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diff --git a/contrib/ntp/NEWS b/contrib/ntp/NEWS index fd2551c..6445ed4 100644 --- a/contrib/ntp/NEWS +++ b/contrib/ntp/NEWS @@ -1,4 +1,311 @@ --- +NTP 4.2.8p9 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/11/21) + +Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements. + +Severity: HIGH + +In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the +following 1 high- (Windows only), 2 medium-, 2 medium-/low, and +5 low-severity vulnerabilities, and provides 28 other non-security +fixes and improvements: + +* Trap crash + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3119 / CVE-2016-9311 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.0.90 (21 July 1999), possibly earlier, up to but not + including 4.2.8p9, and ntp-4.3.0 up to but not including ntp-4.3.94. + CVSS2: MED 4.9 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C) + CVSS3: MED 4.4 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H + Summary: + ntpd does not enable trap service by default. If trap service + has been explicitly enabled, an attacker can send a specially + crafted packet to cause a null pointer dereference that will + crash ntpd, resulting in a denial of service. + Mitigation: + Implement BCP-38. + Use "restrict default noquery ..." in your ntp.conf file. Only + allow mode 6 queries from trusted networks and hosts. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco. + +* Mode 6 information disclosure and DDoS vector + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3118 / CVE-2016-9310 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.0.90 (21 July 1999), possibly earlier, up to but not + including 4.2.8p9, and ntp-4.3.0 up to but not including ntp-4.3.94. + CVSS2: MED 6.4 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) + CVSS3: MED 6.5 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L + Summary: + An exploitable configuration modification vulnerability exists + in the control mode (mode 6) functionality of ntpd. If, against + long-standing BCP recommendations, "restrict default noquery ..." + is not specified, a specially crafted control mode packet can set + ntpd traps, providing information disclosure and DDoS + amplification, and unset ntpd traps, disabling legitimate + monitoring. A remote, unauthenticated, network attacker can + trigger this vulnerability. + Mitigation: + Implement BCP-38. + Use "restrict default noquery ..." in your ntp.conf file. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco. + +* Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3114 / CVE-2016-7427 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.2.8p6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and + ntp-4.3.90 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94. + CVSS2: LOW 3.3 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) + CVSS3: MED 4.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L + Summary: + The broadcast mode of NTP is expected to only be used in a + trusted network. If the broadcast network is accessible to an + attacker, a potentially exploitable denial of service + vulnerability in ntpd's broadcast mode replay prevention + functionality can be abused. An attacker with access to the NTP + broadcast domain can periodically inject specially crafted + broadcast mode NTP packets into the broadcast domain which, + while being logged by ntpd, can cause ntpd to reject broadcast + mode packets from legitimate NTP broadcast servers. + Mitigation: + Implement BCP-38. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco. + +* Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3113 / CVE-2016-7428 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.2.8p6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and + ntp-4.3.90 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94 + CVSS2: LOW 3.3 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) + CVSS3: MED 4.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L + Summary: + The broadcast mode of NTP is expected to only be used in a + trusted network. If the broadcast network is accessible to an + attacker, a potentially exploitable denial of service + vulnerability in ntpd's broadcast mode poll interval enforcement + functionality can be abused. To limit abuse, ntpd restricts the + rate at which each broadcast association will process incoming + packets. ntpd will reject broadcast mode packets that arrive + before the poll interval specified in the preceding broadcast + packet expires. An attacker with access to the NTP broadcast + domain can send specially crafted broadcast mode NTP packets to + the broadcast domain which, while being logged by ntpd, will + cause ntpd to reject broadcast mode packets from legitimate NTP + broadcast servers. + Mitigation: + Implement BCP-38. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco. + +* Windows: ntpd DoS by oversized UDP packet + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3110 / CVE-2016-9312 / VU#633847 + Affects Windows only: ntp-4.?.?, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, + and ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94. + CVSS2: HIGH 7.8 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C) + CVSS3: HIGH 7.5 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H + Summary: + If a vulnerable instance of ntpd on Windows receives a crafted + malicious packet that is "too big", ntpd will stop working. + Mitigation: + Implement BCP-38. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Robert Pajak of ABB. + +* 0rigin (zero origin) issues + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3102 / CVE-2016-7431 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.2.8p8, and ntp-4.3.93. + CVSS2: MED 5.0 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N) + CVSS3: MED 5.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N + Summary: + Zero Origin timestamp problems were fixed by Bug 2945 in + ntp-4.2.8p6. However, subsequent timestamp validation checks + introduced a regression in the handling of some Zero origin + timestamp checks. + Mitigation: + Implement BCP-38. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal + Malhotra of Boston University. + +* read_mru_list() does inadequate incoming packet checks + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3082 / CVE-2016-7434 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.2.7p22, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and + ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94. + CVSS2: LOW 3.8 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C) + CVSS3: LOW 3.8 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H + Summary: + If ntpd is configured to allow mrulist query requests from a + server that sends a crafted malicious packet, ntpd will crash + on receipt of that crafted malicious mrulist query packet. + Mitigation: + Only allow mrulist query packets from trusted hosts. + Implement BCP-38. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Magnus Stubman. + +* Attack on interface selection + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3072 / CVE-2016-7429 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.2.7p385, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and + ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94 + CVSS2: LOW 1.0 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P) + CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L + Summary: + When ntpd receives a server response on a socket that corresponds + to a different interface than was used for the request, the peer + structure is updated to use the interface for new requests. If + ntpd is running on a host with multiple interfaces in separate + networks and the operating system doesn't check source address in + received packets (e.g. rp_filter on Linux is set to 0), an + attacker that knows the address of the source can send a packet + with spoofed source address which will cause ntpd to select wrong + interface for the source and prevent it from sending new requests + until the list of interfaces is refreshed, which happens on + routing changes or every 5 minutes by default. If the attack is + repeated often enough (once per second), ntpd will not be able to + synchronize with the source. + Mitigation: + Implement BCP-38. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + If you are going to configure your OS to disable source address + checks, also configure your firewall configuration to control + what interfaces can receive packets from what networks. + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat. + +* Client rate limiting and server responses + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3071 / CVE-2016-7426 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.2.5p203, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and + ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94 + CVSS2: LOW 1.0 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P) + CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L + Summary: + When ntpd is configured with rate limiting for all associations + (restrict default limited in ntp.conf), the limits are applied + also to responses received from its configured sources. An + attacker who knows the sources (e.g., from an IPv4 refid in + server response) and knows the system is (mis)configured in this + way can periodically send packets with spoofed source address to + keep the rate limiting activated and prevent ntpd from accepting + valid responses from its sources. + + While this blanket rate limiting can be useful to prevent + brute-force attacks on the origin timestamp, it allows this DoS + attack. Similarly, it allows the attacker to prevent mobilization + of ephemeral associations. + Mitigation: + Implement BCP-38. + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat. + +* Fix for bug 2085 broke initial sync calculations + Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016 + References: Sec 3067 / CVE-2016-7433 / VU#633847 + Affects: ntp-4.2.7p385, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and + ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94. But the + root-distance calculation in general is incorrect in all versions + of ntp-4 until this release. + CVSS2: LOW 1.2 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) + CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L + Summary: + Bug 2085 described a condition where the root delay was included + twice, causing the jitter value to be higher than expected. Due + to a misinterpretation of a small-print variable in The Book, the + fix for this problem was incorrect, resulting in a root distance + that did not include the peer dispersion. The calculations and + formulae have been reviewed and reconciled, and the code has been + updated accordingly. + Mitigation: + Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page + or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page + Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd + (without -g) if it stops running. + Credit: This weakness was discovered independently by Brian Utterback of + Oracle, and Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal Malhotra of Boston University. + +Other fixes: + +* [Bug 3142] bug in netmask prefix length detection <perlinger@ntp.org> +* [Bug 3138] gpsdjson refclock should honor fudgetime1. stenn@ntp.org +* [Bug 3129] Unknown hosts can put resolver thread into a hard loop + - moved retry decision where it belongs. <perlinger@ntp.org> +* [Bug 3125] NTPD doesn't fully start when ntp.conf entries are out of order + using the loopback-ppsapi-provider.dll <perlinger@ntp.org> +* [Bug 3116] unit tests for NTP time stamp expansion. <perlinger@ntp.org> +* [Bug 3100] ntpq can't retrieve daemon_version <perlinger@ntp.org> + - fixed extended sysvar lookup (bug introduced with bug 3008 fix) +* [Bug 3095] Compatibility with openssl 1.1 <perlinger@ntp.org> + - applied patches by Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> to source + - added shim layer for SSL API calls with issues (both directions) +* [Bug 3089] Serial Parser does not work anymore for hopfser like device + - simplified / refactored hex-decoding in driver. <perlinger@ntp.org> +* [Bug 3084] update-leap mis-parses the leapfile name. HStenn. +* [Bug 3068] Linker warnings when building on Solaris. perlinger@ntp.org + - applied patch thanks to Andrew Stormont <andyjstormont@gmail.com> +* [Bug 3067] Root distance calculation needs improvement. HStenn +* [Bug 3066] NMEA clock ignores pps. perlinger@ntp.org + - PPS-HACK works again. +* [Bug 3059] Potential buffer overrun from oversized hash <perlinger@ntp.org> + - applied patch by Brian Utterback <brian.utterback@oracle.com> +* [Bug 3053] ntp_loopfilter.c frequency calc precedence error. Sarah White. +* [Bug 3050] Fix for bug #2960 causes [...] spurious error message. + <perlinger@ntp.org> + - patches by Reinhard Max <max@suse.com> and Havard Eidnes <he@uninett.no> +* [Bug 3047] Fix refclock_jjy C-DEX JST2000. abe@ntp.org + - Patch provided by Kuramatsu. +* [Bug 3021] unity_fixture.c needs pragma weak <perlinger@ntp.org> + - removed unnecessary & harmful decls of 'setUp()' & 'tearDown()' +* [Bug 3019] Windows: ERROR_HOST_UNREACHABLE block packet processing. DMayer +* [Bug 2998] sntp/tests/packetProcessing.c broken without openssl. JPerlinger +* [Bug 2961] sntp/tests/packetProcessing.c assumes AUTOKEY. HStenn. +* [Bug 2959] refclock_jupiter: gps week correction <perlinger@ntp.org> + - fixed GPS week expansion to work based on build date. Special thanks + to Craig Leres for initial patch and testing. +* [Bug 2951] ntpd tests fail: multiple definition of `send_via_ntp_signd' + - fixed Makefile.am <perlinger@ntp.org> +* [Bug 2689] ATOM driver processes last PPS pulse at startup, + even if it is very old <perlinger@ntp.org> + - make sure PPS source is alive before processing samples + - improve stability close to the 500ms phase jump (phase gate) +* Fix typos in include/ntp.h. +* Shim X509_get_signature_nid() if needed +* git author attribution cleanup +* bk ignore file cleanup +* remove locks in Windows IO, use rpc-like thread synchronisation instead + +--- NTP 4.2.8p8 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/06/02) Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements. |
