diff options
-rw-r--r-- | sys/security/audit/audit.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sys/security/audit/audit_private.h | 2 |
4 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit.h b/sys/security/audit/audit.h index f66f33a..dfcd193 100644 --- a/sys/security/audit/audit.h +++ b/sys/security/audit/audit.h @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ void audit_arg_auditon(union auditon_udata *udata); void audit_arg_file(struct proc *p, struct file *fp); void audit_arg_argv(char *argv, int argc, int length); void audit_arg_envv(char *envv, int envc, int length); +void audit_arg_rights(cap_rights_t rights); void audit_sysclose(struct thread *td, int fd); void audit_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest); void audit_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred); @@ -235,6 +236,11 @@ void audit_thread_free(struct thread *td); audit_arg_rgid((rgid)); \ } while (0) +#define AUDIT_ARG_RIGHTS(rights) do { \ + if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \ + audit_arg_rights((rights)); \ +} while (0) + #define AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid) do { \ if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \ audit_arg_ruid((ruid)); \ @@ -342,6 +348,7 @@ void audit_thread_free(struct thread *td); #define AUDIT_ARG_PID(pid) #define AUDIT_ARG_PROCESS(p) #define AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid) +#define AUDIT_ARG_RIGHTS(rights) #define AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid) #define AUDIT_ARG_SIGNUM(signum) #define AUDIT_ARG_SGID(sgid) diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c index 562b799..4e155da 100644 --- a/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c +++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c @@ -865,6 +865,19 @@ audit_arg_envv(char *envv, int envc, int length) ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ENVV); } +void +audit_arg_rights(cap_rights_t rights) +{ + struct kaudit_record *ar; + + ar = currecord(); + if (ar == NULL) + return; + + ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rights = rights; + ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RIGHTS); +} + /* * The close() system call uses it's own audit call to capture the path/vnode * information because those pieces are not easily obtained within the system diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c index b4713cc..a8fcd8f 100644 --- a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c +++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c @@ -1589,6 +1589,28 @@ kaudit_to_bsm(struct kaudit_record *kar, struct au_record **pau) } break; + case AUE_CAP_NEW: + /* + * XXXRW/XXXJA: Would be nice to audit socket/etc information. + */ + FD_VNODE1_TOKENS; + if (ARG_IS_VALID(kar, ARG_RIGHTS)) { + tok = au_to_arg64(2, "rights", ar->ar_arg_rights); + kau_write(rec, tok); + } + break; + + case AUE_CAP_GETRIGHTS: + if (ARG_IS_VALID(kar, ARG_FD)) { + tok = au_to_arg32(1, "fd", ar->ar_arg_fd); + kau_write(rec, tok); + } + break; + + case AUE_CAP_ENTER: + case AUE_CAP_GETMODE: + break; + case AUE_NULL: default: printf("BSM conversion requested for unknown event %d\n", diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h b/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h index b2f2bad..92a0729 100644 --- a/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h +++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h @@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ struct audit_record { int ar_arg_exitstatus; int ar_arg_exitretval; struct sockaddr_storage ar_arg_sockaddr; + cap_rights_t ar_arg_rights; }; /* @@ -288,6 +289,7 @@ struct audit_record { #define ARG_ENVV 0x0002000000000000ULL #define ARG_ATFD1 0x0004000000000000ULL #define ARG_ATFD2 0x0008000000000000ULL +#define ARG_RIGHTS 0x0010000000000000ULL #define ARG_NONE 0x0000000000000000ULL #define ARG_ALL 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL |