
+		    filename);
+
+	/* mode 0600, owned by root or the current user? */
+	if (((st.st_mode & 0177) != 0) || !(st.st_uid == getuid())) {
+		debug("WARNING: PRNG seedfile %.100s must be mode 0600, "
+		    "owned by uid %li", filename, (long int)getuid());
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void
+prng_write_seedfile(void)
+{
+	int fd, save_errno;
+	unsigned char seed[SEED_FILE_SIZE];
+	char filename[MAXPATHLEN], tmpseed[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	mode_t old_umask;
+
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		fatal("Couldn't get password entry for current user "
+		    "(%li): %s", (long int)getuid(), strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Try to ensure that the parent directory is there */
+	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+	    _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+	if (mkdir(filename, 0700) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
+		fatal("mkdir %.200s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
+
+	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+	    SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE);
+
+	strlcpy(tmpseed, filename, sizeof(tmpseed));
+	if (strlcat(tmpseed, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmpseed)) >=
+	    sizeof(tmpseed))
+		fatal("PRNG seed filename too long");
+
+	if (RAND_bytes(seed, sizeof(seed)) <= 0)
+		fatal("PRNG seed extraction failed");
+
+	/* Don't care if the seed doesn't exist */
+	prng_check_seedfile(filename);
+
+	old_umask = umask(0177);
+
+	if ((fd = mkstemp(tmpseed)) == -1) {
+		debug("WARNING: couldn't make temporary PRNG seedfile %.100s "
+		    "(%.100s)", tmpseed, strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		debug("writing PRNG seed to file %.100s", tmpseed);
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &seed, sizeof(seed)) < sizeof(seed)) {
+			save_errno = errno;
+			close(fd);
+			unlink(tmpseed);
+			fatal("problem writing PRNG seedfile %.100s "
+			    "(%.100s)", filename, strerror(save_errno));
+		}
+		close(fd);
+		debug("moving temporary PRNG seed to file %.100s", filename);
+		if (rename(tmpseed, filename) == -1) {
+			save_errno = errno;
+			unlink(tmpseed);
+			fatal("problem renaming PRNG seedfile from %.100s "
+			    "to %.100s (%.100s)", tmpseed, filename,
+			    strerror(save_errno));
+		}
+	}
+	umask(old_umask);
+}
+
+void
+prng_read_seedfile(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	char seed[SEED_FILE_SIZE], filename[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		fatal("Couldn't get password entry for current user "
+		    "(%li): %s", (long int)getuid(), strerror(errno));
+
+	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+		SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE);
+
+	debug("loading PRNG seed from file %.100s", filename);
+
+	if (!prng_check_seedfile(filename)) {
+		verbose("Random seed file not found or invalid, ignoring.");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* open the file and read in the seed */
+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		fatal("could not open PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)",
+		    filename, strerror(errno));
+
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, &seed, sizeof(seed)) < sizeof(seed)) {
+		verbose("invalid or short read from PRNG seedfile "
+		    "%.100s - ignoring", filename);
+		memset(seed, '\0', sizeof(seed));
+	}
+	close(fd);
+
+	/* stir in the seed, with estimated entropy zero */
+	RAND_add(&seed, sizeof(seed), 0.0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * entropy command initialisation functions
+ */
+int
+prng_read_commands(char *cmdfilename)
+{
+	char cmd[SEED_FILE_SIZE], *cp, line[1024], path[SEED_FILE_SIZE];
+	double est;
+	entropy_cmd_t *entcmd;
+	FILE *f;
+	int cur_cmd, linenum, num_cmds, arg;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(cmdfilename, "r")) == NULL) {
+		fatal("couldn't read entropy commands file %.100s: %.100s",
+		    cmdfilename, strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	num_cmds = 64;
+	entcmd = xcalloc(num_cmds, sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
+
+	/* Read in file */
+	cur_cmd = linenum = 0;
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+		linenum++;
+
+		/* Skip leading whitespace, blank lines and comments */
+		cp = line + strspn(line, WHITESPACE);
+		if ((*cp == 0) || (*cp == '#'))
+			continue; /* done with this line */
+
+		/*
+		 * The first non-whitespace char should be a double quote
+		 * delimiting the commandline
+		 */
+		if (*cp != '"') {
+			error("bad entropy command, %.100s line %d",
+			    cmdfilename, linenum);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * First token, command args (incl. argv[0]) in double
+		 * quotes
+		 */
+		cp = strtok(cp, "\"");
+		if (cp == NULL) {
+			error("missing or bad command string, %.100s "
+			    "line %d -- ignored", cmdfilename, linenum);
+			continue;
+		}
+		strlcpy(cmd, cp, sizeof(cmd));
+
+		/* Second token, full command path */
+		if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) == NULL) {
+			error("missing command path, %.100s "
+			    "line %d -- ignored", cmdfilename, linenum);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Did configure mark this as dead? */
+		if (strncmp("undef", cp, 5) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		strlcpy(path, cp, sizeof(path));
+
+		/* Third token, entropy rate estimate for this command */
+		if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) == NULL) {
+			error("missing entropy estimate, %.100s "
+			    "line %d -- ignored", cmdfilename, linenum);
+			continue;
+		}
+		est = strtod(cp, NULL);
+
+		/* end of line */
+		if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) != NULL) {
+			error("garbage at end of line %d in %.100s "
+			    "-- ignored", linenum, cmdfilename);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* save the command for debug messages */
+		entcmd[cur_cmd].cmdstring = xstrdup(cmd);
+
+		/* split the command args */
+		cp = strtok(cmd, WHITESPACE);
+		arg = 0;
+		do {
+			entcmd[cur_cmd].args[arg] = xstrdup(cp);
+			arg++;
+		} while(arg < NUM_ARGS && (cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)));
+
+		if (strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE))
+			error("ignored extra commands (max %d), %.100s "
+			    "line %d", NUM_ARGS, cmdfilename, linenum);
+
+		/* Copy the command path and rate estimate */
+		entcmd[cur_cmd].path = xstrdup(path);
+		entcmd[cur_cmd].rate = est;
+
+		/* Initialise other values */
+		entcmd[cur_cmd].sticky_badness = 1;
+
+		cur_cmd++;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we've filled the array, reallocate it twice the size
+		 * Do this now because even if this we're on the last
+		 * command we need another slot to mark the last entry
+		 */
+		if (cur_cmd == num_cmds) {
+			num_cmds *= 2;
+			entcmd = xrealloc(entcmd, num_cmds,
+			    sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* zero the last entry */
+	memset(&entcmd[cur_cmd], '\0', sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
+
+	/* trim to size */
+	entropy_cmds = xrealloc(entcmd, (cur_cmd + 1),
+	    sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
+
+	debug("Loaded %d entropy commands from %.100s", cur_cmd,
+	    cmdfilename);
+
+	fclose(f);
+	return cur_cmd < MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -v          Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "              Multiple -v increases verbosity.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -x          Force output in hexadecimal (for debugging)\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -X          Force output in binary\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -b bytes    Number of bytes to output (default %d)\n",
+	    OUTPUT_SEED_SIZE);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	int ret, ch, debug_level, output_hex, bytes;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	LogLevel ll;
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	debug_level = output_hex = 0;
+	bytes = OUTPUT_SEED_SIZE;
+
+	/* Don't write binary data to a tty, unless we are forced to */
+	if (isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
+		output_hex = 1;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vxXhb:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'v':
+			if (debug_level < 3)
+				ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level++;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			output_hex = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'X':
+			output_hex = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			if ((bytes = atoi(optarg)) <= 0)
+				fatal("Invalid number of output bytes");
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			usage();
+			exit(0);
+		default:
+			error("Invalid commandline option");
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+#ifdef USE_SEED_FILES
+	prng_read_seedfile();
+#endif
+
+	buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+
+	/*
+	 * Seed the RNG from wherever we can
+	 */
+
+	/* Take whatever is on the stack, but don't credit it */
+	RAND_add(buf, bytes, 0);
+
+	debug("Seeded RNG with %i bytes from system calls",
+	    (int)stir_from_system());
+
+	/* try prngd, fall back to commands if prngd fails or not configured */
+	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, bytes) == 0) {
+		RAND_add(buf, bytes, bytes);
+	} else {
+		/* Read in collection commands */
+		if (prng_read_commands(SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE) == -1)
+			fatal("PRNG initialisation failed -- exiting.");
+		debug("Seeded RNG with %i bytes from programs",
+		    (int)stir_from_programs());
+	}
+
+#ifdef USE_SEED_FILES
+	prng_write_seedfile();
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Write the seed to stdout
+	 */
+
+	if (!RAND_status())
+		fatal("Not enough entropy in RNG");
+
+	if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
+		fatal("Couldn't extract entropy from PRNG");
+
+	if (output_hex) {
+		for(ret = 0; ret < bytes; ret++)
+			printf("%02x", (unsigned char)(buf[ret]));
+		printf("\n");
+	} else
+		ret = atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, bytes);
+
+	memset(buf, '\0', bytes);
+	xfree(buf);
+
+	return ret == bytes ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We may attempt to re-seed during mkstemp if we are using the one in the
+ * compat library (via mkstemp -> _gettemp -> arc4random -> seed_rng) so we
+ * need our own seed_rng().  We must also check that we have enough entropy.
+ */
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+	if (!RAND_status())
+		fatal("Not enough entropy in RNG");
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e16ff8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.39 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *);
+
+/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */
+int
+ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sig;
+	u_int slen, dlen, len;
+	int ok, nid;
+	Buffer b;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA || key->rsa == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1;
+	if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_sign: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+
+	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+	sig = xmalloc(slen);
+
+	ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa);
+	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+
+	if (ok != 1) {
+		int ecode = ERR_get_error();
+
+		error("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s",
+		    ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
+		xfree(sig);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (len < slen) {
+		u_int diff = slen - len;
+		debug("slen %u > len %u", slen, len);
+		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
+		memset(sig, 0, diff);
+	} else if (len > slen) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %u slen2 %u", slen, len);
+		xfree(sig);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* encode signature */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa");
+	buffer_put_string(&b, sig, slen);
+	len = buffer_len(&b);
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	if (sigp != NULL) {
+		*sigp = xmalloc(len);
+		memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	memset(sig, 's', slen);
+	xfree(sig);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+	char *ktype;
+	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
+	u_int len, dlen, modlen;
+	int rlen, ret, nid;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA || key->rsa == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
+	ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		xfree(ktype);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	xfree(ktype);
+	sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (rlen != 0) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
+		xfree(sigblob);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
+	modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+	if (len > modlen) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: len %u > modlen %u", len, modlen);
+		xfree(sigblob);
+		return -1;
+	} else if (len < modlen) {
+		u_int diff = modlen - len;
+		debug("ssh_rsa_verify: add padding: modlen %u > len %u",
+		    modlen, len);
+		sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, 1, modlen);
+		memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
+		memset(sigblob, 0, diff);
+		len = modlen;
+	}
+	nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1;
+	if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
+		xfree(sigblob);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+
+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa);
+	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+	memset(sigblob, 's', len);
+	xfree(sigblob);
+	debug("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : "");
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * See:
+ * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
+ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
+ */
+/*
+ * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
+ */
+static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
+	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
+	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
+	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
+	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
+	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
+};
+/*
+ * id-md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
+ *	rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 }
+ */
+static const u_char id_md5[] = {
+	0x30, 0x20, /* type Sequence, length 0x20 (32) */
+	0x30, 0x0c, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
+	0x06, 0x08, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
+	0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* id-md5 */
+	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+	0x04, 0x10  /* Octet string, length 0x10 (16), followed by md5 hash */
+};
+
+static int
+openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+    u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+	u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
+	int len;
+	const u_char *oid = NULL;
+	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
+
+	ret = 0;
+	switch (type) {
+	case NID_sha1:
+		oid = id_sha1;
+		oidlen = sizeof(id_sha1);
+		hlen = 20;
+		break;
+	case NID_md5:
+		oid = id_md5;
+		oidlen = sizeof(id_md5);
+		hlen = 16;
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (hashlen != hlen) {
+		error("bad hashlen");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if (siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
+		error("bad siglen");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	decrypted = xmalloc(rsasize);
+	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
+	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
+		error("RSA_public_decrypt failed: %s",
+		    ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != hlen + oidlen) {
+		error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (memcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
+		error("oid mismatch");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (memcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
+		error("hash mismatch");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	ret = 1;
+done:
+	if (decrypted)
+		xfree(decrypted);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e88cfe3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
@@ -0,0 +1,1481 @@
+.\"  -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.283 2009/03/19 15:15:09 jmc Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.Dd March 19 2009
+.Dt SSH 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh
+.Op Fl 1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
+.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+.Oo Fl D\ \&
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port
+.Sm on
+.Oc
+.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
+.Op Fl F Ar configfile
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Ek
+.Oo Fl L\ \&
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Oc
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl l Ar login_name
+.Ek
+.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
+.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
+.Op Fl o Ar option
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Oo Fl R\ \&
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Oc
+.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
+.Bk -words
+.Oo Fl w Ar local_tun Ns
+.Op : Ns Ar remote_tun Oc
+.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname
+.Op Ar command
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands on a remote machine.
+It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh,
+and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
+X11 connections and arbitrary TCP ports
+can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+connects and logs into the specified
+.Ar hostname
+(with optional
+.Ar user
+name).
+The user must prove
+his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
+depending on the protocol version used (see below).
+.Pp
+If
+.Ar command
+is specified,
+it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Forces
+.Nm
+to try protocol version 1 only.
+.It Fl 2
+Forces
+.Nm
+to try protocol version 2 only.
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl A
+Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
+.Pp
+Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
+can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
+however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
+authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
+.It Fl a
+Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+.It Fl b Ar bind_address
+Use
+.Ar bind_address
+on the local machine as the source address
+of the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
+.It Fl C
+Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
+data for forwarded X11 and TCP connections).
+The compression algorithm is the same used by
+.Xr gzip 1 ,
+and the
+.Dq level
+can be controlled by the
+.Cm CompressionLevel
+option for protocol version 1.
+Compression is desirable on modem lines and other
+slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
+The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
+configuration files; see the
+.Cm Compression
+option.
+.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+.Pp
+Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher.
+The supported values are
+.Dq 3des ,
+.Dq blowfish ,
+and
+.Dq des .
+.Ar 3des
+(triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three different keys.
+It is believed to be secure.
+.Ar blowfish
+is a fast block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster than
+.Ar 3des .
+.Ar des
+is only supported in the
+.Nm
+client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
+that do not support the
+.Ar 3des
+cipher.
+Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses.
+The default is
+.Dq 3des .
+.Pp
+For protocol version 2,
+.Ar cipher_spec
+is a comma-separated list of ciphers
+listed in order of preference.
+See the
+.Cm Ciphers
+keyword for more information.
+.It Fl D Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies a local
+.Dq dynamic
+application-level port forwarding.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to
+.Ar port
+on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
+.Ar bind_address .
+Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
+protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+remote machine.
+Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+.Nm
+will act as a SOCKS server.
+Only root can forward privileged ports.
+Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+.Pp
+IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Sm off
+.Xo
+.Op Ar bind_address No /
+.Ar port
+.Xc
+.Sm on
+or by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.It Fl e Ar escape_char
+Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default:
+.Ql ~ ) .
+The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line.
+The escape character followed by a dot
+.Pq Ql \&.
+closes the connection;
+followed by control-Z suspends the connection;
+and followed by itself sends the escape character once.
+Setting the character to
+.Dq none
+disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent.
+.It Fl F Ar configfile
+Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
+If a configuration file is given on the command line,
+the system-wide configuration file
+.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+will be ignored.
+The default for the per-user configuration file is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
+.It Fl f
+Requests
+.Nm
+to go to background just before command execution.
+This is useful if
+.Nm
+is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
+wants it in the background.
+This implies
+.Fl n .
+The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
+something like
+.Ic ssh -f host xterm .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+configuration option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+then a client started with
+.Fl f
+will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
+before placing itself in the background.
+.It Fl g
+Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
+.It Fl I Ar smartcard_device
+Specify the device
+.Nm
+should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's
+private RSA key.
+This option is only available if support for smartcard devices
+is compiled in (default is no support).
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
+RSA or DSA authentication is read.
+The default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+for protocol version 1, and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+for protocol version 2.
+Identity files may also be specified on
+a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+It is possible to have multiple
+.Fl i
+options (and multiple identities specified in
+configuration files).
+.It Fl K
+Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI
+credentials to the server.
+.It Fl k
+Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be
+forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to
+.Ar port
+on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
+.Ar bind_address .
+Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
+made to
+.Ar host
+port
+.Ar hostport
+from the remote machine.
+Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Sm off
+.Xo
+.Op Ar bind_address No /
+.Ar port No / Ar host No /
+.Ar hostport
+.Xc
+.Sm on
+or by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.It Fl l Ar login_name
+Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
+This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.It Fl M
+Places the
+.Nm
+client into
+.Dq master
+mode for connection sharing.
+Multiple
+.Fl M
+options places
+.Nm
+into
+.Dq master
+mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm ControlMaster
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.It Fl m Ar mac_spec
+Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC
+(message authentication code) algorithms can
+be specified in order of preference.
+See the
+.Cm MACs
+keyword for more information.
+.It Fl N
+Do not execute a remote command.
+This is useful for just forwarding ports
+(protocol version 2 only).
+.It Fl n
+Redirects stdin from
+.Pa /dev/null
+(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
+This must be used when
+.Nm
+is run in the background.
+A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine.
+For example,
+.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
+will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11
+connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.
+The
+.Nm
+program will be put in the background.
+(This does not work if
+.Nm
+needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
+.Fl f
+option.)
+.It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
+Control an active connection multiplexing master process.
+When the
+.Fl O
+option is specified, the
+.Ar ctl_cmd
+argument is interpreted and passed to the master process.
+Valid commands are:
+.Dq check
+(check that the master process is running) and
+.Dq exit
+(request the master to exit).
+.It Fl o Ar option
+Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
+This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Cipher
+.It Ciphers
+.It ClearAllForwardings
+.It Compression
+.It CompressionLevel
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It DynamicForward
+.It EscapeChar
+.It ExitOnForwardFailure
+.It ForwardAgent
+.It ForwardX11
+.It ForwardX11Trusted
+.It GatewayPorts
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It HostName
+.It IdentityFile
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It LocalCommand
+.It LocalForward
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It PermitLocalCommand
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It Protocol
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RemoteForward
+.It RhostsRSAAuthentication
+.It RSAAuthentication
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It SmartcardDevice
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It Tunnel
+.It TunnelDevice
+.It UsePrivilegedPort
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.It VersionAddendum
+.It VisualHostKey
+.It XAuthLocation
+.El
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Port to connect to on the remote host.
+This can be specified on a
+per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be
+forwarded to the given host and port on the local side.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to
+.Ar port
+on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
+made to
+.Ar host
+port
+.Ar hostport
+from the local machine.
+.Pp
+Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
+logging in as root on the remote machine.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square braces or
+using an alternative syntax:
+.Sm off
+.Xo
+.Op Ar bind_address No /
+.Ar host No / Ar port No /
+.Ar hostport
+.Xc .
+.Sm on
+.Pp
+By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback
+interface only.
+This may be overridden by specifying a
+.Ar bind_address .
+An empty
+.Ar bind_address ,
+or the address
+.Ql * ,
+indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
+Specifying a remote
+.Ar bind_address
+will only succeed if the server's
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+option is enabled (see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar port
+argument is
+.Ql 0 ,
+the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+to the client at run time.
+.It Fl S Ar ctl_path
+Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm ControlPath
+and
+.Cm ControlMaster
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.It Fl s
+May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system.
+Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use
+of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg.\&
+.Xr sftp 1 ) .
+The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
+.It Fl T
+Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
+.It Fl t
+Force pseudo-tty allocation.
+This can be used to execute arbitrary
+screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
+e.g. when implementing menu services.
+Multiple
+.Fl t
+options force tty allocation, even if
+.Nm
+has no local tty.
+.It Fl V
+Display the version number and exit.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in
+debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.It Fl w Xo
+.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
+.Xc
+Requests
+tunnel
+device forwarding with the specified
+.Xr tun 4
+devices between the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
+The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+.Dq any ,
+which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
+See also the
+.Cm Tunnel
+and
+.Cm TunnelDevice
+directives in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+If the
+.Cm Tunnel
+directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
+.It Fl X
+Enables X11 forwarding.
+This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
+.Pp
+X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the user's X authorization database)
+can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+.Pp
+For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
+restrictions by default.
+Please refer to the
+.Nm
+.Fl Y
+option and the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+directive in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.It Fl x
+Disables X11 forwarding.
+.It Fl Y
+Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
+Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
+controls.
+.It Fl y
+Send log information using the
+.Xr syslog 3
+system module.
+By default this information is sent to stderr.
+.El
+.Pp
+.Nm
+may additionally obtain configuration data from
+a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Nm
+exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
+if an error occurred.
+.Sh AUTHENTICATION
+The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.
+Protocol 2 is the default, with
+.Nm
+falling back to protocol 1 if it detects protocol 2 is unsupported.
+These settings may be altered using the
+.Cm Protocol
+option in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+or enforced using the
+.Fl 1
+and
+.Fl 2
+options (see above).
+Both protocols support similar authentication methods,
+but protocol 2 is preferred since
+it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality
+(the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour)
+and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160).
+Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the
+integrity of the connection.
+.Pp
+The methods available for authentication are:
+GSSAPI-based authentication,
+host-based authentication,
+public key authentication,
+challenge-response authentication,
+and password authentication.
+Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above,
+though protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order:
+.Cm PreferredAuthentications .
+.Pp
+Host-based authentication works as follows:
+If the machine the user logs in from is listed in
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+or
+.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+on the remote machine, and the user names are
+the same on both sides, or if the files
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
+or
+.Pa ~/.shosts
+exist in the user's home directory on the
+remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
+machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
+considered for login.
+Additionally, the server
+.Em must
+be able to verify the client's
+host key (see the description of
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
+below)
+for login to be permitted.
+This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
+spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
+[Note to the administrator:
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
+and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
+disabled if security is desired.]
+.Pp
+Public key authentication works as follows:
+The scheme is based on public-key cryptography,
+using cryptosystems
+where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys,
+and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key.
+The idea is that each user creates a public/private
+key pair for authentication purposes.
+The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
+.Nm
+implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
+using either the RSA or DSA algorithms.
+Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys,
+but protocol 2 may use either.
+The
+.Sx HISTORY
+section of
+.Xr ssl 8
+contains a brief discussion of the two algorithms.
+.Pp
+The file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
+When the user logs in, the
+.Nm
+program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for
+authentication.
+The client proves that it has access to the private key
+and the server checks that the corresponding public key
+is authorized to accept the account.
+.Pp
+The user creates his/her key pair by running
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+This stores the private key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+(protocol 1),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+(protocol 2 DSA),
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+(protocol 2 RSA)
+and stores the public key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+(protocol 1),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+(protocol 2 DSA),
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+(protocol 2 RSA)
+in the user's home directory.
+The user should then copy the public key
+to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
+The
+.Pa authorized_keys
+file corresponds to the conventional
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
+file, and has one key
+per line, though the lines can be very long.
+After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
+.Pp
+The most convenient way to use public key authentication may be with an
+authentication agent.
+See
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+for more information.
+.Pp
+Challenge-response authentication works as follows:
+The server sends an arbitrary
+.Qq challenge
+text, and prompts for a response.
+Protocol 2 allows multiple challenges and responses;
+protocol 1 is restricted to just one challenge/response.
+Examples of challenge-response authentication include
+BSD Authentication (see
+.Xr login.conf 5 )
+and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems).
+.Pp
+Finally, if other authentication methods fail,
+.Nm
+prompts the user for a password.
+The password is sent to the remote
+host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted,
+the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+automatically maintains and checks a database containing
+identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.
+Host keys are stored in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+in the user's home directory.
+Additionally, the file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+is automatically checked for known hosts.
+Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.
+If a host's identification ever changes,
+.Nm
+warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent
+server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
+which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.
+The
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+option can be used to control logins to machines whose
+host key is not known or has changed.
+.Pp
+When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
+either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives
+the user a normal shell on the remote machine.
+All communication with
+the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+.Pp
+If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the
+user may use the escape characters noted below.
+.Pp
+If no pseudo-tty has been allocated,
+the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data.
+On most systems, setting the escape character to
+.Dq none
+will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
+.Pp
+The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
+machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
+.Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS
+When a pseudo-terminal has been requested,
+.Nm
+supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character.
+.Pp
+A single tilde character can be sent as
+.Ic ~~
+or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below.
+The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
+special.
+The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the
+.Cm EscapeChar
+configuration directive or on the command line by the
+.Fl e
+option.
+.Pp
+The supported escapes (assuming the default
+.Ql ~ )
+are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm ~.
+Disconnect.
+.It Cm ~^Z
+Background
+.Nm .
+.It Cm ~#
+List forwarded connections.
+.It Cm ~&
+Background
+.Nm
+at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate.
+.It Cm ~?
+Display a list of escape characters.
+.It Cm ~B
+Send a BREAK to the remote system
+(only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+.It Cm ~C
+Open command line.
+Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the
+.Fl L ,
+.Fl R
+and
+.Fl D
+options (see above).
+It also allows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings
+using
+.Sm off
+.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
+.Sm on
+.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
+allows the user to execute a local command if the
+.Ic PermitLocalCommand
+option is enabled in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Basic help is available, using the
+.Fl h
+option.
+.It Cm ~R
+Request rekeying of the connection
+(only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+.El
+.Sh TCP FORWARDING
+Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can
+be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
+One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a
+mail server; another is going through firewalls.
+.Pp
+In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between
+an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly
+support encrypted communications.
+This works as follows:
+the user connects to the remote host using
+.Nm ,
+specifying a port to be used to forward connections
+to the remote server.
+After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted
+on the client machine,
+connecting to the same local port,
+and
+.Nm
+will encrypt and forward the connection.
+.Pp
+The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine
+.Dq 127.0.0.1
+(localhost)
+to remote server
+.Dq server.example.com :
+.Bd -literal -offset 4n
+$ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+$ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+This tunnels a connection to IRC server
+.Dq server.example.com ,
+joining channel
+.Dq #users ,
+nickname
+.Dq pinky ,
+using port 1234.
+It doesn't matter which port is used,
+as long as it's greater than 1023
+(remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports)
+and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use.
+The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server,
+since that's the standard port for IRC services.
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl f
+option backgrounds
+.Nm
+and the remote command
+.Dq sleep 10
+is specified to allow an amount of time
+(10 seconds, in the example)
+to start the service which is to be tunnelled.
+If no connections are made within the time specified,
+.Nm
+will exit.
+.Sh X11 FORWARDING
+If the
+.Cm ForwardX11
+variable is set to
+.Dq yes
+(or see the description of the
+.Fl X ,
+.Fl x ,
+and
+.Fl Y
+options above)
+and the user is using X11 (the
+.Ev DISPLAY
+environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
+automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
+encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
+from the local machine.
+The user should not manually set
+.Ev DISPLAY .
+Forwarding of X11 connections can be
+configured on the command line or in configuration files.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ev DISPLAY
+value set by
+.Nm
+will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero.
+This is normal, and happens because
+.Nm
+creates a
+.Dq proxy
+X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+connections over the encrypted channel.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie,
+store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded
+connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
+the connection is opened.
+The real authentication cookie is never
+sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ForwardAgent
+variable is set to
+.Dq yes
+(or see the description of the
+.Fl A
+and
+.Fl a
+options above) and
+the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
+is automatically forwarded to the remote side.
+.Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+When connecting to a server for the first time,
+a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user
+(unless the option
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+has been disabled).
+Fingerprints can be determined using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 :
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+.Pp
+If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched
+and the key can be accepted or rejected.
+Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
+just by looking at hex strings,
+there is also support to compare host keys visually,
+using
+.Em random art .
+By setting the
+.Cm VisualHostKey
+option to
+.Dq yes ,
+a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter
+if the session itself is interactive or not.
+By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily
+find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern
+is displayed.
+Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
+similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
+host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
+.Pp
+To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for
+all known hosts, the following command line can be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pp
+If the fingerprint is unknown,
+an alternative method of verification is available:
+SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.
+An additional resource record (RR),
+SSHFP,
+is added to a zonefile
+and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint
+with that of the key presented.
+.Pp
+In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
+.Dq host.example.com .
+The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
+host.example.com:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
+To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
+.Pp
+Finally the client connects:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
+[...]
+Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
+Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
+.Ed
+.Pp
+See the
+.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
+option in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
+.Nm
+contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling
+using the
+.Xr tun 4
+network pseudo-device,
+allowing two networks to be joined securely.
+The
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+configuration option
+.Cm PermitTunnel
+controls whether the server supports this,
+and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic).
+.Pp
+The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24
+with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection
+from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2,
+provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network,
+at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
+.Pp
+On the client:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
+# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
+.Ed
+.Pp
+On the server:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
+# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Client access may be more finely tuned via the
+.Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
+file (see below) and the
+.Cm PermitRootLogin
+server option.
+The following entry would permit connections on
+.Xr tun 4
+device 1 from user
+.Dq jane
+and on tun device 2 from user
+.Dq john ,
+if
+.Cm PermitRootLogin
+is set to
+.Dq forced-commands-only :
+.Bd -literal -offset 2n
+tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
+tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
+it may be more suited to temporary setups,
+such as for wireless VPNs.
+More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as
+.Xr ipsecctl 8
+and
+.Xr isakmpd 8 .
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Nm
+will normally set the following environment variables:
+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
+.It Ev DISPLAY
+The
+.Ev DISPLAY
+variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
+It is automatically set by
+.Nm
+to point to a value of the form
+.Dq hostname:n ,
+where
+.Dq hostname
+indicates the host where the shell runs, and
+.Sq n
+is an integer \*(Ge 1.
+.Nm
+uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
+channel.
+The user should normally not set
+.Ev DISPLAY
+explicitly, as that
+will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to
+manually copy any required authorization cookies).
+.It Ev HOME
+Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+.It Ev LOGNAME
+Synonym for
+.Ev USER ;
+set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
+.It Ev MAIL
+Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+.It Ev PATH
+Set to the default
+.Ev PATH ,
+as specified when compiling
+.Nm .
+.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+If
+.Nm
+needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
+terminal if it was run from a terminal.
+If
+.Nm
+does not have a terminal associated with it but
+.Ev DISPLAY
+and
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+are set, it will execute the program specified by
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
+This is particularly useful when calling
+.Nm
+from a
+.Pa .xsession
+or related script.
+(Note that on some machines it
+may be necessary to redirect the input from
+.Pa /dev/null
+to make this work.)
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+Identifies the path of a
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION
+Identifies the client and server ends of the connection.
+The variable contains
+four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number,
+server IP address, and server port number.
+.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
+is executed.
+It can be used to extract the original arguments.
+.It Ev SSH_TTY
+This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
+with the current shell or command.
+If the current session has no tty,
+this variable is not set.
+.It Ev TZ
+This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
+was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
+on to new connections).
+.It Ev USER
+Set to the name of the user logging in.
+.El
+.Pp
+Additionally,
+.Nm
+reads
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
+and adds lines of the format
+.Dq VARNAME=value
+to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
+change their environment.
+For more information, see the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It ~/.rhosts
+This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+because
+.Xr sshd 8
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
+accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.shosts
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa .rhosts ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/
+This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+and authentication information.
+There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
+and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described in the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page.
+This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/config
+This is the per-user configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/environment
+Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT ,
+above.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/identity
+.It ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the private key for authentication.
+These files
+contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
+accessible by others (read/write/execute).
+.Nm
+will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.
+It is possible to specify a passphrase when
+generating the key which will be used to encrypt the
+sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+.It ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.It ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+Contains the public key for authentication.
+These files are not
+sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
+that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
+See
+.Xr sshd 8
+for further details of the format of this file.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/rc
+Commands in this file are executed by
+.Nm
+when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is
+started.
+See the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page for more information.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is for host-based authentication (see above).
+It should only be writable by root.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa hosts.equiv ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Systemwide configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These three files contain the private parts of the host keys
+and are used for host-based authentication.
