diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c | 498 |
1 files changed, 269 insertions, 229 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c index 7439b5a..fd59a6b 100644 --- a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c +++ b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static double clock_combine P((struct peer **, int)); static void peer_xmit P((struct peer *)); static void fast_xmit P((struct recvbuf *, int, u_long)); static void clock_update P((void)); +int default_get_precision P((void)); #ifdef MD5 static void make_keylist P((struct peer *)); #endif /* MD5 */ @@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ transmit( peer->valid++; if (oreach & 0x80) peer->valid--; - if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && - peer->valid > NTP_SHIFT / 2 && (peer->reach & 0x80) && + if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->valid > + NTP_SHIFT / 2 && (peer->reach & 0x80) && peer->status < CTL_PST_SEL_SYNCCAND) peer->reach = 0; peer->reach <<= 1; @@ -261,8 +262,8 @@ receive( if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_PRIVATE) { if (restrict_mask & RES_NOQUERY) return; - process_private(rbufp, ((restrict_mask & RES_NOMODIFY) == - 0)); + process_private(rbufp, ((restrict_mask & + RES_NOMODIFY) == 0)); return; } if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_CONTROL) { @@ -291,17 +292,18 @@ receive( /* * If we are not a broadcast client, ignore broadcast packets. */ - if ((PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST && !sys_bclient)) + if ((PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST && + !sys_bclient)) return; /* * This is really awful ugly. We figure out whether an extension * field is present and then measure the MAC size. If the number * of words following the packet header is less than or equal to - * 5, no extension field is present and these words constitute the - * MAC. If the number of words is greater than 5, an extension - * field is present and the first word contains the length of - * the extension field and the MAC follows that. + * 5, no extension field is present and these words constitute + * the MAC. If the number of words is greater than 5, an + * extension field is present and the first word contains the + * length of the extension field and the MAC follows that. */ has_mac = 0; /* pkeyid = 0; */ @@ -323,7 +325,8 @@ receive( * MAC itself. */ /* pkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid2) & 0xffffffff; */ - skeyid = tkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid3) & 0xffffffff; + skeyid = tkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid3) & + 0xffffffff; } /* @@ -366,11 +369,12 @@ receive( /* * For multicast mode, generate the session key - * and install in the key cache. For client mode, - * generate the session key for the unicast - * address. For server mode, the session key should - * already be in the key cache, since it was - * generated when the last request was sent. + * and install in the key cache. For client + * mode, generate the session key for the + * unicast address. For server mode, the session + * key should already be in the key cache, since + * it was generated when the last request was + * sent. */ if (hismode == MODE_BROADCAST) { tkeyid = session_key( @@ -391,7 +395,8 @@ receive( * Compute the cryptosum. Note a clogging attack may * succceed in bloating the key cache. */ - if (authdecrypt(skeyid, (u_int32 *)pkt, authlen, has_mac)) + if (authdecrypt(skeyid, (u_int32 *)pkt, authlen, + has_mac)) is_authentic = 1; else sys_badauth++; @@ -411,137 +416,148 @@ receive( peer = findpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, rbufp->fd, hismode, &retcode); /* - * The new association matching rules are driven by a table specified - * in ntp.h. We have replaced the *default* behaviour of replying - * to bogus packets in server mode in this version. - * A packet must now match an association in order to be processed. - * In the event that no association exists, then an association is - * mobilized if need be. Two different associations can be mobilized - * a) passive associations - * b) client associations due to broadcasts or manycasts. + * The new association matching rules are driven by a table + * specified in ntp.h. We have replaced the *default* behaviour + * of replying to bogus packets in server mode in this version. + * A packet must now match an association in order to be + * processed. In the event that no association exists, then an + * association is mobilized if need be. Two different + * associations can be mobilized a) passive associations b) + * client associations due to broadcasts or manycasts. */ is_error = 0; switch (retcode) { case AM_FXMIT: - /* - * If the client is configured purely as a broadcast client and - * not as an manycast server, it has no business being a server. - * Simply go home. Otherwise, send a MODE_SERVER response and go - * home. Note that we don't do a authentication check here, - * since we can't set the system clock; but, we do set the - * key ID