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diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 68c170b..0000000 --- a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1140 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying M. Thomas - Cisco Systems - K. McCloghrie - Cisco Systems - July 13, 2000 - - - - - - - Kerberized USM Keying - - draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00.txt - - - -Status of this Memo - - This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with - all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working - documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, - and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute - working documents as Internet-Drafts. - - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months - and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any - time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference - material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt - - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - -Abstract - - The KerbUSM MIB provides a means of leveraging a trusted third party - authentication and authorization mechanism using Kerberos for SNMP V3 - USM users and their associated VACM views. The MIB encodes the normal - Kerberos AP-REQ and AP-REP means of both authenticating and creating - a shared secret between the SNMP V3 Manager and Agent. - -The SNMP Management Framework - - The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major - components: An overall architecture, described in RFC 2571 - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 1] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - [RFC2571]. Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events - for the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure - of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described in STD - 16, RFC 1155 [RFC1155], STD 16, RFC 1212 [RFC1212] and RFC 1215 - [RFC1215]. The second version, called SMIv2, is described in STD 58, - RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580 - [RFC2580]. Message protocols for transferring management - information. The first version of the SNMP message protocol is - called SNMPv1 and described in STD 15, RFC 1157 [RFC1157]. A second - version of the SNMP message protocol, which is not an Internet - standards track protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 - [RFC1901] and RFC 1906 [RFC1906]. The third version of the message - protocol is called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [RFC1906], RFC - 2572 [RFC2572] and RFC 2574 [RFC2574]. Protocol operations for - accessing management information. The first set of protocol - operations and associated PDU formats is described in STD 15, RFC - 1157 [RFC1157]. A second set of protocol operations and associated - PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [RFC1905]. A set of fundamental - applications described in RFC 2573 [RFC2573] and the view-based - access control mechanism described in RFC 2575 [RFC2575]. - - A more detailed introduction to the current SNMP Management Framework - can be found in RFC 2570 [RFC2570]. - - Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed - the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are - defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI. - - This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A - MIB conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate - translations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically - equivalent, except where objects or events are omitted because no - translation is possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable - information in SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in - SMIv1 during the translation process. However, this loss of machine - readable information is not considered to change the semantics of the - MIB. - - -Introduction - - The User based Security Model of SNMP V3 (USM) [2] provides a means - of associating different users with different access privileges of - the various MIB's that an agent supports. In conjunction with the - View based Access Control Model of SNMP V3 (VACM) [3], SNMP V3 - provides a means of providing resistance from various threats both - from outside attacks such as spoofing, and inside attacks such as an - user having, say, SET access to MIB variable for which they are not - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 2] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - authorized. - - SNMP V3, unfortunately, does not specify a means of doing key - distribution between the managers and the agents. For small numbers - of agents and managers, the O(n*m) manual keying is a cumbersome, but - possibly tractable problem. For a large number of agents with - distribution of managers, the key distribution quickly goes from - cumbersome to unmanageable. Also: there is always the lingering - concern of the security precautions taken for keys on either local - management stations, or even directories. - - Kerberos [1] provides a means of centralizing key management into an - authentication and authorization server known as a Key Distribution - Center (KDC). At a minimum, Kerberos changes the key distribution - problem from a O(n*m) problem to a O(n) problem since keys are shared - between the KDC and the Kerberos principals rather directly between - each host pair. Kerberos also provides a means to use public key - based authentication which can be used to further scale down the - number of pre-shared secrets required. Furthermore, a KDC is intended - and explicitly expected to be a standalone server which is managed - with a much higher level of security concern than a management - station or even a central directory which may host many services and - thus be exposed to many more possible vectors of attack. - - The MIB defined in this memo describes a means of using the desirable - properties of Kerberos within the context of SNMP V3. Kerberos - defines a standardized means of communicating with the KDC as well as - a standard format of Kerberos tickets which Kerberos principals - exchange in order to authenticate to one another. The actual means of - exchanging tickets, however, is left as application specific. This - MIB defines the SNMP MIB designed to transport Kerberos tickets and - by doing so set up SNMP V3 USM keys for authentication and privacy. - - It should be noted that using Kerberos does introduce reliance on a - key network element, the KDC. This flies in the face of one of SNMP's - dictums of working when the network is misbehaving. While this is a - valid concern, the risk of reliance on the KDC can be significantly - diminished with a few common sense actions. Since Kerberos tickets - can have long life times (days, weeks) a manager of key network - elements can and should maintain Kerberos tickets well ahead ticket - expiration so that likelihood of not being able to rekey a session - while the network is misbehaving is minimized. For non-critical, but - high fanout elements such as user CPE, etc, requiring a pre-fetched - ticket may not be practical, which puts the KDC into the critical - path. However, if all KDC's are unreachable, the non-critical network - elements are probably the least of the worries. - - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 3] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - -Operation - - The normal Kerberos application ticket exchange is accomplished by a - client first fetching a service ticket from a KDC for the service - principal and then sending an AP-REQ to a server to authenticate - itself to the server. The server then sends a AP-REP to finish the - exchange. This MIB maps Kerberos' concept of client and server into - the SNMP V3 concept of Manager and Agent by designating that the - Kerberos Client is the SNMP V3 Agent. Although it could be argued - that an Agent is really a server, in practice there may be many, many - agents and relatively few managers. Also: Kerberos clients may make - use of public key authentication as defined in [4], and it is very - advantageous to take advantage of that capability for Agents rather - than Managers. - - The MIB is intended to be stateless and map USM users to Kerberos - principals. This mapping is explicitly done by putting a Kerberos - principal name into the usmUserSecurityName in the usmUser MIB and - instatiating the krbUsmMibEntry for the usmUserEntry. MIB variables - are accessed with INFORM's or TRAP PDU's and SET's to perform a - normal Kerberos AP-REQ/AP-REP exchange transaction which causes the - keys for a USM user to be derived and installed. The basic structure - of the MIB is a table which augements usmUserEntry's with a Kerberos - principal name as well as the transaction varbinds. In the normal - case, multiple varbinds should be sent in a single PDU which prevents - various race conditions, as well as increasing efficiency. - - It should be noted that this MIB is silent on the subject of how the - Agent and Manager find the KDC. In practice, this may be either - statically provisioned or use either DNS SRV records (RFC 2782) or - Service Location (RFC 2608). This MIB is does not provide for a means - of doing cipher suite negotiation either. It is expected that the - choices for ciphers in the USM MIB will reflect site specific choices - for ciphers. This matches well with the general philosophy of - centralized keying. - -Keying Transactions - - The following shows an error free transaction: - - Note: optional steps or parameters are shown like [ ] - - - - - - - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 4] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - - Agent Manager KDC - +-- --+ - | 1) <------------------------------- | - | SET (krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibNonce = xxxx; | - | [ krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibTgt = | - | TGT[usmUserSecurityName] ]); | - | | - | 2) -------------------------------> | - | Response | - +-- (optional) --+ - - 