Fix a couple of typos.

Safe for 2.2.

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/usr.sbin/rndcontrol/random.4 b/usr.sbin/rndcontrol/random.4
index 1545133..d814a19 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/rndcontrol/random.4
+++ b/usr.sbin/rndcontrol/random.4
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 .\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 .\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $Id: random.4,v 1.1.1.1 1995/10/28 17:04:25 markm Exp $
+.\" $Id: random.4,v 1.2 1996/08/23 00:56:35 mpp Exp $
 .\"
 .Dd October 21, 1995
 .Dt RANDOM 4 i386
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ This device gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
 and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
 Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
 for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
-desireable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
+desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
 predict by an attacker.
 .Ss Theory of operation
 Computers are very predictable devices.  Hence it is extremely hard
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the MD5
 hash of a counter plus the contents of the "entropy pool".  The
 reason for the MD5 hash is so that we can avoid exposing the
 internal state of random number generator.  Although the MD5 hash
-does protect the pool, as each random byte which is generated from
+does protect the pool, each random byte which is generated from
 the pool reveals some information which was derived from the
-internal state, and thus increasing the amount of information an
+internal state, and thus increases the amount of information an
 outside attacker has available to try to make some guesses about
 the random number generator's internal state.  For this reason,
 the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many bits of
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool".
 The second function uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
 inputs to the entropy pool.  Note that not all interrupts are good
 sources of randomness!  For example, the timer interrupts is not a
-good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is to
+good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
 regular, and hence predictable to an attacker.  Disk interrupts are
 a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
 unpredictable.  The routines try to estimate how many bits of