to zero to tell the caller about this. - */ - if (!sys_bclient || sys_manycastserver) { - if (is_authentic) - fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid); - else - fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0); - } - - /* - * We can't get here if an association is mobilized, so just - * toss the key, if appropriate. - */ - if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) - authtrust(skeyid, 0); - return; + + /* + * If the client is configured purely as a broadcast + * client and not as an manycast server, it has no + * business being a server. Simply go home. Otherwise, + * send a MODE_SERVER response and go home. Note that we + * don't do a authentication check here, since we can't + * set the system clock; but, we do set the key ID to + * zero to tell the caller about this. + */ + if (!sys_bclient || sys_manycastserver) { + if (is_authentic) + fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid); + else + fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0); + } + + /* + * We can't get here if an association is mobilized, so + * just toss the key, if appropriate. + */ + if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) + authtrust(skeyid, 0); + return; case AM_MANYCAST: - /* - * This could be in response to a multicast packet sent by - * the "manycast" mode association. Find peer based on the - * originate timestamp in the packet. Note that we don't - * mobilize a new association, unless the packet is properly - * authenticated. The response must be properly authenticated - * and it's darn funny of the manycaster isn't around now. - */ - if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) { - is_error = 1; - break; - } - peer2 = (struct peer *)findmanycastpeer(&pkt->org); - if (peer2 == 0) { - is_error = 1; - break; - } - - /* - * Create a new association and copy the peer variables to it. - * If something goes wrong, carefully pry the new association - * away and return its marbles to the candy store. - */ - peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, - rbufp->dstadr, MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode), - NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid); - if (peer == 0) { - is_error = 1; - break; - } - peer_config_manycast(peer2, peer); - break; + + /* + * This could be in response to a multicast packet sent + * by the "manycast" mode association. Find peer based + * on the originate timestamp in the packet. Note that + * we don't mobilize a new association, unless the + * packet is properly authenticated. The response must + * be properly authenticated and it's darn funny of the + * manycaster isn't around now. + */ + if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) { + is_error = 1; + break; + } + peer2 = (struct peer *)findmanycastpeer(&pkt->org); + if (peer2 == 0) { + is_error = 1; + break; + } + + /* + * Create a new association and copy the peer variables + * to it. If something goes wrong, carefully pry the new + * association away and return its marbles to the candy + * store. + */ + peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, + MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode), + NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid); + if (peer == 0) { + is_error = 1; + break; + } + peer_config_manycast(peer2, peer); + break; case AM_ERR: - /* - * Something bad happened. Dirty floor will be mopped by the - * code at the end of this adventure. - */ - is_error = 1; - break; + + /* + * Something bad happened. Dirty floor will be mopped by + * the code at the end of this adventure. + */ + is_error = 1; + break; case AM_NEWPASS: - /* - * Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him some - * memory. But, don't do that unless the packet is properly - * authenticated. - */ - if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) { - is_error = 1; - break; - } - peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, - rbufp->dstadr, MODE_PASSIVE, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode), - NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid); - break; + + /* + * Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him + * some memory. But, don't do that unless the packet is + * properly authenticated. + */ + if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) { + is_error = 1; + break; + } + peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, + MODE_PASSIVE, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode), + NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid); + break; case AM_NEWBCL: - /* - * Broadcast client being set up now. Do this only if the - * packet is properly authenticated. - */ - if ((restrict_mask & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient || - (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) { - is_error = 1; - break; - } - peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, - rbufp->dstadr, MODE_MCLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode), - NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid); - if (peer == 