3) ---------------------------------------------------------------> - TGS-REQ (krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibMgrPrinName - [, krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibTgt]); - - 4) <-------------------------------------------------------------- - Tick[usmUserSecurityName] = TGS-REP (); - - 5) ------------------------------> - INFORM (krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibApReq = - AP_REQ[Tick[usmUserSecurityName]]; - [ krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibNonce = xxxx]); - - 6) <------------------------------ - SET (krbUsmPrinTable[usmUserName].krbUsmMibApRep = AP_REP[]); - - - 7) ------------------------------> - Response - - - The above flow translates to: - - - 1) This step is used when the Manager does not currently have a ses- - sion with the Agent but wishes to start one. The Manager MAY - place a ticket granting ticket into the krbUsmMibMgrTgt varbind - in the same PDU as the krbUsmMibNonce if it does not share a - secret with the KDC (as would be the case if the Manager used - PKinit to do initial authentication with the KDC). - - - 2) This step acknowledges the SET. There are no MIB specific errors - which can happen here. - - - 3) If the Agent is not already in possession of a service ticket for - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 5] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - the Manager in its ticket cache, it MUST request a service ticket - from the Agent's KDC for the service principal given by - krbUsmMibMgrPrinName in the row that the krbUsmMibNonce was SET - in, optionally adding a krbUsmMibMgrTgt. If the TGT is speci- - fied, the Manager's TGT must be placed in the additional-tickets - field with the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option set in the TGS-REQ to - obtain a service ticket (see section 3.3.3 of [1]). - - Note: a Kerberos TGS-REQ is but one way to obtain a service - ticket. An Agent may use any normal Kerberos means to - obtain the service ticket. This flow has also elided ini- - tial authentication (ie, AS-REQ) and any cross realm con- - siderations, though those may be necessary prerequisites - to obtaining the service ticket. - - 4) If step 3 was performed, this step receives the ticket or an - error from the KDC. - - - 5) This step sends a krbUsmMibApReq to the Manager via an INFORM or - TRAP PDU. If the message is the result of a request by the - Manager, krbUsmMibNonce received from the Manager MUST be sent in - the same PDU. If the Manager did not initiate the transaction, - the Agent MUST NOT send a krbUsmMibNonce varbind. The Agent also - MUST check krbUsmMibUnsolicitedNotify is not false, otherwise it - MUST abort the transaction. All krbUsmMibApReq's MUST contain a - sequence nonce so that the resulting krbUsmMibApRep can provide a - proof of the freshness of the message to prevent replay attacks. - - If the Agent encounters an error either generated by the KDC or - internally, the Agent MUST send an INFORM or TRAP PDU indicating - the error in the form of a KRB-ERROR placed in krbUsmMibApReq - with the same rules applied to krbUsmMibNonce and krbUsmMibUnsol- - icitedNotify above. If the Agent suspects that it is being - attacked by a purported Manager which is generating many failed - TGS-REQ's to the KDC, it SHOULD meter its TGS-REQ transactions - for that Manager to the KDC using an exponential backoff mechan- - ism truncated at 10 seconds. - - - - 6) Upon recepit of an INFORM or TRAP PDU with a krbUsmMibApReq, a - Manager may accept the AP-REQ. If it is accompanied with a - krbUsmMibNonce it MUST correlate it with any outstanding transac- - tions using its stored nonce for the transaction. If it does not - correlate with a current nonce, the request MUST be rejected as - it may be a replay. - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 6] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - If the Manager chooses to reject an unsolicited keying request, - it SHOULD send a WrongValue Error to the Agent with the krbUsmMi- - bApReq as the subject of the WrongValue. If an Agent receives a - WrongValue Error from a Manager it MUST cease retransmission of - the INFORM or TRAP PDU's so as to mitigate event avalanches by - Agents. There is a possible denial of service attack here, but it - must be weighed against the larger problem of network congestion, - flapping, etc. Therefore, if the Agent finds that it cannot can- - cel an unsolicited Notify (ie, it must be reliable), it MUST use - a truncated exponential backoff mechanism with the maximum trun- - cation interval set to 10 minutes. - - Otherwise, the Manager MUST send a SET PDU to the Agent which - contains a krbUsmMibApRep. - - - 7) If the Agent detects an error (including detecting replays) in - the final AP-REP, it MUST send a WrongValue error with a pointer - to the krbUsmMibApRep varbind to indicate its inability to estab- - lish the security association. Otherwise, receipt of the positive - acknowledgement from the final SET indicates to the Manager that - the proper keys have been