diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/kerberosIV/appl/bsd/login_fbtab.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/kerberosIV/appl/bsd/login_fbtab.c | 154 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 154 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/kerberosIV/appl/bsd/login_fbtab.c b/crypto/kerberosIV/appl/bsd/login_fbtab.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3aa5e4c..0000000 --- a/crypto/kerberosIV/appl/bsd/login_fbtab.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,154 +0,0 @@ -/************************************************************************ -* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema. All rights reserved. -* -* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at -* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991, -* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. -* -* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted -* provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such -* copies. -* -* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied -* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of -* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose. -************************************************************************/ -/* - SYNOPSIS - void login_fbtab(tty, uid, gid) - char *tty; - uid_t uid; - gid_t gid; - - DESCRIPTION - This module implements device security as described in the - SunOS 4.1.x fbtab(5) and SunOS 5.x logindevperm(4) manual - pages. The program first looks for /etc/fbtab. If that file - cannot be opened it attempts to process /etc/logindevperm. - We expect entries with the folowing format: - - Comments start with a # and extend to the end of the line. - - Blank lines or lines with only a comment are ignored. - - All other lines consist of three fields delimited by - whitespace: a login device (/dev/console), an octal - permission number (0600), and a ":"-delimited list of - devices (/dev/kbd:/dev/mouse). All device names are - absolute paths. A path that ends in "/*" refers to all - directory entries except "." and "..". - - If the tty argument (relative path) matches a login device - name (absolute path), the permissions of the devices in the - ":"-delimited list are set as specified in the second - field, and their ownership is changed to that of the uid - and gid arguments. - - DIAGNOSTICS - Problems are reported via the syslog daemon with severity - LOG_ERR. - - BUGS - - AUTHOR - Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) - Eindhoven University of Technology - The Netherlands - */ - -#include "bsd_locl.h" - -RCSID("$Id: login_fbtab.c,v 1.14 1999/09/16 20:37:24 assar Exp $"); - -void login_protect (char *, char *, int, uid_t, gid_t); -void login_fbtab (char *tty, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); - -#define WSPACE " \t\n" - -/* login_fbtab - apply protections specified in /etc/fbtab or logindevperm */ - -void -login_fbtab(char *tty, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) -{ - FILE *fp; - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - char *devname; - char *cp; - int prot; - char *table; - char *foo; - - if ((fp = fopen(table = _PATH_FBTAB, "r")) == 0 - && (fp = fopen(table = _PATH_LOGINDEVPERM, "r")) == 0) - return; - - while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { - if ((cp = strchr(buf, '#')) != 0) - *cp = 0; /* strip comment */ - foo = NULL; - if ((cp = devname = strtok_r(buf, WSPACE, &foo)) == 0) - continue; /* empty or comment */ - if (strncmp(devname, "/dev/", 5) != 0 - || (cp = strtok_r(NULL, WSPACE, &foo)) == 0 - || *cp != '0' - || sscanf(cp, "%o", &prot) == 0 - || prot == 0 - || (prot & 0777) != prot - || (cp = strtok_r(NULL, WSPACE, &foo)) == 0) { - syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: bad entry: %s", table, cp ? cp : "(null)"); - continue; - } - if (strcmp(devname + 5, tty) == 0) { - foo = NULL; - for (cp = strtok_r(cp, ":", &foo); - cp; - cp = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &foo)) { - login_protect(table, cp, prot, uid, gid); - } - } - } - fclose(fp); -} - -/* login_protect - protect one device entry */ - -void -login_protect(char *table, char *path, int mask, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) -{ - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - int pathlen = strlen(path); - struct dirent *ent; - DIR *dir; - - if (strcmp("/*", path + pathlen - 2) != 0) { - if (chmod(path, mask) && errno != ENOENT) - syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: chmod(%s): %m", table, path); - if (chown(path, uid, gid) && errno != ENOENT) - syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: chown(%s): %m", table, path); - } else { - strlcpy (buf, path, sizeof(buf)); - if (sizeof(buf) > pathlen) - buf[pathlen - 2] = '\0'; - /* Solaris evidently operates on the directory as well */ - login_protect(table, buf, mask | ((mask & 0444) >> 2), uid, gid); - if ((dir = opendir(buf)) == 0) { - syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: opendir(%s): %m", table, path); - } else { - if (sizeof(buf) > pathlen) { - buf[pathlen - 2] = '/'; - buf[pathlen - 1] = '\0'; - } - - while ((ent = readdir(dir)) != 0) { - if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") != 0 - && strcmp(ent->d_name, "..") != 0) { - strlcpy (buf + pathlen - 1, - ent->d_name, - sizeof(buf) - (pathlen + 1)); - login_protect(table, buf, mask, uid, gid); - } - } - closedir(dir); - } - } -} |