+If protocol version 1 is used,
+.Nm
+must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by root.
+For protocol version 2,
+.Nm
+uses
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+to access the host keys,
+eliminating the requirement that
+.Nm
+be setuid root when host-based authentication is used.
+By default
+.Nm
+is not setuid root.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+It should be world-readable.
+See
+.Xr sshd 8
+for further details of the format of this file.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/sshrc
+Commands in this file are executed by
+.Nm
+when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
+See the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page for more information.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+.Xr tun 4 ,
+.Xr hosts.equiv 5 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4250
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4251
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4252
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4253
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4254
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4255
+.%T "Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4256
+.%T "Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4335
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4344
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4345
+.%T "Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4419
+.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4716
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%T "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security"
+.%A A. Perrig
+.%A D. Song
+.%D 1999
+.%O "International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)"
+.Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25dd863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1305 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.326 2009/07/02 02:11:47 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Ssh client program.  This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
+ * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
+ * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * in Canada (German citizen).
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "version.h"
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+#include "scard.h"
+#endif
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on.  May be set on the command line. */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be allocated */
+int tty_flag = 0;
+int no_tty_flag = 0;
+int force_tty_flag = 0;
+
+/* don't exec a shell */
+int no_shell_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin.  This can be set
+ * on the command line.
+ */
+int stdin_null_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication.  This is useful
+ * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
+ * background.
+ */
+int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * General data structure for command line options and options configurable
+ * in configuration files.  See readconf.h.
+ */
+Options options;
+
+/* optional user configfile */
+char *config = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to.  This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+char *host;
+
+/* socket address the host resolves to */
+struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
+
+/* Private host keys. */
+Sensitive sensitive_data;
+
+/* Original real UID. */
+uid_t original_real_uid;
+uid_t original_effective_uid;
+
+/* command to be executed */
+Buffer command;
+
+/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
+int subsystem_flag = 0;
+
+/* # of replies received for global requests */
+static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0;
+
+/* pid of proxycommand child process */
+pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
+
+/* mux.c */
+extern int muxserver_sock;
+extern u_int muxclient_command;
+
+/* Prints a help message to the user.  This function never returns. */
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
+"           [-D [bind_address:]port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile]\n"
+"           [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]\n"
+"           [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
+"           [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path]\n"
+"           [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]\n"
+	);
+	exit(255);
+}
+
+static int ssh_session(void);
+static int ssh_session2(void);
+static void load_public_identity_files(void);
+
+/* from muxclient.c */
+void muxclient(const char *);
+void muxserver_listen(void);
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the ssh client.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+	int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog;
+	char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct stat st;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	int dummy, timeout_ms;
+	extern int optind, optreset;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	struct servent *sp;
+	Forward fwd;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+	init_rng();
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the original real uid.  It will be needed later (uid-swapping
+	 * may clobber the real uid).
+	 */
+	original_real_uid = getuid();
+	original_effective_uid = geteuid();
+
+	/*
+	 * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of
+	 * option processing.  We will re-instantiate the rights when we are
+	 * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop
+	 * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection
+	 * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times).
+	 */
+	PRIV_END;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+	/* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */
+	if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) {
+		struct rlimit rlim;
+		rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
+		if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0)
+			fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+#endif
+	/* Get user data. */
+	pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
+	if (!pw) {
+		logit("You don't exist, go away!");
+		exit(255);
+	}
+	/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
+	pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
+	 * with the default umask.  This will make them world-readable but
+	 * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
+	 * don't set the modes explicitly.
+	 */
+	umask(022);
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been
+	 * set.
+	 */
+	initialize_options(&options);
+
+	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
+	host = NULL;
+	use_syslog = 0;
+	argv0 = av[0];
+
+ again:
+	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
+	    "ACD:F:I:KL:MNO:PR:S:TVw:XYy")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case '1':
+			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
+			break;
+		case '2':
+			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+			break;
+		case '4':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		case 'n':
+			stdin_null_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
+			stdin_null_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			options.forward_x11 = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'X':
+			options.forward_x11 = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'y':
+			use_syslog = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'Y':
+			options.forward_x11 = 1;
+			options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'g':
+			options.gateway_ports = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
+			else
+				fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
+			break;
+		case 'P':	/* deprecated */
+			options.use_privileged_port = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			options.forward_agent = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'A':
+			options.forward_agent = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'K':
+			options.gss_authentication = 1;
+			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
+				    "not accessible: %s.\n", optarg,
+				    strerror(errno));
+				break;
+			}
+			if (options.num_identity_files >=
+			    SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+				fatal("Too many identity files specified "
+				    "(max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+			options.identity_files[options.num_identity_files++] =
+			    xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'I':
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+			options.smartcard_device = xstrdup(optarg);
+#else
+			fprintf(stderr, "no support for smartcards.\n");
+#endif
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			if (tty_flag)
+				force_tty_flag = 1;
+			tty_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (debug_flag == 0) {
+				debug_flag = 1;
+				options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			} else {
+				if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+					options.log_level++;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 'V':
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+			    SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+			if (opt == 'V')
+				exit(0);
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			if (options.tun_open == -1)
+				options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
+			options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote);
+			if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
+			    (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
+			    (u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
+				options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
+			else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
+				options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
+				options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+			else {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			if (ciphers_valid(optarg)) {
+				/* SSH2 only */
+				options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
+				options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_INVALID;
+			} else {
+				/* SSH1 only */
+				options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg);
+				if (options.cipher == -1) {
+					fprintf(stderr,
+					    "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
+					    optarg);
+					exit(255);
+				}
+				if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
+					options.ciphers = "3des-cbc";
+				else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH)
+					options.ciphers = "blowfish-cbc";
+				else
+					options.ciphers = (char *)-1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'm':
+			if (mac_valid(optarg))
+				options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
+			else {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'M':
+			if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
+				options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+			else
+				options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			options.port = a2port(optarg);
+			if (options.port <= 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			options.user = optarg;
+			break;
+
+		case 'L':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
+				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'R':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1)) {
+				add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad remote forwarding specification "
+				    "'%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'D':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
+				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
+				    "'%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'C':
+			options.compression = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'N':
+			no_shell_flag = 1;
+			no_tty_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			no_tty_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'o':
+			dummy = 1;
+			line = xstrdup(optarg);
+			if (process_config_line(&options, host ? host : "",
+			    line, "command-line", 0, &dummy) != 0)
+				exit(255);
+			xfree(line);
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			subsystem_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			if (options.control_path != NULL)
+				free(options.control_path);
+			options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			options.bind_address = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'F':
+			config = optarg;
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	ac -= optind;
+	av += optind;
+
+	if (ac > 0 && !host && **av != '-') {
+		if (strrchr(*av, '@')) {
+			p = xstrdup(*av);
+			cp = strrchr(p, '@');
+			if (cp == NULL || cp == p)
+				usage();
+			options.user = p;
+			*cp = '\0';
+			host = ++cp;
+		} else
+			host = *av;
+		if (ac > 1) {
+			optind = optreset = 1;
+			goto again;
+		}
+		ac--, av++;
+	}
+
+	/* Check that we got a host name. */
+	if (!host)
+		usage();
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+	buffer_init(&command);
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
+	 * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
+	 * packet size.  Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
+	 */
+	if (!ac) {
+		/* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
+		tty_flag = 1;
+		if (subsystem_flag) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
+			usage();
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* A command has been specified.  Store it into the buffer. */
+		for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
+			if (i)
+				buffer_append(&command, " ", 1);
+			buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i]));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
+	if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 &&
+	    !no_shell_flag)
+		fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command "
+		    "to execute.");
+
+	/* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
+	if (buffer_len(&command) == 0)
+		tty_flag = 1;
+
+	/* Force no tty */
+	if (no_tty_flag)
+		tty_flag = 0;
+	/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+	if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && !force_tty_flag) {
+		if (tty_flag)
+			logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
+			    "stdin is not a terminal.");
+		tty_flag = 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize "log" output.  Since we are the client all output
+	 * actually goes to stderr.
+	 */
+	log_init(argv0,
+	    options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read per-user configuration file.  Ignore the system wide config
+	 * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
+	 */
+	if (config != NULL) {
+		if (!read_config_file(config, host, &options, 0))
+			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
+			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+			(void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
+
+		/* Read systemwide configuration file after use config. */
+		(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host,
+		    &options, 0);
+	}
+
+	/* Fill configuration defaults. */
+	fill_default_options(&options);
+
+	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
+	/* reinit */
+	log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
+
+	seed_rng();
+
+	if (options.user == NULL)
+		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+	/* Get default port if port has not been set. */
+	if (options.port == 0) {
+		sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
+		options.port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	}
+
+	if (options.local_command != NULL) {
+		char thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+		if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+			fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", options.port);
+		debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
+		cp = options.local_command;
+		options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir,
+		    "h", options.hostname? options.hostname : host,
+                    "l", thishost, "n", host, "r", options.user, "p", buf,
+                    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+		debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
+		xfree(cp);
+	}
+
+	if (options.hostname != NULL)
+		host = options.hostname;
+
+	/* Find canonic host name. */
+	if (strchr(host, '.') == 0) {
+		struct addrinfo hints;
+		struct addrinfo *ai = NULL;
+		int errgai;
+		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+		hints.ai_family = options.address_family;
+		hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+		errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai);
+		if (errgai == 0) {
+			if (ai->ai_canonname != NULL)
+				host = xstrdup(ai->ai_canonname);
+			freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* force lowercase for hostkey matching */
+	if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
+		for (p = options.host_key_alias; *p; p++)
+			if (isupper(*p))
+				*p = (char)tolower(*p);
+	}
+
+	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(options.proxy_command, "none") == 0) {
+		xfree(options.proxy_command);
+		options.proxy_command = NULL;
+	}
+	if (options.control_path != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(options.control_path, "none") == 0) {
+		xfree(options.control_path);
+		options.control_path = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (options.control_path != NULL) {
+		char thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+		if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+			fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", options.port);
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path,
+		    original_real_uid);
+		xfree(options.control_path);
+		options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "p", buf, "h", host,
+		    "r", options.user, "l", thishost, (char *)NULL);
+		xfree(cp);
+	}
+	if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
+		fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
+	if (options.control_path != NULL)
+		muxclient(options.control_path);
+
+	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+
+	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
+	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms,
+	    options.tcp_keep_alive, 
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	    options.use_privileged_port,
+#else
+	    original_effective_uid == 0 && options.use_privileged_port,
+#endif
+	    options.proxy_command) != 0)
+		exit(255);
+
+	if (timeout_ms > 0)
+		debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key
+	 * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts
+	 * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra
+	 * privileges, because the file is only readable by root.
+	 * If we cannot access the private keys, load the public keys
+	 * instead and try to execute the ssh-keysign helper instead.
+	 */
+	sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
+	sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
+	sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0;
+	if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
+	    options.hostbased_authentication) {
+		sensitive_data.nkeys = 3;
+		sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
+		    sizeof(Key));
+
+		PRIV_START;
+		sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
+		    _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+		sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
+		    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+		sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
+		    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+		PRIV_END;
+
+		if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 &&
+		    sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL &&
+		    sensitive_data.keys[1] == NULL &&
+		    sensitive_data.keys[2] == NULL) {
+			sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_public(
+			    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+			sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_public(
+			    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+			sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have.  We will no
+	 * longer need them.  Also, extra privileges could make it very hard
+	 * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the
+	 * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where
+	 * root is mapped to nobody.
+	 */
+	if (original_effective_uid == 0) {
+		PRIV_START;
+		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
+	 * directory if it doesn't already exist.
+	 */
+	r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
+	    strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+	if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+		if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
+			error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
+
+	/* load options.identity_files */
+	load_public_identity_files();
+
+	/* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
+	/* XXX mem-leaks: */
+	options.system_hostfile =
+	    tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile, original_real_uid);
+	options.user_hostfile =
+	    tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile, original_real_uid);
+	options.system_hostfile2 =
+	    tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile2, original_real_uid);
+	options.user_hostfile2 =
+	    tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile2, original_real_uid);
+
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
+
+	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
+	ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
+	    pw, timeout_ms);
+
+	/* We no longer need the private host keys.  Clear them now. */
+	if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
+				/* Destroys contents safely */
+				debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
+				key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
+				sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		xfree(sensitive_data.keys);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		if (options.identity_files[i]) {
+			xfree(options.identity_files[i]);
+			options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+		}
+		if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
+			key_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
+			options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session();
+	packet_close();
+
+	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+		unlink(options.control_path);
+
+	/*
+	 * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in
+	 * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child
+	 */
+	if (proxy_command_pid > 1)
+		kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
+
+	return exit_status;
+}
+
+/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
+static void
+ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Forward *rfwd = (Forward *)ctxt;
+
+	/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
+	debug("remote forward %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d",
+	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+	    rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
+		logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
+			packet_get_int(),
+			rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+	}
+	
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+			fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed for "
+			    "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+		else
+			logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for "
+			    "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+	}
+	if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) {
+		debug("All remote forwarding requests processed");
+		if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
+			fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
+			if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+				fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s",
+				    strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_forwarding(void)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
+		    "address %.200s:%d",
+		    (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
+		success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_port,
+		    options.gateway_ports);
+	}
+	if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+		fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
+	if (i > 0 && success == 0)
+		error("Could not request local forwarding.");
+
+	/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
+		    "local address %.200s:%d",
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
+		if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port) < 0) {
+			if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+				fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+			else
+				logit("Warning: Could not request remote "
+				    "forwarding.");
+		}
+		client_register_global_confirm(ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
+		    &options.remote_forwards[i]);
+	}
+
+	/* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
+	if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+		if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open,
+		    options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) {
+			if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+				fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+			else
+				error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+		}
+	}			
+}
+
+static void
+check_agent_present(void)
+{
+	if (options.forward_agent) {
+		/* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
+		if (!ssh_agent_present())
+			options.forward_agent = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_session(void)
+{
+	int type;
+	int interactive = 0;
+	int have_tty = 0;
+	struct winsize ws;
+	char *cp;
+	const char *display;
+
+	/* Enable compression if requested. */
+	if (options.compression) {
+		debug("Requesting compression at level %d.",
+		    options.compression_level);
+
+		if (options.compression_level < 1 ||
+		    options.compression_level > 9)
+			fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to "
+			    "9 (slow, best).");
+
+		/* Send the request. */
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
+		packet_put_int(options.compression_level);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+		type = packet_read();
+		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+			packet_start_compression(options.compression_level);
+		else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+			logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
+		else
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for "
+			    "compression response.");
+	}
+	/* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */
+	if (tty_flag) {
+		debug("Requesting pty.");
+
+		/* Start the packet. */
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+
+		/* Store TERM in the packet.  There is no limit on the
+		   length of the string. */
+		cp = getenv("TERM");
+		if (!cp)
+			cp = "";
+		packet_put_cstring(cp);
+
+		/* Store window size in the packet. */
+		if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+			memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+
+		/* Store tty modes in the packet. */
+		tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL);
+
+		/* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		/* Read response from the server. */
+		type = packet_read();
+		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+			interactive = 1;
+			have_tty = 1;
+		} else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+			logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to "
+			    "allocate a pseudo tty.");
+		else
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty "
+			    "request response.");
+	}
+	/* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+		char *proto, *data;
+		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+		    options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
+		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+		    "spoofing.");
+		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto, data);
+
+		/* Read response from the server. */
+		type = packet_read();
+		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+			interactive = 1;
+		} else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+			logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
+		} else {
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 "
+			    "forwarding");
+		}
+	}
+	/* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
+	packet_set_interactive(interactive);
+
+	/* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */
+	check_agent_present();
+
+	if (options.forward_agent) {
+		debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+		auth_request_forwarding();
+
+		/* Read response from the server. */
+		type = packet_read();
+		packet_check_eom();
+		if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+			logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
+	}
+
+	/* Initiate port forwardings. */
+	ssh_init_forwarding();
+
+	/* Execute a local command */
+	if (options.local_command != NULL &&
+	    options.permit_local_command)
+		ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
+
+	/*
+	 * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
+	 * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
+	 */
+	if (fork_after_authentication_flag &&
+	    (!options.exit_on_forward_failure ||
+	    options.num_remote_forwards == 0)) {
+		fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
+		if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+			fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the
+	 * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell.
+	 */
+	if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) {
+		int len = buffer_len(&command);
+		if (len > 900)
+			len = 900;
+		debug("Sending command: %.*s", len,
+		    (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command));
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
+		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+	} else {
+		debug("Requesting shell.");
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+	}
+
+	/* Enter the interactive session. */
+	return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ?
+	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0);
+}
+
+/* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */
+static void
+ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
+{
+	extern char **environ;
+	const char *display;
+	int interactive = tty_flag;
+
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+		char *proto, *data;
+		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+		    options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
+		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+		    "spoofing.");
+		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data);
+		interactive = 1;
+		/* XXX wait for reply */
+	}
+
+	check_agent_present();
+	if (options.forward_agent) {
+		debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+		channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+
+	client_session2_setup(id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"),
+	    NULL, fileno(stdin), &command, environ);
+
+	packet_set_interactive(interactive);
+}
+
+/* open new channel for a session */
+static int
+ssh_session2_open(void)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
+
+	if (stdin_null_flag) {
+		in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
+	} else {
+		in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+	}
+	out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+	err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
+
+	if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
+		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
+
+	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+	if (!isatty(in))
+		set_nonblock(in);
+	if (!isatty(out))
+		set_nonblock(out);
+	if (!isatty(err))
+		set_nonblock(err);
+
+	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+	if (tty_flag) {
+		window >>= 1;
+		packetmax >>= 1;
+	}
+	c = channel_new(
+	    "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
+	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+	    "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+
+	debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self);
+
+	channel_send_open(c->self);
+	if (!no_shell_flag)
+		channel_register_open_confirm(c->self,
+		    ssh_session2_setup, NULL);
+
+	return c->self;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_session2(void)
+{
+	int id = -1;
+
+	/* XXX should be pre-session */
+	ssh_init_forwarding();
+
+	if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN))
+		id = ssh_session2_open();
+
+	/* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
+	    (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
+		debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+		packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
+		packet_put_char(0);
+		packet_send();
+	}
+
+	/* Execute a local command */
+	if (options.local_command != NULL &&
+	    options.permit_local_command)
+		ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
+
+	/* Start listening for multiplex clients */
+	muxserver_listen();
+
+	/* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */
+	if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
+		fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
+		if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+			fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ?
+	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
+}
+
+static void
+load_public_identity_files(void)
+{
+	char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char *pwdir = NULL, *pwname = NULL;
+	int i = 0;
+	Key *public;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+	Key **keys;
+
+	if (options.smartcard_device != NULL &&
+	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
+	    (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL) {
+		int count = 0;
+		for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			count++;
+			memmove(&options.identity_files[1],
+			    &options.identity_files[0],
+			    sizeof(char *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1));
+			memmove(&options.identity_keys[1],
+			    &options.identity_keys[0],
+			    sizeof(Key *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1));
+			options.num_identity_files++;
+			options.identity_keys[0] = keys[i];
+			options.identity_files[0] = sc_get_key_label(keys[i]);
+		}
+		if (options.num_identity_files > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+			options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES;
+		i = count;
+		xfree(keys);
+	}
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+	if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
+		fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed");
+	pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+	pwdir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+	if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+		fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+	for (; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
+		    original_real_uid);
+		filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir,
+		    "u", pwname, "l", thishost, "h", host,
+		    "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+		xfree(cp);
+		public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
+		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+		    public ? public->type : -1);
+		xfree(options.identity_files[i]);
+		options.identity_files[i] = filename;
+		options.identity_keys[i] = public;
+	}
+	bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname));
+	xfree(pwname);
+	bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir));
+	xfree(pwdir);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..186cfff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.78 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */
+#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER	SSH_CIPHER_3DES
+
+/* Default port number. */
+#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT	22
+
+/* Maximum number of TCP/IP ports forwarded per direction. */
+#define SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION	100
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified
+ * in configuration files or on the command line.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES		100
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of lines in authorized_keys file.
+ * Current value permits 16kbit RSA and RSA1 keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with
+ * some room for options and comments.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES		8192
+
+/*
+ * Major protocol version.  Different version indicates major incompatibility
+ * that prevents communication.
+ *
+ * Minor protocol version.  Different version indicates minor incompatibility
+ * that does not prevent interoperation.
+ */
+#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1	1
+#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1	5
+
+/* We support both SSH1 and SSH2 */
+#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2	2
+#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2	0
+
+/*
+ * Name for the service.  The port named by this service overrides the
+ * default port if present.
+ */
+#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME	"ssh"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the
+ * authentication agent.
+ */
+#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME	"SSH_AGENT_PID"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
+ * authentication socket.
+ */
+#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
+
+/*
+ * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass
+ */
+#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV		"SSH_ASKPASS"
+
+/*
+ * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this
+ * many bits.  This is to make double encryption with rsaref work.
+ */
+#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED		128
+
+/*
+ * Length of the session key in bytes.  (Specified as 256 bits in the
+ * protocol.)
+ */
+#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH		32
+
+/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
+#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE		-2
+
+/*
+ * unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes;
+ * sshd will change its privileges to this user and its
+ * primary group.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER		"sshd"
+#endif
+
+/* Minimum modulus size (n) for RSA keys. */
+#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE	768
+
+/* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */
+#define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG		128
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh1.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh1.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..353d930
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.6 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Definition of message types.  New values can be added, but old values
+ * should not be removed or without careful consideration of the consequences
+ * for compatibility.  The maximum value is 254; value 255 is reserved for
+ * future extension.
+ */
+/* Ranges */
+#define SSH_MSG_MIN				1
+#define SSH_MSG_MAX				254
+/* Message name */			/* msg code */	/* arguments */
+#define SSH_MSG_NONE				0	/* no message */
+#define SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT			1	/* cause (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY			2	/* ck,msk,srvk,hostk */
+#define SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY			3	/* key (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_USER				4	/* user (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS			5	/* user (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA			6	/* modulus (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE		7	/* int (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE		8	/* int (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD			9	/* pass (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY			10	/* TERM, tty modes */
+#define SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE			11	/* row,col,xpix,ypix */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL			12	/* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD			13	/* cmd (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS			14	/* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_FAILURE			15	/* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA			16	/* data (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA			17	/* data (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA			18	/* data (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EOF				19	/* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS			20	/* status (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION	21	/* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE		22	/* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA			23	/* ch,data (int,str) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE			24	/* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION	25	/* channel (int) */
+/*      SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING		26	   OBSOLETE */
+#define SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN			27	/* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST		28	/* p,host,hp (i,s,i) */
+#define SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN			29	/* ch,h,p (i,s,i) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING	30	/* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN			31	/* port (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_IGNORE				32	/* string */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION		33	/* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING		34	/* proto,data (s,s) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA		35	/* user,mod (s,mpi) */
+#define SSH_MSG_DEBUG				36	/* string */
+#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION		37	/* level 1-9 (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE		38	/* size 4k-1024k (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS			39	/* we use this for s/key */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE		40	/* challenge (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE		41	/* response (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS			42	/* (KTEXT) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE		43	/* (KTEXT) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT		44	/* credentials (s) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN			65	/* token (s) */
+
+/* protocol version 1.5 overloads some version 1.3 message types */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF	SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE	SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
+
+/*
+ * Authentication methods.  New types can be added, but old types should not
+ * be removed for compatibility.  The maximum allowed value is 31.
+ */
+#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS		1
+#define SSH_AUTH_RSA		2
+#define SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD	3
+#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA	4
+#define SSH_AUTH_TIS		5
+#define SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS	6
+#define SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT	7
+				/* 8 to 15 are reserved */
+#define SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN	21
+
+/* Protocol flags.  These are bit masks. */
+#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER	1	/* X11 forwarding includes screen */
+#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN	2	/* forwarding opens contain host */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c33dc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.11 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt
+ *
+ *   Transport layer protocol:
+ *
+ *     1-19     Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,
+ *              etc)
+ *     20-29    Algorithm negotiation
+ *     30-49    Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
+ *              different authentication methods)
+ *
+ *   User authentication protocol:
+ *
+ *     50-59    User authentication generic
+ *     60-79    User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused
+ *              for different authentication methods)
+ *
+ *   Connection protocol:
+ *
+ *     80-89    Connection protocol generic
+ *     90-127   Channel related messages
+ *
+ *   Reserved for client protocols:
+ *
+ *     128-191  Reserved
+ *
+ *   Local extensions:
+ *
+ *     192-255  Local extensions
+ */
+
+/* ranges */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN				1
+#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX				49
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN				50
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX				79
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN		60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX		SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX
+#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN				80
+#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX				127
+#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MIN				128
+#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MAX				191
+#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN				192
+#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MAX				255
+#define SSH2_MSG_MIN					1
+#define SSH2_MSG_MAX					255
+
+/* transport layer: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT				1
+#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE					2
+#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED				3
+#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG					4
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST			5
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT				6
+
+/* transport layer: alg negotiation */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT				20
+#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS				21
+
+/* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT				30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY				31
+
+/* dh-group-exchange */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD			30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP			31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT			32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY			33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST			34
+
+/* user authentication: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST			50
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE			51
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS			52
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER			53
+
+/* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK				60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ		60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST			60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE			61
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1		60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1		61
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2		62
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2		63
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM		64
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM		65
+
+/* connection protocol: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST				80
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS			81
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE			82
+
+/* channel related messages */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN				90
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION		91
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE			92
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST			93
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA				94
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA			95
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF				96
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE				97
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST			98
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS			99
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE			100
+
+/* disconnect reason code */
+
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT	1
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR			2
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED		3
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED	4
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED			4
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR			5
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR		6
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE		7
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED	8
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE		9
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST			10
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION			11
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS		12
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER		13
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE	14
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME		15
+
+/* misc */
+
+#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED		1
+#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED			2
+#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE			3
+#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE			4
+
+#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR			1
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5045a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.25 2009/02/17 01:28:32 djm Exp $
+#	$FreeBSD$
+
+# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  See
+# ssh_config(5) for more information.  This file provides defaults for
+# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files
+# or on the command line.
+
+# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+#  1. command line options
+#  2. user-specific file
+#  3. system-wide file
+# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options.  For a comprehensive
+# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+# ssh_config(5) man page.
+
+# Host *
+#   ForwardAgent no
+#   ForwardX11 no
+#   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+#   RSAAuthentication yes
+#   PasswordAuthentication yes
+#   HostbasedAuthentication no
+#   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+#   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+#   BatchMode no
+#   CheckHostIP no
+#   AddressFamily any
+#   ConnectTimeout 0
+#   StrictHostKeyChecking ask
+#   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+#   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+#   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+#   Port 22
+#   Protocol 2,1
+#   Cipher 3des
+#   Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
+#   MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
+#   EscapeChar ~
+#   Tunnel no
+#   TunnelDevice any:any
+#   PermitLocalCommand no
+#   VisualHostKey no
+#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20091001
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0497d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
@@ -0,0 +1,1156 @@
+.\"  -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.119 2009/02/22 23:50:57 djm Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.Dd February 22 2009
+.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh_config
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ~/.ssh/config
+.Nm /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Xr ssh 1
+obtains configuration data from the following sources in
+the following order:
+.Pp
+.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
+.It
+command-line options
+.It
+user's configuration file
+.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
+.It
+system-wide configuration file
+.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+.El
+.Pp
+For each parameter, the first obtained value
+will be used.
+The configuration files contain sections separated by
+.Dq Host
+specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
+match one of the patterns given in the specification.
+The matched host name is the one given on the command line.
+.Pp
+Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
+host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
+file, and general defaults at the end.
+.Pp
+The configuration file has the following format:
+.Pp
+Empty lines and lines starting with
+.Ql #
+are comments.
+Otherwise a line is of the format
+.Dq keyword arguments .
+Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
+optional whitespace and exactly one
+.Ql = ;
+the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
+when specifying configuration options using the
+.Nm ssh ,
+.Nm scp ,
+and
+.Nm sftp
+.Fl o
+option.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+.Pp
+The possible
+keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm Host
+Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
+.Cm Host
+keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
+given after the keyword.
+If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace.
+A single
+.Ql *
+as a pattern can be used to provide global
+defaults for all hosts.
+The host is the
+.Ar hostname
+argument given on the command line (i.e. the name is not converted to
+a canonicalized host name before matching).
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
+Valid arguments are
+.Dq any ,
+.Dq inet
+(use IPv4 only), or
+.Dq inet6
+(use IPv6 only).
+.It Cm BatchMode
+If set to
+.Dq yes ,
+passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
+is present to supply the password.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm BindAddress
+Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
+the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
+Note that this option does not work if
+.Cm UsePrivilegedPort
+is set to
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm CheckHostIP
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will additionally check the host IP address in the
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing.
+If the option is set to
+.Dq no ,
+the check will not be executed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Cipher
+Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session
+in protocol version 1.
+Currently,
+.Dq blowfish ,
+.Dq 3des ,
+and
+.Dq des
+are supported.
+.Ar des
+is only supported in the
+.Xr ssh 1
+client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
+that do not support the
+.Ar 3des
+cipher.
+Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses.
+The default is
+.Dq 3des .
+.It Cm Ciphers
+Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2
+in order of preference.
+Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+The supported ciphers are
+.Dq 3des-cbc ,
+.Dq aes128-cbc ,
+.Dq aes192-cbc ,
+.Dq aes256-cbc ,
+.Dq aes128-ctr ,
+.Dq aes192-ctr ,
+.Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq arcfour128 ,
+.Dq arcfour256 ,
+.Dq arcfour ,
+.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
+and
+.Dq cast128-cbc .
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
+aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
+aes256-cbc,arcfour
+.Ed
+.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
+specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
+cleared.
+This option is primarily useful when used from the
+.Xr ssh 1
+command line to clear port forwardings set in
+configuration files, and is automatically set by
+.Xr scp 1
+and
+.Xr sftp 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Compression
+Specifies whether to use compression.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm CompressionLevel
+Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled.
+The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).
+The default level is 6, which is good for most applications.
+The meaning of the values is the same as in
+.Xr gzip 1 .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm ConnectionAttempts
+Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting.
+The argument must be an integer.
+This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
+The default is 1.
+.It Cm ConnectTimeout
+Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
+SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable,
+not when it refuses the connection.
+.It Cm ControlMaster
+Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
+When set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
+.Cm ControlPath
+argument.
+Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
+.Cm ControlPath
+with
+.Cm ControlMaster
+set to
+.Dq no
+(the default).
+These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection
+rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally
+if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
+.Pp
+Setting this to
+.Dq ask
+will cause ssh
+to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+program before they are accepted (see
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+for details).
+If the
+.Cm ControlPath
+cannot be opened,
+ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance.
+.Pp
+X11 and
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
+display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master
+connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
+.Pp
+Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
+master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
+exist.
+These options are:
+.Dq auto
+and
+.Dq autoask .
+The latter requires confirmation like the
+.Dq ask
+option.
+.It Cm ControlPath
+Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
+in the
+.Cm ControlMaster
+section above or the string
+.Dq none
+to disable connection sharing.
+In the path,
+.Ql %l
+will be substituted by the local host name,
+.Ql %h
+will be substituted by the target host name,
+.Ql %p
+the port, and
+.Ql %r
+by the remote login username.
+It is recommended that any
+.Cm ControlPath
+used for opportunistic connection sharing include
+at least %h, %p, and %r.
+This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
+.It Cm DynamicForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
+over the secure channel, and the application
+protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+remote machine.
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
+.Sm on
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or
+by using an alternative syntax:
+.Oo Ar bind_address Ns / Oc Ns Ar port .
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.Pp
+Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+.Xr ssh 1
+will act as a SOCKS server.
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
+additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign
+Setting this option to
+.Dq yes
+in the global client configuration file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+enables the use of the helper program
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
+See
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+for more information.
+.It Cm EscapeChar
+Sets the escape character (default:
+.Ql ~ ) .