0) - break; - peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2 | FLAG_BURST; - peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT; - break; + + /* + * Broadcast client being set up now. Do this only if + * the packet is properly authenticated. + */ + if ((restrict_mask & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient || + (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) { + is_error = 1; + break; + } + peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, + MODE_MCLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode), + NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid); + if (peer == 0) + break; + peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2 | FLAG_BURST; + peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT; + break; case AM_POSSBCL: case AM_PROCPKT: - /* - * It seems like it is okay to process the packet now - */ - break; + + /* + * It seems like it is okay to process the packet now + */ + break; default: - /* - * shouldn't be getting here, but simply return anyway! - */ - is_error = 1; + + /* + * shouldn't be getting here, but simply return anyway! + */ + is_error = 1; } if (is_error) { /* - * Error stub. If we get here, something broke. We scuttle - * the autokey if necessary and sink the ship. This can - * occur only upon mobilization, so we can throw the - * structure away without fear of breaking anything. + * Error stub. If we get here, something broke. We + * scuttle the autokey if necessary and sink the ship. + * This can occur only upon mobilization, so we can + * throw the structure away without fear of breaking + * anything. */ if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) authtrust(skeyid, 0); @@ -550,8 +566,8 @@ receive( unpeer(peer); #ifdef DEBUG if (debug) - printf("match error code %d assoc %d\n", retcode, - peer_associations); + printf("match error code %d assoc %d\n", + retcode, peer_associations); #endif return; } @@ -574,22 +590,23 @@ receive( /* * Determine if this guy is basically trustable. If not, flush - * the bugger. If this is the first packet that is authenticated, - * flush the clock filter. This is to foil clogging attacks that - * might starve the poor dear. + * the bugger. If this is the first packet that is + * authenticated, flush the clock filter. This is to foil + * clogging attacks that might starve the poor dear. */ peer->flash = 0; if (is_authentic) peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENTIC; else peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENTIC; - if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST && (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST)) + if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST && (restrict_mask & + RES_DONTTRUST)) peer->flash |= TEST10; /* access denied */ if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE) { if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENTIC)) - peer->flash |= TEST5; /* authentication failed */ + peer->flash |= TEST5; /* auth failed */ else if (skeyid == 0) - peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not authenticated */ + peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not auth */ else if (!(oflags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE)) { peer_clear(peer); report_event(EVNT_PEERAUTH, peer); @@ -598,10 +615,10 @@ receive( if ((peer->flash & ~(u_int)TEST9) != 0) { /* - * The packet is bogus, so we throw it away before becoming - * a denial-of-service hazard. We don't throw the current - * association away if it is configured or if it has prior - * reachable friends. + * The packet is bogus, so we throw it away before + * becoming a denial-of-service hazard. We don't throw + * the current association away if it is configured or + * if it has prior reachable friends. */ if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) authtrust(skeyid, 0); @@ -619,8 +636,8 @@ receive( #ifdef MD5 /* * The autokey dance. The cha-cha requires that the hash of the - * current session key matches the previous key identifier. Heaps - * of trouble if the steps falter. + * current session key matches the previous key identifier. + * Heaps of trouble if the steps falter. */ if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) { int i; @@ -635,7 +652,8 @@ receive( } else if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) { if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0); - for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; + i++) { tkeyid = session_key( ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr), ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr), @@ -644,7 +662,8 @@ receive( } else { if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0); - for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; + i++) { tkeyid = session_key( ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr), ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr), @@ -660,9 +679,10 @@ receive( #endif /* MD5 */ /* - * Gawdz, it's come to this. Process the dang packet. If something - * breaks and the association