installed on the Agent in the USM MIB. - -Unsolicited Agent Keying Requests - - An Agent may find that it needs to set up a security association for - a USM user in order to notify a Manager of some event. When the Agent - engine receives a request for a notify, it SHOULD check to see if - keying material has been established for the user and that the keying - material is valid. If the keying material is not valid and the USM - user has been tagged as being a Kerberos principal in a realm, the - Agent SHOULD first try to instantiate a security association by - obtaining a service ticket for the USM User and follow steps 3-7 of - the flow above. This insures that the USM User will have proper key- - ing material and providing a mechanism to allow for casual security - associations to be built up and torn down. This is especially useful - for Agents which may not normally need to be under constant Manager - supervision, such as the case with high fan out user residential CPE - and other SNMP managed "appliances". In all cases, the Agent MUST NOT - send an unsolicited Notify if krbUsmUnsolicitedNotify is set to - false. - - How the Agent obtains the Manager's address, how it determines - whether a Manager, realm, and whether it can be keyed using this MIB - is outside of the scope of this memo. - - Note: Although the MIB allows for a Manager to set up a session - using User-User mode of Kerberos by sending a TGT along with - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 7] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - the nonce, this, is limited to Manager initiated sessions - only since there is no easy way to store the Manager's ticket - in the MIB since it is publicly writable and as such would be - subject to denial of service attacks. Another method might be - to have the Agent send a krbUsmMibNonce to the Manager which - would tell it to instigate a session. Overall, it seems like - a marginal feature to allow a PKinit authenticated user be - the target of unsolicited informs and it would complicate the - transactions. For this reason, this scenario has been omitted - in favor of simplicity. - -Retransmissions - - Since this MIB defines not only variables, but transactions, discus- - sion of the retransmission state machine is in order. There are two - similar but different state machines for the Manager Solicited and - Agent Unsolicited transactions. There is one timer Timeout which - SHOULD take into consideration round trip considerations and MUST - implement a truncated exponential backoff mechanism. In addition, in - the case where an Agent makes an unsolicited Agent keying request, - the Agent SHOULD perform an initial random backoff if the keying - request to the Manager may result in a restart avalanche. A suitable - method is described in section 4.3.4 of [5]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 8] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - -Manager Solicited Retransmission State Machine - - Timeout - +---+ - | | - | V - +-----------+ Set-Ack (2) +----------+ - | |------------>| | - | Set-Nonce | | Ap-Req | - | (1) |<------------| (5) | - +-----------+ Timeout +----------+ - ^ | - | | Set-Ap-Rep - | +----------+ | (6) - +------| |<------+ - Timeout | Estab-wt | - | (7) | - +----------+ - | - | Set-Ap-Rep-Ack (7) - V - +----------+ - | | - | Estab | - | | - - +----------+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 9] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - -Agent Unsolicited Retransmission State Machine - - Timeout - +---+ - | | - | V - +----------+ - | | - +----> | Ap-Req |-------+ - | | (5) | | - | +----------+ | - | | - | | Set-Ap-Rep - | +----------+ | (6) - +------| |<------+ - Timeout | Estab-wt | - | (7) | - +----------+ - | - | Set-Ap-Rep-Ack (7) - V - +----------+ - | | - | Estab | - | | - +----------+ - -Session Duration and Failures - - The KerbUsmMib uses the ticket lifetime to determine the life of the - USM session. The Agent MUST keep track of whether the ticket which - instigated the session is valid whenever it forms PDU's for that par- - ticular user. If a session expires, or if it wasn't valid to begin - with (from the Agent's perspective), the Agent MUST reject the PDU by - sending a XXX Error [mat: help me here Keith... what does USM say - about this?]