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diff --git a/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-04.txt b/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-04.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 2ec9dbe..0000000 --- a/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-04.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,840 +0,0 @@ - - - -Network Working Group S. Josefsson -Internet-Draft August 30, 2005 -Expires: March 3, 2006 - - - Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS) - draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-04 - -Status of this Memo - - By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any - applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware - have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes - aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. - - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering - Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that - other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- - Drafts. - - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months - and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any - time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference - material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. - - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - - This Internet-Draft will expire on March 3, 2006. - -Copyright Notice - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). - -Abstract - - Cryptographic public keys are frequently published and their - authenticity demonstrated by certificates. A CERT resource record - (RR) is defined so that such certificates and related certificate - revocation lists can be stored in the Domain Name System (DNS). - - This document obsoletes RFC 2538. - - - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 1] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - -Table of Contents - - 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2. The CERT Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2.1. Certificate Type Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 2.2. Text Representation of CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2.3. X.509 OIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 3. Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 3.1. Content-based X.509 CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 3.2. Purpose-based X.509 CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 3.3. Content-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 3.4. Purpose-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 3.5. Owner names for IPKIX, ISPKI, and IPGP . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 4. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 9. Changes since RFC 2538 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - Appendix A. Copying conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 2] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - -1. Introduction - - Public keys are frequently published in the form of a certificate and - their authenticity is commonly demonstrated by certificates and - related certificate revocation lists (CRLs). A certificate is a - binding, through a cryptographic digital signature, of a public key, - a validity interval and/or conditions, and identity, authorization, - or other information. A certificate revocation list is a list of - certificates that are revoked, and incidental information, all signed - by the signer (issuer) of the revoked certificates. Examples are - X.509 certificates/CRLs in the X.500 directory system or OpenPGP - certificates/revocations used by OpenPGP software. - - Section 2 below specifies a CERT resource record (RR) for the storage - of certificates in the Domain Name System [1] [2]. - - Section 3 discusses appropriate owner names for CERT RRs. - - Sections 4, 5, and 6 below cover performance, IANA, and security - considerations, respectively. - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in [3]. - - -2. The CERT Resource Record - - The CERT resource record (RR) has the structure given below. Its RR - type code is 37. - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | type | key tag | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | algorithm | / - +---------------+ certificate or CRL / - / / - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-| - - The type field is the certificate type as defined in section 2.1 - below. - - The key tag field is the 16 bit value computed for the key embedded - in the certificate, using the RRSIG Key Tag algorithm described in - Appendix B of [10]. This field is used as an efficiency measure to - pick which CERT RRs may be applicable to a particular key. The key - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 3] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - - tag can be calculated for the key in question and then only CERT RRs - with the same key tag need be examined. However, the key must always - be transformed to the format it would have as the public key portion - of a DNSKEY RR before the key tag is computed. This is only possible - if the key is applicable to an algorithm (and limits such as key size - limits) defined for DNS security. If it is not, the algorithm field - MUST BE zero and the tag field is meaningless and SHOULD BE zero. - - The algorithm field has the same meaning as the algorithm field in - DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs [10], except that a zero algorithm field - indicates the algorithm is unknown to a secure DNS, which may simply - be the result of the algorithm not having been standardized for - DNSSEC. - -2.1. Certificate Type Values - - The following values are defined or reserved: - - Value Mnemonic