+The escape character can also
+be set on the command line.
+The argument should be a single character,
+.Ql ^
+followed by a letter, or
+.Dq none
+to disable the escape
+character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
+data).
+.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh 1
+should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
+dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm ForwardAgent
+Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
+will be forwarded to the remote machine.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
+can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
+however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
+authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
+.It Cm ForwardX11
+Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected
+over the secure channel and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+set.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the user's X11 authorization database)
+can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring
+if the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option is also enabled.
+.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+If this option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq no ,
+remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
+from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
+clients.
+Furthermore, the
+.Xr xauth 1
+token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
+Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
+the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
+.It Cm GatewayPorts
+Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
+forwarded ports.
+By default,
+.Xr ssh 1
+binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
+This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+can be used to specify that ssh
+should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
+thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile
+Specifies a file to use for the global
+host key database instead of
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .
+.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm HashKnownHosts
+Indicates that
+.Xr ssh 1
+should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+These hashed names may be used normally by
+.Xr ssh 1
+and
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
+will not be converted automatically,
+but may be manually hashed using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
+authentication.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only and
+is similar to
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication .
+.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms
+that the client wants to use in order of preference.
+The default for this option is:
+.Dq ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .
+.It Cm HostKeyAlias
+Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+in the host key database files.
+This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
+or for multiple servers running on a single host.
+.It Cm HostName
+Specifies the real host name to log into.
+This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
+The default is the name given on the command line.
+Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
+.Cm HostName
+specifications).
+.It Cm IdentitiesOnly
+Specifies that
+.Xr ssh 1
+should only use the authentication identity files configured in the
+.Nm
+files,
+even if
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+offers more identities.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
+offers many different identities.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm IdentityFile
+Specifies a file from which the user's RSA or DSA authentication identity
+is read.
+The default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+for protocol version 1, and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+for protocol version 2.
+Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
+will be used for authentication.
+.Pp
+The file name may use the tilde
+syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following
+escape characters:
+.Ql %d
+(local user's home directory),
+.Ql %u
+(local user name),
+.Ql %l
+(local host name),
+.Ql %h
+(remote host name) or
+.Ql %r
+(remote user name).
+.Pp
+It is possible to have
+multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
+identities will be tried in sequence.
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices
+Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
+Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
+The default is to use the server specified list.
+The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
+For an OpenSSH server,
+it may be zero or more of:
+.Dq bsdauth ,
+.Dq pam ,
+and
+.Dq skey .
+.It Cm LocalCommand
+Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
+connecting to the server.
+The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
+the user's shell.
+The following escape character substitutions will be performed:
+.Ql %d
+(local user's home directory),
+.Ql %h
+(remote host name),
+.Ql %l
+(local host name),
+.Ql %n
+(host name as provided on the command line),
+.Ql %p
+(remote port),
+.Ql %r
+(remote user name) or
+.Ql %u
+(local user name).
+This directive is ignored unless
+.Cm PermitLocalCommand
+has been enabled.
+.It Cm LocalForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
+The first argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+and the second argument must be
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or
+by using an alternative syntax:
+.Oo Ar bind_address Ns / Oc Ns Ar port
+and
+.Ar host Ns / Ns Ar hostport .
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
+given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.It Cm LogLevel
+Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+The default is INFO.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+.It Cm MACs
+Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+in order of preference.
+The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
+for data integrity protection.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,
+hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
+.Ed
+.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines.
+In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of
+the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys.
+However, this option disables host authentication for localhost.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is to check the host key for localhost.
+.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
+The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
+The default is 3.
+.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use password authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PermitLocalCommand
+Allow local command execution via the
+.Ic LocalCommand
+option or using the
+.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
+escape sequence in
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Port
+Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
+The default is 22.
+.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
+Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
+authentication methods.
+This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
+.Cm keyboard-interactive )
+over another method (e.g.\&
+.Cm password )
+The default for this option is:
+.Do gssapi-with-mic ,
+hostbased,
+publickey,
+keyboard-interactive,
+password
+.Dc .
+.It Cm Protocol
+Specifies the protocol versions
+.Xr ssh 1
+should support in order of preference.
+The possible values are
+.Sq 1
+and
+.Sq 2 .
+Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq 2,1 .
+This means that ssh
+tries version 2 and falls back to version 1
+if version 2 is not available.
+.It Cm ProxyCommand
+Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
+The command
+string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
+the user's shell.
+In the command string,
+.Ql %h
+will be substituted by the host name to
+connect and
+.Ql %p
+by the port.
+The command can be basically anything,
+and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
+It should eventually connect an
+.Xr sshd 8
+server running on some machine, or execute
+.Ic sshd -i
+somewhere.
+Host key management will be done using the
+HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by
+the user).
+Setting the command to
+.Dq none
+disables this option entirely.
+Note that
+.Cm CheckHostIP
+is not available for connects with a proxy command.
+.Pp
+This directive is useful in conjunction with
+.Xr nc 1
+and its proxy support.
+For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
+192.0.2.0:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
+.Ed
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm RekeyLimit
+Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
+session key is renegotiated.
+The argument is the number of bytes, with an optional suffix of
+.Sq K ,
+.Sq M ,
+or
+.Sq G
+to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
+The default is between
+.Sq 1G
+and
+.Sq 4G ,
+depending on the cipher.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm RemoteForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
+the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine.
+The first argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+and the second argument must be
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets
+or by using an alternative syntax:
+.Oo Ar bind_address Ns / Oc Ns Ar port
+and
+.Ar host Ns / Ns Ar hostport .
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
+forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
+logging in as root on the remote machine.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar port
+argument is
+.Ql 0 ,
+the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+to the client at run time.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar bind_address
+is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses.
+If the
+.Ar bind_address
+is
+.Ql *
+or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
+interfaces.
+Specifying a remote
+.Ar bind_address
+will only succeed if the server's
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+option is enabled (see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
+.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host
+authentication.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires
+.Xr ssh 1
+to be setuid root.
+.It Cm RSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try RSA authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+RSA authentication will only be
+attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is
+running.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm SendEnv
+Specifies what variables from the local
+.Xr environ 7
+should be sent to the server.
+Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
+The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
+accept these environment variables.
+Refer to
+.Cm AcceptEnv
+in
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+for how to configure the server.
+Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
+Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
+across multiple
+.Cm SendEnv
+directives.
+The default is not to send any environment variables.
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
+Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
+sent without
+.Xr ssh 1
+receiving any messages back from the server.
+If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
+ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
+It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
+different from
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+(below).
+The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
+and therefore will not be spoofable.
+The TCP keepalive option enabled by
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+is spoofable.
+The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
+.Pp
+The default value is 3.
+If, for example,
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+(see below) is set to 15 and
+.Cm ServerAliveCountMax
+is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
+ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm ServerAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the server,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the server.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm SmartcardDevice
+Specifies which smartcard device to use.
+The argument to this keyword is the device
+.Xr ssh 1
+should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's
+private RSA key.
+By default, no device is specified and smartcard support is not activated.
+.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will never automatically add host keys to the
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks,
+though it can be annoying when the
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
+frequently made.
+This option forces the user to manually
+add all new hosts.
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq no ,
+ssh will automatically add new host keys to the
+user known hosts files.
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq ask ,
+new host keys
+will be added to the user known host files only after the user
+has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
+ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+The host keys of
+known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq no ,
+or
+.Dq ask .
+The default is
+.Dq ask .
+.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
+other side.
+If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+of the machines will be properly noticed.
+However, this means that
+connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+find it annoying.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq yes
+(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice
+if the network goes down or the remote host dies.
+This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
+.Pp
+To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Tunnel
+Request
+.Xr tun 4
+device forwarding between the client and the server.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq point-to-point
+(layer 3),
+.Dq ethernet
+(layer 2),
+or
+.Dq no .
+Specifying
+.Dq yes
+requests the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm TunnelDevice
+Specifies the
+.Xr tun 4
+devices to open on the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
+.Sm on
+The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+.Dq any ,
+which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
+The default is
+.Dq any:any .
+.It Cm UsePrivilegedPort
+Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+If set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+must be setuid root.
+Note that this option must be set to
+.Dq yes
+for
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+with older servers.
+.It Cm User
+Specifies the user to log in as.
+This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
+This saves the trouble of
+having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
+.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+Specifies a file to use for the user
+host key database instead of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
+Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
+records.
+If this option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint
+from DNS.
+Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to
+.Dq ask .
+If this option is set to
+.Dq ask ,
+information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still
+need to confirm new host keys according to the
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+option.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq no ,
+or
+.Dq ask .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.Pp
+See also
+.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+in
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Cm VersionAddendum
+Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
+OS- or site-specific modifications.
+The default is
+.Dq FreeBSD-20091001 .
+.It Cm VisualHostKey
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is
+printed in addition to the hex fingerprint string at login and
+for unknown host keys.
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq no ,
+no fingerprint strings are printed at login and
+only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm XAuthLocation
+Specifies the full pathname of the
+.Xr xauth 1
+program.
+The default is
+.Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth .
+.El
+.Sh PATTERNS
+A
+.Em pattern
+consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
+.Sq *
+(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
+or
+.Sq ?\&
+(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
+For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
+.Dq .co.uk
+set of domains,
+the following pattern could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host *.co.uk
+.Pp
+The following pattern
+would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
+.Pp
+A
+.Em pattern-list
+is a comma-separated list of patterns.
+Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
+by preceding them with an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+For example,
+to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organisation
+except from the
+.Dq dialup
+pool,
+the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
+This is the per-user configuration file.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file is used by the SSH client.
+Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Systemwide configuration file.
+This file provides defaults for those
+values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
+for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+This file must be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..108a0a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+/*
+ * Namespace munging inspired by an equivalent hack in NetBSD's tree: add
+ * the "ssh_" prefix to every symbol in libssh which doesn't already have
+ * it.  This prevents collisions between symbols in libssh and symbols in
+ * other libraries or applications which link with libssh, either directly
+ * or indirectly (e.g. through PAM loading pam_ssh).
+ *
+ * A list of symbols which need munging is obtained as follows:
+ *
+ * nm libssh.a | awk '$2 == "T" && $3 !~ /^ssh_/ { print "#define", $3, "ssh_" $3 }'
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#define a2port					ssh_a2port
+#define a2tun					ssh_a2tun
+#define acss					ssh_acss
+#define acss_setkey				ssh_acss_setkey
+#define acss_setsubkey				ssh_acss_setsubkey
+#define add_host_to_hostfile			ssh_add_host_to_hostfile
+#define addargs					ssh_addargs
+#define addr_match_list				ssh_addr_match_list
+#define ask_permission				ssh_ask_permission
+#define atomicio				ssh_atomicio
+#define atomiciov				ssh_atomiciov
+#define auth_request_forwarding			ssh_auth_request_forwarding
+#define buffer_append				ssh_buffer_append
+#define buffer_append_space			ssh_buffer_append_space
+#define buffer_check_alloc			ssh_buffer_check_alloc
+#define buffer_clear				ssh_buffer_clear
+#define buffer_compress				ssh_buffer_compress
+#define buffer_compress_init_recv		ssh_buffer_compress_init_recv
+#define buffer_compress_init_send		ssh_buffer_compress_init_send
+#define buffer_compress_uninit			ssh_buffer_compress_uninit
+#define buffer_consume				ssh_buffer_consume
+#define buffer_consume_end			ssh_buffer_consume_end
+#define buffer_consume_end_ret			ssh_buffer_consume_end_ret
+#define buffer_consume_ret			ssh_buffer_consume_ret
+#define buffer_dump				ssh_buffer_dump
+#define buffer_free				ssh_buffer_free
+#define buffer_get				ssh_buffer_get
+#define buffer_get_bignum			ssh_buffer_get_bignum
+#define buffer_get_bignum2			ssh_buffer_get_bignum2
+#define buffer_get_bignum2_ret			ssh_buffer_get_bignum2_ret
+#define buffer_get_bignum_ret			ssh_buffer_get_bignum_ret
+#define buffer_get_char				ssh_buffer_get_char
+#define buffer_get_char_ret			ssh_buffer_get_char_ret
+#define buffer_get_int				ssh_buffer_get_int
+#define buffer_get_int64			ssh_buffer_get_int64
+#define buffer_get_int64_ret			ssh_buffer_get_int64_ret
+#define buffer_get_int_ret			ssh_buffer_get_int_ret
+#define buffer_get_ret				ssh_buffer_get_ret
+#define buffer_get_short			ssh_buffer_get_short
+#define buffer_get_short_ret			ssh_buffer_get_short_ret
+#define buffer_get_string			ssh_buffer_get_string
+#define buffer_get_string_ptr			ssh_buffer_get_string_ptr
+#define buffer_get_string_ret			ssh_buffer_get_string_ret
+#define buffer_init				ssh_buffer_init
+#define buffer_len				ssh_buffer_len
+#define buffer_ptr				ssh_buffer_ptr
+#define buffer_put_bignum			ssh_buffer_put_bignum
+#define buffer_put_bignum2			ssh_buffer_put_bignum2
+#define buffer_put_bignum2_ret			ssh_buffer_put_bignum2_ret
+#define buffer_put_bignum_ret			ssh_buffer_put_bignum_ret
+#define buffer_put_char				ssh_buffer_put_char
+#define buffer_put_cstring			ssh_buffer_put_cstring
+#define buffer_put_int				ssh_buffer_put_int
+#define buffer_put_int64			ssh_buffer_put_int64
+#define buffer_put_short			ssh_buffer_put_short
+#define buffer_put_string			ssh_buffer_put_string
+#define buffer_uncompress			ssh_buffer_uncompress
+#define chan_ibuf_empty				ssh_chan_ibuf_empty
+#define chan_is_dead				ssh_chan_is_dead
+#define chan_mark_dead				ssh_chan_mark_dead
+#define chan_obuf_empty				ssh_chan_obuf_empty
+#define chan_rcvd_eow				ssh_chan_rcvd_eow
+#define chan_rcvd_ieof				ssh_chan_rcvd_ieof
+#define chan_rcvd_oclose			ssh_chan_rcvd_oclose
+#define chan_read_failed			ssh_chan_read_failed
+#define chan_write_failed			ssh_chan_write_failed
+#define channel_add_adm_permitted_opens		ssh_channel_add_adm_permitted_opens
+#define channel_add_permitted_opens		ssh_channel_add_permitted_opens
+#define channel_after_select			ssh_channel_after_select
+#define channel_by_id				ssh_channel_by_id
+#define channel_cancel_cleanup			ssh_channel_cancel_cleanup
+#define channel_cancel_rport_listener		ssh_channel_cancel_rport_listener
+#define channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens	ssh_channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens
+#define channel_clear_permitted_opens		ssh_channel_clear_permitted_opens
+#define channel_close_all			ssh_channel_close_all
+#define channel_close_fd			ssh_channel_close_fd
+#define channel_connect_by_listen_address	ssh_channel_connect_by_listen_address
+#define channel_connect_to			ssh_channel_connect_to
+#define channel_find_open			ssh_channel_find_open
+#define channel_free				ssh_channel_free
+#define channel_free_all			ssh_channel_free_all
+#define channel_input_close			ssh_channel_input_close
+#define channel_input_close_confirmation	ssh_channel_input_close_confirmation
+#define channel_input_data			ssh_channel_input_data
+#define channel_input_extended_data		ssh_channel_input_extended_data
+#define channel_input_ieof			ssh_channel_input_ieof
+#define channel_input_oclose			ssh_channel_input_oclose
+#define channel_input_open_confirmation		ssh_channel_input_open_confirmation
+#define channel_input_open_failure		ssh_channel_input_open_failure
+#define channel_input_port_forward_request	ssh_channel_input_port_forward_request
+#define channel_input_port_open			ssh_channel_input_port_open
+#define channel_input_status_confirm		ssh_channel_input_status_confirm
+#define channel_input_window_adjust		ssh_channel_input_window_adjust
+#define channel_lookup				ssh_channel_lookup
+#define channel_new				ssh_channel_new
+#define channel_not_very_much_buffered_data	ssh_channel_not_very_much_buffered_data
+#define channel_open_message			ssh_channel_open_message
+#define channel_output_poll			ssh_channel_output_poll
+#define channel_permit_all_opens		ssh_channel_permit_all_opens
+#define channel_prepare_select			ssh_channel_prepare_select
+#define channel_print_adm_permitted_opens	ssh_channel_print_adm_permitted_opens
+#define channel_register_cleanup		ssh_channel_register_cleanup
+#define channel_register_confirm		ssh_channel_register_confirm
+#define channel_register_filter			ssh_channel_register_filter
+#define channel_register_open_confirm		ssh_channel_register_open_confirm
+#define channel_register_status_confirm		ssh_channel_register_status_confirm
+#define channel_request_remote_forwarding	ssh_channel_request_remote_forwarding
+#define channel_request_rforward_cancel		ssh_channel_request_rforward_cancel
+#define channel_request_start			ssh_channel_request_start
+#define channel_send_open			ssh_channel_send_open
+#define channel_send_window_changes		ssh_channel_send_window_changes
+#define channel_set_af				ssh_channel_set_af
+#define channel_set_fds				ssh_channel_set_fds
+#define channel_setup_local_fwd_listener	ssh_channel_setup_local_fwd_listener
+#define channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener	ssh_channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener
+#define channel_still_open			ssh_channel_still_open
+#define channel_stop_listening			ssh_channel_stop_listening
+#define check_host_in_hostfile			ssh_check_host_in_hostfile
+#define choose_dh				ssh_choose_dh
+#define chop					ssh_chop
+#define cipher_blocksize			ssh_cipher_blocksize
+#define cipher_by_name				ssh_cipher_by_name
+#define cipher_by_number			ssh_cipher_by_number
+#define cipher_cleanup				ssh_cipher_cleanup
+#define cipher_crypt				ssh_cipher_crypt
+#define cipher_get_keycontext			ssh_cipher_get_keycontext
+#define cipher_get_keyiv			ssh_cipher_get_keyiv
+#define cipher_get_keyiv_len			ssh_cipher_get_keyiv_len
+#define cipher_get_number			ssh_cipher_get_number
+#define cipher_init				ssh_cipher_init
+#define cipher_is_cbc				ssh_cipher_is_cbc
+#define cipher_keylen				ssh_cipher_keylen
+#define cipher_mask_ssh1			ssh_cipher_mask_ssh1
+#define cipher_name				ssh_cipher_name
+#define cipher_number				ssh_cipher_number
+#define cipher_set_key_string			ssh_cipher_set_key_string
+#define cipher_set_keycontext			ssh_cipher_set_keycontext
+#define cipher_set_keyiv			ssh_cipher_set_keyiv
+#define ciphers_valid				ssh_ciphers_valid
+#define cleanhostname				ssh_cleanhostname
+#define cleanup_exit				ssh_cleanup_exit
+#define clear_cached_addr			ssh_clear_cached_addr
+#define colon					ssh_colon
+#define compat_cipher_proposal			ssh_compat_cipher_proposal
+#define compat_datafellows			ssh_compat_datafellows
+#define convtime				ssh_convtime
+#define debug					ssh_debug
+#define debug					ssh_debug
+#define debug2					ssh_debug2
+#define debug2					ssh_debug2
+#define debug3					ssh_debug3
+#define debug3					ssh_debug3
+#define decode_reply				ssh_decode_reply
+#define deny_input_open				ssh_deny_input_open
+#define derive_ssh1_session_id			ssh_derive_ssh1_session_id
+#define detect_attack				ssh_detect_attack
+#define dh_estimate				ssh_dh_estimate
+#define dh_gen_key				ssh_dh_gen_key
+#define dh_new_group				ssh_dh_new_group
+#define dh_new_group1				ssh_dh_new_group1
+#define dh_new_group14				ssh_dh_new_group14
+#define dh_new_group_asc			ssh_dh_new_group_asc
+#define dh_pub_is_valid				ssh_dh_pub_is_valid
+#define dispatch_init				ssh_dispatch_init
+#define dispatch_protocol_error			ssh_dispatch_protocol_error
+#define dispatch_protocol_ignore		ssh_dispatch_protocol_ignore
+#define dispatch_range				ssh_dispatch_range
+#define dispatch_run				ssh_dispatch_run
+#define dispatch_set				ssh_dispatch_set
+#define do_log					ssh_do_log
+#define dump_base64				ssh_dump_base64
+#define enable_compat13				ssh_enable_compat13
+#define enable_compat20				ssh_enable_compat20
+#define error					ssh_error
+#define error					ssh_error
+#define evp_acss				ssh_evp_acss
+#define evp_aes_128_ctr				ssh_evp_aes_128_ctr
+#define evp_rijndael				ssh_evp_rijndael
+#define evp_ssh1_3des				ssh_evp_ssh1_3des
+#define evp_ssh1_bf				ssh_evp_ssh1_bf
+#define export_dns_rr				ssh_export_dns_rr
+#define fatal					ssh_fatal
+#define fatal					ssh_fatal
+#define fmt_scaled				ssh_fmt_scaled
+#define freeargs				ssh_freeargs
+#define freerrset				ssh_freerrset
+#define gen_candidates				ssh_gen_candidates
+#define get_canonical_hostname			ssh_get_canonical_hostname
+#define get_local_ipaddr			ssh_get_local_ipaddr
+#define get_local_name				ssh_get_local_name
+#define get_local_port				ssh_get_local_port
+#define get_peer_ipaddr				ssh_get_peer_ipaddr
+#define get_peer_port				ssh_get_peer_port
+#define get_remote_ipaddr			ssh_get_remote_ipaddr
+#define get_remote_name_or_ip			ssh_get_remote_name_or_ip
+#define get_remote_port				ssh_get_remote_port
+#define get_sock_port				ssh_get_sock_port
+#define get_u16					ssh_get_u16
+#define get_u32					ssh_get_u32
+#define get_u64					ssh_get_u64
+#define getrrsetbyname				ssh_getrrsetbyname
+#define host_hash				ssh_host_hash
+#define hostfile_read_key			ssh_hostfile_read_key
+#define hpdelim					ssh_hpdelim
+#define init_rng				ssh_init_rng
+#define ipv64_normalise_mapped			ssh_ipv64_normalise_mapped
+#define kex_derive_keys				ssh_kex_derive_keys
+#define kex_dh_hash				ssh_kex_dh_hash
+#define kex_finish				ssh_kex_finish
+#define kex_get_newkeys				ssh_kex_get_newkeys
+#define kex_input_kexinit			ssh_kex_input_kexinit
+#define kex_send_kexinit			ssh_kex_send_kexinit
+#define kex_setup				ssh_kex_setup
+#define kexdh_client				ssh_kexdh_client
+#define kexgex_client				ssh_kexgex_client
+#define kexgex_hash				ssh_kexgex_hash
+#define key_demote				ssh_key_demote
+#define key_equal				ssh_key_equal
+#define key_fingerprint				ssh_key_fingerprint
+#define key_fingerprint_raw			ssh_key_fingerprint_raw
+#define key_free				ssh_key_free
+#define key_from_blob				ssh_key_from_blob
+#define key_from_private			ssh_key_from_private
+#define key_generate				ssh_key_generate
+#define key_load_private			ssh_key_load_private
+#define key_load_private_pem			ssh_key_load_private_pem
+#define key_load_private_type			ssh_key_load_private_type
+#define key_load_public				ssh_key_load_public
+#define key_load_public_type			ssh_key_load_public_type
+#define key_names_valid2			ssh_key_names_valid2
+#define key_new					ssh_key_new
+#define key_new_private				ssh_key_new_private
+#define key_perm_ok				ssh_key_perm_ok
+#define key_read				ssh_key_read
+#define key_save_private			ssh_key_save_private
+#define key_sign				ssh_key_sign
+#define key_size				ssh_key_size
+#define key_ssh_name				ssh_key_ssh_name
+#define key_to_blob				ssh_key_to_blob
+#define key_type				ssh_key_type
+#define key_type_from_name			ssh_key_type_from_name
+#define key_verify				ssh_key_verify
+#define key_write				ssh_key_write
+#define log_facility_name			ssh_log_facility_name
+#define log_facility_number			ssh_log_facility_number
+#define log_init				ssh_log_init
+#define log_level_name				ssh_log_level_name
+#define log_level_number			ssh_log_level_number
+#define logit					ssh_logit
+#define logit					ssh_logit
+#define lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type		ssh_lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type
+#define mac_clear				ssh_mac_clear
+#define mac_compute				ssh_mac_compute
+#define mac_init				ssh_mac_init
+#define mac_setup				ssh_mac_setup
+#define mac_valid				ssh_mac_valid
+#define match_host_and_ip			ssh_match_host_and_ip
+#define match_hostname				ssh_match_hostname
+#define match_list				ssh_match_list
+#define match_pattern				ssh_match_pattern
+#define match_pattern_list			ssh_match_pattern_list
+#define match_user				ssh_match_user
+#define mm_receive_fd				ssh_mm_receive_fd
+#define mm_send_fd				ssh_mm_send_fd
+#define ms_subtract_diff			ssh_ms_subtract_diff
+#define ms_to_timeval				ssh_ms_to_timeval
+#define mysignal				ssh_mysignal
+#define packet_add_padding			ssh_packet_add_padding
+#define packet_backup_state			ssh_packet_backup_state
+#define packet_close				ssh_packet_close
+#define packet_connection_is_ipv4		ssh_packet_connection_is_ipv4
+#define packet_connection_is_on_socket		ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket
+#define packet_disconnect			ssh_packet_disconnect
+#define packet_get_bignum			ssh_packet_get_bignum
+#define packet_get_bignum2			ssh_packet_get_bignum2
+#define packet_get_char				ssh_packet_get_char
+#define packet_get_connection_in		ssh_packet_get_connection_in
+#define packet_get_connection_out		ssh_packet_get_connection_out
+#define packet_get_encryption_key		ssh_packet_get_encryption_key
+#define packet_get_input			ssh_packet_get_input
+#define packet_get_int				ssh_packet_get_int
+#define packet_get_int64			ssh_packet_get_int64
+#define packet_get_keycontext			ssh_packet_get_keycontext
+#define packet_get_keyiv			ssh_packet_get_keyiv
+#define packet_get_keyiv_len			ssh_packet_get_keyiv_len
+#define packet_get_maxsize			ssh_packet_get_maxsize
+#define packet_get_newkeys			ssh_packet_get_newkeys
+#define packet_get_output			ssh_packet_get_output
+#define packet_get_protocol_flags		ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags
+#define packet_get_raw				ssh_packet_get_raw
+#define packet_get_ssh1_cipher			ssh_packet_get_ssh1_cipher
+#define packet_get_state			ssh_packet_get_state
+#define packet_get_string			ssh_packet_get_string
+#define packet_get_string_ptr			ssh_packet_get_string_ptr
+#define packet_have_data_to_write		ssh_packet_have_data_to_write
+#define packet_inc_alive_timeouts		ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts
+#define packet_is_interactive			ssh_packet_is_interactive
+#define packet_need_rekeying			ssh_packet_need_rekeying
+#define packet_not_very_much_data_to_write	ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write
+#define packet_process_incoming			ssh_packet_process_incoming
+#define packet_put_bignum			ssh_packet_put_bignum
+#define packet_put_bignum2			ssh_packet_put_bignum2
+#define packet_put_char				ssh_packet_put_char
+#define packet_put_cstring			ssh_packet_put_cstring
+#define packet_put_int				ssh_packet_put_int
+#define packet_put_int64			ssh_packet_put_int64
+#define packet_put_raw				ssh_packet_put_raw
+#define packet_put_string			ssh_packet_put_string
+#define packet_read				ssh_packet_read
+#define packet_read_expect			ssh_packet_read_expect
+#define packet_read_poll			ssh_packet_read_poll
+#define packet_read_poll_seqnr			ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr
+#define packet_read_seqnr			ssh_packet_read_seqnr
+#define packet_remaining			ssh_packet_remaining
+#define packet_restore_state			ssh_packet_restore_state
+#define packet_send				ssh_packet_send
+#define packet_send_debug			ssh_packet_send_debug
+#define packet_send_ignore			ssh_packet_send_ignore
+#define packet_set_alive_timeouts		ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts
+#define packet_set_authenticated		ssh_packet_set_authenticated
+#define packet_set_connection			ssh_packet_set_connection
+#define packet_set_encryption_key		ssh_packet_set_encryption_key
+#define packet_set_interactive			ssh_packet_set_interactive
+#define packet_set_iv				ssh_packet_set_iv
+#define packet_set_keycontext			ssh_packet_set_keycontext
+#define packet_set_maxsize			ssh_packet_set_maxsize
+#define packet_set_nonblocking			ssh_packet_set_nonblocking
+#define packet_set_protocol_flags		ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags
+#define packet_set_rekey_limit			ssh_packet_set_rekey_limit
+#define packet_set_server			ssh_packet_set_server
+#define packet_set_state			ssh_packet_set_state
+#define packet_set_timeout			ssh_packet_set_timeout
+#define packet_start				ssh_packet_start
+#define packet_start_compression		ssh_packet_start_compression
+#define packet_write_poll			ssh_packet_write_poll
+#define packet_write_wait			ssh_packet_write_wait
+#define percent_expand				ssh_percent_expand
+#define permanently_drop_suid			ssh_permanently_drop_suid
+#define permanently_set_uid			ssh_permanently_set_uid
+#define prime_test				ssh_prime_test
+#define proto_spec				ssh_proto_spec
+#define put_host_port				ssh_put_host_port
+#define put_u16					ssh_put_u16
+#define put_u32					ssh_put_u32
+#define put_u64					ssh_put_u64
+#define pwcopy					ssh_pwcopy
+#define read_keyfile_line			ssh_read_keyfile_line
+#define read_passphrase				ssh_read_passphrase
+#define refresh_progress_meter			ssh_refresh_progress_meter
+#define replacearg				ssh_replacearg
+#define restore_uid				ssh_restore_uid
+#define rijndael_decrypt			ssh_rijndael_decrypt
+#define rijndael_encrypt			ssh_rijndael_encrypt
+#define rijndael_set_key			ssh_rijndael_set_key
+#define rsa_generate_additional_parameters	ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters
+#define rsa_private_decrypt			ssh_rsa_private_decrypt
+#define rsa_public_encrypt			ssh_rsa_public_encrypt
+#define sanitise_stdfd				ssh_sanitise_stdfd
+#define scan_scaled				ssh_scan_scaled
+#define schnorr_sign				ssh_schnorr_sign
+#define schnorr_verify				ssh_schnorr_verify
+#define seed_rng				ssh_seed_rng
+#define set_newkeys				ssh_set_newkeys
+#define set_nodelay				ssh_set_nodelay
+#define set_nonblock				ssh_set_nonblock
+#define shadow_pw				ssh_shadow_pw
+#define sigdie					ssh_sigdie
+#define ssh1_3des_iv				ssh_ssh1_3des_iv
+#define start_progress_meter			ssh_start_progress_meter
+#define stop_progress_meter			ssh_stop_progress_meter
+#define strdelim				ssh_strdelim
+#define strnvis					ssh_strnvis
+#define strvis					ssh_strvis
+#define strvisx					ssh_strvisx
+#define sys_tun_open				ssh_sys_tun_open
+#define temporarily_use_uid			ssh_temporarily_use_uid
+#define tilde_expand_filename			ssh_tilde_expand_filename
+#define tohex					ssh_tohex
+#define tty_make_modes				ssh_tty_make_modes
+#define tty_parse_modes				ssh_tty_parse_modes
+#define tun_open				ssh_tun_open
+#define umac_delete				ssh_umac_delete
+#define umac_final				ssh_umac_final
+#define umac_new				ssh_umac_new
+#define umac_update				ssh_umac_update
+#define unset_nonblock				ssh_unset_nonblock
+#define uudecode				ssh_uudecode
+#define uuencode				ssh_uuencode
+#define verbose					ssh_verbose
+#define verbose					ssh_verbose
+#define verify_host_key_dns			ssh_verify_host_key_dns
+#define vis					ssh_vis
+#define x11_connect_display			ssh_x11_connect_display
+#define x11_create_display_inet			ssh_x11_create_display_inet
+#define x11_input_open				ssh_x11_input_open
+#define x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing	ssh_x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing
+#define xasprintf				ssh_xasprintf
+#define xcalloc					ssh_xcalloc
+#define xcrypt					ssh_xcrypt
+#define xfree					ssh_xfree
+#define xmalloc					ssh_xmalloc
+#define xmmap					ssh_xmmap
+#define xrealloc				ssh_xrealloc
+#define xstrdup					ssh_xstrdup
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19009cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1189 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.214 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
+/* $FreeBSD$ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
+ * login (authentication) dialog.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+#include "version.h"
+
+char *client_version_string = NULL;
+char *server_version_string = NULL;
+
+static int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
+
+/* import */
+extern Options options;
+extern char *__progname;
+extern uid_t original_real_uid;
+extern uid_t original_effective_uid;
+extern pid_t proxy_command_pid;
+
+static int show_other_keys(const char *, Key *);
+static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
+
+/*
+ * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
+{
+	char *command_string, *tmp;
+	int pin[2], pout[2];
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *shell, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+	/* Convert the port number into a string. */
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port);
+
+	/*
+	 * Build the final command string in the buffer by making the
+	 * appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command.