. - - Kerberos also inherently implies adding state to the Agent and - Manager since they share not only a key, but a lifetime associated - with that key. This is in some sense soft state because failure of an - Agent will cause it to reject PDU's for Managers with whom it does - not share a secret. The Manager can use the Error PDU's as an indica- - tion that it needs to reauthenticate with the Agent, taking care not - to loop. The Manager is even easier: when it reboots, it can either - check its credential cache to reconstruct state or cause the Agent to - reauthenticate to the Manager with its service ticket by initiating a - authentication transaction with the manager. - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 10] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - -Manager Collisions - - Managers may freely set up keys for different USM users using this - MIB without problem since they access different rows in the krbUsm- - PrinTable. However, multiple Managers trying to set up keys for the - same USM user is possible but discouraged. The requirement for the - Manager is that they MUST share the same service key with the KDC so - that they can all decrypt the same service ticket. There are two race - conditions, however, which are not well handled: - - - -1) At the end of a ticket lifetime, one manager may request the agent - to refresh its service ticket causing a new session key to be - installed for the USM user leaving the other managers with stale - keys. The workaround here is that the Agent will reject the stale - manager's PDU's which should inform them to do their own rekeying - operations. - - -2) If multiple managers try to access the same row at the same time, - the Agent SHOULD try to keep the transactions separate based on the - nonce values. The Managers or the Agents SHOULD NOT break the - krbUsmMibNonce and any other additional varbinds into separate PDU's - as this may result in a meta stable state. Given normal MTU sizes, - this should not be an issue in practice, and this should at worst - devolve into the case above. - - In all cases, the krbUsmMibNonce MUST be the last value to be - transmitted, though its position within a PDU is unimportant. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 11] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - - KrbUSM MIB - - KRB-USM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN - IMPORTS - MODULE-IDENTITY, - OBJECT-TYPE, OBJECT-IDENTITY, - snmpModules, Counter32, Unsigned32 FROM SNMPv2-SMI - TruthValue, DisplayString FROM SNMPv2-TC - usmUserEntry FROM SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB - - - - krbUsmMib MODULE-IDENTITY - LAST-UPDATED "00071300Z" - ORGANIZATION "IETF SNMP V3 Working Group" - CONTACT-INFO - "Michael Thomas - Cisco Systems - 375 E Tasman Drive - San Jose, Ca 95134 - Phone: +1 408-525-5386 - Fax: +1 801-382-5284 - email: mat@cisco.com" - DESCRIPTION - "This MIB contains the MIB variables to - exchange Kerberos credentials and a session - key to be used to authenticate and set up - USM keys" - - ::= { snmpModules nnn } -- not sure what needs to be here. - krbUsmMibObjects OBJECT INDENTIFIER ::= { krbUsmMib 1 } - - krbUsmMibAuthInAttemps - SYNTAX Counter32 - MAX-ACCESS read-only - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "Counter of the number of Kerberos - authorization attempts as defined by - receipt of a PDU from a Manager with a - krbUsmMibNonce set in the principal table." - ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 1 } - - krbUsmMibAuthOutAttemps - SYNTAX Counter32 - MAX-ACCESS read-only - STATUS current - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 12] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - DESCRIPTION - "Counter of the number of unsolicited Kerberos - authorization attempts as defined by - an Agent sending an INFORM or TRAP PDU with a - krbUsmMibApRep but without krbUsmApMibNonce - varbind." - ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 2 } - krbUsmMibAuthInFail - SYNTAX Counter32 - MAX-ACCESS read-only - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "Counter of the number of Kerberos - authorization failures as defined by - a Manager setting the krbUsmMibNonce - in the principal table which results - in some sort of failure to install keys - in the requested USM user entry." - ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 3 } - - krbUsmMibAuthOutFail - SYNTAX Counter32 - MAX-ACCESS read-only - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "Counter of the number of unsolicited Kerberos - authorization failures as defined by - an Agent sending an INFORM or TRAP PDU with a - krbUsmMibApRep but without a krbUsmMibNonce - varbind which does not result in keys being - installed for that USM user entry." - ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 4 } - - krbUsmMibPrinTable OBJECT-TYPE - SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF krbUsmMibEntry - MAX-ACCESS not-accessible - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "Table which maps Kerberos principals with USM - users as well as the per user variables to key - up sessions" - ::= { krbUsmMibObjects 5 } - - krbUsmMibPrinEntry OBJECT-TYPE - SYNTAX KrbUsmMibPrinEntry - MAX-ACCESS not-accessible - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 13] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - "an entry into the krbMibPrinTable which is a - parallel table to UsmUserEntry table" - AUGMENTS { usmUserEntry } - ::= { krbUsmMibPrinTable 1 } - - KrbUsmMibPrinEntry SEQUENCE - { - krbUsmMibApReq OCTET STRING, - krbUsmMibApRep OCTET STRING, - krbUsmMibNonce OCTET STRING, - krbUsmMibMgrTGT OCTET STRING, - krbUsmMibUnsolicitedNotify TruthValue, - } - - - krbUsmMibApReq OBJECT-TYPE - SYNTAX OCTET STRING - MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "This variable contains a DER encoded Kerberos - AP-REQ or KRB-ERROR for the USM user which is - to be keyed. This is sent from the Agent to - the Manager in an INFORM or TRAP request. - KRB-ERROR MUST only be sent to the Manager - if it is in response to a keying request from - the Manager. - " - ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 1 } - - krbUsmMibApRep OBJECT-TYPE - SYNTAX OCTET STRING - MAX-ACCESS read-write - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "This variable contains the DER encoded response - to an AP-REQ. This variable is SET by the - Manager to acknowledge receipt of an AP-REQ. If - krbUsmMibApRep contains a Kerberos AP-REP, the - Agent must derive keys from the session key - of the Kerberos ticket in the AP-REQ and place - them in the USM database in a manner specified - by [RFC2574]. If the Manager detects an error, - it will instead place a KRB-ERROR in this - variable to inform the Agent of the error. - - This variable is in effect a write-only variable. - attempts to read this variable will result in a - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 14] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - null octet string being returned" - ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 2 } - - krbUsmMibNonce OBJECT-TYPE - SYNTAX OCTET STRING - MAX-ACCESS read-write - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "SET'ing a krbUsmMibnonce allows a Manager to - determine whether an INFORM or TRAP from an - Agent is an outstanding keying request, or - unsolicited from the Agent. The Manager - initiates keying for a particular USM user - by writing a nonce into the row for which - desires to establish a security association. - The nonce is an ASCII string of the form - ``host:port?nonce'' where: - - host: is either an FQDN, or valid ipv4 or ipv6 - numerical notation of the Manager which - desires to initiate keying - port: is the destination port at which that the - Manager may be contacted - nonce: is a number generated by the Manager to - correlate the transaction - - The same nonce MUST be sent to the Manager in a - subsequent INFORM or TRAP with a krbUsmApReq. - The Agent MUST use the host address and port - supplied in the nonce as the destination of a - subsequent INFORM or TRAP. Unsolicited keying - requests MUST NOT contain a nonce, and should - instead use the destination stored Notifies of - this type. - - Nonces MUST be highly collision resistant either - using a time based method or a suitable random - number generator. Managers MUST never create - nonces which are 0. - - This variable is in effect a write-only variable. - Attempts to read this variable will result in a - nonce of value 0 being returned" - - - ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 3 } - - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 15] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - krbUsmMibMgrTgt OBJECT-TYPE - SYNTAX OCTET STRING - MAX-ACCESS read-write - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "If the Manager does not possess a symmetric - key with the KDC as would be the case with - a Manager using PKinit for authentication, - the Manager MUST SET its DER encoded ticket - granting ticket into KrbUsmMgrTgt along - with krbUsmMibNonce. - - The agent will then attach the Manager's TGT - into the additional tickets field of the - TGS-REQ message to the KDC to get a User-User - service ticket. - - This variable is in effect a write-only variable. - Attempts to read this variable will result in a - null octet string being returned" - ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 4 } - - - krbUsmMibUnsolicitedNotify OBJECT-TYPE - SYNTAX TruthValue - MAX-ACCESS read-write - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "If this variable is false, the Agent MUST NOT - send unsolicited INFORM or TRAP PDU's to the - Manager. - - Attempts to SET this variable by the no-auth - no-priv user MUST be rejected." - ::= { krbUsmMibPrinEntry 5 } - - -- - -- Conformance section... nothing optional. - - krbUsmMibCompliences MODULE-COMPLIANCE - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP - engines whichimplement the KRB-USM-MIB - " - MODULE -- this module - MANDATORY-GROUPS { krbUsmMib } - ::= { krbUsmMibCompliances 1 } - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 16] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - END - - -Key Derivation - - The session key provides the basis for the keying material for the - USM user specified in the AP-REQ. The actual keys for use for the - authentication and privacy are produced using the cryptographic hash- - ing function used to protect the ticket itself. The keying material - is derived using this function, F(key, salt), using successive - interations of F over the salt string "SNMPV3RULZ%d", where %d is a - monotonic counter starting at zero. The bits are taken directly from - the successive interations to produce two keys of appropriate size - (as specified in the USM user row) for the authentication transform - first, and the privacy transform second. If the authentication - transform is null, the first bits of the derived key are used for the - privacy transform. - -Security Considerations - - Various elements of this MIB must be readable and writable as the - no-auth, no-priv user. Unless specifically necessary for the key - negotiation, elements of this MIB SHOULD be protected by VACM views - which limit access. In particular, there is no reason anything in - this MIB should be visible to a no-auth, no-priv user with the excep- - tion of KrbUsmMibApReq, KrbUsmMibApRep, KrbUsmMibNonce, and - KrbUsmMibMgrTgt, and then only with the restrictions placed on them - in the MIB. As such, probing attacks are still possible, but should - not be profitable: all of the writable variables with interesting - information in them are defined in such a way as to be write only. - - There are some interesting denial of service attacks which are possi- - ble by attackers spoofing managers and putting load on the KDC to - generate unnecessary tickets. For large numbers or agents this could - be problematic. This can probably be mitigated by the KDC prioritiz- - ing TGS-REQ's though. - - -References - -[1] The CAT Working Group, J. Kohl, C.Neuman, "The Kerberos - Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September - 1993 - -[2] The SNMPV3 Working Group, U. Blumenthal, B. Wijnen, "The - User-based Security Model of SNMP V3", RFC 2574, April 1999 - -[3] The SNMPV3 Working Group, B. Wijnen, R. Presuhn, - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 17] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - - K.McCloghrie, "The View-based Access Control Model of SNMP - V3", RFC 2575, April 1999 - -[4] The CAT Working Group, Tung, et al, "Public Key Cryptography - for Initial Authentication in Kerberos", draft-ietf-cat-pk- - init-11, November 1999 - -[5] Arango, et al, "Media Gateway Control Protocl (MGCP)", RFC - 2705, October 1999 - - -[RFC2571] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, An Architecture - for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks, RFC 2571, April - 1999. - -[RFC1155] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, Structure and Identification of - Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets, STD 16, - RFC 1155, May 1990. - -[RFC1212] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, Concise MIB Definitions, STD - 16, RFC 1212, March 1991. - -[RFC1215] M. Rose, A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the - SNMP, RFC 1215, March 1991. - -[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., - Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Structure of Management Infor- - mation Version 2 (SMIv2), STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999. - -[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., - Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Textual Conventions for SMIv2, - STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999. - -[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., - Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Conformance Statements for - SMIv2, STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999. - -[RFC1157] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, Simple - Network Management Protocol, STD 15, RFC 1157, May 1990. - -[RFC1901] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, - Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2, RFC 1901, January - 1996. - -[RFC1906] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Tran- - sport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Manage- - ment Protocol (SNMPv2), RFC 1906, January 1996. - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 18] - - - - - -INTERNET-DRAFT Kerberized USM Keying 13 July 2000 - - -[RFC2572] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, Message - Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management - Protocol (SNMP), RFC 2572, April 1999. - -[RFC2574] Blumenthal, U., and B. Wijnen, User-based Security Model - (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Proto- - col (SNMPv3), RFC 2574, April 1999. - -[RFC1905] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, Pro- - tocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Manage- - ment Protocol (SNMPv2), RFC 1905, January 1996. - -[RFC2573] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, SNMPv3 Applications, - RFC 2573, April 1999. - -[RFC2575] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, View-based - Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Manage- - ment Protocol (SNMP), RFC 2575, April 1999. - -[RFC2570] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart, Introduc- - tion to Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Manage- - ment Framework, RFC 2570, April 1999. - -Author's Address - - Michael Thomas - Cisco Systems - 375 E Tasman Rd - San Jose, Ca, 95134, USA - Tel: +1 408-525-5386 - email: mat@cisco.com - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Thomas draft-thomas-snmpv3-kerbusm-00 [Page 19] - - |