Certificate Type - ----- -------- ---------------- - 0 reserved - 1 PKIX X.509 as per PKIX - 2 SPKI SPKI certificate - 3 PGP OpenPGP packet - 4 IPKIX The URL of an X.509 data object - 5 ISPKI The URL of an SPKI certificate - 6 IPGP The URL of an OpenPGP packet - 7-252 available for IANA assignment - 253 URI URI private - 254 OID OID private - 255-65534 available for IANA assignment - 65535 reserved - - The PKIX type is reserved to indicate an X.509 certificate conforming - to the profile being defined by the IETF PKIX working group. The - certificate section will start with a one-byte unsigned OID length - and then an X.500 OID indicating the nature of the remainder of the - certificate section (see 2.3 below). (NOTE: X.509 certificates do - not include their X.500 directory type designating OID as a prefix.) - - The SPKI type is reserved to indicate the SPKI certificate format - [13], for use when the SPKI documents are moved from experimental - status. - - The PGP type indicates an OpenPGP packet as described in [6] and its - extensions and successors. Two uses are to transfer public key - material and revocation signatures. The data is binary, and MUST NOT - be encoded into an ASCII armor. An implementation SHOULD process - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 4] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - - transferable public keys as described in section 10.1 of [6], but it - MAY handle additional OpenPGP packets. - - The IPKIX, ISPKI and IPGP types indicate a URL which will serve the - content that would have been in the "certificate, CRL or URL" field - of the corresponding (PKIX, SPKI or PGP) packet types. These types - are known as "indirect". These packet types MUST be used when the - content is too large to fit in the CERT RR, and MAY be used at the - implementer's discretion. They SHOULD NOT be used where the entire - UDP packet would have fit in 512 bytes. - - The URI private type indicates a certificate format defined by an - absolute URI. The certificate portion of the CERT RR MUST begin with - a null terminated URI [5] and the data after the null is the private - format certificate itself. The URI SHOULD be such that a retrieval - from it will lead to documentation on the format of the certificate. - Recognition of private certificate types need not be based on URI - equality but can use various forms of pattern matching so that, for - example, subtype or version information can also be encoded into the - URI. - - The OID private type indicates a private format certificate specified - by an ISO OID prefix. The certificate section will start with a one- - byte unsigned OID length and then a BER encoded OID indicating the - nature of the remainder of the certificate section. This can be an - X.509 certificate format or some other format. X.509 certificates - that conform to the IETF PKIX profile SHOULD be indicated by the PKIX - type, not the OID private type. Recognition of private certificate - types need not be based on OID equality but can use various forms of - pattern matching such as OID prefix. - -2.2. Text Representation of CERT RRs - - The RDATA portion of a CERT RR has the type field as an unsigned - decimal integer or as a mnemonic symbol as listed in section 2.1 - above. - - The key tag field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer. - - The algorithm field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer or - a mnemonic symbol as listed in [10]. - - The certificate / CRL portion is represented in base 64 [14] and may - be divided up into any number of white space separated substrings, - down to single base 64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the - full signature. These substrings can span lines using the standard - parenthesis. - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 5] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - - Note that the certificate / CRL portion may have internal sub-fields, - but these do not appear in the master file representation. For - example, with type 254, there will be an OID size, an OID, and then - the certificate / CRL proper. But only a single logical base 64 - string will appear in the text representation. - -2.3. X.509 OIDs - - OIDs have been defined in connection with the X.500 directory for - user certificates, certification authority certificates, revocations - of certification authority, and revocations of user certificates. - The following table lists the OIDs, their BER encoding, and their - length-prefixed hex format for use in CERT RRs: - - id-at-userCertificate - = { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) at(4) 36 } - == 0x 03 55 04 24 - id-at-cACertificate - = { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) at(4) 37 } - == 0x 03 55 04 25 - id-at-authorityRevocationList - = { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) at(4) 38 } - == 0x 03 55 04 26 - id-at-certificateRevocationList - = { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) at(4) 39 } - == 0x 03 55 04 27 - - -3. Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs - - It is recommended that certificate CERT RRs be stored under a domain - name related to their subject, i.e., the name of the entity intended - to control the private key corresponding to the public key being - certified. It is recommended that certificate revocation list CERT - RRs be stored under a domain name related to their issuer. - - Following some of the guidelines below may result in the use in DNS - names of characters that require DNS quoting which is to use a - backslash followed by the octal representation of the ASCII code for - the character (e.g., \000 for NULL). - - The choice of name under which CERT RRs are stored is important to - clients that perform CERT queries. In some situations, the clients - may not know all information about the CERT RR object it wishes to - retrieve. For example, a client may not know the subject name of an - X.509 certificate, or the e-mail address of the owner of an OpenPGP - key. Further, the client might only know the hostname of a service - that uses X.509 certificates or the Key ID of an OpenPGP key. - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 6] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - - Therefore, two owner name guidelines are defined: content-based owner - names and purpose-based owner names. A content-based owner name is - derived from the content of the CERT RR data; for example, the - Subject field in an X.509 certificate or the User ID field in OpenPGP - keys. A purpose-based owner name is a name that a client retrieving - CERT RRs MUST already know; for example, the host name of an X.509 - protected service or the Key ID of an OpenPGP key. The content-based - and purpose-based owner name MAY be the same; for example, when a - client looks up a key based on the From: address of an incoming - e-mail. - - Implementations SHOULD use the purpose-based owner name guidelines - described in this document, and MAY use CNAMEs of content-based owner - names (or other names), pointing to the purpose-based owner name. - -3.1. Content-based X.509 CERT RR Names - - Some X.509 versions permit multiple names to be associated with - subjects and issuers under "Subject Alternate Name" and "Issuer - Alternate Name". For example, X.509v3 has such Alternate Names with - an ASN.1 specification as follows: - - GeneralName ::= CHOICE { - otherName [0] INSTANCE OF OTHER-NAME, - rfc822Name [1] IA5String, - dNSName [2] IA5String, - x400Address [3] EXPLICIT OR-ADDRESS.&Type, - directoryName [4] EXPLICIT Name, - ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, - uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, - iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, - registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER - } - - The recommended locations of CERT storage are as follows, in priority - order: - 1. If a domain name is included in the identification in the - certificate or CRL, that should be used. - 2. If a domain name is not included but an IP address is included, - then the translation of that IP address into the appropriate - inverse domain name should be used. - 3. If neither of the above is used, but a URI containing a domain - name is present, that domain name should be used. - 4. If none of the above is included but a character string name is - included, then it should be treated as described for OpenPGP - names below. - - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 7] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - - 5. If none of the above apply, then the distinguished name (DN) - should be mapped into a domain name as specified in [4]. - - Example 1: An X.509v3 certificate is issued to /CN=John Doe /DC=Doe/ - DC=com/DC=xy/O=Doe Inc/C=XY/ with Subject Alternative Names of (a) - string "John (the Man) Doe", (b) domain name john-doe.com, and (c) - uri <https://www.secure.john-doe.com:8080/>. The storage locations - recommended, in priority order, would be - 1. john-doe.com, - 2. www.secure.john-doe.com, and - 3. Doe.com.xy. - - Example 2: An X.509v3 certificate is issued to /CN=James Hacker/ - L=Basingstoke/O=Widget Inc/C=GB/ with Subject Alternate names of (a) - domain name widget.foo.example, (b) IPv4 address 10.251.13.201, and - (c) string "James Hacker <hacker@mail.widget.foo.example>". The - storage locations recommended, in priority order, would be - 1. widget.foo.example, - 2. 201.13.251.10.in-addr.arpa, and - 3. hacker.mail.widget.foo.example. - -3.2. Purpose-based X.509 CERT RR Names - - Due to the difficulty for clients that do not already possess a - certificate to reconstruct the content-based owner name, purpose- - based owner names are recommended in this section. Recommendations - for purpose-based owner names vary per scenario. The following table - summarizes the purpose-based X.509 CERT RR owner name guidelines for - use with S/MIME [16], SSL/TLS [11], and IPSEC [12]: - - Scenario Owner name - ------------------ ---------------------------------------------- - S/MIME Certificate Standard translation of an RFC 2822 email - address. Example: An S/MIME certificate for - "postmaster@example.org" will use a standard - hostname translation of the owner name, - "postmaster.example.org". - - TLS Certificate Hostname of the TLS server. - - IPSEC Certificate Hostname of the IPSEC machine and/or, for IPv4 - or IPv6 addresses, the fully qualified domain - name in the appropriate reverse domain. - - An alternate approach for IPSEC is to store raw public keys [15]. - - - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 8] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - -3.3. Content-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names - - OpenPGP signed keys (certificates) use a general character string - User ID [6]. However, it is recommended by OpenPGP that such names - include the RFC 2822 [8] email address of the party, as in "Leslie - Example <Leslie@host.example>". If such a format is used, the CERT - should be under the standard translation of the email address into a - domain name, which would be leslie.host.example in this case. If no - RFC 2822 name can be extracted from the string name, no specific - domain name is recommended. - - If a user has more than one email address, the CNAME type can be used - to reduce the amount of data stored in the DNS. Example: - - $ORIGIN example.org. - smith IN CERT PGP 0 0 <OpenPGP binary> - john.smith IN CNAME smith - js IN CNAME smith - -3.4. Purpose-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names - - Applications that