diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/sendmail/src/tls.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/sendmail/src/tls.c | 1671 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1671 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/sendmail/src/tls.c b/contrib/sendmail/src/tls.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1a213ca..0000000 --- a/contrib/sendmail/src/tls.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1671 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2000-2006 Sendmail, Inc. and its suppliers. - * All rights reserved. - * - * By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set - * forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of - * the sendmail distribution. - * - */ - -#include <sendmail.h> - -SM_RCSID("@(#)$Id: tls.c,v 8.107 2006/10/12 21:35:11 ca Exp $") - -#if STARTTLS -# include <openssl/err.h> -# include <openssl/bio.h> -# include <openssl/pem.h> -# ifndef HASURANDOMDEV -# include <openssl/rand.h> -# endif /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */ -# if !TLS_NO_RSA -static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL; /* temporary RSA key */ -static RSA *tmp_rsa_key __P((SSL *, int, int)); -# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ -# if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L -static int tls_verify_cb __P((X509_STORE_CTX *)); -# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ -static int tls_verify_cb __P((X509_STORE_CTX *, void *)); -# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ - -# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L -static int x509_verify_cb __P((int, X509_STORE_CTX *)); -# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ - -# if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L -# define CONST097 -# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ -# define CONST097 const -# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ -static void apps_ssl_info_cb __P((CONST097 SSL *, int , int)); -static bool tls_ok_f __P((char *, char *, int)); -static bool tls_safe_f __P((char *, long, bool)); -static int tls_verify_log __P((int, X509_STORE_CTX *, char *)); - -# if !NO_DH -static DH *get_dh512 __P((void)); - -static unsigned char dh512_p[] = -{ - 0xDA,0x58,0x3C,0x16,0xD9,0x85,0x22,0x89,0xD0,0xE4,0xAF,0x75, - 0x6F,0x4C,0xCA,0x92,0xDD,0x4B,0xE5,0x33,0xB8,0x04,0xFB,0x0F, - 0xED,0x94,0xEF,0x9C,0x8A,0x44,0x03,0xED,0x57,0x46,0x50,0xD3, - 0x69,0x99,0xDB,0x29,0xD7,0x76,0x27,0x6B,0xA2,0xD3,0xD4,0x12, - 0xE2,0x18,0xF4,0xDD,0x1E,0x08,0x4C,0xF6,0xD8,0x00,0x3E,0x7C, - 0x47,0x74,0xE8,0x33 -}; -static unsigned char dh512_g[] = -{ - 0x02 -}; - -static DH * -get_dh512() -{ - DH *dh = NULL; - - if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) - return NULL; - dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL); - dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL); - if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) - return NULL; - return dh; -} -# endif /* !NO_DH */ - - -/* -** TLS_RAND_INIT -- initialize STARTTLS random generator -** -** Parameters: -** randfile -- name of file with random data -** logl -- loglevel -** -** Returns: -** success/failure -** -** Side Effects: -** initializes PRNG for tls library. -*/ - -# define MIN_RAND_BYTES 128 /* 1024 bits */ - -# define RF_OK 0 /* randfile OK */ -# define RF_MISS 1 /* randfile == NULL || *randfile == '\0' */ -# define RF_UNKNOWN 2 /* unknown prefix for randfile */ - -# define RI_NONE 0 /* no init yet */ -# define RI_SUCCESS 1 /* init was successful */ -# define RI_FAIL 2 /* init failed */ - -static bool tls_rand_init __P((char *, int)); - -static bool -tls_rand_init(randfile, logl) - char *randfile; - int logl; -{ -# ifndef HASURANDOMDEV - /* not required if /dev/urandom exists, OpenSSL does it internally */ - - bool ok; - int randdef; - static int done = RI_NONE; - - /* - ** initialize PRNG - */ - - /* did we try this before? if yes: return old value */ - if (done != RI_NONE) - return done == RI_SUCCESS; - - /* set default values */ - ok = false; - done = RI_FAIL; - randdef = (randfile == NULL || *randfile == '\0') ? RF_MISS : RF_OK; -# if EGD - if (randdef == RF_OK && sm_strncasecmp(randfile, "egd:", 4) == 0) - { - randfile += 4; - if (RAND_egd(randfile) < 0) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: RAND_egd(%s) failed: random number generator not seeded", - randfile); - } - else - ok = true; - } - else -# endif /* EGD */ - if (randdef == RF_OK && sm_strncasecmp(randfile, "file:", 5) == 0) - { - int fd; - long sff; - struct stat st; - - randfile += 5; - sff = SFF_SAFEDIRPATH | SFF_NOWLINK - | SFF_NOGWFILES | SFF_NOWWFILES - | SFF_NOGRFILES | SFF_NOWRFILES - | SFF_MUSTOWN | SFF_ROOTOK | SFF_OPENASROOT; - if (DontLockReadFiles) - sff |= SFF_NOLOCK; - if ((fd = safeopen(randfile, O_RDONLY, 0, sff)) >= 0) - { - if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) - { - if (LogLevel > logl) - sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: can't fstat(%s)", - randfile); - } - else - { - bool use, problem; - - use = true; - problem = false; - - /* max. age of file: 10 minutes */ - if (st.st_mtime + 600 < curtime()) - { - use = bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, - DontBlameSendmail); - problem = true; - if (LogLevel > logl) - sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: RandFile %s too old: %s", - randfile, - use ? "unsafe" : - "unusable"); - } - if (use && st.st_size < MIN_RAND_BYTES) - { - use = bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, - DontBlameSendmail); - problem = true; - if (LogLevel > logl) - sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: size(%s) < %d: %s", - randfile, - MIN_RAND_BYTES, - use ? "unsafe" : - "unusable"); - } - if (use) - ok = RAND_load_file(randfile, -1) >= - MIN_RAND_BYTES; - if (use && !ok) - { - if (LogLevel > logl) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: RAND_load_file(%s) failed: random number generator not seeded", - randfile); - } - if (problem) - ok = false; - } - if (ok || bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, - DontBlameSendmail)) - { - /* add this even if fstat() failed */ - RAND_seed((void *) &st, sizeof(st)); - } - (void) close(fd); - } - else - { - if (LogLevel > logl) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: Warning: safeopen(%s) failed", - randfile); - } - } - else if (randdef == RF_OK) - { - if (LogLevel > logl) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: Error: no proper random file definition %s", - randfile); - randdef = RF_UNKNOWN; - } - if (randdef == RF_MISS) - { - if (LogLevel > logl) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: Error: missing random file definition"); - } - if (!ok && bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, DontBlameSendmail)) - { - int i; - long r; - unsigned char buf[MIN_RAND_BYTES]; - - /* assert((MIN_RAND_BYTES % sizeof(long)) == 0); */ - for (i = 0; i <= sizeof(buf) - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) - { - r = get_random(); - (void) memcpy(buf + i, (void *) &r, sizeof(long)); - } - RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf)); - if (LogLevel > logl) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: Warning: random number generator not properly seeded"); - ok = true; - } - done = ok ? RI_SUCCESS : RI_FAIL; - return ok; -# else /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */ - return true; -# endif /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */ -} -/* -** INIT_TLS_LIBRARY -- Calls functions which setup TLS library for global use. -** -** Parameters: -** none. -** -** Returns: -** succeeded? -*/ - -bool -init_tls_library() -{ - /* basic TLS initialization, ignore result for now */ - SSL_library_init(); - SSL_load_error_strings(); -# if 0 - /* this is currently a macro for SSL_library_init */ - SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms(); -# endif /* 0 */ - - return tls_rand_init(RandFile, 7); -} -/* -** TLS_SET_VERIFY -- request client certificate? -** -** Parameters: -** ctx -- TLS context -** ssl -- TLS structure -** vrfy -- require certificate? -** -** Returns: -** none. -** -** Side Effects: -** Sets verification state for TLS -** -# if TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX -** Notice: -** This is per TLS context, not per TLS structure; -** the former is global, the latter per connection. -** It would be nice to do this per connection, but this -** doesn't work in the current TLS libraries :-( -# endif * TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX * -*/ - -void -tls_set_verify(ctx, ssl, vrfy) - SSL_CTX *ctx; - SSL *ssl; - bool vrfy; -{ -# if !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX - SSL_set_verify(ssl, vrfy ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); -# else /* !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX */ - SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, vrfy ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, - NULL); -# endif /* !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX */ -} - -/* -** status in initialization -** these flags keep track of the status of the initialization -** i.e., whether a file exists (_EX) and whether it can be used (_OK) -** [due to permissions] -*/ - -# define TLS_S_NONE 0x00000000 /* none yet */ -# define TLS_S_CERT_EX 0x00000001 /* cert file exists */ -# define TLS_S_CERT_OK 0x00000002 /* cert file is ok */ -# define TLS_S_KEY_EX 0x00000004 /* key file exists */ -# define TLS_S_KEY_OK 0x00000008 /* key file is ok */ -# define TLS_S_CERTP_EX 0x00000010 /* CA cert path exists */ -# define TLS_S_CERTP_OK 0x00000020 /* CA cert path is ok */ -# define TLS_S_CERTF_EX 0x00000040 /* CA cert file exists */ -# define TLS_S_CERTF_OK 0x00000080 /* CA cert file is ok */ -# define TLS_S_CRLF_EX 0x00000100 /* CRL file exists */ -# define TLS_S_CRLF_OK 0x00000200 /* CRL file is ok */ - -# if _FFR_TLS_1 -# define TLS_S_CERT2_EX 0x00001000 /* 2nd cert file exists */ -# define TLS_S_CERT2_OK 0x00002000 /* 2nd cert file is ok */ -# define TLS_S_KEY2_EX 0x00004000 /* 2nd key file exists */ -# define TLS_S_KEY2_OK 0x00008000 /* 2nd key file is ok */ -# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */ - -# define TLS_S_DH_OK 0x00200000 /* DH cert is ok */ -# define TLS_S_DHPAR_EX 0x00400000 /* DH param file exists */ -# define TLS_S_DHPAR_OK 0x00800000 /* DH param file is ok to use */ - -/* Type of variable */ -# define TLS_T_OTHER 0 -# define TLS_T_SRV 1 -# define TLS_T_CLT 2 - -/* -** TLS_OK_F -- can var be an absolute filename? -** -** Parameters: -** var -- filename -** fn -- what is the filename used for? -** type -- type of variable -** -** Returns: -** ok? -*/ - -static bool -tls_ok_f(var, fn, type) - char *var; - char *fn; - int type; -{ - /* must be absolute pathname */ - if (var != NULL && *var == '/') - return true; - if (LogLevel > 12) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: %s%s missing", - type == TLS_T_SRV ? "Server" : - (type == TLS_T_CLT ? "Client" : ""), fn); - return false; -} -/* -** TLS_SAFE_F -- is a file safe to use? -** -** Parameters: -** var -- filename -** sff -- flags for safefile() -** srv -- server side? -** -** Returns: -** ok? -*/ - -static bool -tls_safe_f(var, sff, srv) - char *var; - long sff; - bool srv; -{ - int ret; - - if ((ret = safefile(var, RunAsUid, RunAsGid, RunAsUserName, sff, - S_IRUSR, NULL)) == 0) - return true; - if (LogLevel > 7) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s: file %s unsafe: %s", - srv ? "server" : "client", var, sm_errstring(ret)); - return false; -} - -/* -** TLS_OK_F -- macro to simplify calls to tls_ok_f -** -** Parameters: -** var -- filename -** fn -- what is the filename used for? -** req -- is the file required? -** st -- status bit to set if ok -** type -- type of variable -** -** Side Effects: -** uses r, ok; may change ok and status. -** -*/ - -# define TLS_OK_F(var, fn, req, st, type) if (ok) \ - { \ - r = tls_ok_f(var, fn, type); \ - if (r) \ - status |= st; \ - else if (req) \ - ok = false; \ - } - -/* -** TLS_UNR -- macro to return whether a file should be unreadable -** -** Parameters: -** bit -- flag to test -** req -- flags -** -** Returns: -** 0/SFF_NORFILES -*/ -# define TLS_UNR(bit, req) (bitset(bit, req) ? SFF_NORFILES : 0) -# define TLS_OUNR(bit, req) (bitset(bit, req) ? SFF_NOWRFILES : 0) -# define TLS_KEYSFF(req) \ - (bitnset(DBS_GROUPREADABLEKEYFILE, DontBlameSendmail) ? \ - TLS_OUNR(TLS_I_KEY_OUNR, req) : \ - TLS_UNR(TLS_I_KEY_UNR, req)) - -/* -** TLS_SAFE_F -- macro to simplify calls to tls_safe_f -** -** Parameters: -** var -- filename -** sff -- flags for safefile() -** req -- is the file required? -** ex -- does the file exist? -** st -- status bit to set if ok -** srv -- server side? -** -** Side Effects: -** uses r, ok, ex; may change ok and status. -** -*/ - -# define TLS_SAFE_F(var, sff, req, ex, st, srv) if (ex && ok) \ - { \ - r = tls_safe_f(var, sff, srv); \ - if (r) \ - status |= st; \ - else if (req) \ - ok = false; \ - } - -/* -** INITTLS -- initialize TLS -** -** Parameters: -** ctx -- pointer to context -** req -- requirements for initialization (see sendmail.h) -** srv -- server side? -** certfile -- filename of certificate -** keyfile -- filename of private key -** cacertpath -- path to CAs -** cacertfile -- file with CA(s) -** dhparam -- parameters for DH -** -** Returns: -** succeeded? -*/ - -/* -** The session_id_context identifies the service that created a session. -** This information is used to distinguish between multiple TLS-based -** servers running on the same server. We use the name of the mail system. -** Note: the session cache is not persistent. -*/ - -static char server_session_id_context[] = "sendmail8"; - -/* 0.9.8a and b have a problem with SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG */ -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) -# define SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 1 -#else -# define SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0 -#endif - -bool -inittls(ctx, req, srv, certfile, keyfile, cacertpath, cacertfile, dhparam) - SSL_CTX **ctx; - unsigned long req; - bool srv; - char *certfile, *keyfile, *cacertpath, *cacertfile, *dhparam; -{ -# if !NO_DH - static DH *dh = NULL; -# endif /* !NO_DH */ - int r; - bool ok; - long sff, status, options; - char *who; -# if _FFR_TLS_1 - char *cf2, *kf2; -# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */ -# if SM_CONF_SHM - extern int ShmId; -# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */ -# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L - BIO *crl_file; - X509_CRL *crl; - X509_STORE *store; -# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ -#if SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG - long rt_version; - STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; -#endif - - status = TLS_S_NONE; - who = srv ? "server" : "client"; - if (ctx == NULL) - { - syserr("STARTTLS=%s, inittls: ctx == NULL", who); - /* NOTREACHED */ - SM_ASSERT(ctx != NULL); - } - - /* already initialized? (we could re-init...) */ - if (*ctx != NULL) - return true; - ok = true; - -# if _FFR_TLS_1 - /* - ** look for a second filename: it must be separated by a ',' - ** no blanks allowed (they won't be skipped). - ** we change a global variable here! this change will be undone - ** before return from the function but only if it returns true. - ** this isn't a problem since in a failure case this function - ** won't be called again with the same (overwritten) values. - ** otherwise each return must be replaced with a goto endinittls. - */ - - cf2 = NULL; - kf2 = NULL; - if (certfile != NULL && (cf2 = strchr(certfile, ',')) != NULL) - { - *cf2++ = '\0'; - if (keyfile != NULL && (kf2 = strchr(keyfile, ',')) != NULL) - *kf2++ = '\0'; - } -# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */ - - /* - ** Check whether files/paths are defined - */ - - TLS_OK_F(certfile, "CertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), - TLS_S_CERT_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); - TLS_OK_F(keyfile, "KeyFile", bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), - TLS_S_KEY_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); - TLS_OK_F(cacertpath, "CACertPath", bitset(TLS_I_CERTP_EX, req), - TLS_S_CERTP_EX, TLS_T_OTHER); - TLS_OK_F(cacertfile, "CACertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERTF_EX, req), - TLS_S_CERTF_EX, TLS_T_OTHER); - -# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L - TLS_OK_F(CRLFile, "CRLFile", bitset(TLS_I_CRLF_EX, req), - TLS_S_CRLF_EX, TLS_T_OTHER); -# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ - -# if _FFR_TLS_1 - /* - ** if the second file is specified it must exist - ** XXX: it is possible here to define only one of those files - */ - - if (cf2 != NULL) - { - TLS_OK_F(cf2, "CertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), - TLS_S_CERT2_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); - } - if (kf2 != NULL) - { - TLS_OK_F(kf2, "KeyFile", bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), - TLS_S_KEY2_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); - } -# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */ - - /* - ** valid values for dhparam are (only the first char is checked) - ** none no parameters: don't use DH - ** 512 generate 512 bit parameters (fixed) - ** 1024 generate 1024 bit parameters - ** /file/name read parameters from /file/name - ** default is: 1024 for server, 512 for client (OK? XXX) - */ - - if (bitset(TLS_I_TRY_DH, req)) - { - if (dhparam != NULL) - { - char c = *dhparam; - - if (c == '1') - req |= TLS_I_DH1024; - else if (c == '5') - req |= TLS_I_DH512; - else if (c != 'n' && c != 'N' && c != '/') - { - if (LogLevel > 12) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: illegal value '%s' for DHParam", - who, dhparam); - dhparam = NULL; - } - } - if (dhparam == NULL) - dhparam = srv ? "1" : "5"; - else if (*dhparam == '/') - { - TLS_OK_F(dhparam, "DHParameters", - bitset(TLS_I_DHPAR_EX, req), - TLS_S_DHPAR_EX, TLS_T_OTHER); - } - } - if (!ok) - return ok; - - /* certfile etc. must be "safe". */ - sff = SFF_REGONLY | SFF_SAFEDIRPATH | SFF_NOWLINK - | SFF_NOGWFILES | SFF_NOWWFILES - | SFF_MUSTOWN | SFF_ROOTOK | SFF_OPENASROOT; - if (DontLockReadFiles) - sff |= SFF_NOLOCK; - - TLS_SAFE_F(certfile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERT_UNR, req), - bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), - bitset(TLS_S_CERT_EX, status), TLS_S_CERT_OK, srv); - TLS_SAFE_F(keyfile, sff | TLS_KEYSFF(req), - bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), - bitset(TLS_S_KEY_EX, status), TLS_S_KEY_OK, srv); - TLS_SAFE_F(cacertfile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERTF_UNR, req), - bitset(TLS_I_CERTF_EX, req), - bitset(TLS_S_CERTF_EX, status), TLS_S_CERTF_OK, srv); - TLS_SAFE_F(dhparam, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_DHPAR_UNR, req), - bitset(TLS_I_DHPAR_EX, req), - bitset(TLS_S_DHPAR_EX, status), TLS_S_DHPAR_OK, srv); -# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L - TLS_SAFE_F(CRLFile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CRLF_UNR, req), - bitset(TLS_I_CRLF_EX, req), - bitset(TLS_S_CRLF_EX, status), TLS_S_CRLF_OK, srv); -# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ - if (!ok) - return ok; -# if _FFR_TLS_1 - if (cf2 != NULL) - { - TLS_SAFE_F(cf2, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERT_UNR, req), - bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), - bitset(TLS_S_CERT2_EX, status), TLS_S_CERT2_OK, srv); - } - if (kf2 != NULL) - { - TLS_SAFE_F(kf2, sff | TLS_KEYSFF(req), - bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), - bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_EX, status), TLS_S_KEY2_OK, srv); - } -# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */ - - /* create a method and a new context */ - if ((*ctx = SSL_CTX_new(srv ? SSLv23_server_method() : - SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_%s_method()) failed", - who, who); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - return false; - } - -# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L - if (CRLFile != NULL) - { - /* get a pointer to the current certificate validation store */ - store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(*ctx); /* does not fail */ - crl_file = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal()); - if (crl_file != NULL) - { - if (BIO_read_filename(crl_file, CRLFile) >= 0) - { - crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(crl_file, NULL, - NULL, NULL); - BIO_free(crl_file); - X509_STORE_add_crl(store, crl); - X509_CRL_free(crl); - X509_STORE_set_flags(store, - X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); - X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, - x509_verify_cb); - } - else - { - if (LogLevel > 9) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(%s)=failed", - who, CRLFile); - } - - /* avoid memory leaks */ - BIO_free(crl_file); - return false; - } - - } - else if (LogLevel > 9) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: BIO_new=failed", who); - } - else - store = NULL; -# if _FFR_CRLPATH - if (CRLPath != NULL && store != NULL) - { - X509_LOOKUP *lookup; - - lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); - if (lookup == NULL) - { - if (LogLevel > 9) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: X509_STORE_add_lookup(hash)=failed", - who, CRLFile); - } - return false; - } - X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CRLPath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); - X509_STORE_set_flags(store, - X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); - } -# endif /* _FFR_CRLPATH */ -# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ - -# if TLS_NO_RSA - /* turn off backward compatibility, required for no-rsa */ - SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); -# endif /* TLS_NO_RSA */ - - -# if !TLS_NO_RSA - /* - ** Create a temporary RSA key - ** XXX Maybe we shouldn't create this always (even though it - ** is only at startup). - ** It is a time-consuming operation and it is not always necessary. - ** maybe we should do it only on demand... - */ - - if (bitset(TLS_I_RSA_TMP, req) -# if SM_CONF_SHM - && ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID && - (rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(RSA_KEYLENGTH, RSA_F4, NULL, - NULL)) == NULL -# else /* SM_CONF_SHM */ - && 0 /* no shared memory: no need to generate key now */ -# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */ - ) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: RSA_generate_key failed", - who); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - return false; - } -# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ - - /* - ** load private key - ** XXX change this for DSA-only version - */ - - if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY_OK, status) && - SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(*ctx, keyfile, - SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed", - who, keyfile); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_KEY, req)) - return false; - } - - /* get the certificate file */ - if (bitset(TLS_S_CERT_OK, status) && - SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(*ctx, certfile, - SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(%s) failed", - who, certfile); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_CERT, req)) - return false; - } - - /* check the private key */ - if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY_OK, status) && - (r = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(*ctx)) <= 0) - { - /* Private key does not match the certificate public key */ - if (LogLevel > 5) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_check_private_key failed(%s): %d", - who, keyfile, r); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_KEY, req)) - return false; - } - -# if _FFR_TLS_1 - /* XXX this code is pretty much duplicated from above! */ - - /* load private key */ - if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_OK, status) && - SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(*ctx, kf2, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed", - who, kf2); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - } - - /* get the certificate file */ - if (bitset(TLS_S_CERT2_OK, status) && - SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(*ctx, cf2, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(%s) failed", - who, cf2); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - } - - /* also check the private key */ - if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_OK, status) && - (r = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(*ctx)) <= 0) - { - /* Private key does not match the certificate public key */ - if (LogLevel > 5) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_check_private_key 2 failed: %d", - who, r); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - } -# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */ - - /* SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(*ctx, 1); violation of standard? */ - - options = SSL_OP_ALL; /* bug compatibility? */ -#if SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG - - /* - ** In OpenSSL 0.9.8[ab], enabling zlib compression breaks the - ** padding bug work-around, leading to false positives and - ** failed connections. We may not interoperate with systems - ** with the bug, but this is better than breaking on all 0.9.8[ab] - ** systems that have zlib support enabled. - ** Note: this checks the runtime version of the library, not - ** just the compile time version. - */ - - rt_version = SSLeay(); - if (rt_version >= 0x00908000L && rt_version <= 0x0090802fL) - { - comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); - if (comp_methods != NULL && sk_SSL_COMP_num(comp_methods) > 0) - options &= ~SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG; - } -#endif - SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, options); - -# if !NO_DH - /* Diffie-Hellman initialization */ - if (bitset(TLS_I_TRY_DH, req)) - { - if (bitset(TLS_S_DHPAR_OK, status)) - { - BIO *bio; - - if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhparam, "r")) != NULL) - { - dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); - BIO_free(bio); - if (dh == NULL && LogLevel > 7) - { - unsigned long err; - - err = ERR_get_error(); - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: cannot read DH parameters(%s): %s", - who, dhparam, - ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - } - else - { - if (LogLevel > 5) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: BIO_new_file(%s) failed", - who, dhparam); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - } - } - if (dh == NULL && bitset(TLS_I_DH1024, req)) - { - DSA *dsa; - - /* this takes a while! (7-130s on a 450MHz AMD K6-2) */ - dsa = DSA_generate_parameters(1024, NULL, 0, NULL, - NULL, 0, NULL); - dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa); - DSA_free(dsa); - } - else - if (dh == NULL && bitset(TLS_I_DH512, req)) - dh = get_dh512(); - - if (dh == NULL) - { - if (LogLevel > 9) - { - unsigned long err; - - err = ERR_get_error(); - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: cannot read or set DH parameters(%s): %s", - who, dhparam, - ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); - } - if (bitset(TLS_I_REQ_DH, req)) - return false; - } - else - { - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(*ctx, dh); - - /* important to avoid small subgroup attacks */ - SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); - if (LogLevel > 13) - sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, Diffie-Hellman init, key=%d bit (%c)", - who, 8 * DH_size(dh), *dhparam); - DH_free(dh); - } - } -# endif /* !NO_DH */ - - - /* XXX do we need this cache here? */ - if (bitset(TLS_I_CACHE, req)) - { - SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(*ctx, 1); - SSL_CTX_set_timeout(*ctx, 1); - SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(*ctx, - (void *) &server_session_id_context, - sizeof(server_session_id_context)); - (void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(*ctx, - SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); - } - else - { - (void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(*ctx, - SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); - } - - /* load certificate locations and default CA paths */ - if (bitset(TLS_S_CERTP_EX, status) && bitset(TLS_S_CERTF_EX, status)) - { - if ((r = SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(*ctx, cacertfile, - cacertpath)) == 1) - { -# if !TLS_NO_RSA - if (bitset(TLS_I_RSA_TMP, req)) - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(*ctx, tmp_rsa_key); -# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ - - /* - ** We have to install our own verify callback: - ** SSL_VERIFY_PEER requests a client cert but even - ** though *FAIL_IF* isn't set, the connection - ** will be aborted if the client presents a cert - ** that is not "liked" (can't be verified?) by - ** the TLS library :-( - */ - - /* - ** XXX currently we could call tls_set_verify() - ** but we hope that that function will later on - ** only set the mode per connection. - */ - SSL_CTX_set_verify(*ctx, - bitset(TLS_I_NO_VRFY, req) ? SSL_VERIFY_NONE - : SSL_VERIFY_PEER, - NULL); - - /* install verify callback */ - SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(*ctx, tls_verify_cb, - NULL); - SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(*ctx, - SSL_load_client_CA_file(cacertfile)); - } - else - { - /* - ** can't load CA data; do we care? - ** the data is necessary to authenticate the client, - ** which in turn would be necessary - ** if we want to allow relaying based on it. - */ - if (LogLevel > 5) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: load verify locs %s, %s failed: %d", - who, cacertpath, cacertfile, r); - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - if (bitset(TLS_I_VRFY_LOC, req)) - return false; - } - } - - /* XXX: make this dependent on an option? */ - if (tTd(96, 9)) - SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctx, apps_ssl_info_cb); - -# if _FFR_TLS_1 - /* install our own cipher list */ - if (CipherList != NULL && *CipherList != '\0') - { - if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(*ctx, CipherList) <= 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed, list ignored", - who, CipherList); - - if (LogLevel > 9) - tlslogerr(who); - } - /* failure if setting to this list is required? */ - } - } -# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */ - if (LogLevel > 12) - sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, init=%d", who, ok); - -# if _FFR_TLS_1 -# if 0 - /* - ** this label is required if we want to have a "clean" exit - ** see the comments above at the initialization of cf2 - */ - - endinittls: -# endif /* 0 */ - - /* undo damage to global variables */ - if (cf2 != NULL) - *--cf2 = ','; - if (kf2 != NULL) - *--kf2 = ','; -# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */ - - return ok; -} -/* -** TLS_GET_INFO -- get information about TLS connection -** -** Parameters: -** ssl -- TLS connection structure -** srv -- server or client -** host -- hostname of other side -** mac -- macro storage -** certreq -- did we ask for a cert? -** -** Returns: -** result of authentication. -** -** Side Effects: -** sets macros: {cipher}, {tls_version}, {verify}, -** {cipher_bits}, {alg_bits}, {cert}, {cert_subject}, -** {cert_issuer}, {cn_subject}, {cn_issuer} -*/ - -int -tls_get_info(ssl, srv, host, mac, certreq) - SSL *ssl; - bool srv; - char *host; - MACROS_T *mac; - bool certreq; -{ - SSL_CIPHER *c; - int b, r; - long verifyok; - char *s, *who; - char bitstr[16]; - X509 *cert; - - c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); - - /* cast is just workaround for compiler warning */ - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cipher}"), - (char *) SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); - b = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, &r); - (void) sm_snprintf(bitstr, sizeof(bitstr), "%d", b); - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cipher_bits}"), bitstr); - (void) sm_snprintf(bitstr, sizeof(bitstr), "%d", r); - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{alg_bits}"), bitstr); - s = SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c); - if (s == NULL) - s = "UNKNOWN"; - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{tls_version}"), s); - - who = srv ? "server" : "client"; - cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); - verifyok = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); - if (LogLevel > 14) - sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, get_verify: %ld get_peer: 0x%lx", - who, verifyok, (unsigned long) cert); - if (cert != NULL) - { - unsigned int n; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - char buf[MAXNAME]; - - X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), - buf, sizeof(buf)); - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_subject}"), - xtextify(buf, "<>\")")); - X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), - buf, sizeof(buf)); - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_issuer}"), - xtextify(buf, "<>\")")); - X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(cert), - NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf)); - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cn_subject}"), - xtextify(buf, "<>\")")); - X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), - NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf)); - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cn_issuer}"), - xtextify(buf, "<>\")")); - n = 0; - if (X509_digest(cert, EVP_md5(), md, &n) != 0 && n > 0) - { - char md5h[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3]; - static const char hexcodes[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; - - SM_ASSERT((n * 3) + 2 < sizeof(md5h)); - for (r = 0; r < (int) n; r++) - { - md5h[r * 3] = hexcodes[(md[r] & 0xf0) >> 4]; - md5h[(r * 3) + 1] = hexcodes[(md[r] & 0x0f)]; - md5h[(r * 3) + 2] = ':'; - } - md5h[(n * 3) - 1] = '\0'; - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_md5}"), md5h); - } - else - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_md5}"), ""); - } - else - { - macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cert_subject}"), ""); - macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cert_issuer}"), ""); - macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cn_subject}"), ""); - macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cn_issuer}"), ""); - macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_md5}"), ""); - } - switch (verifyok) - { - case X509_V_OK: - if (cert != NULL) - { - s = "OK"; - r = TLS_AUTH_OK; - } - else - { - s = certreq ? "NO" : "NOT", - r = TLS_AUTH_NO; - } - break; - default: - s = "FAIL"; - r = TLS_AUTH_FAIL; - break; - } - macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{verify}"), s); - if (cert != NULL) - X509_free(cert); - - /* do some logging */ - if (LogLevel > 8) - { - char *vers, *s1, *s2, *cbits, *algbits; - - vers = macget(mac, macid("{tls_version}")); - cbits = macget(mac, macid("{cipher_bits}")); - algbits = macget(mac, macid("{alg_bits}")); - s1 = macget(mac, macid("{verify}")); - s2 = macget(mac, macid("{cipher}")); - - /* XXX: maybe cut off ident info? */ - sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, version=%.16s, verify=%.16s, cipher=%.64s, bits=%.6s/%.6s", - who, - host == NULL ? "local" : host, - vers, s1, s2, /* sm_snprintf() can deal with NULL */ - algbits == NULL ? "0" : algbits, - cbits == NULL ? "0" : cbits); - if (LogLevel > 11) - { - /* - ** Maybe run xuntextify on the strings? - ** That is easier to read but makes it maybe a bit - ** more complicated to figure out the right values - ** for the access map... - */ - - s1 = macget(mac, macid("{cert_subject}")); - s2 = macget(mac, macid("{cert_issuer}")); - sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, cert-subject=%.256s, cert-issuer=%.256s, verifymsg=%s", - who, s1, s2, - X509_verify_cert_error_string(verifyok)); - } - } - return r; -} -/* -** ENDTLS -- shutdown secure connection -** -** Parameters: -** ssl -- SSL connection information. -** side -- server/client (for logging). -** -** Returns: -** success? (EX_* code) -*/ - -int -endtls(ssl, side) - SSL *ssl; - char *side; -{ - int ret = EX_OK; - - if (ssl != NULL) - { - int r; - - if ((r = SSL_shutdown(ssl)) < 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 11) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, SSL_shutdown failed: %d", - side, r); - tlslogerr(side); - } - ret = EX_SOFTWARE; - } -# if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090602fL - - /* - ** Bug in OpenSSL (at least up to 0.9.6b): - ** From: Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE - ** Message-ID: <20010723152244.A13122@serv01.aet.tu-cottbus.de> - ** To: openssl-users@openssl.org - ** Subject: Re: SSL_shutdown() woes (fwd) - ** - ** The side sending the shutdown alert first will - ** not care about the answer of the peer but will - ** immediately return with a return value of "0" - ** (ssl/s3_lib.c:ssl3_shutdown()). SSL_get_error will evaluate - ** the value of "0" and as the shutdown alert of the peer was - ** not received (actually, the program did not even wait for - ** the answer), an SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL is flagged, because this - ** is the default rule in case everything else does not apply. - ** - ** For your server the problem is different, because it - ** receives the shutdown first (setting SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN), - ** then sends its response (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN), so for the - ** server the shutdown was successfull. - ** - ** As is by know, you would have to call SSL_shutdown() once - ** and ignore an SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL returned. Then call - ** SSL_shutdown() again to actually get the server's response. - ** - ** In the last discussion, Bodo Moeller concluded that a - ** rewrite of the shutdown code would be necessary, but - ** probably with another API, as the change would not be - ** compatible to the way it is now. Things do not become - ** easier as other programs do not follow the shutdown - ** guidelines anyway, so that a lot error conditions and - ** compitibility issues would have to be caught. - ** - ** For now the recommondation is to ignore the error message. - */ - - else if (r == 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 15) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s, SSL_shutdown not done", - side); - tlslogerr(side); - } - ret = EX_SOFTWARE; - } -# endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090602fL */ - SSL_free(ssl); - ssl = NULL; - } - return ret; -} - -# if !TLS_NO_RSA -/* -** TMP_RSA_KEY -- return temporary RSA key -** -** Parameters: -** s -- TLS connection structure -** export -- -** keylength -- -** -** Returns: -** temporary RSA key. -*/ - -# ifndef MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT -# define MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT 1000 /* XXX better value? */ -# endif /* ! MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT */ - -/* ARGUSED0 */ -static RSA * -tmp_rsa_key(s, export, keylength) - SSL *s; - int export; - int keylength; -{ -# if SM_CONF_SHM - extern int ShmId; - extern int *PRSATmpCnt; - - if (ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID && rsa_tmp != NULL && - ++(*PRSATmpCnt) < MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT) - return rsa_tmp; -# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */ - - if (rsa_tmp != NULL) - RSA_free(rsa_tmp); - rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(RSA_KEYLENGTH, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL); - if (rsa_tmp == NULL) - { - if (LogLevel > 0) - sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=server, tmp_rsa_key: RSA_generate_key failed!"); - } - else - { -# if SM_CONF_SHM -# if 0 - /* - ** XXX we can't (yet) share the new key... - ** The RSA structure contains pointers hence it can't be - ** easily kept in shared memory. It must be transformed - ** into a continous memory region first, then stored, - ** and later read out again (each time re-transformed). - */ - - if (ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID) - *PRSATmpCnt = 0; -# endif /* 0 */ -# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */ - if (LogLevel > 9) - sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=server, tmp_rsa_key: new temp RSA key"); - } - return rsa_tmp; -} -# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ -/* -** APPS_SSL_INFO_CB -- info callback for TLS connections -** -** Parameters: -** s -- TLS connection structure -** where -- state in handshake -** ret -- return code of last operation -** -** Returns: -** none. -*/ - -static void -apps_ssl_info_cb(s, where, ret) - CONST097 SSL *s; - int where; - int ret; -{ - int w; - char *str; - BIO *bio_err = NULL; - - if (LogLevel > 14) - sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: info_callback where=0x%x, ret=%d", - where, ret); - - w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK; - if (bio_err == NULL) - bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); - - if (bitset(SSL_ST_CONNECT, w)) - str = "SSL_connect"; - else if (bitset(SSL_ST_ACCEPT, w)) - str = "SSL_accept"; - else - str = "undefined"; - - if (bitset(SSL_CB_LOOP, where)) - { - if (LogLevel > 12) - sm_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: %s:%s", - str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); - } - else if (bitset(SSL_CB_ALERT, where)) - { - str = bitset(SSL_CB_READ, where) ? "read" : "write"; - if (LogLevel > 12) - sm_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s", - str, SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), - SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); - } - else if (bitset(SSL_CB_EXIT, where)) - { - if (ret == 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: %s:failed in %s", - str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); - } - else if (ret < 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 7) - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: %s:error in %s", - str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); - } - } -} -/* -** TLS_VERIFY_LOG -- log verify error for TLS certificates -** -** Parameters: -** ok -- verify ok? -** ctx -- x509 context -** -** Returns: -** 0 -- fatal error -** 1 -- ok -*/ - -static int -tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, name) - int ok; - X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; - char *name; -{ - SSL *ssl; - X509 *cert; - int reason, depth; - char buf[512]; - - cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); - reason = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); - depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); - ssl = (SSL *) X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, - SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); - - if (ssl == NULL) - { - /* internal error */ - sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: internal error: tls_verify_cb: ssl == NULL"); - return 0; - } - - X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); - sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, - "STARTTLS: %s cert verify: depth=%d %s, state=%d, reason=%s", - name, depth, buf, ok, X509_verify_cert_error_string(reason)); - return 1; -} - -/* -** TLS_VERIFY_CB -- verify callback for TLS certificates -** -** Parameters: -** ctx -- x509 context -** -** Returns: -** accept connection? -** currently: always yes. -*/ - -static int -# if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L -tls_verify_cb(ctx) - X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; -# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ -tls_verify_cb(ctx, unused) - X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; - void *unused; -# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ -{ - int ok; - - ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx); - if (ok == 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 13) - return tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, "TLS"); - return 1; /* override it */ - } - return ok; -} -/* -** TLSLOGERR -- log the errors from the TLS error stack -** -** Parameters: -** who -- server/client (for logging). -** -** Returns: -** none. -*/ - -void -tlslogerr(who) - const char *who; -{ - unsigned long l; - int line, flags; - unsigned long es; - char *file, *data; - char buf[256]; -# define CP (const char **) - - es = CRYPTO_thread_id(); - while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(CP &file, &line, CP &data, &flags)) - != 0) - { - sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, - "STARTTLS=%s: %lu:%s:%s:%d:%s", who, es, - ERR_error_string(l, buf), - file, line, - bitset(ERR_TXT_STRING, flags) ? data : ""); - } -} - -# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L -/* -** X509_VERIFY_CB -- verify callback -** -** Parameters: -** ctx -- x509 context -** -** Returns: -** accept connection? -** currently: always yes. -*/ - -static int -x509_verify_cb(ok, ctx) - int ok; - X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; -{ - if (ok == 0) - { - if (LogLevel > 13) - tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, "x509"); - if (ctx->error == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL) - { - ctx->error = 0; - return 1; /* override it */ - } - } - return ok; -} -# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ -#endif /* STARTTLS */ |
