diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/fs/procfs/procfs.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/fs/procfs/procfs_mem.c | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/fs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c | 11 |
3 files changed, 9 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/sys/fs/procfs/procfs.h b/sys/fs/procfs/procfs.h index 1c8e5e1..1882be6 100644 --- a/sys/fs/procfs/procfs.h +++ b/sys/fs/procfs/procfs.h @@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ struct pfsnode { ((cnp)->cn_namelen == (len) && \ (bcmp((s), (cnp)->cn_nameptr, (len)) == 0)) -#define KMEM_GROUP 2 - #define PROCFS_FILENO(pid, type) \ (((type) < Pproc) ? \ ((type) + 2) : \ diff --git a/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_mem.c b/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_mem.c index dcba9b0..29773a0 100644 --- a/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_mem.c +++ b/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_mem.c @@ -247,26 +247,14 @@ procfs_domem(curp, p, pfs, uio) struct pfsnode *pfs; struct uio *uio; { + int error; if (uio->uio_resid == 0) return (0); - /* - * XXX - * We need to check for KMEM_GROUP because ps is sgid kmem; - * not allowing it here causes ps to not work properly. Arguably, - * this is a bug with what ps does. We only need to do this - * for Pmem nodes, and only if it's reading. This is still not - * good, as it may still be possible to grab illicit data if - * a process somehow gets to be KMEM_GROUP. Note that this also - * means that KMEM_GROUP can't change without editing procfs.h! - * All in all, quite yucky. - */ - - if (p_candebug(curp, p) && - !(uio->uio_rw == UIO_READ && - procfs_kmemaccess(curp))) - return EPERM; + error = p_candebug(curp, p); + if (error) + return (error); return (procfs_rwmem(curp, p, uio)); } @@ -303,21 +291,3 @@ procfs_findtextvp(p) return (p->p_textvp); } - -int procfs_kmemaccess(curp) - struct proc *curp; -{ - int i; - struct ucred *cred; - - cred = curp->p_ucred; - if (suser(curp)) - return 1; - - /* XXX: Why isn't this done with file-perms ??? */ - for (i = 0; i < cred->cr_ngroups; i++) - if (cred->cr_groups[i] == KMEM_GROUP) - return 1; - - return 0; -} diff --git a/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c b/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c index bc280c78..9efe6d66 100644 --- a/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c +++ b/sys/fs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c @@ -157,10 +157,9 @@ procfs_open(ap) } p1 = ap->a_p; - if (p_candebug(p1, p2) && - !procfs_kmemaccess(p1)) { - error = EPERM; - } + error = p_candebug(p1, p2); + if (error) + return (error); if (ap->a_mode & FWRITE) pfs->pfs_flags = ap->a_mode & (FWRITE|O_EXCL); @@ -456,7 +455,6 @@ procfs_getattr(ap) ((VREAD|VWRITE)>>6)); break; case Pmem: - /* Retain group kmem readablity. */ PROC_LOCK(procp); if (procp->p_flag & P_SUGID) vap->va_mode &= ~(VREAD|VWRITE); @@ -528,6 +526,8 @@ procfs_getattr(ap) * If we denied owner access earlier, then we have to * change the owner to root - otherwise 'ps' and friends * will break even though they are setgid kmem. *SIGH* + * XXX: ps and friends are no longer setgid kmem, why + * is this needed? */ PROC_LOCK(procp); if (procp->p_flag & P_SUGID) @@ -535,7 +535,6 @@ procfs_getattr(ap) else vap->va_uid = procp->p_ucred->cr_uid; PROC_UNLOCK(procp); - vap->va_gid = KMEM_GROUP; break; case Pregs: |