receive an OpenPGP packet containing encrypted or - signed data but do not know the email address of the sender will have - difficulties constructing the correct owner name and cannot use the - content-based owner name guidelines. However, these clients commonly - know the key fingerprint or the Key ID. The key ID is found in - OpenPGP packets, and the key fingerprint is commonly found in - auxilliary data that may be available. In this case, use of an owner - name identical to the key fingerprint and the key ID expressed in - hexadecimal [14] is recommended. Example: - - $ORIGIN example.org. - 0424D4EE81A0E3D119C6F835EDA21E94B565716F IN CERT PGP ... - F835EDA21E94B565716F IN CERT PGP ... - B565716F IN CERT PGP ... - - If the same key material is stored for several owner names, the use - of CNAME may be used to avoid data duplication. Note that CNAME is - not always applicable, because it maps one owner name to the other - for all purposes, which may be sub-optimal when two keys with the - same Key ID are stored. - -3.5. Owner names for IPKIX, ISPKI, and IPGP - - These types are stored under the same owner names, both purpose- and - content-based, as the PKIX, SPKI and PGP types. - - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 9] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - -4. Performance Considerations - - Current Domain Name System (DNS) implementations are optimized for - small transfers, typically not more than 512 bytes including - overhead. While larger transfers will perform correctly and work is - underway to make larger transfers more efficient, it is still - advisable at this time to make every reasonable effort to minimize - the size of certificates stored within the DNS. Steps that can be - taken may include using the fewest possible optional or extension - fields and using short field values for necessary variable length - fields. - - The RDATA field in the DNS protocol may only hold data of size 65535 - octets (64kb) or less. This means that each CERT RR MUST NOT contain - more than 64kb of payload, even if the corresponding certificate or - certificate revocation list is larger. This document addresses this - by defining "indirect" data types for each normal type. - - -5. Contributors - - The majority of this document is copied verbatim from RFC 2538, by - Donald Eastlake 3rd and Olafur Gudmundsson. - - -6. Acknowledgements - - Thanks to David Shaw and Michael Graff for their contributions to - earlier works that motivated, and served as inspiration for, this - document. - - This document was improved by suggestions and comments from Olivier - Dubuisson, Olaf M. Kolkman, Ben Laurie, Edward Lewis, Jason - Sloderbeck, Samuel Weiler, and Florian Weimer. No doubt the list is - incomplete. We apologize to anyone we left out. - - -7. Security Considerations - - By definition, certificates contain their own authenticating - signature. Thus, it is reasonable to store certificates in non- - secure DNS zones or to retrieve certificates from DNS with DNS - security checking not implemented or deferred for efficiency. The - results MAY be trusted if the certificate chain is verified back to a - known trusted key and this conforms with the user's security policy. - - Alternatively, if certificates are retrieved from a secure DNS zone - with DNS security checking enabled and are verified by DNS security, - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 10] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - - the key within the retrieved certificate MAY be trusted without - verifying the certificate chain if this conforms with the user's - security policy. - - If an organization chooses to issue certificates for it's employees, - placing CERT RR's in the DNS by owner name, and if DNSSEC (with NSEC) - is in use, it is possible for someone to enumerate all employees of - the organization. This is usually not considered desirable, for the - same reason enterprise phone listings are not often publicly - published and are even mark confidential. - - When the URI type is used, it should be understood that it introduces - an additional indirection that may allow for a new attack vector. - One method to secure that indirection is to include a hash of the - certificate in the URI itself. - - CERT RRs are not used by DNSSEC [9], so there are no security - considerations related to CERT RRs and securing the DNS itself. - - If DNSSEC is used, then the non-existence of a CERT RR and, - consequently, certificates or revocation lists can be securely - asserted. Without DNSSEC, this is not possible. - - -8. IANA Considerations - - Certificate types 0x0000 through 0x00FF and 0xFF00 through 0xFFFF can - only be assigned by an IETF standards action [7]. This document - assigns 0x0001 through 0x0006 and 0x00FD and 0x00FE. Certificate - types 0x0100 through 0xFEFF are assigned through IETF Consensus [7] - based on RFC documentation of the certificate type. The availability - of private types under 0x00FD and 0x00FE should satisfy most - requirements for proprietary or private types. - - The CERT RR reuses the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry. In - particular, the CERT RR requires that algorithm number 0 remain - reserved, as described in Section 2. The IANA is directed to - reference the CERT RR as a user of this registry and value 0, in - particular. - - -9. Changes since RFC 2538 - - 1. Editorial changes to conform with new document requirements, - including splitting reference section into two parts and - updating the references to point at latest versions, and to add - some additional references. - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 11] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - - 2. Improve terminology. For example replace "PGP" with "OpenPGP", - to