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diff --git a/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt b/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 423a119..0000000 --- a/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,951 +0,0 @@ - - -IPSECKEY WG M. Richardson -Internet-Draft SSW -|Expires: August 1, 2004 February 2004 - - - A Method for Storing IPsec Keying Material in DNS -| draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt - -Status of this Memo - - This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with - all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. - - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering - Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that - other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- - Drafts. - - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months - and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any - time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference - material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http:// - www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. - - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - -| This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2004. - -Copyright Notice - -| Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. - -Abstract - -| This document describes a new resource record for Domain Name System -| (DNS). This record may be used to store public keys for use in IP -| security (IPsec) systems. The record also includes provisions for -| indicating what system should be contacted when establishing an IPsec -| tunnel with the entity in question. - - This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY - Resource Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC3445. - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 1] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -Table of Contents - - 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 -| 1.2 Use of reverse (in-addr.arpa) map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 -| 1.3 Usage Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 -| 2. Storage formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -| 2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -| 2.2 RDATA format - precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -| 2.3 RDATA format - gateway type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -| 2.4 RDATA format - algorithm type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 -| 2.5 RDATA format - gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 -| 2.6 RDATA format - public keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 -| 3. Presentation formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 -| 3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 -| 3.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 -| 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 -| 4.1 Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records . . 10 -| 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 -| 6. Intellectual Property Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 -| 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 -| Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 -| Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 -| Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 -| Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 2] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -1. Introduction - - It postulated that there is an end system desiring to establish an - IPsec tunnel with some remote entity on the network. This system, - having only a DNS name of some kind (forward, reverse or even - user@FQDN) needs a public key to authenticate the remote entity. It - also desires some guidance about whether to contact the entity - directly, or whether to contact another entity, as the gateway to - that desired entity. - - The IPSECKEY RR provides a storage mechanism for such items as the - public key, and the gateway information. - - The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD. - -1.1 Overview - - The IPSECKEY resource record (RR) is used to publish a public key - that is to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name for use - with the IPsec protocol suite. This can be the public key of a - host, network, or application (in the case of per-port keying). - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [7]. - -|1.2 Use of reverse (in-addr.arpa) map - -| Often a security gateway will only have access to the IP address to -| which communication is desired. It will not know the forward name. -| As such, it will frequently be the case that the IP address will be -| used an index into the reverse map. - -| The lookup is done in the usual fashion as for PTR records. The IP -| address' octets (IPv4) or nibbles (IPv6) are reversed and looked up -| under the .arpa. zone. Any CNAMEs or DNAMEs found SHOULD be -| followed. - -| Note: even when the IPsec function is the end-host, often only the -| application will know the forward name used. While the case where -| the application knows the forward name is common, the user could -| easily have typed in a literal IP address. This storage mechanism -| does not preclude using the forward name when it is available, but -| does not require it. - -|1.3 Usage Criteria - - An IPSECKEY resource record SHOULD be used in combination with DNSSEC - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 3] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - - unless some other means of authenticating the IPSECKEY resource - record is available. - - It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource - records at the same name. This will be due to the presence of - multiple gateways and the need to rollover keys. - - This resource record is class independent. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 4] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -2. Storage formats - -2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format - - The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a - gateway type, a public key, algorithm type, and an optional gateway - address. - - 0 1 2 3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | precedence | gateway type | algorithm | gateway | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+ + - ~ gateway ~ - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | / - / public key / - / / - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-| - - -2.2 RDATA format - precedence - - This is an 8-bit precedence for this record. This is interpreted in - the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section 3.3.9 of - RFC1035 [2]. - - Gateways listed in IPSECKEY records with lower precedence are to be - attempted first. Where there is a tie in precedence, the order - should be non-deterministic. - -2.3 RDATA format - gateway type - - The gateway type field indicates the format of the information that - is stored in the gateway field. - - The following values are defined: - - 0 No gateway is present - - 1 A 4-byte IPv4 address is present - - 2 A 16-byte IPv6 address is present - - 3 A wire-encoded domain name is present. The wire-encoded format is - self-describing, so the length is implicit. The domain name MUST - NOT be compressed. (see section 3.3 of RFC1035 [2]). - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 5] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -2.4 RDATA format - algorithm type - - The algorithm type field identifies the public key's cryptographic - algorithm and determines the format of the public key field. - - A value of 0 indicates that no key is present. - - The following values are defined: - - 1 A DSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC2536 [10] - - 2 A RSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC3110 [11] - - -2.5 RDATA format - gateway - - The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be - created in order to reach the entity named by this resource record. - - There are three formats: - - A 32-bit IPv4 address is present in the gateway field. The data - portion is an IPv4 address as described in section 3.4.1 of RFC1035 - [2]. This is a 32-bit number in network byte order. - - A 128-bit IPv6 address is present in the gateway field. The data - portion is an IPv6 address as described in section 2.2 of RFC3596 - [13]. This is a 128-bit number in network byte order. - - The gateway field is a normal wire-encoded domain name, as described - in section 3.3 of RFC1035 [2]. Compression MUST NOT be used. - -2.6 RDATA format - public keys - - Both of the public key types defined in this document (RSA and DSA) - inherit their public key formats from the corresponding KEY RR - formats. Specifically, the public key field contains the algorithm- - specific portion of the KEY RR RDATA, which is all of the KEY RR DATA - after the first four octets. This is the same portion of the KEY RR - that must be specified by documents that define a DNSSEC algorithm. - Those documents also specify a message digest to be used for - generation of SIG RRs; that specification is not relevant for - IPSECKEY RR. - - Future algorithms, if they are to be used by both DNSSEC (in the KEY - RR) and IPSECKEY, are likely to use the same public key encodings in - both records. Unless otherwise specified, the IPSECKEY public key - field will contain the algorithm-specific portion of the KEY RR RDATA - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 6] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - - for the corresponding algorithm. The algorithm must still be - designated for use by IPSECKEY, and an IPSECKEY algorithm type number - (which might be different than the DNSSEC algorithm number) must be - assigned to it. - - The DSA key format is defined in RFC2536 [10] - - The RSA key format is defined in RFC3110 [11], with the following - changes: - - The earlier definition of RSA/MD5 in RFC2065 limited the exponent and - modulus to 2552 bits in length. RFC3110 extended that limit to 4096 - bits for RSA/SHA1 keys. The IPSECKEY RR imposes no length limit on - RSA public keys, other than the 65535 octet limit imposed by the two- - octet length encoding. This length extension is applicable only to - IPSECKEY and not to KEY RRs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 7] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -3. Presentation formats - -3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs - - IPSECKEY RRs may appear in a zone data master file. The precedence, - gateway type and algorithm and gateway fields are REQUIRED. The - base64 encoded public key block is OPTIONAL; if not present, then the - public key field of the resource record MUST be construed as being - zero octets in length. - - The algorithm field is an unsigned integer. No mnemonics are - defined. - - If no gateway is to be indicated, then the gateway type field MUST be - zero, and the gateway field MUST be "." - - The Public Key field is represented as a Base64 encoding of the - Public Key. Whitespace is allowed within the Base64 text. For a - definition of Base64 encoding, see RFC3548 [6] Section 5.2. - - The general presentation for the record as as follows: - - IN IPSECKEY ( precedence gateway-type algorithm - gateway base64-encoded-public-key ) - - -3.2 Examples - - An example of a node 192.0.2.38 that will accept IPsec tunnels on its - own behalf. - - 38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2 - 192.0.2.38 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) - - An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has published its key only. - - 38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 0 2 - . - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) - - An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has delegated authority to the - node 192.0.2.3. - - 38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2 - 192.0.2.3 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 8] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - - An example of a node, 192.0.1.38 that has delegated authority to the - node with the identity "mygateway.example.com". - - 38.1.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 3 2 - mygateway.example.com. - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) - - An example of a node, 2001:0DB8:0200:1:210:f3ff:fe03:4d0 that has - delegated authority to the node 2001:0DB8:c000:0200:2::1 - - $ORIGIN 1.0.0.0.0.0.2.8.B.D.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. - 0.d.4.0.3.0.e.f.f.f.3.f.0.1.2.0 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 2 2 - 2001:0DB8:0:8002::2000:1 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 9] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -4. Security Considerations - - This entire memo pertains to the provision of public keying material - for use by key management protocols such as ISAKMP/IKE (RFC2407) [8]. - - The IPSECKEY resource record contains information that SHOULD be - communicated to the end client in an integral fashion - i.e. free - from modification. The form of this channel is up to the consumer of - the data - there must be a trust relationship between the end - consumer of this resource record and the server. This relationship - may be end-to-end DNSSEC validation, a TSIG or SIG(0) channel to - another secure source, a secure local channel on the host, or some - combination of the above. - - The keying material provided by the IPSECKEY resource record is not - sensitive to passive attacks. The keying material may be freely - disclosed to any party without any impact on the security properties - of the resulting IPsec session: IPsec and IKE provide for defense - against both active and passive attacks. - - Any derivative standard that makes use of this resource record MUST - carefully document their trust model, and why the trust model of - DNSSEC is appropriate, if that is the secure channel used. - -4.1 Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records - - This section deals with active attacks against the DNS. These - attacks require that DNS requests and responses be intercepted and - changed. DNSSEC is designed to defend against attacks of this kind. - - The first kind of active attack is when the attacker replaces the - keying material with either a key under its control or with garbage. - - If the attacker is not able to mount a subsequent man-in-the-middle - attack on the IKE negotiation after replacing the public key, then - this will result in a denial of service, as the authenticator used by - IKE would fail. - - If the attacker is able to both to mount active attacks against DNS - and is also in a position to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on - IKE and IPsec negotiations, then the attacker will be in a position - to compromise the resulting IPsec channel. Note that an attacker - must be able to perform active DNS attacks on both sides of the IKE - negotiation in order for this to succeed. - - The second kind of active attack is one in which the attacker - replaces the the gateway address to point to a node under the - attacker's control. The attacker can then either replace the public - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 10] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - - key or remove it, thus providing an IPSECKEY record of its own to - match the gateway address. - - This later form creates a simple man-in-the-middle since the attacker - can then create a second tunnel to the real destination. Note that, - as before, this requires that the attacker also mount an active - attack against the responder. - - Note that the man-in-the-middle can not just forward cleartext - packets to the original destination. While the destination may be - willing to speak in the clear, replying to the original sender, the - sender will have already created a policy expecting ciphertext. - Thus, the attacker will need to intercept traffic from both sides. - In some cases, the attacker may be able to accomplish the full - intercept by use of Network Addresss/Port Translation (NAT/NAPT) - technology. - -| Note that risk of a man-in-the-middle attack mediated by the IPSECKEY -| RR only applies to cases where the gateway field of the IPSECKEY RR -| indicates a different entity than the owner name of the IPSECKEY RR. - -| An active attack on the DNS that caused the wrong IP address to be -| retrieved (via forged A RR), and therefore the wrong QNAME to be -| queried would also result in a man-in-the-middle attack. This -| situation exists independantly of whether or not the IPSECKEY RR is -| used. - -| In cases where the end-to-end integrity of the IPSECKEY RR is -| suspect, the end client MUST restrict its use of the IPSECKEY RR to -| cases where the RR owner name matches the content of the gateway -| field. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 11] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -5. IANA Considerations - - This document updates the IANA Registry for DNS Resource Record Types - by assigning type X to the IPSECKEY record. - - This document creates two new IANA registries, both specific to the - IPSECKEY Resource Record: - - This document creates an IANA registry for the algorithm type field. - - Values 0, 1 and 2 are defined in Section 2.4. Algorithm numbers 3 - through 255 can be assigned by IETF Consensus (see RFC2434 [5]). - - This document creates an IANA registry for the gateway type field. - - Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 are defined in Section 2.3. Gateway type - numbers 4 through 255 can be assigned by Standards Action (see - RFC2434 [5]). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 12] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -6. Intellectual Property Claims - - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any - intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to - pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in - this document or the extent to which any license under such rights - might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it - has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the - IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and - standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of - claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of - licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to - obtain a general license or permission for the use of such - proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can - be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. - - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any - copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary - rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice - this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive - Director. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 13] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -7. Acknowledgments - - My thanks to Paul Hoffman, Sam Weiler, Jean-Jacques Puig, Rob - Austein, and Olafur Gurmundsson who reviewed this document carefully. - Additional thanks to Olafur Gurmundsson for a reference - implementation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 14] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -Normative references - - [1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD - 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. - - [2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and - specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. - - [3] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP - 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. - - [4] Eastlake, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System Security - Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997. - - [5] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA - Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998. - - [6] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", - RFC 3548, July 2003. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 15] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -Non-normative references - - [7] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement - Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - - [8] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation - for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998. - - [9] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC - 2535, March 1999. - - [10] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System - (DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999. - - [11] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name - System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001. - - [12] Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource - Record (RR)", RFC 3445, December 2002. - - [13] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V. and M. Souissi, "DNS - Extensions to Support IP Version 6", RFC 3596, October 2003. - - -Author's Address - - Michael C. Richardson - Sandelman Software Works - 470 Dawson Avenue - Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7 - CA - - EMail: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca - URI: http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 16] - -|Internet-Draft Storing IPsec keying material in DNS February 2004 - - -Full Copyright Statement - -| Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. - - This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to - others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it - or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published - and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any - kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are - included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this - document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing - the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other - Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of - developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for - copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be - followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than - English. - - The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be - revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. - - This document and the information contained herein is provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING - TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING - BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION - HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - -Acknowledgement - - Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the - Internet Society. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 17] |