doesn't deserve to live, toss it. - * Be careful in active mode and return a packet anyway. + * Gawdz, it's come to this. Process the dang packet. If + * something breaks and the association doesn't deserve to live, + * toss it. Be careful in active mode and return a packet + * anyway. */ process_packet(peer, pkt, &(rbufp->recv_time)); if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->reach == 0) { @@ -812,15 +832,15 @@ process_packet( p_disp = CLOCK_PHI * (peer->rec.l_ui - p_org.l_ui); /* - * If running in a broadcast association, the clock offset is (t1 - * - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't measure - * that directly; therefore, we start up in client/server mode, - * calculate the clock offset, using the engineered refinement - * algorithms, while also receiving broadcasts. When a broadcast - * is received in client/server mode, we calculate a correction - * factor to use after switching back to broadcast mode. We know - * NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which accounts for the simplified ei - * calculation. + * If running in a broadcast association, the clock offset is + * (t1 - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't + * measure that directly; therefore, we start up in + * client/server mode, calculate the clock offset, using the + * engineered refinement algorithms, while also receiving + * broadcasts. When a broadcast is received in client/server + * mode, we calculate a correction factor to use after switching + * back to broadcast mode. We know NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which + * accounts for the simplified ei calculation. * * If FLAG_MCAST2 is set, we are a broadcast/multicast client. * If FLAG_MCAST1 is set, we haven't calculated the propagation @@ -870,7 +890,8 @@ process_packet( clock_filter(peer, p_offset, p_del, fabs(p_disp)); clock_select(); record_peer_stats(&peer->srcadr, ctlpeerstatus(peer), - peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp, SQRT(peer->variance)); + peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp, + SQRT(peer->variance)); return(1); } @@ -943,7 +964,8 @@ clock_update(void) else sys_refid = sys_peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr; sys_reftime = sys_peer->rec; - sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay + fabs(sys_peer->delay); + sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay + + fabs(sys_peer->delay); sys_leap = leap_consensus; } if (oleap != sys_leap) @@ -994,14 +1016,15 @@ poll_update( else peer->nextdate += RANDPOLL(BURST_INTERVAL1); } else { - update = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll), peer->minpoll); + update = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll), + peer->minpoll); peer->nextdate = peer->outdate + RANDPOLL(update); } #ifdef DEBUG if (debug > 1) printf("poll_update: at %lu %s poll %d burst %d last %lu next %lu\n", - current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), hpoll, peer->burst, - peer->outdate, peer->nextdate); + current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), hpoll, + peer->burst, peer->outdate, peer->nextdate); #endif } @@ -1081,7 +1104,8 @@ clock_filter( */ peer->filter_offset[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_offset; peer->filter_delay[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_delay; - x = LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) + sample_disp; + x = LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) + + sample_disp; peer->filter_disp[peer->filter_nextpt] = min(x, MAXDISPERSE); peer->filter_epoch[peer->filter_nextpt] = current_time; distance[0] = min(x + fabs(sample_delay) / 2, MAXDISTANCE); @@ -1117,7 +1141,8 @@ clock_filter( x = NTP_FWEIGHT * (x + peer->filter_disp[ord[i]]); if (i < n) { z += 1. / distance[i]; - off += peer->filter_offset[ord[i]] / distance[i]; + off += peer->filter_offset[ord[i]] / + distance[i]; y += DIFF(peer->filter_offset[ord[i]], peer->filter_offset[ord[0]]); } @@ -1241,7 +1266,7 @@ clock_select(void) peer->flags &= ~FLAG_SYSPEER; peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_REJECT; if (peer->flags & FLAG_NOSELECT) - continue; /* noselect (survey only) */ + continue; /* noselect (survey) */ if (peer->reach == 0) continue; /* unreachable */ if (peer->stratum > 1 && peer->refid == @@ -1250,7 +1275,7 @@ clock_select(void) if (root_distance(peer) >= MAXDISTANCE + 2 * CLOCK_PHI * ULOGTOD(sys_poll)) { peer->seldisptoolarge++; - continue; /* too noisy or broken */ + continue; /* noisy or broken */ } /* @@ -1323,7 +1348,7 @@ clock_select(void) if (debug > 1) for (i = 0; i < nl3; i++) printf("select: endpoint %2d %.6f\n", - endpoint[index[i]].type, endpoint[index[i]].val); + endpoint[index[i]].type, endpoint[index[i]].val); #endif i = 0; j = nl3 - 1; @@ -1369,9 +1394,10 @@ clock_select(void) } else { if (sys_peer != 0) { report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG, - (struct peer *)0); + (struct peer *)0); NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS) - msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronisation lost"); + msyslog(LOG_INFO, + "synchronisation lost"); } sys_peer = 0; return; @@ -1418,7 +1444,7 @@ clock_select(void) if (debug > 1) for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) printf("select: %s distance %.6f\n", - ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), synch[i]); + ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), synch[i]); #endif /* @@ -1508,7 +1534,8 @@ clock_select(void) typesystem = peer_list[i]; if (peer_list[i]->flags & FLAG_PREFER) { typeprefer = peer_list[i]; - if (fabs(typeprefer->offset) < clock_max) + if (fabs(typeprefer->offset) < + clock_max) pps_update = 1; } } else { @@ -1521,24 +1548,26 @@ clock_select(void) * Mitigation rules of the game. There are several types of * peers that make a difference here: (1) prefer local peers * (type REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK with FLAG_PREFER) or prefer modem - * peers (type REFCLK_NIST_ATOM etc with FLAG_PREFER), (2) pps peers - * (type REFCLK_ATOM_PPS), (3) remaining prefer peers (flag - * FLAG_PREFER), (4) the existing system peer, if any, (5) the - * head of the survivor list. Note that only one peer can be + * peers (type REFCLK_NIST_ATOM etc with FLAG_PREFER), (2) pps + * peers (type REFCLK_ATOM_PPS), (3) remaining prefer peers + * (flag FLAG_PREFER), (4) the existing system peer, if any, (5) + * the head of the survivor list. Note that only one peer can be * declared prefer. The order of preference is in the order * stated. Note that all of these must be at the lowest stratum, * i.e., the stratum of the head of the survivor list. */ osys_peer = sys_peer; - if (typeprefer && (typeprefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK || - typeprefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE || !typepps)) { + if (typeprefer && (typeprefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK + || typeprefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE || + !typepps)) { sys_peer = typeprefer; sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYSPEER; sys_offset = sys_peer->offset; sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance; #ifdef DEBUG if (debug > 1) - printf("select: prefer offset %.6f\n", sys_offset); + printf("select: prefer offset %.6f\n", + sys_offset); #endif } else if (typepps && pps_update) { sys_peer = typepps; @@ -1652,15 +1681,18 @@ peer_xmit( if (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY) { /* - * In SKEY mode, allocate and initialize a key list if - * not already done. Then, use the list in inverse - * order, discarding keys once used. Keep the latest - * key around until the next one, so clients can use - * client/server packets to compute propagation delay. - * Note we have to wait until the receive side of the - * socket is bound and the server address confirmed. + * In autokey mode, allocate and initialize a + * key list if not already done. Then, use the + * list in inverse order, discarding keys once + * used. Keep the latest key around until the + * next one, so clients can use client/server + * packets to compute propagation delay. Note we + * have to wait until the receive side of the + * socket is bound and the server address + * confirmed. */ - if (ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0 && + if (ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) == + 0 && ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0) peer->keyid = 0; else { @@ -1688,13 +1720,13 @@ peer_xmit( get_systime(&peer->xmt); L_ADD(&peer->xmt, &sys_authdelay); HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt); - sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen); + sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, + sendlen); get_systime(&xmt_tx); sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, find_rtt ? any_interface : - peer->dstadr, - ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ? - ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : peer->ttl) : -7, - &xpkt, sendlen); + peer->dstadr, ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && + !find_rtt) ? ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : + peer->ttl) : -7, &xpkt, sendlen); /* * Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over @@ -1712,9 +1744,9 @@ peer_xmit( #ifdef DEBUG if (debug) printf( - "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx index %d\n", - current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), - peer->hmode, xkeyid, peer->keynumber); + "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx index %d\n", + current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), + peer->hmode, xkeyid, peer->keynumber); #endif } else { /* @@ -1723,10 +1755,9 @@ peer_xmit( get_systime(&(peer->xmt)); HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt); sendpkt(&(peer->srcadr), find_rtt ? any_interface : - peer->dstadr, - ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ? - ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : peer->ttl) : -8, - &xpkt, sendlen); + peer->dstadr, ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && + !find_rtt) ? ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : + peer->ttl) : -8, &xpkt, sendlen); peer->sent++; #ifdef DEBUG if (debug) @@ -1785,10 +1816,11 @@ fast_xmit( get_systime(&xmt_ts); L_ADD(&xmt_ts, &sys_authdelay); HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt); - sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen); + sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, + sendlen); get_systime(&xmt_tx); sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -9, &xpkt, - sendlen); + sendlen); /* * Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over @@ -1805,9 +1837,9 @@ fast_xmit( #ifdef DEBUG if (debug) printf( - "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx\n", - current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), - xmode, xkeyid); + "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx\n", + current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), + xmode, xkeyid); #endif } else { @@ -1870,15 +1902,14 @@ make_keylist( peer->keylist[i] = keyid; peer->keynumber = i; keyid = session_key( - ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr), - (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST || (peer->flags & - FLAG_MCAST2)) ? - ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr): - ntohl(peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr), - keyid, ltemp); + ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr), + (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST || (peer->flags & + FLAG_MCAST2)) ? + ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr): + ntohl(peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr), keyid, ltemp); ltemp -= 1 << peer->hpoll; if (auth_havekey(keyid) || keyid <= NTP_MAXKEY || - ltemp <= (1 << (peer->hpoll + 1))) + ltemp <= (1 << (peer->hpoll + 1))) break; } } @@ -1933,17 +1964,15 @@ default_get_precision(void) * which drives our timekeeping */ j = sizeof freq; - i = sysctlbyname("kern.timecounter.frequency", - &freq, &j , 0, 0); + i = sysctlbyname("kern.timecounter.frequency", &freq, &j , 0, + 0); if (i) - i = sysctlbyname("machdep.tsc_freq", - &freq, &j , 0, 0); + i = sysctlbyname("machdep.tsc_freq", &freq, &j , 0, 0); if (i) - i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i586_freq", - &freq, &j , 0, 0); + i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i586_freq", &freq, &j , 0, 0); if (i) - i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i8254_freq", - &freq, &j , 0, 0); + i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i8254_freq", &freq, &j , 0, + 0); if (!i) { for (i = 1; freq ; i--) freq >>= 1; @@ -1979,7 +2008,7 @@ default_get_precision(void) val = diff; } } - NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO) /* conditional if clause for conditional syslog */ + NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO) msyslog(LOG_INFO, "precision = %ld usec", val); if (usec >= HUSECS) val = MINSTEP; /* val <= MINSTEP; fast machine */ @@ -2044,9 +2073,9 @@ init_proto(void) * Some system clocks should only be adjusted in 10ms increments. */ #if defined RELIANTUNIX_CLOCK - systime_10ms_ticks = 1; /* Reliant UNIX */ + systime_10ms_ticks = 1; /* Reliant UNIX */ #elif defined SCO5_CLOCK - if (sys_precision >= (s_char)-10) /* pre- SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 */ + if (sys_precision >= (s_char)-10) /* pre-SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 */ systime_10ms_ticks = 1; #endif if (systime_10ms_ticks) @@ -2068,21 +2097,24 @@ proto_config( * Figure out what he wants to change, then do it */ switch (item) { - case PROTO_KERNEL: + case PROTO_KERNEL: + /* * Turn on/off kernel discipline */ kern_enable = (int)value; break; - case PROTO_NTP: + case PROTO_NTP: + /* * Turn on/off clock discipline */ ntp_enable = (int)value; break; - case PROTO_MONITOR: + case PROTO_MONITOR: + /* * Turn on/off monitoring */ @@ -2092,14 +2124,16 @@ proto_config( mon_stop(MON_ON); break; - case PROTO_FILEGEN: + case PROTO_FILEGEN: + /* * Turn on/off statistics */ stats_control = (int)value; break; - case PROTO_BROADCLIENT: + case PROTO_BROADCLIENT: + /* * Turn on/off facility to listen to broadcasts */ @@ -2110,39 +2144,45 @@ proto_config( io_unsetbclient(); break; - case PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD: + case PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD: + /* * Add muliticast group address */ io_multicast_add(value); break; - case PROTO_MULTICAST_DEL: + case PROTO_MULTICAST_DEL: + /* * Delete multicast group address */ io_multicast_del(value); break; - case PROTO_BROADDELAY: + case PROTO_BROADDELAY: + /* * Set default broadcast delay */ sys_bdelay = dvalue; break; - case PROTO_AUTHENTICATE: + case PROTO_AUTHENTICATE: + /* * Specify the use of authenticated data */ sys_authenticate = (int)value; break; - default: + default: + /* * Log this error */ - msyslog(LOG_ERR, "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld", + msyslog(LOG_ERR, + "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld", item, value); break; } |