+	 *
+	 * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms
+	 * (e.g. Solaris)
+	 */
+	xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
+	command_string = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host,
+	    "p", strport, (char *)NULL);
+	xfree(tmp);
+
+	/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
+	if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0)
+		fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+	debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
+
+	/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
+	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+		char *argv[10];
+
+		/* Child.  Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
+		permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
+
+		/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
+		close(pin[1]);
+		if (pin[0] != 0) {
+			if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
+				perror("dup2 stdin");
+			close(pin[0]);
+		}
+		close(pout[0]);
+		if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
+			perror("dup2 stdout");
+		/* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
+		close(pout[1]);
+
+		/* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
+		   printed on the user's terminal. */
+		argv[0] = shell;
+		argv[1] = "-c";
+		argv[2] = command_string;
+		argv[3] = NULL;
+
+		/* Execute the proxy command.  Note that we gave up any
+		   extra privileges above. */
+		execv(argv[0], argv);
+		perror(argv[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Parent. */
+	if (pid < 0)
+		fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	else
+		proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
+
+	/* Close child side of the descriptors. */
+	close(pin[0]);
+	close(pout[1]);
+
+	/* Free the command name. */
+	xfree(command_string);
+
+	/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
+	packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]);
+	packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
+	    options.server_alive_count_max);
+
+	/* Indicate OK return */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
+{
+	int sock, gaierr;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
+	 * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port.
+	 */
+	if (privileged) {
+		int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
+		PRIV_START;
+		sock = rresvport_af(&p, ai->ai_family);
+		PRIV_END;
+		if (sock < 0)
+			error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", ai->ai_family,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		else
+			debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
+		return sock;
+	}
+	sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+	if (options.bind_address == NULL)
+		return sock;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
+	hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+	gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res);
+	if (gaierr) {
+		error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
+		    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		close(sock);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+		error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address, strerror(errno));
+		close(sock);
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+	return sock;
+}
+
+static int
+timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
+    socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
+{
+	fd_set *fdset;
+	struct timeval tv, t_start;
+	socklen_t optlen;
+	int optval, rc, result = -1;
+
+	gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL);
+
+	if (*timeoutp <= 0) {
+		result = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	set_nonblock(sockfd);
+	rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+		result = 0;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (errno != EINPROGRESS) {
+		result = -1;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS),
+	    sizeof(fd_mask));
+	FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
+	ms_to_timeval(&tv, *timeoutp);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv);
+		if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Timed out */
+		errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+		break;
+	case -1:
+		/* Select error */
+		debug("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		/* Completed or failed */
+		optval = 0;
+		optlen = sizeof(optval);
+		if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval,
+		    &optlen) == -1) {
+			debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
+			break;
+		}
+		if (optval != 0) {
+			errno = optval;
+			break;
+		}
+		result = 0;
+		unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Should not occur */
+		fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc);
+	}
+
+	xfree(fdset);
+
+ done:
+ 	if (result == 0 && *timeoutp > 0) {
+		ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
+		if (*timeoutp <= 0) {
+			errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+			result = -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
+ * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
+ * If port is 0, the default port will be used.  If needpriv is true,
+ * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection.
+ * This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true.
+ * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
+ * second).  If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
+ * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
+ * the daemon.
+ */
+int
+ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
+    u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms,
+    int want_keepalive, int needpriv, const char *proxy_command)
+{
+	int gaierr;
+	int on = 1;
+	int sock = -1, attempt;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+
+	debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv);
+
+	/* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */
+	if (proxy_command != NULL)
+		return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, proxy_command);
+
+	/* No proxy command. */
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname,
+		    host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+
+	for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
+		if (attempt > 0) {
+			/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
+			sleep(1);
+			debug("Trying again...");
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
+		 * sequence until the connection succeeds.
+		 */
+		for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+				continue;
+			if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+			    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+				error("ssh_connect: getnameinfo failed");
+				continue;
+			}
+			debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
+				host, ntop, strport);
+
+			/* Create a socket for connecting. */
+			sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai);
+			if (sock < 0)
+				/* Any error is already output */
+				continue;
+
+			if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+			    timeout_ms) >= 0) {
+				/* Successful connection. */
+				memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+				break;
+			} else {
+				debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
+				    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+				close(sock);
+				sock = -1;
+			}
+		}
+		if (sock != -1)
+			break;	/* Successful connection. */
+	}
+
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+
+	/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
+	if (sock == -1) {
+		error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
+		    host, strport, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	debug("Connection established.");
+
+	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+	if (want_keepalive &&
+	    setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
+	    sizeof(on)) < 0)
+		error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Set the connection. */
+	packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
+	packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
+	    options.server_alive_count_max);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
+ * identification string.
+ */
+void
+ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
+{
+	char buf[256], remote_version[256];	/* must be same size! */
+	int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
+	int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+	int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+	int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+	u_int i, n;
+	size_t len;
+	int fdsetsz, remaining, rc;
+	struct timeval t_start, t_remaining;
+	fd_set *fdset;
+
+	fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+	fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz);
+
+	/* Read other side's version identification. */
+	remaining = timeout_ms;
+	for (n = 0;;) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+			if (timeout_ms > 0) {
+				gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL);
+				ms_to_timeval(&t_remaining, remaining);
+				FD_SET(connection_in, fdset);
+				rc = select(connection_in + 1, fdset, NULL,
+				    fdset, &t_remaining);
+				ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, &remaining);
+				if (rc == 0 || remaining <= 0)
+					fatal("Connection timed out during "
+					    "banner exchange");
+				if (rc == -1) {
+					if (errno == EINTR)
+						continue;
+					fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+					    "select: %s", strerror(errno));
+				}
+			}
+
+			len = roaming_atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+
+			if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
+				fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+				    "Connection closed by remote host");
+			else if (len != 1)
+				fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+				    "read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+				buf[i] = '\n';
+				buf[i + 1] = 0;
+				continue;		/**XXX wait for \n */
+			}
+			if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+				buf[i + 1] = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (++n > 65536)
+				fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+				    "No banner received");
+		}
+		buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+		if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+			break;
+		debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
+	}
+	server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+	xfree(fdset);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the versions match.  In future this might accept
+	 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+	 */
+	if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+	    &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
+		fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf);
+	debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+
+	compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+	mismatch = 0;
+
+	switch (remote_major) {
+	case 1:
+		if (remote_minor == 99 &&
+		    (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) &&
+		    !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) {
+			enable_compat20();
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
+			mismatch = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (remote_minor < 3) {
+			fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version.");
+		} else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) {
+			/* We speak 1.3, too. */
+			enable_compat13();
+			minor1 = 3;
+			if (options.forward_agent) {
+				logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3");
+				options.forward_agent = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+			enable_compat20();
+			break;
+		}
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default:
+		mismatch = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (mismatch)
+		fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
+		    (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
+		    remote_major);
+	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s",
+	    compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
+	    compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
+	    SSH_VERSION, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n");
+	if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf))
+	    != strlen(buf))
+		fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+	chop(client_version_string);
+	chop(server_version_string);
+	debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
+}
+
+/* defaults to 'no' */
+static int
+confirm(const char *prompt)
+{
+	const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
+	char *p;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (options.batch_mode)
+		return 0;
+	for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) {
+		p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
+		if (p == NULL ||
+		    (p[0] == '\0') || (p[0] == '\n') ||
+		    strncasecmp(p, "no", 2) == 0)
+			ret = 0;
+		if (p && strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0)
+			ret = 1;
+		if (p)
+			xfree(p);
+		if (ret != -1)
+			return ret;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
+ * is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
+ */
+#define RDRW	0
+#define RDONLY	1
+#define ROQUIET	2
+static int
+check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+    Key *host_key, int readonly, const char *user_hostfile,
+    const char *system_hostfile)
+{
+	Key *file_key;
+	const char *type = key_type(host_key);
+	char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
+	char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
+	HostStatus host_status;
+	HostStatus ip_status;
+	int r, local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0;
+	int salen;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char msg[1024];
+	int len, host_line, ip_line, cancelled_forwarding = 0;
+	const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
+	 * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
+	 * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
+	 * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings.  This
+	 * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
+	 * this is probably not a real problem.
+	 */
+	/**  hostaddr == 0! */
+	switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		local = (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
+		    sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		local = IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
+		    &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		break;
+	default:
+		local = 0;
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+		break;
+	}
+	if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
+	    options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
+		debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
+		    "loopback/localhost.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
+	 * using a proxy command
+	 */
+	if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+		if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, salen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+		    NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+			fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed");
+		ip = put_host_port(ntop, port);
+	} else {
+		ip = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy command>");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
+	 * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
+	 */
+	if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
+	    strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
+		options.check_host_ip = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
+	 * differentiate a non-standard port.  This is useful for ssh
+	 * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
+	 * sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
+	 */
+	if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
+		host = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
+		debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", host);
+	} else {
+		host = put_host_port(hostname, port);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Store the host key from the known host file in here so that we can
+	 * compare it with the key for the IP address.
+	 */
+	file_key = key_new(host_key->type);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
+	 * hosts or in the systemwide list.
+	 */
+	host_file = user_hostfile;
+	host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key,
+	    file_key, &host_line);
+	if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
+		host_file = system_hostfile;
+		host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key,
+		    file_key, &host_line);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
+	 * localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with
+	 */
+	if (options.check_host_ip) {
+		Key *ip_key = key_new(host_key->type);
+
+		ip_file = user_hostfile;
+		ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip, host_key,
+		    ip_key, &ip_line);
+		if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+			ip_file = system_hostfile;
+			ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip,
+			    host_key, ip_key, &ip_line);
+		}
+		if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
+		    (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || !key_equal(ip_key, file_key)))
+			host_ip_differ = 1;
+
+		key_free(ip_key);
+	} else
+		ip_status = host_status;
+
+	key_free(file_key);
+
+	switch (host_status) {
+	case HOST_OK:
+		/* The host is known and the key matches. */
+		debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host key.",
+		    host, type);
+		debug("Found key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
+		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+			if (readonly)
+				logit("%s host key for IP address "
+				    "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
+				    type, ip);
+			else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip,
+			    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
+				logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
+				    "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
+				    "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, user_hostfile);
+			else
+				logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
+				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
+				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
+			xfree(ra);
+			xfree(fp);
+		}
+		break;
+	case HOST_NEW:
+		if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
+		    port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
+			debug("checking without port identifier");
+			if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
+			    ROQUIET, user_hostfile, system_hostfile) == 0) {
+				debug("found matching key w/out port");
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (readonly)
+			goto fail;
+		/* The host is new. */
+		if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
+			/*
+			 * User has requested strict host key checking.  We
+			 * will not add the host key automatically.  The only
+			 * alternative left is to abort.
+			 */
+			error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
+			    "have requested strict checking.", type, host);
+			goto fail;
+		} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+			char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
+
+			if (show_other_keys(host, host_key))
+				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
+				    "\nbut keys of different type are already"
+				    " known for this host.");
+			else
+				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+			/* The default */
+			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+			msg2[0] = '\0';
+			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+				if (matching_host_key_dns)
+					snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+					    "Matching host key fingerprint"
+					    " found in DNS.\n");
+				else
+					snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+					    "No matching host key fingerprint"
+					    " found in DNS.\n");
+			}
+			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+			    "established%s\n"
+			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
+			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+			    "(yes/no)? ",
+			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
+			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+			    msg2);
+			xfree(ra);
+			xfree(fp);
+			if (!confirm(msg))
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the
+		 * local known_hosts file.
+		 */
+		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+			snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s",
+			    host, ip);
+			hostp = hostline;
+			if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
+				/* Add hash of host and IP separately */
+				r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, host,
+				    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
+				    add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip,
+				    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
+			} else {
+				/* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
+				r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile,
+				    hostline, host_key,
+				    options.hash_known_hosts);
+			}
+		} else {
+			r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, host, host_key,
+			    options.hash_known_hosts);
+			hostp = host;
+		}
+
+		if (!r)
+			logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
+			    "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfile);
+		else
+			logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
+			    "list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
+		break;
+	case HOST_CHANGED:
+		if (readonly == ROQUIET)
+			goto fail;
+		if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
+			char *key_msg;
+			if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
+				key_msg = "is unknown";
+			else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
+				key_msg = "is unchanged";
+			else
+				key_msg = "has a different value";
+			error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+			error("@       WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED!          @");
+			error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+			error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
+			error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
+			error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
+			error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
+			error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
+			if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
+				error("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line);
+		}
+		/* The host key has changed. */
+		warn_changed_key(host_key);
+		error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
+		    user_hostfile);
+		error("Offending key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
+
+		/*
+		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+		 */
+		if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
+			error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+			    "requested strict checking.", type, host);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
+		 * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
+		 * forwarding.
+		 */
+		if (options.password_authentication) {
+			error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.password_authentication = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
+			error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
+			    " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+			options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
+			error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
+			    " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.forward_agent) {
+			error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.forward_agent = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.forward_x11) {
+			error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.forward_x11 = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
+		    options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+			error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.num_local_forwards =
+			    options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+			error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
+			fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
+			    "check failure");
+		
+		/*
+		 * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
+		 * This could be done by converting the host key to an
+		 * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
+		 * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she whishes to
+		 * accept the authentication.
+		 */
+		break;
+	case HOST_FOUND:
+		fatal("internal error");
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
+	    ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
+		snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+		    "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
+		    "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
+		    "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%d",
+		    type, host, ip, ip_file, ip_line);
+		if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+			len = strlen(msg);
+			snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
+			    "\nMatching host key in %s:%d",
+			    host_file, host_line);
+		}
+		if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
+			logit("%s", msg);
+			error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
+			goto fail;
+		} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+			strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
+			    "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
+			if (!confirm(msg))
+				goto fail;
+		} else {
+			logit("%s", msg);
+		}
+	}
+
+	xfree(ip);
+	xfree(host);
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	xfree(ip);
+	xfree(host);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
+int
+verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	int flags = 0;
+
+	if (options.verify_host_key_dns &&
+	    verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
+
+		if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
+
+			if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
+			    flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
+			    flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE)
+				return 0;
+
+			if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
+				matching_host_key_dns = 1;
+			} else {
+				warn_changed_key(host_key);
+				error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
+				    "host key to get rid of this message.");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */
+	if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 ||
+	    stat(options.user_hostfile2, &st) == 0) {
+		if (check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key,
+		    RDONLY, options.user_hostfile2,
+		    options.system_hostfile2) == 0)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key,
+	    RDRW, options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
+ * server.  This does not need any extra privileges.  The basic connection
+ * to the server must already have been established before this is called.
+ * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
+ * This function does not require super-user privileges.
+ */
+void
+ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
+    struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
+{
+	char *host, *cp;
+	char *server_user, *local_user;
+
+	local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+	server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
+
+	/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
+	host = xstrdup(orighost);
+	for (cp = host; *cp; cp++)
+		if (isupper(*cp))
+			*cp = (char)tolower(*cp);
+
+	/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
+	ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms);
+
+	/* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
+	packet_set_nonblocking();
+
+	/* key exchange */
+	/* authenticate user */
+	if (compat20) {
+		ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr);
+		ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
+	} else {
+		ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
+		ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
+	}
+	xfree(local_user);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_put_password(char *password)
+{
+	int size;
+	char *padded;
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) {
+		packet_put_cstring(password);
+		return;
+	}
+	size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
+	padded = xcalloc(1, size);
+	strlcpy(padded, password, size);
+	packet_put_string(padded, size);
+	memset(padded, 0, size);
+	xfree(padded);
+}
+
+static int
+show_key_from_file(const char *file, const char *host, int keytype)
+{
+	Key *found;
+	char *fp, *ra;
+	int line, ret;
+
+	found = key_new(keytype);
+	if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host,
+	    keytype, found, &line))) {
+		fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+		if (options.visual_host_key)
+			ra = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+		    "in %s:%d\n"
+		    "%s key fingerprint %s.%s%s\n",
+		    key_type(found), host, file, line,
+		    key_type(found), fp,
+		    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+		    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "");
+		if (options.visual_host_key)
+			xfree(ra);
+		xfree(fp);
+	}
+	key_free(found);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
+static int
+show_other_keys(const char *host, Key *key)
+{
+	int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, -1};
+	int i, found = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
+		if (type[i] == key->type)
+			continue;
+		if (type[i] != KEY_RSA1 &&
+		    show_key_from_file(options.user_hostfile2, host, type[i])) {
+			found = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (type[i] != KEY_RSA1 &&
+		    show_key_from_file(options.system_hostfile2, host, type[i])) {
+			found = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (show_key_from_file(options.user_hostfile, host, type[i])) {
+			found = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (show_key_from_file(options.system_hostfile, host, type[i])) {
+			found = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug2("no key of type %d for host %s", type[i], host);
+	}
+	return (found);
+}
+
+static void
+warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+{
+	char *fp;
+	const char *type = key_type(host_key);
+
+	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+
+	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
+	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+	error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type);
+	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+	    type, fp);
+	error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+
+	xfree(fp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Execute a local command
+ */
+int
+ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
+{
+	char *shell;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+
+	if (!options.permit_local_command ||
+	    args == NULL || !*args)
+		return (1);
+
+	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+		execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+		error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
+		    shell, args, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	} else if (pid == -1)
+		fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+		return (1);
+
+	return (WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c59a097
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.25 2009/05/27 06:38:16 andreas Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
+struct Sensitive {
+	Key	**keys;
+	int	nkeys;
+	int	external_keysign;
+};
+
+int
+ssh_connect(const char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int,
+    int *, int, int, const char *);
+
+void
+ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct passwd *, int);
+
+void	 ssh_exchange_identification(int);
+
+int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *);
+
+void	 ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
+void	 ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *);
+
+void	 ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
+void	 ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
+
+void	 ssh_put_password(char *);
+int	 ssh_local_cmd(const char *);
+
+/*
+ * Macros to raise/lower permissions.
+ */
+#define PRIV_START do {					\
+	int save_errno = errno;				\
+	if (seteuid(original_effective_uid) != 0)	\
+		fatal("PRIV_START: seteuid: %s",	\
+		    strerror(errno));			\
+	errno = save_errno;				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define PRIV_END do {					\
+	int save_errno = errno;				\
+	if (seteuid(original_real_uid) != 0)		\
+		fatal("PRIV_END: seteuid: %s",		\
+		    strerror(errno));			\
+	errno = save_errno;				\
+} while (0)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd07bbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.70 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
+ * login (authentication) dialog.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/* Session id for the current session. */
+u_char session_id[16];
+u_int supported_authentications = 0;
+
+extern Options options;
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to
+ * authenticate using the agent.
+ */
+static int
+try_agent_authentication(void)
+{
+	int type;
+	char *comment;
+	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
+	u_char response[16];
+	u_int i;
+	Key *key;
+	BIGNUM *challenge;
+
+	/* Get connection to the agent. */
+	auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+	if (!auth)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("try_agent_authentication: BN_new failed");
+	/* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
+	for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &comment, 1);
+	    key != NULL;
+	    key = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &comment, 1)) {
+
+		/* Try this identity. */
+		debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment);
+		xfree(comment);
+
+		/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
+		packet_put_bignum(key->rsa->n);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		/* Wait for server's response. */
+		type = packet_read();
+
+		/* The server sends failure if it doesn't like our key or
+		   does not support RSA authentication. */
+		if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+			debug("Server refused our key.");
+			key_free(key);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */
+		if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d",
+					  type);
+
+		packet_get_bignum(challenge);
+		packet_check_eom();
+
+		debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
+
+		/* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */
+		if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, key, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) {
+			/*
+			 * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier
+			 * although it advertised it supports this.  Just
+			 * return a wrong value.
+			 */
+			logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
+			memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
+		}
+		key_free(key);
+		debug("Sending response to RSA challenge.");
+
+		/* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+			packet_put_char(response[i]);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		/* Wait for response from the server. */
+		type = packet_read();
+
+		/* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */
+		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+			ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth);
+			BN_clear_free(challenge);
+			debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		/* Otherwise it should return failure. */
+		if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d",
+					  type);
+	}
+	ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth);
+	BN_clear_free(challenge);
+	debug("RSA authentication using agent refused.");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to
+ * the server.
+ */
+static void
+respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
+{
+	u_char buf[32], response[16];
+	MD5_CTX md;
+	int i, len;
+
+	/* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
+	/* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */
+	if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) <= 0)
+		packet_disconnect(
+		    "respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed");
+
+	/* Compute the response. */
+	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+	if (len <= 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(buf))
+		packet_disconnect(
+		    "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
+
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len);
+	MD5_Init(&md);
+	MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
+	MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
+	MD5_Final(response, &md);
+
+	debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge.");
+
+	/* Send the response back to the server. */
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		packet_put_char(response[i]);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
+	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate
+ * the user using it.
+ */
+static int
+try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
+{
+	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	Key *public, *private;
+	char buf[300], *passphrase, *comment, *authfile;
+	int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit;
+
+	public = options.identity_keys[idx];
+	authfile = options.identity_files[idx];
+	comment = xstrdup(authfile);
+
+	debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
+
+	/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
+	packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/* Wait for server's response. */
+	type = packet_read();
+
+	/*
+	 * The server responds with failure if it doesn't like our key or
+	 * doesn't support RSA authentication.
+	 */
+	if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+		debug("Server refused our key.");
+		xfree(comment);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
+	if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
+
+	/* Get the challenge from the packet. */
+	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("try_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(challenge);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
+
+	/*
+	 * If the key is not stored in external hardware, we have to
+	 * load the private key.  Try first with empty passphrase; if it
+	 * fails, ask for a passphrase.
+	 */
+	if (public->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)
+		private = public;
+	else
+		private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL,
+		    &perm_ok);
+	if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) {
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
+		for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+			passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
+			if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
+				private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
+				    authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
+				quit = 0;
+			} else {
+				debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+				quit = 1;
+			}
+			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+			xfree(passphrase);
+			if (private != NULL || quit)
+				break;
+			debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
+		}
+	}
+	/* We no longer need the comment. */
+	xfree(comment);
+
+	if (private == NULL) {
+		if (!options.batch_mode && perm_ok)
+			error("Bad passphrase.");
+
+		/* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+			packet_put_char(0);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		/* Expect the server to reject it... */
+		packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+		BN_clear_free(challenge);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */
+	respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa);
+
+	/* Destroy the private key unless it in external hardware. */
+	if (!(private->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
+		key_free(private);
+
+	/* We no longer need the challenge. */
+	BN_clear_free(challenge);
+
+	/* Wait for response from the server. */
+	type = packet_read();
+	if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+		debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
+	debug("RSA authentication refused.");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
+ * authentication and RSA host authentication.
+ */
+static int
+try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key)
+{
+	int type;
+	BIGNUM *challenge;
+
+	debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
+
+	/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
+	packet_put_cstring(local_user);
+	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
+	packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/* Wait for server's response. */
+	type = packet_read();
+
+	/* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our
+	   .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */
+	if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+		debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
+	if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
+
+	/* Get the challenge from the packet. */
+	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("try_rhosts_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(challenge);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server.");
+
+	/* Compute a response to the challenge. */
+	respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key->rsa);
+
+	/* We no longer need the challenge. */
+	BN_clear_free(challenge);
+
+	/* Wait for response from the server. */
+	type = packet_read();
+	if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+		debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server.");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
+	debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused.");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system.
+ * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS.
+ */
+static int
+try_challenge_response_authentication(void)
+{
+	int type, i;
+	u_int clen;
+	char prompt[1024];
+	char *challenge, *response;
+
+	debug("Doing challenge response authentication.");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+		/* request a challenge */
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		type = packet_read();
+		if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE &&
+		    type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
+			    "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS", type);
+		}
+		if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+			debug("No challenge.");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		challenge = packet_get_string(&clen);
+		packet_check_eom();
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "%s%s", challenge,
+		    strchr(challenge, '\n') ? "" : "\nResponse: ");
+		xfree(challenge);
+		if (i != 0)
+			error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+			logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
+			    "Response will be transmitted in clear text.");
+		response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+		if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) {
+			xfree(response);
+			break;
+		}
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
+		ssh_put_password(response);
+		memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
+		xfree(response);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+		type = packet_read();
+		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+			return 1;
+		if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
+			    "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE", type);
+	}
+	/* failure */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication.
+ */
+static int
+try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
+{
+	int type, i;
+	char *password;
+
+	debug("Doing password authentication.");
+	if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+		logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text.");
+	for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+		if (i != 0)
+			error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+		password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
+		ssh_put_password(password);
+		memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+		xfree(password);
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+
+		type = packet_read();
+		if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+			return 1;
+		if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type);
+	}
+	/* failure */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 key exchange
+ */
+void
+ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+{
+	int i;
+	BIGNUM *key;
+	Key *host_key, *server_key;
+	int bits, rbits;
+	int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
+	u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+	u_char cookie[8];
+	u_int supported_ciphers;
+	u_int server_flags, client_flags;
+	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+
+	debug("Waiting for server public key.");
+
+	/* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */
+	packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+	/* Get cookie from the packet. */
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
+
+	/* Get the public key. */
+	server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	bits = packet_get_int();
+	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
+
+	rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n);
+	if (bits != rbits) {
+		logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
+		    "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
+		logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+	}
+	/* Get the host key. */
+	host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	bits = packet_get_int();
+	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+
+	rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n);
+	if (bits != rbits) {
+		logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
+		    "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
+		logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+	}
+
+	/* Get protocol flags. */
+	server_flags = packet_get_int();
+	packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags);
+
+	supported_ciphers = packet_get_int();
+	supported_authentications = packet_get_int();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
+	    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
+
+	if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1)
+		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+
+	client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
+
+	derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id);
+
+	/* Generate a session key. */
+	arc4random_stir();
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate an encryption key for the session.   The key is a 256 bit
+	 * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
+	 * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+		if (i % 4 == 0)
+			rnd = arc4random();
+		session_key[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+		rnd >>= 8;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key
+	 * is the highest byte of the integer.  The session key is xored with
+	 * the first 16 bytes of the session id.
+	 */
+	if ((key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_kex: BN_new failed");
+	if (BN_set_word(key, 0) == 0)
+		fatal("ssh_kex: BN_set_word failed");
+	for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
+		if (BN_lshift(key, key, 8) == 0)
+			fatal("ssh_kex: BN_lshift failed");
+		if (i < 16) {
+			if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i])
+			    == 0)
+				fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed");
+		} else {
+			if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]) == 0)
+				fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
+	 * server (key with smaller modulus first).
+	 */
+	if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) {
+		/* Public key has smaller modulus. */
+		if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + "
+			    "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+			    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+		}
+		rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa);
+		rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa);
+	} else {
+		/* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
+		if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + "
+			    "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+			    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+		}
+		rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa);
+		rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa);
+	}
+
+	/* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */
+	key_free(server_key);
+	key_free(host_key);
+
+	if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) {
+		if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default))
+			options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
+	} else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_INVALID ||
+	    !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) {
+		logit("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.",
+		    cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default));
+		options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
+	}
+	/* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */
+	if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher)))
+		fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.",
+		    cipher_name(options.cipher));
+
+	debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher));
+
+	/* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+	packet_put_char(options.cipher);
+
+	/* Send the cookie back to the server. */
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
+
+	/* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */
+	packet_put_bignum(key);
+	BN_clear_free(key);
+
+	/* Send protocol flags. */
+	packet_put_int(client_flags);
+
+	/* Send the packet now. */
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	debug("Sent encrypted session key.");
+
+	/* Set the encryption key. */
+	packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher);
+
+	/* We will no longer need the session key here.  Destroy any extra copies. */
+	memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+
+	/*
+	 * Expect a success message from the server.  Note that this message
+	 * will be received in encrypted form.
+	 */
+	packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+
+	debug("Received encrypted confirmation.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticate user
+ */
+void
+ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
+    Sensitive *sensitive)
+{
+	int i, type;
+
+	if (supported_authentications == 0)
+		fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods");
+
+	/* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */
+	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+	packet_put_cstring(server_user);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	/*
+	 * The server should respond with success if no authentication is
+	 * needed (the user has no password).  Otherwise the server responds
+	 * with failure.
+	 */
+	type = packet_read();
+
+	/* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */
+	if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+		goto success;
+	if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type);
+
+	/*
+	 * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
+	 * authentication.
+	 */
+	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) &&
+	    options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sensitive->keys[i] != NULL &&
+			    sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
+			    try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user,
+			    sensitive->keys[i]))
+				goto success;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */
+	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) &&
+	    options.rsa_authentication) {
+		/*
+		 * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The
+		 * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for
+		 * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases.
