1 files changed, 300 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bab75b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/* 
+ * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.6 2002/05/15 16:39:51 mouring Exp $
+ *
+ * bsd-cray.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Cray Inc.  (Wendy Palm <wendyp@cray.com>)
+ * Significant portions provided by 
+ *          Wayne Schroeder, SDSC <schroeder@sdsc.edu>
+ *          William Jones, UTexas <jones@tacc.utexas.edu>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Apr 22 16.34:00 2002 wp
+ *
+ * This file contains functions required for proper execution
+ * on UNICOS systems.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef _CRAY
+#include <udb.h>
+#include <tmpdir.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/category.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#include <sys/jtab.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/priv.h>
+#include <sys/secparm.h>
+#include <sys/usrv.h>
+#include <sys/sysv.h>
+#include <sys/sectab.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "bsd-cray.h"
+
+char cray_tmpdir[TPATHSIZ+1];		    /* job TMPDIR path */
+
+/*
+ * Functions.
+ */
+void cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *, int);
+void cray_delete_tmpdir(char *, int, uid_t);
+void cray_init_job(struct passwd *);
+void cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *);
+
+
+/*
+ * Orignal written by:
+ *     Wayne Schroeder
+ *     San Diego Supercomputer Center
+ *     schroeder@sdsc.edu
+*/
+void
+cray_setup(uid_t uid, char *username)
+{
+	struct udb *p;
+	extern char *setlimits();
+	int i, j;
+	int accts[MAXVIDS];
+	int naccts;
+	int err;
+	char *sr;
+	int pid;
+	struct jtab jbuf;
+	int jid;
+
+	if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0)
+		fatal("getjtab: no jid");
+
+	err = setudb();	   /* open and rewind the Cray User DataBase */
+	if (err != 0)
+		fatal("UDB open failure");
+	naccts = 0;
+	p = getudbnam(username);
+	if (p == NULL)
+		fatal("No UDB entry for %.100s", username);
+	if (uid != p->ue_uid)
+		fatal("UDB entry %.100s uid(%d) does not match uid %d",
+		    username, (int) p->ue_uid, (int) uid);
+	for (j = 0; p->ue_acids[j] != -1 && j < MAXVIDS; j++) {
+		accts[naccts] = p->ue_acids[j];
+		naccts++;
+	}
+	endudb();	 /* close the udb */
+
+	if (naccts != 0) {
+		/* Perhaps someday we'll prompt users who have multiple accounts
+		   to let them pick one (like CRI's login does), but for now just set
+		   the account to the first entry. */
+		if (acctid(0, accts[0]) < 0)
+			fatal("System call acctid failed, accts[0]=%d", accts[0]);
+	}
+
+	/* Now set limits, including CPU time for the (interactive) job and process,
+	   and set up permissions (for chown etc), etc.	 This is via an internal CRI
+	   routine, setlimits, used by CRI's login. */
+
+	pid = getpid();
+	sr = setlimits(username, C_PROC, pid, UDBRC_INTER);
+	if (sr != NULL)
+		fatal("%.200s", sr);
+
+	sr = setlimits(username, C_JOB, jid, UDBRC_INTER);
+	if (sr != NULL)
+		fatal("%.200s", sr);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * The rc.* and /etc/sdaemon methods of starting a program on unicos/unicosmk
+ * can have pal privileges that sshd can inherit which
+ * could allow a user to su to root with out a password.
+ * This subroutine clears all privileges.
+ */
+void
+drop_cray_privs()
+{
+#if defined(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU)
+	priv_proc_t*		  privstate;
+	int			  result;
+	extern	    int		  priv_set_proc();
+	extern	    priv_proc_t*  priv_init_proc();
+	struct	    usrv	  usrv;
+
+	/*
+	 * If ether of theses two flags are not set
+	 * then don't allow this version of ssh to run.
+	 */
+	if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU))
+		fatal("Not PRIV_SU system.");
+	if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_POSIX_PRIV))
+		fatal("Not POSIX_PRIV.");
+
+	debug("Dropping privileges.");
+
+	memset(&usrv, 0, sizeof(usrv));
+	if (setusrv(&usrv) < 0)
+		fatal("%s(%d): setusrv(): %s", __FILE__, __LINE__,
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+	if ((privstate = priv_init_proc()) != NULL) {
+		result = priv_set_proc(privstate);
+		if (result != 0 )
+			fatal("%s(%d): priv_set_proc(): %s",
+			    __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror(errno));
+		priv_free_proc(privstate);
+	}
+	debug ("Privileges should be cleared...");
+#else
+	/* XXX: do this differently */
+#	error Cray systems must be run with _SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU on!
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *  Retain utmp/wtmp information - used by cray accounting.
+ */
+void
+cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *ut, int pid)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct utmp utmp;
+
+	if ((fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+		while (read(fd, (char *)&utmp, sizeof(utmp)) == sizeof(utmp)) {
+			if (pid == utmp.ut_pid) {
+				ut->ut_jid = utmp.ut_jid;
+				/* XXX: MIN_SIZEOF here? can this go in loginrec? */
+				strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, utmp.ut_tpath, sizeof(utmp.ut_tpath));
+				strncpy(ut->ut_host, utmp.ut_host, sizeof(utmp.ut_host));
+				strncpy(ut->ut_name, utmp.ut_name, sizeof(utmp.ut_name));
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		close(fd);
+	}
+	/* XXX: error message? */
+}
+
+/*
+ * tmpdir support.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * find and delete jobs tmpdir.
+ */
+void
+cray_delete_tmpdir(char *login, int jid, uid_t uid)
+{
+	int child;
+	static char jtmp[TPATHSIZ];
+	struct stat statbuf;
+	int c;
+	int wstat;
+
+	for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+		snprintf(jtmp, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c);
+		if (stat(jtmp, &statbuf) == 0 && statbuf.st_uid == uid)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (c > 'z')
+		return;
+
+	if ((child = fork()) == 0) {
+		execl(CLEANTMPCMD, CLEANTMPCMD, login, jtmp, (char *)NULL);
+		fatal("cray_delete_tmpdir: execl of CLEANTMPCMD failed");
+	}
+
+	while (waitpid(child, &wstat, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+		;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove tmpdir on job termination.
+ */
+void
+cray_job_termination_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int jid;
+	char *login = NULL;
+	struct jtab jtab;
+
+	debug("Received SIG JOB.");
+
+	if ((jid = waitjob(&jtab)) == -1 ||
+	    (login = uid2nam(jtab.j_uid)) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	cray_delete_tmpdir(login, jid, jtab.j_uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set job id and create tmpdir directory.
+ */
+void
+cray_init_job(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	int jid;
+	int c;
+
+	jid = setjob(pw->pw_uid, WJSIGNAL);
+	if (jid < 0)
+		fatal("System call setjob failure");
+
+	for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+		snprintf(cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c);
+		if (mkdir(cray_tmpdir, JTMPMODE) != 0)
+			continue;
+		if (chown(cray_tmpdir,	pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+			rmdir(cray_tmpdir);
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (c > 'z')
+		cray_tmpdir[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	int jid;
+	struct jtab jbuf;
+
+	if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set jid and tmpdir in utmp record.
+	 */
+	ut->ut_jid = jid;
+	strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ);
+}
+#endif