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diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 321c5ba..0000000 --- a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,929 +0,0 @@ - - -DHC Working Group S. Medvinsky -Internet Draft Motorola -Document: <draft-smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt> -Category: Standards Track P.Lalwaney -Expires: January 2001 Nokia - - July 2000 - - - Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients - - -Status of this Memo - - This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with - all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. - - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering - Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that - other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- - Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of - six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other - documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts - as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in - progress." - - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt - - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - - The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as <draft- - smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt>, and expires January 2001. Please - send comments to the authors. - - - -1. Abstract - - The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [1] includes an - option that allows authentication of all DHCP messages, as specified - in [2]. This document specifies a DHCP authentication mode based on - Kerberos V tickets. This provides mutual authentication between a - DHCP client and server, as well as authentication of all DHCP - messages. - - This document specifies Kerberos message exchanges between an - uninitialized client and the KDC (Key Distribution Center) using an - IAKERB proxy [7] so that the Kerberos key management phase is - decoupled from, and precedes the address allocation and network - configuration phase that uses the DHCP authentication option. In - order to make use of the IAKERB proxy, this document specifies a - transport mechanism that works with an uninitialized client (i.e. a - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - client without an assigned IP address). In addition, the document - specifies the format of the Kerberos authenticator to be used with - the DHCP authentication option. - -2. Conventions used in this document - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in - this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119. - -3. Introduction - - 3.1 Terminology - - o "DHCP client" - - A DHCP client is an Internet host using DHCP to obtain configuration - parameters such as a network address. - - o "DHCP server" - - A DHCP server is an Internet host that returns configuration - parameters to DHCP clients. - - O "Ticket" - - A Kerberos term for a record that helps a client authenticate itself - to a server; it contains the client's identity, a session key, a - timestamp, and other information, all sealed using the server's - secret key. It only serves to authenticate a client when presented - along with a fresh Authenticator. - - o "Key Distribution Center" - - Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and - temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host - on which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and Ticket- - Granting Ticket (TGT) requests. The initial ticket portion is - sometimes referred to as the Authentication Server (or service. The - Ticket-Granting Ticket portion is sometimes referred to as the - Ticket-Granting Server (or service). - - o "Realm" - - A Kerberos administrative domain that represents a group of - principals registered at a KDC. A single KDC may be responsible for - one or more realms. A fully qualified principal name includes a - realm name along with a principal name unique within that realm. - -3.2 Protocol Overview - - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -2- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - DHCP as defined in [1] defines the protocol exchanges for a client - to obtain its IP address and network configuration information from - a DHCP Server. Kerberos V5 as described in [6] defines the protocol - and message exchanges to mutually authenticate two parties. It is - our goal to provide authentication support for DHCP using Kerberos. - This implies that the Kerberos key management exchange has to take - place before a client gets its IP address from the DHCP Server. - Kerberos assumes that the client has a network address and can - contact the Key Distribution Center to obtain its credentials for - authenticated communication with an application server. - - In this specification we utilize the key exchange using an IAKERB - proxy described in [7]. This does not require any changes to either - the IAKERB or the Kerberos V5 specification. This document also - specifies a particular transport that allows an uninitialized client - to contact an IAKERB proxy. - - The Kerberos ticket returned from the key management exchange - discussed in Section 5 of this document is passed to the DHCP Server - inside the DHCP authentication option with the new Kerberos - authenticator type. This is described in Section 6 of this draft. - - -3.3 Related Work - - A prior Internet Draft [3] outlined the use of Kerberos-based - authentication