+		 */
+		if (try_agent_authentication())
+			goto success;
+
+		/* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
+			if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL &&
+			    options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
+			    try_rsa_authentication(i))
+				goto success;
+	}
+	/* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */
+	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) &&
+	    options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
+		if (try_challenge_response_authentication())
+			goto success;
+	}
+	/* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */
+	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) &&
+	    options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
+		char prompt[80];
+
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
+		    server_user, host);
+		if (try_password_authentication(prompt))
+			goto success;
+	}
+	/* All authentication methods have failed.  Exit with an error message. */
+	fatal("Permission denied.");
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+
+ success:
+	return;	/* need statement after label */
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..260c630
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1828 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.171 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+/* import */
+extern char *client_version_string;
+extern char *server_version_string;
+extern Options options;
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 key exchange
+ */
+
+u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+
+char *xxx_host;
+struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
+
+Kex *xxx_kex = NULL;
+
+static int
+verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey)
+{
+	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
+		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+{
+	Kex *kex;
+
+	xxx_host = host;
+	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
+	if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+		logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+		options.ciphers = NULL;
+	}
+	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
+	}
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
+	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
+	if (options.compression) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none";
+	} else {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
+	}
+	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+	}
+	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+
+	if (options.rekey_limit)
+		packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
+
+	/* start key exchange */
+	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+	kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
+	xxx_kex = kex;
+
+	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+
+	session_id2 = kex->session_id;
+	session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+	packet_put_cstring("markus");
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticate user
+ */
+
+typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
+typedef struct identity Identity;
+typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+
+struct identity {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+	AuthenticationConnection *ac;	/* set if agent supports key */
+	Key	*key;			/* public/private key */
+	char	*filename;		/* comment for agent-only keys */
+	int	tried;
+	int	isprivate;		/* key points to the private key */
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
+
+struct Authctxt {
+	const char *server_user;
+	const char *local_user;
+	const char *host;
+	const char *service;
+	Authmethod *method;
+	int success;
+	char *authlist;
+	/* pubkey */
+	Idlist keys;
+	AuthenticationConnection *agent;
+	/* hostbased */
+	Sensitive *sensitive;
+	/* kbd-interactive */
+	int info_req_seen;
+	/* generic */
+	void *methoddata;
+};
+struct Authmethod {
+	char	*name;		/* string to compare against server's list */
+	int	(*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+	void	(*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+	int	*enabled;	/* flag in option struct that enables method */
+	int	*batch_flag;	/* flag in option struct that disables method */
+};
+
+void	input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_jpake_server_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_jpake_server_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int	userauth_none(Authctxt *);
+int	userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
+int	userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
+int	userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
+int	userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
+int	userauth_jpake(Authctxt *);
+
+void	userauth_jpake_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int	userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
+void	input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+#endif
+
+void	userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+
+static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *);
+static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
+static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *);
+static Key *load_identity_file(char *);
+
+static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
+static char *authmethods_get(void);
+
+Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	{"gssapi-with-mic",
+		userauth_gssapi,
+		NULL,
+		&options.gss_authentication,
+		NULL},
+#endif
+	{"hostbased",
+		userauth_hostbased,
+		NULL,
+		&options.hostbased_authentication,
+		NULL},
+	{"publickey",
+		userauth_pubkey,
+		NULL,
+		&options.pubkey_authentication,
+		NULL},
+#ifdef JPAKE
+	{"jpake-01@openssh.com",
+		userauth_jpake,
+		userauth_jpake_cleanup,
+		&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication,
+		&options.batch_mode},
+#endif
+	{"keyboard-interactive",
+		userauth_kbdint,
+		NULL,
+		&options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
+		&options.batch_mode},
+	{"password",
+		userauth_passwd,
+		NULL,
+		&options.password_authentication,
+		&options.batch_mode},
+	{"none",
+		userauth_none,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		NULL},
+	{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+void
+ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
+    Sensitive *sensitive)
+{
+	Authctxt authctxt;
+	int type;
+
+	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth");
+	packet_send();
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent");
+	packet_write_wait();
+	type = packet_read();
+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
+		fatal("Server denied authentication request: %d", type);
+	if (packet_remaining() > 0) {
+		char *reply = packet_get_string(NULL);
+		debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
+		xfree(reply);
+	} else {
+		debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
+
+	if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
+		options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
+
+	/* setup authentication context */
+	memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
+	pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
+	authctxt.server_user = server_user;
+	authctxt.local_user = local_user;
+	authctxt.host = host;
+	authctxt.service = "ssh-connection";		/* service name */
+	authctxt.success = 0;
+	authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
+	authctxt.authlist = NULL;
+	authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
+	authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
+	authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
+	if (authctxt.method == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
+
+	/* initial userauth request */
+	userauth_none(&authctxt);
+
+	dispatch_init(&input_userauth_error);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
+	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt);	/* loop until success */
+
+	pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt);
+	dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
+
+	debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+}
+
+void
+userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
+{
+	if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
+		authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
+
+	if (authctxt->methoddata) {
+		xfree(authctxt->methoddata);
+		authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+	}
+	if (authlist == NULL) {
+		authlist = authctxt->authlist;
+	} else {
+		if (authctxt->authlist)
+			xfree(authctxt->authlist);
+		authctxt->authlist = authlist;
+	}
+	for (;;) {
+		Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist);
+		if (method == NULL)
+			fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist);
+		authctxt->method = method;
+
+		/* reset the per method handler */
+		dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
+		    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
+
+		/* and try new method */
+		if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) {
+			debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
+			break;
+		} else {
+			debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method");
+			method->enabled = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
+	    "type %d", type);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	char *msg, *raw, *lang;
+	u_int len;
+
+	debug3("input_userauth_banner");
+	raw = packet_get_string(&len);
+	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+		if (len > 65536)
+			len = 65536;
+		msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */
+		strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL);
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+		xfree(msg);
+	}
+	xfree(raw);
+	xfree(lang);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context");
+	if (authctxt->authlist) {
+		xfree(authctxt->authlist);
+		authctxt->authlist = NULL;
+	}
+	if (authctxt->methoddata) {
+		xfree(authctxt->methoddata);
+		authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+	}
+	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	char *authlist = NULL;
+	int partial;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context");
+
+	authlist = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	partial = packet_get_char();
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	if (partial != 0)
+		logit("Authenticated with partial success.");
+	debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
+
+	userauth(authctxt, authlist);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Key *key = NULL;
+	Identity *id = NULL;
+	Buffer b;
+	int pktype, sent = 0;
+	u_int alen, blen;
+	char *pkalg, *fp;
+	u_char *pkblob;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context");
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) {
+		/* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */
+		debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK");
+		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+		buffer_init(&b);
+		buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
+		pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
+		buffer_free(&b);
+	} else {
+		pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+	}
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen);
+
+	if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) {
+		debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key->type != pktype) {
+		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
+		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
+		    key->type, pktype);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+	xfree(fp);
+
+	/*
+	 * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
+	 * moved to the end of the queue.  this also avoids confusion by
+	 * duplicate keys
+	 */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) {
+		if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
+			sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+done:
+	if (key != NULL)
+		key_free(key);
+	xfree(pkalg);
+	xfree(pkblob);
+
+	/* try another method if we did not send a packet */
+	if (sent == 0)
+		userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int
+userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
+	static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL;
+	static u_int mech = 0;
+	OM_uint32 min;
+	int ok = 0;
+
+	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+	 * once. */
+
+	if (gss_supported == NULL)
+		gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+
+	/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+	while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+		} else {
+			mech++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!ok)
+		return 0;
+
+	authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+
+	packet_put_int(1);
+
+	packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2);
+	packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE);
+	packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+	packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements,
+	    gss_supported->elements[mech].length);
+
+	packet_send();
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+
+	mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+	OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
+	Buffer b;
+
+	status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+	    recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags);
+
+	if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+		if (GSS_ERROR(status))
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
+		else
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+
+		packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+		packet_send();
+		gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+	}
+
+	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
+		if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
+			packet_send();
+		} else {
+			ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user,
+			    authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+			gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+			gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+			status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic);
+
+			if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
+				packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+
+				packet_send();
+			}
+
+			buffer_free(&b);
+			gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	int oidlen;
+	char *oidv;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	/* Setup our OID */
+	oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen);
+
+	if (oidlen <= 2 ||
+	    oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
+	    oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
+		xfree(oidv);
+		debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
+		userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
+		fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	xfree(oidv);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
+		/* Start again with next method on list */
+		debug("Trying to start again");
+		userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+		return;
+	}
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 status;
+	u_int slen;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+
+	recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+	recv_tok.length = slen;	/* safe typecast */
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok);
+
+	xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+		/* Start again with the next method in the list */
+		userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+		return;
+	}
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 status, ms;
+	u_int len;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+	recv_tok.length = len;
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
+	status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+	    &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
+
+	xfree(recv_tok.value);
+	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+
+	/* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+	OM_uint32 maj, min;
+	char *msg;
+	char *lang;
+
+	maj=packet_get_int();
+	min=packet_get_int();
+	msg=packet_get_string(NULL);
+	lang=packet_get_string(NULL);
+
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg);
+	xfree(msg);
+	xfree(lang);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+int
+userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	/* initial userauth request */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_send();
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int
+userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	static int attempt = 0;
+	char prompt[150];
+	char *password;
+
+	if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (attempt != 1)
+		error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
+	    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_put_char(0);
+	packet_put_cstring(password);
+	memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+	xfree(password);
+	packet_add_padding(64);
+	packet_send();
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
+	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
+	char prompt[150];
+
+	debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
+		    "no authentication context");
+
+	info = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	if (strlen(info) > 0)
+		logit("%s", info);
+	xfree(info);
+	xfree(lang);
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_put_char(1);			/* additional info */
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+	    "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ",
+	    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+	packet_put_cstring(password);
+	memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+	xfree(password);
+	password = NULL;
+	while (password == NULL) {
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+		    "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
+		    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+		password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+		if (password == NULL) {
+			/* bail out */
+			return;
+		}
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+		    "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
+		    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+		retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+		if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
+			memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+			xfree(password);
+			logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
+			password = NULL;
+		}
+		memset(retype, 0, strlen(retype));
+		xfree(retype);
+	}
+	packet_put_cstring(password);
+	memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+	xfree(password);
+	packet_add_padding(64);
+	packet_send();
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
+	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
+}
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+static char *
+pw_encrypt(const char *password, const char *crypt_scheme, const char *salt)
+{
+	/* OpenBSD crypt(3) handles all of these */
+	if (strcmp(crypt_scheme, "crypt") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "bcrypt") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "md5crypt") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(crypt_scheme, "crypt-extended") == 0)
+		return xstrdup(crypt(password, salt));
+	error("%s: unsupported password encryption scheme \"%.100s\"",
+	    __func__, crypt_scheme);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *
+jpake_password_to_secret(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *crypt_scheme,
+    const char *salt)
+{
+	char prompt[256], *password, *crypted;
+	u_char *secret;
+	u_int secret_len;
+	BIGNUM *ret;
+
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password (JPAKE): ",
+	    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+
+	if ((crypted = pw_encrypt(password, crypt_scheme, salt)) == NULL) {
+		logit("Disabling %s authentication", authctxt->method->name);
+		authctxt->method->enabled = NULL;
+		/* Continue with an empty password to fail gracefully */
+		crypted = xstrdup("");
+	}
+
+#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
+	debug3("%s: salt = %s", __func__, salt);
+	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, crypt_scheme);
+	debug3("%s: crypted = %s", __func__, crypted);
+#endif
+
+	if (hash_buffer(crypted, strlen(crypted), EVP_sha256(),
+	    &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
+
+	bzero(password, strlen(password));
+	bzero(crypted, strlen(crypted));
+	xfree(password);
+	xfree(crypted);
+
+	if ((ret = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
+	bzero(secret, secret_len);
+	xfree(secret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof, *x2_s_proof;
+	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len, x2_s_proof_len;
+	char *crypt_scheme, *salt;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1, NULL);
+
+	if ((pctx->g_x3 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (pctx->g_x4 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Fetch step 1 values */
+	crypt_scheme = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	salt = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	pctx->server_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->server_id_len);
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
+	x3_proof = packet_get_string(&x3_proof_len);
+	x4_proof = packet_get_string(&x4_proof_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Obtain password and derive secret */
+	pctx->s = jpake_password_to_secret(authctxt, crypt_scheme, salt);
+	bzero(crypt_scheme, strlen(crypt_scheme));
+	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
+	xfree(crypt_scheme);
+	xfree(salt);
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((pctx->s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
+
+	/* Calculate step 2 values */
+	jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x1,
+	    pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->x2,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    x3_proof, x3_proof_len,
+	    x4_proof, x4_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->a,
+	    &x2_s_proof, &x2_s_proof_len);
+
+	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+	xfree(x3_proof);
+	xfree(x4_proof);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Send values for step 2 */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->a);
+	packet_put_string(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+	packet_send();
+
+	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x2_s_proof);
+
+	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_server_step2);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+	u_char *x4_s_proof;
+	u_int x4_s_proof_len;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2, NULL);
+
+	if ((pctx->b = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+	/* Fetch step 2 values */
+	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->b);
+	x4_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x4_s_proof_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
+	jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->b,
+	    pctx->x2, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4,
+	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len,
+	    &pctx->k,
+	    &pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+
+	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+	xfree(x4_s_proof);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Send key confirmation proof */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM);
+	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
+	packet_send();
+
+	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+void
+input_userauth_jpake_server_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	/* Disable this message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM, NULL);
+
+	pctx->h_k_sid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
+
+	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
+	if (jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
+	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
+	    pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len) == 1)
+		debug("%s: %s success", __func__, authctxt->method->name);
+	else {
+		debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
+		/* XXX stash this so if auth succeeds then we can warn/kill */
+	}
+
+	userauth_jpake_cleanup(authctxt);
+}
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+
+static int
+identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Key *prv;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* the agent supports this key */
+	if (id->ac)
+		return (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, sigp, lenp,
+		    data, datalen));
+	/*
+	 * we have already loaded the private key or
+	 * the private key is stored in external hardware
+	 */
+	if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
+		return (key_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen));
+	/* load the private key from the file */
+	if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	ret = key_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+	key_free(prv);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	u_char *blob, *signature;
+	u_int bloblen, slen;
+	u_int skip = 0;
+	int ret = -1;
+	int have_sig = 1;
+
+	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey");
+
+	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+		/* we cannot handle this key */
+		debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* data to be signed */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+		buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+		skip = session_id2_len;
+	} else {
+		buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+		skip = buffer_len(&b);
+	}
+	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+	    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+	    "ssh-userauth" :
+	    authctxt->service);
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+		buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+	} else {
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
+		buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
+	}
+	buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
+
+	/* generate signature */
+	ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen,
+	    buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		xfree(blob);
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		return 0;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) {
+		buffer_clear(&b);
+		buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+		skip = session_id2_len;
+		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
+		buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
+			buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key));
+		buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
+	}
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	/* append signature */
+	buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen);
+	xfree(signature);
+
+	/* skip session id and packet type */
+	if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1)
+		fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error");
+	buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1);
+
+	/* put remaining data from buffer into packet */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	packet_send();
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+{
+	u_char *blob;
+	u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0;
+
+	debug3("send_pubkey_test");
+
+	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+		/* we cannot handle this key */
+		debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_put_char(have_sig);
+	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
+		packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(id->key));
+	packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
+	xfree(blob);
+	packet_send();
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static Key *
+load_identity_file(char *filename)
+{
+	Key *private;
+	char prompt[300], *passphrase;
+	int perm_ok, quit, i;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
+		debug3("no such identity: %s", filename);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL, &perm_ok);
+	if (!perm_ok)
+		return NULL;
+	if (private == NULL) {
+		if (options.batch_mode)
+			return NULL;
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
+		    "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename);
+		for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+			passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+			if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
+				private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
+				    filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
+				quit = 0;
+			} else {
+				debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+				quit = 1;
+			}
+			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+			xfree(passphrase);
+			if (private != NULL || quit)
+				break;
+			debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
+		}
+	}
+	return private;
+}
+
+/*
+ * try keys in the following order:
+ *	1. agent keys that are found in the config file
+ *	2. other agent keys
+ *	3. keys that are only listed in the config file
+ */
+static void
+pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+	Idlist agent, files, *preferred;
+	Key *key;
+	AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+	char *comment;
+	int i, found;
+
+	TAILQ_INIT(&agent);	/* keys from the agent */
+	TAILQ_INIT(&files);	/* keys from the config file */
+	preferred = &authctxt->keys;
+	TAILQ_INIT(preferred);	/* preferred order of keys */
+
+	/* list of keys stored in the filesystem */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		key = options.identity_keys[i];
+		if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+			continue;
+		options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+		id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+		id->key = key;
+		id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
+	}
+	/* list of keys supported by the agent */
+	if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection())) {
+		for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2);
+		    key != NULL;
+		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) {
+			found = 0;
+			TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
+				/* agent keys from the config file are preferred */
+				if (key_equal(key, id->key)) {
+					key_free(key);
+					xfree(comment);
+					TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+					TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+					id->ac = ac;
+					found = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
+				id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+				id->key = key;
+				id->filename = comment;
+				id->ac = ac;
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
+			}
+		}
+		/* append remaining agent keys */
+		for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+		}
+		authctxt->agent = ac;
+	}
+	/* append remaining keys from the config file */
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+	}
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) {
+		debug2("key: %s (%p)", id->filename, id->key);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+
+	if (authctxt->agent != NULL)
+		ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt->agent);
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
+	    id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		if (id->key)
+			key_free(id->key);
+		if (id->filename)
+			xfree(id->filename);
+		xfree(id);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+	int sent = 0;
+
+	while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
+		if (id->tried++)
+			return (0);
+		/* move key to the end of the queue */
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		/*
+		 * send a test message if we have the public key. for
+		 * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
+		 * private key instead
+		 */
+		if (id->key && id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+			debug("Offering public key: %s", id->filename);
+			sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id);
+		} else if (id->key == NULL) {
+			debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
+			id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename);
+			if (id->key != NULL) {
+				id->isprivate = 1;
+				sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id);
+				key_free(id->key);
+				id->key = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		if (sent)
+			return (sent);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method.
+ */
+int
+userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	static int attempt = 0;
+
+	if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+		return 0;
+	/* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
+	if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
+		debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
+		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	debug2("userauth_kbdint");
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_put_cstring("");					/* lang */
+	packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
+	    options.kbd_interactive_devices : "");
+	packet_send();
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE
+ */
+void
+input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response;
+	u_int num_prompts, i;
+	int echo = 0;
+
+	debug2("input_userauth_info_req");
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context");
+
+	authctxt->info_req_seen = 1;
+
+	name = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	inst = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	if (strlen(name) > 0)
+		logit("%s", name);
+	if (strlen(inst) > 0)
+		logit("%s", inst);
+	xfree(name);
+	xfree(inst);
+	xfree(lang);
+
+	num_prompts = packet_get_int();
+	/*
+	 * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested.
+	 * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if
+	 * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to
+	 * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response.
+	 */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
+	packet_put_int(num_prompts);
+
+	debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
+	for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
+		prompt = packet_get_string(NULL);
+		echo = packet_get_char();
+
+		response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
+
+		packet_put_cstring(response);
+		memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
+		xfree(response);
+		xfree(prompt);
+	}
+	packet_check_eom(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */
+
+	packet_add_padding(64);
+	packet_send();
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_keysign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	struct stat st;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int to[2], from[2], status, version = 2;
+
+	debug2("ssh_keysign called");
+
+	if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: no installed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
+		error("ssh_keysign: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (pipe(to) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pipe(from) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
+		close(from[0]);
+		if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+			fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(to[1]);
+		if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
+			fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(from[1]);
+		close(to[0]);
+		execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *) 0);
+		fatal("ssh_keysign: exec(%s): %s", _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	}
+	close(from[1]);
+	close(to[0]);
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, packet_get_connection_in()); /* send # of socket */
+	buffer_put_string(&b, data, datalen);
+	if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, &b) == -1)
+		fatal("ssh_keysign: couldn't send request");
+
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(from[0], &b) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: no reply");
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	close(from[0]);
+	close(to[1]);
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+
+	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: bad version");
+		buffer_free(&b);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*sigp = buffer_get_string(&b, lenp);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Key *private = NULL;
+	Sensitive *sensitive = authctxt->sensitive;
+	Buffer b;
+	u_char *signature, *blob;
+	char *chost, *pkalg, *p, myname[NI_MAXHOST];
+	const char *service;
+	u_int blen, slen;
+	int ok, i, len, found = 0;
+
+	/* check for a useful key */
+	for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
+		private = sensitive->keys[i];
+		if (private && private->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+			found = 1;
+			/* we take and free the key */
+			sensitive->keys[i] = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found) {
+		debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (key_to_blob(private, &blob, &blen) == 0) {
+		key_free(private);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* figure out a name for the client host */
+	p = NULL;
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+		p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
+	if (p == NULL) {
+		if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
+			verbose("userauth_hostbased: gethostname: %s", 
+			    strerror(errno));
+		} else
+			p = xstrdup(myname);
+	}
+	if (p == NULL) {
+		error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name");
+		key_free(private);
+		xfree(blob);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	len = strlen(p) + 2;
+	xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", p);
+	debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost);
+	xfree(p);
+
+	service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
+	    authctxt->service;
+	pkalg = xstrdup(key_ssh_name(private));
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	/* construct data */
+	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+	buffer_put_string(&b, blob, blen);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->local_user);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+	if (sensitive->external_keysign)
+		ok = ssh_keysign(private, &signature, &slen,
+		    buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	else
+		ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen,
+		    buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	key_free(private);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (ok != 0) {
+		error("key_sign failed");
+		xfree(chost);
+		xfree(pkalg);
+		xfree(blob);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_put_cstring(pkalg);
+	packet_put_string(blob, blen);
+	packet_put_cstring(chost);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->local_user);
+	packet_put_string(signature, slen);
+	memset(signature, 's', slen);
+	xfree(signature);
+	xfree(chost);
+	xfree(pkalg);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	packet_send();
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+int
+userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
+	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof;
+	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len;
+	static int attempt = 0; /* XXX share with userauth_password's? */
+
+	if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+		return 0;
+	if (attempt != 1)
+		error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+
+	if (authctxt->methoddata != NULL)
+		fatal("%s: authctxt->methoddata already set (%p)",
+		    __func__, authctxt->methoddata);
+
+	authctxt->methoddata = pctx = jpake_new();
+
+	/*
+	 * Send request immediately, to get the protocol going while
+	 * we do the initial computations.
+	 */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
+	    &pctx->client_id, &pctx->client_id_len,
+	    &pctx->x1, &pctx->x2, &pctx->g_x1, &pctx->g_x2,
+	    &x1_proof, &x1_proof_len,
+	    &x2_proof, &x2_proof_len);
+
+	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
+
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1);
+	packet_put_string(pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
+	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
+	packet_put_string(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+	packet_put_string(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+	packet_send();
+
+	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+	xfree(x1_proof);
+	xfree(x2_proof);
+
+	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1,
+	    input_userauth_jpake_server_step1);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void
+userauth_jpake_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	debug3("%s: clean up", __func__);
+	if (authctxt->methoddata != NULL) {
+		jpake_free(authctxt->methoddata);
+		authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* JPAKE */
+
+/* find auth method */
+
+/*
+ * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill
+ * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false.
+ */
+static int
+authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
+{
+	if (method == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
+	if  (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
+		return 0;
+	/* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
+	if  (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+	Authmethod *method = NULL;
+	if (name != NULL)
+		for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
+			if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
+				return method;
+	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX internal state */
+static Authmethod *current = NULL;
+static char *supported = NULL;
+static char *preferred = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
+ * next method we should try.  If the server initially sends a nil list,
+ * use a built-in default list.
+ */
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_get(char *authlist)
+{
+	char *name = NULL;
+	u_int next;
+
+	/* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list.  */
+	if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0)
+		authlist = options.preferred_authentications;
+
+	if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) {
+		debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist);
+		if (supported != NULL)
+			xfree(supported);
+		supported = xstrdup(authlist);
+		preferred = options.preferred_authentications;
+		debug3("preferred %s", preferred);
+		current = NULL;
+	} else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current))
+		return current;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
+			debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
+			current = NULL;
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		preferred += next;
+		debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name);
+		debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred);
+		if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
+		    authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
+			debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
+			debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
+			return current;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static char *
+authmethods_get(void)
+{
+	Authmethod *method = NULL;
+	Buffer b;
+	char *list;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
+		if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) {
+			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+			buffer_append(&b, method->name, strlen(method->name));
+		}
+	}
+	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+	list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	return list;
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e3c0a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
@@ -0,0 +1,905 @@
+.\"  -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.248 2009/03/26 08:38:39 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.Dd March 26 2009
+.Dt SSHD 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sshd
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sshd
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 46DdeiqTt
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Op Fl C Ar connection_spec
+.Op Fl f Ar config_file
+.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
+.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
+.Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time
+.Op Fl o Ar option
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl u Ar len
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+Together these programs replace
+.Xr rlogin 1
+and
+.Xr rsh 1 ,
+and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
+over an insecure network.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+listens for connections from clients.
+It is normally started at boot from
+.Pa /etc/rc.d/sshd .
+It forks a new
+daemon for each incoming connection.
+The forked daemons handle
+key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
+and data exchange.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
+(by default
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
+command-line options override values specified in the
+configuration file.
+.Nm
+rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
+.Dv SIGHUP ,
+by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
+.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl b Ar bits
+Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+server key (default 1024).
+.It Fl C Ar connection_spec
+Specify the connection parameters to use for the
+.Fl T
+extended test mode.
+If provided, any
+.Cm Match
+directives in the configuration file
+that would apply to the specified user, host, and address will be set before
+the configuration is written to standard output.
+The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs.
+The keywords are
+.Dq user ,
+.Dq host ,
+and
+.Dq addr .
+All are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple
+.Fl C
+options or as a comma-separated list.
+.It Fl D
+When this option is specified,
+.Nm
+will not detach and does not become a daemon.
+This allows easy monitoring of
+.Nm sshd .
+.It Fl d
+Debug mode.
+The server sends verbose debug output to the system
+log, and does not put itself in the background.
+The server also will not fork and will only process one connection.
+This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
+Multiple
+.Fl d
+options increase the debugging level.
+Maximum is 3.
+.It Fl e
+When this option is specified,
+.Nm
+will send the output to the standard error instead of the system log.
+.It Fl f Ar config_file
+Specifies the name of the configuration file.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config .
+.Nm
+refuses to start if there is no configuration file.
+.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time
+Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default
+120 seconds).
+If the client fails to authenticate the user within
+this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
+A value of zero indicates no limit.
+.It Fl h Ar host_key_file
+Specifies a file from which a host key is read.
+This option must be given if
+.Nm
+is not run as root (as the normal
+host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+for protocol version 1, and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+for protocol version 2.
+It is possible to have multiple host key files for
+the different protocol versions and host key algorithms.
+.It Fl i
+Specifies that
+.Nm
+is being run from
+.Xr inetd 8 .
+.Nm
+is normally not run
+from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can
+respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds.
+Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time.
+However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512) using
+.Nm
+from inetd may
+be feasible.
+.It Fl k Ar key_gen_time
+Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is
+regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour).
+The motivation for regenerating the key fairly
+often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour
+it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted
+communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically
+seized.
+A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated.
+.It Fl o Ar option
+Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
+This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options, and their values, see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
+(default 22).
+Multiple port options are permitted.
+Ports specified in the configuration file with the
+.Cm Port
+option are ignored when a command-line port is specified.
+Ports specified using the
+.Cm ListenAddress
+option override command-line ports.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Nothing is sent to the system log.
+Normally the beginning,
+authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
+.It Fl T
+Extended test mode.
+Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
+to stdout and then exit.
+Optionally,
+.Cm Match
+rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
+.Fl C
+options.
+.It Fl t
+Test mode.
+Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
+This is useful for updating
+.Nm
+reliably as configuration options may change.
+.It Fl u Ar len
+This option is used to specify the size of the field
+in the
+.Li utmp
+structure that holds the remote host name.
+If the resolved host name is longer than
+.Ar len ,
+the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
+This allows hosts with very long host names that
+overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
+Specifying
+.Fl u0
+indicates that only dotted decimal addresses
+should be put into the
+.Pa utmp
+file.
+.Fl u0
+may also be used to prevent
+.Nm
+from making DNS requests unless the authentication
+mechanism or configuration requires it.
+Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
+and using a
+.Cm from="pattern-list"
+option in a key file.
+Configuration options that require DNS include using a
+USER@HOST pattern in
+.Cm AllowUsers
+or
+.Cm DenyUsers .
+.El
+.Sh AUTHENTICATION
+The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.
+Both protocols are supported by default,
+though this can be changed via the
+.Cm Protocol
+option in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+Protocol 2 supports both RSA and DSA keys;
+protocol 1 only supports RSA keys.
+For both protocols,
+each host has a host-specific key,
+normally 2048 bits,
+used to identify the host.
+.Pp
+Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through
+an additional server key,
+normally 768 bits,
+generated when the server starts.
+This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and
+is never stored on disk.
+Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
+host and server keys.
+The client compares the
+RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
+The client then generates a 256-bit random number.
+It encrypts this
+random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends
+the encrypted number to the server.
+Both sides then use this
+random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further
+communications in the session.
+The rest of the session is encrypted
+using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES
+being used by default.
+The client selects the encryption algorithm
+to use from those offered by the server.
+.Pp
+For protocol 2,
+forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+This key agreement results in a shared session key.
+The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently
+128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.
+The client selects the encryption algorithm
+to use from those offered by the server.
+Additionally, session integrity is provided
+through a cryptographic message authentication code
+(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64 or hmac-ripemd160).
+.Pp
+Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+The client tries to authenticate itself using
+host-based authentication,
+public key authentication,
+challenge-response authentication,
+or password authentication.
+.Pp
+Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to
+ensure that it is accessible.  An account is not accessible if it is
+locked, listed in
+.Cm DenyUsers
+or its group is listed in
+.Cm DenyGroups
+\&.  The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms
+have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
+.Ql \&*LK\&*
+on Solaris and UnixWare,
+.Ql \&*
+on HP-UX, containing
+.Ql Nologin
+on Tru64,
+a leading
+.Ql \&*LOCKED\&*
+on FreeBSD and a leading
+.Ql \&!
+on most Linuxes).
+If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
+for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
+should be set to something other than these values (eg
+.Ql NP
+or
+.Ql \&*NP\&*
+).
+.Pp
+If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
+preparing the session is entered.
+At this time the client may request
+things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
+forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
+connection over the secure channel.
+.Pp
+After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
+The sides then enter session mode.
+In this mode, either side may send
+data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
+command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
+.Pp
+When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
+connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to
+the client, and both sides exit.
+.Sh LOGIN PROCESS
+When a user successfully logs in,
+.Nm
+does the following:
+.Bl -enum -offset indent
+.It
+If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
+prints last login time and
+.Pa /etc/motd
+(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
+.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
+see the
+.Sx FILES
+section).
+.It
+If the login is on a tty, records login time.
+.It
+Checks
+.Pa /etc/nologin and
+.Pa /var/run/nologin ;
+if one exists, it prints the contents and quits
+(unless root).
+.It
+Changes to run with normal user privileges.
+.It
+Sets up basic environment.
+.It
+Reads the file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
+if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
+See the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It
+Changes to user's home directory.
+.It
+If
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+exists, runs it; else if
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+exists, runs
+it; otherwise runs
+.Xr xauth 1 .
+The
+.Dq rc
+files are given the X11
+authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
+See
+.Sx SSHRC ,
+below.
+.It
+Runs user's shell or command.
+.El
+.Sh SSHRC
+If the file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+exists,
+.Xr sh 1
+runs it after reading the
+environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
+It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
+instead.
+If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
+its standard input (and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+in its environment).
+The script must call
+.Xr xauth 1
+because
+.Nm
+will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
+.Pp
+The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
+which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
+accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+.Pp
+This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
+something similar to:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
+	if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
+		# X11UseLocalhost=yes
+		echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
+		    cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
+	else
+		# X11UseLocalhost=no
+		echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
+	fi | xauth -q -
+fi
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If this file does not exist,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+is run, and if that
+does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
+.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+specifies the file containing public keys for
+public key authentication;
+if none is specified, the default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .
+Each line of the file contains one
+key (empty lines and lines starting with a
+.Ql #
+are ignored as
+comments).
+Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
+options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+Protocol 2 public key consist of:
+options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
+The options field is optional;
+its presence is determined by whether the line starts
+with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number).
+The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for
+protocol version 1; the
+comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+user to identify the key).
+For protocol version 2 the keytype is
+.Dq ssh-dss
+or
+.Dq ssh-rsa .
+.Pp
+Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
+(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
+8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA
+keys up to 16 kilobits.
+You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
+.Pa identity.pub ,
+.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
+or the
+.Pa id_rsa.pub
+file and edit it.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1
+and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits.
+.Pp
+The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
+specifications.
+No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+The following option specifications are supported (note
+that option keywords are case-insensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm command="command"
+Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
+authentication.
+The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
+The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
+otherwise it is run without a tty.
+If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
+one must not request a pty or should specify
+.Cm no-pty .
+A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
+This option might be useful
+to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
+An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
+Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
+forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
+Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
+.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
+Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
+logging in using this key.
+Environment variables set this way
+override other default environment values.
+Multiple options of this type are permitted.
+Environment processing is disabled by default and is
+controlled via the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option.
+This option is automatically disabled if
+.Cm UseLogin
+is enabled.
+.It Cm from="pattern-list"
+Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
+name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
+comma-separated list of patterns.
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.Pp
+In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
+addresses, a
+.Cm from
+stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
+.Pp
+The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
+authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
+anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
+permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
+This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
+servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
+just the key).
+.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
+Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
+authentication.
+.It Cm no-port-forwarding
+Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
+This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
+.Cm command
+option.
+.It Cm no-pty
+Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
+.It Cm no-user-rc
+Disables execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
+.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
+Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
+.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
+Limit local
+.Li ``ssh -L''
+port forwarding such that it may only connect to the specified host and
+port.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Ar host Ns / Ns Ar port .