align with RFC 2440. - 3. In section 2.1, clarify that OpenPGP public key data are binary, - not the ASCII armored format, and reference 10.1 in RFC 2440 on - how to deal with OpenPGP keys, and acknowledge that - implementations may handle additional packet types. - 4. Clarify that integers in the representation format are decimal. - 5. Replace KEY/SIG with DNSKEY/RRSIG etc, to align with DNSSECbis - terminology. Improve reference for Key Tag Algorithm - calculations. - 6. Add examples that suggest use of CNAME to reduce bandwidth. - 7. In section 3, appended the last paragraphs that discuss - "content-based" vs "purpose-based" owner names. Add section 3.2 - for purpose-based X.509 CERT owner names, and section 3.4 for - purpose-based OpenPGP CERT owner names. - 8. Added size considerations. - 9. The SPKI types has been reserved, until RFC 2692/2693 is moved - from the experimental status. - 10. Added indirect types IPKIX, ISPKI, and IPGP. - - -Appendix A. Copying conditions - - Regarding the portion of this document that was written by Simon - Josefsson ("the author", for the remainder of this section), the - author makes no guarantees and is not responsible for any damage - resulting from its use. The author grants irrevocable permission to - anyone to use, modify, and distribute it in any way that does not - diminish the rights of anyone else to use, modify, and distribute it, - provided that redistributed derivative works do not contain - misleading author or version information. Derivative works need not - be licensed under similar terms. - - -10. References - -10.1. Normative References - - [1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", - STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. - - [2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and - specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. - - [3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement - Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - - [4] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R., and S. Sataluri, - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 12] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - - "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", RFC 2247, - January 1998. - - [5] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform - Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396, - August 1998. - - [6] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., and R. Thayer, - "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998. - - [7] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA - Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, - October 1998. - - [8] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001. - - [9] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, - March 2005. - - [10] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, - March 2005. - -10.2. Informative References - - [11] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", - RFC 2246, January 1999. - - [12] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the - Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. - - [13] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, B., - and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693, - September 1999. - - [14] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", - RFC 3548, July 2003. - - [15] Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying Material in - DNS", RFC 4025, March 2005. - - [16] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions - (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851, - July 2004. - - - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 13] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - -Author's Address - - Simon Josefsson - - Email: simon@josefsson.org - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 14] - -Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 - - -Intellectual Property Statement - - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any - Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to - pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in - this document or the extent to which any license under such rights - might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has - made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information - on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be - found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. - - Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any - assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an - attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of - such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this - specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at - http://www.ietf.org/ipr. - - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any - copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary - rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement - this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at - ietf-ipr@ietf.org. - - -Disclaimer of Validity - - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS - OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET - ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, - INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE - INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED - WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - - -Copyright Statement - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject - to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and - except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. - - -Acknowledgment - - Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the - Internet Society. - - - - -Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 15] - |