for DHCP. The proposal tightly coupled the Kerberos - client state machines and the DHCP client state machines. As a - result, the Kerberos key management messages were carried in DHCP - messages, along with the Kerberos authenticators. In addition, the - first DHCP message exchange (request, offer) is not authenticated. - - We propose a protocol exchange where Kerberos key management is - decoupled from and precedes authenticated DHCP exchanges. This - implies that the Kerberos ticket returned in the initial key - management exchange could be used to authenticate servers assigning - addresses by non-DHCP address assignment mechanisms like RSIP [4] - and for service specific parameter provisioning mechanisms using SLP - [5]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -3- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - -4. System Architecture - - - Client - -------- -------- - | | 5.Authenticated DHCP | | - | DHCP |<------------------------>| DHCP | - | client | | server | - | | | | - | | | | - |Kerberos| | | - | Client | | | - -------- -------- - ^ - | - | - | - | ------- - ------------------------------>| | - Kerberos Key Mgmt | Proxy | - messages: | | - 1. AS Request / 2.AS Reply ------- - 3. TGS Request / 4.TGS Reply ^ - | Kerberos - | Key Mgmt messages - v (1, 2, 3, 4) - -------- - | | - | KDC | - | | - -------- - - Figure 1: System blocks and message interactions between them - - - In this architecture, the DHCP client obtains a Kerberos ticket from - the Key Distribution Center (KDC) using standard Kerberos messages, - as specified in [6]. The client, however, contacts the KDC via a - proxy server, according to the IAKERB mechanism, described in [7]. - The are several reasons why a client has to go through this proxy in - order to contact the KDC: - - a)The client may not know the host address of the KDC and may be - sending its first request message as a broadcast on a local - network. The KDC may not be located on the local network, and - even if it were - it will be unable to communicate with a client - without an IP address. This document describes a specific - mechanism that may be used by a client to communicate with the - Kerberos proxy. - - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -4- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - b)The client may not know its Kerberos realm name. The proxy is - able to fill in the missing client realm name in an AS Request - message, as specified in IAKERB. Note that in the case that - PKINIT pre-authenticator is used [8], the realm name in the AS - Request may be the KDC realm name and not the clientÆs realm name. - - c) The client does not know the realm name of the DHCP server. - - According to IAKERB, when the client sends a TGS Request with a - missing server realm name, the proxy will return to the client an - error message containing the missing realm name. - - Note that in this case the proxy could return the client a wrong - realm name and the client could be fooled into obtaining a ticket - for the wrong DHCP server (on the same local network). However, - the wrong DHCP server must still be a registered principal in a - KDC database. In some circumstances this may be an acceptable - compromise. Also, see the security considerations section. - - IAKERB describes the proxy as part of an application server - the - DHCP server in this case. However, in this document we are not - requiring the proxy to be integrated with the DHCP server. The - same IAKERB mechanisms apply in the more general case, where the - proxy is an independent application. This proxy, however, MUST be - reachable by a client via a local network broadcast. - - After a client has obtained a Kerberos ticket for the DHCP server, - it will use it as part of an authentication option in the DHCP - messages. The only extension to the DHCP protocol is the addition - of a new authenticator type based on Kerberos tickets. - -4.1 Cross-Realm Authentication - - Figure 1 shows a client communicating with a single KDC via a proxy. - However, the DHCP clientÆs realm may be different from the DHCP - serverÆs realm. In that case, the client may need to first contact - the KDC in its local realm to obtain a cross-realm TGT. Then, the - client would use the cross-realm TGT to contact the KDC in the DHCP - serverÆs realm, as specified in [6]. - - In the following example a client doesnÆt know its realm or the DHCP - serverÆs realm, which happens to be different from the clientÆs - realm. Here are the steps in obtaining the ticket for the DHCP - server (based on [6] and [7]): - - 1) The client sends AS Request with NULL realm to the proxy. - 2) The proxy fills in the realm and forwards the AS Request to - the KDC in the clientÆs realm. - 3) The KDC issues a TGT and sends back an AS Reply to the - proxy. - 4) The proxy forwards AS Reply to the client. - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -5- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - 5) The client sends TGS Request for a principal name "dhcpsrvr" - with NULL realm to the proxy. - 6) The proxy returns KRB_AP_ERR_REALM_REQUIRED error with the - DHCP serverÆs realm to the client. - 7) The client sends another TGS Request for a cross-realm TGT - to the proxy. - 8) The proxy forwards the TGS Request to the KDC in the - clientÆs realm. - 9) The KDC issues a cross-realm TGT and sends back a TGS Reply - to the proxy. - 10) The proxy forwards TGS Reply to the client. - 11) The client sends a TGS Request to the proxy for a principal - "dhcpsrvr" with the realm name filled in, using a cross-realm - TGT. - 12) The proxy forwards TGS Request to the KDC in the DHCP - server's realm. - 13) The KDC issues a ticket for the DHCP server and sends TGS - Reply back to the proxy. - 14) The proxy forwards TGS Reply to the client. - - In a most general case, the client may need to contact any number of - KDCs in different realms before it can get a ticket for the DHCP - server. In each case, the client would contact a KDC via the proxy - server, as specified in Section 5 of this document. - -4.2 Public Key Authentication - - This specification also allows clients to perform public key - authentication to the KDC, based on the PKINIT specification [8]. - In this case, the size of an AS Request and AS Reply messages is - likely to exceed the size of typical link MTU's. - - Here is an example, where PKINIT is used by a DHCP client that is - not a registered principal in the KDC principal database: - - 1) The client sends AS Request with a PKINIT Request pre- - authenticator to the proxy. This includes the clientÆs - signature and X.509 certificate. The KDC realm field is - left as NULL. - 2) The proxy fills in the realm and forwards the AS Request to - the KDC in the filled in realm. This is the realm of the - DHCP server. Here, the clientÆs realm is the name of a - Certification Authority - not the same as the KDC realm. - 3) The KDC issues a TGT and sends back an AS Reply with a - PKINIT Reply pre-authenticator to the proxy. - 4) The proxy forwards the AS Reply to the client. - 5) The client sends TGS Request for a principal name "dhcpsrvr" - with the realm found in the TGT to the proxy. - 6) The proxy forwards TGS Request to the KDC in the DHCP - serverÆs realm. - 7) The KDC issues a ticket for the DHCP server and sends TGS - Reply back to the proxy. - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -6- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - 8) The proxy forwards TGS Reply to the client. - - - 5. Key Management Exchange that Precedes Network Address Allocation - - An uninitialized host (e.g. on power-on and reset) does not have a - network address. It does have a link layer address or hardware - address. At this time, the client may not have any information on - its realm or the realm of the address allocation server (DHCP - Server). - - In the Kerberos key management exchange, a client gets its ticket - granting ticket (TGT) by contacting the Authentication Server in the - KDC using the AS_Request / Reply messages (shown as messages 1 and 2 - in Figure 1). The client then contacts the Ticket Granting Server in - the KDC to get the DHCP server ticket (to be used for mutual - authentication with the DHCP server) using the TGS_REQ / TGS_REP - messages (shown as messages 3 and 4 in the above figure). It is - also possible for the client to obtain a DHCP server ticket directly - with the AS Request / Reply exchange, without the use of the TGT. - - In the use of Kerberos for DHCP authentication, the client (a) does - not have an IP/network address (b) does not know he KDCÆs IP address - (c) the KDC may not be on the local network and (d) the client may - not know the DHCP ServerÆs IP address and realm. We therefore - require a Kerberos proxy on the local network to accept broadcast - Kerberos request messages (AS_REQ and TGS_REQ) from uninitialized - clients and relay them to the appropriate KDC. - - The uninitialized client formulates a broadcast AS_REQ or TGS_REQ as - follows: - - The request payload contains the client hardware address in - addresses field with a negative value for the address type. Kerberos - v5 [6] allows for the usage of negative address types for "local" - use. Note that IAKERB [7] discourages the use of the addresses field - as network addresses may not be known or may change in situation - where proxies are used. In this draft we incorporate the negative - values permitted in the Kerberos transport in the address type field - of both the AS_REQ and TGS_REQ messages. The negative value SHOULD - be the negative number of the hardware address type "htype" value - (from assigned numbers RFC) used in RFC 2131. The address field of - the message contains the clients hardware address. - - The request payload is UDP encapsulated and addressed to port 88 on - the server/proxy. The UDP source port is selected by the client. The - source and destination network addresses are the all-zeroÆs address - and the broadcast address, respectively. For IPv4, the source IP - address is set to 0.0.0.0 and the destination IP address is set to - 255.255.255.255. The data link layer header source address - corresponds to the link layer/hardware address of the client. The - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -7- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - destination link layer address is the broadcast address at the link - layer (e.g. for Ethernet the address is ffffffff). - - In the case where AS_REQ message contains a PKINIT pre-authenticator - for public key-based client authentication (based on [8]), the - message will probably not fit into a single UDP packet given typical - link MTU's. - - It is assumed that the proxy server on a network is configured with - a list of KDCÆs, their realms and their IP addresses. The proxy - server will act as a client to the KDC and forward standard