+Multiple
+.Cm permitopen
+options may be applied separated by commas.
+No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames,
+they must be literal domains or addresses.
+.It Cm tunnel="n"
+Force a
+.Xr tun 4
+device on the server.
+Without this option, the next available device will be used if
+the client requests a tunnel.
+.El
+.Pp
+An example authorized_keys file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net
+from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
+AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net
+command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss
+AAAAC3...51R== example.net
+permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss
+AAAAB5...21S==
+tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
+jane@example.net
+.Ed
+.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
+The
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
+The global file should
+be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
+maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
+its key is added to the per-user file.
+.Pp
+Each line in these files contains the following fields: hostnames,
+bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+The fields are separated by spaces.
+.Pp
+Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
+.Pf ( Ql *
+and
+.Ql \&?
+act as
+wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host
+name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied
+name (when authenticating a server).
+A pattern may also be preceded by
+.Ql \&!
+to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
+pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
+pattern on the line.
+A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
+.Ql \&[
+and
+.Ql \&]
+brackets then followed by
+.Ql \&:
+and a non-standard port number.
+.Pp
+Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
+and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
+Hashed hostnames start with a
+.Ql |
+character.
+Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
+negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
+.Pp
+Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they
+can be obtained, for example, from
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .
+The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
+.Pp
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are ignored as comments.
+.Pp
+When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
+matching line has the proper key.
+It is thus permissible (but not
+recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same
+names.
+This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names
+from different domains are put in the file.
+It is possible
+that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is
+accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
+.Pp
+Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
+long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
+Rather, generate them by a script
+or by taking
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+and adding the host names at the front.
+.Pp
+An example ssh_known_hosts file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
+cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
+# A hashed hostname
+|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
+AAAA1234.....=
+.Ed
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It ~/.hushlogin
+This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
+.Pa /etc/motd ,
+if
+.Cm PrintLastLog
+and
+.Cm PrintMotd ,
+respectively,
+are enabled.
+It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
+.Cm Banner .
+.Pp
+.It ~/.rhosts
+This file is used for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1
+for more information).
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+because
+.Nm
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
+accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.shosts
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa .rhosts ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/
+This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+and authentication information.
+There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
+and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described above.
+The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+If this file, the
+.Pa ~/.ssh
+directory, or the user's home directory are writable
+by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
+users.
+In this case,
+.Nm
+will not allow it to be used unless the
+.Cm StrictModes
+option has been set to
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/environment
+This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
+It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
+.Ql # ) ,
+and assignment lines of the form name=value.
+The file should be writable
+only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
+Environment processing is disabled by default and is
+controlled via the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
+that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+can, but need not be, world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/rc
+Contains initialization routines to be run before
+the user's home directory becomes accessible.
+This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+readable by anyone else.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/hosts.allow
+.It /etc/hosts.deny
+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+It should only be writable by root.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
+The file format is described in
+.Xr moduli 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/motd
+See
+.Xr motd 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/nologin
+If this file exists,
+.Nm
+refuses to let anyone except root log in.
+The contents of the file
+are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
+refused.
+The file should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa hosts.equiv ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These three files contain the private parts of the host keys.
+These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+These three files contain the public parts of the host keys.
+These files should be world-readable but writable only by
+root.
+Their contents should match the respective private parts.
+These files are not
+really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
+the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
+These files are created using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Nm sshd .
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/sshrc
+Similar to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
+it can be used to specify
+machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
+This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It /var/empty
+.Xr chroot 2
+directory used by
+.Nm
+during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
+The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
+and not group or world-writable.
+.Pp
+.It /var/run/sshd.pid
+Contains the process ID of the
+.Nm
+listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
+concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+started last).
+The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+.Xr chroot 2 ,
+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+.Xr moduli 5 ,
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+.Xr inetd 8 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+for privilege separation.
+.Sh CAVEATS
+System security is not improved unless
+.Nm rshd ,
+.Nm rlogind ,
+and
+.Nm rexecd
+are disabled (thus completely disabling
+.Xr rlogin
+and
+.Xr rsh
+into the machine).
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..249e20f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2273 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.367 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This program is the ssh daemon.  It listens for connections from clients,
+ * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
+ * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
+ * connection.  This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
+ * authentication agent connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation:
+ * Privilege Separation:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+#include <sys/security.h>
+#include <prot.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __FreeBSD__
+#include <resolv.h>
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
+#include <gssapi.h>
+#elif defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+#include "version.h"
+
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+#include <tcpd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+int allow_severity;
+int deny_severity;
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY	0
+#endif
+
+/* Re-exec fds */
+#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD	(STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Server configuration options. */
+ServerOptions options;
+
+/* Name of the server configuration file. */
+char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+
+/*
+ * Debug mode flag.  This can be set on the command line.  If debug
+ * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
+ * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
+ * the first connection.
+ */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
+int test_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+int inetd_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+
+/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+int log_stderr = 0;
+
+/* Saved arguments to main(). */
+char **saved_argv;
+int saved_argc;
+
+/* re-exec */
+int rexeced_flag = 0;
+int rexec_flag = 1;
+int rexec_argc = 0;
+char **rexec_argv;
+
+/*
+ * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
+ * signal handler.
+ */
+#define	MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS	16
+int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
+int num_listen_socks = 0;
+
+/*
+ * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
+ * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
+ */
+char *client_version_string = NULL;
+char *server_version_string = NULL;
+
+/* for rekeying XXX fixme */
+Kex *xxx_kex;
+
+/*
+ * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
+ * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
+ * that the pages do not get written into swap.  However, there are some
+ * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
+ * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
+ * not very useful.  Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
+ */
+struct {
+	Key	*server_key;		/* ephemeral server key */
+	Key	*ssh1_host_key;		/* ssh1 host key */
+	Key	**host_keys;		/* all private host keys */
+	int	have_ssh1_key;
+	int	have_ssh2_key;
+	u_char	ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+} sensitive_data;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
+ * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
+ */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
+
+/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+
+/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
+u_char session_id[16];
+
+/* same for ssh2 */
+u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+
+/* record remote hostname or ip */
+u_int utmp_len = UT_HOSTSIZE;
+
+/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
+int *startup_pipes = NULL;
+int startup_pipe;		/* in child */
+
+/* variables used for privilege separation */
+int use_privsep = -1;
+struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
+
+/* global authentication context */
+Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+
+/* sshd_config buffer */
+Buffer cfg;
+
+/* message to be displayed after login */
+Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* Unprivileged user */
+struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+
+/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+
+static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
+static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
+
+/*
+ * Close all listening sockets
+ */
+static void
+close_listen_socks(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+		close(listen_socks[i]);
+	num_listen_socks = -1;
+}
+
+static void
+close_startup_pipes(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (startup_pipes)
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+				close(startup_pipes[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for SIGHUP.  Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
+ * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
+ * the server key).
+ */
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sighup_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+
+	received_sighup = 1;
+	signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
+ * Restarts the server.
+ */
+static void
+sighup_restart(void)
+{
+	logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+	close_listen_socks();
+	close_startup_pipes();
+	alarm(0);  /* alarm timer persists across exec */
+	execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
+	logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+	    strerror(errno));
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigterm_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_sigterm = sig;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SIGCHLD handler.  This is called whenever a child dies.  This will then
+ * reap any zombies left by exited children.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+
+	while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+	    (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+		;
+
+	signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+{
+	if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
+		kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
+
+	/* Log error and exit. */
+	sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm.  Note that this
+ * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
+ * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
+ * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
+ * problems.
+ */
+static void
+generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
+{
+	verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
+	    sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
+	if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
+		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+	sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
+	    options.server_key_bits);
+	verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
+
+	arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+	arc4random_stir();
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+
+	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+	errno = save_errno;
+	key_do_regen = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int mismatch;
+	int remote_major, remote_minor;
+	int major, minor;
+	char *s, *newline = "\n";
+	char buf[256];			/* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
+	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+
+	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+	    (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
+		major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
+		minor = 99;
+	} else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+		major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
+		minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
+		newline = "\r\n";
+	} else {
+		major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
+		minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+	}
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s", major, minor,
+	    SSH_VERSION, newline);
+	server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+
+	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
+	if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
+	    strlen(server_version_string))
+	    != strlen(server_version_string)) {
+		logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	/* Read other sides version identification. */
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+		if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
+			logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr());
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+		if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+			buf[i] = 0;
+			/* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
+			if (i == 12 &&
+			    strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
+				break;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+			buf[i] = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+	client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the versions match.  In future this might accept
+	 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+	 */
+	if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+	    &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
+		s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+		close(sock_in);
+		close(sock_out);
+		logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
+		    client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
+	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+
+	compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
+		logit("probed from %s with %s.  Don't panic.",
+		    get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
+		logit("scanned from %s with %s.  Don't panic.",
+		    get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	mismatch = 0;
+	switch (remote_major) {
+	case 1:
+		if (remote_minor == 99) {
+			if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
+				enable_compat20();
+			else
+				mismatch = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
+			mismatch = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (remote_minor < 3) {
+			packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
+			    "is no longer supported.  Please install a newer version.");
+		} else if (remote_minor == 3) {
+			/* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
+			enable_compat13();
+		}
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+			enable_compat20();
+			break;
+		}
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default:
+		mismatch = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	chop(server_version_string);
+	debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
+
+	if (mismatch) {
+		s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+		close(sock_in);
+		close(sock_out);
+		logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
+		    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+		    server_version_string, client_version_string);
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
+void
+destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+		sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+	memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+}
+
+/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+void
+demote_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+	Key *tmp;
+	int i;
+
+	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+		tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
+		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+		sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+			tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+			if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
+				sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie.  XXX - Okay Niels? */
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_preauth_child(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t rnd[256];
+	gid_t gidset[1];
+
+	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
+	privsep_challenge_enable();
+
+	arc4random_stir();
+	arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+	demote_sensitive_data();
+
+	/* Change our root directory */
+	if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+		fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Drop our privileges */
+	debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
+	    (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
+#if 0
+	/* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
+	do_setusercontext(privsep_pw);
+#else
+	gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
+	if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
+		fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	int status;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
+	pmonitor = monitor_init();
+	/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
+	pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid == -1) {
+		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+	} else if (pid != 0) {
+		debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
+
+		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+		pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
+		monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
+		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+		/* Sync memory */
+		monitor_sync(pmonitor);
+
+		/* Wait for the child's exit status */
+		while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		return (1);
+	} else {
+		/* child */
+
+		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+		/* Demote the child */
+		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+			privsep_preauth_child();
+		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	u_int32_t rnd[256];
+
+#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+	if (1) {
+#else
+	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
+#endif
+		/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
+		use_privsep = 0;
+		goto skip;
+	}
+
+	/* New socket pair */
+	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+
+	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
+
+		/* NEVERREACHED */
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+	demote_sensitive_data();
+
+	arc4random_stir();
+	arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+	/* Drop privileges */
+	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+
+ skip:
+	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+	/*
+	 * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+	 * this information is not part of the key state.
+	 */
+	packet_set_authenticated();
+}
+
+static char *
+list_hostkey_types(void)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	const char *p;
+	char *ret;
+	int i;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+		if (key == NULL)
+			continue;
+		switch (key->type) {
+		case KEY_RSA:
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+			p = key_ssh_name(key);
+			buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+	ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+Key *
+get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+		if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
+			return key;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+Key *
+get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
+{
+	if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+		return (NULL);
+	return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
+}
+
+int
+get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
+			return (i);
+	}
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
+ * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
+ * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
+ * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
+ */
+static int
+drop_connection(int startups)
+{
+	int p, r;
+
+	if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
+		return 0;
+	if (startups >= options.max_startups)
+		return 1;
+	if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
+		return 1;
+
+	p  = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
+	p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
+	p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
+	p += options.max_startups_rate;
+	r = arc4random_uniform(100);
+
+	debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
+	return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+	    SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+	fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-f config_file]\n"
+"            [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time]\n"
+"            [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
+	);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd,
+	    buffer_len(conf));
+
+	/*
+	 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
+	 *	string	configuration
+	 *	u_int	ephemeral_key_follows
+	 *	bignum	e		(only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
+	 *	bignum	n			"
+	 *	bignum	d			"
+	 *	bignum	iqmp			"
+	 *	bignum	p			"
+	 *	bignum	q			"
+	 *	string rngseed		(only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
+	 */
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
+
+	if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
+	    sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+		buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
+		buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+		buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
+		buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
+		buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
+		buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
+	} else
+		buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+	rexec_send_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
+	if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+	char *cp;
+	u_int len;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
+	if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
+
+	cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+	if (conf != NULL)
+		buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1);
+	xfree(cp);
+
+	if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
+		if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
+			key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+		sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
+		rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
+		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+	rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Accept a connection from inetd */
+static void
+server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	startup_pipe = -1;
+	if (rexeced_flag) {
+		close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+		*sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+		if (!debug_flag) {
+			startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+			close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+		}
+	} else {
+		*sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+		*sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
+	 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
+	 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
+	 */
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+		dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+		dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
+			close(fd);
+	}
+	debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Listen for TCP connections
+ */
+static void
+server_listen(void)
+{
+	int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+	for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+		if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
+			fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
+			    "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
+		if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+		    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+			error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Create socket for listening. */
+		listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+		    ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (listen_sock < 0) {
+			/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
+			verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Set socket options.
+		 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
+		 */
+		if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+		    &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+			error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
+		/* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
+		if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
+			if (setsockopt(listen_sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY,
+			    &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+				error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s",
+				    strerror(errno));
+		}
+#endif
+
+		debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+
+		/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+			    strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
+		num_listen_socks++;
+
+		/* Start listening on the port. */
+		if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
+			fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
+			    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+		logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
+
+	if (!num_listen_socks)
+		fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
+ * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
+ */
+static void
+server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+{
+	fd_set *fdset;
+	int i, j, ret, maxfd;
+	int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
+	int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	/* setup fd set for accept */
+	fdset = NULL;
+	maxfd = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+		if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
+			maxfd = listen_socks[i];
+	/* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
+	startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
+	for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+		startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
+	 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		if (received_sighup)
+			sighup_restart();
+		if (fdset != NULL)
+			xfree(fdset);
+		fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
+		    sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+			FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+				FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
+
+		/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
+		ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+			error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		if (received_sigterm) {
+			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+			    (int) received_sigterm);
+			close_listen_socks();
+			unlink(options.pid_file);
+			exit(255);
+		}
+		if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
+			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+			key_used = 0;
+			key_do_regen = 0;
+		}
+		if (ret < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
+			    FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
+				/*
+				 * the read end of the pipe is ready
+				 * if the child has closed the pipe
+				 * after successful authentication
+				 * or if the child has died
+				 */
+				close(startup_pipes[i]);
+				startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+				startups--;
+			}
+		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
+			if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
+				continue;
+			fromlen = sizeof(from);
+			*newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
+			    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
+			if (*newsock < 0) {
+				if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
+				    errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+					error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
+				close(*newsock);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
+				debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
+				close(*newsock);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
+				close(*newsock);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
+			    SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
+				error("reexec socketpair: %s",
+				    strerror(errno));
+				close(*newsock);
+				close(startup_p[0]);
+				close(startup_p[1]);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+				if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
+					startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
+					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+						maxfd = startup_p[0];
+					startups++;
+					break;
+				}
+
+			/*
+			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
+			 * we are in debugging mode.
+			 */
+			if (debug_flag) {
+				/*
+				 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening
+				 * socket, and start processing the
+				 * connection without forking.
+				 */
+				debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
+				close_listen_socks();
+				*sock_in = *newsock;
+				*sock_out = *newsock;
+				close(startup_p[0]);
+				close(startup_p[1]);
+				startup_pipe = -1;
+				pid = getpid();
+				if (rexec_flag) {
+					send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
+					    &cfg);
+					close(config_s[0]);
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Normal production daemon.  Fork, and have
+			 * the child process the connection. The
+			 * parent continues listening.
+			 */
+			platform_pre_fork();
+			if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+				/*
+				 * Child.  Close the listening and
+				 * max_startup sockets.  Start using
+				 * the accepted socket. Reinitialize
+				 * logging (since our pid has changed).
+				 * We break out of the loop to handle
+				 * the connection.
+				 */
+				platform_post_fork_child();
+				startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
+				close_startup_pipes();
+				close_listen_socks();
+				*sock_in = *newsock;
+				*sock_out = *newsock;
+				log_init(__progname,
+				    options.log_level,
+				    options.log_facility,
+				    log_stderr);
+				if (rexec_flag)
+					close(config_s[0]);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/* Parent.  Stay in the loop. */
+			platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
+			if (pid < 0)
+				error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			else
+				debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
+
+			close(startup_p[1]);
+
+			if (rexec_flag) {
+				send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
+				close(config_s[0]);
+				close(config_s[1]);
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Mark that the key has been used (it
+			 * was "given" to the child).
+			 */
+			if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+			    key_used == 0) {
+				/* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
+				signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
+				alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
+				key_used = 1;
+			}
+
+			close(*newsock);
+
+			/*
+			 * Ensure that our random state differs
+			 * from that of the child
+			 */
+			arc4random_stir();
+		}
+
+		/* child process check (or debug mode) */
+		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the daemon.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern int optind;
+	int opt, i, on = 1;
+	int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
+	const char *remote_ip;
+	char *test_user = NULL, *test_host = NULL, *test_addr = NULL;
+	int remote_port;
+	char *line, *p, *cp;
+	int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
+	mode_t new_umask;
+	Key *key;
+	Authctxt *authctxt;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+#endif
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+	init_rng();
+
+	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+	saved_argc = ac;
+	rexec_argc = ac;
+	saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+	saved_argv[i] = NULL;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+	compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+	av = saved_argv;
+#endif
+
+	if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
+		debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
+	initialize_server_options(&options);
+
+	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
+	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:C:dDeiqrtQRT46")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case '4':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			config_file_name = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			if (debug_flag == 0) {
+				debug_flag = 1;
+				options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+				options.log_level++;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			no_daemon_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			log_stderr = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			inetd_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			rexec_flag = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'R':
+			rexeced_flag = 1;
+			inetd_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'Q':
+			/* ignored */
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
+			    32768, NULL);
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
+			if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
+			if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'g':
+			if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			test_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			test_flag = 2;
+			break;
+		case 'C':
+			cp = optarg;
+			while ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")) && *p != '\0') {
+				if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0)
+					test_addr = xstrdup(p + 5);
+				else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0)
+					test_host = xstrdup(p + 5);
+				else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0)
+					test_user = xstrdup(p + 5);
+				else {
+					fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test "
+					    "mode specification %s\n", p);
+					exit(1);
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'u':
+			utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1, NULL);
+			if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'o':
+			line = xstrdup(optarg);
+			if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
+			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+				exit(1);
+			xfree(line);
+			break;
+		case '?':
+		default:
+			usage();
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
+		rexec_flag = 0;
+	if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/')))
+		fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
+	if (rexeced_flag)
+		closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
+	else
+		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	/*
+	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
+	 * key (unless started from inetd)
+	 */
+	log_init(__progname,
+	    options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
+	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
+
+	/*
+	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
+	 * root's environment
+	 */
+	if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
+		unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+	/* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
+	 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
+	 */
+	drop_cray_privs();
+#endif
+
+	sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+	sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
+	sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of
+	 * the parameters we need.  If we're not doing an extended test,
+	 * do not silently ignore connection test params.
+	 */
+	if (test_flag >= 2 &&
+	   (test_user != NULL || test_host != NULL || test_addr != NULL)
+	    && (test_user == NULL || test_host == NULL || test_addr == NULL))
+		fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing "
+		   "Match configs");
+	if (test_flag < 2 && (test_user != NULL || test_host != NULL ||
+	    test_addr != NULL))
+		fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
+		   "test mode (-T)");
+
+	/* Fetch our configuration */
+	buffer_init(&cfg);
+	if (rexeced_flag)
+		recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
+	else
+		load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
+
+	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+	    &cfg, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+	seed_rng();
+
+	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+	fill_default_server_options(&options);
+
+	/* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
+	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+
+	/* set default channel AF */
+	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
+	/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
+	if (optind < ac) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
+
+	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
+	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
+		if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication)
+			fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+			    SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+	} else {
+		memset(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
+		privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
+		xfree(privsep_pw->pw_passwd);
+		privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
+	}
+	endpwent();
+
+	/* load private host keys */
+	sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
+	    sizeof(Key *));
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
+		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
+		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
+		if (key == NULL) {
+			error("Could not load host key: %s",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+			continue;
+		}
+		switch (key->type) {
+		case KEY_RSA1:
+			sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
+			sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
+			break;
+		case KEY_RSA:
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
+		    key_type(key));
+	}
+	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
+		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+	}
+	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+		logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+	}
+	if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* Check certain values for sanity. */
+	if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
+		if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
+		    options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
+		 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
+		 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
+		 */
+		if (options.server_key_bits >
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
+		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			options.server_key_bits =
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
+			debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
+			    options.server_key_bits);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		struct stat st;
+
+		if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
+		    (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
+			fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
+			    _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+		if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
+		    (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
+		    (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
+#else
+		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
+#endif
+			fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
+			    "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+	}
+
+	if (test_flag > 1) {
+		if (test_user != NULL && test_addr != NULL && test_host != NULL)
+			parse_server_match_config(&options, test_user,
+			    test_host, test_addr);
+		dump_config(&options);
+	}
+
+	/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
+	if (test_flag)
+		exit(0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited.  This
+	 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
+	 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
+	 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
+	 * module which might be used).
+	 */
+	if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
+		debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (rexec_flag) {
+		rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
+		for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
+			debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
+			rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
+		}
+		rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
+		rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+	new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
+	(void) umask(new_umask);
+
+	/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
+	if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
+		log_stderr = 1;
+	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	/*
+	 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
+	 * from the controlling terminal, and fork.  The original process
+	 * exits.
+	 */
+	if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+		int fd;
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+		if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
+			fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+		/* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+		fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+		if (fd >= 0) {
+			(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+			close(fd);
+		}
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+	}
+	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	/* Initialize the random number generator. */
+	arc4random_stir();
+
+	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+	   unmounted if desired. */
+	chdir("/");
+
+	/* ignore SIGPIPE */
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	/* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
+	if (inetd_flag) {
+		server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
+	} else {
+		server_listen();
+
+		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+
+		signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+
+		/*
+		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+		 */
+		if (!debug_flag) {
+			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+
+			if (f == NULL) {
+				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+			} else {
+				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
+				fclose(f);
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+		    &newsock, config_s);
+	}
+
+	/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+	setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
+
+	/*
+	 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+	 * setlogin() affects the entire process group.  We don't
+	 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
+	 */
+#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+	/*
+	 * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
+	 * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
+	 * controlling tty" errors.
+	 */
+	if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
+		error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+	if (rexec_flag) {
+		int fd;
+
+		debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+		    sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+		dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
+		dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		if (startup_pipe == -1)
+			close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+		else
+			dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+
+		dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+		close(config_s[1]);
+		if (startup_pipe != -1)
+			close(startup_pipe);
+
+		execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
+
+		/* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
+		error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
+		recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
+		log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+		    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+		/* Clean up fds */
+		startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
+		close(config_s[1]);
+		close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+		newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+		if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+			dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+			dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+			if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+				close(fd);
+		}
+		debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+		    sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable the key regeneration alarm.  We will not regenerate the
+	 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
+	 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
+	 */
+	alarm(0);
+	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+	signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+	signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+	signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+
+#ifdef __FreeBSD__
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the resolver.  This may not happen automatically
+	 * before privsep chroot().                                   
+	 */
+	if ((_res.options & RES_INIT) == 0) {
+		debug("res_init()");         
+		res_init();         
+	}
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/*
+	 * Force GSS-API to parse its configuration and load any
+	 * mechanism plugins.
+	 */
+	{
+		gss_OID_set mechs;
+		OM_uint32 minor_status;
+		gss_indicate_mechs(&minor_status, &mechs);
+		gss_release_oid_set(&minor_status, &mechs);
+	}
+#endif
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Register our connection.  This turns encryption off because we do
+	 * not have a key.
+	 */
+	packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
+	packet_set_server();
+
+	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+	if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+	    setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+		error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
+		debug("get_remote_port failed");
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
+	 * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
+	 */
+	(void) get_canonical_hostname(0);
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the code depends on the fact that
+	 * get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
+	 * the socket goes away.
+	 */
+	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+#endif
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+	allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
+	deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
+	/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+		struct request_info req;
+
+		request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
+		fromhost(&req);
+
+		if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
+			debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
+			refuse(&req);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+			fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
+		}
+	}
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
+	/* Log the connection. */
+	verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+	 * cleared after successful authentication.  A limit of zero
+	 * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
+	 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
+	 * are about to discover the bug.
+	 */
+	signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
+	if (!debug_flag)
+		alarm(options.login_grace_time);
+
+	sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
+
+	/* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */
+	if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
+		generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+
+	packet_set_nonblocking();
+
+	/* allocate authentication context */
+	authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
+
+	authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
+	/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
+	the_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+	buffer_init(&loginmsg);
+
+	if (use_privsep)
+		if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
+			goto authenticated;
+
+	/* perform the key exchange */
+	/* authenticate user and start session */
+	if (compat20) {
+		do_ssh2_kex();
+		do_authentication2(authctxt);
+	} else {
+		do_ssh1_kex();
+		do_authentication(authctxt);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
+	 * the current keystate and exits
+	 */
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+ authenticated:
+	/*
+	 * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+	 * authentication.
+	 */
+	alarm(0);
+	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+	authctxt->authenticated = 1;
+	if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+		close(startup_pipe);
+		startup_pipe = -1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	if (options.gss_authentication) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+		restore_uid();
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		do_pam_setcred(1);
+		do_pam_session();
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
+	 * file descriptor passing.
+	 */
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		privsep_postauth(authctxt);
+		/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
+		if (!compat20)
+			destroy_sensitive_data();
+	}
+
+	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
+	    options.client_alive_count_max);
+
+	/* Start session. */
+	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+
+	/* The connection has been terminated. */
+	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
+	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
+	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", obytes, ibytes);
+
+	verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		finish_pam();
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
+	packet_close();
+
+	if (use_privsep)
+		mm_terminate();
+
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
+ * (key with larger modulus first).
+ */
+int
+ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
+{
+	int rsafail = 0;
+
+	if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
+	    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
+		/* Server key has bigger modulus. */
+		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("do_connection: %s: "
+			    "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+		}
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
+			rsafail++;
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
+			rsafail++;
+	} else {
+		/* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
+		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
+		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("do_connection: %s: "
+			    "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+		}
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
+			rsafail++;
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
+			rsafail++;
+	}
+	return (rsafail);
+}
+/*
+ * SSH1 key exchange
+ */
+static void
+do_ssh1_kex(void)
+{
+	int i, len;
+	int rsafail = 0;
+	BIGNUM *session_key_int;
+	u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+	u_char cookie[8];
+	u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
+	 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
+	 * spoofing attacks.  Note that this only works against somebody
+	 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
+	 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
+	 * cookie.  This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
+	 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
+	 */
+	arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
+
+	/*
+	 * Send our public key.  We include in the packet 64 bits of random
+	 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
+	 * spoofing.
+	 */
+	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
+
+	/* Store our public server RSA key. */
+	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
+	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+
+	/* Store our public host RSA key. */
+	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
+	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
+
+	/* Put protocol flags. */
+	packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
+
+	/* Declare which ciphers we support. */
+	packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
+
+	/* Declare supported authentication types. */
+	auth_mask = 0;
+	if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
+		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
+	if (options.rsa_authentication)
+		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
+	if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
+		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
+	if (options.password_authentication)
+		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
+	packet_put_int(auth_mask);
+
+	/* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+
+	debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
+	    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+	    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
+
+	/* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
+	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+
+	/* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
+	cipher_type = packet_get_char();
+
+	if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
+		packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
+
+	/* Get check bytes from the packet.  These must match those we
+	   sent earlier with the public key packet. */
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
+			packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+
+	debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
+
+	/* Get the encrypted integer. */
+	if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
+
+	protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
+	packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
+	packet_check_eom();
+
+	/* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
+	rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
+
+	/*
+	 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer.  The key is in the
+	 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
+	 * key is in the highest bits.
+	 */
+	if (!rsafail) {
+		(void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
+		len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
+		if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+			error("do_ssh1_kex: bad session key len from %s: "
+			    "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
+			rsafail++;
+		} else {
+			memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+			BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
+			    session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
+
+			derive_ssh1_session_id(
+			    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
+			    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
+			    cookie, session_id);
+			/*
+			 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
+			 * session id.
+			 */
+			for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+				session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
+		}
+	}
+	if (rsafail) {
+		int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
+		u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+		MD5_CTX md;
+
+		logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
+		BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
+		MD5_Init(&md);
+		MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
+		MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+		MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
+		MD5_Init(&md);
+		MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
+		MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
+		MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+		MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
+		memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+		xfree(buf);
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+			session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
+	}
+	/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
+	destroy_sensitive_data();
+
+	if (use_privsep)
+		mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
+
+	/* Destroy the decrypted integer.  It is no longer needed. */
+	BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
+
+	/* Set the session key.  From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
+	packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
+
+	/* Destroy our copy of the session key.  It is no longer needed. */
+	memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+
+	debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
+
+	/* Send an acknowledgment packet.  Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+ */
+static void
+do_ssh2_kex(void)
+{
+	Kex *kex;
+
+	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
+	}
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
+	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
+
+	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+	}
+	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+	} else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
+	}
+
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+
+	/* start key exchange */
+	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+	kex->server = 1;
+	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+	kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
+	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+
+	xxx_kex = kex;
+
+	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+
+	session_id2 = kex->session_id;
+	session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+	packet_put_cstring("markus");
+	packet_send();
+	packet_write_wait();
+#endif
+	debug("KEX done");
+}
+
+/* server specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	if (the_authctxt)
+		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+#endif
+	_exit(i);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78e51ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.80 2008/07/02 02:24:18 djm Exp $
+#	$FreeBSD$
+
+# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
+# sshd_config(5) for more information.
+
+# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin
+
+# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with
+# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where
+# possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options change a
+# default value.
+
+# Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and
+# FreeBSD has a few additional options.
+
+#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20091001
+
+#Port 22
+#Protocol 2
+#AddressFamily any
+#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+#ListenAddress ::
+
+# Disable legacy (protocol version 1) support in the server for new
+# installations. In future the default will change to require explicit
+# activation of protocol 1
+Protocol 2
+
+# HostKey for protocol version 1
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+# HostKeys for protocol version 2
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+
+# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
+#KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
+#ServerKeyBits 1024
+
+# Logging
+# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+#SyslogFacility AUTH
+#LogLevel INFO
+
+# Authentication:
+
+#LoginGraceTime 2m
+#PermitRootLogin no
+#StrictModes yes
+#MaxAuthTries 6
+#MaxSessions 10
+
+#RSAAuthentication yes
+#PubkeyAuthentication yes
+#AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+
+# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+#RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+# similar for protocol version 2
+#HostbasedAuthentication no
+# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
+# RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
+#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
+# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+#IgnoreRhosts yes
+
+# Change to yes to enable built-in password authentication.
+#PasswordAuthentication no
+#PermitEmptyPasswords no
+
+# Change to no to disable PAM authentication
+#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+
+# Kerberos options
+#KerberosAuthentication no
+#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+#KerberosGetAFSToken no
+
+# GSSAPI options
+#GSSAPIAuthentication no
+#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+
+# Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing,
+# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
+# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+# PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
+# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
+# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+#UsePAM yes
+
+#AllowAgentForwarding yes
+#AllowTcpForwarding yes
+#GatewayPorts no
+#X11Forwarding yes
+#X11DisplayOffset 10
+#X11UseLocalhost yes
+#PrintMotd yes
+#PrintLastLog yes
+#TCPKeepAlive yes
+#UseLogin no
+#UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
+#PermitUserEnvironment no
+#Compression delayed
+#ClientAliveInterval 0
+#ClientAliveCountMax 3
+#UseDNS yes
+#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+#MaxStartups 10
+#PermitTunnel no
+#ChrootDirectory none
+
+# no default banner path
+#Banner none
+
+# override default of no subsystems
+Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+
+# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+#Match User anoncvs
+#	X11Forwarding no
+#	AllowTcpForwarding no
+#	ForceCommand cvs server
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84b0ae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
@@ -0,0 +1,1092 @@
+.\"  -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.106 2009/04/21 15:13:17 stevesk Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.Dd April 21 2009
+.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sshd_config
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Xr sshd 8
+reads configuration data from
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+(or the file specified with
+.Fl f
+on the command line).
