diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh/session.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssh/session.c | 55 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c index 1de0c60..e21cd8e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/session.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.270 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.274 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <grp.h> +#include <netdb.h> #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include <paths.h> #endif @@ -84,11 +85,11 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "canohost.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "session.h" #include "kex.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" @@ -183,7 +184,6 @@ auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) { Channel *nc; int sock = -1; - struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); @@ -209,33 +209,15 @@ auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld", auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid()); - /* Create the socket. */ - sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - if (sock < 0) { - error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - goto authsock_err; - } - - /* Bind it to the name. */ - memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); - sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; - strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); - - if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { - error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - goto authsock_err; - } + /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */ + sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); - /* Start listening on the socket. */ - if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { - error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */ + if (sock < 0) goto authsock_err; - } /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ nc = channel_new("auth socket", @@ -274,6 +256,7 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name); /* setup the channel layer */ + /* XXX - streamlocal? */ if (no_port_forwarding_flag || (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0) channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); @@ -393,7 +376,7 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt) } debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request."); if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, - options.gateway_ports) < 0) { + &options.fwd_opts) < 0) { debug("Port forwarding failed."); break; } @@ -1370,7 +1353,8 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell) /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */ if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL && - !no_user_rc && stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) { + !no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc && + stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) { snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); if (debug_flag) @@ -1517,6 +1501,9 @@ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { char *chroot_path, *tmp; +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF + int doing_chroot = 0; +#endif platform_setusercontext(pw); @@ -1556,6 +1543,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */ free(options.chroot_directory); options.chroot_directory = NULL; +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF + doing_chroot = 1; +#endif } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP @@ -1570,7 +1560,14 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK); #else # ifdef USE_LIBIAF - if (set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) { +/* In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail; typically + * because of the lack of necessary authentication services and runtime + * such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so, ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd + * We skip it in the internal sftp chroot case. + * We'll lose auditing and ACLs but permanently_set_uid will + * take care of the rest. + */ + if ((doing_chroot == 0) && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) { fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name); } # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ @@ -2652,7 +2649,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) { struct stat st; char display[512], auth_display[512]; - char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; u_int i; if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) { |