Kerberos - messages to/from the KDC using unicast UDP or TCP transport - mechanisms, according to [6]. - - Upon receiving a broadcast request from a client, the proxy MUST - record the clientÆs hardware address that appears as the source - address on the frame as well as in the addresses field of the - request message. Based on the realm of the KDC specified in the - request, the proxy determines the KDC to which this message is - relayed as a unicast message from the proxy to the KDC. In the case - that the client left the KDC realm name as NULL, it is up to the - proxy to first determine the correct realm name and fill it in the - request (according to [7]). - - On receiving a request, the KDC formulates a response (AS_REP or - TGS_REP). It includes the clientÆs addresses field in the encrypted - part of the ticket (according to [6]). This response is unicast to - the proxy. - - Upon receiving the reply, the proxy MUST first determine the - previously saved hardware address of the client. The proxy - broadcasts the reply on its local network. This is a network layer - broadcast. At the link level, it uses the hardware address obtained - from the addresses field of the request. - - The client on receiving the response (link layer destination address - as its hardware address, network layer address is the broadcast - address) must verify that the hardware address in the ticket - corresponds to its link layer address. - - Upon receiving a TGS_REP (or an AS_REP with the application server - ticket) from the proxy, the client will have enough information to - securely communicate with the application server (the DHCP Server in - this case), as specified in the following section. - - - - - - - - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -8- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - 6. Authenticated Message Exchange Between the DHCP Client and the - DHCP Server - - The ticket returned in the TGS response is used by the DHCP client - in the construction of the Kerberos authenticator. The Kerberos - ticket serves two purposes: to establish a shared session key with - the DHCP server, and is also included as part of a Kerberos - authenticator in the DHCP request. - - If the size of the authenticator is greater than 255 bytes, the DHCP - authentication option is repeated multiple times. When the values - of all the authentication options are concatenated together, they - will make up the complete authenticator. - - Once the session key is established, the Kerberos structure - containing the ticket (AP REQ) can be omitted from the authenticator - for subsequent messages sent by both the DHCP client and the DHCP - server. - - The Kerberos authenticator for a DHCP request message is specified - below: - - 0 1 2 3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | Code | Length | Protocol | Algorithm | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | | - + Replay Detection (64 bits) + - | | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | | - + Authentication token (n octets) ... + - | | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - - The format of this authenticator is in accordance with [2]. The code - for the authentication option is TBD, and the length field contains - the length of the remainder of the option, starting with the - protocol field. - - The value of the protocol field for this authenticator MUST be set - to 2. - - The algorithm field MUST take one of the following values: - 1 - HMAC-MD5 - 2 - HMAC-SHA-1 - - Replay protection field is a monotonically increasing counter field. - When the Kerberos AP REQ structure is present in the authenticator - the counter may be set to any value. The AP REQ contains its own - replay protection mechanism in the form of a timestamp. - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -9- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - - Once the session key has been established and the AP REQ is not - included in the authenticator, this field MUST be monotonically - increasing in the messages sent by the client. - - Kerberos authenticator token consists of type-length-value - attributes: - - 0 1 2 3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | Type | Reserved | Payload Length | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | attribute value... - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - - The following attributes are included in the Kerberos authenticator - token: - - Type Attribute Name Value - -------------------------------------------------------------------- - 0 Message Integrity Code Depends on the value of the - algorithm field. Its length is - 16 bytes for HMAC-MD5 [9, 10] - and 20 bytes for HMAC-SHA-1 - [11, 10]. The HMAC key must be - derived from Kerberos session - key found in the Kerberos - ticket according to the key - derivation rules in [6]: - - HMAC Key = DK(sess key, - key usage | 0x99) - - Here, DK is defined in [12] and - the key usage value for DHCP is - TBD. - - The HMAC is calculated over the - entire DHCP message. The - Message Integrity Code - attribute MUST be set to all 0s - for the computation of the - HMAC. Because a DHCP relay - agent may alter the values of - the 'giaddr' and 'hops' fields - in the DHCP message, the - contents of those two fields - MUST also be set to zero for - the computation of the HMAC. - Rules specified in Section 3 of - [2] for the exclusion and - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -10- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - processing of the relay agent - information are applicable here - too. - - This field MUST always be - present in the Kerberos - authenticator. - - 1 AP_REQ ASN.1 encoding of a Kerberos - AP_REQ message, as specified - in [6]. This MUST be included - by the client when establishing - a new session key. In all - other cases, this attribute - MUST be omitted. - - AP_REQ contains the Kerberos ticket for the DHCP server and also - contains information needed by the DHCP server to authenticate the - client. After verifying the AP_REQ and decrypting the Kerberos - ticket, the DHCP server is able to extract a session key which it - now shares with the DHCP client. - - The Kerberos authenticator token contains its own replay protection - mechanism inside the AP_REQ structure. The AP_REQ contains a - timestamp that must be within an agreed upon time window at the DHCP - server. However, this does not require the DHCP clients to maintain - an accurate clock between reboots. Kerberos allows clients to - synchronize their clock with the KDC with the help of Kerberos - KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error message, as specified in [6]. - - The DHCP server MUST save both the session key and its associated - expiration time found in the Kerberos ticket. Up until the - expiration time, the server must accept client requests with the - Kerberos authenticator that does not include the AP REQ, using the - saved session key in calculating HMAC values. - - The Kerberos authenticator inside all DHCP server responses MUST NOT - contain the AP REQ and MUST use the saved Kerberos session key in - calculating HMAC values. - - When the session key expires, it is the client's responsibility to - obtain a new ticket from the KDC and to include an AP REQ inside the - Kerberos authenticator for the next DHCP request message. - - - - - - - - - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -11- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - -7. Detailed message flows for Kerberos and DHCP message Exchanges - - The following flow depicts the Kerberos exchange in which a AS REQ - message is used to directly request the DHCP Server ticket. There - are no changes to transport mechanisms below when the additional - phase of using TGS requests/responses with TGTÆs is used. - - Client IAKERB Proxy KDC - - KB-client-------- AS_REQ ------> - - AS REQ Address type = - (htype) - AS REQ Address= hw address - - src UDP port = senders port - destination UDP port = 88 - - src IP = 0.0.0.0 - destination IP = 255.255.255.255 - - src link layer address = - clientÆs HW/link address [e.g Ethernet address] - - destination link layer address = - link broadcast address [e.g. ffffffff for Ethernet] - - - ---------------------------> - (unicast to UDP port 88) - - - - <-------------------------- - (unicast AS REP) - Encrypted portion of ticket - Includes clients HW address - - - <---------------AS_REP ----------- - - - Ticket includes clientÆs hardware address - - src UDP port = 88 - destination UDP port = copied from src port in AS_REQ - - src IP = ProxyÆs IP address - destination IP = 255.255.255.255 - - src link layer address = ProxyÆs HW/link address - destination link layer address = - ClientÆs link layer address from AS_REQ - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -12- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - - - - The client uses the ticket received from the KDC in the DHCP -Authentication option as described in Section 6. - - - Client - DHCP-client DHCP Server - - ------DHCPDISCOVER ----> - (Auth Protocol = 2, includes Kerberos - authenticator with AP REQ ) - ----------------------------------- - | HMAC | AP REQ | - ---------------------------------- - | Ticket| Client Authent | - -------------------------- - - 1. Server decrypts ticket - (inside AP REQ) with service - key - 2. Server decrypts client - authenticator (inside AP REQ) - and checks content and - checksum to validate the - client. - 3. Recompute HMAC with session - key and compare. - - - <-------DHCPOFFER---------- - (Auth Protocol = 2, no AP REQ ) - - - - ---------DHCPREQUEST-------> - (Auth Protocol = 2, no AP REQ) - - - <--------DHCPACK------------- - (Auth Protocol = 2, no AP REQ ) - - - - -8. Security Considerations - - DHCP clients that do not know the DHCP serverÆs realm name will get - it from the proxy, as specified in IAKERB [7]. Since the proxy is - not authenticated, a DHCP client can be fooled into obtaining a - ticket for the wrong DHCP server in the wrong realm. - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -13- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - - This could happen when the client leaves out the server realm name - in a TGS Request message to the proxy. It is also possible, - however, for a client to directly request a DHCP server ticket with - an AS Request message. In those cases, the same situation occurs - when the client leaves out the realm name in an AS Request. - - This wrong DHCP server is still registered as a valid principal in a - database of a KDC that can be trusted by the client. In some - circumstances a client may assume that a DHCP server that is a - Kerberos principal registered with a trusted KDC will not attempt to - deliberately misconfigure a client. - - This specification provides a tradeoff between: - - 1) The DHCP clients knowing DHCP serverÆs realm ahead of