+The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+.Pp
+The possible
+keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm AcceptEnv
+Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into
+the session's
+.Xr environ 7 .
+See
+.Cm SendEnv
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for how to configure the client.
+Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
+Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
+.Ql *
+and
+.Ql \&? .
+Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
+across multiple
+.Cm AcceptEnv
+directives.
+Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
+user environments.
+For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
+The default is not to accept any environment variables.
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family should be used by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Valid arguments are
+.Dq any ,
+.Dq inet
+(use IPv4 only), or
+.Dq inet6
+(use IPv6 only).
+The default is
+.Dq any .
+.It Cm AllowAgentForwarding
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding is permitted.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security
+unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install
+their own forwarders.
+.It Cm AllowGroups
+This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
+group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
+Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
+Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
+users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
+own forwarders.
+.It Cm AllowUsers
+This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
+match one of the patterns.
+Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all users.
+If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
+are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
+users from particular hosts.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
+for user authentication.
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
+setup.
+The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
+%u is replaced by the username of that user.
+After expansion,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
+directory.
+The default is
+.Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .
+.It Cm Banner
+The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
+authentication is allowed.
+If the argument is
+.Dq none
+then no banner is displayed.
+This option is only available for protocol version 2.
+By default, no banner is displayed.
+.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+PAM or though authentication styles supported in
+.Xr login.conf 5 )
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm ChrootDirectory
+Specifies a path to
+.Xr chroot 2
+to after authentication.
+This path, and all its components, must be root-owned directories that are
+not writable by any other user or group.
+After the chroot,
+.Xr sshd 8
+changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
+.Pp
+The path may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once
+the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
+%u is replaced by the username of that user.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
+user's session.
+For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
+.Xr sh 1 ,
+and basic
+.Pa /dev
+nodes such as
+.Xr null 4 ,
+.Xr zero 4 ,
+.Xr stdin 4 ,
+.Xr stdout 4 ,
+.Xr stderr 4 ,
+.Xr arandom 4
+and
+.Xr tty 4
+devices.
+For file transfer sessions using
+.Dq sftp ,
+no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the
+in-process sftp server is used,
+though sessions which use logging do require
+.Pa /dev/log
+inside the chroot directory (see
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+for details).
+.Pp
+The default is not to
+.Xr chroot 2 .
+.It Cm Ciphers
+Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.
+Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+The supported ciphers are
+.Dq 3des-cbc ,
+.Dq aes128-cbc ,
+.Dq aes192-cbc ,
+.Dq aes256-cbc ,
+.Dq aes128-ctr ,
+.Dq aes192-ctr ,
+.Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq arcfour128 ,
+.Dq arcfour256 ,
+.Dq arcfour ,
+.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
+and
+.Dq cast128-cbc .
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
+aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
+aes256-cbc,arcfour
+.Ed
+.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be
+sent without
+.Xr sshd 8
+receiving any messages back from the client.
+If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
+sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
+It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
+different from
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+(below).
+The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
+and therefore will not be spoofable.
+The TCP keepalive option enabled by
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+is spoofable.
+The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
+.Pp
+The default value is 3.
+If
+.Cm ClientAliveInterval
+(see below) is set to 15, and
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
+will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the client,
+.Xr sshd 8
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the client.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm Compression
+Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until
+the user has authenticated successfully.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq delayed ,
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq delayed .
+.It Cm DenyGroups
+This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
+group list matches one of the patterns.
+Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm DenyUsers
+This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
+Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all users.
+If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
+are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
+users from particular hosts.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm ForceCommand
+Forces the execution of the command specified by
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+ignoring any command supplied by the client and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+if present.
+The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
+This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
+It is most useful inside a
+.Cm Match
+block.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
+Specifying a command of
+.Dq internal-sftp
+will force the use of an in-process sftp server that requires no support
+files when used with
+.Cm ChrootDirectory .
+.It Cm GatewayPorts
+Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
+forwarded for the client.
+By default,
+.Xr sshd 8
+binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
+This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+can be used to specify that sshd
+should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
+allowing other hosts to connect.
+The argument may be
+.Dq no
+to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only,
+.Dq yes
+to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
+.Dq clientspecified
+to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+on logout.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
+(host-based authentication).
+This option is similar to
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+and applies to protocol version 2 only.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
+Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
+name lookup when matching the name in the
+.Pa ~/.shosts ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
+and
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+files during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+A setting of
+.Dq yes
+means that
+.Xr sshd 8
+uses the name supplied by the client rather than
+attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm HostKey
+Specifies a file containing a private host key
+used by SSH.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+for protocol version 1, and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+for protocol version 2.
+Note that
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible.
+It is possible to have multiple host key files.
+.Dq rsa1
+keys are used for version 1 and
+.Dq dsa
+or
+.Dq rsa
+are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol.
+.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+Specifies that
+.Pa .rhosts
+and
+.Pa .shosts
+files will not be used in
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+or
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+.Pp
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv 
+are still used.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should ignore the user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+during
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+or
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
+Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
+To use this option, the server needs a
+Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
+If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
+an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
+If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
+the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
+such as
+.Pa /etc/passwd .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
+Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+file on logout.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
+In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
+after this many seconds (if it has been used).
+The purpose of regeneration is to prevent
+decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and
+stealing the keys.
+The key is never stored anywhere.
+If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.
+The default is 3600 (seconds).
+.It Cm ListenAddress
+Specifies the local addresses
+.Xr sshd 8
+should listen on.
+The following forms may be used:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No | Ar IPv6_addr
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No : Ar port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Ar host No | Ar IPv6_addr Oc : Ar port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+If
+.Ar port
+is not specified,
+sshd will listen on the address and all prior
+.Cm Port
+options specified.
+The default is to listen on all local addresses.
+Multiple
+.Cm ListenAddress
+options are permitted.
+Additionally, any
+.Cm Port
+options must precede this option for non-port qualified addresses.
+.It Cm LoginGraceTime
+The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
+successfully logged in.
+If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
+The default is 120 seconds.
+.It Cm LogLevel
+Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+The default is INFO.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+.It Cm MACs
+Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
+for data integrity protection.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,
+hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
+.Ed
+.It Cm Match
+Introduces a conditional block.
+If all of the criteria on the
+.Cm Match
+line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
+set in the global section of the config file, until either another
+.Cm Match
+line or the end of the file.
+.Pp
+The arguments to
+.Cm Match
+are one or more criteria-pattern pairs.
+The available criteria are
+.Cm User ,
+.Cm Group ,
+.Cm Host ,
+and
+.Cm Address .
+The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated
+lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
+.Sx PATTERNS
+section of
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+The patterns in an
+.Cm Address
+criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+address/masklen format, e.g.\&
+.Dq 192.0.2.0/24
+or
+.Dq 3ffe:ffff::/32 .
+Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address -
+it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
+or one with bits set in this host portion of the address.
+For example,
+.Dq 192.0.2.0/33
+and
+.Dq 192.0.2.0/8
+respectively.
+.Pp
+Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
+.Cm Match
+keyword.
+Available keywords are
+.Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
+.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
+.Cm Banner ,
+.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+.Cm GatewayPorts ,
+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
+.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
+.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+.Cm MaxSessions ,
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
+.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
+.Cm PermitOpen ,
+.Cm PermitRootLogin ,
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
+.Cm RSAAuthentication ,
+.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11Forwarding
+and
+.Cm X11UseLocalHost .
+.It Cm MaxAuthTries
+Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
+connection.
+Once the number of failures reaches half this value,
+additional failures are logged.
+The default is 6.
+.It Cm MaxSessions
+Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per network connection.
+The default is 10.
+.It Cm MaxStartups
+Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
+SSH daemon.
+Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
+.Cm LoginGraceTime
+expires for a connection.
+The default is 10.
+.Pp
+Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
+the three colon separated values
+.Dq start:rate:full
+(e.g. "10:30:60").
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
+.Dq rate/100
+(30%)
+if there are currently
+.Dq start
+(10)
+unauthenticated connections.
+The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
+are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches
+.Dq full
+(60).
+.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
+Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
+See also
+.Cm UsePAM .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
+When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
+server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm PermitOpen
+Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
+The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar host : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar IPv4_addr : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
+An argument of
+.Dq any
+can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
+By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
+.It Cm PermitRootLogin
+Specifies whether root can log in using
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq without-password ,
+.Dq forced-commands-only ,
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that if
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+is
+.Dq yes ,
+the root user may be allowed in with its password even if
+.Cm PermitRootLogin is set to
+.Dq without-password .
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq without-password ,
+password authentication is disabled for root.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq forced-commands-only ,
+root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
+but only if the
+.Ar command
+option has been specified
+(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
+normally not allowed).
+All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq no ,
+root is not allowed to log in.
+.It Cm PermitTunnel
+Specifies whether
+.Xr tun 4
+device forwarding is allowed.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq point-to-point
+(layer 3),
+.Dq ethernet
+(layer 2), or
+.Dq no .
+Specifying
+.Dq yes
+permits both
+.Dq point-to-point
+and
+.Dq ethernet .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+Specifies whether
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+and
+.Cm environment=
+options in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+are processed by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
+restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as
+.Ev LD_PRELOAD .
+.It Cm PidFile
+Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
+SSH daemon.
+The default is
+.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
+.It Cm Port
+Specifies the port number that
+.Xr sshd 8
+listens on.
+The default is 22.
+Multiple options of this type are permitted.
+See also
+.Cm ListenAddress .
+.It Cm PrintLastLog
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
+in interactively.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PrintMotd
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should print
+.Pa /etc/motd
+when a user logs in interactively.
+(On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
+.Pa /etc/profile ,
+or equivalent.)
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Protocol
+Specifies the protocol versions
+.Xr sshd 8
+supports.
+The possible values are
+.Sq 1
+and
+.Sq 2 .
+Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq 2 .
+Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference,
+because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered
+by the server.
+Specifying
+.Dq 2,1
+is identical to
+.Dq 1,2 .
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether rhosts or
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+authentication together
+with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm RSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm ServerKeyBits
+Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
+The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
+.It Cm StrictModes
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should check file modes and ownership of the
+user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
+directory or files world-writable.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Subsystem
+Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
+Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
+to execute upon subsystem request.
+.Pp
+The command
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+implements the
+.Dq sftp
+file transfer subsystem.
+.Pp
+Alternately the name
+.Dq internal-sftp
+implements an in-process
+.Dq sftp
+server.
+This may simplify configurations using
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+to force a different filesystem root on clients.
+.Pp
+By default no subsystems are defined.
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm SyslogFacility
+Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is AUTH.
+.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
+other side.
+If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+of the machines will be properly noticed.
+However, this means that
+connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+find it annoying.
+On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent,
+sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
+.Dq ghost
+users and consuming server resources.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq yes
+(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice
+if the network goes down or the client host crashes.
+This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
+.Pp
+To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm UseDNS
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should look up the remote host name and check that
+the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
+very same IP address.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm UseLogin
+Specifies whether
+.Xr login 1
+is used for interactive login sessions.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that
+.Xr login 1
+is never used for remote command execution.
+Note also, that if this is enabled,
+.Cm X11Forwarding
+will be disabled because
+.Xr login 1
+does not know how to handle
+.Xr xauth 1
+cookies.
+If
+.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
+is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
+.It Cm UsePAM
+Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
+If set to
+.Dq yes
+this will enable PAM authentication using
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+and
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
+authentication types.
+.Pp
+Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent
+role to password authentication, you should disable either
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+or
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
+.Pp
+If
+.Cm UsePAM
+is enabled, you will not be able to run
+.Xr sshd 8
+as a non-root user.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
+to deal with incoming network traffic.
+After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
+the privilege of the authenticated user.
+The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
+escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm VersionAddendum
+Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
+OS- or site-specific modifications.
+The default is
+.Dq FreeBSD-20091001 .
+.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
+Specifies the first display number available for
+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
+X11 forwarding.
+This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+The default is 10.
+.It Cm X11Forwarding
+Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.Pp
+When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
+the server and to client displays if the
+.Xr sshd 8
+proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
+.Cm X11UseLocalhost
+below), though this is not the default.
+Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
+verification and substitution occur on the client side.
+The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
+display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
+forwarding (see the warnings for
+.Cm ForwardX11
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ) .
+A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to
+protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
+requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a
+.Dq no
+setting.
+.Pp
+Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
+forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders.
+X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if
+.Cm UseLogin
+is enabled.
+.It Cm X11UseLocalhost
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
+the wildcard address.
+By default,
+sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
+hostname part of the
+.Ev DISPLAY
+environment variable to
+.Dq localhost .
+This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display.
+However, some older X11 clients may not function with this
+configuration.
+.Cm X11UseLocalhost
+may be set to
+.Dq no
+to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard
+address.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm XAuthLocation
+Specifies the full pathname of the
+.Xr xauth 1
+program.
+The default is
+.Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth .
+.El
+.Sh TIME FORMATS
+.Xr sshd 8
+command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
+may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
+.Sm off
+.Ar time Op Ar qualifier ,
+.Sm on
+where
+.Ar time
+is a positive integer value and
+.Ar qualifier
+is one of the following:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
+.It Aq Cm none
+seconds
+.It Cm s | Cm S
+seconds
+.It Cm m | Cm M
+minutes
+.It Cm h | Cm H
+hours
+.It Cm d | Cm D
+days
+.It Cm w | Cm W
+weeks
+.El
+.Pp
+Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate
+the total time value.
+.Pp
+Time format examples:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
+.It 600
+600 seconds (10 minutes)
+.It 10m
+10 minutes
+.It 1h30m
+1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
+(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+for privilege separation.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33bd652
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.26 2007/09/11 15:47:17 gilles Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does.  We cannot
+ * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are
+ * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of
+ * login the current system has.  Also, we want to be able to execute commands
+ * on a tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * Returns the time when the user last logged in.  Returns 0 if the
+ * information is not available.  This must be called before record_login.
+ * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf.
+ */
+time_t
+get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
+    char *buf, size_t bufsize)
+{
+	struct logininfo li;
+
+	login_get_lastlog(&li, uid);
+	strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize);
+	return (time_t)li.tv_sec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate and store last login message.  This must be done before
+ * login_login() is called and lastlog is updated.
+ */
+static void
+store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid)
+{
+#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
+	char *time_string, hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = "", buf[512];
+	time_t last_login_time;
+
+	if (!options.print_lastlog)
+		return;
+
+# ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+	time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid);
+	if (time_string != NULL) {
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, time_string, strlen(time_string));
+		xfree(time_string);
+	}
+# else
+	last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname,
+	    sizeof(hostname));
+
+	if (last_login_time != 0) {
+		time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
+		time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0';
+		if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0)
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s\r\n",
+			    time_string);
+		else
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s from %s\r\n",
+			    time_string, hostname);
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+# endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */
+#endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Records that the user has logged in.  I wish these parts of operating
+ * systems were more standardized.
+ */
+void
+record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid,
+    const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+	struct logininfo *li;
+
+	/* save previous login details before writing new */
+	store_lastlog_message(user, uid);
+
+	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
+	login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
+	login_login(li);
+	login_free_entry(li);
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+void
+record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
+		 const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+	struct logininfo *li;
+
+	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname);
+	login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
+	login_utmp_only(li);
+	login_free_entry(li);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Records that the user has logged out. */
+void
+record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user)
+{
+	struct logininfo *li;
+
+	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty);
+	login_logout(li);
+	login_free_entry(li);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..500d3fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.8 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+void	record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t,
+    const char *, struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+void   record_logout(pid_t, const char *, const char *);
+time_t	get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, u_int);
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+void	record_utmp_only(pid_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+		struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbbc0fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.28 2007/09/11 23:49:09 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+# include <AvailabilityMacros.h>
+# if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5)
+#  define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Allocates and opens a pty.  Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or
+ * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated.  On success, open file
+ * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are
+ * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters).
+ */
+
+int
+pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
+{
+	/* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */
+	char *name;
+	int i;
+
+	i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (i < 0) {
+		error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	name = ttyname(*ttyfd);
+	if (!name)
+		fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails.");
+
+	strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen);	/* possible truncation */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Releases the tty.  Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */
+
+void
+pty_release(const char *tty)
+{
+#ifndef __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
+	if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0)
+		error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+	if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0)
+		error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+#endif /* __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ */
+}
+
+/* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
+
+void
+pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty)
+{
+	int fd;
+#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
+	void *old;
+#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+	if (setsid() < 0)
+		error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	fd = open(tty, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
+	if (fd != -1) {
+		signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
+		ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL);
+		signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+		setpgid(0, 0);
+		close(fd);
+	} else {
+		error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
+	}
+
+	debug("Setting controlling tty using TCSETCTTY.");
+	ioctl(*ttyfd, TCSETCTTY, NULL);
+	fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+	close(*ttyfd);
+	*ttyfd = fd;
+#else /* _UNICOS */
+
+	/* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+	fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+		close(fd);
+	}
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+	if (setsid() < 0)
+		error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling
+	 * tty.
+	 */
+	fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
+		close(fd);
+	}
+	/* Make it our controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCSCTTY
+	debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY.");
+	if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0)
+		error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif /* TIOCSCTTY */
+#ifdef NEED_SETPGRP
+	if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0)
+		error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno));
+#endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */
+#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
+	old = signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
+	vhangup();
+	signal(SIGHUP, old);
+#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
+	fd = open(tty, O_RDWR);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
+		close(*ttyfd);
+		*ttyfd = fd;
+#else /* USE_VHANGUP */
+		close(fd);
+#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
+	}
+	/* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */
+	fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+	else
+		close(fd);
+#endif /* _UNICOS */
+}
+
+/* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */
+
+void
+pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
+	u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel)
+{
+	struct winsize w;
+
+	/* may truncate u_int -> u_short */
+	w.ws_row = row;
+	w.ws_col = col;
+	w.ws_xpixel = xpixel;
+	w.ws_ypixel = ypixel;
+	(void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w);
+}
+
+void
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+{
+	struct group *grp;
+	gid_t gid;
+	mode_t mode;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */
+	grp = getgrnam("tty");
+	if (grp) {
+		gid = grp->gr_gid;
+		mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP;
+	} else {
+		gid = pw->pw_gid;
+		mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Change owner and mode of the tty as required.
+	 * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/
+	 * tty is owned by root.
+	 */
+	if (stat(tty, &st))
+		fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty,
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
+#endif
+
+	if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
+		if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
+			if (errno == EROFS &&
+			    (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
+				debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
+				    tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			else
+				fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
+				    tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
+				    strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) {
+		if (chmod(tty, mode) < 0) {
+			if (errno == EROFS &&
+			    (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0)
+				debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
+				    tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
+			else
+				fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
+				    tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.h b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac90035
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.h,v 1.11 2008/05/19 15:45:07 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for allocating a pseudo-terminal and making it the controlling
+ * tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+struct termios *get_saved_tio(void);
+void	 leave_raw_mode(void);
+void	 enter_raw_mode(void);
+
+int	 pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+void	 pty_release(const char *);
+void	 pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
+void	 pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
+void	 pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshtty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshtty.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21ade4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshtty.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.c,v 1.13 2008/05/19 15:45:07 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "sshpty.h"
+
+static struct termios _saved_tio;
+static int _in_raw_mode = 0;
+
+struct termios *
+get_saved_tio(void)
+{
+	return _in_raw_mode ? &_saved_tio : NULL;
+}
+
+void
+leave_raw_mode(void)
+{
+	if (!_in_raw_mode)
+		return;
+	if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &_saved_tio) == -1)
+		perror("tcsetattr");
+	else
+		_in_raw_mode = 0;
+}
+
+void
+enter_raw_mode(void)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+
+	if (tcgetattr(fileno(stdin), &tio) == -1) {
+		perror("tcgetattr");
+		return;
+	}
+	_saved_tio = tio;
+	tio.c_iflag |= IGNPAR;
+	tio.c_iflag &= ~(ISTRIP | INLCR | IGNCR | ICRNL | IXON | IXANY | IXOFF);
+#ifdef IUCLC
+	tio.c_iflag &= ~IUCLC;
+#endif
+	tio.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ICANON | ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL);
+#ifdef IEXTEN
+	tio.c_lflag &= ~IEXTEN;
+#endif
+	tio.c_oflag &= ~OPOST;
+	tio.c_cc[VMIN] = 1;
+	tio.c_cc[VTIME] = 0;
+	if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &tio) == -1)
+		perror("tcsetattr");
+	else
+		_in_raw_mode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f51b8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.29 2008/11/02 00:16:16 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way.
+ * Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times
+ * into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the
+ * suitable code.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+#define TTY_OP_END		0
+/*
+ * uint32 (u_int) follows speed in SSH1 and SSH2
+ */
+#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1	192
+#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1	193
+#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2	128
+#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2	129
+
+/*
+ * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate.  The values of the
+ * constants for speed_t are not themselves portable.
+ */
+static int
+speed_to_baud(speed_t speed)
+{
+	switch (speed) {
+	case B0:
+		return 0;
+	case B50:
+		return 50;
+	case B75:
+		return 75;
+	case B110:
+		return 110;
+	case B134:
+		return 134;
+	case B150:
+		return 150;
+	case B200:
+		return 200;
+	case B300:
+		return 300;
+	case B600:
+		return 600;
+	case B1200:
+		return 1200;
+	case B1800:
+		return 1800;
+	case B2400:
+		return 2400;
+	case B4800:
+		return 4800;
+	case B9600:
+		return 9600;
+
+#ifdef B19200
+	case B19200:
+		return 19200;
+#else /* B19200 */
+#ifdef EXTA
+	case EXTA:
+		return 19200;
+#endif /* EXTA */
+#endif /* B19200 */
+
+#ifdef B38400
+	case B38400:
+		return 38400;
+#else /* B38400 */
+#ifdef EXTB
+	case EXTB:
+		return 38400;
+#endif /* EXTB */
+#endif /* B38400 */
+
+#ifdef B7200
+	case B7200:
+		return 7200;
+#endif /* B7200 */
+#ifdef B14400
+	case B14400:
+		return 14400;
+#endif /* B14400 */
+#ifdef B28800
+	case B28800:
+		return 28800;
+#endif /* B28800 */
+#ifdef B57600
+	case B57600:
+		return 57600;
+#endif /* B57600 */
+#ifdef B76800
+	case B76800:
+		return 76800;
+#endif /* B76800 */
+#ifdef B115200
+	case B115200:
+		return 115200;
+#endif /* B115200 */
+#ifdef B230400
+	case B230400:
+		return 230400;
+#endif /* B230400 */
+	default:
+		return 9600;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t.
+ */
+static speed_t
+baud_to_speed(int baud)
+{
+	switch (baud) {
+	case 0:
+		return B0;
+	case 50:
+		return B50;
+	case 75:
+		return B75;
+	case 110:
+		return B110;
+	case 134:
+		return B134;
+	case 150:
+		return B150;
+	case 200:
+		return B200;
+	case 300:
+		return B300;
+	case 600:
+		return B600;
+	case 1200:
+		return B1200;
+	case 1800:
+		return B1800;
+	case 2400:
+		return B2400;
+	case 4800:
+		return B4800;
+	case 9600:
+		return B9600;
+
+#ifdef B19200
+	case 19200:
+		return B19200;
+#else /* B19200 */
+#ifdef EXTA
+	case 19200:
+		return EXTA;
+#endif /* EXTA */
+#endif /* B19200 */
+
+#ifdef B38400
+	case 38400:
+		return B38400;
+#else /* B38400 */
+#ifdef EXTB
+	case 38400:
+		return EXTB;
+#endif /* EXTB */
+#endif /* B38400 */
+
+#ifdef B7200
+	case 7200:
+		return B7200;
+#endif /* B7200 */
+#ifdef B14400
+	case 14400:
+		return B14400;
+#endif /* B14400 */
+#ifdef B28800
+	case 28800:
+		return B28800;
+#endif /* B28800 */
+#ifdef B57600
+	case 57600:
+		return B57600;
+#endif /* B57600 */
+#ifdef B76800
+	case 76800:
+		return B76800;
+#endif /* B76800 */
+#ifdef B115200
+	case 115200:
+		return B115200;
+#endif /* B115200 */
+#ifdef B230400
+	case 230400:
+		return B230400;
+#endif /* B230400 */
+	default:
+		return B9600;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a special character into SSH line format.
+ */
+static u_int
+special_char_encode(cc_t c)
+{
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+	if (c == _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+		return 255;
+#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
+	return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode a special character from SSH line format.
+ */
+static cc_t
+special_char_decode(u_int c)
+{
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+	if (c == 255)
+		return _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
+	return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd
+ * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet
+ * being constructed.
+ */
+void
+tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+	int baud;
+	Buffer buf;
+	int tty_op_ospeed, tty_op_ispeed;
+	void (*put_arg)(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+	buffer_init(&buf);
+	if (compat20) {
+		tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2;
+		tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2;
+		put_arg = buffer_put_int;
+	} else {
+		tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1;
+		tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1;
+		put_arg = (void (*)(Buffer *, u_int)) buffer_put_char;
+	}
+
+	if (tiop == NULL) {
+		if (fd == -1) {
+			debug("tty_make_modes: no fd or tio");
+			goto end;
+		}
+		if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
+			logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			goto end;
+		}
+	} else
+		tio = *tiop;
+
+	/* Store input and output baud rates. */
+	baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio));
+	buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ospeed);
+	buffer_put_int(&buf, baud);
+	baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio));
+	buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ispeed);
+	buffer_put_int(&buf, baud);
+
+	/* Store values of mode flags. */
+#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
+	buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
+	put_arg(&buf, special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME]));
+
+#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
+	buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
+	put_arg(&buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0));
+
+#include "ttymodes.h"
+
+#undef TTYCHAR
+#undef TTYMODE
+
+end:
+	/* Mark end of mode data. */
+	buffer_put_char(&buf, TTY_OP_END);
+	if (compat20)
+		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf));
+	else
+		packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf));
+	buffer_free(&buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable
+ * manner from a packet being read.
+ */
+void
+tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+	int opcode, baud;
+	int n_bytes = 0;
+	int failure = 0;
+	u_int (*get_arg)(void);
+	int arg_size;
+
+	if (compat20) {
+		*n_bytes_ptr = packet_get_int();
+		if (*n_bytes_ptr == 0)
+			return;
+		get_arg = packet_get_int;
+		arg_size = 4;
+	} else {
+		get_arg = packet_get_char;
+		arg_size = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Get old attributes for the terminal.  We will modify these
+	 * flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific
+	 * modes, they will initially have reasonable values.
+	 */
+	if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
+		logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		failure = -1;
+	}
+
+	for (;;) {
+		n_bytes += 1;
+		opcode = packet_get_char();
+		switch (opcode) {
+		case TTY_OP_END:
+			goto set;
+
+		/* XXX: future conflict possible */
+		case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1:
+		case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2:
+			n_bytes += 4;
+			baud = packet_get_int();
+			if (failure != -1 &&
+			    cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+				error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud);
+			break;
+
+		/* XXX: future conflict possible */
+		case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1:
+		case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2:
+			n_bytes += 4;
+			baud = packet_get_int();
+			if (failure != -1 &&
+			    cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+				error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud);
+			break;
+
+#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
+	case OP: \
+	  n_bytes += arg_size; \
+	  tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(get_arg()); \
+	  break;
+#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
+	case OP: \
+	  n_bytes += arg_size; \
+	  if (get_arg()) \
+	    tio.FIELD |= NAME; \
+	  else \
+	    tio.FIELD &= ~NAME;	\
+	  break;
+
+#include "ttymodes.h"
+
+#undef TTYCHAR
+#undef TTYMODE
+
+		default:
+			debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)",
+			    opcode, opcode);
+			if (!compat20) {
+				/*
+				 * SSH1:
+				 * Opcodes 1 to 127 are defined to have
+				 * a one-byte argument.
+				 * Opcodes 128 to 159 are defined to have
+				 * an integer argument.
+				 */
+				if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 128) {
+					n_bytes += 1;
+					(void) packet_get_char();
+					break;
+				} else if (opcode >= 128 && opcode < 160) {
+					n_bytes += 4;
+					(void) packet_get_int();
+					break;
+				} else {
+					/*
+					 * It is a truly undefined opcode (160 to 255).
+					 * We have no idea about its arguments.  So we
+					 * must stop parsing.  Note that some data
+					 * may be left in the packet; hopefully there
+					 * is nothing more coming after the mode data.
+					 */
+					logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d",
+					    opcode);
+					goto set;
+				}
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * SSH2:
+				 * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have
+				 * a uint32 argument.
+				 * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and
+				 * cause parsing to stop.
+				 */
+				if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) {
+					n_bytes += 4;
+					(void) packet_get_int();
+					break;
+				} else {
+					logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d",
+					    opcode);
+					goto set;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+set:
+	if (*n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes) {
+		*n_bytes_ptr = n_bytes;
+		logit("parse_tty_modes: n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes: %d %d",
+		    *n_bytes_ptr, n_bytes);
+		return;		/* Don't process bytes passed */
+	}
+	if (failure == -1)
+		return;		/* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */
+
+	/* Set the new modes for the terminal. */
+	if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1)
+		logit("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.h b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d848fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.14 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH1:
+ * The tty mode description is a stream of bytes.  The stream consists of
+ * opcode-arguments pairs.  It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0).
+ * Opcodes 1-127 have one-byte arguments.  Opcodes 128-159 have integer
+ * arguments.  Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined, and cause parsing to
+ * stop (they should only be used after any other data).
+ *
+ * SSH2:
+ * Differences between SSH1 and SSH2 terminal mode encoding include:
+ * 1. Encoded terminal modes are represented as a string, and a stream
+ *    of bytes within that string.
+ * 2. Opcode arguments are uint32 (1-159); 160-255 remain undefined.
+ * 3. The values for TTY_OP_ISPEED and TTY_OP_OSPEED are different;
+ *    128 and 129 vs. 192 and 193 respectively.
+ *
+ * The client puts in the stream any modes it knows about, and the
+ * server ignores any modes it does not know about.  This allows some degree
+ * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like
+ * tty interface.  The protocol can support other systems as well, but might
+ * require reimplementing as mode names would likely be different.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Some constants and prototypes are defined in packet.h; this file
+ * is only intended for including from ttymodes.c.
+ */
+
+/* termios macro */
+/* name, op */
+TTYCHAR(VINTR, 1)
+TTYCHAR(VQUIT, 2)
+TTYCHAR(VERASE, 3)
+#if defined(VKILL)
+TTYCHAR(VKILL, 4)
+#endif /* VKILL */
+TTYCHAR(VEOF, 5)
+#if defined(VEOL)
+TTYCHAR(VEOL, 6)
+#endif /* VEOL */
+#ifdef VEOL2
+TTYCHAR(VEOL2, 7)
+#endif /* VEOL2 */
+TTYCHAR(VSTART, 8)
+TTYCHAR(VSTOP, 9)
+#if defined(VSUSP)
+TTYCHAR(VSUSP, 10)
+#endif /* VSUSP */
+#if defined(VDSUSP)
+TTYCHAR(VDSUSP, 11)
+#endif /* VDSUSP */
+#if defined(VREPRINT)
+TTYCHAR(VREPRINT, 12)
+#endif /* VREPRINT */
+#if defined(VWERASE)
+TTYCHAR(VWERASE, 13)
+#endif /* VWERASE */
+#if defined(VLNEXT)
+TTYCHAR(VLNEXT, 14)
+#endif /* VLNEXT */
+#if defined(VFLUSH)
+TTYCHAR(VFLUSH, 15)
+#endif /* VFLUSH */
+#ifdef VSWTCH
+TTYCHAR(VSWTCH, 16)
+#endif /* VSWTCH */
+#if defined(VSTATUS)
+TTYCHAR(VSTATUS, 17)
+#endif /* VSTATUS */
+#ifdef VDISCARD
+TTYCHAR(VDISCARD, 18)
+#endif /* VDISCARD */
+
+/* name, field, op */
+TTYMODE(IGNPAR,	c_iflag, 30)
+TTYMODE(PARMRK,	c_iflag, 31)
+TTYMODE(INPCK,	c_iflag, 32)
+TTYMODE(ISTRIP,	c_iflag, 33)
+TTYMODE(INLCR,	c_iflag, 34)
+TTYMODE(IGNCR,	c_iflag, 35)
+TTYMODE(ICRNL,	c_iflag, 36)
+#if defined(IUCLC)
+TTYMODE(IUCLC,	c_iflag, 37)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(IXON,	c_iflag, 38)
+TTYMODE(IXANY,	c_iflag, 39)
+TTYMODE(IXOFF,	c_iflag, 40)
+#ifdef IMAXBEL
+TTYMODE(IMAXBEL,c_iflag, 41)
+#endif /* IMAXBEL */
+
+TTYMODE(ISIG,	c_lflag, 50)
+TTYMODE(ICANON,	c_lflag, 51)
+#ifdef XCASE
+TTYMODE(XCASE,	c_lflag, 52)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(ECHO,	c_lflag, 53)
+TTYMODE(ECHOE,	c_lflag, 54)
+TTYMODE(ECHOK,	c_lflag, 55)
+TTYMODE(ECHONL,	c_lflag, 56)
+TTYMODE(NOFLSH,	c_lflag, 57)
+TTYMODE(TOSTOP,	c_lflag, 58)
+#ifdef IEXTEN
+TTYMODE(IEXTEN, c_lflag, 59)
+#endif /* IEXTEN */
+#if defined(ECHOCTL)
+TTYMODE(ECHOCTL,c_lflag, 60)
+#endif /* ECHOCTL */
+#ifdef ECHOKE
+TTYMODE(ECHOKE,	c_lflag, 61)
+#endif /* ECHOKE */
+#if defined(PENDIN)
+TTYMODE(PENDIN,	c_lflag, 62)
+#endif /* PENDIN */
+
+TTYMODE(OPOST,	c_oflag, 70)
+#if defined(OLCUC)
+TTYMODE(OLCUC,	c_oflag, 71)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONLCR
+TTYMODE(ONLCR,	c_oflag, 72)
+#endif
+#ifdef OCRNL
+TTYMODE(OCRNL,	c_oflag, 73)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONOCR
+TTYMODE(ONOCR,	c_oflag, 74)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONLRET
+TTYMODE(ONLRET,	c_oflag, 75)
+#endif
+
+TTYMODE(CS7,	c_cflag, 90)
+TTYMODE(CS8,	c_cflag, 91)
+TTYMODE(PARENB,	c_cflag, 92)
+TTYMODE(PARODD,	c_cflag, 93)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8376483
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.35 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Code for uid-swapping.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases:
+ *    1. euid=0, ruid=0
+ *    2. euid=0, ruid!=0
+ *    3. euid!=0, ruid!=0
+ * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has
+ * POSIX saved uids or not.
+ */
+
+#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that
+   is not part of the posix specification. */
+#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+/* Saved effective uid. */
+static uid_t 	saved_euid = 0;
+static gid_t	saved_egid = 0;
+#endif
+
+/* Saved effective uid. */
+static int	privileged = 0;
+static int	temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
+static gid_t	*saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL;
+static int	saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1;
+
+/*
+ * Temporarily changes to the given uid.  If the effective user
+ * id is not root, this does nothing.  This call cannot be nested.
+ */
+void
+temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	/* Save the current euid, and egroups. */
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+	saved_euid = geteuid();
+	saved_egid = getegid();
+	debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)",
+	    (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+	    (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (saved_euid != 0) {
+		privileged = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+#endif
+#else
+	if (geteuid() != 0) {
+		privileged = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+	privileged = 1;
+	temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1;
+
+	saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
+	if (saved_egroupslen < 0)
+		fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	if (saved_egroupslen > 0) {
+		saved_egroups = xrealloc(saved_egroups,
+		    saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
+		if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
+			fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	} else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */
+		if (saved_egroups != NULL)
+			xfree(saved_egroups);
+	}
+
+	/* set and save the user's groups */
+	if (user_groupslen == -1) {
+		if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+			fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name,
+			    strerror(errno));
+
+		user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
+		if (user_groupslen < 0)
+			fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		if (user_groupslen > 0) {
+			user_groups = xrealloc(user_groups,
+			    user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
+			if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
+				fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		} else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */
+			if (user_groups)
+				xfree(user_groups);
+		}
+	}
+	/* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */
+	if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
+		fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+	/* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */
+	if (setgid(getegid()) < 0)
+		debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno));
+	/* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */
+	if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0)
+		debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno));
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+	if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+		fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+		    strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+permanently_drop_suid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	uid_t old_uid = getuid();
+
+	debug("permanently_drop_suid: %u", (u_int)uid);
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
+	if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+#elif defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	if (setreuid(uid, uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setreuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+#else
+# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+	if (seteuid(uid) < 0)
+		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+# endif
+	if (setuid(uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
+	if (old_uid != uid &&
+	    (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
+		fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+	/* Verify UID drop was successful */
+	if (getuid() != uid || geteuid() != uid) {
+		fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
+		    __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)uid);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restores to the original (privileged) uid.
+ */
+void
+restore_uid(void)
+{
+	/* it's a no-op unless privileged */
+	if (!privileged) {
+		debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective)
+		fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective");
+
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+	debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
+	/* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */
+	if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0)
+		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno));
+	if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0)
+		fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno));
+#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+	/*
+	 * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value.
+	 * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid
+	 * as well.
+	 */
+	setuid(getuid());
+	setgid(getgid());
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+	if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
+		fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid.  This cannot be
+ * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective.
+ */
+void
+permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	uid_t old_uid = getuid();
+	gid_t old_gid = getgid();
+
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given");
+	if (temporarily_use_uid_effective)
+		fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective");
+	debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+	    (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+	if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+		fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+#elif defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID)
+	if (setregid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+		fatal("setregid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+#else
+	if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+		fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+	if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+		fatal("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+	/*
+	 * OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into
+	 * memberd support for >16 supplemental groups.
+	 */
+	if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+		fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s",
+		    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
+	if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
+#elif defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	if (setreuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setreuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
+#else
+# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+	if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0)
+		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
+# endif
+	if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */
+	if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 &&
+	    (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1))
+		fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+	/* Verify GID drop was successful */
+	if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) {
+		fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)",
+		    __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(),
+		    (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+	}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
+	if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid &&
+	    (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
+		fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+	/* Verify UID drop was successful */
+	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) {
+		fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
+		    __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(),
+		    (u_int)pw->pw_uid);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.h b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c1163d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.h,v 1.13 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+void	 temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *);
+void	 restore_uid(void);
+void	 permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *);
+void	 permanently_drop_suid(uid_t);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/umac.c b/crypto/openssh/umac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92902bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/umac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1277 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.3 2008/05/12 20:52:20 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * 
+ * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
+ *
+ * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18
+ *
+ * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
+ * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
+ * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz
+ *                                                                 
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
+ * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
+ * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
+ * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
+ * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
+ * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)                                        
+ *                                                                   
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+ 
+ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
+  *
+  * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
+  *
+  * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
+  *    aligned
+  *
+  * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
+  * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
+  * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
+  * zeroed.
+  *
+  * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
+  * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
+  * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
+  * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
+  * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU
+  * Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
+  * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is
+  * the third.
+  *
+  * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes
+  * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why.
+  *
+  /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
+ 
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN     8  /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16                  */
+/* #define FORCE_C_ONLY        1  ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd        */
+/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION   1  1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman   */
+/* #define SSE2                0  Is SSE2 is available?                   */
+/* #define RUN_TESTS           0  Run basic correctness/speed tests       */
+/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT     0  Enable auhthenticated encrytion         */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "umac.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Primitive Data Types ---                                           */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The following assumptions may need change on your system */
+typedef u_int8_t	UINT8;  /* 1 byte   */
+typedef u_int16_t	UINT16; /* 2 byte   */
+typedef u_int32_t	UINT32; /* 4 byte   */
+typedef u_int64_t	UINT64; /* 8 bytes  */
+typedef unsigned int	UWORD;  /* Register */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define UMAC_KEY_LEN           16  /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */
+
+/* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner.     */
+/* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must    */
+/* be set true if the host computer is little-endian.                     */
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1
+#else
+#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b)))
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms           */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if HAVE_SWAP32
+#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p)		(swap32(*(UINT32 *)(p)))
+#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) 	(*(UINT32 *)(p) = swap32(v))
+#else /* HAVE_SWAP32 */
+
+static UINT32 LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(void *ptr)
+{
+    UINT32 temp = *(UINT32 *)ptr;
+    temp = (temp >> 24) | ((temp & 0x00FF0000) >> 8 )
+         | ((temp & 0x0000FF00) << 8 ) | (temp << 24);
+    return (UINT32)temp;
+}
+
+# if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+static void STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(void *ptr, UINT32 x)
+{
+    UINT32 i = (UINT32)x;
+    *(UINT32 *)ptr = (i >> 24) | ((i & 0x00FF0000) >> 8 )
+                   | ((i & 0x0000FF00) << 8 ) | (i << 24);
+}
+# endif /* __LITTLE_ENDIAN */
+#endif /* HAVE_SWAP32 */
+
+/* The following definitions use the above reversal-primitives to do the right
+ * thing on endian specific load and stores.
+ */
+
+#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(ptr)     (*(UINT32 *)(ptr))
+#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(ptr,x)     STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(ptr,x)
+#else
+#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(ptr)     LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(ptr)
+#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(ptr,x)     (*(UINT32 *)(ptr) = (UINT32)(x))
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */
+#define AES_BLOCK_LEN  16
+
+/* OpenSSL's AES */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+# include <openssl/aes.h>
+#endif
+typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1];
+#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key)                  \
+  AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key)
+#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key)                      \
+  AES_set_encrypt_key((u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key)
+
+/* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter
+ * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes
+ * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of
+ * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct
+ * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream.
+ */
+static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes)
+{
+    UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0};
+    UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+    UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp;
+    int i;
+    
+    /* Setup the initial value */
+    in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx;
+    in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1;
+        
+    while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) {
+        aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
+        memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN);
+        in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i;
+        nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+        dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+    }
+    if (nbytes) {
+        aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
+        memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes);
+    }
+}
+
+/* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom
+ * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and 
+ * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce.
+ * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+    UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN];  /* Previous AES output is saved      */
+    UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN];  /* The AES input making above cache  */
+    aes_int_key prf_key;         /* Expanded AES key for PDF          */
+} pdf_ctx;
+
+static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+{
+    UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN];
+    
+    kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN);
+    aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key);
+    
+    /* Initialize pdf and cache */
+    memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce));
+    aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
+}
+
+static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
+{
+    /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes
+     * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st
+     * element, then we may have the result in the cache already.
+     */
+     
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 3
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 1
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 0
+#endif
+
+    UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4];
+#if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0
+    int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK;
+#endif
+    *(UINT32 *)tmp_nonce_lo = ((UINT32 *)nonce)[1];
+    tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */
+    
+    if ( (((UINT32 *)tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) ||
+         (((UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) )
+    {
+        ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((UINT32 *)nonce)[0];
+        ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)tmp_nonce_lo)[0];
+        aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
+    }
+    
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+    *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+    *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
+    ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
+    ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
+    ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1];
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper
+ * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website.     
+ * The interface to this implementation has two         
+ * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed
+ * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second
+ * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the          
+ * muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as     
+ * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the   
+ * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output.    
+ * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine       
+ * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to  
+ * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is        
+ * optimized and should be prefered whenever the multiple-buffer interface
+ * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's         
+ * responsability to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.            
+ *                                                                        
+ * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and        
+ * must be called once, before any other PDF routine.                     
+ */
+ 
+ /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They
+  * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines
+  * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call, 
+  * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams.
+  */
+
+#define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied  */
+#define L1_KEY_LEN         1024     /* Internal key bytes                 */
+#define L1_KEY_SHIFT         16     /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */
+#define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY      32     /* pad message to boundary multiple   */
+#define ALLOC_BOUNDARY       16     /* Keep buffers aligned to this       */
+#define HASH_BUF_BYTES       64     /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple          */
+
+typedef struct {
+    UINT8  nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
+    UINT8  data   [HASH_BUF_BYTES];    /* Incomming data buffer           */
+    int next_data_empty;    /* Bookeeping variable for data buffer.       */
+    int bytes_hashed;        /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorperated.   */
+    UINT64 state[STREAMS];               /* on-line state     */
+} nh_ctx;
+
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and     
+* then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp",
+* "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32).  Key
+* is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup.    
+*/
+{
+    UINT64 h;
+    UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+    UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+    UINT32 *d = (UINT32 *)dp;
+    UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+    UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7;
+    
+    h = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+    do {
+        d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+        d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+        d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+        d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+        k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+        k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+        h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+        h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+        h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+        h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+        
+        d += 8;
+        k += 8;
+    } while (--c);
+  *((UINT64 *)hp) = h;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call.
+ */
+{
+  UINT64 h1,h2;
+  UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+  UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+  UINT32 *d = (UINT32 *)dp;
+  UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+  UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+        k8,k9,k10,k11;
+
+  h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+  h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+  k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+  do {
+    d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+    d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+    d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+    d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+    k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+    k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+
+    h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+    h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+
+    h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+    h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+
+    h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+    h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+
+    h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+    h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+
+    k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+
+    d += 8;
+    k += 8;
+  } while (--c);
+  ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+  ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
+*/
+{
+    UINT64 h1,h2,h3;
+    UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+    UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+    UINT32 *d = (UINT32 *)dp;
+    UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+    UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+        k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15;
+    
+    h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+    h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+    h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
+    k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+    k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+    do {
+        d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+        d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+        d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+        d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+        k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+        k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
+        
+        h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+        h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+        h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
+        
+        h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+        h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+        h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
+        
+        h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+        h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+        h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
+        
+        h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+        h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+        h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
+        
+        k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+        k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
+        
+        d += 8;
+        k += 8;
+    } while (--c);
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
+*/
+{
+    UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4;
+    UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+    UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+    UINT32 *d = (UINT32 *)dp;
+    UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+    UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+        k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15,
+        k16,k17,k18,k19;
+    
+    h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+    h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+    h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
+    h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3);
+    k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+    k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+    do {
+        d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+        d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+        d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+        d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+        k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+        k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
+        k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19);
+        
+        h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+        h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+        h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
+        h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4));
+        
+        h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+        h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+        h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
+        h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5));
+        
+        h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+        h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+        h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
+        h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6));
+        
+        h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+        h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+        h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
+        h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7));
+        
+        k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+        k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
+        k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19;
+        
+        d += 8;
+        k += 8;
+    } while (--c);
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+#endif  /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
+/* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes
+ * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a
+ * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset
+ * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already.
+ */
+{
+    UINT8 *key;
+  
+    key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed;
+    nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes)
+/* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to               */
+/* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing.     */
+{
+    UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw;
+    if (bpw == 4) {
+        UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
+        do {
+            *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
+            p++;
+        } while (--iters);
+    } else if (bpw == 8) {
+        UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
+        UINT32 t;
+        do {
+            t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1);
+            p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
+            p[0] = t;
+            p += 2;
+        } while (--iters);
+    }
+}
+#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z))
+#else
+#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0)  /* Do nothing */
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc)
+/* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */
+{
+    hc->bytes_hashed = 0;
+    hc->next_data_empty = 0;
+    hc->state[0] = 0;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    hc->state[1] = 0;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    hc->state[2] = 0;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    hc->state[3] = 0;
+#endif
+
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+/* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing.   */
+{
+    kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
+    endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
+    nh_reset(hc);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
+/* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an    */
+/* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES.                                       */
+{
+    UINT32 i,j;
+    
+    j = hc->next_data_empty;
+    if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
+        if (j) {
+            i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j;
+            memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i);
+            nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES);
+            nbytes -= i;
+            buf += i;
+            hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES;
+        }
+        if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
+            i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1);
+            nh_transform(hc, buf, i);
+            nbytes -= i;
+            buf += i;
+            hc->bytes_hashed += i;
+        }
+        j = 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes);
+    hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes)
+{
+/* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */
+    if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
+        while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) {
+            *p = 0;
+            nbytes--;
+            p++;
+        }
+        while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
+            *(UWORD *)p = 0;
+            nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD);
+            p += sizeof(UWORD);
+        }
+    }
+    while (nbytes) {
+        *p = 0;
+        nbytes--;
+        p++;
+    }
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result)
+/* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration
+ * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any
+ * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the
+ * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number
+ * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result".
+ * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated.
+ */
+{
+    int nh_len, nbits;
+
+    if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) {
+        nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) &
+                                                ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+        zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty, 
+                                          nh_len - hc->next_data_empty);
+        nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
+        hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty;
+    } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) {
+    	nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;
+        zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY);
+        nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
+    }
+
+    nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3);
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits;
+#endif
+    nh_reset(hc);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len,
+               UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result)
+/* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent.
+ * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is
+ * well aligned
+ */
+{
+    UINT32 nbits;
+    
+    /* Initialize the hash state */
+    nbits = (unpadded_len << 3);
+    
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits;
+#endif
+    
+    nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first
+ * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer
+ * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial-
+ * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output.
+ *
+ * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data
+ * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the
+ * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary.
+ * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls
+ * uhash_final() which          
+ * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation    
+ * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine,   
+ * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and         
+ * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be                     
+ * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary.              
+ *                                                                        
+ * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and    
+ * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine.
+ */                                                        
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Primes and masks */
+#define p36    ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull)              /* 2^36 -  5 */
+#define p64    ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull)              /* 2^64 - 59 */
+#define m36    ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull)  /* The low 36 of 64 bits */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+typedef struct uhash_ctx {
+    nh_ctx hash;                          /* Hash context for L1 NH hash  */
+    UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS];           /* p64 poly keys                */
+    UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS];           /* poly hash result             */
+    UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4];            /* Inner-product keys           */
+    UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS];             /* Inner-product translation    */
+    UINT32 msg_len;                       /* Total length of data passed  */
+                                          /* to uhash */
+} uhash_ctx;
+typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one
+ * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64
+ * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit
+ * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to
+ * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation
+ * patches any errant values.
+ */
+
+static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data)
+{
+    UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32),
+           key_lo = (UINT32)key,
+           cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32),
+           cur_lo = (UINT32)cur,
+           x_lo,
+           x_hi;
+    UINT64 X,T,res;
+    
+    X =  MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo);
+    x_lo = (UINT32)X;
+    x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32);
+    
+    res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo);
+     
+    T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32);
+    res += T;
+    if (res < T)
+        res += 59;
+
+    res += data;
+    if (res < data)
+        res += 59;
+
+    return res;
+}
+
+
+/* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this
+ * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle
+ * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to
+ * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24
+ * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB).
+ */
+static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
+{
+    int i;
+    UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in;
+    
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+        if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) {
+            hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], 
+                                       hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1);
+            hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+                                       hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59));
+        } else {
+            hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+                                       hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
+ * produces a result not neccesarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
+ * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
+ * multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
+ */
+
+static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data)
+{
+    t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48);
+    t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32);
+    t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16);
+    t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data);
+    
+    return t;
+}
+
+static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t)
+{
+/* Divisionless modular reduction */
+    UINT64 ret;
+    
+    ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36);
+    if (ret >= p36)
+        ret -= p36;
+
+    /* return least significant 32 bits */
+    return (UINT32)(ret);
+}
+
+
+/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
+ * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the
+ * NH output.
+ */
+static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res)
+{
+    UINT64 t;
+    UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res;
+    
+    t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]);
+    STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]);
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]);
+    STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]);
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]);
+    STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]);
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]);
+    STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
+ * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the
+ * polyhash output.
+ */
+static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res)
+{
+    int i;
+    UINT64 t;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+        /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */
+        if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64)
+            ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64;
+        t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]);
+        STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i, 
+                         ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Reset uhash context for next hash session */
+static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc)
+{
+    nh_reset(&pc->hash);
+    pc->msg_len = 0;
+    pc->poly_accum[0] = 1;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    pc->poly_accum[1] = 1;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    pc->poly_accum[2] = 1;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    pc->poly_accum[3] = 1;
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context,
+ * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner-
+ * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native
+ * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation.
+ */
+static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+{
+    int i;
+    UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)];
+    
+    /* Zero the entire uhash context */
+    memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx));
+
+    /* Initialize the L1 hash */
+    nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key);
+    
+    /* Setup L2 hash variables */
+    kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf));    /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+        /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not
+         * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a
+         * little-endian computer.
+         */
+        memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8);
+        endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8);
+        /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */
+        ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu;
+        ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1;  /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */
+    }
+    
+    /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */
+    kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++)
+          memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64),
+                                                 4*sizeof(UINT64));
+    endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64), 
+                                                  sizeof(ahc->ip_keys));
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++)
+        ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36;  /* Bring into Z_p36 */
+    
+    /* Setup L3-2 hash variables    */
+    /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */
+    kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
+    endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32),
+                         STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[])
+{
+/* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */
+    uhash_ctx_t ctx;
+    u_char bytes_to_add;
+    aes_int_key prf_key;
+    
+    ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+    if (ctx) {
+        if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+            bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
+                              ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1));
+            ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
+            *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add;
+        }
+        aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
+        uhash_init(ctx, prf_key);
+    }
+    return (ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx)
+{
+/* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */
+    u_char bytes_to_sub;
+    
+    if (ctx) {
+        if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+            bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1);
+            ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub);
+        }
+        free(ctx);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *input, long len)
+/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and
+ * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output.
+ */
+{
+    UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining;
+    UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
+    UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
+    
+    if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+        nh_update(&ctx->hash, (UINT8 *)input, len);
+        ctx->msg_len += len;
+    } else {
+    
+         bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN;
+         if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN)
+             bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN;
+
+         if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+
+             /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function      */
+             /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */
+             /* bytes to complete the current nh_block.                  */
+             if (bytes_hashed) {
+                 bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed);
+                 nh_update(&ctx->hash, (UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining);
+                 nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+                 ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining;
+                 poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+                 len -= bytes_remaining;
+                 input += bytes_remaining;
+             }
+
+             /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */
+             while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+                 nh(&ctx->hash, (UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN,
+                                   L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
+                 ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN;
+                 len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
+                 input += L1_KEY_LEN;
+                 poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+             }
+         }
+
+         /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */
+         if (len) {
+             nh_update(&ctx->hash, (UINT8 *)input, len);
+             ctx->msg_len += len;
+         }
+     }
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res)
+/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
+{
+    UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
+    UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
+
+    if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) {
+        if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) {
+            nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+            poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+        }
+        ip_long(ctx, res);
+    } else {
+        nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+        ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res);
+    }
+    uhash_reset(ctx);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res)
+/* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */
+/* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed.           */
+{
+    UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
+    UINT32 nh_len;
+    int extra_zeroes_needed;
+        
+    /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip
+     * the polyhash.
+     */
+    if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+    	if (len == 0)                  /* If zero length messages will not */
+    		nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;  /* be seen, comment out this case   */ 
+    	else
+        	nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+        extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
+        zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
+        nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
+        ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res);
+    } else {
+        /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH
+         * output to poly_hash().
+         */
+        do {
+            nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
+            poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+            len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
+            msg += L1_KEY_LEN;
+        } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN);
+        if (len) {
+            nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+            extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
+            zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
+            nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
+            poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+        }
+
+        ip_long(ahc, res);
+    }
+    
+    uhash_reset(ahc);
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where
+ * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer,
+ * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a   
+ * time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and
+ * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required. 
+ */
+struct umac_ctx {
+    uhash_ctx hash;          /* Hash function for message compression    */
+    pdf_ctx pdf;             /* PDF for hashed output                    */
+    void *free_ptr;          /* Address to free this struct via          */
+} umac_ctx;
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
+/* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication.        */
+{
+    uhash_reset(&ctx->hash);
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
+/* Deallocate the ctx structure */
+{
+    if (ctx) {
+        if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY)
+            ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr;
+        xfree(ctx);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+struct umac_ctx *umac_new(u_char key[])
+/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, 
+ * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary.
+ */
+{
+    struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx;
+    size_t bytes_to_add;
+    aes_int_key prf_key;
+    
+    octx = ctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+    if (ctx) {
+        if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+            bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
+                              ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1));
+            ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
+        }
+        ctx->free_ptr = octx;
+        aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
+        pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key);
+        uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key);
+    }
+        
+    return (ctx);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8])
+/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
+{
+    uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag);
+    pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
+    
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len)
+/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and   */
+/* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */
+/* output buffer is full.                                                 */
+{
+    uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, 
+         long len, u_char tag[],
+         u_char nonce[8])
+/* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final().        */
+{
+    uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag);
+    pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
+    
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/umac.h b/crypto/openssh/umac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..055c705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/umac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.1 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * 
+ * umac.h -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
+ *
+ * Version 0.93a of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 14
+ *
+ * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
+ * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
+ * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Ted Krovetz
+ *                                                                 
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
+ * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
+ * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
+ * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
+ * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
+ * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)                                        
+ *                                                                   
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+ 
+ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
+  *
+  * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
+  *
+  * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
+  *    aligned
+  *
+  * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
+  * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
+  * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
+  * zeroed.
+  *
+  * 4) Two free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
+  * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
+  * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
+  * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
+  * rijndael-alg-fst.h.
+  * Brian Gladman's version is distributed with GNU Public lisence
+  * and can be found at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
+  * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version.
+  *
+  /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
+#ifndef HEADER_UMAC_H
+#define HEADER_UMAC_H
+
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+    extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+struct umac_ctx *umac_new(u_char key[]);
+/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, 
+ * generate subkeys from key.
+ */
+
+#if 0
+int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
+/* Reset a umac_ctx to begin authenicating a new message */
+#endif
+
+int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len);
+/* Incorporate len bytes pointed to by input into context ctx */
+
+int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8]);
+/* Incorporate any pending data and the ctr value, and return tag. 
+ * This function returns error code if ctr < 0. 
+ */
+
+int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
+/* Deallocate the context structure */
+
+#if 0
+int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, 
+         long len, u_char tag[],
+         u_char nonce[8]);
+/* All-in-one implementation of the functions Reset, Update and Final */
+#endif
+
+/* uhash.h */
+
+
+#if 0
+typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
+  /* The uhash_ctx structure is defined by the implementation of the    */
+  /* UHASH functions.                                                   */
+ 
+uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[16]);
+  /* Dynamically allocate a uhash_ctx struct and generate subkeys using */
+  /* the kdf and kdf_key passed in. If kdf_key_len is 0 then RC6 is     */
+  /* used to generate key with a fixed key. If kdf_key_len > 0 but kdf  */
+  /* is NULL then the first 16 bytes pointed at by kdf_key is used as a */
+  /* key for an RC6 based KDF.                                          */
+  
+int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx);
+
+int uhash_set_params(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+                   void       *params);
+
+int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t ctx);
+
+int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+               u_char       *input,
+               long        len);
+
+int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+              u_char        ouput[]);
+
+int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+        u_char       *input,
+        long        len,
+        u_char        output[]);
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+    }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HEADER_UMAC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9e57e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.25 2009/03/05 11:30:50 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+
+/*
+ * Encode binary 'src' of length 'srclength', writing base64-encoded text
+ * to 'target' of size 'targsize'. Will always nul-terminate 'target'.
+ * Returns the number of bytes stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc.
+ * 'targsize' too small).
+ */
+int
+uuencode(const u_char *src, u_int srclength,
+    char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+	return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode base64-encoded 'src' into buffer 'target' of 'targsize' bytes.
+ * Will skip leading and trailing whitespace. Returns the number of bytes
+ * stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. targsize too small).
+ */
+int
+uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+	int len;
+	char *encoded, *p;
+
+	/* copy the 'readonly' source */
+	encoded = xstrdup(src);
+	/* skip whitespace and data */
+	for (p = encoded; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++)
+		;
+	for (; *p != '\0' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++)
+		;
+	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
+	*p = '\0';
+	len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
+	xfree(encoded);
+	return len;
+}
+
+void
+dump_base64(FILE *fp, u_char *data, u_int len)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	int i, n;
+
+	if (len > 65536) {
+		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
+		return;
+	}
+	buf = xmalloc(2*len);
+	n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
+		if (i % 70 == 69)
+			fprintf(fp, "\n");
+	}
+	if (i % 70 != 69)
+		fprintf(fp, "\n");
+	xfree(buf);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fec55b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.13 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+int	 uuencode(const u_char *, u_int, char *, size_t);
+int	 uudecode(const char *, u_char *, size_t);
+void	 dump_base64(FILE *, u_char *, u_int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.c b/crypto/openssh/version.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88361ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Brian Fundakowski Feldman
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "version.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+
+static char *version = NULL;
+
+const char *
+ssh_version_get(void) {
+
+	if (version == NULL)
+		version = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_BASE " " SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM);
+	return (version);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_version_set_addendum(const char *add) {
+	char *newvers;
+	size_t size;
+
+	if (add != NULL) {
+		size = strlen(SSH_VERSION_BASE) + 1 + strlen(add) + 1;
+		newvers = xmalloc(size);
+		snprintf(newvers, size, "%s %s", SSH_VERSION_BASE, add);
+	} else {
+		newvers = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_BASE);
+	}
+	if (version != NULL)
+		xfree(version);
+	version = newvers;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..581decf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.56 2009/06/30 14:54:40 markus Exp $ */
+/* $FreeBSD$ */
+
+#ifndef SSH_VERSION
+
+#define SSH_VERSION             (ssh_version_get())
+#define SSH_RELEASE             (ssh_version_get())
+#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_5.3p1"
+#define SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM    "FreeBSD-20091001"
+
+const char *ssh_version_get(void);
+void ssh_version_set_addendum(const char *);
+#endif /* SSH_VERSION */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9985b4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.27 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
+ * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+void *
+xmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+
+	if (size == 0)
+		fatal("xmalloc: zero size");
+	ptr = malloc(size);
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %lu bytes)", (u_long) size);
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+
+	if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0)
+		fatal("xcalloc: zero size");
+	if (SIZE_T_MAX / nmemb < size)
+		fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_T_MAX");
+	ptr = calloc(nmemb, size);
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %lu bytes)",
+		    (u_long)(size * nmemb));
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	void *new_ptr;
+	size_t new_size = nmemb * size;
+
+	if (new_size == 0)
+		fatal("xrealloc: zero size");
+	if (SIZE_T_MAX / nmemb < size)
+		fatal("xrealloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_T_MAX");
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		new_ptr = malloc(new_size);
+	else
+		new_ptr = realloc(ptr, new_size);
+	if (new_ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %lu bytes)",
+		    (u_long) new_size);
+	return new_ptr;
+}
+
+void
+xfree(void *ptr)
+{
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xfree: NULL pointer given as argument");
+	free(ptr);
+}
+
+char *
+xstrdup(const char *str)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = strlen(str) + 1;
+	cp = xmalloc(len);
+	strlcpy(cp, str, len);
+	return cp;
+}
+
+int
+xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	int i;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
+		fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory");
+
+	return (i);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb217a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.13 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo
+ *
+ * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
+ * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+void	*xmalloc(size_t);
+void	*xcalloc(size_t, size_t);
+void	*xrealloc(void *, size_t, size_t);
+void     xfree(void *);
+char	*xstrdup(const char *);
+int	 xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...)
+                __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
+                __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));