time, - which provides for full 2-way authentication at the cost of - an additional configuration parameter. - 2) The DHCP clients not requiring any additional configuration - information, besides a password or a key (and a public key - certificate if PKINIT is used). This is at the cost of not - being able to fully authenticate the identity of the DHCP - server. - - - -9. References - - - [1]Droms, R., Arbaugh, W., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", - RFC 2131, Bucknell University, March 1997. - - [2]Droms, R., Arbaugh, W., "Authentication for DHCP Messages", - draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-13.txt, June 2000. - - [3]Hornstein, K., Lemon, T., "DHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V", - draft-hornstein-dhc-kerbauth-02.txt, February 2000. - - [4]Borella, M., Grabelsky, D., Lo, J., Tuniguchi, K., "Realm - Specific IP: Protocol Specification ", draft-ietf-nat-rsip- - protocol-06.txt, March 2000. - - [5]Guttman, E., Perkins, C., Veizades, J., Day, M., "Service - Location Protocol, Version 2", RFC 2608, June 1999. - - [6]Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network - Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions- - 05.txt, March 2000. - - - - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -14- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients July 2000 - - - - [7]Swift, M., Trostle, J., "Initial Authentication and Pass Through - Authentication Using Kerberos V5 and the GSS-API (IAKERB)", - draft-ietf-cat-iakerb-03.txt, September 1999. - - [8]Tung, B., C. Neuman, M. Hur, A. Medvinsky, S. Medvinsky, J. Wray, - J. Trostle, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication - in Kerberos", draft-ietf-cat-pk-init-11.txt, March 2000. - - [9]Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, April - 1992. - - [10]Krawczyk H., M. Bellare and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for - Message Authentication," RFC 2104, February 1997. - - [11]NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", April 1995. - - [12]Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, Integrity, and - Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-02.txt, August 1998. - - [13]Bradner, S. "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", RFC - 2026. - - - - 10. Author's Addresses - - Sasha Medvinsky - Motorola - 6450 Sequence Drive - San Diego, CA 92121 - Email: smedvinsky@gi.com - - Poornima Lalwaney - Nokia - 12278 Scripps Summit Drive - San Diego, CA 92131 - Email: poornima.lalwaney@nokia.com - - -11. Expiration - - This memo is filed as <draft-smedvinsky-dhc-kerbauth-01.txt>, and - expires January 1, 2001. - - - -12. Intellectual Property Notices - - - - - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -15- - -Kerberos V Authentication Mode for Uninitialized Clients March 2000 - - - This section contains two notices as required by [13] for - standards track documents. Per [13], section 10.4(A): - - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any - intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to - pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in - this document or the extent to which any license under such rights - might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it - has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the - IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and - standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of - claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances - of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made - to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such - proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification - can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. - - Per [13] section 10.4(D): - - The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights - claimed in regard to some or all of the specification contained in - this document. For more information consult the online list of - claimed rights. - - 13. Full Copyright Statement - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. - - This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to - others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it - or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published - and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any - kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph - are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this - document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing - the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other - Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of - developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for - copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be - followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than - English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and - will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or - assigns. This document and the information contained herein is - provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE - INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR - IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF - THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED - WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - - - - - -S. Medvinsky, P. Lalwaney -16- -
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